FEBRUARY 2018

ISSUE NO. 229

The Quad in the Indo-Pacific:

Why ASEAN Remains Cautious
PREMESHA SAHA

ABSTRACT As India, Japan, Australia and the United States renew their quadrilateral
cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, there are suggestions to expand the ‘Quad’ into a
‘Quad-plus’ grouping to include the countries of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN). This brief argues that the Quad will not have much to offer to ASEAN;
it has, in fact, the potential to dilute ASEAN centrality which is the pillar of the regional
bloc. India, too, has a stake in this conversation, as it has long championed the need for
‘ASEAN centrality and unity’ for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2017, officials from India, Japan, the centrality of Southeast Asia in the Indo-
Australia, and the United States (US) met on Pacific geography, the Quad should be
the sidelines of the ASEAN and East Asia expanded to a ‘Quad-plus’ mechanism by
Summit in Manila to begin the revival of their including the ASEAN countries in its fold.
quadrilateral cooperation that was put on hold Southeast Asia, overall, has been gaining more
for a decade. The ‘Quad’ has since then been attention in recent years owing to China’s
under scholarly scrutiny. Observers say that conduct in the South China Sea (SCS); this
the potential of the Quad and its sustainability region also forms the main arc in China’s Belt
are hinged on the response and support of the and Road Initiative (BRI). For India as well, the
partners around it. There have been Quad is seen as a platform for the promotion
discussions in policy-making circles that given of its ‘Act East’ policy which is the cornerstone

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

of India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific more overt role in the SCS dispute by external
region. At the core of 'Act East' is the ASEAN powers, the question of inclusion of the
region, and this importance was clearly shown ASEAN countries in the Quad will only
in the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit contribute to the deterioration of an ASEAN-
in January. centred institutional system in Asia.

This paper argues that there will be little Against this backdrop, and given that the
enthusiasm for the Quad in Southeast Asia, if Act East policy is gaining momentum, this
it is merely another extension of great-power brief scrutinises whether the Quad will indeed
rivalries occurring at the expense of the push India’s Act East policy. This will be done
interests of ASEAN. The region views existing by, first, outlining the aims of India’s Act East
multilateral mechanisms—including the East policy in relation to the ASEAN. The brief will
Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional then look into the Quad countries’ divergent
Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers notions of the “Indo-Pacific” concept, as well
Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), and the Indian as the perspectives of Southeast Asian
Ocean Rim Association (IORA)—as potential countries of the Indo-Pacific region, and
whether the “China factor” has a role in both.
platforms for dialogue with the countries of
The succeeding section will look at whether a
the Indo-Pacific region. The main aim of the
greater involvement of “outsider” countries,
Quad is to enable a regional security
especially India, is welcomed by the ASEAN in
architecture for the maintenance of a rules-
dealing with the SCS dispute. The brief will
based order. This is also the primary objective
then describe the Southeast Asian countries’
of the ARF, and even the ADMM and ADMM
perspectives on the BRI, and conclude with the
Plus are also looking into issues of concern in
Southeast Asian countries’ views on the
the political and security arenas. The ASEAN
Quad’s revival.
countries also understand the importance of
strengthening maritime cooperation to
WHY THE QUAD?
promote mutual trust and confidence to
ensure security, peace and stability. This In August 2007, in a speech before the Indian
includes ensuring freedom of navigation and Parliament, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
overflight, which falls within the mandate of Abe tried to draw a strategic link between the
the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and the Indian and the Pacific oceans and spoke of the
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). “confluence of the two seas”. This was
envisioned as the Japanese Indo-Pacific
What then will the Quad be able to offer to strategy. Abe had then posited that “Japan
the ASEAN region? India is repeatedly and India had a shared responsibility, as
championing the need of ‘ASEAN centrality maritime nations located at the opposite
and unity’ for peace and prosperity in the edges of the two seas, to ensure the
Indo-Pacific and maintaining this centrality maintenance of peace and prosperity
also forms the core of the country’s Act East anchored by democratic principles.”
1

policy. Given the already existing divide

within the ASEAN on issues such as the The first Quadrilateral meeting involving
conception of the “Indo-Pacific”, the need for a the US, Japan, India and Australia was held on

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum After the first Quadrilateral meeting,
meeting in the Philippines in May 2007. The however, no formal agenda was released nor a
first Quad also had a maritime element, date set for the next meeting. The differing
whereby the four countries along with expectations of the four countries and a fear of
Singapore conducted a naval exercise. The irking Chinese sentiments had led to
first Quad meeting was described as a US disagreements at the end of the meeting.
project, “an axis of democracies”, a “security Though there was still some appetite for the
diamond” or a way to contain China. Days Quad left, as was seen with the 2007 visit of
after the first Quad meeting, China demanded Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to India and his
that the participating countries explain its mention of the ‘confluence of the two seas’ in
purpose. This was one of the prime reasons for the Indian Parliament. Most importantly, the
the non-sustainability of the first Quad.2 maritime Quad involving Singapore took place
in September 2007. In 2007, two editions of
The push for the first Quadrilateral came Malabar was held—one bilateral off the coast
after the Tsunami Core Group in 2004-05, of Okinawa which saw Japan’s participation
which was a coordinated response to the for the first time, and a multilateral one in the
tsunami of 2004. This was followed by the Bay of Bengal.
4

concept of “concert of democracies” finding a

place in the US policy circles. PM Abe also Cracks had begun to appear as early as July
desired a closer cooperation with India and with the visit of the then Australian Defence
Australia and a value-based foreign policy. In Minister Brendan Nelson to China. With
December 2006, the then Indian Prime Australia’s faltering steps, Abe’s resignation in
Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan and 2007 and with then Indian Prime Minister
the two sides acknowledged the need for a Manmohan Singh getting caught in
dialogue between India, Japan and other like- contestations due to the maritime exercises
minded countries to discuss issues of common conducted from his alliance partners, the first
interest in the Asia-Pacific region. There were Quad failed.5
also reports that then US vice president-elect,
Dick Cheney, despite some hesitation had A Japanese scholar notes that there are
endorsed the idea of a quadrilateral dialogue in two major factors for the current efforts to
addition to the already existing Trilateral revive the Quad. First, even though China was
Strategic Dialogue involving Japan, US and already on the rise in 2007, most were
Australia. There were other important optimistic of such growth and the country’s
meetings that preceded the 2007 assertive nature did not yet provoke as much
Quadrilateral meeting which paved the way concern as it does today. The US was also seen
for the first Quad: the visit of Dick Cheney to as trying to engage with China to ensure its
Australia in February 2007, the then rise as a “responsible stakeholder” in the
Australian Prime Minister Howard’s visit to international stage. India and Australia too
Tokyo, the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister were engaging with China and looking at its
to Japan, the then Japanese Foreign Minister rise from an economic viewpoint, rather than
Aso’s trip to India, and Prime Minister Abe’s a strategic one. These views have since
visit to Washington.3 changed, given the “aggressive assertion of its

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

sovereignty claims in the SCS and on disputed free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-
borders, its frequent use of economic coercion Pacific region serves the long-term interests of
and economic espionage, and its ‘predatory’ all countries in the region and of the world at
investments under the guise of the BRI.”6 12
large.” India is engaging with the four Quad
Second, there is greater concern from partners with the view of promoting its Act
Japan—given the decline of US influence in East policy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific—if Australia’s Indo-Pacific strategy, meanwhile is
the US will be playing a leading role in ensuring a “shared vision for increased prosperity and
a peaceful order in the region. In Japan’s security in the Indo-Pacific region and to work
opinion, the presence of the US and engaging together to ensure it remains free and open.”
13

the US in the Indo-Pacific region will help keep Australia’s recently released Foreign Policy
a check on China’s rise. Therefore, Japan is White Paper also expresses its attempt to
trying to engage with like-minded countries engage with other partners, along with the US,
and ensure that the US continues its for a free, open and rules-based order in the
7
engagement in this region. Indian and the Pacific oceans. The US’ national
security strategy refers to China as a “strategic
The second Quad meeting took place in competitor in political, economic and military
Manila in November 2017 on the sidelines of spheres, and a ‘revisionist power’ seeking to
the ASEAN and EAS to discuss “issues of
“shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and
common interests in the Indo-Pacific region”.8
interests.”14 The shared vision for increased
According to the statement issued by India’s
prosperity and security in a free and open
MEA after the meeting, the discussions aimed
Indo-Pacific idea has also been added in the
at cooperation based on a shared vision and
national security strategy of the US.15
the desire for the “promotion of peace,
stability, and prosperity in an increasingly Further, the Japanese statement issued
inter-connected region that they share with after the Quad meeting in Manila highlighted
9
each other and with other partners.” The need the need for upholding a rules-based order,
for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” was the
respect for international law in the Indo-
theme around which the first working level
Pacific, tackling proliferation tests, ensuring
Quadrilateral meeting took place. The core
freedom of navigation and maritime security
issues that were addressed at the meeting were 16
in the Indo-Pacific, and countering terrorism.
the following: the need for a rules-based order
The Australian statement also stressed on the
in Asia; freedom of navigation and overflight
in the maritime commons; respect for same objectives and added a clause on
international law; boosting connectivity; increased connectivity in the region.17 The US
maritime security; the North Korean threat statement underlined the same themes as
and non-proliferation; and terrorism.10 those of Japan and Australia.18 The Indian
statement, meanwhile, highlighted most of
For Japan, the Indo-Pacific strategy is a the same clauses, but remained silent on
“free and open Indo-Pacific region for aspects of freedom of navigation and
‘international public goods’ and a maritime 19
overflight, and maritime security. Given that
order based on the rule of law.”11 For India, “a no joint statement or even a future plan of

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

action was issued at the end of the meeting, Even though India’s Act East policy has
the Quad appears to be a work in progress. been gaining momentum in the recent past,
there is still plenty of room to push the
Some analysts refer to the Quad as an country’s engagement with ASEAN. There is a
initiative which is aimed at “containing China need for India to “do a more convincing job as a
than about anything else. For most areas that beneficial strategic partner of the ASEAN.”25
the four countries see as the base for
According to a recent statement by secretary-
cooperation, China is seen as a major
East of the MEA, “All 10 ASEAN leaders want
competitor and rule breaker.”20 Official India to play a more assertive role in the
statements from China are also reflective of
strategically important Indo-Pacific while
the suspicion that this move might be directed
recognising New Delhi’s growing stature in
against a “third party”, given the “exclusion of
21
ensuring regional peace and stability.”26 Due to
relevant parties”* from such meetings.
India’s “not very overt presence” in the region,
many Southeast Asian countries are not even
INDIA’S ‘ACT EAST’ POLICY AND ASEAN
taking India’s Act East policy in a serious
Under the administration of Prime Minister manner. The name of the policy has once been
Modi, India’s ‘Look East’ policy was referred to as ‘At ease!’# by a scholar in
27
rechristened ‘Act East’—for “accelerated Thailand.
across the board engagement between the two
growth poles of a vibrant Asia.”22 India has If India chooses to actively participate in
been working with ASEAN for the creation of a the Quad, it will have to make sure that the
regional security architecture in the Indo- core focus and objectives of India’s Act East
Pacific region that will focus on the peaceful policy is not compromised. Therefore, there is
settlement of disputes, finding “collaborative” a need to understand the perspective of the
solutions to emerging traditional and non- ASEAN on the issues that the Quad purports
traditional security threats, and support for to address.
the centrality of ASEAN. 2 3 The Delhi
Declaration released after the ASEAN-India SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES’
Commemorative Summit in 2017 also stresses PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDO-PACIFIC
“India’s support for ASEAN centrality in the
evolving regional architecture and its The crises of the SCS and the Korean Peninsula
continued contribution to regional peace, demand that countries work together. This
security, and prosperity and to ASEAN makes it seem that in principle, the core issues
integration towards the realisation of the being addressed by the Quad will garner
24
ASEAN Community Vision 2025.” unqualified support from the ASEAN

* “The relevant proposals should be open and inclusive and should be conducive to win-win cooperation and avoid
politicizing or excluding the relevant parties,” – stated by Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang.
# As has been quoted by Arun Prakash in a recent article in the Indian Express, a panellist during the CSCAP (Council for
Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) held in Thailand had remarked that though India's Look East policy have been
elevated to an Act East policy, but “to us it seems that you are simply 'At ease'!”

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

countries. In reality, the probabilities of the ASEAN, Indonesia will continue to contribute
Quad being caught up in great-power politics in advancing a strong positive cooperation in
and rivalries in the region will deter the the Indo-Pacific, instead of a cooperation that
ASEAN countries from formally extending is based on suspicion or worse, a perception of
their support for the initiative. ASEAN has threat.”29 Its aim is to work with the countries
always been sensitive of being overshadowed of the region to develop an Indo-Pacific
by big powers. More importantly, ASEAN cooperation “based on a ‘building blocks’
member states are wary of the possibility that approach to ensure peace and stability amid
ASEAN centrality might get diluted. Some 30
geopolitical changes.” The Indonesian
scholars have also pointed out that a reason Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi in January
for some Southeast Asian nations not this year outlined the country’s foreign policy
welcoming the Indo-Pacific concept has been priorities for 2018 which talks about
the scepticism over including India within the strengthening the unity of the ASEAN and
strategic domain of the Asia Pacific. These seeking a stronger presence for the ASEAN in
critics say that this would lead to an excessive the Indo-Pacific region.
31

focus on India and dilution of focus on ASEAN

countries in maritime security discussions in Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hseing
28
platforms like the EAS and the ARF. Loong has said, “This geopolitical uncertainty
gives new impetus to ASEAN’s cooperation
The preferred way of engagement for the with key partners like India. ASEAN and India
ASEAN countries for the promotion of a free, share common interests in peace and security
open, inclusive Indo-Pacific adhering to in the region, and also an open, balanced and
international law and principles of inclusive regional architecture for the
multilateralism will be through the platform region.”32 While both countries may be
of existing institutions, most importantly the receptive of the “free and open Indo-Pacific”
ASEAN—this ensures that the centrality and idea proposed by the Quad, the priority is an
unity of the regional bloc is upheld. These inclusive and balanced cooperative framework
multilateral platforms include the EAS, which in the Indo-Pacific.
involves most of the countries of the Indo-
Pacific region and the evolution of which has It has been difficult to find a consensus
been the effort of middle powers like the amongst the ASEAN member states on
ASEAN countries and not initiated by big security-related issues, as they have varying
powers like China, US and India. There is also interests in ASEAN as an institution. They
the platform of the IORA. view the regional architecture differently, and
have their own stakes with the powers in the
Countries like Vietnam, Singapore, region. It will thus be difficult to find the bloc
Indonesia, and to some extent Thailand, are openly endorsing the Indo-Pacific conception
growing to embrace the Indo-Pacific concept, 33
as one, unified voice. The Southeast Asian
but there are also countries like Cambodia, the countries prefer an inclusive regional
Philippines, and Malaysia who have remained architecture, engaging as many regional
silent so far. For Indonesia, “together with stakeholders as possible. The premise of this

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engagement is two-pronged: 1) using ASEAN where India urged the ASEAN countries to
as a platform; and 2) engaging major and other “conclude a substantive and effective COC
middle powers bilaterally.34 consistent with universally recognised
principles of international law and the 1982
DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA United Nations Convention on the Law of the
35
Sea (UNCLOS) at the earliest opportunity.”
The issues in the South China Sea (SCS) are
critical, and from statements issued by some SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE BELT AND
of the individual countries in the region, it is ROAD INITIATIVE
inferred that a multi-stakeholder platform for
dealing with the issues may be welcome. Here The Quad arrangement and the free and open
again the divide within the ASEAN becomes Indo-Pacific are a kind of subtle competition
evident. Countries such as Vietnam and against China’s BRI initiative. This region,
Singapore, for example, would expect India to after all, remains an important pillar in
play an overt security role, and this is attested China’s BRI. The degree of support extended
to by the fact that Singapore and India have to China’s BRI by the ASEAN countries is also
conducted annual SIMBEX-series naval varied. Malaysia and Thailand, for example,
exercises, rotated in the SCS and the Indian are expected to serve as pivot countries in this
36
Ocean. This implies Singapore’s readiness to initiative. The BRI initiative has considerably
work alongside with India in the preservation more resources compared to the generic “free
of this access through the SCS in times of and open Indo-Pacific” idea. Malaysia would
crisis. Vietnam has openly called on India to incline more towards China to draw on the
engage more frequently in the SCS, through latter’s resources. Unless Japan musters
more regular visits by the Indian Navy and resources to build up this “free and open Indo-
Coast Guard to its ports, such as the Cam Ranh Pacific” idea, it is hard to make Malaysia lean
International Port. However, most other more towards the Quad initiative.37
ASEAN countries do not seek greater
involvement of India with regard to this issue. The Philippines and Indonesia, for their
It is difficult with respect to the ASEAN to get part, are more enthusiastic about the BRI and
an explicit statement supporting a more overt are cooperation partners in whom China sees
role for external players like India in resolving potential. However, it is hard for them to
of the dispute as it could mean the pursue a close relationship with China, owing
downplaying of ASEAN’s own importance in to the territorial and maritime disputes
Southeast Asia. between the Philippines and China. Indonesia,
on the other hand, is committed to becoming
Supporting the Code of Conduct (CoC) is a the leading nation of the ASEAN and tends to
safe bet if India wants to support ASEAN. limit the influence of other countries and is
India is already doing so, as was clear from the particularly sensitive to the rising influence of
statement of the 15th ASEAN-India Summit other big powers in the ASEAN.38 Therefore,
held in Manila in November 2017. It was also China’s investment is mainly aimed at
expressed in the recent Delhi Declaration, boosting Indonesia’s hinterland connectivity

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

rather than the ports which are the main focus The first and foremost priority for ASEAN
of Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum countries, notwithstanding their varying
(GMF) policy.
39
attitudes and national approaches, is to
ensure that the institution continues to lead in
Singapore also enjoys drawing the the shaping of a regional architecture. ASEAN
commercial benefits from China, but refrains member states would want to prevent the
from indulging in a special relationship with unravelling of the grouping.
China, especially on security issues. Though
The Quad, as it is currently formulated,
Singapore may not emerge as a primary might overshadow the influence of the ASEAN
partner in China’s BRI, it can be an important in the Indo-Pacific region for the sheer
partner in the economic and cultural fields. imbalance in these countries’ influence and
Cambodia is also highly supportive of China’s might. The division within the ASEAN is also
BRI, whereas Vietnam is more cautious in mostly due to the issues that the Quad is
indulging in friendly relations with China aiming to resolve like the SCS and the need for
given the SCS issue; it does not appear greater involvement of the big powers in
enthusiastic about the BRI.40 resolving these issues. The tough question for
ASEAN is this: Should it keep itself away from
such a platform knowing that most of the
CONCLUSION
issues being discussed have a direct bearing on
The Quad signals the commitment of big the Southeast Asian region? Or will the
powers to be present in the Indo-Pacific. question of being a part of the initiative cause
more friction within the grouping?
ASEAN has also focused its efforts on
enhancing regional connectivity and the For the Quad to attract more attention
importance of economic interdependence for from the ASEAN countries, there is a need to
regional stability and peace. Even if ASEAN present the Quad in a way that does not cause
42
welcomes this Indo-Pacific stance, it will further strategic disruptions in the region.
choose to remain cautious. If this Indo-Pacific Given that India has been a long-time
idea morphs into a form of great-power supporter of ASEAN centrality and ASEAN is
politics that is aimed at countering China’s the central pillar of the country’s Act East
increasing influence, then ASEAN would not policy, its engagement with the Quad may be
wholly support it. The Quad can be said to add seen as compromising that strategy. How
India will balance these contradictions
on to the Act East, in such manner as giving it a
remains to be seen, and whether making it a
strategic vision and clearer directions. ASEAN
‘Quad plus ASEAN’ will fulfil the expectations
or Southeast Asia cannot be said to be the
41
of the ASEAN, especially in maintaining its
focus of this policy. centrality in the region.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Premesha Saha is a Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.

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ENDNOTES

1． Yuki Tatsumi ,“Is Japan ready for the Quad? Opportunities and Challenges for Tokyo in a
Changing Indo-Pacific”, War on the Rocks, January 9, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/
01/japan-ready-quad-opportunities-challenges-tokyo-changing-indo-pacific/ (accessed
January 20, 2018)

2. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the Quad”, War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/ (accessed 15 February 2018)

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Tetsuo Kotani, “Can the Indo-Pacific compete with China”, Japan Times, January 10, 2018,
Commentary section, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/01/10/commentary/
japan-commentary/can-indo-pacific-compete-china/#.Wlo6OKiWZPb (accessed January 12,
2018)

7. Ibid.

8. Ministry of External Affairs press release (2017), “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on

Indo-Pacific”, Ministry of External Affairs, November 12, 2017, http://mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_IndoPacific_Manila_Nov
ember_12_2017 (accessed November 13, 2017)

9. Ibid.

10. Ankit Panda, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working –Level Quadrilateral Meeting on
Regional Cooperation”, The Diplomat, November 13, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/
2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-
cooperation/ (accessed November 13, 2017)

11. Anton Tsvetov, “ Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?”, The Diplomat, November
15, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/will-the-quad-mean-the-end-of-asean-
centrality/ (accessed November 16 2017)

12. Ministry of External Affairs press release , “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-

Pacific”, n.8.

13. Ankit Panda, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working –Level Quadrilateral Meeting on
Regional Cooperation”,n.10.

14. Tetsuo Kotani , “Can the Indo-Pacific compete with China”, n.6.

15. Ibid.

16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “ Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

Pacific”, November 12, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html

(accessed November 15, 2018)

17. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “ Australia- India-Japan-U.S.
Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”, November 12, 2017, http://dfat.gov.au/news/media/
Pages/aus-india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx (accessed November 15,
2018)

18. U.S. Department of State, “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific”,

November 12, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/11/275464.htm (accessed
November 15, 2018)

19. Ministry of External Affairs press release, “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-

Pacific”, n.8.

20. Anton Tsvetov , “ Will the Quad Mean the End of ASEAN Centrality?”,n.11.

21. K.J.M Verma, “China hopes Quad meet at ASEAN Summit not directed against it”, Livemint,
Novenmer 13, 2017, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/DFPYeUMtS6hvVbHKNgxzcJ/China-
hopes-Quad-meet-at-Asean-summit-not-directed-against-i.html (accessed 4 January 2018)

22. Ministry of External Affairs, “Act East: India's ASEAN Journey”, Ministry of External Affars
Public Diplomacy Section, November 10, 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?
24216/Act+East+Indias+ASEAN+Journey (accessed November 20, 2018)

23. Keynote Address on ASEAN-India Partnership by Smt. Sushma Swaraj, Hon'ble Minister of
External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, India, June 22, 2017, http://aic.ris.org.in/
sites/default/files/AIC-Newletter-Vol-3-No-1-Jan-Jun-2017.pdf (accessed 20 December 2017)

24. Ministry of External Affairs, “Delhi Declaration of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit to
mark the 25th Anniversary of ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations”, Media Center, January 25,
2018, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/29386/Delhi+Declaration+
of+the+ASEANIndia+Commemorative+Summit+to+mark+the+25th+Anniversary+of+ASEAN
India+Dialogue+Relations (accessed January 27, 2018)

25. Harsh V. Pant, “India's ambitious outreach”, Raisina Debates, January 24, 2018,
http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/india-ambitious-outreach/ (accessed 25 January
2018)

26. Times of India, “ASEAN leaders want India to play a more assertive role in the Indo-Pacific”,
January 26, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/asean-leaders-want-india-to-
play-more-assertive-role-in-indo-pacific/articleshow/62665958.cms (accessed 27 January
2018)

27. Arun Prakash, “A strategy for the sea”, The Indian Express, January 6, 2018,
http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/asean-cscap-security-look-east-indian-
navy-a-strategy-for-the-sea-5013281/ (accessed January 10, 2018)

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 The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious

28. Abhijit Singh, “India's 'Act East' must satisfy ASEAN expectations”, January 24, 2018,
http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/indias-act-east-must-satisfy-asean-expectations/
(accessed 30 January 2018)

29. Retno Marsudi, “Indonesia: Partner for peace, security, prosperity”, The Jakarta Post, January
11, 2018, http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/01/10/full-text-indonesia-
partner-for-peace-security-prosperity.html (accessed 12 January 2018)

30. Sheany, “Asean to Discuss Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture”, Jakarta Globe, February 7, 2018,
http://jakartaglobe.id/news/asean-discuss-indo-pacific-regional-architecture/ (accessed
February 8, 2018)

31. Sheany,” Indonesia Highlights Importance of developing Regional Policy Architecture in 2018”,
Jakarta Globe, January 10, 2018, http://www.jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-
highlights-importance-developing-regional-policy-architecture-2018/ (accessed 11 January
2018)

32. PMINDIA, “PM hails article by ASEAN Chair Singapore's PM, Mr. Lee Hsien Loong”, January 25,
2018, http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-hails-article-by-asean-chair-
singapores-pm-mr-lee-hsien-loong/ (accessed 27 January 2018)

33. Dr. Collin Coh Swee Lean and Evans Laksmana, e-mail message to author, December 14, 2017
and December 18, 2017.

34. Ibid.

35. ASEAN, “Chairman's Statement Of The 15th Asean-India Summit 14 November 2017, Manila,
Philippines”, December 1, 2017, http://asean.org/storage/2017/12/15th-ASEAN-India-
Summit-Chairmans-Statement-FINAL.pdf (accessed December 3, 2017)

36. Xue Li and Li Yongke, “ The Belt and Road Initiative and China's Southeast Asia Diplomacy”, The
Diplomat, November 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-belt-and-road-
initiative-and-chinas-southeast-asia-diplomacy/ (accessed 1 December 2017)

37. David Han Guo Xiong, email message to author, December 16, 2017.

38. Xue Li and Li Yongke, “The Belt and Road Initiative and China's Southeast Asia Diplomacy”,
n.36.

39. Interview with Dr. Siswo Pramono at a conference on “Indonesia and India Foreign Policy
Convergence and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific” organized by the Embassy of the Republic of
Indonesia and the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Nehru University held at the Committee Hall, Convention Centre, JNU on January 16 2018.

40. Xue Li and Li Yongke, “ The Belt and Road Initiative and China's Southeast Asia Diplomacy”,
n.36.

41. Dr. Collin Coh Swee Lean, e-mail message to author, December 14, 2017.

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42. Dino Patti Djalal, “Uncharted Water: In search for order in the Indo-Pacific”, (opinion presented
at the Raisina Dialogue, New Delhi, India, January 16-18, 2018)

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