Mahinay v.

Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay was accused on June 10, 1998, by the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA), through Officer-in-Charge Jesus S. Sirios, of accepting unauthorized fees from FRITZ
Logistics Phils. Inc. due to his position and in exchange for the latter providing escort service to FRITZ'
trucks from Baguio City to Manila and vice versa. In connection to Sec. 22 (1), Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, petitioner allegedly violated Sec. 46 (b) (9), Chapter 6, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. The petitioner acknowledges accepting the fees from
FRITZ in an Answer, and he also claims that they did so in good faith and with no goal of profiting
themselves.

Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier, the Special Prosecutor's line witness, testified that the "additional sum" of
P300 was really obtained by petitioner, who demanded it from FRITZ in exchange for accompanying their
"trucks all the way to the airport or all the way to our FRITZ headquarters in Manila." PEZA determined
that all components of the alleged crime were present in the case. If the Authority deems him guilty, he will
be required to quit without the possibility of receiving monetary or other compensation. PEZA refused the
petitioner's request. The petitioner took his case to the CSC. The CSC maintained the PEZA's ruling, but
changed the punishment of forced resignation to expulsion from the service under Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule IV,
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 I 7 Rule XIV, Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was refused by the CSC. Following that, the CA refused a
slew of motions and petitions. As a result, this petition has been created. Petitioner claims that the CA erred
in ruling that the petition for certiorari was filed to replace a lost appeal because, while a petition for review
under Rule 43 was available, it was insufficient for petitioner because he was fired from his job on June 9,
1999 by PEZA before the case was appealed to the Civil Service on June 22, 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal by way of special civil action for certiorari.

RULING:
No. The petitioner’s contention lacks merit. As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper
mode of appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with
the CA. The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to only
when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Certiorari, which in effect dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.

Cruz vs CSC
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission found in 1994 that petitioner Zenaida Paitim (municipal treasurer of
Norzagaray, Bulacan) had taken Gilda Cruz's non-professional test after the latter had failed it three times.
After conducting a fact-finding investigation, the CSC determined that Paitim and Cruz have a prima facie
case against them. A "Formal Charge" is issued for dishonesty, grave misconduct, or conduct that is
detrimental to the service's best interests. In their response, the petitioners stated that they deny the official
accusation in general. The petitioners stated that they wanted an official investigation into the situation. The
petitioners then filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that if the inquiry continues, they will be deprived of
their right to due process because the CSC was simultaneously the complainant, prosecutor, and judge.

Dulce J. Cochon issued an investigative report and recommendation on November 16, 1995, finding the
petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and dismissing them from government service. The report was sent to the
CSC for review, and the CSC judged the petitioners guilty and ordered them to be fired from their
government jobs. The CSC lacked initial jurisdiction to hear and consider the administrative case, according
to petitioners. According to the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1,
Book V, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction only in administrative cases where the penalty imposed is
removal or dismissal from office and the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government
employee.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as an investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge all at the same time.

RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative.Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
explicitly provides that the CSC can rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
connected to the examinations. Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact
that the CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the
petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide
administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including actions of its officers
and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11
of the Administrative Code of 1987. It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a
finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. They were properly informed of the charges,
given a chance to submit their answer and were given the opportunity to defend themselves. Hence, no
denial of due process.

De Leon vs CA
FACTS:
The trial court granted a partial judgment against Estelita on May 14, 1996, and a full decision against
Avelino on June 2, 1997, in response to petitioner's action for money damages against respondent spouses
Estelita and Avelino Batungbacal. The spouses then filed an appeal from both rulings, which was denied by
petitioner, who did not file an appellee's brief as a result. The Amended Appellant's Brief was admitted after
the Court of Appeals refused the request to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it considered the
appeal as submitted for decision without petitioner’s brief.

RULING:
No. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said
attorney and notice to client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. In this
case, the counsel of record for the private respondent is presumed to be their counsel on appeal and the only
one authorized to receive court processes. Notice of judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was notice to
the clients for all legal intents and purposes.

Montecillo vs Civil Service Commission

FACTS:
As a result, while the MCWD's personnel structure was being altered, three of its employees —
petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega, and Charrishe Dosdos — applied for promotion to
the position of "Secretary to the Assistant General Manager" or "Private Secretary C," as the position was
later dubbed. Petitioners had been engaged in the MCWD for six to seven years and held the status of
"Department Secretary" at the time of their application. When MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla
forwarded their appointments to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC FO), the CSC FO refused
to approve the petitioners' appointments as "permanent" on the grounds that the position applied for was a
"primarily confidential" and "co-terminous" position. The CSC Regional Office2 supported the decision,
and respondent affirmed it on appeal.
 Respondent based its judgments in Resolution No. 972512 on CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22,
Series of 1991. However, it should be emphasized that Private Secretary jobs can be found in the offices of
officials who are not named in Section 9, Chapter 2, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 but whose
responsibilities necessitate greatest secrecy." In accordance with Resolution No. 91-676, it is officially
proclaimed that all Private Secretary jobs, regardless of their location, are essentially secret in nature. The
nominees to these posts shall have the same term of office as the official they serve.' After the CSC denied
their move for reconsideration, petitioners filed this special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not CSC unduly amended and expanded the scope of the non-career service under Section 6,
Article IV of the Civil Service Decree.

Held:
We find no merit in the present petition.

In the present case, there is no clear and persuasive showing that respondent grossly abused its
discretion or exceeded its powers when it issued the assailed circular. On the contrary, respondent was
expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily
confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.10 To our mind, this
signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the
non-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it
issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are
considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve.
In our view, the assailed memorandum circular cannot be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza
FACTS:
Respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino operations manager for petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), was charged with administrative charges on November 5,
1997, for failing to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers
during his tenure. On the basis of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and/or behavior injurious to the best
interests of the service, the PAGCOR Board issued a Resolution terminating respondent. As a result,
respondent filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, which amended the ruling and found
respondent solely guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the CSC's
decision and ordered respondent's reinstatement with full back salary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is a confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by reason of loss
of confidence.
HELD:
No. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16 of Presidential Decree No.
1869 expressly provides that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as
“Confidential” appointee are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations,
and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. The
submission that PAGCOR employees have been declared confidential appointees must be rejected. Section
16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not
absolutely binding on the courts, the true test being the nature of the position.

Although respondent’s position handles confidential matters such fact does not warrant the
conclusion that his position is primarily confidential in character. Every appointment implies confidence, but
much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential.
The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
 Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
Del Castillo worked for the respondent PRC. He was assigned to the Optometry Licensure
Examination as a watcher. Later, Susan Corpuz and Enriquieta Flores, both observers at the aforementioned
license exam, wrote to the CSC, claiming that they observed Del Castillo answer test papers supplied by an
examinee. Commissioner Francia, Jr., PRC, charged Del Castillo with grave misconduct: While the
examinations in the subject General and Ocular Pathology of the Optometry licensure examinations were
still in progress and after an examinee had submitted his answer sheets, you compared the answers in the
said answer sheet to those on the piece of paper you pulled out of the pocket of your shirt, crossed out some
of the answers on the answer sheet and changed them with the answers appearing on the piece of paper and
answered the blank numbers.
Petitioner voluntarily submitted his affidavit-answer disputing the charges against him on August 10,
1990. Associate Commissioner Mariano A. Mendieta of the respondent PRC conducted a formal hearing of
the matter on August 15, 1990. After a thorough inquiry, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct
and was discharged from the military with all benefits forfeited. The Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) overturned the PRC's judgment, clearing petitioner of the accusation. However, when the PRC filed
an appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and sentenced
him to dismissal. The move for reconsideration of the petitioner was refused. As a result, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, arguing, among other things, that the
CSC abused its discretion in hearing the PRC's appeal.
In an En Banc Decision issued on February 14, 1995, this Court approved the petition, overturning
the CSC and ordered the petitioner's restoration. Nonetheless, petitioner wrote to PRC Chairman
Hermogenes Pobre through counsel, asking not only reinstatement but also reimbursement of back salary.
On July 17, 1995, the petitioner was restored. Chairman Pobre, in a Letter to Petitioner dated November 28,
1995, effectively refused his claim for backwages. A Correspondence sent to Chairman Pobre and signed by
a specific Julieta de la Torre of the Department of Bureau and Management was attached to said letter. As a
result, another Motion for Reconsideration has been filed in this matter.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is entitled not only to reinstatement but also for backwages.

HELD:
YES. The Solicitor General, for his part, recommends that petitioner’s prayer for payment of backwages be
granted. We are in full accord with the Solicitor General’s recommendation. As we recently held in De
Guzman v. Civil Service Commission: When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his
reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office.
Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held
(Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]). Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee
(City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]). Having been exonerated of the
charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPB’s decision
notwithstanding.

In Cristobal vs. Melchor, Justice Claudio Teehankee, speaking for this Court, said: As likewise reaffirmed
by the Court inPerez vs. Evite, ‘under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court . . . . a judgment is not confined
to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.’ The late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the Court in Padua vs. Robles, that ‘(T)he
sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a
judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather
than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any
other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part
thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.’

GINSON VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MURCIA

FACTS:
Plaintiff's duties as Municipal Dentist of Murcia were terminated by defendant Mayor Baldomero de la
Rama 44 days after he took office as Mayor of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Plaintiff had been fulfilling her
responsibilities as Municipal Dentist of the Municipality of Murcia regularly, sincerely, and competently
since August 1, 1964, and was paid P200.00 per month previous to her dismissal. Plaintiff immediately
proceeded to defendant Mayor Baldomero de la Rama and asked to be returned to the service on the grounds
that her tenure of office is covered by Civil Service Law and that she cannot be dismissed or suspended
without cause, but defendant de la Rama flatly refused. Rather, she was advised and challenged to go to
court and file a lawsuit against him and the municipality.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering the private respondents to restore her in office
and pay back salary and legal expenses. On appeal, the respondent Court 3 ruled that the respondent
municipality's financial situation, which stemmed from an alleged overdraft during the year, justified the
dismissal, upheld it, and reversed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent municipality's state of finances justifies the challenged dismissal.
RULING:
The Court is convinced that the respondent municipality was financially capable of continued
support to the petitioner in office. There is evidence, to begin with, that at the time the petitioner was
discharged, the Murcia treasury had existing funds to cover her salary for the month of February, 1968, and
for the succeeding months as well, until June, 1968. 6 As of February, 1968 therefore, the Municipality of
Murcia had no justifiable reason to plead insolvency. At that time, it had no excuse to effect the questioned
dismissal.
In sum, we declare the pretended abolition of the dentist's clinic of the Municipality of Murcia to be
in fact a flimsy excuse to justify the dismissal of the petitioner, contrary to security of tenure protection of
the Constitution, and is hence, null and void.
We likewise order her reinstatement, subject to the condition that she has not obtained any other
employment, as Murcia municipal dentist or any position for which she is qualified by reason of civil service
eligibility, and subject to the requisites of age and physical fitness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby entered, ordering the private respondents, the Municipality of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, and the Municipal Mayor of Murcia, to:
1. REINSTATE the petitioner as municipal dentist of the Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental, or to
any position for which she is qualified pursuant to the Civil Service Law and other rules;
2. PAY unto her back pay equivalent to five (5) years based on her latest salary scale. Costs against the
private respondents. This Decision is IMMIDIATELY EXECUTORY.
 Office of the Ombudsman vs Madriaga
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman San Juan School Club, through its president, charged respondents with
violating Section 1 Rule IV and Section 1 Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act No. 6713, also
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, in a letter-
complaint dated September 8, 200. Respondents were found guilty of violating Section 5(a) of Republic Act
6713 by Graft Investigation Officer Helen M. Ascua. Respondents' move for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation was refused by Order of July 26, 2001, thus they petitioned for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over
public officials;

RULING:
The Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 converse that it has full authority on disciplining public
officials and employees counting the power to enforce its judgments and jurisprudence with the exemption
of impeachable officials.