RONA E.

BARICANTE
03-17792
Legal Medicine, Block A

       
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL LORICA
LABAD
G.R. No. 188124
June 29, 2010

Facts:

The above-named are accused, conspiring and confederating with one John Doe,
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Nino Noel Ramos, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab
wound, which caused his death.

Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne Charisse Gavino
(Dianne). On his way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge connecting the
barangays of Sto. Niño and La Huerta. Thereat, Niño was stabbed and mauled.

Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the vicinity. He met Niño and noticed that
his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by
Joe-An. Cesar immediately brought Niño to the hospital where the latter expired.

Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her cousin
informed her of a commotion on the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, she met a friend
who told her that her boyfriend, Niño, was stabbed and brought to the hospital. She
added that one day before the incident, she and Niño were walking along the bridge
when they passed by the group of appellants and heard Joe-An utter the words, "Iyang
mama na iyan, may araw din siya sa akin." In her testimony during the trial however,
she narrated that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Niño.

Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-legal officer who issued the autopsy
report, testified that the victim was stabbed twice at the back and the assailant was
situated within arm’s length. The victim succumbed from the stab wounds, both of
which, are fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there were contuse abrasions on different
parts of the victim’s body.

Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-Analleged that he was at his
house on 8 December 2002. Joe-An alleged that he was physically forced by the police
to admit the killing of Niño. Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Niño.
RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

(1) whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses are sufficient to prove appellants’
guilt beyond reasonable doubt
(2) whether or not the killing was qualified by treachery and evident premeditation;
(3) whether or not conspiracy has been adequately proven.

Ruling:

We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder not by virtue of identification by Dianne but as established by the dying
declaration of the victim. Upon the other hand, we reverse the conviction of Joel Lorica
Labad. Dianne gave conflicting statements regarding the identity of the assailants. In
her affidavit, she narrated that a friend informed her that Niño was stabbed and taken
to the hospital. During trial however, Dianne testified that she witnessed the actual
stabbing incident. This Court is mindful of the rule that if there is an inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more
weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and
unexplained and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit
the veracity of the witness' claim. Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. From the tenor of her affidavit, Dianne’s
suspicion that appellants committed the crime merely arose from the alleged threats
made by appellants on the victim the day before the incident. To the mind of the Court,
this omission in Dianne’s affidavit is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to
attribute authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne altogether
becomes suspect. Nevertheless, the victim’s dying declaration is a most telling
evidence identifying Joe-an. Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of the
word "Joe-An" when the victim was asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance
that the victim may have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the victim did
not even mention "Joel" or "Joel Labad," the other suspect. As an exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of
the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. In order for a dying
declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness;
and fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. All requisites for a dying declaration were
sufficiently met by the statement of the victim communicated to Cesar. First, the
statement pertained to Niño being stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the
perpetrator. Second, Niño must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of
death considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the bridge. Third,
the competence of Niño is unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident.
Fourth, Niño’s statement was being offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.
Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no direct evidence
linking appellant Joel to the crime. While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the
bridge, this incident appears to be circumstantial and cannot stand to prove Joel’s
complicity without any corroborating evidence. Admittedly, Joel’s defense of denial and
alibi are inherently weak, however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the defense
cannot be the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies with the prosecution
whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who must establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused before there can be conviction. At
this juncture, we acquit appellant Joel.

With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly appreciated the presence of treachery
in qualifying the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

The medical records support the finding of treachery. The nature and location of his
wounds are indicative of the positions of the victim and his assailant at the time the
incident occurred. It is clear under the circumstances that the victim has no
opportunity to retaliate the aggression of the accused when he was stabbed because
according to Dr. Valentin Bernales, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation considering the locations of the wound which was sustained by the
accused, the assailant was about an arm [sic] length away and believed to be at the
back of the victim who was standing and almost in the same level when the first stab
wound was inflicted. As to the second wound, according to Dr. Bernales, the victim
appears already lying face down on the ground when stabbed by the accused which to
some extent is consistent with the testimony of Cesar that his brother/victim was
mauled by four (4) other persons. This may be the reason why the victim sustained
contuse abrasions on the different parts of his body. The victim was suddenly attacked
by appellant on his way home from his girlfriend’s house. He was stabbed twice from
behind. The mode of attack on the victim was clearly executed without risk to the
attacker. We cannot discount the fact that there were other participants to the crime.
Appellant could not have acted alone based on the testimony of the witnesses and the
medico-legal report. However, the identity of the other assailants was not proven by the
prosecution. While affirming that treachery attended the commission of the crime, we
however rule out the presence of evident premeditation. In order for evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his
will. In the instant case, appellant uttered the words "iyang mama na iyan, may araw
din siya sa akin." Even conceding that these utterances were in the form of a threat, it
still cannot be presumed that at the time they were made, there was indeed a
determination to kill and that appellants had indeed clung to that determination,
planning and meditating on how to kill the victim.

Finally, appellants question the sufficiency of evidence to prove conspiracy. There is

In sum, we find that the prosecution has proven that appellant Joe-An is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The acquittal of the other appellant, Joel, is
in order on the ground of reasonable doubt.