Apportionment & Voting

Romeo T. Quintos Jr., PhD

[email protected]
Apportionment
-is the determination of the proportional number of
members each US state sends to the House of
Representatives, based on population figures.
 THE HAMILTON METHOD
by Alexander Hamilton
Standard Divisor is derived from dividing the total number of
population by the number of people to apportion.

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Standard Quota is the whole number part of the quotient of a

population divided by the standard divisor.
Example: No. State Population
1. Suppose a fictitious 1 Ascovoli 3,800
2 Beninca 2,500
country, Escia which
3 Costeri 3,150
consists of thirteen states 4 Espigo 2,100
with a total population of 5 Fuenlativa 9,150
42,000, needs to apportion 6 Guidolvia 2,000
45 representatives. The 7 Larim 2,750
population of each state is 8 Modilia 4,050
presented in table. Find 9 Olimento 2,400
how many members will 10 Santiavelas 3,100
represent each state. 11 Sevinea 2,700
12 Trevine 2,600
Population = 42000 13 Versine 1,700
No.of people = 45 Total 42,000
• Steps:
1. Calculate the standard divisor.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

42,000
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 = = 933.33
45
2. Divide the population of each state by the standard divisor
and round the quotient down to a whole number to get the
standard quota.
2. Divide the population of each state by the standard divisor and round the
quotient down to a whole number to get the standard quota.
State Standard
Population Standard Quota Apportioned
No. (N) Quota
(SQ)(SQ) Representatives
Representative
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 3800
𝑆𝑄𝐴 =
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 933.33
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 𝑆𝑄𝐴 = 4.07
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 2500
𝑆𝑄𝐵 =
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 933.33
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 𝑆𝑄𝐵 = 2.68
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3150
𝑆𝑄𝐶 =
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 933.33
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 𝑆𝑄𝐶 = 3.38
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2100
𝑆𝑄𝐷 =
Total 42,000 𝟒𝟓 𝟑𝟖 933.33

𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑆𝑄𝐷 = 2.25

3.If the required total number of representatives is not
attained, consider adding 1 representative for each state with
the largest decimal remainder. In this case, 7 representatives
are needed to complete 45, thus an additional of 1
representative will be added to the 7 states with largest
decimal remainder.
 Standard Apportioned
No. State Population
Quota Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 +1
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 +1
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 +1
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 +1
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 +1
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 +1
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 +1
Total 42,000 45 38
 Standard Apportioned
No. State Population
Quota Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 3
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 10
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 3
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 3
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 3
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 3
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 2
Total 42,000 45 45
THE JEFFERSON METHOD

by Thomas Jefferson

Modified Standard Divisor (MSD)

trial and error

𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑴𝑺𝑫 = 𝟗𝟎𝟎
State Standard Quota
Population Standard Quota Apportioned
No. (N) (SQ)
(SQ) Representative
Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1
Total 42,000 𝟒𝟓 𝟑𝟖
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑴𝑺𝑫 = 𝟗𝟎𝟎
State Standard
Population Standard 𝑴𝑺𝑫 Apportioned
Quota Apportioned 3800
No. (N) Quota Representatives 𝑆𝑄𝐴 = 900
(SQ)(SQ) 𝟗𝟎𝟎Representative
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 𝟒. 𝟐𝟐 4 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 𝟐. 𝟕𝟕 2 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐴 = 4.22
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 𝟑. 𝟓𝟎 3 𝟑 2500
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 𝟐. 𝟑𝟑 2 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐵 =
900
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 𝟏𝟎. 𝟏𝟕 9 𝟏𝟎
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 𝟐. 𝟐𝟐 2 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐵 = 2.77
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 3. 𝟎𝟔 2 𝟑 3150
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4. 𝟓𝟎 4 𝟒 𝑆𝑄𝐶 = 900
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 𝟐. 𝟔𝟕 2 𝟐
3.32 𝟑. 𝟒𝟒 3 𝟑 𝑆𝑄𝐶 = 3.50
10 Santiavelas 3,100
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 𝟑. 𝟎𝟎 2 𝟑 2100
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 𝟐. 𝟖𝟗 2 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐷 =
900
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 𝟏. 𝟖𝟗 1 𝟏
Total 42,000 𝑆𝑄𝐷 = 2.33
𝟒𝟓 𝟑𝟖 𝟒𝟏
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑴𝑺𝑫 = 𝟖𝟐𝟎
State Population Apportioned 3800
No. (N) MSD=820 Representative 𝑆𝑄𝐴 =
820
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.63 4
2 Beninca 2,500 3.05 𝑆𝑄𝐴 = 4.63
𝟑
3 Costeri 3,150 3.84 𝟑 2500
4 Espigo 2,100 2.56 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐵 =
820
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 11.16 𝟏𝟏
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.44 𝑆𝑄𝐵 = 3.04
𝟐
7 Larim 2,750 3.35 𝟑 3150
8 Modilia 4,050 4.94 𝟒 𝑆𝑄𝐶 =
820
9 Olimento 2,400 2.93 𝟐
𝑆𝑄𝐶 = 3.84
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.78 𝟑
11 Sevinea 2,700 3.29 𝟑 2100
12 Trevine 2,600 3.17 𝟑 𝑆𝑄𝐷 =
820
13 Versine 1,700 2.07 𝟐
Total 42,000 𝑆𝑄𝐷 = 2.56
𝟒𝟓 𝟒𝟓
 THE WEBSTER METHOD

by Daniel Webster
A modified standard divisor may be less than, equal to or
greater than the standard divisor. It applies the rules for
rounding off the quotient.
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑴𝑺𝑫 = 𝟗𝟐𝟎
State Standard
Population Standard Quota Apportioned
Apportioned
No. (N) Quota
(SQ)(SQ) Representative
Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.28 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1
Total 42,000 𝟒𝟓 𝟑𝟖
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑 𝑴𝑺𝑫 = 𝟗𝟐𝟎
State Population Apportioned 3800
No. (N) MSD=920 Representative 𝑆𝑄𝐴 =
920
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.13 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.72 𝑆𝑄𝐴 = 4.13
𝟑
3 Costeri 3,150 3.42 𝟑 2500
4 Espigo 2,100 2.28 𝟐 𝑆𝑄𝐵 =
920
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.95 𝟏𝟎
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.17 𝑆𝑄𝐵 = 2.72
𝟐
7 Larim 2,750 2.99 𝟑 3150
8 Modilia 4,050 4.40 𝟒 𝑆𝑄𝐶 =
920
9 Olimento 2,400 2.61 𝟑
𝑆𝑄𝐶 = 3.42
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.37 𝟑
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.93 𝟑 2100
12 Trevine 2,600 2.83 𝟑 𝑆𝑄𝐷 =
920
13 Versine 1,700 1.85 𝟐
Total 42,000 𝑆𝑄𝐷 = 2.28
𝟒𝟓 𝟒𝟓
WEBSTER METHOD (ROUND-OFF)
 HUNTINGTON-HILL APPORTION METHOD
This method is based on the apportionment principle and is
called as the method of equal proportions.
Steps:
1. Calculate the standard divisor.
2. The next step involves Round up or round down the quotient
(upper and lower quota).
3. Finding the geometric mean 𝐔𝐋 .
If the geometric mean is greater than the standard quota,
round down the geometric mean to get the number of
representatives.
If the geometric mean is less than or equal the standard quota,
round up the geometric mean.
 Population Standard Lower Upper
No. State 𝑃
(N) Quota Quota Quota
𝑆𝐷
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14
7 Larim 2,750 2.95
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79
13 Versine 1,700 1.82
Total 42,000 45
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑
 Population Standard Upper
Lower Upper
Lower Geometric
No. State 𝑃
(N) Quota Quota Quota Mean 𝑈𝐿
𝑆𝐷
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 5
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 3
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 4
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2 3
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 10
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 3
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 3
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4 5
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 4
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 3
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 3
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2
Total 42,000 45 38 51
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑
 Population Standard Upper
Lower Upper
Lower Geometric
No. State 𝑃
(N) Quota Quota Quota Mean 𝑈𝐿
𝑆𝐷
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 5 𝟒. 𝟒𝟕 𝟐𝟎
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 3 𝟐. 𝟒𝟓 𝟔
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 4 𝟑. 𝟒6 𝟏𝟐
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2 3 𝟐. 𝟒𝟓 𝟔
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 10 𝟗. 𝟒9 𝟗𝟎
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 3
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 3
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4 5
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 4
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 3
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 3
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2
Total 42,000 45 38 51
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑
 Standard Apportioned
Population
Population Standard Lower
Upper
Lower Upper
Upper
Lower Geometric
Geometric
No.
No. State
State 𝑃𝑃 Number of
(N)
(N) Quota
Quota 𝑆𝐷 Quota
Quota Quota
Quota Mean 𝑈𝐿
Mean 𝑈𝐿
𝑆𝐷 Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 5 4.47
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 3 2.45
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 4 3.46
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2 3 2.45
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 10 9.49
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 3 2.45
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 3 2.45
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4 5 4.47
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3 2.45
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 4 3.46
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 3 2.45
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 3 2.45
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2 1.41
Total 42,000 45 38 51 43.92
 Standard Apportioned
Population
Population Standard Lower
Upper
Lower Upper
Upper
Lower Geometric
Geometric
No.
No. State
State 𝑃𝑃 Number of
(N)
(N) Quota
Quota 𝑆𝐷 Quota
Quota Quota
Quota Mean 𝑈𝐿
Mean 𝑈𝐿
𝑆𝐷 Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 5 4.47
4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 3 3
2.45
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 4 3.46
3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2 3 2.45
2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 10 9.49
10
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 3 2
2.45
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 3 2.45
3
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4 5 4.47
4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3 2.45
3
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 4 3.46
3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 3 2.45
3
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 3 3
2.45
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2 1.41
2
Total 42,000 45 38 51 45
43.92
If the geometric mean is greater than the standard quota, round down the
geometric mean to get the number of representatives.
If the geometric mean is less than or equal the standard quota, round up
the geometric mean.
 Standard Apportioned
Population Lower Upper Geometric
No. State 𝑃 Number of
(N) Quota Quota Quota Mean 𝑈𝐿
𝑆𝐷 Representatives
1 Ascovoli 3,800 4.07 4 5 4.47 4
2 Beninca 2,500 2.68 2 3 2.45 3
3 Costeri 3,150 3.38 3 4 3.46 3
4 Espigo 2,100 2.25 2 3 2.45 2
5 Fuenlativa 9,150 9.80 9 10 9.49 10
6 Guidolvia 2,000 2.14 2 3 2.45 2
7 Larim 2,750 2.95 2 3 2.45 3
8 Modilia 4,050 4.34 4 5 4.47 4
9 Olimento 2,400 2.57 2 3 2.45 3
10 Santiavelas 3,100 3.32 3 4 3.46 3
11 Sevinea 2,700 2.89 2 3 2.45 3
12 Trevine 2,600 2.79 2 3 2.45 3
13 Versine 1,700 1.82 1 2 1.41 2
Total 42,000 45 38 51 43.92 45
𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒅 𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒔𝒐𝒓 = 𝟗𝟑𝟑. 𝟑𝟑
INTRODUCTION TO VOTING
METHODS OF VOTING
PLURALITY METHOD

Each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate with the
most votes wins.

PLURALITY METHOD WITH ELIMINATION

The candidate who receives majority of the votes is declared

as winner at once but if no one receives majority of votes,
the candidate with the least number of votes is eliminated
and a new election is held. This process continues until a
candidate receives a majority of votes.
1. An election was conducted for president in the community.
Five hundred (500) persons were asked. The results are as
follows.
Candidate Number of Votes
A 234
B 144
C 67
D 45

Since Candidate A obtained the highest vote of 234.

Therefore, Candidate A declares the winner.
2. The selection of the site for the SEA Games is made by the
International Committee. The voting process calls for a
plurality election.

Country Number of Votes

Japan 40
Philippines 18
Indonesia 20
Vietnam 22
Total Members 100

The highest vote is 40 which is not a majority votes.

2. The selection of the site for the SEA Games is made by the
International Committee. The voting process calls for a
plurality election.

Country Number of Votes

Japan 56
Indonesia 21
Vietnam 23
Total Members 100

Japan got the highest vote of 56 which is the

majority. Therefore, Japan is the winner.
3. Fifty students were asked to rank their most used social
media networks using 1 as their most used and 5 as their
least used network. The table below shows the rankings of
their preferences. Which social media network is the most
used network according to plurality method?

Social Media Rankings

Facebook 1 3 2 1
Instagram 2 1 3 4
Snapchat 4 2 4 3
Twitter 3 4 1 2
Number of
Voters 18 16 12 4
3. Fifty students were asked to rank their most used social
media networks using 1 as their most used and 5 as their
least used network. The table below shows the rankings of
their preferences. Which social media network is the most
used network according to plurality method?

Social Media Rankings

Facebook 1 3 2 1
Instagram 2 1 3 4
Snapchat 4 2 4 3
Twitter 3 4 1 2
Number of
Voters 18
18 16 12 4
18 + 4 = 22
3. Fifty students were asked to rank their most used social
media networks using 1 as their most used and 5 as their
least used network. The table below shows the rankings of
their preferences. Which social media network is the most
used network according to plurality method?

Social Media Rankings

Facebook 1 2 2 1
Instagram 2 1 3 4
Twitter 3 3 1 2
Number of
Voters 18 16 12 4
18 + 4 = 22
3. Fifty students were asked to rank their most used social
media networks using 1 as their most used and 5 as their
least used network. The table below shows the rankings of
their preferences. Which social media network is the most
used network according to plurality method?

Social Media Rankings

Facebook 1 2 1 1
Instagram 2 1 2 2
Number of
Voters 18
18 16 12
12 4
18 + 12 + 4 = 34
 BORDA COUNT METHOD

In this method of voting, points are assigned for each

candidate’s rank, i.e. if there are n candidates or issues in an
election, each voter ranks the candidates or issues by giving
n points to the voter’s first choice, n – 1 points for the
voter’s second choice, and so on, with the voter’s least
favorite choice receiving 1 point. The candidate or issue
that receives the most total points is the winner
Example:
1. One hundred movie goers were asked to rank the following
Avengers movies according to their preferences. Determine
which Avenger movie is the most preferred by using the
Borda Count Method.
Movie Ranking
Iron Man 3 3 1 4 6 1
Thor: Ragnarok 4 6 6 5 4
Black Panther 1 4 2 1 3
Captain America:
Civil War 5 3 3 2 2
Spiderman:
Homecoming 6 5 5 4 5
The Avengers:
Infinity War 2 2 1 3 6
Number of Voters 38 29 15 12 6
Points should be assigned to corresponding ranks; highest point is 6
since there are six movies. The points allotment are as follows:
Rank 1 = 6 points Rank 2 = 5 points Rank 3 = 4 points
Rank 4 = 3 points Rank 5 = 2 points Rank 6 = 1 point
Movie Ranking
Iron Man 3 38 x3 4 29 x 1 6 15 x4 3 12 x6 1 6 x 1 6
Thor: Ragnarok 38 x4 3 29 x 6 1 15 x6 1 12 x5 2 6 x 4 3
Black Panther 38 x1 6 29 x4 3 15 x2 5 12 x1 6 6 x3 4
Captain America: Civil
War 38 x5 2 29 x3 4 15 x3 4 12 x2 5 6 x2 5
Spiderman:
Homecoming 38 x6 1 29 x5 2 15 x5 2 12 x4 3 6 x5 2
The Avengers: Infinity
War 38 x2 5 29 x2 5 15 x1 6 12 x3 4 6 x6 1
Number of Voters 38 29 15 12 6
Number of Voters x Corresponding Points per Rank
Points should be assigned to corresponding ranks; highest point is 6
since there are six movies. The points allotment are as follows:
Rank 1 = 6 points Rank 2 = 5 points Rank 3 = 4 points
Rank 4 = 3 points Rank 5 = 2 points Rank 6 = 1 point
Movie No. of Voters * Corresponding Points/Rank
Iron Man 3 38*4 29*6 15*3 12*1 6*6
Thor: Ragnarok 38*3 29*1 15*1 12*2 6*3
Black Panther 38*6 29*3 15*5 12*6 6*4
Captain America: Civil
War 38*2 29*4 15*4 12*5 6*5
Spiderman:
Homecoming 38*1 29*2 15*2 12*3 6*2
The Avengers: Infinity
War 38*5 29*5 15*6 12*4 6*1
Number of Voters 38 29 15 12 6
 Total
Movies Points Rank
Points
Iron Man 3 152 174 45 12 36 419 3
Thor: Ragnarok 114 29 15 24 18 200 5
Black Panther 228 87 75 72 24 486 1
Captain America: Civil
War 76 116 60 60 30 342 4
Spiderman:
Homecoming 38 58 30 36 12 174 6
The Avengers: Infinity
War 190 145 90 48 6 479 2
 PAIRWISE COMPARISON VOTING METHOD
COPELAND’S METHOD
The pairwise comparison method of voting is usually referred as
the head-to-head method of voting. In this method, each
candidate is compared one-to-one with each of the other
candidates. A candidate receives 1 point for a win, 0.5 point for a
tie and 0 point for a loss. A candidate with the highest points
wins.
Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored
Pantoja favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85
Pantoja favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85
Pantoja favored 108 65
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85
Pantoja favored 108 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Pantoja:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 85
Pantoja favored 108 65 42 215
*Pantoja will get 1 point
Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored
Quintero favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85
Quintero favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65
Quintero favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65
Quintero favored 108 42
 • Between Mejia and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65 150
Quintero favored 108 42 150
*Mejia and Quintero will get 0.5 point each since
they have the same points.
Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored
Soler favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85
Soler favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65
Soler favored 108
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65
Soler favored 108 42
 • Between Mejia and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Mejia favored 85 65 150
Soler favored 108 42 150
*Mejia and Soler will get 0.5 point each since they have the
same points.
Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored
Quintero favored 108
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored
Quintero favored 108 85
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored 65
Quintero favored 108 85
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored 65
Quintero favored 108 85 42
 • Between Pantoja and Quintero:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored 65 65
Quintero favored 108 85 42 235

*Quintero will get 1 point.

Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Pantoja and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Pantoja and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Pantoja favored 108 85 65 42 300
Soler favored 0
*Pantoja will get 1 point.
Example:
3. Suppose a pairwise comparison method will be used to
determine the winner of home owners association’s
presidency. Three hundred members of HOA were asked to
rank the four candidates in order of their preferences.
Determine who ranked first in the election using the table
below:
Candidates Rankings
Mejia 4 1 2 4
Pantoja 2 3 1 2
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of
Voters 108 85 65 42
 • Between Quintero and Soler:
Candidates Rankings Total
Quintero 1 2 3 1
Soler 3 4 4 3
Number of Voters 108 85 65 42
Quintero favored 108 85 65 42 300
Soler favored
*Quintero will get 1 point.
Summary of points:

Candidates Total Points

Mejia 0.5 + 0.5 = 1
Pantoja 1+1=2
Quintero 0.5 + 1 + 1 = 2.5
Soler 0.5

Quintero wins the presidency.

FAIRNESS CRITERIA IN VOTING
“A voting method that is democratic and always fair is a
mathematical impossibility.”
-Kenneth J. Arrow
FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Kenneth J. Arrow had come out with various criteria for a fair
voting system.

Majority Criterion. The candidate who receives a majority

of the first-place votes is the winner.
 FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Kenneth J. Arrow had come out with various criteria for a fair
voting system.

Majority Criterion. The candidate who receives a majority

of the first-place votes is the winner.

Monotonicity Criterion. If candidate A wins an election, then

candidate A will also win the election if the only change in
the voters’ preferences is that supporters of a different
candidate change their votes to support candidate A.
FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Kenneth J. Arrow had come out with various criteria for a fair
voting system.

Condorcet Criterion. A candidate who wins all head-head

matchups should win an election when all candidates appear
on the ballot.
FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Kenneth J. Arrow had come out with various criteria for a fair
voting system.

Condorcet Criterion. A candidate who wins all head-head

matchups should win an election when all candidates appear
on the ballot.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If a candidate wins

an election, the winner should remain the winner in any
recount in which losing candidates withdraw from the race.
Exercises:
A. Two hundred (200) trash bins will be distributed among five (5)
barangays of Morong. This will be apportioned according to their
population as shown in the table
1.Determine the standard divisor.
2.Determine the standard quota of each barangay.
3.Find the number of trash bins which will be allocated per barangay
using
3.1 the Hamilton Method; Barangay Population
3.2 the Jefferson Method; Binaritan 5,966
3.3. the Webster Method; Mabayo 4,771
3.4. the Huntington Hill Method Nagbalayong 6,207
Poblacion 5,511
Sabang 7,446
Total 29,901
B. The table below shows the population of students per program in the
College of Information and Communications Technology. Using the
Huntington-Hill Method, determine the number of computers to be
apportioned per program if there are 350 computers to be distributed.

Program Population
BSCS 340
BSMIS 550
BSEMC 385
BSIT 725
Total 2000
• Exercises:
C. The BPSU Faculty Association is planning its annual team building
activities and has asked its members to rank four different choices of
venue in order of preferences. The result is given below:
Determine where the team building shall be held using
1. plurality with elimination method;
2. borda count method and
3. pairwise comparison method

Venue Rankings
beach 1 3 4 2 3
resort 2 2 3 1 2
conference hall 4 1 2 3 4
open field 3 4 1 4 1
Number of teachers 118 68 46 38 30
• Exercises:
D. A group of BPSU students were asked to rank their favorite band
according to their preferences for the University’s Kagitingan Awards.
The table below shows the responses given by the students.
4. Using the plurality method, determine if the winner satisfy the
majority criterion,
5. Use plurality with elimination method to determine student’s
favorite band.
6. Use the pairwise comparison method.

Name of Bands Rankings

Callalily 3 4 3 3 3
IV of Spades 2 1 1 2 2
Parokya Ni Edgar 1 2 2 1 4
Silent Sanctuary 4 3 2 4 1
Number of students 40 24 18 10 8
Apportionment and Voting References:
Hamilton Method
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWfEqWLz9pc
Jefferson Method
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=weGGVmy9yLc
Webster Method
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNybGTvz_hQ
Huntington Hill Method
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l74j-auLjZE
 References:
• Plurality Voting Method
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-VmxJQFMq8
• Borda Count Method
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVG9jmA4FBU
• Copeland’s Method/pairwise comparison
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sh3IEALnpNg