G.R. No.

200444

SUPREME TRANSPORTATION LINER, INC. and FELIX Q. RUZ, Petitioners

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The requirement for the reservation of the civil action does not anymore apply to the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Such actions may be filed at
anytime, provided the plaintiff does not recover twice upon the same act or omission.

The Case

Petitioners Supreme Transportation Liner Inc. and Felix Q. Ruz hereby assail the decision
promulgated on January 27, 2011,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
1

rendered in Civil Case No. T- 2240 on November 24, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court in Tabaco
City dismissing their counterclaim on the ground that to allow their counterclaim was tantamount to
double recovery of damages, considering that the same was not prosecuted in the criminal action
against the respondent's driver.2

Antecedents

The relevant factual background was summarized by the CA thusly:

On November 5, 2002, at around 5:00 in the morning, Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus,
Mabel Tours Bus with body number 1896-C and plate Number TB EBJ (old)/TB EVL-648 (new),
owned by [respondent] Antonio San Andres, along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Malabanban
Norte, Candelaria, Quezon, going towards the direction of Manila. While traversing Maharlika
Highway, the Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking. The Mabel Tours Bus
immediately swerved to the left lane but in the process, it hit head-on the Supreme Bus owned and
registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by
[petitioner] Felix G. Ruz, that was negotiating in the opposite lane. Because of the strong impact of
the incident, the Supreme Bus was pushed to the side of the road and the Mabel Tour Bus
continuously moved until it hit a passenger jeepney that was parked on the side of the road which
later on fell on the canal. Nobody died but all the vehicles were damaged.

Investigation of the incident and photographs of the damaged buses as well as the other two (2)
vehicles were conducted and undertaken by SPO1 Rafael Ausa of Candelaria, Municipal Police
Station.

[Respondent] then brought the Mabel Tours Bus to the RMB Assembler and Body Builder to have it
repaired. The cost of repair was estimated in the amount of One Hundred Forty Four Thousand and
Five Hundred Pesos (Phpl44,500.00).

On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was instituted by
[respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus
and unrealized profits for the non-use of the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the
amount of ₱144,500.00 and ₱150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of ₱30,000.00,
appearance fee of ₱l,000.00, litigation expenses of ₱20,000.00 and cost of the suit were also lodged
in the complaint.

xxxx

Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They alleged among others that
plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the
reckless imprudence of the [respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus
recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another
vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite
direction resulting to head on collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of the
accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his franchise and without a registered
plate.

By way of counterclaim, [petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc. alleged that it suffered
damages in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00 and another ₱l00,000.00 for the medical
expenses of its employees and passengers. The unwarranted filing of the case forced them to
secure the services of a counsel for ₱50,000.00 plus appearance fee of ₱5,000.00 and litigation
expenses in the amount of ₱3,000.00 including traveling expenses.

xxxx

After all the issues have been joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference wherein the parties, in
an effort to amicably settle the case, referred the case to conciliation. The parties, however, failed to
hammer out an amicable settlement. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.

[The parties] presented oral and documentary evidence to support their claims and contentions.
[Respondent] presented himself and Ernesto Belchez who later became a hostile witness. On the
part of [petitioner and Ruz], Felix Ruz, SPOl Rafael B. Ausa and Assistant for Operations of
[petitioner] Supreme Transportation Liner, Inc., Jessi Alvarez, were presented.

In the course of trial, Jessi Alvarez stated that he filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property against Ernesto Belchez before the Court in Candelaria, Quezon.
The case is now terminated and the accused was convicted because of his admission of the crime
charged. In the said criminal complaint, he did not reserve their civil claim or asked (sic) the fiscal to
reserve it, which, if itemized, would also be the amount of their counterclaim in the present civil
action filed by [respondent]. He added that they did not receive any compensation for the civil aspect
of the criminal case, and although the Supreme Bus was covered by insurance, they did not claim
for any reimbursement in connection with the subject incident. 3

Judgment of the RTC

On November 24, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the respondent's complaint as well
as the petitioners' counterclaim,  decreeing:
4

From the foregoing, the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is hereby dismissed for
having failed to prove liability on the part of the defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the
defendants hereof is also dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.

SO ORDERED. 5
The RTC opined that the respondent was not able to prove the petitioners' liability;  and that the
6

petitioners' counterclaim should also be dismissed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court,  whose pertinent portions the RTC quoted in its judgment as follows:
7

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institute the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

xxxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. 8

The RTC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
precluded their right to recover damages from the respondent through their counterclaim. 9

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed, submitting that:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE COUNTERCLAIM.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE NO RESERVATION

Decision of the CA

In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,  the CA dismissed the petitioners'
11

appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly ruled that the counterclaim could not prosper because
their recourse was limited to the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code;  that "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is tantamount to
12

double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3,
Rule 111 of the Rules;"  and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their
13

right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal action. 14

The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the resolution promulgated on
January 26, 2012. 15

Hence, this appeal.

Issue
The Court is called upon to decide whether or not the petitioners' counterclaim was correctly denied
by the RTC.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed by the RTC and the CA
despite their failure to reserve the right to file a separate civil action in the criminal case they had
brought against respondent's driver. However, whether or not they could recover damages upon
their counterclaim presents a different story, as they should first show that they will not recover
damages twice for the same incident.

1.
Petitioners' counterclaim, being in the
nature of an independent civil action,
required no prior reservation

As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should be limited to the recovery
of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their having initiated against the respondent's driver the criminal
complaint for criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was
seemingly of the opinion that the petitioners' recourse against the respondent was limited to
recovering from him, as the driver's employer, his subsidiary liability under and pursuant to Article
103  of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve
16

the civil aspect of the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Corollary, appellants should have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case they have filed.
Without so doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver on the
basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of appellants to institute a separate civil case to recover
liability from appellee based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be limited to the recovery
of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x 17

The CA thereby erred. It incorrectly appreciated the nature of the petitioners' cause of action as
presented in their counterclaim.

We only need to look at the facts alleged in the petitioners' counterclaim to determine the correct
nature of their cause of action.  The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern the suit are to
18

be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather
by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.19

The counterclaim relevantly reads:

xxxx

5. That the proximate cause of the subject vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
plaintiffs driver, one ERNESTO BELCHEZ, by operating said Mabel Tours bus recklessly and in
violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the overtaking of another vehicle without
regards (sic) to the rightful vehicle occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction
resulting to head on collision (sic) on the lane of defendant's SUPREME bus;
6. That at the time of the accident, plaintiff operated the subject Mabel Tour bus outside his
franchise, hence, in violation of his franchise and allied rules and regulations; operated the same
without registered plate and using the route of another franchise holder; and

COUNTERCLAIM

7. Defendants replead the proceedings (sic) paragraphs as they may be relevant;

8. That as a result of plaintiffs violation of his franchise and gross negligence of his driver, the
defendant's SUPREME bus suffered damage in the aggregate amount of ₱500,000.00; medical
expenses for its employee and passengers in the amount of ₱100,000.00; 20

xxxx

Contrary to the conclusion thereon by the CA, the petitioners' cause of action was upon a quasi-
delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent was based on Article 2184,  in relation to
21

Article 2180  and Article 2176,  all of the Civil Code. It is relevant to state that even the RTC itself
22 23

acknowledged that the counterclaim was upon a quasi-delict, as its ratiocination bears out, to wit:

The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may
nonetheless bring an action for damages against the plaintiff under the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned task, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal
Code.

However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action
under the above quoted provisions of the New Civil Code may be brought separately from the
criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved.
24

Yet, the RTC likewise erred on its outcome because its ratiocination was founded on the obsolete
version of the Rules of Court. By the time when the RTC rendered judgment on November 24, 2008,
the revised relevant rule of procedure had already been promulgated and taken effect,  and it had
25

specifically deleted the erstwhile reservation requirement vis-a-vis the independent civil actions, as
follows:
Section 1. Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions. - (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary dan1ages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint
or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (la)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. 1awp++i1

The error committed by the CA emanated from its failure to take into consideration that the omission
of the driver in violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code could give rise not only to the
obligation ex delicto,  but also to the obligation based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of
26

the Civil Code. Under the factual antecedents herein, both obligations rested on the common
element of negligence. Article 2177  of the Civil Code and Section 3,  Rule 111 of the Rules of
27 28

Court allow the injured party to prosecute both criminal and civil actions simultaneously. As clarified
in Casupanan v. Laroya: 29

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. (Bold emphasis supplied)

The foregoing notwithstanding, the petitioners as the injured parties have to choose the remedy by
which to enforce their claim in the event of favorable decisions in both actions. This is because
Article 2177 of the Civil Code bars them from recovering damages twice upon the same act or
omission. As ruled in Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. v. Tangco: 30

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., ( 1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil
Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

As can be seen, the latest iteration of Rule III, unlike the predecessor, no longer includes the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code as requiring prior
reservation to be made in a previously instituted criminal action. Had it been cautious and
circumspect, the RTC could have avoided the error.

2.
Petitioners should first show that
they would not recover damages
twice from the same act or omission.

Nonetheless, we are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by the petitioners in
their counterclaim.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly prohibit double recovery of damages
arising from the same act or omission. The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered
damages from the respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against the
respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for the petitioners to still demonstrate
that the RTC as the trial court did not award civil damages in the criminal case. Consequently, Civil
Case No. T-2240 should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, if only to afford to the
petitioners the opportunity to present evidence on their counterclaim subject to the prohibition
against double recovery of damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 23-34; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in

by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (now a Member of the Court) and Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser.

2
 Id. at 47-64; penned by Judge Arnulfo B. Cabredo.

3
 Supra note 1, at 24-26.

4
 Supra note 2.

5
 Id. at 64.
6
 Id. at 59.

7
 Id. at 63.

8
 Id.

9
 Id. at 63-64.

10
 Rollo, p. 27.

11
 Supra note 1.

12
 Id. at 31.

13
 Id.

14
 Id.at31-32.

15
 Id. at 36-37.

 Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in
16

the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

17
 Supra note 1, at 31.

18
 Dulay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108017, April 3, l 995, 243 SCRA 220, 227.

19
 Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 393, 401.

20
 Rollo, pp. 45-46.

 Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
21

former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are
applicable. (n)

 Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
22

acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company.
 The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
23

negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

 Rollo, pp. 62-63.
24

 Effective December 1, 2000, A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

 Article 100. Civil Liability of Person Guilty of Felony. - Every person criminally liable for a
26

felony is also civilly liable.

 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article [2176] is
27

entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. (n)

 Section 3. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently. - In the cases provided in
28

Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
(3a)

 G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002, 388 SCRA 28, 37.
29

 G.R. No. 165732, December 14, 2006, 511SCRA67, 78.