Ideology Lecture Two The Main Ideologies: An Overview

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IDEOLOGY

 LECTURE  TWO  
 
The  main  ideologies:  an  overview  
 
Daryl  Glaser  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION:  MODERN  IDEOLOGIES  AND  THE  ‘MODERN’  
 
Which   are   the   main   ideologies   –   the   main   ‘isms’   –   that   have   dominated  
political  life?    
 
There   have   always   been   ideas   guiding   political   life.   But   the   ideas   that  
preoccupy   us   today   are   mostly   products   of   what   is   called   the   modern  
period  –  by  which  I  mean  the  period  beginning  roughly  with  the  American  and  
French   Revolutions   of   the   later   eighteenth   century   –   and   these   ‘modern’  
ideologies  will  be  our  main  focus.    
 
That   is   not   to   say   that   the   ‘pre’   or   ‘non’   modern   ideologies   have   disappeared  
from   the   scene.   They   still   make   appearance,   notably   under   the   rubric   of  
conservatism,   which   is   precisely   in   part   a   reaction   against   ‘modern’   ideologies.  
Religious   revivalism,   itself   a   kind   of   radical   conservatism,   falls   into   this   category,  
having   defied   the   modernist   expectation   of   inevitable   global   secularisation.   But  
we  should  beware,  because  much  of  what  is  presented  as  a  restoration  of  the  old  
and  true  is  actually  a  call  for  a  return  to  ideas  of  tradition  or  of  ‘old  ways’  that  are  
themselves   modern   inventions,   or   modern   re-­‐imaginings   of   the   past,   often  
reimagined  precisely  for  purposes  of  combat  with  (other?)  modern  ideologies.    
 
But   the   other   modern   ideologies   –   and   even   the   less   outrightly   reactionary  
brands   of   conservatism   –   mainly   involve   arguments   about   the   form   that   the  
modern   should   take.   And   the   modern,   for   its   part,   arises   at   precisely   the  
historical   moment   –   of   scientific   advance,   economic   change,   of   political  
revolution   –   where   earlier   taken-­‐for-­‐granted   ideologies   of   the   ‘pre’   or   ‘non’  
modern  are  thrown  into  question.  
 
Modern  political  ideologies  originate  in  Europe,  and  in  combat  with  an  old  
world   of   European   Christian   feudalism,   or   in   an   argument   about   what  
should   replace   it.   In   the   Christian   feudal   world,   a   monarch   ruled,   a   landed  
aristocracy  commanded  much  power,  the  different  social  orders  (the  aristocracy,  
clergy,   peasantry,   townsmen)   ‘knew   their   place’,   most   people   lived   in   the  
countryside,   and   the   church   supplied   people   with   their   understanding   of   the  
proper  divinely-­‐ordained  order  of  things.  (Again,  some  need  for  caution:  this  is  
an   ideal-­‐typical   or   ‘classical’   picture   of   feudalism   to   which   pre-­‐modern   Europe  
corresponded  only  to  varying  and  shifting  degrees.)  This  world  was  overturned,  
materially,   by   the   rise   of   new   technologies   and   classes   and   towns,   and  
ideationally  by  the  rise  of  new  ideas,  including  about  reason,  equality  and  social  

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mobility.   This   was   the   context   of   change   in   which   liberal   and   socialist   ideas  
began  to  take  form  and  compete  in  offering  alternatives.    
 
And   in   this   sense,   the   modern   ideologies   are   European.  The  combat  between  
the  modern  and  its  predecessor,  and  the  ideological  arguments  over  what  should  
replace   the   non-­‐modern   order,   begins   in   Europe.   But   soon   enough,   mainly  
thanks   to   colonialism   and   mercantile-­‐capitalist   globalization,   the   whole   world  
becomes  the  stage  for  this  same  struggle  between  the  old  and  new;  and  on  which  
the  modern  is  universalized  to  varying  degrees.  But  because  modernist  ferment  
originates  in  Europe,  and  because  the  modern  is  spread  coercively  from  Europe  
in   order   to   serve   Europe,   it   is   experienced   by   many   non-­‐Europeans   as   an  
oppressive  imposition.    
 
And  in  engaging  and  confronting  this  ‘Western’  imposition,  the  ideological  
and   political   leaders   of   the   South   and   East   faced   –   still   face   –   a   range   of  
options.  (a)  They  could  adopt  modern  ideologies,  and  their  egalitarian  promise  
that   European   colonialists   betrayed,   as   instruments   of   their   own   anti-­‐colonial  
liberation.   Liberalism   and   socialism   often   played   this   role   (in   Africa,   think   of  
Christian   liberalism   or   Marxism-­‐Leninism).   Movements   adopting   this   stance  
often   themselves   became   local   instruments   of   modernity,   now   supposedly  
pursued   in   the   interests   of   the   colonized.   (b)   They   could   ‘rediscover’   –   in   reality,  
reinvent  –  their  own  precolonial  traditions  as  sources  of  their  own  emancipation,  
but  in  a  modern  ideological  light.  Nyerere’s  ‘ujamaa’  –  African  socialism’  –  should  
perhaps  be  placed  in  this  context.  (c)  Or  they  could  engage  in  their  own  form  of  
conservative   reaction,   rejecting,   at   least   rhetorically,   modernity   as   such   as  
western.   Many   an   anticolonial   revolt   has   involved   an   attempt   to   preserve   or  
restore   older   orders,   usually   pretty   inegalitarian   older   orders.   Usually   such  
revolts   are   defensive   and   localized.   But   in   Islamic   fundamentalism   we   perhaps  
have   the   clearest   example   of   a   confident   and   proselytizing   current   of   anti-­‐
modern  and  anti-­‐European  reaction.    
 
It   is   difficult,   though,   to   escape   the   stamp   of   the   modern,   and   of   modern  
ideology.   ‘Postcolonial   theory’   represents   perhaps   the   most   intellectually  
ambitious   attempt   so   far   to   provide   a   comprehensive   indictment   of   Western  
modernity  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Global  South.  Like  radical  anticolonialists  
before   them,   they   insist   that   decolonization   involves   more   than   formal   or   flag  
decolonization,  but  something  like  overthrowing  the  epistemology  of  the  liberal  
West   and   the   ‘epistemicide’   –   the   destruction   of   knowledge   systems   –   it   has  
perpetrated   against   its   ‘others’.   It   seeks   to   decenter   western   knowledge,   and  
centre  the  trauma  caused  by  Western  racism  and  colonialism.  But  it  continues  to  
borrow   from   Western   and   modern   currents   of   thought,   including   Marxism,  
psychoanalysis   and   poststructuralism.   And   it   finds   a   home   in   the   Western  
academy,  where  it  is  rather  fashionable.  Moreover  one  can  question  whether  it  is  
an  ideology  at  all,  in  the  sense  of  offering  an  alternative  model  of  economics  or  
governments   –   it   functions   primarily,   and   most   usefully,   as   a   source   of   cultural  
critique  and  resistance  within  modernity  itself.  
 
As   a   first   approximation,   we   can,   as   implied,   think   of   liberalism   and  
socialism   as   arguing   over   the   forms   of   modernity,   and   conservatism   as  

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resisting   modernity.     The   argument   was   over   both   the   economic   and  
political  forms  of  modernity.  How  should  goods  be  generated  and  distributed?  
How  should  people  be  governed?  But  behind  such  questions  lay  still  deeper  ones.  
What   are   the   conditions   under   which   human   beings   do   well,   and   indeed   what  
sorts  of  creatures  are  human  beings?  And  who  or  what  should  be  our  source  of  
authority  in  deciding  such  matters?  
 
 
LIBERALISM  
 
Politically,  those  who  came  to  be  called  the  liberals  sought  to  replace  the  feudal  
system   of   ‘estates’   (in   effect,   castes)   and   mercantilism   (state-­‐regulated  
international  trade)  with  a  regime  of  free  market  exchange  and  social  mobility.  
Politically,   they   sought   to   replace   absolute   monarchy   with   representative  
government.  In  place  of  the  authority  of  the  church,  liberals  looked  to  the  reason  
and  the  reasoning  powers  of  the  individual.  Political  authority  ceased  to  derive  
from   a   divine   mandate;   it   now   required   justification   as   a   source   of   benefit   to  
individuals  enjoying  natural  rights.      
 
The   central   liberal   idea   was   then,   and   now   still   is,   individual   freedom.  
According  to  liberals,  individuals  should  be  free  to  make  choices,  exercise  moral  
responsibility   and   develop   their   own   individual   talents.   They   should   be   free   to  
decide  what  sorts  of  lives  they  wished  to  lead.    This  meant  that  collective  public  
political   power   should   be   exercised   only   over   a   limited   field   and   as   far   as   was  
necessary;   and   it   should   be   based   on   popular   consent.   Liberals   also   came   to  
believe  in  the  idea  of  progress;  in  place  of  feudal  stagnation  or  the  cyclical  belief  
in   restoring   golden   ages,   they   placed   their   faith   in   the   idea   of   linear   progress  
towards   an   ever-­‐better   future,   driven   not   by   utopian   schemes   but   by   the  
dynamism   of   individuals   exercising   their   intellectual,   creative   and   market  
freedom.   Liberals   thought   of   individuals   as   capable   of   making   rational   choices   in  
their   own   interest   and,   directly   or   via   some   kind   of   ‘hidden   hand’,   in   the  
collective  interest  of  society.  Rational  self-­‐interest  and  human  benevolence  could  
between  them  be  harnessed  to  a  greater  good.    
 
All  this,  at  any  rate,  was  the  idea.  Practice,  with  liberalism  as  with  all  ideologies,  
has   often   been   a   different   matter.   In   principle   rights   belonged   to   all   human  
beings,   or   to   all   capable   of   reason.   In   practice   liberal   rights   were,   in   the   early  
history   of   liberalism,   reserved   mainly   for   property-­‐owning   white   household  
heads,  whether  in  Europe  or  in  its  colonies;  but  liberal  rights,  and  the  idea  that  
they  should  be  enjoyed  equally,  became  a  banner  under  which  many  fought  for  
full   political   and   legal   equality,   whether   as   women,   people   of   colour   or   as  
colonized  peoples.    
 
 
SOCIALISM  
 
Socialists,  however,  were  dissatisfied  with  the  world  offered  by  liberalism.  
Or   rather,   they   were   dissatisfied   with   the   new   world   of   industrial  
capitalism  and  the  way  in  which  liberalism  sought  to  order  it.  For  socialists,  

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industrial   capitalism   was   a   world   of   class   domination   and   exploitation.   Market  
competition  was  not  benign  but  a  source  of  division  and  conflict,  as  well  as  being  
a   blind   force   that   deprived   humans   of   control   over   their   collective   economic  
destinies.   In   an   industrial   context   it   generated   an   impoverished   working   class  
whose   surplus   labour   enriched   capitalist   property   owners.   Work,   instead   of  
being   a   source   of   creative   satisfaction   for   the   masses,   became   a   source   of   their  
alienation  s  it  came  under  capitalist  direction.    
 
Liberalism,  according  to  socialists,  either  offered  a  justification  for  this  capitalist  
social  order,  disguising  its  gross  inequalities  under  a  pretence  of  equal  right;  or,  
insofar   as   it   sought   freedom   and   democracy   and   equality,   it   did   not   take   these  
ideas   far   enough.   The   freedom   and   equality   it   offered   was   too   thin   and   largely  
formal;  it  did  not  deliver  the  substance  of  freedom,  which  remained  the  preserve  
of   those   controlling   property.   Insofar   as   liberalism   came   to   be   associated   with  
democracy,  the  democratic  regime  it  offered  was  thin,  elitist  and  served  merely  
to   disguise   the   disproportionate   political   power   of   capital.   The   capitalists   were  
the  new  ruling  class.    
 
Socialists  sought,  in  place  of  liberal  industrial  capitalism,  a  new  world  free  
of  class  domination.   Under   socialism,   class   conflict   would   be   replaced   by   social  
harmony;   competition   by   solidarity;   the   blind   operation   of   the   market   by  
conscious  collective  economic  control;  and  bourgeois  democracy  by  proletarian  
democracy.  Proletarian  democracy  would  not  be  the  illusory  and  formal  political  
democracy   of   liberal   capitalism;   it   would   be   a   substantive   democracy   of   the  
collective  producer,  rooted  in  shared  control  of  economic  or  ‘material’  life.  Under  
socialism,  the  masses  would  no  longer  be  exploited,  but  would  jointly  control  the  
product   of   their   labour;   workers   would   no   longer   be   alienated,   but   would   regain  
the  possibility  of  enjoyable  and  convivial  work.    
 
Socialists  did  not  necessarily  seek  to  replace  industrial  modernity  as  such.  
What   became   the   dominant   stream,   Marxism,   believed   that   the   economic  
dynamism  of  industrial  capitalism  could  be,  in  some  sense,  repurposed;  capitalist  
industrial   modernity   could   be   replaced   by   socialist   industrial   modernity;   the  
previously   capitalist   industrial   economy   could   be   placed   under   collective  
proletarian  ownership  and  control.  The  productive  advances  of  industrial  society  
would   help   to   overcome   the   material   scarcity   that   fostered   class   struggle   and  
class   domination.   The   ‘development   of   the   productive   forces’   would   create  
conditions   under   which   not   only   classes   would   disappear   (following   a   transition  
period  of  proletarian  class  rule)  but  the  state  itself  would  no  longer  be  necessary,  
and  could  be  replaced  by  a  simplified  post-­‐political  ‘administration  of  things’  in  
which   all   could   participate.   Not   only   industrialism,   but   science   itself   could   be  
harnessed,  both  in  identifying  the  correct  strategy  for  socialist  revolution   and  in  
constructing  a  socialist  order.  Indeed,  the  reign  of  bourgeois  ideology  would  be  
replaced   by   the   objective   truth   of   Marxist   science;   and   reality   itself,   the   veil   of  
ideology   lifted,   would   become   more   transparent,   enabling   all   to   participate   in  
running   human   affairs   and   the   division   of   labour,   with   its   oppressive  
specialisations,  to  disappear.  Even  more  than  liberals,  Marxists  and  communists  
believed  in  the  possibility  of  human  progress,  even  of  a  kind  of  human  perfection  
with  the  arrival  of  a  non-­‐selfish  and  all-­‐rounded  ‘new  man’.  

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CONSERVATISM  
 
If  liberals  found  this  utopian  vision  horrifying,  an  invitation  to  totalitarian  social  
engineering,   for   conservatives,   both   progressive   liberalism   and   Marxism   were  
complicit   in   the   creation   of   a   destructive   new   world   of   socially-­‐engineered  
human  affairs.    Both  disrespected  received  historical  wisdom,  putting  in  its  place  
a   vision   of   relentless   progress;   both   replaced   religious   faith   with   the   God   of  
Reason;   both   sought   to   plan   and   perfect   the   world   according   to   some   sort   of  
rational  scheme,  instead  of  recognizing  the  limits  of  human  perfection.    
 
In  its  most  reactionary  form,  conservatism  rejected  capitalism,  secularism  
and   democracy,   seeking   instead   to   restore   a   lost   world   of   divinely-­‐ordained  
hierarchy,   one   in   which   the   authority   of   monarch,   church   and   landowner,   and  
ultimately  that  of  God,  was  restored.    
 
But   other   conservatives   sought   simply   to   slow   things   down;   they   claimed  
that  conservatism  was  not  an  ideology,  but  simply  a  disposition,  one  that  sought  
to   hold   on   to   cherished   beliefs   and   ways   and   to   temper   the   harshness   and  
ambition   of   both   freewheeling   capitalist   individualism   and   socialist   collective  
planning.   They   were   willing   to   accept   change,   but   not   rushed   change;   change  
should  be  gradual,  measured  and  organic.  For  its  critics,  of  course,  this  amounted  
to  a  rationalization  of  the  status  quo  and  its  inherited  privileges.  But  the  ideology  
stood   to   appeal   not   only   to   landed   aristocrats,   but   to   others,   like   peasants   and  
artisans,   who   feared   urban   industrial   change,   and   to   those   of   all   classes  –   clerics,  
male  household  heads  –  who  stood  to  lose  authority  as  egalitarianism  advanced  
and  traditional  ways  were  disrupted.    
 
 
OTHER  IDEOLOGIES  
 
If   liberalism,   socialism   and   conservatism   were   the   big   three   of   the   new  
modern   industrial   age,   other   competitors   were   in   the   field   too   from   the  
outset;  still  others  entered  it  later.  They  were  often  offshoots  or  elaborations  
of   existing   ideologies,   or   attached   themselves   to   them.   On   the   ‘left’,   anarchists  
wanted   to   get   to   a   stateless   and   classless   communism   straight   away;   they  
rejected  the  Marxist  idea  of  a  transitional  ‘dictatorship  of  the  proletariat’,  or  even  
the  social-­‐democratic  idea  of  a  benevolent  welfare  state  (on  which  more  later).  
They  considered  states  –  and  indeed  political  parties  –  to  be  inherent  sources  of  
domination.  Later  egalitarian  ideologies,  like  feminism,  insisted  that  the  struggle  
for   emancipation   should   be   waged   not   only   on   behalf   of   exploited   economic  
classes  but  on  behalf  of  women  too,  the  subjugated  half  of  humanity.  Other  non-­‐
class  claimants  would  emerge,  too,  over  time.    
 
On  the  ‘right’,  new  forms  of  backlash  against  egalitarian  and  democratic  progress  
appeared.   Fascism   acquired   power   between   the   two   World   Wars;   its   varied  
regimes   covered   a   spectrum   from   radical   reactionary   religious   conservatism   to  
attempts   (in   Nazi   Germany)   to   implement   a   new   order   based   on   Pagan  

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romanticism,  pseudoscientific  theories  of  natural  race  hierarchy  and  the  Leader  
Principle.   It   believed   above   all   in   the   nation,   conceived   of   as   an   organic  
community.    
 
With   these   new   ideologies,   the   relationship   to   modernity   becomes  
muddied.  Some  anarchist  seemed  to  want  to  regain  the  ‘primitive  communism’  
of   preindustrial,   pre-­‐state   communities.   Nazism   was   in   some   respects   a  
reactionary   throwback,   but   certain   critics   saw   its   racial   pseudoscience   and  
machinery  of  industrial  mass  killing  as  ultimate  expressions  of  modernity.    In  the  
1960s   a   ‘New   Left’   emerged   as   a   trenchant   critic   of   the   excesses   of   later  
twentieth-­‐century   capitalism’s   consumerism,   militarism,   imperialism   and  
ecological   destructiveness.   Ecologism   –   radical   environmentalism,   if   you   like   –  
was  a  product  of  this.  
 
 
EVOLVING  IDEOLOGICAL  TRADITIONS  AND  THEIR  INTERNAL  DIVISIONS  
 
Indeed,  once  we  look  more  closely,  we  find  all  of  the  ideologies  divided  on  
the  issue  of  capitalist  industrial  modernity.    
 
Liberals  welcomed  a  market-­‐based  order,  but  many  did  not  like  what  industrial  
capitalism   became   in   the   nineteenth   century.   Individual   freedom   seemed   to  
mean  too  little  if  too  many  lacked  the  resources  to  make  their  freedoms  effective;  
government   by   consent   became   too   truncated   if   private   corporations   acquired  
too   much   power.   Liberals   were   believers   in   reform   and   progress,   and   they  
desired  to  rescue  the  poor  from  their  degraded  condition.  Thus  was  modern  or  
social   liberalism   born   in   the   late   nineteenth   century   that   become   a   powerful  
ideological   engine   of   the   development   of   the   welfare   state   in   the   twentieth  
century.  For  late  nineteenth  century  British  Idealists,  freedom  had  to  mean  more  
than   a   negative   right   not   to   be   interfered   with;   it   had   to   extend   to   a   positive  
freedom  in  which  people  acquired  the  effective  means  to  realize  lives  that  they  
had   reason   to   value.   The   conditions   had   to   be   created   in   which   the   individual  
prized   by   liberalism   could   realize   their   potential.   Moreover,   this   left   or   social  
liberalism   became   less   preoccupied   with   private   property,   which   classical  
liberals   had   seen   as   an   anchor   of   liberty,   and   more   willing   to   see   state  
intervention   to   eliminate   poverty   and   correct   market   imbalances;   more   ready   to  
empower   workers   with   union   rights;   and   more   committed   to   ensuring   that  
formal   equality   of   opportunity   became   an   actual   substantive   equality   of  
opportunity.    
 
From   the   1970s   ‘egalitarian   liberals’   like   John   Rawls   began   to   develop   liberal  
theories  of  distributive  justice,  which  they  sought  to  reconcile  with  a  continued  
commitment  to  political  and  civil   liberties.   Equality   –  in   the   form   of   equal   rights,  
and   in   the   form   of   equal   entitlement   to   concern   and   respect   –   became  
increasingly  elevated  as  a  liberal  value.    
 
And   egalitarian   liberalism   became   increasingly   difficult   to   distinguish   from   the  
parliamentary,   welfarist   and   reformist   version   of   socialism   termed   social  

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democracy.  The  two  became  joined  in  rejecting  both  Communist  totalitarianism  
and  market  fundamentalism.  
 
Of  course  other  liberals  resisted  such  trends,  insisting  on  a  more  classic  market-­‐
based   variety   of   liberalism.   In   the   US,   where   liberalism   is   now   seen   as   a   more  
redistributive   left-­‐of-­‐centre   ideology,   classic   market   liberalism   is   dubbed  
‘libertarianism’.   The   pushback   against   the   welfare   state   by   libertarians   and  
conservatives   alike   has   generated   the   e   ideology,   at   odds   with   liberal  
egalitarianism,  known  as  ‘neo-­‐liberalism’.  
 
And   in   the   case   of   socialism,   not   all   socialists,   not   even   all   Marxists,   followed  
orthodox   Marxism   in   its   embrace   of   science   and   the   perpetual   expansion   of  
human  productivity.  Classical  Marxism  itself  developed  in  part  as  a  critique  of  
‘utopian   socialism’,   which   sought   to   escape   industrial   modernity   by  
withdrawing   from   it   into   utopian   communes   and   villages   associated   with   the  
names   of   people   like   Robert   Owen   and   Fourier.   Within   Marxism,   a   humanist  
strand   developed,   inspired   in   part   by   the   later-­‐published   earlier   works   of   Karl  
Marx,   that   distanced   itself   from   Marxism   as   an   objective   scientific   theory   of  
impersonal   social   relations,   and   embraced   a   concern   instead   with   overcoming  
alienation   and   realizing   human   potential.   The   Frankfurt   School   became   a  
stringent   opponent   of   what   it   saw   as   capitalist   modernity’s   cold   instrumental  
rationality  and  its  mindless  commercialism.  We  have  already  referred  to  the  New  
Left   and   ecologism,   some   subcurrents   of   which   found   Marxist   inspiration   for  
their   hostility   not   only   to   capitalist   modernity   but   to   the   variant   of   socialist  
modernity  that  had  emerged  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  East  Bloc.  Both  variants  of  
modernity,  they  held,  were  in  thrall  to  a  kind  of  technocratic  managerialism.  And  
now  there  are  strands  of  ecological  Marxism,  retaining  the  original’s  criticism  of  
the   accumulation   imperative   and   the   prioritization   of   profit   over   people,   but  
pushing  back  against  the  idea  of  continuous  economic  expansion  and  the  myth  of  
communist  material  abundance.  
 
And   even   conservatism   has   its   divisions   on   the   question.   Reactionary  
conservatism   opposed   modernity   in   all   its   varieties.   But   some   other  
conservatisms,  notably  in  Britain,  proved  remarkably  adaptable,  embracing  mass  
democratic   politics   and   finding   a   working   class   constituency   for   its   vision   of  
‘one-­‐nation  conservatism’.  Christian  democracy,  drawing  inter  alia  on  Catholic  
social   teachings,   made   similar   adaptations   in   continental   Europe.   A   moderate  
conservatism  emerged  that  joined  moderate  socialism,  aka  social  democracy,  in  
embracing   the   welfare   state.   The   moderate   conservative   argument   was   that  
change   was   possible   and   needed,   but   had   to   be   gradual   and   tradition-­‐respecting.  
This   formula   has   served   conservatism   well,   enabling   it   to   survive   into   the  
twentieth  century  as  a  powerful  political  force.    
 
A  further  strand  of  conservatism  allied  itself  with  classic  economic  liberalism  to  
produce   the   concoction   known   as   the   New   Right,   embodied   in   leaders   like  
Thatcher   in   the   UK   and   Reagan   in   the   US.   Here,   again,   was   conservatism  
adapting,   this   time   embracing   the   very   forces   of   capitalist   individualism   that  
some  earlier  conservatives  had  rejected  as  a  dangerous  solvent  of  communal  and  
spiritual  life.  

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CONCLUSION  
 
What   emerges   clearly   from   these   further   developments   is   the   extent   to  
which   the   great   ideological   traditions   are   both   internally   diverse   and  
evolving.    
 
There  is  more  to  be  said,  including  about  the  attitude  of  competing  ideologies  to  
still   other   features   of   modernity   not   discussed   here   –   notably   the   modern   nation  
state.  But  that  will  be  taken  up  in  a  later  lecture.  
 
 
 
Recommended  further  reading:    
 
Andrew  Heywood  (2013),  ‘Political  ideas  and  ideologies’  in  Politics  (4th  edition)  
 
 
A  QUESTION  TO  THINK  ABOUT:    
 
Have   ideologies   become   so   internally   diverse   that   it   is   no   longer   possible   to  
distinguish  them?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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