Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Functionalities Functionalities
Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Functionalities Functionalities
Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Aviation Safety Regulations Versus CNS/ATM Systems and Functionalities Functionalities
2020
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Osunwusi: Aviation Safety and CNS/ATM
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Osunwusi: Aviation Safety and CNS/ATM
targets the identification of functions and jobs that are critical to operational safety
and security as well as the appropriate training and licensing/certification of
personnel performing the identified functions and jobs.
Specifically, a license authorizes the performance of defined activities or
functions which should otherwise be prohibited given the potentially serious
implications of such functions or activities being performed improperly. The
overall objective, of course, is not only to provide a set of standards, practices, and
operational procedures which must be adhered to by the personnel so certified but
also to enthrone a virile mechanism for the confirmation of personnel competency
and for holding the personnel responsible and accountable for any actions
undertaken in the performance of their safety-critical duties, including any act of
commission or omission.
This paper explores the concept and nature of aviation safety within the
broader context of safety and safety regulation; examines the safety dimensions of
CNS/ATM (communication, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management)
systems and functionalities and identifies the critical elements of the air navigation
safety web. In addition, it examines the main issues and challenges relating to air
navigation safety, and presents an argument for globally-inclusive considerations
in respect of a harmonized approach to the regulation of all the safety-critical
elements of air navigation service, particularly the certification and/or licensing of
CNS/ATM systems and functionalities.
Safety has been identified as an essential element for the existence of civil
aviation (Mwikya & Mulwa, 2018) and has always been the prime reflection in the
conduct of all aviation activities (Bala et al, 2013) aside from having been
proclaimed by the aviation industry as its primary objective (Billings, 1997).
Safety is aviation’s first priority and is at the core of ICAO’s Strategic
Objectives, which also incorporate goals such as capacity and efficiency, security
and facilitation, economic development, and environmental protection. This creates
a multi-dimensional orientation that is a reflection of the increasing complexity and
dynamic nature of the civil aviation industry.
Aviation has been appropriately conceptualized as “a large industry, a true
system of systems” that must necessarily be managed as such (European
Commission, 2018, p. 11). As Lofquist (2010, p. 6) has also rightly noted: “The
civil aviation industry can be described as a complex system of overlapping socio-
technical systems embedded within a highly competitive business environment,
where safety is a primary, but not the only, goal.” For this reason, aviation safety
requires a multidisciplinary approach involving the technical, economic,
managerial, and legal perspectives (Huang, 2009) while the reliability of the
infrastructure in use constitutes one of the key elements of the safety of any modern
mode of transportation (Borener & Guzhva, 2014).
Conceptualized within the framework of civil aviation operations, safety
presents a two-pronged manifestation – from the perspective of operational safety
and from the technical perspective, otherwise referred to as system safety. Maurino
(2017) describes system safety as an engineering discipline whose objective is to
ensure the safety of technical system by designing “safety” into the system during
the system’s development. Maurino claims that “the significant progress in
technology accomplished by aviation between the 1960s and the 1980s was in no
small degree due to the contribution of system safety” (p. 8). From a historical
perspective, the author further highlights a four-step hierarchical precedence-based
architecture of intervention – design to eliminate safety concerns, incorporate
safety devices, provide warning devices, and develop procedures and training –
which emphasizes the exclusivity of improving technical systems and the
implications of human error in the course of actual system operations.
Within the context of its characteristic dynamism and complexity, the
aviation industry has always existed as an embodiment of a tremendous vitality,
which, according to Jung et al (2018), is premised upon the existence of a well-
established and global partnership. One of the key elements to maintaining the
vitality of civil aviation is ensuring safe, secure, efficient and environmentally
sustainable operation at the global, regional and national levels (Mwikya & Mulwa,
2018).
To say the least, security, efficiency, regularity, and environmental
sustainability are closely linked to the safety of civil aviation. For this reason, 16
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of the Chicago Convention’s 19 Annexes deal with safety, including the Annexes
that relate to the efficiency and security of air navigation. Also, four PANS deal
with the issue of the safety and efficiency of air navigation.
There is, though, a clear distinction between aviation safety and aviation
security. Oster, Strong and Zorn (2013, p. 161) explains the distinction thus:
Improving aviation security involves thwarting attempts by individuals to
disrupt, damage, or destroy parts of the aviation system intentionally.
Improving other aspects of aviation safety involves reducing the chances
that unintentional mistakes or unexpected failures of parts of the system will
reduce the safety of air travel.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the fact remains that safety includes
security (Huang, 2009) and aviation security is an important part of aviation safety
(Oster et al., 2013). According to Huang (2009, p. 5), “No matter how airworthy an
aircraft is, and how competent its crew members are, air travel will not be safe if it
is subject to terrorist attacks.”
Aviation safety is essentially paradigmatic and multi-dimensional as its
nature rests squarely with a wide variety of operational, technical, and regulatory
exigencies. It has become the concern of the whole world and its importance is
unanimously recognized (Huang, 2009) just as it is also seen as “central to ensuring
that air transport continues to play a major role in driving sustainable economic and
social development” (Jung et al, 2018, p. 1).
The nature of aviation safety is such that there is nothing like absolute safety
or the complete elimination of risks, accidents, or incidents. This situation has been
attributed to the nature of the aviation industry, which renders the total elimination
of accidents or serious incidents unachievable (Bala et al., 2013). It has been
observed that if aviation must be free from any dangers or risks, it will not even
exist at all because flight is inherently a risky venture carried out in a hostile
environment at great speed (Huang, 2009). The importance of this reality is actually
the fact that the safety, security, and efficiency of aviation revolves around
regulatory, administrative, and operational approaches that are not only systematic,
proactive, multi-dimensional, and dynamic but also completely devoid of
complacency. As the late Dr. Assad Kotaite, the then President of the Council of
ICAO, had rightly reiterated in his opening address to the 2006 Directors General
of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy for Aviation Safety (ICAO,
2006, sec. 7.1) “There is absolutely no room for complacency where safety is
concerned, there never was and there never will be”.
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It has been argued that aviation safety goes beyond accident prevention
from a technical point of view and extends to more profound political, strategic,
and legal dimensions, including preventive, remedial, and punitive measures
(Huang, 2009). For this reason, there has been a shift towards a more proactive
approach, which, in the words of Oster et al. (2013, p. 149), “involves identifying
emerging risk factors, characterizing these risks through modeling exposure and
consequences, prioritizing this risk, and making recommendations with regard to
necessary improvements.”
This proactive approach conceptualizes aviation safety as a multi-
dimensional and multi-sectorial paradigm and extends the horizon of aviation
safety to capture the entire spectrum of aviation safety management, thus
culminating in the concept of Safety Management, which, according to Thomas
represents a collection of specific practices for organizational safety management
that has “emerged as a conglomerate of safety-related activities that enabled an
organization to discharge their responsibilities under the spectra of self-regulation”
(2012, pp. 1-2). It aims, in the words of Maurino (2017, p. 11), “at turning safety
and its management in socio-technical systems into a business function, along lines
similar to those through which finance, legal, human resources, quality and any
other business of the organization are managed as business functions.” It
emphasizes a systems approach on safety, while focusing, at an aviation
organization, on safety of the operation and the types of hazards that can contribute
to a catastrophic accident (Roelen & Klompstra, 2012), with the overall goal of
allowing the identification and management of flaws before accidents occur
(Kaspers et al, n.d.). Lofquist (2010, pp. 5-6) describes this type of approach as one
involving “interaction and involvement from the system operators and business
leaders and managers responsible for both system performance and for safety
outcomes prior to undesired events”, whilst also requiring “a robust safety
management system that is integrated into the overall strategic business objectives
of an organization within an expanded industrial business context that can
anticipate changes in an operative environment while balancing safety with
economic goals.”
The global civil aviation realm took a bold step towards proactive and
systematic safety strategies with the adoption on February 2013 by the ICAO
Council of Annex 19 – Safety Management – with an applicability date of
November 2013. As aviation safety management is becoming a regulatory
requirement rather than an industry best practice (Roelen & Klompstra, 2012),
ICAO has introduced - under a provision that took effect on 24 November 2006 - a
new requirement for States to ensure:
• The establishment of Safety Management System (SMS) as well as
an acceptable level of safety; and
•
The implementation of SMS by aviation organizations, specifically
aircraft operators, aircraft maintenance organizations, air traffic
service providers and certified aerodrome operators. (Osunwusi,
2014, p. 11)
Safety Management system (SMS) is defined as “the systematic
management of all activities to secure an acceptable level of safety” (van der Geest
et al., 2003, p. 33) or a planned, documented and verifiable method of managing
hazards and associated risks (Bottomley, 1999, cited in Thomas, 2012), which
effectively moves the primary mechanism for safety management from prescriptive
regulation to organizational responsibility (Thomas, 2012).
Thomas (2012) identifies three transitional phases for safety management.
Based on the transition of safety management from the fragile system of 1920s to
1970s – typified by accident investigation and individualized risk management –
and the safe system of 1970 to mid-1990s – typified by incident investigation and
technology/regulation to the modern Ultra-safe system of mid-1990s onwards,
typified by business management approach to safety, Thomas (2012, p. 3) also
defines SMS as the “third age of safety.”
Two interesting paradigmatic perspectives on safety have emerged from the
evolving proactive, predictive, and systematic approach to managing safety,
particularly within the context of human factors and the organizational
ramifications of safety. These perspectives relate to the emergence of the concepts
of “Safety Intelligence” and “Safety Wisdom.” Safety intelligence refers to the
various sources of quantitative information – incident data and other safety
information on precursor events – which an organization may use to identify and
assess various threats, and to provide “reasonable predictions about likely accidents
and measures to avoid them” (Makins et al., 2016, p. 3).
Safety Intelligence, as reiterated in ICAO (2013), not only “provides
actionable information used to drive ICAO’s safety strategy and programmes” but
also “enables the organization to create a holistic understanding of safety issues by
consolidating and benchmarking a number of safety performance indicators and
providing guidance used to develop assistance for Member States, regional and sub-
regional organizations” (p. 17). Safety wisdom, on its part, refers to “the judgment
and decision-making of those in senior positions who must decide what to do to
remain safe, and how they use quantitative and qualitative information to support
those decisions” (Makins et al., 2016, p. 5). It, therefore, rests squarely upon the
critical-thinking ability of those at the top of the organizational hierarchy as well as
on the perceptions of those leaders in relation to the philosophies of aviation safety
vis-à-vis organizational goals.
Another paradigmatic shift that has emerged from the safety management
concept is the organizational principle of safety culture or just culture, a paradigm
that the European Commission (2018) has referred to as an enduring safety mindset.
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Safety or just culture represents a principle that lays a strong emphasis on a non-
punitive approach to safety information through an enduring protection of not only
the information but also those who file such information. It also emphasizes the
safety significance of non-criminalization of incidents and accidents. To be sure,
the presence of internal rules for Just Culture is already an important aspect of
European aviation organizations in keeping with Article 16(11) of Regulation (EU)
No. 376/2014.
July, 2002, in order to re-arrange the Zurich area control sectors for which there
were neither briefings regarding the technical and operational implications nor
coordination with adjacent air traffic control (ATC) units; the maintenance work
being carried out, consequent upon the sectorisation exercise, on the image
processing system of the main radar, which resulted in the use of a fallback system
with the consequence of delayed radar data and an increase of the separation
minimum from 5 to 7 NM. Other issues included the switching off for maintenance
of the ground-based optical collision warning system, which could have drawn the
attention of the duty air traffic controller (ATCO) to the pending collision; the lack
of information to the duty ATCO, who was handling two workstations at the time
of the accident, in respect of the maintenance of the main radar and the optical
collision warning system; the non-availability to the Skyguide ATCO at the time
of the accident of direct phone connections with adjacent ATC units; and the lack
of an automatic change-over of incoming calls to the bypass system.
One particular downside of the outcome of the Ueberlingen accident is that
Peter Nielsen, the lone ATCO handling the airspace at the time of the accident, and
not an ATSEP (air traffic safety electronics personnel), had to pay the supreme
price when, on February 24, 2004, he was stabbed and killed by a Russian, Vitaly
Kaloyev, who had lost his wife and two children in the accident.
Beyond the Ueberlingen accident, there are quite a number of accidents or
incidents where investigations had initially targeted the functional integrity of CNS
systems or where either on-board avionics working cooperatively with ground-
based CNS/ATM systems or a component of the CNS system has been implicated.
An example is Alitalia Flight AZ404, a DC 9 airliner, which crashed into the
Stadlerberg Mountain, Weiach, Switzerland on 14 November 1990, as it
approached Runway 14 of Zurich Airport, Switzerland on an international
passenger flight that originated from Milan Linate Airport, Italy killing all 46
people on board. Investigation found multiple factors leading to CFIT (controlled
flight into terrain) with the initial focus of investigators being on whether the ILS
was sending the proper signal consequent upon the mysterious glide path shown on
the Radar track. Aside from pilot error and GPWS (ground proximity warning
system) failure caused by a short-circuit on the NAV receiver, investigation
concluded that the pilot’s Instrument Landing System (ILS) display provided
incorrect values due to a faulty NAV receiver as the ADI/HSI had apparently
captured the glide slope.
Less than a year before Ueberlingen, specifically on October 8, 2001, at
Milano Linate Airport, Italy, a Scandinavian Airlines MD 87 jet, on a take-off,
crashed into a private Cessna 525 aircraft, which had strayed onto the runway in
dense fog, killing all 110 passengers and crew aboard the MD 87 and all 4
passengers and crew aboard the Cessna as well as 4 airport workers on the ground.
The lack of an Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
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SMGCS) radar at Linate prevented the ATCO from detecting the presence of the
Cessna on taxiway R6 intersecting the runway. The deployment of the same type
of surveillance system could have also helped to prevent aviation’s deadliest
disaster at Los Rodeos (now Tenerife-North Airport) on March 27, 1977, which
recorded 583 fatalities.
There is also the case of Loftleider Icelandic Airways Flight LL001, a DC
8 airliner operated on behalf of Garuda Indonesia Airways, which crashed, on 15
November 1978, into a rubber and coconut plantation about 2 kilometres from the
threshold of runway 22 of Colombo-Katunayake Airport, Sri Lanka while on a
Radar vectored ILS approach, killing 183 out of the 262 people on board. Although
the probable causes of the accident were crew’s error, erroneous distance/altitude
information provided by the Radar controller and the failure of approach lighting
system, the Icelandic Directorate of Civil Aviation blamed the accident on
inadequate maintenance of ILS facilities resulting in a downward bending of the
glide path approximately 3.5 nautical miles from touchdown zone. The Icelandic
authority also revealed that the ILS at Colombo-Katunayake Airport had not been
calibrated for 11 months as against international calibration policy requiring ground
checks and flight calibration to be carried out once in three months and once every
six months respectively.
The reference to inadequate maintenance of ILS facilities as a causative
factor in a fatal air accident is not only an unmistakable pointer to the safety
criticality of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities but is also a clear wake-up call
to the need for globally-inclusive and internationally harmonized and standardized
procedures for assuring the competency and certification of personnel involved in
the task of ensuring the adequate maintenance, operation, trouble shooting and
calibration of safety-critical CNS/ATM systems. Underscoring the significance of
this reality and having regard to the need “to safeguard against erosion of technical
expertise”, van der Geest et al. (2003, p. 123) have, through Recommendation 7-3
in the seminal report on Aviation Safety Management in Switzerland, re-echoed the
need for the licensing and certification of air traffic safety electronics personnel
(ATSEP) and ATC equipment. Aside from this, the ATSEPs have been identified
as playing a crucial part in the ATM system such that “mistakes of the ATSEPs
might lead to incorrect operation of systems, with a potential negative impact on
safety” (ECORYS, 2013, p. 30).
Two air events – an incident with no fatality and an accident involving 229
fatalities – vividly depict the possible nexus between CNS/ATM-related
inadequacies, confusion, and failures and the possibility of a CFIT accident. The
incident involved an Air New Zealand Flight NZ60 – a Boeing 767 – on an auto-
coupled ILS approach to runway 08 at Faleolo International Airport, Apia, Western
Samoa, which, on the night of 29 July 2000, carried out a missed approach from an
altitude of about 400ft, some 6 miles short of the runway due to a suspected
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ATSEP
AERO
COMMS
ATCO
ANSP AIS
AEROMET
FLIGHT
CAA CREW
AIRPORT
AUTHORITY AIRLINE AME
CABIN
DISPATCHER CREW
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The study also identifies functions and jobs within the ATM/ANS services
that are “safety-related” and “safety-critical;” a safety-related function being a
function, the failure of which could impact safety and a safety-related job being a
job that “involves performing at least one safety-related function” (p. 33) while “A
function is safety-critical if a failure of the function could impact the safety and
there are no barriers within the ATM/ANS system to prevent an accident following
the of the function” (p. 33) and a job is safety-critical “if the job involves
performing at least one safety-critical function” (p. 33).
Based on the definitions of safety-related and safety-critical functions and
jobs and the application of the EUROCONTROL Accident Incident Model, which
was originally christened the “Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) model”, the ECORYS
study identifies a total of 143 safety-related functions with the following 26 jobs
regarded as safety-related: Air traffic controller, ATC supervisor, ATC instructor,
ATC Assessor, ATC Examiner, ATSEP – System Monitoring and Control, ATSEP
– Surveillance, ATSEP – Navigation, ATSEP – Communication, ATSEP – Data
Processing, ATSEP – Instructor, Meteorological information officer, Aeronautical
information service officer, Aerodrome Flight Information officer, Flight
information service officer, Airspace Management Cell (AMC) coordinator, High
level airspace policy makers, Network management officer, Flow Management
Position (FMP), Airspace designers, Navigation data provision officer, ATM/ANS
technical system designer, On-the-Job-Training-Instructor, HR Manager, Staff
instructor, and safety management officer.
Of the 143 safety-related functions identified, 28 functions and 9 associated
jobs are regarded as safety-critical. The safety-critical jobs are: Air traffic
controller, ATSEP – System Monitoring and Control, ATSEP – Surveillance,
ATSEP – Navigation, ATSEP – Communication, ATSEP – Data Processing,
Aeronautical information service officer, Navigation data provision officer, and
ATM/ANS technical system designer.
Aside from this, and having regard to the nature and safety significance of
the jobs and functions of CNS/ATM technical personnel, the International Labour
Organization (ILO) - in its International Standard Classification of Occupations
and under ILO List of Professional Occupations No. 3155-ISCO 88 Minor Group
(ILO, 2012, p. 75) – classifies ATSEPs as aviation professionals who occupy the
same professional level as air traffic controllers, aircraft pilots and related associate
professionals.
General Assembly in 2007, emphasize the fact that “Development and growth of
air traffic at the international level require the adoption of modern methodologies,
mechanisms and approaches in planning and implementing all elements relating to
air navigation” (ICAO, 2007c, para. 4.1).
The expanding aviation system of today “comprises multiple and
interrelated systems that are geopolitically diverse, technologically complex and
highly multidisciplinary” (ICAO, 2013, p. 4). With this perspective, the question of
whether the aviation industry will continue to be characterized by steady
transformations is, perhaps, no longer open to debate. These transformations may
not necessarily be limited to the future as they are actually becoming realities in the
contemporary aviation realm. It is also clear that the transformational movement
will continue to reveal issues and challenges that have far-reaching implications for
the safety of civil aviation operations.
Smith, Roelen and den Hertog (2016, p. 3) note that transformations
affecting the future of aviation system will come in the following two distinct
categories:
• Progressive or rapid-onset physical, functional, and procedural
changes that stakeholders plan for the aviation system with the
deliberate intention of improving throughput, safety and/or
efficiency/economics.
• Unintentional technological innovation, shifting operational tasks,
subtle changes in organizations or actors in the system, and
contextual factors external to aviation itself that can nonetheless
influence the robustness of the support systems upon which
operational safety depends.
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challenge relating to the increasing need to factor in safety risks from aviation
infrastructure especially in respect of airport/runway operations and air navigation;
issues surrounding the imperativeness of human factors in aviation safety; and
challenges relating to the need to improve and extend data analytics.
In relation to the provision of air navigation services, the International
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has identified challenges relating to
corporatization, privatization, outsourcing, and subcontracting, which have “led to
increasing fragmentation both in the provision of air traffic services and in the
maintenance of navigational aids and ground-based equipment such as radar and
telecommunications” (ICAO, 2004, sub-section 1.1.). There are also challenges
related to environmental issues (including the problem of carbon emission), the
increasing evolution of new technologies, and the emerging threats and risks of
cyber security.
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hitherto excluded from Annex 1 given contemporary and emerging civil aviation
operational realities, particularly the human factors and safety implications of the
increasing incursion of the new technologies into civil aviation operation terrains.
The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) has, for instance, argued for
the introduction of a set of ICAO regulations that cover the licensing of all air
navigation service providers including maintenance organizations and suppliers of
safety-critical parts (ICAO, 2004).
Having regard to the peculiarities of their operational terrains, the
identification of the safety-criticality of certain civil aviation functions, and the
leeway copiously provided by Article 38 of the Chicago Convention 1944, some
States – including Nigeria, which deposited a notification of adherence in respect
of the Chicago Convention on 14 November 1960 - have entrenched in their
national laws appropriate training, licensing and/or certification regimes for certain
functions and personnel hitherto excluded from ICAO Annex 1. For example, Part
2 (Personnel Licensing) of the Nigeria Civil Aviation Regulations provides for the
licensing of the following aviation personnel: flight crew members (pilots and flight
engineers); flight dispatchers; flight instructors/ground instructors; aircraft
maintenance engineers; aviation repair specialists; air traffic safety electronics
personnel (ATSEP); parachute riggers; flight radio telephony operators (restricted
licence); air traffic controllers; aeronautical station operators; and cabin crew
(Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, 2015, Part 2, Sub-section 2.2.1.1).
In spite of this kind of initiative by the States concerned, concerns still
remain on the need to harmonize the licensing procedures and ensure the
international uniformity requirements contained in Article 37 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. In recent times, therefore, the agitations for the
inclusion of certain aviation functions and jobs in ICAO Annex 1 - in order to meet
Article 37 requirements - have been escalated to the ICAO General Assembly,
which convenes every three years. Table 1 highlights some of the events and efforts
that are especially relevant to the agitation for the inclusion of ATSEP in ICAO
Annex 1 (Personnel Licensing) in recent times.
It is pertinent to observe, at this juncture, that reactions and responses at the
ICAO General Assembly level to the deafening cries for the institutionalization of
a globally harmonized and comprehensive certification and personnel regulation
frameworks for the air navigation services realm have been somewhat mixed. At
best, the situation reflects a lack of adequate comprehension of the philosophies of
aviation safety particularly in the context of the growing complexity and
modernization of civil aviation operations. For example, with respect to the joint
working paper, A36-WP/210, presented to the 36th Session of the Assembly in
2007 by IFATSEA (International Federation of Air Traffic Safety Electronics
Associations) and ITF, the ICAO Technical Commission, in view of the support of
the majority of delegates for the proposal on licensing standards for ATSEP,
“agreed that the concept of establishing licensing requirements for ATSEP could
be supported in principle but had to be referred to the ICAO Council for further
consideration in view of its financial implications” (ICAO Technical Commission,
2007, para. 30.4.5).
However, in respect of Working Paper A37-WP/160 on ATSEP
competencies and licenses presented to the 37th Session of the Assembly in 2010
by IFATSEA, the Commission reports:
Other comments shared were: in relation to A37-WP/160, that licensing was
not the only means of demonstrating ATSEP competencies; that new
provisions developed by the NGAP Task Force should not overly impact
developing States and that transition measures be considered in the case of
new requirements; and that the scope of the NGAP Task Force be expanded
in a timely manner to include the development of competencies for
aerodrome professionals. (ICAO Technical Commission, 2010, para. 45.8)
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Table 1
Events Relevant to the Struggles for the Establishment of Universal ATSEP Certification
Principles and Standards
Year Events
2000 30th IFATSEA General Assembly, Montreal, Canada – Interactions among
IFATSEA members, the ICAO secretariat and ICAO Air Navigation Commission
members led to the recognition of the fact that ATSEPs were trained to certain
standards.
2003 ICAO 11th Air Navigation Conference, Montreal, Canada, 22 September-3 October
– The conference, inter alia, highlighted the need to subject issues surrounding the
training, competency, and qualification of ATSEP to further investigation.
2004 Development of an ATSEP Training Manual, November – The Training Manual
was approved by the ICAO and the unedited version published as ICAO Doc 7192 –
AN/857 (Part E-2). The Manual effectively set the stage for any proposal regarding
the inclusion of ATSEP in ICAO Annex 1.
2004 35th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 28 September – 8 October –
Under Agenda Item 23: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and
practices related to communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic
management (CNS/ATM) systems, the International Transport Workers’ Federation
(ITF) presented Working Paper A35-WP/198 on “Personnel Regulation as a Tool to
Support Safety and Security in Air Traffic Services”, which invited the Assembly to,
inter alia, develop requirements for the certification or licensing of ATSEPs and
other safety or security sensitive or critical functions as well as request the ICAO
Secretariat to develop proposals for the regulation of working time for ATSEPs and
ATCOs.
2007 36th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 18-28 September – Under
Agenda Item 30: Other Safety Matters, IFATSEA and ITF presented a joint working
paper, A36-WP/210. The working paper invited the ICAO General Assembly to,
inter alia, develop regulatory requirements for the licensing of ATSEPs and for the
certification of safety-critical CNS/ATM systems and equipment.
2010 37th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 28 September - 8 October –
Under Agenda Item 45: Next Generation of Aviation Professionals, IFATSEA
presented working paper, A37-WP/160, on “Competencies and Licenses of Air
Traffic Safety Electronic Personnel (ATSEP)”, which invited the Assembly to
recognize the global context of ATM/ANS, support the updating of ICAO regulations
including Annex 1, and endorse the concept of ATSEP licensing.
2013 38th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 24 September - 3 October –
Under Agenda Item 38: Other issues to be considered by the Technical Commission,
Indonesia presented working paper, A38-WP/151, on “The Integration of Air
Navigation Personnel into Annex 1”, which invited the Assembly to request the
ICAO Council to update Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing – by developing
requirements for air navigation personnel, comprising AIS personnel, ATSEPs, and
flight procedure designer personnel.
2016 39th ICAO General Assembly, Montreal, Canada, 27 September - 7 October –
Under Agenda Item 37, IFATSEA presented working paper, A39-WP/298, on “The
Inclusion of Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel into Annex 1”, which invited
the Assembly to request the Council to undertake the necessary steps to develop
licensing requirements for ATSEP including updating ICAO Annex 1.
Conclusion
This paper explored issues surrounding aviation safety within the context of
a globally-harmonized and comprehensive safety regulation environment and with
an emphasis on the safety ramifications of CNS/ATM systems and functionalities.
The dynamic and complex nature of aviation safety is quite incontestable and is
tied to the evolutionary strides of the aviation systems. The larger picture that this
assertion is painting is that functionalities, tasks, systems, and techniques that were
considered safe or unsafe at a point in time in the past may not necessarily be the
case today. As Huang (2009) has rightly argued:
Safety is also a dynamic rather than static concept. It has a strong temporal
sense. What was considered safe or unsafe yesterday may not be so today.
(p. 4)
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Osunwusi: Aviation Safety and CNS/ATM
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