8.

Requisites of valid Judgment

Guevarra v. Sandiganbayan,
454 SCRA 372, G.R. Nos. 138792-804, March 31, 2005

Facts:

Administrators of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines were

charged with violation of RA 3019 in the office of the Ombudsman alleging that
said administrators have caused undue damage to the government in connection
with questionable transactions entered into by PUP. Graft investigator Evelina
Reyes, recommended that the charges be dismissed but Ombudsman disapproved
and adopted instead the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Cicero Jurado Jr to
charge Olonan, Guevarra, Cesar and Salvador with 17 counts on violation of RA
3019 Section 3 (e). Upon review on the recommendation of Jurado, Special
Prosecutor Evelyn Agcaoili submitted a memorandum recommending the 17 cases
be filed and Case 22854 be withdrawn. She referred the case to Judge Marigomen
and recommended the dropping of some of the charges against Zenaida Olonan
only, and remains to be one of the accused in CC Nos 23083, 23088 and 23098 –
approved by Ombudsman. It turned out that those 13 cases which were also filed
against Guevarra, Cesar and Salvador were also dismissed. When the Special
Prosecutor received a copy of the Order of January 26, 1998, he filed, on February
20, 1998, a motion for the partial reconsideration of the order contending that that
it was only Olonan that should be dropped from said cases. Thus, he prayed that
the Order of the graft court dismissing the cases against the petitioners, be
reconsidered, and the 13 cases filed against them be reinstated. Consequently, the
graft court declared that, while the motion of the Special Prosecutor was filed three
days beyond the period therefor, nevertheless, it granted the motion in the interest
of substantial justice.

Issue:

Whether or not the graft court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the 13 criminal cases.

Ruling:

Yes, the graft court committed grave abuse of discretion.

In People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, it was held
that “A tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where a tribunal, being clothed
with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any
purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.”
 In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, 29 December 1989, “Such
judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is
involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void
judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.”

Here, the petitioners are correct in claiming that an order or resolution of the
Sandiganbayan ordering the dismissal of criminal cases becomes final and
executory upon the lapse of 15 days from notice thereof to the parties, and, as such,
is beyond the jurisdiction of the graft court to review, modify or set aside, if no
appeal therefrom is filed by the aggrieved party. However, if the Sandiganbayan
acts in excess or lack of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case, the
dismissal is null and void. The Sandiganbayan ordered the dismissal of the 13
cases as against the petitioners over the objection of the Special Prosecutor on its
erroneous perception that Justice Marigomen recommended in his report the
dismissal of the 13 cases against the petitioners. By its Order, the graft court
deprived the respondent People of the Philippines of its right to due process. In
fine, the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed grave
abuse of its discretion in dismissing the 13 criminal cases against the petitioners.
Hence, its Order dated January 26, 1998 dismissing the 13 criminal cases, as
against the petitioners, was null and void; it may thus be rectified, as did the graft
court, per its Resolution dated April 6, 1999 despite the lapse of fifteen days from
notice of the Special Prosecutor of its January 26, 1998 Order. By rectifying its
void Order, it cannot be said that the graft court acted with grave abuse of its
discretion, amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, in so doing, the
Sandiganbayan acted in accord with law.
17. Rule on Stare Decisis
Hortencia v. Cuenca, 456 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 150478, April 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Starke contends that the established doctrine that seasonal

employees are regular employees had been overturned and abandoned by Mercado,
Sr. v. NLRC. She stresses that in that case, the Court held that petitioners therein
who were sugar workers, are seasonal employees and their employment legally
ends upon completion of the project or the season. Petitioner Starke argues that the
CA violated the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the said ruling. She asserts
that the respondents, who are also sugar workers, are seasonal employees; hence,
their employment can be terminated at the end of the season and such termination
cannot be considered an illegal dismissal. Petitioner Starke maintains that the
determination of whether the workers are regular or seasonal employees is not
dependent on the number of hectares operated upon by them, or the number of
workers, or the capitalization involved, but rather, in the nature of the work. She
asserts that the respondents also made their services available to the neighboring
haciendas. To buttress her contention that the respondents are seasonal employees,
petitioner Starke cites Rep. Act 6982, An Act Strengthening the Social
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its
Implementation, and for other Purposes, which recognizes the seasonal nature of
the work in the sugar industry.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable in this case.

Ruling:

No, the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in this case.

In Villena v. Chavez, G.R. No. 148126, 10 November 2003, “Under the

doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same.”

In Lee v. Insurance Company of North America, 70 Haw. 120, 763 P.2d 567
(1988), “Where the facts are essentially different, however, stare decisis does not
apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be
entirely inappropriate when a factual variance is introduced.”

Here, Supreme Court do not find the concept of stare decisis relevant in the
case. For although in the Mercado case, the Supreme Court held the petitioners
who were sugar workers not to be regular but seasonal workers, nevertheless, the
same does not operate to abandon the settled doctrine of the High Court that sugar
workers are considered regular and permanent farm workers of a sugar plantation
owner, the reason being that there are facts present that are peculiar to the Mercado
case. The disparity in facts between the Mercado case and the instant case is best
exemplified by the fact that the former decision ruled on the status of employment
of farm laborers, who, as found by the labor arbiter, work only for a definite period
for a farm worker, after which they offer their services to other farm owners,
considering the area in question being comparatively small, comprising of
seventeen and a half (17½) hectares of land, such that the planting of rice and sugar
cane thereon could not possibly entail a whole year operation. The herein case
presents a different factual condition as the enormity of the size of the sugar
hacienda of petitioner, with an area of two hundred thirty-six (236) hectares,
simply do not allow for private respondents to render work only for a definite
period. In this case, there is no evidence on record that the same particulars
are present. The petitioners did not present any evidence that the respondents
were required to perform certain phases of agricultural work for a definite period
of time. Although the petitioners assert that the respondents made their services
available to the neighboring haciendas, the records do not, however, support such
assertion.
26. Bar by former judgment and conclusiveness of judgment distinguished
Del Rosario vs Far East Bank and Trust Company,
G.R. No 150134, October 31, 2007

Facts:

Davao Timber and Rosario filed a complaint (first complaint) before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) for the recovery of the excess payment
made from Private Development and Far East. RTC ordered Private Development
to pay Davao Timber and Rosario while the complaint against Far East was
dismissed for lack of cause of action. On appeal, the CA held that despite the
excess payment of Php 5 Million, only the amount of P965,000 from Far East may
be recovered by Davao Timber as claimed by it in the complaint. Such decision
was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Davao Timber and Rosario then filed a complaint (second complaint)

against Far East for the recovery of the balance of the excess payment in the
amount of Php 4.335 Million before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial
court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata and splitting of the cause
of action. The trial court also held that the decision in the first complaint had
already become final and executory and that the Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment
was already filed by the parties. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners proffer that, aside from the issue of whether their complaint is
dismissible on the ground of res judicata and splitting of cause of action, the issues
of 1) whether FEBTC can be held liable for the balance of the overpayment of
P4.335 million plus interest which petitioners previously claimed against PDCP in
Civil Case No. 94-1610, and 2) whether PDCP can interpose as defense the
provision in the Deed of Assignment and the MOA that the assignment of the
receivables shall not be affected by this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 73198.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint is dismissible on the ground of res judicata

and splitting of cause of action.

Ruling:

Yes.

In Orendain v. BF Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 146313, October 31, 2006,

“Section 49(b) enunciates the first rule of res judicata known as "bar by prior
judgment" or "estoppel by judgment," which states that the judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies
to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal.”

In Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12,

2006, “"bar by former judgment" makes the judgment rendered in the first case an
absolute bar to the subsequent action since that judgment is conclusive not only as
to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any other matter
which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been
adjudged therein.”

In Vda. De Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, “It is
in this concept that the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.

In Aromin v. Floresca, G.R. No. 160994, July 27, 2006, “The second rule of
res judicata embodied in Section 47(c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment."
This rule provides that any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is
the same.”

In Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 461 Phil. 104, 124 (2003), “It refers to
a situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
the matters actually determined or which were necessarily included therein.”

In Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006, “the four
essential requisites of "bar by prior judgment," are: (a) finality of the former
judgment; (b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be,
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action.

Here, this case satisfies the four essential requisites of "bar by prior
judgment”. There is no doubt that the judgment on appeal relative to Civil Case
No. 94-1610 (that rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 50591) was a final judgment. Not
only did it dispose of the case on the merits; it also became executory as a
consequence of the denial of FEBTC's motion for reconsideration and appeal.
Right or wrong, that judgment bars another case based upon the same cause of
action.
35. Judgment upon compromise, define
Philippine Journalist, Inc. v. NLRC,
501 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 166421, September 5, 2006

Facts:

The parties executed a Compromise Agreement dated July 9, 2001, where

PJI undertook to reinstate the 31 complainant-employees effective July 1, 2001
without loss of seniority rights and benefits; 17 of them who were previously
retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their respective
monetary claims, while 14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what
they received by way of separation pay. The agreement stated that the parties
entered the agreement "[i]n a sincere effort at peace and reconciliation as well as to
jointly establish a new era in labor management relations marked by mutual trust,
cooperation and assistance, enhanced by open, constant and sincere
communication with a view of advancing the interest of both the company and its
employees." The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval.
All the employees mentioned in the agreement and in the NLRC Resolution
affixed their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the Joint Manifesto and
Declaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been submitted for
the consideration of the labor tribunal. The compromise agreement was approved
and NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-00 was deemed closed and terminated.

In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike on July
1, 2002. The Union claimed that 29 employees were illegally dismissed from
employment, and that the salaries and benefits of 50 others had been illegally
reduced. After the retrenchment program was implemented, 200 Union members-
employees who continued working for petitioner had been made to sign five-month
contracts. The Union also alleged that the company, through its legal officer,
threatened to dismiss some 200 union members from employment if they refused
to conform to a 40% to 50% salary reduction; indeed, the 29 employees who
refused to accede to these demands were dismissed on June 28, 2002. The Union
prayed that the dismissed employees be reinstated with payment of full backwages
and all other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the date of their dismissal
on July 3, 2002 up to the actual date of reinstatement; and that the CBA benefits
(as of November 2002) of the 29 employees and 50 others be restored. In its
Resolution dated July 31, 2003, the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not
illegally dismissed. The May 31, 2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment
program illegal did not attain finality as "it had been academically mooted by the
compromise agreement entered into between both parties on July 9, 2001."

Issue:

Whether or not an NLRC Resolution, which includes a pronouncement that

the members of a union had been illegally dismissed, is abandoned or rendered
"moot and academic" by a compromise agreement subsequently entered into
between the dismissed employees and the employer.

Ruling:

No.

In Master Tours and Travel Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 105409, March 1, 1993,
“a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is not
appealable, and is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the
agreement on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress, in which case an appeal may
be taken against the order denying the motion.”

In Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120482, January
27, 1997, “Under Article 2037 of the Civil Code, "a compromise has upon the
parties the effect and authority of res judicata," even when effected without judicial
approval; and under the principle of res judicata, an issue which had already been
laid to rest by the parties themselves can no longer be relitigated.”

Here, a careful perusal of the wordings of the compromise agreement will

show that the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was the question of
the monetary claim of several employees. The agreement was later approved by
the NLRC. The case was considered closed and terminated and the Resolution
dated May 31, 2001 fully implemented insofar as the employees "mentioned in
paragraphs 2c and 2d of the compromise agreement" were concerned. Hence, the
CA was correct in holding that the compromise agreement pertained only to the
"monetary obligation" of the employer to the dismissed employees, and in no way
affected the Resolution in NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-00 dated May 31, 2001 where
the NLRC made the pronouncement that there was no basis for the implementation
of petitioners' retrenchment program.
44. Other cases/updates in jurisprudence (Rule 34)
Pacific Rehaus v. Export & Industry Bank, G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010

Facts:

The trial court found merit in rendering a judgment on the pleadings: first,
the assailed transactions were all documented; second, the transactions were
admitted by the parties; and third, the main issues can be resolved based on the
parties’ documentary evidence appended to the pleadings. The RTC, interpreting
the agreement agreed upon by the parties, held that the sale of the Kuok Properties,
Inc. (KKP) shares was with a buy-back obligation and not an option as petitioners
argued. However, it found that, as per their notices of sale agreements, the
collateral for the sale transactions is the same KKP shares. Thus, it held that EIB
erred in selling the DMCI shares instead of the KKP shares which served as
collateral. It ruled that Section 7 of the Securities Dealings Account Agreement
(SDAA) does not apply, since it provided for a general agreement executed prior to
the subsequent and specific agreements entered into by the parties specifically for
the sale and repurchase of the KKP shares. Thus, the trial court concluded that EIB
went beyond its authority in selling petitioners’ DMCI shares in order to buy back
the KKP shares. Anent petitioners’ apparent lack of objection to the account
statements issued by EIB and the sales confirmation receipts covering the sale of
DMCI shares, the RTC viewed it as not constituting ratification by petitioners for
said documents did not disclose the purpose of the sale, applying the rule that any
ambiguity in a written document should be strictly construed against the party who
caused its preparation. In fine, it held that since the parties’ relation is fiduciary in
nature, with more reason that EIB should have been more forthright in getting the
prior consent of petitioners before selling the DMCI shares. EIB timely filed its
motion for partial reconsideration of the RTC Resolution dated October 18, 2005.
In the meantime, EIB moved to inhibit Judge Rommel O. Baybay from further
handling the case. Both motions of EIB were opposed by petitioners. On April 28,
2006, RTC Judge Baybay inhibited himself. Subsequently, on July 26, 2006, the
RTC, Branch 66, through its new Presiding Judge, Joselito C. Villarosa, denied
EIB’s motion for partial reconsideration. After oral arguments on June 23, 2006,
the RTC affirmed the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by
Pairing Judge Baybay. Citing Savellano v. Northwest Airlines, on the strict
construal of any ambiguity on a written document on the party issuing it, the trial
court reiterated its ruling that petitioners are not estopped from assailing the sale by
EIB of their DMCI shares, for the sale confirmation receipts do not disclose the
purpose of the sales made. CA revoked the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court is correct in rendering judgment on the

pleadings in the case before it.
Ruling:

Yes, the trial court is correct.

In 1 F.D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 393 (9th revised ed.,

2005), “Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that "where an answer fails to
tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading." Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes, if any,
without consideration of any evidence aliunde.”

Here, Based on the admissions in the pleadings and documents attached, the
Court finds that the issues presented by the complaint and the answer can be
resolved within the four corners of said pleadings without need to conduct further
hearings. As explained by the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Utility
Assurance & Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. 32915, September 1, 1989, when what
remains to be done is the proper interpretation of the contracts or documents
attached to the pleadings, then judgment on the pleadings is proper. In the case at
bar, the issue of whether the sale of DMCI shares to effectuate the buy back of the
KKP shares is valid can be decided by the trial court based on the SDAA, Notices
of Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the parties, and other
appendages to the pleadings in conjunction with the allegations or admissions
contained in the pleadings without need of trial. The Makati City RTC is,
therefore, correct in issuing the October 18, 2005 Resolution granting the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.