Escamilla V Iredale Complaint For Damages and Exhibits 1 Through 7
Escamilla V Iredale Complaint For Damages and Exhibits 1 Through 7
Escamilla V Iredale Complaint For Damages and Exhibits 1 Through 7
1
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.2 Page 2 of 28
2
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.3 Page 3 of 28
7 10. Plaintiff JANIE RICHELLE SANDERS was for all relevant times
13 13. Plaintiffs, each and all of them, bring this action as individuals on
14 their own behalf under both federal and California law. Plaintiff Janie Sanders
15 brings this action on behalf of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith, deceased, in her
17 Smith.
20 HOLSLAG, and other unidentified police officers DOES 1 through 25. The
21 individual defendants performed all of the herein alleged acts for, and in the name
22 of, defendant City of San Diego.
24 and DOES 1 to 25 were, and still are, residents of the County of San Diego, State
25 of California, and were duly appointed and acting police officers for the City of
26 San Diego. They are sued individually and in their capacities as employees of the
27 City of San Diego.
1 Missouri, a citizen of the United States, and doing business throughout the United
2 States. Upon information and belief, MACEY BAIL BONDS was and has been for
3 all relevant times herein registered in the State of Missouri, Charter No.
4 X01275749, with its headquarters and principal place of business located at 114
5 W. North Man, Richmond, MO 64085.
6 17. Upon information and belief, and for all relevant times herein,
7 LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC. (hereinafter “LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU”),
8 d/b/a GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY, was and is a California domestic
9 corporation registered with the California Secretary of State as Corporation No.
10 C2112580, with its headquarters and principal place of business located at 888 W.
11 Santa Ana Blvd., Suite 100, Santa Ana, CA 92701. Plaintiff alleges on information
12 and belief that defendant LEGAL SERVICES BUREAU, INC., d/b/a GLOBAL
13 FUGITIVE RECOVERY, does business as a bail bondsman and fugitive recovery
14 agent in the State of California.
15 18. Plaintiff alleges that defendant DAN ESCAMILLA (“ESCAMILLA”)
16 is an officer and director of defendant LEGAL SERVICES BUREAU, INC., d/b/a
17 GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY, and is a resident of the State of California,
18 County of Orange, and a citizen of the United States. Plaintiffs bring suit against
19 defendant ESCAMILLA as an individual and as a director of LEGAL SERVICE
20 BUREAU, INC., and DOES 26 to 35.
21 19. Upon information and belief, defendant LELAND CHAPMAN BAIL
22 BOND CO., INC. (“LELAND BAIL”) was and is for all relevant times mentioned
23 herein, a State of Colorado corporation with a registered headquarters and principal
24 place of business address of P.O. Box 10204, Colorado Springs, CO 80932.
25 Plaintiffs allege that LELAND BAIL was doing business in the State of California,
26 and throughout the United States, at the time of the incidents alleged herein.
27 20. Upon information and belief, LELAND BAIL was and is for all
28 relevant times mentioned herein a State of Hawaii registered corporation, having
4
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.5 Page 5 of 28
1 Secretary of State file number of 218622 D1. Plaintiff alleges that the purpose of
2 defendant LELAND BAIL is “Acting Services for Reality Television” with the
3 agent for service identified as Leland Chapman, P.O. Box 1134, Kona, HI 96745.
4 Plaintiffs allege LELAND BAIL is and was doing business in the State of
5 California and, throughout the United States, at the time of the incidents alleged
6 herein.
7 21. Upon information and belief, defendant DA KINE BAIL BONDS,
8 INC. (hereinafter “DA KINE”) was and is for all relevant times mentioned herein,
9 a State of Hawaii corporation with headquarters and principal place of business at
10 1381 Queen Emma St., Honolulu, HI 96813. Plaintiffs allege that the purpose of
11 DA KINE is and was bail bond collection, doing business in the State of
12 California, and throughout the United States, at the time of the incidents alleged
13 herein.
14 22. Upon information and belief, defendant KAMA AINA BAIL
15 BONDS, INC. (hereinafter “KAMA’AINA”) was and is for all relevant times
16 mentioned herein, a State of Hawaii corporation, File Number 228303 D1, with
17 headquarters and principal place of business at 74-592 Hale Makai Place, Kailua-
18 Kona, HI 96740, having a website address of http://kamaainabailbonds.com/.
19 Plaintiffs allege that the purpose of KAMA’AINA is and was bail bond collection,
20 and that it was doing business in the State of California, and throughout the United
21 States, at the time of the incidents alleged herein. Plaintiff further alleges that
22 defendant LELAND CHAPMAN is the identified Agent for Service of Process of
23 KAMA’AINA BAIL BONDS, INC. with service addresses of P.O. Box 1134,
24 Kona, Hawaii 96745 and a mailing address of C/O FP Accounting, 1680 N. Vine
25 St., Suite 604, Los Angeles, CA 90028.
26 23. Plaintiff alleges that defendant LELAND CHAPMAN
27 (“CHAPMAN”) is an officer, director, and/or agent of defendants LELAND
28 CHAPMAN BAIL BOND CO., INC., LBC, INC., DA KINE BAIL BONDS,
5
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.6 Page 6 of 28
1 INC., and KAMA’AINA BAIL BONDS, INC. and is a resident of the State of
2 Hawaii, and a citizen of the United States. Plaintiffs bring suit against defendant
3 CHAPMAN as an individual and -as an employee and officer of LELAND
4 CHAPMAN BAIL BOND CO., INC., LBC, INC., DA KINE BAIL BONDS,
5 INC., and KAMA’AINA BAIL BONDS, INC., and DOES 36 TO 50.
6 24. Defendants DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are sued under fictitious
7 names. Their true names and capacities are unknown to plaintiff. Plaintiff will
8 amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.
9 Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each of the
10 fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences
11 alleged in this complaint, and that Plaintiff’s claims alleged in this complaint were
12 proximately caused by such defendants.
13 25. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each
14 named defendant, including DOES 1 through 50, was the agent, servant, employee,
15 or partner of each other defendant, and that each defendant was acting within the
16 course and scope of such agency, employment, partnership, or other business
17 relationship and with the consent or the ratification of each other in doing the
18 things alleged herein.
19 26. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that at all
20 times herein mentioned, -Does 1 through 50, and each of them, were residents
21 and/or doing business within the County of San Diego, State of California, within
22 this judicial district, and that defendants, and each of them, are responsible to
23 plaintiff pursuant to the causes of action set forth herein.
24 IV.
25 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
26 27. This is a claim for damages brought under state and federal law
27 against the CITY OF SAN DIEGO, SHELLEY ZIMMERMAN, SCOTT
7
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.8 Page 8 of 28
8
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.9 Page 9 of 28
1 who otherwise would have been ignored due to the minor nature of their alleged
2 crimes and the minute amount of outstanding bail to be recovered.
3 38. On the date of the incident, November 4, 2015, decedent Timothy
4 Gene Smith was apparently seen by two officers of the San Diego Police
5 Department exiting a store in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego. Mr. Smith was
6 not wearing a t-shirt. He was only wearing tan shorts and black socks. Officers
7 gave chase and Timothy Smith fled. A perimeter was set up, with police
8 helicopters overhead, and canine units were deployed. Timothy Smith was
9 eventually cornered in an alley. After jumping on a ledge, he was unable to move
10 in any direction. He did not have any weapon. He was not a threat in any way-.
11 Yet, Officer Scott Holslag fatally shot Timothy Smith numerous times with a .45
12 caliber weapon-. Mr. Smith was declared dead shortly thereafter.
13 39. Timothy Smith had not committed any crime in California, was not
14 wanted for any crime in California. He had not made any verbal threats or
15 threatening movements or gestures. He was not a danger to the public, Holslag and
16 the other officers never warned him that officers would shoot before officers fired
17 upon him. Plaintiffs further allege that SDPD Officers did not use any other
18 alternative, non-deadly measures against Mr. Smith before using deadly force.
19 40. Decedent Timothy Gene Smith died intestate in the City of San
20 Diego, County of San Diego, State of California. No special administrator or
21 personal representative of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith has been appointed
22 by the Court.
23 41. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Holslag and other unidentified officers
24 shot and killed an unarmed man who posed no immediate threat to them or to any
25 third person. They acted without justification or necessity. The officers’ actions
26 were unreasonable under the circumstances. Their actions constituted an excessive
27 and unreasonable use of force and an unlawful seizure in violation of Mr. Smith’s
28 clearly established rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
9
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.10 Page 10 of 28
1 particularly the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from the use of
2 excessive force.
3 42. Plaintiffs further allege that Officer Scott Holslag has a history of
4 shooting unarmed and non-threatening persons. In 2002, the City of San Diego was
5 sued for his unlawful killing of Gary S. Martin in a similar case in which Mr.
6 Martin was unarmed. Officer Holslag shot Gary Martin three times while he was
7 seated in his vehicle. The San Diego police department did not discipline, and
8 continued employing, Officer Holslag. San Diego did not alter and/or promulgate
9 changes in policies and procedures, or make any changes with respect to the
10 practices or training of its police officers, including Officer Scott Holslag.
11 43. As Police Chief of the San Diego Police Department, Shelley
12 Zimmerman acted under color of law in supervising the SDPD, promulgating and
13 enforcing its policies and procedures, and supervising use of force investigations.
14 The SDPD’s policy and procedure regarding use of force is vague, ambiguous, and
15 inadequate. The SDPD further has a de facto policy, custom and practice of not
16 properly training its officers in the use of force; of authorizing and ratifying the use
17 of excessive force;, and in not properly investigating its officers' use of force. The
18 SDPD's deficient use of force, acceptance of the use of excessive force, and its use
19 of force investigation procedures are unconstitutional policies, customs and
20 practices under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S.
21 658 (1978).
22 44. The City of San Diego has failed to provide proper training for its
23 officers to avoid the use of excessive force, which constitutes a policy for which
24 the city is responsible. SDPD personnel are aware of these failures. They are
25 further aware that no discipline or adequate investigation will result from any
26 excessive use of force. As a result of these policies, customs, and practices, which
27 in fact encourage excessive use of force, Mr. Smith was killed.
28
10
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.11 Page 11 of 28
1 45. The San Diego Police Department is an agency of the City of San
2 Diego, a municipality. As a result of the aforementioned, the City of San Diego
3 engaged in and continues to engage in a pattern and practice of conduct by law
4 enforcement officers that deprived Mr. Smith of rights, privileges, and immunities
5 secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and by the
6 Constitution and laws of California.
7 46. The City of San Diego Police Department has a policy requiring the
8 use of body cameras. It requires that officers activate their body cameras before
9 confronting suspects. Claimants are informed and believe that Officer Scott
10 Holslag was either not wearing a body camera or did not activate his body camera
11 at the time of the incident, in direct violation of SDPD policy.
12 47. Plaintiffs allege the SDPD has a custom and practice of ignoring its
13 body camera policy or policies, and failing to enforce those policies. This further
14 encourages officers in their excessive use of force because absent video evidence,
15 officers know that it is their word against that of a deceased person who is unable
16 to testify about what actually transpired. The SDPD, including Police Chief
17 Shelley Zimmerman, knew about, encouraged and ratified this policy and practice.
18 This custom and practice is an unconstitutional policy (i.e. a policy designed to
19 disregard and ignore written policies) for which the City of San Diego is liable
20 under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
21 V.
22 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION [42 USC § 1983]
23 (Against Defendants Scott Holslag and DOES 1 to 25 on Behalf of
24 All Plaintiffs)
48. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
25
incorporate the same herein by this reference. The acts alleged above, including the
26
act by defendant Holslag of shooting and killing an innocent, unarmed man
27
without justification or necessity, constituted an excessive and unreasonable use of
28
force and thus an unlawful seizure, in violation of Timothy Gene Smith’s rights as
11
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.12 Page 12 of 28
12
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.13 Page 13 of 28
1 VI.
2 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION [42 USC § 1983]
3 (As Against Defendants Scott Holslag and DOES 1 to 25
4 by Janie Richelle Sanders,
Sandy Simmons and Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith)
5
6 54. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
7 incorporates the same herein by this reference. As a result of the acts alleged
8 above, particularly the unjustified, unnecessary and excessive use of deadly force
9 which caused the death of Plaintiffs' decedent Timothy Gene Smith, Plaintiff Janie
10 Richelle Sanders suffered the loss of her husband; Sandy Lynn Simmons suffered
11 the loss of her son; and Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith suffered the loss of his father.
12 Thus, the acts of defendant Holslag deprived Plaintiffs Janie Sanders, Sandy
13 Simmons, and Wyatt Smith of their constitutionally protected First and Fourteenth
14 Amendment rights to the love, support, affection and companionship of Timothy
15 Smith, in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
16 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, inculing their First and Fifth Amendment
17 rights to intimate familial association.
18 55. The acts of defendants and each of them as described caused Timothy
19 Smith’s death, resulting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
20 Plaintiffs Janie Sanders, Sandy Simmons, and Wyatt Smith, Said acts proximately
21 caused the death of plaintiffs' decedent, Timothy Smith, entitling Plaintiffs to
22 general and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
23 56. The aforesaid acts of defendant Holslag were done willfully,
24 maliciously and/or with callous and reckless indifference to decedent’s and
25 plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights and disregard for decedent's safety and continued
26 life, therefore entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at
27 trial.
28 ///
13
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.14 Page 14 of 28
1 VII.
2 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
MONELL VIOLATION [42 USC § 1983]
3 UNLAWFUL POLICIES AND CUSTOM
4 (As Against Defendant City of San Diego by All Plaintiffs)
5 57. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
6 incorporate the same herein by this reference. On information and belief, Plaintiffs
7 allege that defendant City of San Diego, through its police department, has
8 unlawful policies, customs and habits of improper and inadequate hiring, training,
9 retention, discipline and supervision of its police officers, including Officer
10 Holslag, DOES 1 to 25, and others, proximately causing the constitutional
11 deprivations, injuries and damages alleged in the First and Second Causes of
12 Action, As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled to damages pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §
13 1983, in an amount to be proven at trial.
14 58. The City of San Diego has also failed to provide proper training for its
15 officers in the use of excessive force which constitutes a policy for which the city
16 is responsible. SDPD personnel are aware of these failures and are further aware
17 that no discipline or adequate investigation will result from any excessive use of
18 force. As a result of these policies, customs, and practices, which in fact encourage
19 excessive use of force, Mr. Smith was killed.
20 59. Further, on information and belief Plaintiffs allege that defendant City
21 of San Diego, through its police department, has an unlawful policy, custom or
22 habit of permitting, condoning or ratifying the unnecessary and unjustified use of
23 force by its police officers, including the unjustified use of deadly force.
24 60. As Police Chief of the San Diego Police Department, Shelley
25 Zimmerman acted under color of law in supervising the SDPD, promulgating and
26 enforcing its policies and procedures, and supervising the use of force
27 investigations. The SDPD’s policy and procedure regarding use of force is vague,
28 ambiguous, and inadequate. The SDPD further has a de facto policy, custom and
14
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.15 Page 15 of 28
1 practice of not properly training its officers in the use of force, authorizing and
2 ratifying the use of excessive force in unwarranted situations, and in not properly
3 investigating its officers' uses of force, including the investigation into the death of
4 Mr. Smith. The SDPD's deficient use of force, acceptance of the excessive use of
5 force in unwarranted situations, and its use of force investigation procedures are
6 unconstitutional policies, customs and practices under Monell v. Department of
7 Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
8 61. The City of San Diego Police Department further has a policy
9 requiring the use of body cameras and further requires that officers activate their
10 body cameras before confronting suspects. Claimants are informed and believe that
11 Officer Scott Holslag was either not wearing a body camera or did not activate his
12 body camera at the time of the incident, in direct violation of SDPD policy.
13 62. Plaintiffs allege the SDPD has a custom and practice of ignoring its
14 body camera policy or policies, and failing to enforce those policies. This further
15 encourages officers in their excessive use of force because absent video evidence,
16 officers know that it is their word against that of a deceased person who is unable
17 to testify about what actually transpired. The SDPD, including Police Chief,
18 Shelley Zimmerman, knew about, encouraged and ratified this policy and practice.
19 This custom and practice was and is in effect an unconstitutional policy (i.e. a
20 policy designed to disregard and ignore written policies) for which the City of San
21 Diego is liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436
22 U.S. 658 (1978).
23 63. The San Diego Police Department is an agency of the City of San
24 Diego, a municipality. As a result of the aforementioned, the City of San Diego
25 engaged in and continues to engage in a pattern and practice of conduct by law
26 enforcement officers that deprived Mr. Smith of rights, privileges, and immunities
27 secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States and by the
28 Constitution and laws of California.
15
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.16 Page 16 of 28
16
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.17 Page 17 of 28
17
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.18 Page 18 of 28
18
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.19 Page 19 of 28
1 89. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and
2 Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, guarantee (a) an individual's
3 right to be free from excessive force and (b) a wife’s right to the companionship of
4 her husband, a parent's right to the companionship of her child, and a son’s right to
5 the companionship of his father. California Civil Code confers a right to be secure
6 in one’s bodily integrity from assault and excessive force. By engaging in the acts
7 alleged above, Defendants denied those rights to Plaintiffs, thus giving rise to
8 claims for damages pursuant to California Civil Code section 52.1.
9 90. Defendants interfered by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
10 exercise or enjoyment by Timothy Smith of rights secured by the Constitution or
11 laws of the United States.
12 91. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as alleged
13 herein, Plaintiffs were injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
14 including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial
15 and in excess of the jurisdictional amount required by this Court.
16 92. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
17 claim Timothy Gene Smith’s pre-death damages. Plaintiffs have standing to claim
18 damages for Defendants' violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
19 93. In conducting himself as alleged herein, Holslag and DOES 1 to 25
20 were acting within the course and scope of their employment with Defendant City
21 of San Diego. Thus, the City is responsible for Holslag’s actions.
22 94. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
23 and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
24 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
25 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
26 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
27 ///
28 ///
19
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.20 Page 20 of 28
1 XI.
2 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS
3 (As Against Defendants Macey, Escamilla, Legal Services Bureau, Inc.,
4 Leland Chapman, Leland Chapman Bail Bond Co. Inc., LBC, Inc.,
Da Kine Bail Bonds, Inc., and Kama Aina Bail Bonds Inc. by All Plaintiffs)
5
6 95. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
7 incorporate the same herein by this reference
8 96. Plaintiffs allege that defendants Macey, Escamilla, Legal Services
9 Bureau, Inc., Leland Chapman, Leland Chapman Bail Bond Co. Inc., LBC, Inc.,
10 Da Kine Bail Bonds, Inc., and Kama Aina Bail Bonds Inc. conspired to deprive
11 Timothy Gene Smith of his constitutionally protected rights equal protection and
12 due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
13 Constitution by fabricating and falsifying information about Timothy Smith, and
14 publishing and disseminating said information to law enforcement agencies with
15 the knowledge and expectation that law enforcement would act upon that
16 information to deprive Timothy Smith of said rights.
17 97. Plaintiffs further allege that Leland Chapman and LBC, Inc. further
18 conspired to deprive Timothy Smith of his Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to
19 equal protection and due process solely in order to document his capture (of which
20 they were unable to do) for defendant Chapman’s reality television show.
21 98. Defendants conspired to violate Timothy Smith’s Fourth Amendment
22 rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by setting in motion a
23 series of acts that was likely to culminate in the use of excessive force by the San
24 Diego police. By providing false information which these Defendants intended for
25 the police to rely on, they caused the use of excessive force on the part of the
26 police who apprehended Mr. Smith without probable cause.
27 99. In so doing, plaintiffs allege that defendants Macey, Escamilla, Legal
28 Services Bureau, Inc., Leland Chapman, Leland Chapman Bail Bond Co. Inc.,
20
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.21 Page 21 of 28
1 LBC, Inc., Da Kine Bail Bonds, Inc., and Kama Aina Bail Bonds Inc. conspired to
2 violate Timothy Smith’s rights.
3 100. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as alleged
4 herein, Plaintiffs were injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
5 including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
6 101. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
7 claim Timothy Gene Smith’s pre-death damages. Plaintiffs have standing to claim
8 damages for Defendants' violations of their own rights.
9 102. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
10 and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
11 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
12 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
13 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
14 XII.
15 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENCE
16 (As Against All Defendants by All Plaintiffs)
17
103. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
18
incorporate the same herein by this reference.
19
104. By the acts alleged above, Defendants Zimmerman, Holslag, DOES 1
20
to 25, and other employees of the City of San Diego were negligent and breached
21
their duty of due care, thereby causing the injuries to and death of Timothy Gene
22
Smith as described in the First and Second Causes of Action, and the damages
23
described in paragraphs 51, 52, 54 and 55 above. As a result, Plaintiffs are entitled
24
to general and compensatory damages under California law in an amount to be
25
proven at trial.
26
105. Defendants County of San Diego, Zimmerman and Does 1-25
27
breached their duty of care owed to the Plaintiffs by, among other things, failing to
28
21
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.22 Page 22 of 28
22
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.23 Page 23 of 28
1 XIV.
2 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
WRONGFUL DEATH [CAL.CIV.PROC. § 377.60]
3 (against All Defendants by Plaintiffs)
4
5 111. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
6 incorporate the same herein by this reference.
7 112. Defendants committed wrongful acts which proximately caused the
8 death of Tim Smith. Specifically, Defendants deprived Tim Smith of his rights
9 under the United States Constitution to be free from the punishment without due
10 process.
11 113. These acts resulted in the death of Tim Smith.
12 114. The City of San Diego is responsible for the act of individual and Doe
13 Defendants under the theory of respondeat superior.
14 115. The wrongful acts alleged above has destroyed the relationship
15 between Plaintiffs and Tim Smith and has legally, proximately, foreseeably and
16 actually caused severe emotional damages, including the loss of society,
17 companionship, emotional distress, and further economic and non-economic
18 damages according to proof at the time of trial.
19 XV.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
20 SURVIVAL ACTION [CAL.CIV.PROC. § 377.30]
21 (As Against All Defendants by the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith)
22
116. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
23
incorporate the same herein by this reference.
24
117. Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that decedent Timothy
25
Gene Smith did not die immediately following the fatal shooting by Officer Scott
26
Holslag, and lived for a period of time, however short, before finally passing.
27
118. The actual and proximate cause of decedent Timothy Smith’s injuries
28
and damages were the actions and/or omissions of all defendants as alleged further
23
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.24 Page 24 of 28
25
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.26 Page 26 of 28
1 understood the statements to mean that Plaintiff Janie Sanders had committed the
2 serious criminal acts as described.
3 128. Defendants failed to use reasonable care determine the truth or
4 falsity of such information regarding Plaintiff Janie Sanders before publicizing it.
5 129. The actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff Janie Sanders’
6 injuries and damages were the actions and/or omissions of these defendants.
7 130. Plaintiff Janie Sanders is entitled to damages legally,
8 proximately, foreseeably and actually caused by Defendants, including severe
9 emotional damages, ithe loss of society and companionship of her husband,
10 emotional distress, damage to her reputation, and further economic and non-
11 economic damages according to proof at the time of trial, including punitive
12 damages for the malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent acts of Defendants.
13 XV.
14 FOURTEENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FALSE LIGHT
15 (As Against Defendants MACEY, ESCAMILLA, LEGAL SERVICES
16 BUREAU, LELAND CHAPMAN, LELAND CHAPMAN BAIL BOND CO.
INC., DA KINE BAIL BONDS, INC., and/or KAMA AINA BAIL BONDS,
17 INC. by Plaintiff Janie Richelle Sanders)
18
131. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
19
incorporate the same herein by this reference.
20
132. Defendants MACEY, ESCAMILLA, LEGAL SERVICES
21
BUREAU, LELAND CHAPMAN, LELAND CHAPMAN BAIL BOND CO.
22
INC., DA KINE BAIL BONDS, INC., and/or KAMA AINA BAIL BONDS, INC
23
fabricated information about past violent activity of JANIE RICHELLE
24
SANDERS, publicly disseminating false allegations that Plaintiff committed acts
25
of violence, assault, child molestation, and possessed weapons. These defendants
26
printed false information on “WANTED” posters and distributed “WANTED”
27
posters throughout San Diego which contained this false information, alleging
28
Plaintiff Janie Sanders was traveling with her husband who was armed with an
26
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.27 Page 27 of 28
27
COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 1 Filed 12/08/16 PageID.28 Page 28 of 28
13
By: Donald Green
14 DONALD A. GREEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF
15 TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, JANIE
RICHELLE SANDERS, SANDY LYNN
16 SIMMONS, AND WYATT ALLEN
GUNNER SMITH
17
18
19
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
20
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial in this action.
21
22
23 Dated: December 8, 2016 IREDALE & YOO, APC
24
By: Julia Yoo
25
JULIA YOO
26
27
28
28
COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 2
12/5/21, 10:23 AM Gmail - Smith v. City of San Deigo
1 message
Dan Escamilla, JD
Global Fugitive Recovery
a division of Legal Service Bureau, Inc.
www.globalfugitiverecovery.com
This electronic transmission and any documents attached hereto may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential and/or exempt from disclosure
under applicable law. The information is intended only for use by the recipient named above. If you are not the intended recipient and/or you have received
this electronic message in error, please notify the sender and permanently delete the electronic message and any attachments in their entirety, whether in
electronic or hard copy format. You are also hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of information received in error
(including any reliance thereon) is strictly prohibited and may result in civil or criminal liability.
233K
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ik=0710cee6f6&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-f%3A1554450574598590328&simpl=msg-f%3A15544505745… 1/1
GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY
A division of Legal Service Bureau, Inc.
888 W. Santa Ana Blvd, Suite 100
Santa Ana, California 92701
Voicemail & Fax: (714) 783-3016
Cell Phone: (714) 307-1064
e-mail: [email protected]
Donald A. Green
Law Offices of Donald A. Green, PC
1902 Wright Place, 2nd Floor
Carlsbad, CA 92008
Eugene G. Iredale
Iredale & Yoo, APC
105 W. “F” Street, 4th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101-6087
RE: Estate of Timothy Gene Smith et al. v. City of San Diego, et al.
The undersigned has been notified, by a December 14, 2016 telephone call from a San
Diego Tribune reporter, that a federal complaint has been filed seeking damages against
Daniel Escamilla, as an individual and as a director and officer of Legal Service Bureau,
a California Corporation and the parent corporation of Global Fugitive Recovery.
Service of a summons and complaint in this matter has not been effected against the
undersigned or any of these related entities and personal service is not being waived.
This letter is intended to advise each of the plaintiff’s attorneys, and the plaintiff, that the
claims brought against this defendant are wholly without merit and are not warranted
under existing law. Based on the lack of legal and factual merit of plaintiff’s claims
against this defendant, the undersigned is demanding immediate dismissal as a defendant
in this action. The dismissal may be without prejudice, leaving plaintiffs with the option
of re-naming this defendant in the future if evidence is later discovered which supports a
valid claim against this defendant under California law.
Finally, this letter will place plaintiffs, and its attorneys, on notice that if the undersigned
and related entities are not immediately dismissed from this action, monetary and
nonmonetary sanctions, including but not limited to a Rule 11 motion will be brought
against plaintiff and its attorneys seeking costs, attorney’s fees and sanctions.
Messrs. Green and Iredale
December 22, 2016
Page Two
As against the undersigned and related entities, Plaintiffs allege seven (7) causes of
action:
1.) Conspiracy to violate the equal protection and due process rights under the 14th
Amendment of Timothy Gene Smith “by [allegedly] fabricating and falsifying
information about Timothy Smith, and publishing and disseminating said
information to law enforcement agencies with the knowledge and expectation that
law enforcement would act upon that information to deprive Timothy Smith of
said rights.”
2.) Negligence “in providing misleading information to the police and others which
was likely to lead to harm fell below the standard of care owed to Timothy Gene
Smith.”
3.) Wrongful Death under CCP 377.60 by allegedly “depriv[ing] Tim Smith of his
rights under the United States Constitution to be free from the punishment without
due process.”
4.) Survival Action under CCP 377.30 by allegedly committing a “conspiracy to
deprive Timothy Gene Smith of his Fourteenth Amendment rights through false
publication and engagement of law enforcement…”
5.) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by “publiciz[ing] false information
accusing Plaintiff Janie Sanders of committing serious criminal acts in reckless
disregard for the natural consequences of their actions and the harm their behavior
would cause.”
6.) Defamation by “publicly disseminating false allegations that Plaintiff committed
acts of violence, assault, child molestation, and possessed weapons…” which
were allegedly false.
7.) False Light by allegedly “fabricat[ing] information about past violent activity of
JANIE RICHELLE SANDERS, publicly disseminating false allegations that
Plaintiff committed acts of violence, assault, child molestation, and possessed
weapons.”
II. THE COMPLAINT IS IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S ANTI-SLAPP
STATUTE
“A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
Messrs. Green and Iredale
December 22, 2016
Page Three
To prevail on a motion to strike under section 415.16, a defendant must demonstrate that
the acts complained of were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue” and that plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim.
The issue will then become whether plaintiffs can demonstrate a probability of prevailing
on their claims, all based on the communications made by defendant to the police. As to
this issue, California law unequivocally provides that statements to police officers by
private citizens are privileged communications.
Our state’s Supreme Court has held that the litigation privilege under Civil Code section
47, subdivision (b) provides an absolute privilege from tort liability for communications
concerning possible wrongdoing made to a local police department. (Hagberg v.
California Federal Bank FSB (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 364; accord Mulder v. Pilot Air
Freight (2004) 32 Cal.4th 384, 387.) The Supreme Court explained that section 47,
subdivision (b) “‘serves the important public interest of securing open channels of
communications’ between citizens and law enforcement personnel investigating
wrongdoing.” (Mulder v. Pilot Air Freight, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 387; Hagberg v.
California Federal Bank FSB, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 372.)
Because all of the undersigned’s alleged liability is based on communications which are
absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47 and which are within the category of
constitutionally protected speech, there is no reasonable cause for this defendant to be
named as a party in this litigation. Any claims against this defendant which are premised
on his communications with the police, are wholly without merit.
Business & Professions Code section 6068(c), imposes a duty upon a lawyer to bring
only "legal or just" claims or defenses in civil actions. Similarly, the Rules of
Professional Conduct provide:
Well-settled California law explains what it means to bring an action “without probable
cause”:
As the Court noted in Jorgensen v. Taco Bell Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1398,
“[f]rivolous litigation is frequently avoided by a careful lawyer’s investigation of a
client’s claims before filing suit.”
In the within case, there is no there is no evidence which establishes that any of the
plaintiffs was the subject of communications made to the police concerning Timothy
Smith as stated in police advisory attached to the complaint. Accordingly, there is no
factual or legal basis for any of the plaintiffs to bring causes of action for either
defamation or false light. In any event, as discussed above, there is an absolute privilege
as to communications by the undersigned to police officers.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, provides that a pleading, motion, or paper
must be “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.”
An attorney must conduct an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law to
make sure the complaint is well-founded Holgate v. Baldwin 425 F.3d 671, 675-77 (9th
Cir. 2005). To constitute a reasonable inquiry, the prefiling investigation must uncover a
factual basis for the plaintiff’s allegations, as well as a legal basis. Coonts v. Potts 316
F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003)
The pre-filing inquiry also includes the obligation to investigate affirmative defenses. See
Tura v. Sherwin-Williams Co. Nos. 90-3419, 90-3445, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11792, at
*8 (6th Cir. May 28, 1991); White v. Gen. Motors Corp. 908 F.2d 675, 682 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); Profile Publishing & Management Corp. APS
v. Musicmaker.com, Inc. 242 F. Supp. 2d 363, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 991, at *11-12
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2003).
Messrs. Green and Iredale
December 22, 2016
Page Five
As explained in Section II. of this letter, all of the undersigned’s actions which form the
basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint, involve constitutionally protected speech and are
absolutely privileged under California law. No reasonable attorney with any basic
understanding of California’s anti-SLAPP statute or California’s litigation privilege as it
applies to communications made by civilians to police officers, would file or move
forward with the causes of action that the plaintiffs have brought against the undersigned.
At this juncture, I have not yet been served with the complaint, nor have I hired an
attorney to represent me in these proceedings. However, if plaintiffs do not voluntarily
dismiss the undersigned from these proceedings I will have no choice but to engage the
services of a law firm specializing in federal litigation and incur costs and attorney’s fees
to bring a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion.
If it becomes necessary to incur attorney’s fees to seek dismissal of this action as to the
undersigned, I will direct this attorney to file a separate Rule 11 motion to recoup all
costs and attorney’s fees which are expended by the undersigned, as well as sanctions,
against all plaintiffs, Donald A. Green, Eugene G. Iredale and the law firm of Iredale &
Yoo, APC. Other remedies arising out of the unwarranted claims being brought against
the undersigned may also be sought. These remedies may include, but are not limited to,
a malicious prosecution action against plaintiffs and their attorneys after the action is
terminated in favor of this defendant.
While this case resulted in an unfortunate loss of life, all of the actions taken by the
undersigned in this case were in the course and scope of fugitive recovery operations and
entirely lawful and appropriate. For the reasons discussed in detail herein, I will look
forward to receiving plaintiff’s dismissal as to the undersigned defendant and related
entities.
Dan Escamilla
/de
Estate of Timothy Gene Smith et al v. City of San Diego et al Date Filed: 12/08/2016
Assigned to: Judge William Q. Hayes Jury Demand: Both
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Michael S. Berg Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other
Case in other court: USCA, 18−55429 Jurisdiction: Federal Question
USCA, 21−55073
Cause: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act − Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights
Plaintiff
Estate of Timothy Gene Smith represented by Donald A Green
by his successor in interest Wyatt Allen Law Office of Donald A Green, PC
Gunner Smith 5927 Balfour Ct. # 202
Carlsbad, CA 92008
(760) 431−5290
Fax: (760) 268−9889
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene G. Iredale
Iredale & Yoo, APC
105 West F Street
4th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101−6036
(619)233−1525
Fax: (619)233−3221
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Yoo
Iredale & Yoo, APC
105 West F Street
4th Floor
San Diego, CA 92101−6036
(619)233−1525
Fax: (619)233−3221
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
Janie Richelle Sanders represented by Donald A Green
as an individual (See above for address)
TERMINATED: 03/09/2018 LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Yoo
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene G. Iredale
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
Sandy Lynn Simmons represented by Donald A Green
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Yoo
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene G. Iredale
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Plaintiff
Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith represented by Donald A Green
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Julia Yoo
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Eugene G. Iredale
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
Shelley Zimmerman represented by Casey M. Sweda
individuals and on behalf of City of San San Diego City Attorney's office
Diego 1200 Third Avenue
TERMINATED: 07/13/2017 Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
619−533−5800
Fax: 619−533−5856
Email: [email protected] (Inactive)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline J. McQuarrie
San Diego City Attorney's Office
1200 Third Avenue
Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
619−533−5910
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rayna A. Stephan
Office of The San Diego City Attorney
1200 Third Avenue
Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
(619)533−5800
Fax: (619)533−5856
Email: [email protected]
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
LEAD ATTORNEY
Pamela C. Chalk
Murchison & Cumming, LLP
750 B Street
Suite 2550
San Diego, CA 92101
619−544−6838
Fax: 619−544−1568
Email: [email protected]
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
Defendant
Scott Holslag represented by Casey M. Sweda
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline J. McQuarrie
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rayna A. Stephan
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
LEAD ATTORNEY
Pamela C. Chalk
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
Defendant
Natalie Ann Macey represented by Bethsaida C. Obra−White
as an individual Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
doing business as 402 W. Broadway
Macey Bail Bonds Suite 1850
San Diego, CA 92101−3576
619.595.5583
Fax: 619.595.7873
Email: BObra−[email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Lawrence S. Zucker , II
Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
402 W. Broadway, Ste. 1850
San Diego, CA 92101
619−595−5583
Fax: 619−595−7873
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Stanley D Prowse
Law Offices of Stanley D. Prowse
5876 Owens Avenue
Suite 150
Carlsbad, CA 92008
760−438−8460
Fax: 760−438−4379
Email: [email protected]
TERMINATED: 04/10/2017
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Legal Service Bureau, Inc.
a California domestic corporation
doing business as
Global Fugitive Recovery
Defendant
Dan Escamilla represented by Dan Escamilla
as an individual and on behalf of Legal 304 S. Jones Blvd. #3505
Service Bureau, Inc. (PRO SE Las Vegas, NV 89107
ALLOWED TO E−FILE) (714) 783−3016
Fax: (714) 783−3016
Email: [email protected]
PRO SE
Defendant
Leland Chapman Bail Bond Co. Inc. represented by David Harrison Lawton
a Colorado corporation The Gallagher Law Group PC
TERMINATED: 09/20/2017 1875 Century Park East
Suite 1550
Los Angeles, CA 90067
310−203−2600
Fax: 310−203−2610
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
LBC, Inc. represented by David Harrison Lawton
a Hawaii corporation (See above for address)
TERMINATED: 09/20/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Da Kine Bail Bonds, Inc.
a Hawaii corporation
TERMINATED: 12/29/2016
Defendant
Kama Aina Bail Bonds, Inc. represented by David Harrison Lawton
a Hawaii Corporation (See above for address)
TERMINATED: 09/20/2017 LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Leland B. Chapman represented by David Harrison Lawton
as an individual and on behalf of Leland (See above for address)
Chapman Bail Bond Co. Inc., LBC, Inc., LEAD ATTORNEY
and Kama Aina Bail Bonds, Inc. ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
TERMINATED: 09/20/2017
Defendant
Does 1−50
inclusive
Defendant
San Diego, City of represented by Casey M. Sweda
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jacqueline J. McQuarrie
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Rayna A. Stephan
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
LEAD ATTORNEY
Pamela C. Chalk
(See above for address)
TERMINATED: 12/10/2019
Defendant
David Brecht represented by Jacqueline J. McQuarrie
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Casey M. Sweda
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Ismael Soto
as an individual
12
ESTATE OF TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, Case No.: 16-CV-2989-WQH-MDD
13 by his successor in interest Wyatt Allen
Gunner Smith, SANDY LYNN SECOND AMENDED
14 SIMMONS, and WYATT ALLEN COMPLAINT
GUNNER SMITH,
15 1. VIOLATION OF THE
Plaintiffs, FOURTH AMENDMENT
16 v. (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
2. VIOLATION OF THE
17 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; SCOTT FOURTEENTH
HOLSLAG; NATALIE ANN MACEY AMENDMENT
18 d/b/a MACEY BAIL BONDS, as an (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
individual; LEGAL SERVICE 3. VIOLATION OF CIVIL
19 BUREAU, INC. d/b/a GLOBAL RIGHTS
FUGITIVE RECOVERY, a California (CAL. CIV.CODE § 52.1)
20 domestic corporation; DAN
ESCAMILLA, as an individual and on 4. BATTERY
21 behalf of LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, 5. WRONGFUL DEATH
INC.; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, (CAL.CIV.PROC. § 377.60)
22 6. CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE
Defendants. CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C.
23 §1983)
24
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
25
26
27
28
1
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.904 Page 2 of 16
1
2 Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, by its successor in
3 interest Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith, SANDY LYNN SIMMONS, and WYATT
4 ALLEN GUNNER SMITH allege as follows:
5 I.
6 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7 1. Jurisdiction of this court arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337,
8 1343(a), and 1367(a); and 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1988.
9 2. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state law
10 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
11 3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in the Southern
12 District of California because the acts or omissions which form the basis of the
13 Plaintiff’s claims occurred in San Diego County, within the Southern District of
14 California.
15 4. The Estate is the estate of decedent Timothy Smith. Under Section
16 377.20 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the Estate has standing to bring
17 claims for Timothy Smith for the torts resulting in his death. For jurisdictional
18 purposes, and since Timothy Smith’s death occurred in California, the Estate
19 resides in California.
20 5. Decedent Timothy Smith died intestate.
21 6. Timothy Smith is survived by Plaintiff Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith, his
22 son. Wyatt Smith is the successor in interest of the Estate of Timothy Smith.
23 7. Jamie Richelle Sanders has waived any interest she may have in
24 decedent’s estate, causes of action and this case. No other person has any claim to
25 the Estate superior to that of Wyatt Smith.
26 8. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §377.32(a), Wyatt
27 Smith has executed and filed the requisite affidavit to establish that he is
28
2
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.905 Page 3 of 16
1 decedent’s successor in interest and may properly prosecute this action on behalf
2 of the Estate of Timothy Smith.
3 II.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
4
9. Pursuant to section 910 of the California Government Code, Plaintiffs
5
timely filed administrative claims with the City of San Diego (“City”) on April 29,
6
2016. Their claims were denied by written letter on July 7, 2016.
7
10. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies before filing this
8
instant action.
9 III.
10 PARTIES
11 11. The individual plaintiffs are natural persons, citizens, domiciliaries
12 and permanent residents of the State of Missouri.
13 12. Plaintiff WYATT ALLEN GUNNER SMITH is the son of plaintiff’s
14 decedent TIMOTHY GENE SMITH.
15 13. Plaintiff SANDY LYNN SIMMONS is the mother of plaintiff’s
16 decedent TIMOTHY GENE SMITH.
17 14. Plaintiffs bring this action as individuals on their own behalf under
18 both federal and California law. In addition, Plaintiff Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith
19 brings this action on behalf of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith as successor in
20 interest of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith.
21 15. The City of San Diego is a municipality within the State of California
22 and is the employer of Defendants SCOTT HOLSLAG, and other unidentified
23 police officers DOES 1 through 25. The individual defendants performed all of the
24 herein alleged acts for, and in the name of, defendant City of San Diego.
25 16. At all times relevant hereto, defendant HOLSLAG, and DOES 1 to 25
26 were, and still are, residents of the County of San Diego, State of California, and
27 were duly appointed and acting police officers for the City of San Diego. They are
28 sued individually and in their capacities as employees of the City of San Diego.
3
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.906 Page 4 of 16
4
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.907 Page 5 of 16
1 occurrences alleged in this complaint, and that Plaintiffs’ claims alleged in this
2 complaint were proximately caused by such defendants.
3 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each
4 named defendant, including DOES 1 through 50, was the agent, servant, employee,
5 or partner of each other defendant, and that each defendant was acting within the
6 course and scope of such agency, employment, partnership, or other business
7 relationship and with the consent or the ratification of each other in doing the
8 things alleged herein.
9 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that at all
10 times herein mentioned, Does 1 through 50, and each of them, were residents
11 and/or doing business within the County of San Diego, State of California, within
12 this judicial district, and that defendants, and each of them, are responsible to
13 plaintiffs pursuant to the causes of action set forth herein.
14 IV.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
15
23. Plaintiffs SANDY LYNN SIMMONS and WYATT ALLEN
16
GUNNER SMITH are currently residents of Missouri. Ms. Simmons is the mother
17
of decedent Timothy Smith; and Mr. Smith is the son of decedent Timothy Smith.
18
24. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the wrongful death and
19
deprivations of the civil rights of Timothy Smith that occurred on November 4,
20
2015.
21
25. On November 4, 2015, decedent Timothy Smith was with Janie
22
Richelle Sanders in the Pacific Beach area of San Diego.
23
26. At the time, Janie Sanders was on bail for minor, non-violent drug
24
possession charges pending in the state of Missouri. Defendant Natalie Ann
25
Macey, d/b/a Macey Bail Bonds, had posted bail on her behalf in the amount of
26
$7500.00. Mrs. Sanders and Mr. Smith left Missouri to visit decedent’s sister in
27
San Diego.
28
5
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.908 Page 6 of 16
25 ////
26
27 ////
28 ////
6
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.909 Page 7 of 16
1 ////
2
////
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
7
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.910 Page 8 of 16
8
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.911 Page 9 of 16
1 force and an unlawful seizure in violation of Mr. Smith’s clearly established rights
2 as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, particularly the Fourth and
3 Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from the use of excessive force.
4 V.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5 FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION [42 U.S.C. § 1983]
6 (Against Defendants Scott Holslag and DOES 1 to 25 by
All Plaintiffs)
7
37. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
8
incorporate the same herein by this reference. The acts alleged above, including the
9
act by defendant Holslag of shooting and killing an innocent, unarmed man
10
without justification or necessity, constituted an excessive and unreasonable use of
11
force and thus an unlawful seizure, in violation of Timothy Smith’s rights as
12
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, particularly the Fourth Amendment.
13
Plaintiff Estate of Timothy Gene Smith is therefore entitled to damages pursuant to
14
42 U.S.C. §1983, et seq. in an amount to be proven at trial.
15
38. Timothy Smith was detained and seized by Defendant Holslag
16
without a warrant or probable cause. These acts, which led to the shooting and
17
death of Mr. Smith, constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of Mr. Smith’s
18
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Plaintiff Estate of Timothy
19
Gene Smith is entitled to damages pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, et seq. in an
20
amount to be proven at trial.
21
39. The acts of defendant Holslag as described above amounted to
22
deliberate indifference to decedent’s Constitutional Rights.
23
40. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful acts, excessive force,
24
unlawful seizure and recklessness described above, plaintiffs' decedent Timothy
25
Gene Smith suffered severe injuries and loss of his life. His estate is entitled to
26
general and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
27
28
9
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.912 Page 10 of 16
10
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.913 Page 11 of 16
1 45. Tim Smith was unarmed and posed no threat. Defendants had time
2 and opportunity to deliberate before employing deadly force. Defendants’ use of
3 deadly force was unreasonable.
4 46. The acts of defendants and each of them as described caused Timothy
5 Smith’s death, resulting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
6 Plaintiffs Sandy Simmons and Wyatt Smith. These acts proximately caused the
7 death of plaintiffs' decedent, Timothy Smith, entitling Plaintiffs to general and
8 compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
9 47. The aforesaid acts of defendant Holslag were done willfully,
10 maliciously and/or with callous and reckless indifference to decedent’s and
11 plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights and disregard for decedent's safety and continued
12 life, therefore entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at
13 trial.
14 VII.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
15 VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS [CAL.CIV.CODE §52.1]
16 (Against Defendants City of San Diego, Scott Holslag and Does 1-25
by Estate of Timothy Smith)
17
51. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
18
incorporate the same by this reference.
19
52. Defendants interfered by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
20
exercise or enjoyment by Timothy Smith of rights secured by the Constitution or
21
laws of the United States.
22
53. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and
23
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, guarantee (a) an individual's
24
right to be free from excessive force and (b) a parent's right to the companionship
25
of her child, and a son’s right to the companionship of his father. California Civil
26
Code section 43 confers a right to be secure in one’s bodily integrity from assault
27
and excessive force. By engaging in the acts alleged above, Defendants denied
28
11
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.914 Page 12 of 16
1 those rights to Plaintiff, thus giving rise to claims for damages pursuant to
2 California Civil Code section 52.1.
3 54. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, as alleged
4 herein, Plaintiff was injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
5 including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial
6 and in excess of the jurisdictional amount required by this Court.
7 55. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
8 claim Timothy Gene Smith’s pre-death damages.
9 56. In conducting himself as alleged herein, Holslag and DOES 1 to 25
10 were acting within the course and scope of their employment with Defendant City
11 of San Diego. Thus, the City is responsible for Holslag’s and Doe Defendants’
12 actions.
13 57. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
14 and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
15 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
16 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
17 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
18 VIII.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
19 BATTERY
20 (Against Defendants City of San Diego, Scott Holslag and DOES 1 to 25 by All
Plaintiffs)
21
58. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
22
incorporate the same herein by this reference.
23
59. By the acts alleged herein, particularly defendant Holslag's act of
24
shooting and killing Timothy Gene Smith, as described in the Factual Allegations
25
and the First and Second Causes of Action, defendants committed a battery upon
26
Timothy Smith which caused him to suffer injuries and wrongful death, thereby
27
28
12
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.915 Page 13 of 16
13
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.916 Page 14 of 16
1 X.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
3 (Against Defendants NATALIE ANN MACEY d/b/a MACEY BAIL BONDS,
as an individual; LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC. d/b/a GLOBAL
4
FUGITIVE RECOVERY, a California domestic corporation; DAN
5 ESCAMILLA, as an individual and on behalf of LEGAL SERVICE
6 BUREAU, INC.; and DOES 26-50 by All Plaintiffs)
1 joint operation with themselves to locate and seize decedent and Janie Sanders.
2 Pursuant to this plan, defendants provided false information regarding possession
3 of dangerous firearms, and non-existent convictions for crimes of violence to
4 S.D.P.D. Defendant Escamilla falsely reported that decedent and Janie Sanders
5 were “armed and dangerous.”
6 70. Defendants in this cause of action acted under color of state law.
7 Defendants engaged in a search for and surveillance of decedent and Janie Sanders
8 on the day of his death as part of a joint operation in which they coordinated with
9 the San Diego Police Department. Defendant Escamilla, a licensed bondsman and
10 fugitive recovery agent, engaged in frequent communication, coordination, and
11 planning with the S.D.P.D. These activities were directed at locating and detaining
12 decedent and Janie Richelle Sanders. On the date of Timothy Smith’s death,
13 Escamilla and/or his agents specifically searched in the Pacific Beach area of San
14 Diego, and shared the results of their efforts with S.D.P.D.
15 71. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as alleged
16 herein, Plaintiffs were injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
17 including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
18 72. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
19 claim Timothy Smith’s pre-death damages. Plaintiffs have standing to claim
20 damages for Defendants' violations of their own rights.
21 73. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
22 and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
23 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
24 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
25 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
26 ////
27 ////
28 ////
15
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MDD Document 96 Filed 03/09/18 PageID.918 Page 16 of 16
1 XI.
PRAYER FOR
2 DAMAGES AND OTHER REMEDIES
3 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for judgment against DEFENDANTS
4 and relief as follows:
5 1. For compensatory damages, including special and general damages;
6 2. For exemplary and punitive damages against defendants Holslag, Macey,
7 Escamilla, Legal Services Bureau, Inc., and DOES 1-50 in an amount to be proven
8 at trial;
9 3. For attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988, and
10 Cal.Civ.Code § 52.1(h);
11 4. For costs of suit herein incurred;
12 5. For interest according to law;
13 6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.
14
15
Dated: March 9, 2018 IREDALE & YOO, APC
16
17
By:/s/ Julia Yoo
18
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF
19 TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, SANDY LYNN
SIMMONS, AND WYATT ALLEN
20 GUNNER SMITH
21
22
23 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
24 Plaintiffs demand a jury trial in this action.
25
Dated: March 9, 2018 IREDALE & YOO, APC
26
By:/s/ Julia Yoo
27
28
16
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 6
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1538 Page 1 of 24
12
ESTATE OF TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, Case No.: 16-CV-2989-WQH-MSB
13 by his successor in interest Wyatt Allen
Gunner Smith, SANDY LYNN THIRD AMENDED
14 SIMMONS, and WYATT ALLEN COMPLAINT
GUNNER SMITH,
15 1. VIOLATION OF THE
Plaintiffs, FOURTH AMENDMENT
16 v. (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
2. VIOLATION OF THE
17 CITY OF SAN DIEGO; SCOTT FOURTEENTH
HOLSLAG; DAVID BRECHT; AMENDMENT
18 NATALIE ANN MACEY d/b/a (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
MACEY BAIL BONDS, as an 3. VIOLATION OF CIVIL
19 individual; LEGAL SERVICE RIGHTS
BUREAU, INC. d/b/a GLOBAL (CAL. CIV.CODE § 52.1)
20 FUGITIVE RECOVERY, a California
domestic corporation; DAN 4. BATTERY
21 ESCAMILLA, as an individual and on 5. WRONGFUL DEATH
behalf of LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, (CAL.CIV.PROC. § 377.60)
22 INC.; and ISMAEL SOTO, as an 6. CONSPIRACY TO
individual, VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS
23 (42 U.S.C. §1983)
Defendants. 7. VIOLATION OF CIVIL
24 RIGHTS (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
25
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
26
27
28
1
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1539 Page 2 of 24
2
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1540 Page 3 of 24
1 decedent’s successor in interest and may properly prosecute this action on behalf
2 of the Estate of Timothy Smith.
3
II.
4 EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
5 9. Pursuant to section 910 of the California Government Code, Plaintiffs
6 timely filed administrative claims with the City of San Diego (“City”) on April 29,
7 2016. Their claims were denied by written letter on July 7, 2016.
8 10. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies before filing this
9 instant action.
10
III.
11
PARTIES
12 11. The individual plaintiffs are natural persons, citizens, domiciliaries
13 and permanent residents of the State of Missouri.
14 12. Plaintiff WYATT ALLEN GUNNER SMITH is the son of plaintiff’s
15 decedent TIMOTHY GENE SMITH.
16 13. Plaintiff SANDY LYNN SIMMONS is the mother of plaintiff’s
17 decedent TIMOTHY GENE SMITH.
18 14. Plaintiffs bring this action as individuals on their own behalf under
19 both federal and California law. In addition, Plaintiff Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith
20 brings this action on behalf of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith as successor in
21 interest of the Estate of Timothy Gene Smith.
22 15. The City of San Diego is a municipality within the State of California
23 and is the employer of Defendants SCOTT HOLSLAG and DAVID
24 BRECHT.Defendants HOLSLAG and BRECHT performed all of the herein
25 alleged acts for, and in the name of, Defendant City of San Diego.
26 16. At all times relevant hereto, defendants SCOTT HOLSLAG, and
27 DAVID BRECHT were, and still are, residents of the County of San Diego, State
28 of California, and were duly appointed and acting police officers for the City of
3
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1541 Page 4 of 24
1 San Diego. They are sued individually and in their capacities as employees of the
2 City of San Diego.
3 17. Defendant NATALIE ANN MACEY, d/b/a MACEY BAIL BONDS
4 (hereinafter “MACEY”), is a resident of the State of Missouri, a citizen of the
5 United States, and does business throughout the United States. MACEY BAIL
6 BONDS was and has been for all relevant times herein registered in the State of
7 Missouri, Charter No. X01275749, with its headquarters and principal place of
8 business located at 114 W. North Main, Richmond, MO 64085.
9 18. LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC. (hereinafter “LEGAL SERVICE
10 BUREAU”), d/b/a GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY, was and is a California
11 domestic corporation registered with the California Secretary of State as
12 Corporation No. C2112580, with its headquarters and principal place of business
13 located at 888 W. Santa Ana Blvd., Suite 100, Santa Ana, CA 92701. LEGAL
14 SERVICES BUREAU, INC., d/b/a GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY, does
15 business as a bail bondsman and fugitive recovery agent in the State of California.
16 19. Defendant DAN ESCAMILLA (“ESCAMILLA”) is an officer and
17 director of defendant LEGAL SERVICES BUREAU, INC., d/b/a GLOBAL
18 FUGITIVE RECOVERY, and is a resident of the State of California, County of
19 Orange, and a citizen of the United States. Upon information and belief, ISMAEL
20 SOTO is DAN ESCAMILLA’s partner, employee, and/or agent at LEGAL
21 SERVICES BUREAU, INC., d/b/a GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY, and is a
22 resident of the State of California, County of Riverside, and a citizen of the United
23 States. Plaintiffs bring suit against defendant SOTO as an individual.
24 20. Defendants DOES 2 through 25 and 27 through 50, inclusive, are sued
25 under fictitious names. Their true names and capacities are unknown to plaintiff.
26 Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when
27 they are ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege
28 that each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for
4
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1542 Page 5 of 24
1 the occurrences alleged in this complaint, and that Plaintiffs’ claims alleged in this
2 complaint were proximately caused by such defendants.
3 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that each
4 named defendant, including DOES 2 through 25 and 27 through 50, was the agent,
5 servant, employee, or partner of each other defendant, and that each defendant was
6 acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment, partnership, or
7 other business relationship and with the consent or the ratification of each other in
8 doing the things alleged herein.
9 22. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that at all
10 times herein mentioned, DOES 2 through 25 and 27 through 50, and each of them,
11 were residents and/or doing business within the County of San Diego, State of
12 California, within this judicial district, and that defendants, and each of them, are
13 responsible to plaintiffs pursuant to the causes of action set forth herein.
14 23. Defendant BRECHT had previously been named as “Doe #1” in the
15 second amended complaint. Plaintiffs have since discovered his name, his role in
16 the events of the case, and the facts giving rise to his liability.
17 24. Defendant ISMAEL SOTO had previously been named as “Doe #26”
18 in the previous complaints herein. Plaintiffs have since discovered his name, his
19 role in the events of the case, and the facts giving rise to his liability.
20 IV.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
21
25. Plaintiffs SANDY LYNN SIMMONS and WYATT ALLEN
22
GUNNER SMITH are currently residents of Missouri. Ms. Simmons is the mother
23
of decedent Timothy Smith; and Mr. Smith is the son of decedent Timothy Smith.
24
26. Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the wrongful death and
25
deprivations of the civil rights of Timothy Smith that occurred on November 4,
26
2015.
27
27. In November 2015, Janie Sanders was on bail for a minor, non-violent
28
drug possession charge pending in the state of Missouri. Defendant Natalie Ann
5
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1543 Page 6 of 24
1 Macey, d/b/a Macey Bail Bonds, had posted bail on her behalf in the amount of
2 $7500.00. Ms. Sanders and Mr. Smith left Missouri to visit decedent’s sister in
3 San Diego. Ms. Sanders failed to appear in court for an appearance in her drug
4 possession case, and a warrant was issued for her arrest in Missouri.
5 28. Defendant MACEY engaged defendants ESCAMILLA, SOTO, and
6 LEGAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC., d/b/a GLOBAL FUGITIVE RECOVERY,
7 both registered and doing business in the State of California.
8 29. Defendant MACEY was specifically interested in apprehending Janie
9 Sanders.
10 30. Defendants ESCAMILLA and SOTO style themselves as “bail bond
11 agents,” “bail recovery agents” and “bounty hunters.” Defendant MACEY sought
12 ESCAMILLA’s and SOTO’s assistance in order to arrest Janie Sanders, and avoid
13 the forfeiture of the $7500 bail.
14 31. To increase the chances of recovering Janie Sanders, Defendants
15 MACEY and ESCAMILLA, with the assistance of SOTO, began to invent facts
16 pertaining to Janie Sanders’s and Timothy Smith’s criminal history.
17 32. Defendants MACEY and ESCAMILLA, and with the assistance of
18 ESCAMILLA’s agent SOTO, intentionally and maliciously fabricated false claims
19 that both Janie Sanders and Timothy Smith were presently armed and dangerous.
20 33. In an intentional and malicious effort to apprehend Ms. Sanders,
21 defendants MACEY, ESCAMILLA, and LEGAL SERVICES BUREAU, through
22 its agent SOTO, fabricated false information about past violent activity of both
23 Janie Sanders as well as Timothy Smith, including non-existent acts of violence,
24 child molestation, armed robbery and flight from Missouri State Troopers.
25 34. On November 3, 2015 at 3:18 p.m., ISMAEL SOTO spoke with a
26 representative of the San Diego Police Department. SOTO stated that he was
27 acting with his “partner” Don ESCAMILLA. SOTO stated that Janie Sanders and
28 Timothy G. Smith were fugitives from Missouri. SOTO stated that he and his
6
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1544 Page 7 of 24
1 partner were going to call for “back up” because of the seriousness of the fugitives
2 with whom they were dealing, adding “this guy [Mr. Smith] is going away for
3 life.” SOTO then requested to speak to Officer Colin Governski. When told that
4 Governski was not then on duty, SOTO stated, “I have his personal cell, I will give
5 him a jingle.” SOTO ended the call by saying “This should be a fun one.”
6 35. At 3:45 p.m., on the same date, Defendant ESCAMILLA spoke to San
7 Diego Police Department. ESCAMILLA said that now “we are Code 5” (jargon
8 for “on surveillance”) in the area of Fanuel Park in the Pacific Beach section of
9 San Diego. ESCAMILLA stated that he was engaged in surveillance with at least
10 two other persons. ESCAMILLA explained that he would later call for SDPD
11 assistance and to have SDPD take the persons into custody. Defendant
12 ESCAMILLA told the San Diego Police operator that Janie Sanders and Timothy
13 Smith had been spotted. The operator asked ESCAMILLA if he was alone or with
14 someone. ESCAMILLA informed the operator the he was with two observers, one
15 of whom was ISMAEL SOTO.
16 36. Later that same date, SOTO and ESCAMILLA reported that they
17 believed Janie Sanders and Timothy Smith were having sexual relations in a public
18 bathroom in Fanuel Park. At their behest, SDPD reported in force using a police
19 helicopter, police officers with canines, and at least five officers with weapons at
20 the ready. ESCAMILLA and SOTO were present while the police officers
21 searched the park and restrooms at their direction. Three persons were detained at
22 gunpoint. None of these were Janie Sanders or Timothy Smith.
23 37. While the San Diego Police officers were in Fanuel Park searching for
24 Janie Sanders and Timothy Smith in the restrooms, one officer asked Dispatch to
25 run a warrant check. Dispatch reported, “at least in NCIC, there’s no warrants.
26 There’s no warrant.” Dispatch later reported that there was a warrant for the
27 female.
28
7
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1545 Page 8 of 24
8
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1546 Page 9 of 24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1547 Page 10 of 24
10
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1548 Page 11 of 24
1 Pacific Beach, and they are homeless, and they are walking around with an AK and
2 they are on drugs.” SOTO asserted again “we are just trying to get these people off
3 the streets.” SOTO falsely asserted that “Timothy Gene Smith has a 54-page RAP
4 sheet that’ll blow your mind from child molestation to forgery. I mean this guy is
5 dangerous. And they are both armed and on drugs. Apparently she carries a .38
6 and he carries an AK in his backpack.”
7 44. SOTO stated that it was a “Pretty big deal. Great friends that work
8 that beat and they need to be informed. Lt. Dom Crime Suppression Unit.”
9 45. SOTO requested a “BOLO” (be on the lookout) for Janie and
10 Timothy. As if to signify the value or noteworthiness of recovering Janie and
11 Timothy, SOTO informed the San Diego Police operator that this case to recover
12 Janie and Timothy is one of “Dog the Bounty Hunter’s” cases.
13 46. On November 4, during a San Diego Police Department briefing
14 Defendant BRECHT handed out ESCAMILLA’s wanted poster and ordered to the
15 officers to go out on an “11-86” and look for a male and female who were wanted
16 out of Missouri on felony warrants, and who were armed with an AK-47 and a
17 pistol. Sergeant BRECHT requested officers to “look for the guy” because
18 ESCAMILLA “was pinging [his] phone.”
19 47. DAVID BRECHT was a supervising sergeant on scene at the time of
20 the shooting, and was the patrol supervisor for Officers Benjamin Douglas and
21 Ricardo Escalante.
22 48. BRECHT had a duty to use due care and diligence in giving
23 information to his subordinates that was accurate and reliable.
24 49. BRECHT had a duty to use due diligence to avoid conveying false
25 information which could lead to hasty actions by officers who would believe such
26 information, such as that a suspect was armed, dangerous, and violent.
27 50. As an experienced police official BRECHT understood that by
28 conveying information that Timothy Smith was armed, dangerous, and violent, he
11
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1549 Page 12 of 24
12
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1550 Page 13 of 24
13
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1551 Page 14 of 24
1 70. Defendant HOLSLAG, after leashing his dog, stood on the other side
2 of a six foot fence at an angle approximately twelve (12) to fifteen (15) feet from
3 Timothy Smith. HOLSLAG shot Timothy Smith three times, as Mr. Smith stood
4 with his hands raised in the air, empty, while turning to face the wall. Video of the
5 shooting shows Mr. Smith turning away from HOLSLAG to face the wall, empty
6 hands upraised, as HOLSLAG shoots his .45 caliber handgun. One of the bullets
7 pierced Timothy Smith’s heart. An officer at the scene told HOLSLAG, “wow,
8 looks like you shot an unarmed person.”
9 71. HOLSLAG had previously shot and killed another unarmed man in
10 Pacific Beach. Holslag was never disciplined nor criminally charged. Afterwards,
11 HOLSLAG had stated that he killed the unarmed man because he believed the man
12 was reaching for a nonexistent gun.
13 72. On November 5, 2015, in a statement to Homicide detectives
14 HOLSLAG stated that he killed unarmed Timothy Smith because he believed he
15 was reaching for a nonexistent gun.
16 73. On November 4, 2015, Defendant ESCAMILLA telephoned SDPD at
17 4:43 p.m. He stated that for the last three days he had been “in your city working
18 on this case,” involving Missouri fugitives Timothy Smith and Janie Sanders.
19 ESCAMILLA said that he understood that “you just got Smith in custody. I am
20 wondering if you got the other fugitive in custody as well so we can call off our
21 investigation.”
22 74. Several hours after HOLSLAG shot and killed Timothy Smith,
23 S.D.P.D. officers arrested Janie Sanders as she surrendered to them outside of
24 Timothy’s sister’s apartment. She was searched. The apartment was searched.
25 There were no firearms.
26 75. Defendant HOLSLAG shot and killed an unarmed man who posed no
27 immediate threat to him or to any third person. He acted without justification or
28 necessity. Defendant HOLSLAG’s actions were unreasonable under the
14
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1552 Page 15 of 24
15
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1553 Page 16 of 24
1 above, particularly the unjustified, unnecessary and excessive use of deadly force
2 which caused the death of Plaintiffs' decedent Timothy Smith, Plaintiff Sandy
3 Simmons suffered the loss of her son; and Wyatt Smith suffered the loss of his
4 father. Thus, the acts of defendant Holslag deprived Plaintiffs Sandy Simmons and
5 Wyatt Smith of their constitutionally protected First and Fourteenth Amendment
6 rights to the love, support, affection and companionship of Timothy Smith, in
7 violation of Plaintiffs’ rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
8 U.S. Constitution, including their First and Fifth Amendment rights to intimate
9 familial association.
10 86. The use of deadly force on an unarmed man who posed no threat
11 shocks the conscience.
12 87. Tim Smith was unarmed and posed no threat. Defendants had time
13 and opportunity to deliberate before employing deadly force. Defendants’ use of
14 deadly force was unreasonable.
15 88. The acts of defendant HOLSLAG as described caused Timothy
16 Smith’s death, resulting in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
17 Plaintiffs Sandy Simmons and Wyatt Smith. These acts proximately caused the
18 death of plaintiffs' decedent, Timothy Smith, entitling Plaintiffs to general and
19 compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
20 89. The aforesaid acts of defendant Holslag were done willfully,
21 maliciously and/or with callous and reckless indifference to decedent’s and
22 plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights and disregard for decedent's safety and continued
23 life, therefore entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages in an amount to be proven at
24 trial.
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
17
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1555 Page 18 of 24
1 VII.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
2 VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS [CAL.CIV.CODE §52.1]
3 (Against Defendants City of San Diego, Scott Holslag and Does 2-25
by Estate of Timothy Smith)
4
90. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
5
incorporate the same by this reference.
6
91. Defendants interfered by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
7
exercise or enjoyment by Timothy Smith of rights secured by the Constitution or
8
laws of the United States.
9
92. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and
10
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, guarantee (a) an individual's
11
right to be free from excessive force and (b) a parent's right to the companionship
12
of her child, and a son’s right to the companionship of his father. California Civil
13
Code section 43 confers a right to be secure in one’s bodily integrity from assault
14
and excessive force. By engaging in the acts alleged above, Defendants denied
15
those rights to Plaintiff, thus giving rise to claims for damages pursuant to
16
California Civil Code section 52.1.
17
93. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ actions, as alleged
18
herein, Plaintiff was injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
19
including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial
20
and in excess of the jurisdictional amount required by this Court.
21
94. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
22
claim Timothy Gene Smith’s pre-death damages.
23
95. In conducting himself as alleged herein, HOLSLAG was acting within
24
the course and scope of his employment with Defendant CITY OF SAN DIEGO.
25
Thus, the CITY is responsible for HOLSLAG’s actions.
26
96. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
27
and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
28
18
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1556 Page 19 of 24
1 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
2 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
3 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
4
VIII.
5 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
6 BATTERY
(Against Defendants City of San Diego, Scott Holslag and Does 2-25by All
7
Plaintiffs)
8 97. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
9 incorporate the same herein by this reference.
10 98. By the acts alleged herein, particularly defendant Holslag's act of
11 shooting and killing Timothy Gene Smith, as described in the Factual Allegations
12 and the First and Second Causes of Action, defendants committed a battery upon
13 Timothy Smith which caused him to suffer injuries and wrongful death, thereby
14 entitling Plaintiffs to damages pursuant to California law. As a result, Plaintiffs are
15 entitled to general and compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
16 99. In committing the acts alleged above, defendant Holslag acted
17 maliciously and/or was guilty of a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and
18 feelings of Plaintiffs' decedent and by reason thereof Plaintiffs are entitled to
19 exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
20
21 IX.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
22 WRONGFUL DEATH [CAL.CIV.PROC. § 377.60]
23 (Against Defendants City of San Diego, Holslag, Brecht and DOES 2-25 by all
Plaintiffs)
24
100. Plaintiffs reallege all prior paragraphs of this complaint and
25
incorporate the same herein by this reference.
26
101. Defendants committed wrongful acts, including battery and
27
negligence alleged herein, which proximately caused the death of Timothy Smith.
28
19
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1557 Page 20 of 24
20
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1558 Page 21 of 24
1 information to law enforcement agencies with the knowledge and expectation that
2 law enforcement would act upon that information to deprive Timothy Smith of his
3 rights and with the intention and/or reckless disregard of the likelihood that this
4 false information would result in violations of decedent Smith’s Fourth
5 Amendment rights, including the right to be free of wrongful seizure and use of
6 excessive force.
7 107. Defendants conspired to violate Timothy Smith’s Fourth Amendment
8 rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by setting in motion a
9 series of acts that was likely to culminate in the use of excessive force by the San
10 Diego police. By providing false information which these Defendants intended for
11 the police to rely on, they caused the use of excessive force on the part of the
12 police who apprehended Mr. Smith without probable cause, and killed him by the
13 use of excessive force.
14 108. Defendants in this cause of action agreed with each other to
15 coordinate with, to act jointly with, and to obtain the participation of S.D.P.D. in a
16 joint operation with themselves to locate and seize decedent and Janie Sanders.
17 Pursuant to this plan, defendants provided false information regarding possession
18 of dangerous firearms, and non-existent convictions for crimes of violence to
19 S.D.P.D. Defendant Escamilla falsely reported that decedent and Janie Sanders
20 were “armed and dangerous.”
21 109. Defendants in this cause of action acted under color of state law.
22 Defendants engaged in a search for and surveillance of decedent and Janie Sanders
23 on the day of his death as part of a joint operation in which they coordinated with
24 the San Diego Police Department. Defendant ESCAMILLA and his partner SOTO,
25 both fugitive recovery agents, engaged in frequent communication, coordination,
26 and planning with the S.D.P.D. These activities were directed at locating and
27 detaining decedent and Janie Richelle Sanders. On the date of Timothy Smith’s
28
21
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1559 Page 22 of 24
1 death, ESCAMILLA and SOTO specifically searched in the Pacific Beach area of
2 San Diego, and shared the results of their efforts with S.D.P.D.
3 110. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, as alleged
4 herein, Plaintiffs were injured as set forth above and are entitled to damages,
5 including compensatory and punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial.
6 111. As Timothy Smith’s successor-in-interest, the Estate is entitled to
7 claim Timothy Smith’s pre-death damages. Plaintiffs have standing to claim
8 damages for Defendants' violations of their own rights.
9 112. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, Defendants acted in reckless
10 and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The wrongful acts, and
11 each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent and malicious, thus warranting
12 the imposition of punitive damages against each individual Defendant in an
13 amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
14 XI.
Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
15 (Against Defendants Macey, Macey Bail Bonds, Escamilla, Legal Services
16 Bureau, and Soto For Violation of the 14th and 4th Amendment Rights of
Plaintiffs)
17
113. Defendants acted under color of state law by conducting a joint
18
venture with the San Diego Police Department. This conduct included
19
surveillance, provision of information to S.D.P.D. officials, securing and directing
20
the conduct of S.D.P.D. officials, distributing “wanted” posters of decedent with
21
false information for the purpose and with the result of the S.D.P.D. doing the
22
bidding of defendants under color of state law.
23
114. Defendants acted with the understanding that their provision of false
24
information about decedent Timothy Smith increased the likelihood of an
25
encounter in which excessive force would be used.
26
115. It was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that the use of the
27
inflammatory falsehood, which they employed in order to obtain the participation
28
22
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1560 Page 23 of 24
1 of the S.D.P.D., would result in the use of such excessive force. The falsehoods
2 defendants used include, but are not limited to, the following:
3 1) The false assertion that decedent Timothy Smith was currently
4 “armed and dangerous;”
5 2) The false assertion that Timothy Smith was armed with a .35,
6 .38, .40, or .45 caliber pistol;
7 3) The false assertion that Timothy Smith carried an AK47 in his
8 backpack;
9 4) The false assertion that Timothy Smith had a long history of
10 violent offenses;
11 5) The false assertion that Timothy Smith’s record included the
12 offense of child molestation;
13 6) The false assertion that Timothy Smith’s record included an
14 assault with an AK47;
15 7) The false assertion that Timothy Smith had engaged in a
16 dangerous flight during a pursuit by Missouri State police;
17 8) The false assertion that Timothy Smith had left Missouri by
18 train while armed with an AK47;
19 9) The false assertion that Timothy Smith, if arrested, was “going
20 away for life.”
21 10) The false accusation that Timothy Smith had a criminal record
22 for “armed robbery”
23 116. Defendants’ falsehoods were provided in order to obtain the
24 assistance and joint participation of the San Diego Police Department in locating
25 and seizing Janie Sanders and Timothy Smith. The conduct of defendants was a
26 substantial factor in causing the death of Timothy Smith, which was a reasonably
27 foreseeable consequence of defendants’ actions.
28
23
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 162 Filed 03/01/19 PageID.1561 Page 24 of 24
1 XII.
PRAYER FOR
2 DAMAGES AND OTHER REMEDIES
3 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS pray for judgment against DEFENDANTS
4 and relief as follows:
5 1. For compensatory damages, including special and general damages;
6 2. For exemplary and punitive damages against defendants HOLSLAG,
7 MACEY, ESCAMILLA, SOTO and LEGAL SERVICES BUREAU, INC. in an
8 amount to be proven at trial;
9 3. For attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988, and
10 Cal.Civ.Code § 52.1(h);
11 4. For costs of suit herein incurred;
12 5. For interest according to law;
13 6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.
14
15
Dated: March 1, 2019 IREDALE & YOO, APC
16
By: /s/ Eugene Iredale
17
/s/ Julia Yoo
18
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, ESTATE OF
19 TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, SANDY LYNN
SIMMONS, AND WYATT ALLEN
20 GUNNER SMITH
21
22
23 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
24 Plaintiffs demand a jury trial in this action.
25
Dated: March 1, 2019 IREDALE & YOO, APC
26
27 By: /s/ Eugene Iredale
/s/ Julia Yoo
28
24
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 7
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5701 Page 1 of 34
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 ESTATE OF TIMOTHY GENE SMITH, Case No.: 16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
by his successor in interest Wyatt Allen
11
Gunner Smith; SANDY LYNN ORDER
12 SIMMONS; and WYATT ALLEN
GUNNER SMITH,
13
Plaintiffs,
14
v.
15
SCOTT HOLSLAG; NATALIE
16
ANN MACEY, as an individual
17 doing business as Macey Bail
Bonds; LEGAL SERVICE
18
BUREAU, INC., a California
19 domestic corporation doing business
as Global Fugitive Recovery; DAN
20
ESCAMILLA, as an individual and
21 on behalf of Legal Service Bureau,
Inc.; CITY OF SAN DIEGO;
22
DAVID BRECHT; ISMAEL SOTO,
23 as an individual; and DOES 1-50,
inclusive,
24
Defendants.
25
26 HAYES, Judge:
27 The matters before the Court are the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by
28 Defendants Dan Escamilla (ECF No. 215); Sergeant Scott Holslag and City of San Diego
1
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5702 Page 2 of 34
1 (ECF No. 217); Natalie Ann Macey (ECF No. 219); and Sergeant David Brecht and City
2 of San Diego (ECF No. 220).
3 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
4 On December 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for damages based on the fatal
5 shooting of Timothy Gene Smith by San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”) Sergeant
6 Scott Holslag. (ECF No. 1). On March 1, 2019, a Third Amendment Complaint (“TAC”)
7 was filed by Plaintiffs Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith—Smith’s son; Sandy Lynn Simmons—
8 Smith’s mother; and Estate of Timothy Gene Smith (“Estate”) by Smith’s successor in
9 interest, Wyatt Allen Gunner Smith, against Defendants City of San Diego (the “City”);
10 SDPD Sergeant Scott Holslag; SDPD Sergeant David Brecht; bail bondsman Natalie Ann
11 Macey d/b/a Macey Bail Bonds (“Macey”); Legal Service Bureau, Inc. d/b/a Global
12 Fugitive Recovery (“Legal Service Bureau”); bail bondsman Dan Escamilla; and bail
13 bondsman Ismael Soto. (ECF No. 162).
14 Plaintiffs allege that in November 2015, bondsmen Macey, Escamilla, and Soto
15 fabricated a story that Smith was armed with a gun and had a history of violent crime.
16 Plaintiffs allege that Escamilla and Soto provided false information to SDPD officers to
17 engage their assistance in apprehending Smith’s partner, Janie Sanders, who failed to
18 appear in court after Macey paid her bail. Plaintiffs allege that on November 4, 2015,
19 Sergeant Brecht gave SDPD officers a “Wanted” poster prepared by Escamilla and told the
20 officers that Smith had felony warrants and was armed with a gun. Plaintiffs allege that at
21 approximately 2:45 p.m., Smith was cornered by several officers in Pacific Beach.
22 Plaintiffs allege that Smith was unarmed. Plaintiffs allege that Sergeant Holslag shot Smith
23 three times, killing him, as Smith “stood with his hands raised in the air, empty, while
24 turning to face the wall.” (Id. ¶ 70).
25 Plaintiffs bring the following claims: 1) all Plaintiffs against Defendant Sergeant
26 Holslag for violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution under 42
27 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) Plaintiffs Wyatt Smith and Simmons against Defendant Sergeant Holslag
28 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under 42
2
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5703 Page 3 of 34
1 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) Plaintiff Estate against Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City for
2 violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; 4) all
3 Plaintiffs against Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City for battery; 5) all Plaintiffs
4 against Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City for wrongful death
5 under section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil Procedure; 6) all Plaintiffs against
6 Defendants Macey, Escamilla, Soto, and Legal Service Bureau for conspiracy to violate
7 civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 7) all Plaintiffs against Defendants Macey,
8 Escamilla, Soto, and Legal Service Bureau for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
9 Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs seek damages, including exemplary and
10 punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
11 On March 15, 2019, Defendants Macey, Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the
12 City filed Answers to the TAC. (ECF Nos. 164, 165). On March 21, 2019, Defendant
13 Escamilla filed an Answer to the TAC. (ECF No. 168). On July 1, 2020, Defendant Legal
14 Service Bureau filed an Answer to the TAC. (ECF No. 210). Defendant Soto has not
15 appeared in this action.1
16 The parties engaged in fact discovery.
17 On August 17, 2020, Defendant Escamilla, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion for
18 Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 215). On August 28, 2020, Motions for Summary Judgment
19 were filed by Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City (ECF No. 217); Defendant Macey
20 (ECF No. 219); and Defendants Sergeant Brecht and the City (ECF No. 220).
21 On October 5, 2020, Plaintiffs filed Oppositions to the Motions for Summary
22 Judgment filed by Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City and Defendants Sergeant
23 Brecht and the City. (ECF Nos. 229, 230). On October 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed Oppositions
24 to the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Macey and Escamilla. (ECF
25 Nos. 234, 235).
26
27
1
On December 5, 2019, Plaintiffs filed Proof of Service as to Defendant Soto. (ECF No. 202). Defendant
28 Soto has not filed any responsive pleading.
3
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5704 Page 4 of 34
1 On October 13, 2020, Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, the City, and
2 Macey filed Replies in support of their Motions for Summary Judgment.2 (ECF Nos. 244-
3 247).
4 On November 12, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the Motions for Summary
5 Judgment.
6 On November 30, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Submission on the Civil
7 Conspiracy Cause of Action. (ECF No. 252). On December 14, 2020, Defendants Macey
8 and Escamilla filed Responses to the Supplemental Submission. (ECF Nos. 253, 254).
9 II. FACTS
10 Defendant Natalie Ann Macey is the owner of Macey Bail Bonds, a Missouri sole
11 proprietorship. On June 29, 2015, Macey posted $7,500.00 bail in Missouri for Janie
12 Sanders, who was charged with possession of a controlled substance. On July 8, 2015,
13 Sanders failed to appear at a hearing, and a warrant was issued for her arrest. Macey
14 attempted to locate Sanders. A “Wanted” poster was created that included a picture of
15 Sanders and her partner, Timothy Gene Smith. The poster stated that Sanders was wanted
16 for “bail jumping” and was “WITH TIMOTHY GENE SMITH CONSIDERED ARMED
17 AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.” (First Wanted Poster, Ex. 14 to Iredale Decl., ECF
18 No. 235-8 at 3).
19 Macey learned that Sanders and Smith might be in San Diego. Macey hired
20 California bail fugitive recovery agent Defendant Dan Escamilla, an employee and
21 shareholder of Defendant Legal Service Bureau, Inc., to apprehend Sanders. Defendant
22 Ismael Soto, an unlicensed bondsman in California, was also engaged to assist with
23 Sanders’ apprehension. Escamilla created a second “Wanted” poster with the picture of
24 Sanders and Smith. The poster stated that Sanders and Smith were “WANTED ON
25
26
27 2
Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, the City, and Macey also submitted evidentiary
objections, which have been reviewed by the Court. (ECF Nos. 227, 244-3, 245-3, 247-3). The parties’
28 evidentiary objections do not affect this Order.
4
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5705 Page 5 of 34
5
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5706 Page 6 of 34
1 told the responding officers that as to Smith, “at least NCIC, there’s no warrants. There is
2 no warrants.” (Transcript of COSD000421-PD15-0369_51.wav, Ex. 5 to Iredale Decl.,
3 ECF No. 229-8 at 12; Audio Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex. 3A to Iredale Decl.). The
4 suspects in the bathroom at Fanuel Park were not Smith or Sanders. Escamilla gave
5 Sergeant Brecht either the second “Wanted” poster or the picture of Smith and Sanders
6 from the poster.
7 On the morning of November 4, 2015, Soto called SDPD and stated that he could
8 confirm an 800-meter radius of Smith and Sanders’ location. Soto stated, “[W]e got word
9 that the gentleman’s carrying an AK-47 in his bag . . . . They’re walking around with an
10 AK and they’re on drugs and I’m worried, ya know?” (Transcript of COSD000373-PD15-
11 0369_3.wav, Ex. 5 to Iredale Decl., ECF No. 229-8 at 16-17; Audio Rec. of Soto Call, Disc
12 Ex. 3D to Iredale Decl.). Soto stated, “Timothy Gene Smith has a 54 page rap sheet that
13 will blow your mind. From child molestation to forgery. I mean, this guy’s dangerous.
14 They’re both armed and on drugs. Apparently she carries a .38 and he carries an AK in his
15 backpack.” (Transcript of COSD000373-PD15-0369_3.wav, Ex. 5 to Iredale Decl., ECF
16 No. 229-8 at 16-17; Audio Rec. of Soto Call, Disc Ex. 3D to Iredale Decl.).
17 During the SDPD morning lineup, Sergeant Brecht gave copies of Smith and
18 Sanders’ photograph to his team of officers, including Ricardo Escalante and Benjamin
19 Douglas. Sergeant Brecht told the officers that Smith and Sanders were possibly armed.
20 Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Officers Escalante and Douglas were patrolling the 1700 block
21 of Garnet Avenue when they saw a male they believed was Smith. Officer Escalante
22 stepped out of the patrol car, and Smith fled on foot. Officer Escalante chased and lost sight
23 of Smith in a residential area of Pacific Beach.
24 Officer Escalante aired over the police radio that he was involved in a foot pursuit.
25 The officers gave a description of Smith and stated, “Multiple warrants of out state. He’s
26 possibly armed with a .38.” (Transcript of SDPD Dispatch Calls of 11-4-15, Ex. 4 to Sweda
27 Decl., ECF No. 220-10 at 6; Audio Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex. 3 to Sweda Decl.). The
28 dispatcher stated, “This might be the guy from yesterday . . . . He’s got multiple warrants
6
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5707 Page 7 of 34
1 from out of state.” (Transcript of SDPD Dispatch Calls of 11-4-15, Ex. 4 to Sweda Decl.,
2 ECF No. 220-10 at 6; Audio Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex. 3 to Sweda Decl.). The
3 dispatcher relayed, “It’s a possible 10-35 subject”—armed and dangerous. (Transcript of
4 SDPD Dispatch Calls of 11-4-15, Ex. 4 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 220-10 at 8, 9; Audio
5 Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex. 3 to Sweda Decl.). Multiple officers responded to the call,
6 including a lieutenant who responds to high priority calls, an ABLE police helicopter,
7 Sergeant Brecht, and Defendant Sergeant Scott Holslag.
8 Officers chased Smith to an area near 1636 Thomas Avenue, determined that he was
9 likely in a storage shed, and set up a perimeter. Sergeant Holslag arrived at the scene and
10 walked toward the entrance to the eastern side yard of 1636 Thomas Avenue with his police
11 dog. Sergeant Holslag announced, “San Diego Police! If you don’t come out you will be
12 bitten by a police dog!” (Holslag & City’s SOF, ECF No. 220-3 ¶ 33). Smith ran out of the
13 storage shed towards the fence separating 1636 and 1644 Thomas Avenue, as the officers
14 shouted. Smith was wearing tan shorts and was shirtless. Sergeant Holslag deployed the
15 police dog and gave the bite command. The dog bit Smith’s shoe but lost its grip as Smith
16 jumped the fence and climbed onto a ledge protruding from the exterior wall of 1644
17 Thomas Avenue. The officers continued to yell at Smith to put his hands up, to get on the
18 ground, to not reach, and to put his hands behind his back.
19 Sergeant Holslag states in his Declaration:
20 I saw [Smith] plunge both hands deep into his pants pockets. His left hand
appeared to me to be shallow, to knuckle-level. However, his right hand
21
plunged deep into his right pocket . . . . I thought he had a handgun in his
22 pocket and was reaching for it. The suspect looked straight at me with a
thousand-mile stare . . . . The suspect’s right hand started to come out of his
23
right pocket. I was fearful that he was going to pull a handgun. As his hand
24 came out to knuckle level, I was 100% convinced in the moment that he had
a gun and was going to shoot me.
25
26 (Holslag Decl., Ex. 1 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-7 ¶¶ 32-34). Sergeant Holslag shot
27 Smith three times in his chest, right torso, and left torso, killing him. Smith was unarmed.
28 ///
7
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5708 Page 8 of 34
8
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5709 Page 9 of 34
1 nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the
2 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts
3 showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted).
4 The nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
5 drawn in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
6 IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE
7 Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City request that the Court
8 take judicial notice of the warrant for Smith issued on June 27, 2015, in connection with
9 Case No. 15RY-CR00255, the warrant for Smith issued on July 13, 2015, in connection
10 with Case No. W24155277, the warrant for Smith issued on October 14, 2015, in
11 connection with Case No. 15CA-CR00999, and Smith’s conviction history. (ECF Nos.
12 217-3, 220-2). Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court may take judicial
13 notice of “matters of public record,” and facts that “can be accurately and readily
14 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.
15 201(b)(2); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
16 Smith’s arrest warrants and conviction history are matters of public record, and Plaintiffs
17 do not dispute their authenticity. Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are granted.
18 V. DEFENDANTS SERGEANT HOLSLAG, SERGEANT BRECHT, AND THE
19 CITY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
20 Defendant Sergeant Holslag moves for summary judgment on the first claim for
21 violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the second claim for
22 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 19833. Defendants Sergeant
23 Holslag and the City move for summary judgment on the third claim for violation of the
24 Bane Act and the fourth claim for battery. Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht,
25 and the City move for summary judgment on the fifth claim for wrongful death.
26
27
3
Plaintiffs have represented that they will dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 229
28 at 29). The Court does not address the Fourteenth Amendment claim.
9
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5710 Page 10 of 34
10
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5711 Page 11 of 34
11
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5712 Page 12 of 34
12
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5713 Page 13 of 34
1 Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted. Then,
we evaluate the government’s interests by assessing the severity of the crime;
2
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officers’ or public’s
3 safety; and whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape.
Finally, we balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the
4
government’s need for that intrusion.
5
Id. (citations omitted).
6
The “most important single element” is “whether the suspect poses an immediate
7
threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.
8
1994). An officer “may not use deadly force to apprehend a suspect where the suspect
9
poses no immediate threat to the officer or others.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 551 (quoting
10
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11). However, “it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent
11
escape using deadly force ‘[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
12
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.’” Id. (alteration in
13
original) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11). “Only information known to the officer at the
14
time the conduct occurred is relevant.” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir.
15
2019) (citing Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546-47 (2017); Glenn v.
16
Washington Cty., 673 F.3d 864, 873 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011)), reh’g denied, 2019 U.S. App.
17
LEXIS 29633 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2019), cert. denied, Browder v. Nehad, 2020 U.S. LEXIS
18
4507 (Oct. 5, 2020).
19
“[I]n the deadly force context ‘the person most likely to rebut the officers’ version
20
of events—the one killed—can’t testify.’” Estate of Elkins v. Pelayo, 737 F. App’x 830,
21
835 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cruz v. City of Anaheim, 765 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2014)).
22
Accordingly, the court “cannot simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the
23
police officer.” Id. (quoting Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1079). The court “carefully examine[s] ‘all
24
the evidence in the record, such as medical reports, contemporaneous statements by the
25
officer and the available physical evidence, . . . to determine whether the officer’s story is
26
internally consistent and consistent with other known facts.’” Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim,
27
747 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (second alteration in original) (quoting Scott
28
13
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5714 Page 14 of 34
1 v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)). The court “must also examine ‘circumstantial
2 evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s story.’” Id. (quoting
3 Scott, 39 F.3d at 915).
4 In this case, on November 4, 2015, Smith fled from Officer Escalante, leading him
5 on a foot chase through a residential area of Pacific Beach. Sergeant Holslag states in his
6 Declaration that just before 3:00 p.m., as he was refueling his vehicle after a lengthy SWAT
7 standoff, he heard the radio call for the foot pursuit. (Holslag Decl., Ex. 1 to Sweda Decl.,
8 ECF No. 217-7 ¶ 7). Sergeant Holslag states that he “heard that the suspect was believed
9 to be possibly armed with a .38 caliber handgun.” (Id. ¶ 10). Sergeant Holslag states that
10 he heard that Smith was wanted for “multiple warrants out of state.” (Id. ¶ 11). Sergeant
11 Holslag testified at his deposition that he understood that Smith was wanted for a felony
12 warrant but did not know what crime Smith had committed. (Holslag Dep., Ex. 9 to Iredale
13 Decl., ECF No. 229-12 at 58:22-59:13).
14 After officers arrived at the scene and set up a perimeter around the storage shed
15 where Smith was hiding, Smith ran out of the shed, jumped the fence separating 1636 and
16 1644 Thomas Avenue, and climbed onto a ledge protruding from the exterior wall of 1644
17 Thomas Avenue. Smith was wearing tan shorts and was shirtless. Video recordings of the
18 incident include video from body worn cameras by Officers Escalante, Douglas,
19 Christopher Bernard, John White, Dustin Welsh, Corey Harris, and Brandon Orr, and video
20 from the ABLE police helicopter. Officers shouted various commands to Smith at the same
21 time, seconds before the shooting, including “Get your hands up;” “Let me see your
22 hands;” “Get on the ground;” “Don’t do it;” “Do not reach;” “Get your hands up;” “Keep
23 your hands up;” and “Put your hands behind your back.” (See, e.g., Transcript of Bernard
24 Body Worn Camera Video, Ex. 4 to Iredale Decl., ECF No. 229-7 at 5-6; ABLE and Body
25 Worn Camera Video Recordings, Disc Ex. 2 to Iredale Decl.; Body Worn Camera Video
26 Recordings, Disc Exs. 10, 13, 16, 19 to Sweda Decl.; see also Escalante Decl., Ex. 9 to
27 Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-14 ¶ 23; Bernard Decl., Ex. 12 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-
28 17 ¶ 16; White Decl., Ex. 18 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-23 ¶ 8).
14
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5715 Page 15 of 34
15
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5716 Page 16 of 34
1 Officer Escalante states in his Declaration that he saw Smith turn to face the officers
2 and “saw his hands move down to his waist area, around his pockets.” (Escalante Decl.,
3 Ex. 9 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-14 ¶ 21). Escalante states that he “considered whether
4 [Smith] was possibly reaching for something but saw Sergeant Holslag draw his firearm.”
5 (Id.). Escalante states that he was looking away when the three shots were fired. (Id. ¶ 24).
6 Officer White states in his Declaration that he “saw the subject reach for his pocket,” heard
7 the officers give commands to “stop reaching,” and then “heard three shots.” (White Decl.,
8 Ex. 18 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-23 ¶ 8). Smith was unarmed at the time of the
9 shooting.
10 Sergeant Holslag used deadly force, “implicat[ing] the highest level of Fourth
11 Amendment interests.” A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th
12 Cir. 2016). The most severe crime that SDPD had probable cause to believe Smith
13 committed at the time of the shooting was resisting arrest—a misdemeanor. See Cal. Pen.
14 Code § 148. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, at the time of the
15 shooting Smith had climbed onto a ledge and was standing still. A reasonable juror could
16 conclude that at the time of the shooting Smith did not pose an immediate threat to Sergeant
17 Holslag or anyone else. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a
18 reasonable juror could conclude that the severity of Smith’s crime and Smith’s actions did
19 not render the use of deadly force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Thompson,
20 885 F.3d at 586 (citations omitted); see also Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1136 (“Even if Nehad had
21 made felonious threats or committed a serious crime prior to Browder’s arrival, he was
22 indisputably not engaged in any such conduct when Browder arrived, let alone when
23 Browder fired his weapon. A juror could, therefore, conclude that the severity of Nehad’s
24 crimes, whether characterized as a misdemeanor or an already completed felony, did not
25 render Browder’s use of deadly force reasonable.”). A reasonable juror could conclude that
26 Sergeant Holslag’s use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth
27 Amendment.
28 ///
16
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5717 Page 17 of 34
17
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5718 Page 18 of 34
1 safety of others simply because they are armed.”); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d
2 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he police officers could not reasonably have believed the use
3 of deadly force was lawful because [the victim] did not point the gun at the officers and
4 apparently was not facing them when they shot him the first time.”).
5 In this case, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Sergeant
6 Holslag shot Smith within a matter of seconds and without warning, even though Smith
7 was unarmed, was not threatening anyone, and did not pose a danger to Sergeant Holslag
8 or anyone else. The Court concludes that on November 4, 2015, Sergeant Holslag was on
9 notice that under the circumstances reasonably presented by Plaintiffs, the use of deadly
10 force against Smith would be objectively unreasonable. Further, although qualified
11 immunity may apply where the government official makes a reasonable “mistake of fact,”
12 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citation omitted), Smith’s actions and whether Sergeant Holslag
13 could have reasonably perceived a threat to himself or others are disputed questions of fact
14 that “preclude a grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity.” Nehad, 929 F.3d at
15 1140; see Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court concludes that
16 Sergeant Holslag is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The
17 Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim against Sergeant Holslag under § 1983 for
18 violation of the Fourth Amendment is granted as to the claim by individual heirs Simmons
19 and Wyatt Smith and denied as to the claim by the Estate.
20 b. Claim 3 - Bane Act
21 Plaintiff Estate brings a claim against Sergeant Holslag and the City for violation of
22 the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. Plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Holslag interfered by
23 threats, intimidation, or coercion with Smith’s constitutional right to be free from excessive
24 force and with Smith’s right to bodily integrity. Plaintiffs assert that the City is liable
25 because Sergeant Holslag was acting within the course and scope of his employment.
26 Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City contend that the Bane Act claim fails
27 because Sergeant Holslag did not violate Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights or act with an
28 intent to violate Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs contend that there is a
18
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5719 Page 19 of 34
1 genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sergeant Holslag violated Smith’s Fourth
2 Amendment rights, and a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag acted with
3 reckless disregard for Smith’s rights.
4 The Bane Act “provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff’s state or
5 federal civil rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’” Chaudhry v. City of
6 Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). “[T]he
7 Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element of the claim to be
8 transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged.” Reese v. Cty. of
9 Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Cornell v. City & Cty. of San
10 Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 798 (2017), modified by 2017 Cal. App. LEXIS 1018
11 (Nov. 17, 2017), review denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 1730 (Feb. 28, 2018)), as corrected (May
12 3, 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19905 (9th Cir. July 18, 2018). However,
13 proving a Fourth Amendment violation alone does not “vicariously trigger[ ] Bane Act
14 liability. Instead, proving a Bane Act claim [ ] requires specific intent to violate protected
15 rights[.]” Sandoval v. Cty. of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied,
16 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 5100 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2019), cert. denied, Cty. of Sonoma v.
17 Sandoval, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5757 (Oct. 7, 2019). “Reckless disregard of the ‘right at issue’
18 is all that [i]s necessary” to demonstrate specific intent. Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 804.
19 In this case, the claim against Sergeant Holslag and the City for violation of the Bane
20 Act is based on the same facts as the claim for excessive force under the Fourth
21 Amendment. The Court has concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable
22 to Plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag acted unreasonably
23 under the Fourth Amendment when he shot and killed Smith. From these same facts, a
24 reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag acted with reckless disregard for
25 Smith’s rights. The Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim against Sergeant Holslag
26 and the City for violation of the Bane Act is denied.
27 ///
28 ///
19
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5720 Page 20 of 34
1 c. Claim 4 - Battery
2 All Plaintiffs bring a claim against Sergeant Holslag and the City for battery.
3 Plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Holslag committed a battery when he shot and killed Smith
4 and that the City is vicariously liable for Sergeant Holslag’s actions.
5 Defendants Sergeant Holslag and the City contend that the battery claim fails
6 because Sergeant Holslag’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
7 Sergeant Holslag and the City further contend that the individual heirs lack standing to
8 bring a battery claim. Plaintiffs contend that there is an issue of material fact as to whether
9 Sergeant Holslag’s actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, so there is also
10 an issue of fact as to whether Sergeant Holslag committed battery. Plaintiffs contend that
11 they have standing.
12 State law claims for battery are analyzed under the same standard as claims for
13 excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. See Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App.
14 4th 1269, 1273 (1998) (“A peace officer who uses unreasonable or excessive force in
15 making a lawful arrest or detention commits a battery upon the person being arrested or
16 detained as to such excessive force.”). In this case, the claim against Sergeant Holslag and
17 the City for battery is based on the same facts as the claim for excessive force under the
18 Fourth Amendment. The Court has concluded that, viewing the facts in the light most
19 favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag acted
20 unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment when he shot and killed Smith. Accordingly,
21 a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag committed a battery. However,
22 individual heirs lack standing to bring this survival action claim. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
23 § 377.30; Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1229. The Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim
24 against Sergeant Holslag and the City for battery is granted as to the claim by individual
25 heirs Simmons and Wyatt Smith and denied as to the claim by the Estate.
26 d. Claim 5 - Wrongful Death
27 All Plaintiffs bring a claim against Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City
28 for wrongful death under section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
20
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5721 Page 21 of 34
1 Plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Holslag committed a battery against Smith, causing his death.
2 Plaintiffs assert that Sergeant Holslag was negligent in his use of excessive force. Plaintiffs
3 assert that Sergeant Holslag and Sergeant Brecht negligently accepted unsubstantiated and
4 false information, which was a substantial factor in causing Smith’s death. Plaintiffs assert
5 that the City is vicariously liable for Sergeant Holslag and Sergeant Brecht’s actions.
6 i. Standing of Individual Heirs
7 Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City contend that the
8 individual heirs lack standing to bring a wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs contend that they
9 have standing, and Simmons was financially dependent on Smith sufficient to confer
10 standing.
11 “In California, an action for wrongful death is governed solely by statute, and the
12 right to bring such an action is limited to those persons identified therein.” Scott v.
13 Thompson, 184 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1510 (2010), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 25,
14 2010). Standing to sue for wrongful death is governed by section 377.60 of the California
15 Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a cause of action “by any of the following
16 persons or by the decedent’s personal representative on their behalf: (a) The decedent’s
17 surviving . . . children, . . . or if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons
18 including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property
19 of the decedent by intestate succession.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(a).
20 Generally, where a decedent leaves issue, “his parents would not be his heirs at all
21 and therefore not entitled to maintain [a wrongful death] action at all.” Chavez v.
22 Carpenter, 91 Cal. App. 4th 1433, 1440 (2001) (citations omitted). However, “[r]egardless
23 of their status as heirs, parents may sue for the wrongful death of their child ‘if they were
24 dependent on the decedent.’” Id. at 1445 (quoting Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(b)).
25 “[D]ependence refers to financial support,” which “generally presents a question of fact.”
26 Id. (citations omitted). The plaintiff must present evidence that at the time of the child’s
27 death, the surviving parents “were actually dependent, to some extent, upon the decedent
28 for the necessities of life.” Hazelwood v. Hazelwood, 57 Cal. App. 3d 693, 698 (1976).
21
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5722 Page 22 of 34
1 [A] parent cannot claim they are dependent within the meaning of Code of
Civil Procedure section 377 if they receive financial support from their
2
children which merely makes available to them some of the niceties of life
3 they might not otherwise be able to afford. But, if a parent receives financial
support from their child which aids them in obtaining the things, such as
4
shelter, clothing, food and medical treatment, which one cannot and should
5 not do without, the parent is dependent upon their child.
6
Perry v. Medina, 192 Cal. App. 3d 603, 610 (1987).
7
In this case, Wyatt Smith is the surviving child of Smith and has standing to bring a
8
wrongful death claim as Smith’s heir. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(a). Simmons is
9
the surviving parent of Smith. Simmons testified at her deposition that when Smith stayed
10
with her, he always “helped [her] out” and gave her money for groceries and medicine.
11
(Simmons Dep., Ex. 26 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-31 at 29:23-30:1). Simmons testified
12
that Smith did not give her “regular financial assistance” and did not send her money when
13
he was not staying with her. (Id. at 30:6-9). Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence
14
sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Simmons was financially dependent, to
15
some extent, on Smith for the necessities of life. See Hazelwood, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 698.
16
The Court concludes that Simmons lacks standing to bring a wrongful death claim.
17
ii. Sergeants Holslag & Brecht
18
Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City contend that the
19
wrongful death claim fails because Sergeant Holslag’s actions were reasonable, Sergeant
20
Brecht did not owe any duty to Smith, and Sergeant Brecht’s actions did not cause Smith’s
21
death. Plaintiffs contend that a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant Holslag’s
22
actions were unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiffs contend that
23
Sergeant Brecht caused a violation of Smith’s rights by providing false, misleading, and
24
unverified information about Smith to SDPD officers and failing to correct officers that
25
repeated the information on the police radio. Plaintiffs contend that Sergeant Holslag was
26
preconditioned to believe that Smith would shoot and kill him as a result of Sergeant
27
Brecht’s actions.
28
22
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5723 Page 23 of 34
1 “The elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are the tort (negligence or
2 other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting of the pecuniary loss
3 suffered by the heirs.” Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal. App. 4th 1256, 1264 (2006)
4 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). When a plaintiff’s wrongful death claim is premised
5 on a defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff must establish the standard elements of
6 negligence to prevail. See Hayes, 736 F.3d at 1231. “[I]n order to prove facts sufficient to
7 support a finding of negligence, a plaintiff must show that [the] defendant had a duty to
8 use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal
9 cause of the resulting injury.” Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629 (2013)
10 (alterations in original) (quoting Nally v. Grace Comm’y Church, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 292
11 (1988)).
12 The California Supreme Court “has long recognized that peace officers have a duty
13 to act reasonably when using deadly force.” Id. (citations omitted). “The reasonableness of
14 an officer’s conduct is determined in light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. This
15 standard is “broader than the federal Fourth Amendment law, which tends to focus more
16 narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used.” Id. at 639.
17 There will virtually always be a range of conduct that is reasonable. As long
as an officer’s conduct falls within the range of conduct that is reasonable
18
under the circumstances, there is no requirement that he or she choose the
19 “most reasonable” action or the conduct that is the least likely to cause harm
and at the same time the most likely to result in the successful apprehension
20
of a violent suspect, in order to avoid liability for negligence. It would be
21 unreasonable to require police officers in the field to engage in the sort of
complex calculus that would be necessary to determine the “best” or most
22
effective and least dangerous method of handling an immediate and dangerous
23 situation, particularly when officers are forced to make split-second decisions
under tense and often perilous conditions.
24
25 Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 537 (2009).
26 Law enforcement personnel’s tactical conduct and the decisions preceding the
use of deadly force are relevant considerations under California law in
27
determining whether the use of deadly force gives rise to negligence liability.
28 Such liability can arise, for example, if the tactical conduct and decisions
23
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5724 Page 24 of 34
1 show, as part of the totality of the circumstances, that the use of deadly force
was unreasonable.
2
3 Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 639. Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts most
4 favorably to the plaintiff, “no reasonable juror could find negligence.” Id. at 632.
5 In this case, the cause of action against Sergeant Holslag for wrongful death is based
6 on Sergeant Holslag shooting and killing Smith. See id. at 630 (“[T]his case involves only
7 a single indivisible cause of action, seeking recovery for a single wrong—the shooting
8 itself.”). The Court has concluded that a reasonable juror could conclude that Sergeant
9 Holslag did not act reasonably under the Fourth Amendment and committed battery.
10 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could conclude
11 that under the totality of the circumstances Sergeant Holslag was negligent in shooting
12 Smith. Sergeant Holslag is not entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful death claim.
13 Sergeant Brecht and the City contend that Sergeant Brecht took no preshooting
14 actions that caused Sergeant Holslag to shoot Smith. Sergeant Brecht and the City contend
15 that providing officer safety information about a possibly armed and dangerous suspect did
16 not create a dangerous situation that was the proximate cause of Smith’s death. Plaintiffs
17 contend that Sergeant Brecht created a dangerous situation that resulted in Officer Holslag
18 shooting Smith by providing unverified information about Smith to SDPD officers.
19 Sergeant Brecht responded to the call that Smith and Sanders were possibly at Fanuel
20 Park on the day before the shooting. Sergeant Brecht spoke to Escamilla at the park, and
21 Escamilla gave Sergeant Brecht either the second “Wanted” poster or the picture of Smith
22 and Sanders from the poster. Sergeant Brecht states in his Declaration that on November
23 4, 2015, he gave copies of the photograph of Smith and Sanders to his squad at the lineup
24 and “provided information about Smith and Sanders . . . for officer safety reasons[.]”
25 (Brecht Decl., Ex. 1 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 220-7 ¶ 10). Sergeant Brecht testified at his
26 deposition that he told approximately fifteen officers at the lineup that Smith and Sanders
27 were “supposedly armed and dangerous” and possibly had a .38 caliber handgun and an
28 AK-47. (Brecht Dep., Ex. 10 to Iredale Decl., ECF No. 229-13 at 25:2-26:14). Officer
24
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5725 Page 25 of 34
1 Douglas states in his declaration that Brecht told him that Smith was “considered extremely
2 dangerous.” (Douglas Decl., Ex. 15 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 220-37 ¶ 3). Sergeant Holslag
3 was not present at the lineup.
4 Sergeant Brecht responded to Officer Escalante’s call about the foot pursuit of
5 Smith. Sergeant Brecht heard Officer Douglas state that Smith had “multiple warrants from
6 out of state” and was “possibly armed with a .38.” (Transcript of SDPD Dispatch Calls of
7 11-4-15, Ex. 4 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 220-10 at 6; Audio Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex.
8 3 to Sweda Decl.). Sergeant Brecht heard the dispatcher state that Smith had “multiple
9 warrants from out of state” and was a possible “10:35”–armed and dangerous. (Transcript
10 of SDPD Dispatch Calls of 11-4-15, Ex. 4 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 220-10 at 6-8; Audio
11 Rec. of Police Radio, Disc Ex. 3 to Sweda Decl.). Sergeant Brecht helped set up a perimeter
12 around the shed. Sergeant Brecht did not use any force during the incident.
13 “Proximate cause ‘limits the defendant’s liability to those foreseeable consequences
14 that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in producing.’” Ileto v. Glock, Inc.,
15 349 F.3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App.
16 4th 1333, 1342 (1998)). “The proximate cause question asks whether the unlawful conduct
17 is closely enough tied to the injury that it makes sense to hold the defendant legally
18 responsible for the injury.” Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir.
19 2018), reh’g denied, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25361 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2018), cert. denied,
20 Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (Mar. 4, 2019). “Whether an act is
21 the proximate cause of injury is generally a question of fact; it ‘is a question of law where
22 the facts are uncontroverted and only one deduction or inference may reasonably be drawn
23 from those facts.’” Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1206 (quoting Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc., 117 Cal.
24 App. 3d 634, 638 (1981)).
25 Courts in this circuit have denied motions for summary judgment on negligence
26 claims where a police officer creates a dangerous situation that results in another officer
27 using lethal force. See Dorger v. City of Napa, No. 12-cv-00440-WHO, 2013 U.S. Dist.
28 LEXIS 153696, at *33 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (denying summary judgment on
25
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5726 Page 26 of 34
1 negligence claim against officer who did not use force because “whether [the non-shooting
2 officer]’s preshooting conduct (e.g., her plan to detain [the victim], including the presence
3 of armed officers) played a role in negligently provoking a dangerous situation that resulted
4 in the use of reasonable or unreasonable use of lethal force, is relevant under the totality of
5 the circumstances test”); Howard v. Cty. of Riverside, EDCV 12-00700 VAP (OPx), 2014
6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196517, at *27 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2014) (denying summary judgment on
7 negligence claim against officer who did not use force, explaining that “[a] reasonable jury
8 could find that Sergeant Wedertz’s decisions to direct Deputy Munoz to enter the shed and
9 to open the closet door were a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries”).
10 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Sergeant Brecht provided
11 safety information that he received from the bondsmen that Smith was possibly armed to
12 his squad of officers, which did not include Sergeant Holslag. Sergeant Brecht responded
13 to the call about the foot pursuit of Smith and helped set up a perimeter. Sergeant Brecht
14 did not directly communicate with Sergeant Holslag and did not use force during the
15 incident. The Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that Sergeant Brecht’s
16 actions created a dangerous situation that resulted in Sergeant Holslag using deadly force.
17 The use of deadly force by Sergeant Holslag was not a foreseeable consequence of the
18 officer safety information provided by Sergeant Brecht. The Court concludes that no
19 reasonable juror could find that Sergeant Brecht’s actions were a proximate cause of the
20 shooting of Smith by Sergeant Holslag. Sergeant Brecht is entitled to summary judgment
21 on the wrongful death claim.
22 iii. The City
23 Defendant the City contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful
24 death claim because Plaintiffs failed to identify a statute or enactment in the TAC
25 authorizing liability for wrongful death against the City. Plaintiffs contend that the City is
26 liable based on respondeat superior.
27 Tort liability against the City “is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute
28 or ‘enactment.’” Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 177 Cal. App. 3d 792, 802 (1986)
26
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5727 Page 27 of 34
1 (citations omitted). Section 815(a) of the California Government Code provides that,
2 “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury,
3 whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
4 employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a); see Cowing v. City of Torrance,
5 60 Cal. App. 3d 757, 761 (1976) (“There is no common law governmental tort liability in
6 California; and except as otherwise provided by statute, there is no liability on the part of
7 a public entity for any act or omission of itself, a public employee, or any other person.”).
8 “Since the duty of a governmental agency can only be created by statute or ‘enactment,’
9 the statute or ‘enactment’ claimed to establish the duty must at the very least be identified”
10 in the complaint. Searcy, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 802.
11 Section 815.2 of the California Government Code “makes a public entity vicariously
12 liable for its employee’s negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment.”
13 Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175, 1180 (2003). “Since the enactment of
14 the California Tort Claims Act in 1963 (§ 810 et seq.), a governmental entity can be held
15 vicariously liable when a police officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses
16 excessive force or engages in assaultive conduct.” Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.
17 3d 202, 215 (1991).
18 In this case, the Court has determined that Sergeant Holslag is not entitled to
19 summary judgment on the wrongful death claim. At the time of the shooting, Sergeant
20 Holslag was acting in the course and scope of his employment as a police sergeant for the
21 City. A reasonable juror could conclude that the City is vicariously liable for Sergeant
22 Holslag’s actions. The Court construes the claim against the City for wrongful death to be
23 alleged under section 815.2 of the California Government Code. The Motion for Summary
24 Judgment on the wrongful death claim is granted as to the claim by Simmons and as to the
25 claim against Sergeant Brecht and is otherwise denied.
26 e. Joinder
27 Defendants Sergeant Holslag, Sergeant Brecht, and the City contend that Smith’s
28 surviving daughter must be joined under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
27
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5728 Page 28 of 34
1 to protect Defendants against the risk of incurring multiple obligations. Plaintiffs contend
2 that there is no evidence that Smith had a daughter.
3 Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires joinder of a person to a
4 pending action if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among
5 existing parties; or . . . that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
6 and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical
7 matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the interest; or . . . leave an existing
8 party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
9 obligations because of the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
10 In this case, Simmons testified at her deposition that Smith was not sure if he had a
11 daughter. Simmons did not know any possible daughter’s full name. (See Simmons Dep.,
12 Ex. 26 to Sweda Decl., ECF No. 217-31 at 15:17-17:7). The Court concludes that there is
13 insufficient evidence that there is any other party required to be joined in this action.
14 The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Sergeant Scott Holslag and City of San
15 Diego (ECF No. 217) is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion is granted as to the
16 first claim by individual heirs Wyatt Smith and Simmons for violation of the Fourth
17 Amendment, the fourth claim by individual heirs Wyatt Smith and Simmons for battery,
18 and the fifth claim by Simmons for wrongful death, and is otherwise denied. The Motion
19 for Summary Judgment filed by Sergeant David Brecht and City of San Diego (ECF No.
20 220) is granted.
21 VI. DEFENDANTS ESCAMILLA AND MACEY’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
22 JUDGMENT
23 Defendants Escamilla and Macey move for summary judgment on the sixth claim
24 for conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the seventh claim for
25 violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Escamilla
26 and Macey further move for summary judgment on the request for punitive damages.
27 ///
28 ///
28
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5729 Page 29 of 34
29
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5730 Page 30 of 34
1 Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995) . . . . The test
focuses on whether the state has “‘so far insinuated itself into a position of
2
interdependence with [the private actor] that it must be recognized as a joint
3 participant in the challenged activity.’” Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) . . . .
4
5 Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2002); see Jackson v. Pantazes, 810 F.2d
6 426, 429 (4th Cir. 1987) (bail bondsman was a state actor where a police officer assisted
7 the bondsman in entering the suspect’s home and restrained the suspect while the
8 bondsman searched her home).
9 Providing false information to the police does not automatically transform a private
10 individual into a state actor. See Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1357-
11 58 (9th Cir. 1981) (a person who supplies inaccurate information that leads to arrest is not
12 involved in joint activity with that state and is thus not liable under § 1983 (citing Butler v.
13 Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 589 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1978)); Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d
14 1124, 1130 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Police reliance in making an arrest on information given by a
15 private party does not make the private party a state actor.”).
16 In this case, Macey attempted to locate Sanders after a warrant was issued for
17 Sanders’ arrest in Missouri. Macey testified at her deposition that another bondsman,
18 Leland Chapman, created the first “Wanted” poster, and Macey posted it to her Facebook
19 account. The poster stated that Sanders was wanted for “bail jumping” and was “WITH
20 TIMOTHY GENE SMITH CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY
21 DANGEROUS.” (First Wanted Poster, Ex. 14 to Iredale Decl., ECF No. 235-8 at 3).
22 Macey testified that the assertion that Smith and Sanders were “armed” came from
23 talking to Smith and Sanders’ former roommate, Tiffany Moore, who told Macey and
24 Chapman that Smith and Sanders “had guns.” (Macey Dep., Ex. B to Obra-White Decl.,
25 ECF No. 219-6 at 65:2-3). Tiffany Moore stated in her police interview that she told the
26 bondsmen that Sanders and Smith had a gun. Macey testified that the “dangerous” assertion
27 was added to the “Wanted” poster because Smith tried to run Macey over with his car when
28 Macey located Smith and Sanders in Kansas City. (Id. at 65:2-20; 93:7-94:21). Macey
30
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5731 Page 31 of 34
1 testified that “Leland was the one that found out about the AK-47.” (Id. at 84:21-23).
2 Macey learned that Sanders and Smith might be in San Diego and hired Escamilla to
3 apprehend Sanders. Macey did not have any contact with SDPD before the shooting.
4 Escamilla created the second “Wanted” poster. The poster stated that Sanders and
5 Smith were “WANTED ON EXTRADITABLE FELONIES OUT OF MISSOURI.”
6 (Second Wanted Poster, Ex. 17 to Iredale Decl., ECF No. 234-10 at 2). The poster stated,
7 “SUBJECTS KNOWN TO BE HOMELESS AND ON FOOT IN THE PACIFIC BEACH
8 AREA AS OF 11/4/15. CAUTION: CI HAS ADVISED THAT SUBJECT SMITH
9 RECENTLY LEFT MISSOURI BY TRAIN ARMED WITH AN AK-47 and/or Revolver
10 and is a convicted felon with a long criminal history of violent crimes.” (Id.). Escamilla
11 states in his Declaration that he obtained the information for the second “Wanted” poster
12 from Macey, Chapman, and the first “Wanted” poster.
13 On November 3, 2015, Escamilla called SDPD requesting assistance in
14 apprehending Smith and Sanders at Fanuel Park. Escamilla gave Sergeant Brecht either the
15 second “Wanted” poster or the picture of Smith and Sanders from the poster. Escamilla
16 states in his Declaration that his only communication with any SDPD member before the
17 shooting was the “November 3, 2015 notification to S.D.P.D. dispatch of the intended
18 activities on November 3, 2015, as is required by law (Penal Code § 1299.08) and, later
19 that day, providing the photo, given to me by Natalie Macey and contained in the [‘Wanted’
20 posters] to Sgt. David Brecht.” (Escamilla Decl., ECF No. 215-1 ¶ 7).
21 The asserted constitutional violation in this case is the use of lethal force by Sergeant
22 Holslag in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sergeant Holslag testified that he shot
23 Smith because he believed that Smith was armed with a gun and was going to shoot him.
24 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Macey assisted in the creation
25 of a “Wanted” poster that stated that Smith was armed and dangerous. Escamilla used
26 information provided by Macey and by the first “Wanted” poster to create the second
27 “Wanted” poster, which he then provided to Brecht. Escamilla also provided this
28 information to Soto, who told the police dispatcher that Smith was armed, dangerous, and
31
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5732 Page 32 of 34
1 had a long history of violent crime. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
2 Plaintiffs, Holslag heard on the police radio that Smith was possibly armed and dangerous
3 and believed that Smith had a gun when he shot Smith.
4 The Court concludes that Macey providing information to Escamilla, and Escamilla
5 providing information to SDPD about Smith, even if false, did not constitute joint
6 participation with SDPD in the use of lethal force. Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence
7 sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Macey or Escamilla acted in concert with
8 SDPD in the deprivation of Smith’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Franklin, 312 F.3d at
9 445 (quoting Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 507). The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to
10 present facts sufficient to show that either Macey or Escamilla was a state actor rather than
11 engaged in “private conduct.” Burton, 365 U.S. at 722; see Ouzts, 505 F.2d at 555 (“[W]e
12 [ ] know that the bail bondsman is in the business in order to make money and is not acting
13 out of a high-minded sense of devotion to the administration of justice . . . . [T]he bondsman
14 was acting ‘to protect his own private financial interest and not to vindicate the interest of
15 the state.’” (quoting People v. Houle, 13 Cal. App. 3d 892, 895 (1970)). The Motions for
16 Summary Judgment on the claims against Macey and Escamilla for violation of § 1983 are
17 granted.
18 b. Claim 6 - Conspiracy
19 All Plaintiffs bring a claim against Macey and Escamilla for conspiracy to violate
20 civil rights under § 1983. Plaintiffs assert that Macey, Escamilla, Legal Service Bureau,
21 and Soto conspired to deprive Smith of his constitutionally protected rights under the
22 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by providing false information about Smith to SDPD
23 with the expectation that SDPD would use excessive force. Plaintiffs assert that the
24 bondsmen agreed with each other to obtain SDPD’s participation in Sanders’ arrest by
25 falsely telling SDPD that Smith was a violent, armed criminal.
26 Macey and Escamilla contend that they did not conspire with SDPD to deprive Smith
27 of his constitutional rights. Macey contends that she hired Escamilla to apprehend Sanders.
28 Macey and Escamilla assert that the information provided was not false. Plaintiffs contend
32
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5733 Page 33 of 34
1 that a reasonable juror could conclude that Macey and Escamilla conspired with each other
2 and Soto to falsify information, resulting in the use of excessive force by Sergeant Holslag.
3 “To establish a conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy the following
4 elements: (1) the existence of an express or implied agreement among the defendant
5 officers to deprive him of his constitutional rights; and (2) an actual deprivation of those
6 rights resulting from that agreement.” Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010).
7 Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983. See Cassettari v.
Nev. Cnty., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The insufficiency of these
8
allegations to support a section 1983 violation precludes a conspiracy claim
9 predicated upon the same allegations.”); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628
F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[M]ere proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to
10
establish a section 1983 claim.”) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d
11 600, 622 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100
S. Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980)). It does not enlarge the nature of the
12
claims asserted by the plaintiff, as there must always be an underlying
13 constitutional violation. Conspiracy may, however, enlarge the pool of
responsible defendants by demonstrating their causal connections to the
14
violation; the fact of the conspiracy may make a party liable for the
15 unconstitutional actions of the party with whom he has conspired. Conspiracy
in § 1983 actions is usually alleged by plaintiffs to draw in private parties who
16
would otherwise not be susceptible to a § 1983 action because of the state
17 action doctrine, see Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S. Ct.
1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406,
18
440 (9th Cir. 2010); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002), or to
19 aid in proving claims against otherwise tenuously connected parties in a
complex case, see Gilbrook [v. City of Westminster], 177 F.3d [839,] 856-58
20
[(9th Cir. 1999)].
21
Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 934-935 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by statute on
22
other grounds.
23
In this case, the conspiracy claim is based on the same facts as the claim against the
24
bondsmen for violation of § 1983. The underlying constitutional violation in this case is
25
the use of excessive force by Sergeant Holslag against Smith. Viewing the facts in the light
26
most favorable to Plaintiffs, the bondsmen provided information to each other and to SDPD
27
that Smith was armed with one or more guns and had a history of violent crime, in order to
28
33
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB
Case 3:16-cv-02989-WQH-MSB Document 255 Filed 12/31/20 PageID.5734 Page 34 of 34
34
16-cv-2989-WQH-MSB