24.

G.R. No. L-9449             February 12, 1915

BONIFACIA MANALO, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Placida Manalo, plaintiff-

appellant,
vs.
GREGORIO DE MESA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Counsel for Bonifacia Manalo, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Placida
Manalo, file a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, alleging as her first cause of
action that the deceased Placida Manalo had been the owner of two parcels of land, each planted
with 300 coco palms, which she had inherited from her deceased parents and which were located in
the barrio of Palita, municipality of Alaminos, the area and boundaries of said lands being stated in
the complaint; that in 1904 the defendant Gregorio de Mesa had usurped said two parcels of land,
thereby depriving the plaintiff, as administratrix of the property of the deceased Placida Manalo, of
possession and enjoyment thereof, and had refused to deliver them to the plaintiff in spite of
repeated requests that he do so.

In a private document written in Tagalog and thereinafter translated, the spouses Fernando
Regalado and Placida Manalo declared that they are now old and incapacitated for work; that the
Placida has been ill for over a year and she feels that her death is approaching; that as both are
without children to inherit from them, and moreover taking into consideration that their nephew and
niece, the spouses Gregorio de Mesa and Leoncia Manalo, the latter of whom has lived with them
from childhood and has been treated by them as a daughter, have been caring for them both up to
the present time, they agree to donate to them the tract of land which they own, the location and
boundaries whereof are set forth in the document. They further state that on account of the
circumstances recited they make the donation to the exclusion of their other nephews and nieces,
and they request the donees to bear such expenses as would be incurred in case the donor Placida
Manalo should die. To this end, title of ownership was made over to the donees with the injunction
that in case any claim to said land should be set up by any brother or other nephew of the donors,
said claim was to be rejected and ignored by all the authorities.

ISSUE: WON the donation is null and void

HELD:

NO. The Court held that although the donation is made in a private instrument, the donation
is still valid because such is considered an onerous one. Thus, it should be governed by the law of
contracts.

In order to settle the question raised by the appellant that the said donation is null and void
because it was not made in a public instrument in accordance with the provisions of article 633 of
the Civil Code, and that it was recorded in a private document, was not sufficient, it is necessary to
consider whether or not the donation in question is governed by the provisions of the code that treat
of donations in general, or whether, being made for a valuable consideration, it falls outside them,
and thus becomes subject, as stated, to the laws of contracts, under said article 622 of the code,
and so on this hypothesis should have been recorded in a public instrument, as prescribed by article
633.

In the case at bar, the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the
donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the
death and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation which the donee Gregorio
de Mesa carried out in his own behalf and for his wife Leoncia Manalo; therefore in order to
determine whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate
that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although
not recorded in a public instrument. The defendant in his own behalf and for his wife now possesses
under title of owner the two parcels of land improperly claimed by the plaintiff Bonifacia Manalo,
since he acquired them legally and by the means established by law for transferring and acquiring
ownership.
 25.

G.R. No. 77425             June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the
SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 77450             June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, and the
SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO and MARTINA
RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA TOLENTINO, respondents.

FACTS:
The administrators of the estate of deceased spouses Eusebioand Martina De Castro filed a
complaint to nullify the deed of donation, rescission of contract, and reconveyance of the property
against spouses Florencio and Soledad Ignao, Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila. The administrators alleged that in 1930 the De Castros executed the deed of
donation over their Cavite property to the Archbishop, said deed allegedly providing that the latter
cannot dispose or sell the property within 100 years from execution. The administration of the said
properties was transferred to the Bishop of Imus in 1962. And in 1980, the Bishop of Imus sold the
property to the spouses Ignao. The Ignaos were then able to transfer the Transfer Certificate of Title
under their names. The lower court ruled that the action had already prescribed and dismissed the
complaint. This was reversed by the CA. The Ignaos and the Bishops contend that the cause of
action had already prescribed, relying on Art. 764 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON the cause of action of the respondents has already prescribed

HELD:

NO. Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an action for the revocation of
a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed of donation involved herein
expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same is not necessary. A judicial action
for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and
cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. This cancellation can be applied in the case
at bar. Art 732 of the Civil Code provides that donations inter vivos shall be governed by the general
provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined by the law on donations. In
contracts of providing for automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of
obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
 26.

G.R. No. L-4236 November 18, 1952

ASTERIA BAUTISTA, MAXIMA LOMIBAO, FRANCISCO LOMIBAO, JOSE LOMIBAO, FELISA LOMIBAO and
PAULINA LOMIBAO, Plaintiffs-Appellees
vs
EPIFANIO SABINIANO, in his capacity as Guardian ad litem of the minors MARCELINA SABINIANO and
CANDIDA SABINIANO, Defendants-Appellants.

FACTS:
Asteria Bautista donated some of his properties to Sabianos, Lomibao and De Guzman. Though
he donated his properties he reserved the right to dispose the properties for the sustenance and
maintenance of his health in case that he has illness, and the right to usufruct of the products of the
properties and those said properties be at his disposal. That, in his unexpected death, the donees will
dispose the properties to finance his funeral expenses or ceremonies in Roman Catholic

ISSUE: WON the donations are valid

HELD:
No. If the donor reserves the right to revoke it or if he reserves the right to dispose of all the
properties purportedly donated, there is no donation. If the disposition or conveyance or transfer takes
effect upon the donor’s death and becomes irrevocable only upon his death, it is not an inter vivos but a
mortis causa donation. The disposition of the properties in favor of the appellants not having been done
in accord with the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding will of a testator,
there was no lawful and valid transmission thereof to them.
 27.

G.R. No. L-6600             July 30, 1954

HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE BONSATO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
Respondents Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario,
both deceased initiated the case at bar. Their complaint for annulment and damages charged that
Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial
deeds of donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato,
respectively, transferring to them several parcels of land, both donations having been duly accepted
in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and
void for lack of the requisite formalities. Defendants Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato answered
averring that the donations made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past
services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without
the use of force and violence, misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the
case and for damages.

ISSUE: WON the donation was mortis causa

HELD:
NO. the donation was inter vivos. None of the characteristics of mortis causa is discernible in
the deeds of donation, executed by the late Domingo Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself,
during his lifetime, the owner’s share of the fruits or produce, a reservation that would be
unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor. Most significant is
the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a
testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation.
 28.

G.R. No. L-24983           May 20, 1968

FLORENTINO GENATO, FRANCISCO GENATO, and GENATO COMMERCIAL

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
FELISA GENATO DE LORENZO, respondent.

FACTS:

The property in question here is the 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercial
Corporation, which has P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato who was the director
and secretary-treasurer of the said company. The petitioners herein who are heirs of Simona, are
claiming that they own 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercial Corporation because of the
donation made by Simona to them. Felis Genato de Lorenzo, an another heir, however, are trying to
recover from the petitioners, her co-heirs, the said stocks so they can include it in the intestate
estate which should later be distributed among all the surviving children of the decedent. Four or five
days after having Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assistant Secretary-Treasurer of the
Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favor of Florentino Genato and another 265 were issued in
favor of Francisco G. Genato.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid donation

HELD:
NO. There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two
donees was not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that Francisco Genato had
authorized his brother, Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by the donor and the
acceptance by done must be simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than the true done
must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been
claimed to exist in this case.
 29.

G.R. No. L-21676             February 28, 1969

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
Deceased Belen Aldaba owned two parcel of lots. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane
Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her
death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother
Cesar Aldaba. After the death of Belen, the respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises.
Upon their refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really
intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which
reads, ―Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.
They also argue that the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to
P53,000. The respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.
ISSUE: WON there was a disposition of property by the deceased in favor of the petitioners
HELD:
NO. The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence
of a donation with onerous cause. The note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention
to donate. Also, no notarial document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during those 10
years. The P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If
at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to
compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate
proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.
 30.

G.R. No. 22173           September 25, 1924

JULIANA ABRAGAN, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
RITA G. DE CENTENERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
Julieta G. Abragan is the natural daughter of Don Andres Garchitorena, deceased. Not long
before his death in the year 1921 t Andres Garchitorena executed two deeds of gift. The first of
these documents conveys by way of gift to Julieta G. Abragan and her mother Juliana Abragan, two
parcels of property, namely, first, a piece of land planted with fruit-bearing coconut trees and having
an area of nine hectares, located in the barrio of Matacla, in the municipality of Goa, Camarines Sur,
valued at P2,000; and, secondly, a building lot in the pueblo of Tigaon, of an area of 446 square
meters, containing a warehouse (camarin) for commercial use, and having a value of P1,900. The
instrument gives to the mother, Juliana, the usufruct in these properties and to the daughter, Julieta,
the naked ownership. By the second instrument, the same donor gives to the same donees and in
the same manner a piece of hemp land having an area of twenty hectares, and located in the barrio
of Tinawgan, municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Both of these instruments contain an
acceptance of the gifts on the part of Julieta G. Abragan, aided by her mother Juliana; but owing to
circumstances not necessary to be here set out, neither document was at any time acknowledged
before a notary public.
After the death of the donor, Rita G. de Centenera, who is the sole heir of Andres
Garchitorena, qualified as special administratrix of his estate; and she executed a public document
in which she recites that her deceased father had in life made two donations in favor of his daughter,
Julieta G. Abragan, and Juliana Abragan, vesting the nude ownership in Julieta and the usufruct in
Juliana. After this document had been executed and delivered, Rita G. de Centenera ceased to be
special administratrix of the estate of her father and one Jose N. Garchitorena was appointed as
administrator in her stead. The properties mentioned in the deeds of gift appear to have come into
the possession of the said administrator of Andres Garchitorena, who now refuses to recognize the
validity of the donations. The present action was therefore instituted by the Abragans, mother and
daughter.

ISSUE:
 31.

G.R. No. L-69970 November 28, 1988

FELIX DANGUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, APOLONIA MELAD, assisted by her husband, JOSE
TAGACAY, respondents.

FACTS:
Apolonia Melad filed a complaint against Felix Danguilan for the recovery of a farm lot and a
residential lot. She claimed that she had purchased form Domingo Melad the land now being
unlawfully withheld by Danguilan. In his answer, Danguilan denied the allegation and averred that he
was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession,
having acquired them from Domingo Melad. The trial court held that the plaintiff's own declaration
that she moved out of the property and left it in the possession of the defendant was contradictory to
her claim of ownership. She was also inconsistent when she testified first that the defendant was her
tenant and later in rebuttal that he was her administrator. The decision concluded that where there
was doubt as to the ownership of the property, the presumption was in favor of the one actually
occupying the same, which in this case was the defendant.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid donation.
HELD:
NO. The donation being of real property, it is void for not complying with the requirements
given by law. Donation of real property should be in a public instrument. In this case, the donation
was not executed in a public instrument. The Court ruled, considering the language of the two
instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner. The deed of
sale was allegedly executed when the respondent was only three years old and the consideration
was supposedly paid by her mother, Maria Yedan from her earnings as a wage worker in a factory.
This was itself a suspicious circumstance, one may well wonder why the transfer was not made to
the mother herself, who was after all the one paying for the lands. The sale was made out in favor of
Apolonia Melad although she had been using the surname Yedan her mother's surname, before that
instrument was signed and in fact even after she got married. The averment was also made that the
contract was simulated and prepared after Domingo Melad's death. It was also alleged that even
after the supposed execution of the said contract, the respondent considered Domingo Melad the
owner of the properties and that she had never occupied the same.
 32.

G.R. No. L-57455               January 18, 1990

EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA, JR., WILLARD DE LUNA,

ANTONIO DE LUNA, and JOSELITO DE LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch IX, and LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and
conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the
donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna “revived” the said
donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions: 1)
the Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten
School to be named after St. Veronica; 2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least
70% completed three years from the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions; 3)
Automatic reversion in case of violation The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered
and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the
lot donated while the remaining area was retained by the De Luna. The children and only heirs of the
late De Luna filed a complaint with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that
the terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and
substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of
time to complete construction. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE: WON the action prescribes in 4 years

HELD:

NO. The action prescribes in 10 years.

The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. Under the old Civil Code, it
is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but
by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the
New Civil Code as provided in Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by
the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards
that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article
733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on
prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.
 33.

G.R. No. 4372 March 27, 1908

ENRIQUE M. BARRETTO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs
THE CITY OF MANILA, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS:
Enrique Ma. Barretto donates his lot in front of Malacanang Palace to the City of Manila, on
the condition that "no structures shall be erected upon the land and that it will not be devoted to any
purpose other than the beautifying of the vicinity, and for this purpose the city should acquire such of
the adjoining land as may be necessary to form with mine a public square with gardens and walks."
The Ayuntamiento and the Corregimiento of the City declared its acceptance over Barretto's offer,
both requesting for its documents and necessary deeds of conveyance. Barretto thereafter sent to
the Ayuntamiento the necessary documents, and until the month of February, 1903, appears to have
had the idea that a formal transfer of the plot had been executed by him; in fact, it had not been.
However, the city entered into possession of the land, building a railing separating it from the
adjoining property, and ever since that time the ground has been used as part of the public street,
increasing the width thereof opposite the exit from the Palace and substantially improving the
appearance of the locality. Barretto brought the action to recover possession of the land on account
of the failure of the city to comply with the conditions of the donation.

ISSUE:

HELD:
Although a formal conveyance of the property appears to have never been made, yet the taking
possession of the land by the city upon the terms contained in the offer and acceptance give effect
to the latter.

The whole negotiation must be taken into consideration in order to determine what was in the minds
of the parties at the time. The plaintiff's proposition was unmistakable. If the city designed to reject
any part of it while accepting the rest, such rejection should have been in express terms. Not only do
we fail to find any such rejection, but in the letter of June 19 there appears to be in its concluding
words an express recognition of the terms imposed, when it is provided that the deed of cession
shall be drawn "with the restrictions indicated by you." This is a reference to the restrictions in the
letter of the plaintiff and operates of necessity as an acceptance of them.
 34.

G.R. No. 178495               July 26, 2010

SPOUSES RODOLFO A. NOCEDA and ERNA T. NOCEDA, Petitioners,

vs.
AURORA ARBIZO-DIRECTO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Aurora Directo, Rodolfo Noceda and Maria Arbizo are the daughter, grandson and widow,
respectively, of the deceased Celestino Arbizo. They extrajudicially settled a parcel of land having an
area of 66,530 square meters. Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294
square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Directo donated 625
square meters of her share to Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister,
Carolina. However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by Directo,
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while Directo and
Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax
Declaration over the lot in the name of Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an
area of only 29,845 square meters. In 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to
him by Directo. Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding
the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence
earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of Directo
without her consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused. Due
to this, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against Noceda. Trial court ruled in favor of Directo ordering the
revocation of the donation.

ISSUE: WON Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude which can be a ground for
the revocation of the donation

HELD:
YES. It was established that Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by Aurora
Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo, thus petitioner’s
act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without the latter’s knowledge and consent is an
act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.