Mahinay v.

Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 152457 , April 30, 2008)
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
On June 10, 1998, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through Officer-in-charge Jesus S.
Sirios, charged its employee, petitioner Rodolfo R. Mahinay, for receiving unofficial fees from FRITZ Logistics Phils.
Inc. by reason of his office and in consideration of the latter's rendering escort service to FRITZ' trucks from Baguio
City to Manila and vice-versa.
Allegedly, the said conduct of petitioner was in violation of Sec. 46 (b) (9), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation to Sec. 22 (i), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules
and Regulations. In an Answer, the petitioner admitted receiving the fees from FRITZ and he further contends that
there was no bad faith on their part in receiving those fees nor with any intention of enriching themselves.
Thereafter, the Special Prosecutor presented his line witness, Mr. Jerry H. Stehmeier who testified that the
"extra amount" of P300 was in fact actually received by petitioner, who exacted the same from FRITZ, for escorting
their "trucks all the way to the airport or all the way to our FRITZ office in Manila".
On January 8, 1999, the PEZA held that all the elements of the offense charged were present in the case. The
Authority finds him guilty with a penalty of forced resignation without prejudice to the grant of mnetary and other
fringe benefits.
The petitioner’s motion was denied by PEZA.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC. However, the CSC upheld the PEZA's decision, but modified the penalty of
forced resignation to dismissal from the service in accordance with Sec. 52 (A.9), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and Sec. 22 (i), 7 Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.
Motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was denied by the CSC. Thereafter, series of motion and petitions
were also denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the petition for certiorari was made to substitute a lost
appeal because while a petition for review under Rule 43 wasavailable, it was not an adequate remedy for petitioner
considering that he was dismissed from the service on June 9, 1999 by PEZA even before the case was appealed to the
Civil Service on June 22, 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the petitioner’s appeal by way of special civil action for certiorari.

HELD:
No. The petitioner’s contention lacks merit. As provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper mode of
appeal from the decision of a quasi-judicial agency, like the CSC, is a petition for review filed with the CA. The special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be resorted to only when any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioner clearly had the remedy of appeal provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In
Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, th court held that “where appeal is available to the
aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review)
and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute
for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One
of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.”
The Court is aware of instances when the special civil action of certiorari may be resorted to despite the
availability of an appeal, such as when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; when the broader
interests of justice so require; when the writs issued are null; and when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. However, the circumstances in this case do not warrant the application of the exception
to the general rule provided by Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA, therefore, properly denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Certiorari,
which in effect dismissed his Petition for Certiorari.

CRUZ V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 G.R. No. 144464 | 22 November 2001

FACTS:

In 1994, the Civil Service Commission discovered that petitioner Zenaida Paitim (municipal treasurer of Norzagaray,
Bulacan) took the non-professional examination for Gilda Cruz, after the latter had previously failed in the said
examination three times.

The CSC found after a fact-finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against Paitim and Cruz. A “Formal
Charge” for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The petitioners, in
their answer, entered a general denial of the formal charge.

The petitioners declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed
a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process
because the CSC was the complainant, the prosecutor, and the judge, all at the same time.

On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an investigation report and recommendation finding the petitioners
guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service. The report was forwarded to the CSC
for its consideration, and likewise found the petitioners guilty and ordered the same to be dismissed from government
service.

Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case.
Allegedly, in accordance with Sec. 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the
CSC is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or
dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen against the government employee.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner’ right to due process was violated when the CSC acted as an investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge all at the same time.

RULING:

The SC ruled in the negative.

Petitioners' invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where administrative cases are
Bled against erring employees in connection with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the
scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by
the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and
supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service
Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were duly investigated and ascertained whether
they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the penalty meted was dismissal from the office.

Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations explicitly provides that the CSC can
rightfully take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected to the examinations.

Petitioners' contention that they were denied due process of law by the fact that the CSC acted as investigator,
complainant, prosecutor and judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is untenable. The CA correctly
explained that the CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it
directly or on appeal including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1,
Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987 which states:

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or rulings shall be liable for contempt
of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or
rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy thereof;

The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.
It cannot be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies
against them. They were properly informed of the charges, given a chance to submit their answer and were given the
opportunity to defend themselves. Hence, no denial of due process.

Petition was denied.

DE LEON v. CA

G.R. No. 127182 January 22, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and declared as null and void: Department Order
No. 94-370 issued by the Department of Interior and Local Government, relieving private respondent of his duties as
Department Legal Counsel/Director III and reassigning him as Assistant Regional Director of Region XI; and
Administrative Order No. 235 issued by then President Fidel Ramos, dropping private respondent from the rolls of
public service on the ground of serious neglect of duty and absences without official leave.

Private respondent Atty. Jacob Montesa was appointed as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the
Ministry of Local Government, now Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by then Minister
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. Inspite of not being a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the Career
Executive Service (CES), private respondent's appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission. Subsequently, then President Corazon Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 262, reorganizing the
DILG. Then Secretary Luis Santos, who succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor Patricio as Chief of Legal
Service in place of private respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office of the Secretary to perform
special assignments.

This prompted private respondent to file before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto against
Secretary Luis Santos and Nicanor Patricio. On September 26, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of private
respondent and ordered his reinstatement to his former position. Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the position of Department Service Chiefs, which
include the Department Legal Counsel, was reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau Directors under the
generic position title of Director III. Hence, in the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court, respondent was
reinstated to the position: Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III.

Then Secretary Rafael Alunan III, citing as reasons the interest of public service and the smooth flow of
operations in the concerned offices, issued Department Order No. 94-370 on July 26, 1994. This order relieved
private respondent of his current duties and responsibilities and
reassigned him as Director III or Assistant Regional Director of Region XI. Private respondent, however, did not
report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and upon the expiration thereof, he
submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary Alexander Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume his
position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. Acting Secretary Aguirre, by memorandum, reiterated
to private respondent that the issuance of said department order transferring him to Region XI, was in keeping with
the interest of the public service and of the Career Executive Service provision on assignment, reassignment, and
transfer. Accordingly, private respondent was advised to report to Region XI immediately. Private respondent wrote
a memorandum requesting for reconsideration of the department order, but to no avail.

On appeal to the Civil Service Commission by private respondent, the former issued a resolution which
sustained the latter’s reassignment on the following grounds: (a) the reassignment was not violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution or of private respondent's right to security of tenure; (b) the reassignment did not
entail any reduction in rank or status; (c) private respondent could be reassigned from one station to another without
his consent as the rule against unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who is appointed to a particular station,
and not merely assigned thereto. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Civil
Service Commission.

The DILG directed private respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI, stressing that his
continued non-compliance with the department order is prejudicial to the interest of public service. Private
respondent was also warned that upon his failure to comply, the DILG shall be constrained to consider him on
absence without leave and as a consequence, drop him from the rolls of public service. Instead of complying
therewith, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction but the issuance of the same was denied by the court.

Upon the recommendation of the DILG, President Fidel Ramos, issued Administrative Order No. 235,
dropping private respondent from the roster of public servants for serious neglect of duty and absences without
leave. Later, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on the petition in favor of private respondent and rendered as
null and void Department Order No. 94-
370. The Court of Appeals ordered that private respondent be retained in his position as Chief, Legal Service or
Department Legal Counsel in the DILG, without loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges. The DILG
Secretary was ordered to release to petitioner his withheld salaries corresponding to the period July 15-21, 1995 and
his back salaries, if also withheld, corresponding to the period July 22, 1995 to September 27, 1995.

Both petitioners and private respondent moved for reconsideration. In his Motion for Clarification and/or
Partial Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for backwages and his salary that was illegally
withheld from the time the resolution of the Civil Service Commission was issued up to his actual reinstatement to
office. Respondent likewise prayed for the award of RATA during the period of his illegal dismissal. Petitioners, on
the other hand, posited that the decision of the Court of Appeals is not confluent with Administrative Order No. 235
issued by President Ramos which dropped petitioner from the roster of public service. They further argued that
until and unless the said order is declared invalid, the presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent upon
private respondent to comply therewith so as not to prejudice the public servants.

The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents for lack of merit
and granted petitioner's Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for Reconsideration. It modified its earlier
decision by ordering the DILG Secretary to release to petitioner his withheld salaries and backwages,
including allowances or RATA and other benefits, to which petitioner would have been entitled had he
not been illegally removed, corresponding to the period from July 15, 1995 up to his actual reinstatement to office.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the present petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not an individual who lacks the necessary qualifications for a public position can be appointed to it
in a permanent capacity.

RULING:

No. The position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive Service. Under
the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the President from a list of career executive
eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that
appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus
and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The
President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a CES eligible; provided that such
appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class
until qualifies in such examination.

Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of
his name in the roster of CES eligible. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a formal Board
Resolution after an evaluation of the examinee's performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.

In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al., the Court held that: a permanent appointment can be issued only
to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed. If not, the appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be
withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moment's notice. The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security or tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be
so designated.

In the present case, private respondent does not have the required Career Executive Service eligibility as
evidenced by his admission in his Comment that he is not a Career Executive Service Officer or a member of the
Career Executive Service. Hence, private respondent's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the
necessary Career Executive Service examination to obtain requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his
appointment and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service.
Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III,
was merely temporary. The cases on unconsented transfer invoked by private respondent find no application in the
present case. As his appointment was merely temporary, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

Private respondent’s contention, that the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel
under the Career Executive Service do not apply to him because he is not a Career Executive Service Officer, is
without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, non-eligible holding permanent appointments to CES
positions were never meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium
vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not enjoy.

Hence, the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside and the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were reinstated.

Case No. 045

Montecillo vs Civil Service Commission
 G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:

Doctrine:
To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree,
which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it
did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are
considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve.

Facts:

Accordingly, while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified, three of its employees --
petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos -- applied for promotional
appointment to the position of "Secretary to the Assistant General Manager" or "Private Secretary C", as the position
later came to be known. At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying the position of "Department
Secretary" and were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years.
When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC FO) by
MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO refused to approve petitioners’ appointments as "permanent"
on the ground that the position applied for was a "primarily confidential" and "co-terminous" position. This ruling
was upheld by the CSC Regional Office2 and affirmed on appeal by respondent.

In its Resolution No. 972512, respondent based its conclusions on CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22,
Series of 1991
“However, it is noted that there are also Private Secretary positions found in the Offices of officials not
mentioned in Section 9, Chapter 2, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 but, whose duties likewise required utmost
confidentiality.
For consistency and uniformity, it is hereby declared, pursuant to Resolution No. 91-676, that all Private
Secretary positions irrespective of their locations are primarily confidential in nature. The term of office of the
appointees to said positions shall be coterminous with the official they serve.’

Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration by the CSC, petitioners brought this special civil action
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue:

W/O CSC unduly amended and expanded the scope of the non-career service under Section 6, Article IV of
the Civil Service Decree?

Held:

We find no merit in the present petition.

In the present case, there is no clear and persuasive showing that respondent grossly abused its discretion or
exceeded its powers when it issued the assailed circular. On the contrary, respondent was expressly empowered to
declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12,
Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.10 To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in
Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by
specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants
are co-terminous with the official they serve.

In our view, the assailed memorandum circular cannot be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the
law.

PAGCOR v. Rilloraza
G.R. No. 141141 | June 25, 2001

FACTS:
 On November 5, 1997, administrative charges were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a
casino operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR) for failure to prevent an irregularity and violations of casino and regulations committed by co-officers
during his. PAGCOR Board issued a Resolution dismissing respondent on the grounds of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence. Thus, respondent
appealed to the Civil Service Commission which modified the said resolution finding respondent guilty only of
Simple Neglect of Duty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the CSC and ordered
reinstatement of respondent with payment of full backwages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is a confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired by reason of
loss of confidence.

HELD:
No. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869
expressly provides that all employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as “Confidential”
appointee are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed
only by the personnel management policies set by the Board of Directors. The submission that PAGCOR employees
have been declared confidential appointees must be rejected. Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all
positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts, the true test being the
nature of the position.

Although respondent’s position handles confidential matters such fact does not warrant the conclusion that
his position is primarily confidential in character. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than
ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes
not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state.

Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 112513 (Resolution), August 21, 1997
KAPUNAN, J:

DOCTRINE: When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been
ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights
and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.|

FACTS: Petitioner Del Castillo was an employee of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC). On July 16-17, 1990, he was assigned as a watcher in the Optometry Licensure Examination. Later, on July
24, 1990 and July 27, 1990, Susan O. Corpuz and Enriquieta Flores, also watchers in the said licensure examination,
respectively wrote the CSC stating that they saw Del Castillo answering the test papers submitted by an examinee.

On August 1, 1990, Del Castillo was charged with grave misconduct by Commissioner Julio B. Francia, Jr.,
PRC. The formal charge reads as follows: On or about July 17, 1990 while the examinations in the subject General
and Ocular Pathology of the Optometry licensure examinations is still in progress in Group II, PRC Annex Building,
2nd Floor, and after an examinee has submitted his answer sheets, you compared the answers in the said answer
sheet from that on the piece of paper you pulled out from the pocket o your shirt, crossed out some of the answers on
the answer and changed them with the answers appearing on the piece of paper and answered the blank numbers.

On August 10, 1990, petitioner voluntarily submitted his affidavit-answer denying the charge against him.
On August 15, 1990 a formal hearing of the case was conducted by Associate Commissioner Mariano A. Mendieta
of the respondent PRC.

After due investigation, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits.

Petitioner appealed the PRC’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which exonerated
him of said charge.
 On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct, and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner, thus, filed in this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that
the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the PRC’s appeal, among other grounds.

This Court granted said petition in an En Banc Decision promulgated on February 14, 1995 its decision
reversing the CSC and ordering the reinstatement of the petitioner.

Nevertheless, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only
reinstatement but payment of back salaries as well.

Petitioner was eventually reinstated on July 17, 1995. However, his claim for backwages was in effect
denied by Chairman Pobre in a Letter to petitioner dated November 28, 1995. Attached to said letter was a
Correspondence addressed to Chairman Pobre and signed by a certain Julieta de la Torre of the Department of
Bureau and Management. HENCE another Motion for Reconsideration for this case.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled not only to reinstatement but also for backwages.

HELD: YES. The Solicitor General, for his part, recommends that petitioner’s prayer for payment of
backwages be granted. We are in full accord with the Solicitor General’s recommendation. As we recently held in
De Guzman v. Civil Service Commission: When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his
reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore,
he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13
SCRA 566 [1965]). Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee (City Mayor of Zamboanga v.
Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]). Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should
clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPB’s decision notwithstanding.

In Cristobal vs. Melchor, Justice Claudio Teehankee, speaking for this Court, said: As likewise reaffirmed
by the Court inPerez vs. Evite, ‘under Section 45 of Rule 39, Rules of Court . . . . a judgment is not confined to what
appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.’ The late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed for the Court in Padua vs. Robles, that ‘(T)he sufficiency and efficacy of a
judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including
such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its
meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests
on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances.’

GINSON VS. MUNICIPALITY OF MURCIA

G.R. No. L-46585 February 8, 1988

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
On February 16, 1968, or 44 days after defendant Mayor Baldomero de la Rama assumed office as the
Municipal Mayor of Murcia, Negros Occidental, he wrote a letter to plaintiff terminating her services as Municipal
Dentist of Murcia, Negros Occidental effective February 18, 1968. Plaintiff, prior and up to the time she was
dismissed, had been continuously, faithfully and efficiently performing her duties as Municipal Dentist of the
Municipality of Murcia since August 1, 1964, and was receiving a salary of P200.00 per month. On the very day she
was discharged, plaintiff immediately went to the defendant Municipal Mayor Baldomero de la Rama and pleaded
that she be reinstated to the service on the ground that her tenure of office is covered by Civil Service Law and that
she cannot be removed or suspended except for cause, but defendant de la Rama blatantly refused to reinstate her.
Instead she was told and challenged to go to Court and to file a case against him and the Municipality.
The trial court held for the petitioner and directed the private respondents to reinstate her in office and to
pay back salaries and attorney's fees. On appeal, the respondent Court 3 found that the respondent municipality's
financial condition arising from an alleged overdraft incurred during the year, warranted the dismissal, held the same
to be justified, and rendered a reversal.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent municipality's state of finances justifies the challenged dismissal.

RULING:

The Court is convinced that the respondent municipality was financially capable of continued support to the petitioner in
office. There is evidence, to begin with, that at the time the petitioner was discharged, the Murcia treasury had existing
funds to cover her salary for the month of February, 1968, and for the succeeding months as well, until June, 1968. 6 As
of February, 1968 therefore, the Municipality of Murcia had no justifiable reason to plead insolvency. At that time, it had
no excuse to effect the questioned dismissal.
In sum, we declare the pretended abolition of the dentist's clinic of the Municipality of Murcia to be in fact a
flimsy excuse to justify the dismissal of the petitioner, contrary to security of tenure protection of the Constitution, and is
hence, null and void.
We likewise order her reinstatement, subject to the condition that she has not obtained any other employment,
as Murcia municipal dentist or any position for which she is qualified by reason of civil service eligibility, and subject to
the requisites of age and physical fitness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new one is hereby entered, ordering the private respondents, the Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and the
Municipal Mayor of Murcia, to:

1. REINSTATE the petitioner as municipal dentist of the Municipality of Murcia, Negros Occidental, or to any
position for which she is qualified pursuant to the Civil Service Law and other rules;

2. PAY unto her back pay equivalent to five (5) years based on her latest salary scale. Costs against the private
respondents. This Decision is IMMIDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Jaramilla v. COMELEC
GR NO: 155717
23 October 2003

FACTS:

Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan in the Municipalit in the 14 May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candida Mayor, V i c e Ma y o r a n d 8 m e m b e rs o f t h e S a n g
g u n ia n g B a y a n . T h e C e rt i f i c a te o f C a n v a s s o f V o te s shows the following results and
ranking with respect to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, to wit: (1) RAGUCOS, Ma. Luisa ABAYA,
Juan Jr., Andaquig (6,013); (3) GINES, Fidel Cudiamat (5,789); (4) QUILOP, Renato Avila (5,227); (5)
BILIGAN, Osias Depd ( 5 , 1 3 0 ) ; ( 6 ) R U I Z , A g u s t in T u rg a n o ( 4 , 9 7 2 ) ; ( 7 ) J A R A MI
L L A , A lb e r t o J i m e n o ( 4 , 8 1 5 ) ; a n d ( 8 ) C O R T E Z In the tabulated results issued by the
Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is sh obtained 4,779
votes and was ranke d 9 . Upo n re view by S uyat , he disco vere d th at J aram illa was cred ited
with onl per Election Return from Precinct 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded
to the Statement of Votes was credited with 73 votes for Precinct 34A1 or 50 votes more than what he
actually obtained. If the entry were to be corrected candidates would be ranked as follows:(7) CORTEZ,
Ireneo Habon (4,807); (8) SUYAT, Antonio (4,779); and (9) JA RA MILL A, Albe rto(4,765). On
13 June 2001, Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Ord which the
latter trea ted as a Petition for Corr ection o f Ma nifes t Err or. Jaram illa countered in his Answer
that said dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required certification of non-forum
shopping. On 24 October 200 issued a resolution, annulling the proclamation of Jaramilla and creating a new
Municipal Board of Canvassers Jaram il la fi le d certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction ascribing grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the Petition for
Correction

RULING:

Yes. Article IX-C of the Constitution states in part that "The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of ele ction cas es, inc luding pre -proc lamation con
trove rsies. All su cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions
shall be d Commission en banc." As stated in the provision, and in line with the Court’s recent pronouncement in Milla
v. Balmores - Laxa, pre-proclamation controversies should first be heard and d e c i d e d b y a d i v i s i o n o f t h e C
O M E L E C , a n d t h e n b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n e n b a n c i f a m o t i o of the division is filed. It must be
noted however that this provision applies only cases w h e r e t h e C O M E L E C e x e r c i s e s i t s a d j u d i c a t o r
y o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l p o w e r s , a n d n o t w h e n i t m e r e l y administrative functions. This doctrine was laid
out in Castromayor v. COMELEC, and reiterated in subsequent cases. Accor dingl demands only the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the correction of a manifest mistake in the a an erroneous tabulation
in the statement of votes, the COMELEC en banc can directly act on it in the exercise function to decide questions
affecting elections. Herein, the Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors alleges copying of figures from the election
return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in the tabulat wh ic h me re ly re quires a clerical correction
without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands onl e x e r c i s e o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i
v e p o w e r o f t h e C O M E L E C . H e n c e , t h e C o m m i s s i o n e n b a n c p r o p e r l y jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent COMELEC, its Resol
October 24, 2002 is AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED.

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro

G.R. No. 108886 May 5, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Aquiles Reyes and private respondent Adolfo Comia were candidates for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Private respondent moved for the exclusion of certain election returns,
on the ground of serious irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner considering that there was another candidate
bearing the same surname.  The petitioner was proclaimed as the eighth winning candidate without resolving the petition
and took his oath of office.

Private respondent filed an election protest before the trial court alleging that a vital mistake had been
committed by the Board of Canvassers in the computation of the total number of votes garnered by petitioner.

The motion to dismiss filed by Petitioner was denied by the Trial Court. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
admitted that it had made a mistake in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he was entitled to 915
votes in the Statement of Votes. The trial court annulled the proclamation of petitioner and declared private respondent
as the eighth winning candidate. 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the COMELEC and the petition for mandamus and prohibition   to the CA
to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member. The CA dismissed the petition
because of petitioner's pending appeal in the COMELEC. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion
was denied. The appellate court's decision became final and executory. On the other hand, the COMELEC dismissed
petitioner's appeal on the ground that he had failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period.

Petitioner contends that both the trial court and the COMELEC's First Division committed a grave abuse of
discretion, first by assuming jurisdiction over the election contest filed by private respondent despite the fact that the
case was filed more than ten days after petitioner's proclamation, and second by dismissing petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the trial court for late payment of the appeal fee.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc may be dispensed of by the
petitioner?

RULING:
The motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for
certiorari as provided by Article IX(C), Section 2. Petitioner contention that this requirement may be dispensed with
because the only question raised in his petition is a question of law is not correct. The questions raised by petitioner
involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions
tendered are, therefore, not pure questions of law. 

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division.
Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX (A) Section 7
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.

Cipriano v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004

FACTS: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002,
the COMELEC issued a resolution denying due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for
the SK elections, including petitioner, stating that those affected were not registered voters in the barangay where they
intended to run.  Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted
from the official list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce
and administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law.

RULING: The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code. While the
Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

MA. SALVACION BUAC v. COMELEC,

GR No. 155855,
2004-01-26

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista assailing the
October 28, 2002 'en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has no...
jurisdiction over controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result.The facts show that in
April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487)
proposing the conversion of Taguig from... a municipality into a city. Without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64)
other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes won and that the people rejected
the conversion of Taguig to a city.

Private respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election protest. He averred that the jurisdiction to
hear a complaint involving the conduct... of a plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).[3]
In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order on November 29, 2001 granting the Motion for
Reconsideration. It dismissed the petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction over said case as it... involves an exercise of quasi-judicial powers not contemplated under Section 2 (2),
Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.[5]

On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division.

Hence this petition.

Petitioners Contention

Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista reiterate their submission that jurisdiction to decide plebiscite
protest cases is constitutionally vested with the COMELEC. They likewise claim that the impugned Order is
discriminatory as during the pendency of the Taguig... case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar case
concerning the revision and recount of the plebiscite ballots involving the conversion of Malolos into a city. The
COMELEC resolved said case and already declared Malolos a city.

Respondents Contention

Respondents contend that there is no such action as a plebiscite protest under the Constitution, the laws and the
COMELEC rules as they provided only for election protests; the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
election contests extends only to cases enumerated... in Section 2(2), Article IX (C) of the Constitution, which does not
include controversies over plebiscite results; and, even if the petition to annul plebiscite results is akin to an election
protest, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal... officials, and the COMELEC has
only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.

Issues:

The case at bar involves the determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the
conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the... purpose.
Respondents submit that the regular courts of justice, more specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction to
adjudicate any controversy concerning the conduct of said plebiscite.

Ruling:

The petition is impressed with merit.

he case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the
exercise of judicial power. It... does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement. There
is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of
Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their... municipality to a highly urbanized city

The case of Salva v. Macalintal [10] does not support the overarching thesis that "any question on the validity of
plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the plebiscite falls within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts."
Looking... at it with clear eyes, Salva resolved the validity, not of a plebiscite or its result, but of a provision in the rules
and regulations issued by the COMELEC governing the conduct of a plebiscite.

Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can lead to jumbled justice. Consider for
instance where the plebiscite is national as it deals with the ratification of a proposed amendment to our Constitution.
Snap thinking... will tell us that it should be the COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over a petition to annul its
results. If jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result will not enhance the orderly administration of justice. Any
regional trial court from every nook and... corner of the country will have jurisdiction over a petition questioning the
results of a nationwide plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these courts is limited only within their
respective judicial regions, the difficulties that will attend their exercise of... jurisdiction would be many if not
unmanageable.

Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related laws will reveal that only contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of elected officials are subject to the exercise of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial
power of... our administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests involving elective municipal officials are tried and decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, while those involving barangay officials are tried and decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction; in both... cases, however, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b) contests involving all elective
regional, provincial and city officials fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests... involving members of the House of Representatives fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial power; (d)
contests involving members of the Senate fall within the exclusive original... jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
in the exercise of quasi-judicial power; and, (e) contests involving the President and the Vice President fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial... power.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC is directed to reinstate the petition to annul the
results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it without delay.

SO ORDERED.

Montejo v. COMELEC, GR 118702

Facts:

Biliran was originally a municipality of the 3rd District of the province of Leyte. It was later converted into a sub-
province then a regular province. COMELEC sought to remedy the consequent inequality of the distribution of
inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte by promulgating Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred
(in Sec 1 thereof) the municipality of Capoocan of its 2nd District and Palompon of its 4th District to its 3rd District.
Cong. Montejo of the 1st District of Leyte sought to annul said Sec of Res. No. 2736 on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, he prays to transfer the municipality of Tolosa
from his district to the 2nd District of the province.

Issue:

May the Court transfer the Municipality of Tolosa of the 1st District to the 2nd District of Leyte as prayed for?

Held:

No. The court held Sec 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void and conceded that the conversion of Biliran to a regular province
brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters in the legislative districts and, as such, could devalue a citizen’s
vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. However, what is prayed for involves an issue of
reapportionment of legislative districts and remedy for such lies with Congress in accordance to Art VI, Sec 5(4). While
this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as Montejo
would want the Court to do by directing COMELEC to transfer Tolosa from the 1st District to the 2nd District.
Transferring a municipality from one district to another is a substantive (not minor) change.

PASANDALAN VS. COMELEC

[G. R. No. 150312. July 18, 2002
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1 of the Commission on Elections en banc dated
October 12, 2001 dismissing petitioner Bago P. Pasandalans (Pasandalan for brevity) petition to declare a failure of
election. Pasandalan and private respondent Bai Salamona L. Asum (Asum for brevity) were candidates for mayor in the
Municipality of Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 23, 2001, Pasandalan filed a
petition[2 before public respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec for brevity) seeking to nullify the election results
on some barangay. Petitioner alleged that on May 14, 2001, while voting was going on, some Cafgus stationed near
Sultan Gunting Elementary School indiscriminately fired their firearms causing the voters to panic and leave the polling
center without casting their votes. Taking advantage of the confusion, supporters of Asum allegedly took the official
ballots, filled them up with the name of Asum and placed them inside the ballot boxes. On June 26, 2001, Asum filed an
Answer denying Pasandalans allegation that the volley of shots fired on May 14, 2001 disrupted the voting. Private
respondent countered that the gunshots were heard around 2:35 p.m. and not at the start of the voting. On June 30, 2001,
Asum was sworn into office and assumed the position of municipal mayor of the Lumbayanague, Lanao del Sur.
On October 12, 2001, the Comelec issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit.[3

Hence, this petition.

The Comelec ruled that the power to declare a failure of election, being an extraordinary remedy, could be exercised
only in three instances: (1) the election is not held; (2) the election is suspended; or (3) the election results in a failure to
elect. The third instance is understood in its literal sense, that is, nobody was elected.

The Comelec dismissed the petition because none of the grounds relied upon by Pasandalan falls under any of the three
instances justifying a declaration of failure of election. First, the elections in the questioned precincts were held as
scheduled. Second, the gunshots heard during the casting of votes did not suspend the election as the voting continued
normally. Third, Asum was elected by a plurality of votes.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION IN SPA NO. 01-305 FOR ALLEGED
LACK OF MERIT;

2. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ANNULING THE ELECTION OR DECLARING A
FAILURE OF ELECTION IN THE SIXTEEN (16) QUESTIONED PRECINCTS;

3. WHETHER THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION

OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING AS ILLEGAL, NULL AND VOID AB INITIO
THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF
LUMBAYANAGUE, LANAO DEL SUR IN THE LAST MAY 14, 2001 REGULAR ELECTIONS AND MAY 30,
2001 SPECIAL ELECTIONS.

RULING:

We rule that the petition is without merit. The Comelec correctly dismissed the petition for declaration of failure of
election because the irregularities alleged in the petition should have been raised in an election protest, not in a petition
to declare a failure of election.

Under Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991,[5 the Comelec en banc is
empowered to declare a failure of election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). Section 6 of
the Code prescribes the conditions for the exercise of this power, thus:

SEC. 6. Failure of Election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Based on the foregoing provision, three instances justify a declaration of failure of election. These are:

(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes;

(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes.[6

What is common in these three instances is the resulting failure to elect.[7 In the first instance, no election is held while
in the second, the election is suspended.[8 In the third instance, circumstances attending the preparation, transmission,
custody or canvas of the election returns cause a failure to elect. The term failure to elect means nobody emerged as a
winner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of public respondent Comelec is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC

GR 163193 • June 15, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Pursuant to RA 8436,* respondent COMELEC adopted an Automated Election System (AES) modernization program
for the 2004 elections consisting of 3 phases.** Phases I and II failed, but COMELEC nevertheless pursued Phase III
through advanced electronic transmission of “unofficial” results of the 2004 elections for provincial, municipal and also
national positions including that of the President and Vice-President (a.k.a the “unofficial quick count” project).
COMELEC issued Res. No. 6712 for the purpose.*** Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Res. No. 6712 for, among
others, effectively pre-empting the sole and exclusive authority of Congress under Art VII, Sec 4 of the Constitution to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. COMELEC argues that its advanced quick count of the votes for the
President and Vice-President is not prohibited by the Constitution because it is “unofficial”.

ISSUE:

Does Res. No. 6712 violate Art VII, Sec 4?

RULING:

Yes. Res. No. 6712 usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results based on a copy of the
election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. COMELEC’s above-stated argument is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from
conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more
reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.

* RA 8436 authorized COMELEC to use AES for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating
the results of the national and local elections.

** The AES modernization program: Phase I. Computerized system of registration and voters validation Phase II.
Computerized voting and counting of votes Phase III. Electronic transmission of results. N.B. Phase III was functionally
intended to be an interface of Phases I and II.

*** Res. No. 6712 instructed that the votes for the President and Vice-President, among others, shall be encoded (based
on the copies for the election returns intended for COMELEC) in Electronic Transmission Centers (ETCs) to be located
in every city and municipality. The ETCs shall then transmit the data to a National Consolidation Center. The
consolidated and per-precinct results shall then be made available via the Internet, text messaging, and electronic
billboards in designated locations.

Javier v. COMELEC
144 SCRA 194

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all
its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of
the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador,
are now facing trial for these murders. Petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second
Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because it
was only made by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
Meanwhile, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. The case was still being
considered by this Court when the petitioner was gunned down.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections isauthorized to promulgate its decision proclaiming
the private respondent the winner in the election

HELD:
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution. As the Court sees it, the
effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two.: (1) over matters
arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative
power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the
exercise of its judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of
its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there
was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was
competent to do. Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective
provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the election protest.
In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc,
its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any
matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power. All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.

BALAJONDA VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 166032 February 28, 2005

FACTS:
On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman
(Punong Barangay), having won the office in the barangay elections held the previous day. Francisco duly filed a
petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation, lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35. In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Francisco’s petition stated no cause
of action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were "baseless, conjectural, flimsy, frivolous,
preposterous and mere figments of the latter’s wild imagination." She also laid stress on the fact that although the
grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for violation
of the same. After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69) ballot boxes. MeTC
dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by four hundred eighteen (418) votes.
WHEREFORE, the Protest filed by Maricel Susano Francisco is hereby DENIED. Francisco appealed the MeTC
Decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In a Resolution9 promulgated on 2 February 2004, the
COMELEC First Division reversed the MeTC, finding that Francisco won over Balajonda by one hundred eleven (111)
votes. The COMELEC First Division thus annulled the proclamation of 0Balajonda, and declared in her stead Francisco
as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate execution of its judgment or final order
involving a disputed barangay chairmanship is at the heart of the present Petition for Certiorari
RULING:

After evaluating the case, we rule that the reasons cited are indeed obtaining. Public interest is best served if the herein
Protestant who actually received the highest number of votes should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that
the remaining period or the unexpired term is too short that to further prolong the tenure of the protestee is a virtual
denial of the right of the protestant, the duly elected barangay captain, to assume office.

Considering that there are good reasons for the issuance of an Order of Execution, to wit: dictates of public policy and
the shortness of the remaining period, we have to grant the Motion.26

All that Balajonda musters in the main to debunk the poll body’s ruling is that it is just a pro forma reproduction of the
reasons enunciated in pertinent jurisprudence for the grant of execution pending appeal.27 The argument suffers from a
discernible fallacy. The reasons relied upon by the COMELEC First Division are either self-evident or borne out by the
law.

With respect to the first reason, it cannot be disputed with success that public interest demands that the winner on the
basis of a full and incisive recount and new appreciation of votes should be installed in office without delay. Indeed, "[I]t
is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose right is under suspicion."28

Balajonda’s corollary argument that the public interest involved or the will of the electorate is fully determined only after
the election contest becomes final29 would, if sustained, negate altogether the purpose of allowing executions pending
appeal in the first place. Indeed, the argument begs the question. In this regard, Balajonda’s filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision likewise did not divest the COMELEC First Division of jurisdiction to rule on the
Motion For Execution. Once more, Batul30 instructs us that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
First Division’s resolution with the COMELEC en banc does not suspend the execution thereof.

As regards the second reason, it is provided in Republic Act No. 916431 that barangay officials elected in the barangay
elections of July 2002 shall serve up to November 2005. Thus when the poll body’s First Division promulgated the
challenged Order on 26 November 2004, directing immediate execution of its Decision pending final disposition of
Balajonda’s motion for reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc, the expiry of the term of the disputed position was a
scant twelve (12) months away.

At this point, the Court cannot take judicial notice of what Balajonda calls "the consensus to extend the terms of
barangay captains" purportedly soon to be enacted into law by Congress.32 The Court lacks the powers of
prognostication to ascertain whether there is such a "consensus" and, more so, whether it would actually ripen to reality
in the future.

In a bid to ascribe partiality and bias in favor of Francisco to the COMELEC itself, Balajonda alleges that the poll body
failed to observe its own Rules of Procedure33 directing the Clerk of Court, within twenty-four (24) hours following the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, to notify the Presiding Commissioner and therefore to set the motion for hearing,
and the Presiding Commissioner in turn thereafter to certify the case to the Commission en banc.34 However, the record
does not bear out Balajonda’s charge. The case was not forwarded to the COMELEC en banc right away precisely
because of the pendency of Francisco’s motion for immediate execution and Balajonda’s motions. According to the
COMELEC Records, Balajonda filed with the First Division on 03 March 2004 a Manifestation with Motion for Leave
to Xerox Contested Ballots,35 and on 03 March 2004 a Manifestation with Motion for Partial Reconsideration.36

It is noteworthy that the COMELEC First Division did not make use of the third reason invoked by Francisco which
refers to the length of time that the election contest has been pending.37 Consequently, it is pointless to address
Balajonda’s accusation that the delay in the disposition of the election protest is attributable to Francisco.38

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure of petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda to show that respondent
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the challenged Order dated 24 November 2004. Costs
against petitioner.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the
pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as
to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court
not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The
Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

MITMUG VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioner Norlainie Limbona , her husband, and respondent Malik Alingan were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao
Del Norte. After filing their Certificate of Candidacy, Respondent filed a petition of disqualifying the husband of
petitioner for non compliance with the one year residence requirement. Subsequently, respondent also filed the same
petition, this time against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a withdrawal of her candidacy which the COMELEC granted.
The COMELEC granted the disqualification of petitioner’s husband. Petitioner filed a new Certificate of Candidacy as
substitute candidate for her husband which was approved by COMELEC. Respondent yet again sought Petitioner’s
disqualification.

Petitioner claimed that she has been staying , sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months in
Lower Kalangaan.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner satisfied the one year residency requirement and qualify to run for the office mayor in
Pantar, Lanao del Norte?

Ruling:
No. Petitioner failed to qualify the one-year residence requirement. In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be
residence or bodily presence in the new locality, an intention to remain there, and intention to abandon the old domicile.
A person’s domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established.

The court noted the findings of the COMELEC that petitioner’s domicile of origin is Manguing, Lanao Del Norte, which
is his also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law by virtue of marriage, is Rapusan, Marawi City.
Hence, failure to comply with the residence requirement, Petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor in
Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

feliciano vs Commission on Audit

GR No. 147402 January 14, 2004

Facts: A special audit team from COA Regional office no. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD. Subsequently, LMWD
received a letter from COA dated July 19, 1999 requesting payment of auditing fees. As general manager of LMWD,
petitioner sent a reply dated October 12, 1999 informing COA’s regional director that the water district could not pay the
auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action section 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree no. 198 as well as section 18
of RA 6758. The regional director referred petitioner to reply o the COA Chairman on October 18, 1999. On October 19,
1999, petitioner wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid
to COA. On March 16, 2000, petitioner received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangans resolution dated January 3, 2o00
denying his requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 31, 2000, which COA denied on January 30,
2001.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner LMWD is a private corporation exempt from the auditing jurisdiction of COA.

Held: No. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist
under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations
under existing laws, that general law is the corporation code, except that the cooperative code governs the incorporation
of cooperatives.

Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the corporation code. LWDs are
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Section 14 of the corporation code states that all
corporations under this code shall file with the SEC articles of incorporation. LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no
incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board of directors of
LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the
directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the corporation code.

The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government ownership or control of the corporation. The criterion
of ownership and control is more important than the issue of original charter.

Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The government organizes LWDs in accordance with a specific
law, PD 198. There is no private party involved as co-owner in the creation of and LWD. Just prior to the creation of
LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls all their assets. The government controls LWDs because
under PD 198 the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board of directors of an LWD for
a fixed term of six (6) years. The board of directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. LWD have no private
stockholders or members. The board of directors and other personnel of LWDs are government employees subject to
civil service laws, anti-graft laws.

Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA Personnel from receiving any kind of compensation from any government except
compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions. Thus, RA 6758 itself recognizes an
exception to the statutory ban by COA personnel receiving compensation from GOCCs.

JARQUE VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
This case is a resolution of the Court En Banc to the letter-complaint signed by Cpt. Jose Rene Jarque for disbarment
against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto for immorality and involvement in various illegal and immoral activities. The letter
alleges that Aniano Desierto has an illegitimate daughter as shown by a confirmation certificate annexed in the letter-
complaint. Other allegations against Desierto were also made without any substantiation offered.

ISSUE: Whether the allegations made by the petitioner make out a prima facie case for disbarment against Aniano
Desierto

RULING:
No, the Court believes that the letter-complaint with its one (1) annex consisting of a supposed “certificate of
confirmation” does not make out a prima facie case for disbarment against Aniano Desierto.
The Court found as basis the doctrine set out in Administrative Matter No. 88-4-5433, to wit:
A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the
office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal
from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office.
The Constitution provides for the removal by impeachment of constitutional officers in Article XI of the 1987
Constitution:
“Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public offiicers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not impeachment.
Sec. 3. Xxx xxx xxx
Judgment in cases of impeachemnt shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Rpeublic of the Philiippines, but the party convicted shall neverthless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.”
The Court ruled in this case that the Ombudsman and other constitutional officers who are required by the Constitution
to be members of the Philippine Bar and are removed only by impeachment are not immunized from liability for possible
criminal acts or for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or other claimed misbehavior. The Court held
that the fundamental procedural requirement must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.

The Ombudsman or his deputies must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Ombudsman be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer wither criminally or administratively – e.g., in disbarment proceedings –
for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The Court dismissed the letter-complaint.

KHAN VS. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Ismael G. Khan, Jr. and Wenceslao L. Malabanan, former officers of Philippine Airlines (PAL), were charged
before the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) with violation of RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using
their positions in PAL to secure a contract for Synergy Services Corporation, a corporation engaged in hauling and
janitorial services in which they were shareholders.

Petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Ombudsman had no
jurisdiction over them since PAL was a private entity and (2) they were not public officers, hence, outside the application
of RA 3019.

The Deputy Ombudsman denied petitioners' omnibus motion to dismiss, ruling that although PAL was originally
organized as a private corporation, its controlling stock was later acquired by the government through the GSIS.
Therefore, it became a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as enunciated in Quimpo v. Tanodbayan.
The Deputy Ombudsman also held that petitioners were public officers within the definition of RA 3019, Section 2 (b).
Under that provision, public officers included "elective, appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
Government."

Petitioners appealed the order to the Ombudsman which affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman.

Petitioners, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Petitioners argue that: (1) the Ombudsman's
jurisdiction only covers GOCCs with original charters and these do not include PAL, a private entity created under the
general corporation law; (2) Quimpo does not apply to the case at bar and (3) RA 3019 only concerns "public officers,"
thus, they cannot be investigated or prosecuted under that law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over GOCC without original charter

2. Whether or not the Quimpo case apply to the case at bar

3. Whether or not petitioners PAL officers are public officers

HELD:

1. Jurisdiction of the ombudsman over GOCCS is confined only to those with original charters

Article XI, Section 13(2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to
perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties. (italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Based on the foregoing provision, the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees
of GOCCs with original charters. This being so, it can only investigate and prosecute acts or omissions of the
officials/employees of government corporations. Therefore, although the government later on acquired the controlling
interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be
investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman.

In Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we ruled that the phrase "with original charter" means "chartered by
special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code." PAL, being originally a private
corporation seeded by private capital and created under the general corporation law, does not fall within the jurisdictional
powers of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 13(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the latter is devoid of
authority to investigate or prosecute petitioners.

2. Quimpo Not Applicable to the Case at Bar

Quimpo is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, Felicito Quimpo charged in 1984 two officers of PETROPHIL
in the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) for violation of RA 3019. These officers sought the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the Tanodbayan had no jurisdiction over them as officers/employees of a private company. The Court
declared that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over them because PETROPHIL ceased to be a private entity when
Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired its shares.

In hindsight, although Quimpo appears, on first impression, relevant to this case (like PETROPHIL, PAL's shares were
also acquired by the government), closer scrutiny reveals that it is not actually on all fours with the facts here.
In Quimpo, the government acquired PETROPHIL to "perform functions related to government programs and policies
on oil." The fact that the purpose in acquiring PETROPHIL was for it to undertake governmental functions related to oil
was decisive in sustaining the Tanodbayan's jurisdiction over it. This was certainly not the case with PAL. The records
indicate that the government acquired the controlling interest in the airline as a result of the conversion into equity of its
unpaid loans in GSIS. No governmental functions at all were involved.

Furthermore, Quimpo was decided prior to the 1987 Constitution. In fact, it was the 1973 Constitution which the Court
relied on in concluding that the Tanodbayan had jurisdiction over PETROPHIL's accused officers, particularly Article
XIII, Section 6. The term "government-owned or controlled corporations" in the 1973 Constitution was qualified by the
1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters.

3. Petitioners, as then Officers of PAL, were not Public Officers

Neither the 1987 Constitution nor RA 6670 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) defines who "public officers" are. Instead, its
varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence. Usually quoted in our decisions is
Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject. In the 2002 case of Laurel v. Desierto,15 the Court extensively quoted
his exposition on the term "public officers":

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by
law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position
as an office.

xxx xxx xxx

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important
characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and
conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public; − that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,
executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are
of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

From the foregoing, it can be reasonably inferred that "public officers" are those endowed with the exercise of sovereign
executive, legislative or judicial functions. The explication of the term is also consistent with the Court's pronouncement
in Quimpo that, in the case of officers/employees in GOCCs, they are deemed "public officers" if their corporations are
tasked to carry out governmental functions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public respondents Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) and Office of the
Ombudsman are restrained from proceeding with the investigation or prosecution of the complaint against petitioners for
violation of RA 3019. Accordingly, their assailed orders of July 13, 1989 and February 22, 1996, respectively, are SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED.

Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 148944, February 5, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, then mayor of Cebu City, entered into a three-year contract with F.E. Zuellig for the city's supply of asphalt.
Due to alleged anomalous purchase on subject contract, COA officials conducted a special audit.

Thereafter, they submitted a Special Audit Report and joint affidavits for the purpose of initiating a preliminary
investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman ordered the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but the latter did not comply and instead now seeks to restrain the criminal investigation before the
Ombudsman.

Petitioner argued that the Ombudsman cannot compel him to file a counter affidavit because the COA Special Audit
Report and the other supporting affidavits of State Auditors do not constitute a valid complaint that is sufficient to
support a criminal proceeding.

ISSUE:

WON the Office of the Ombudsman may act promptly on complaints filed “in any form or manner” against public
officials / government employees.

HELD:

Yes.

Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall
act promptly on "complaints filled in any form or manner against public officials or employees of Government.”

In this case, the complaint being referred to by petitioner is the complaint filed in court in a criminal case. The SC ruled
that for purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint "in any form
or manner" is sufficient.

Hence, the joint affidavits submitted by State Auditors Cabreros and Quejada contain allegations specific enough for
petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.

Laurel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, [April 12, 2002]

FACTS: On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 “constituting a
Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998.” The Committee was mandated “to take
charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 128, “reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in
1988.” It renamed the Committee as the “National Centennial Commission.” Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were
named Honorary Chairpersons.

Characterized as an “ad-hoc body,” the existence of the Commission “shall terminate upon the completion of all
activities related to the Centennial Celebrations.” Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to “take
charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress.” Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the
Commission was also charged with the responsibility to “prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan
for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of” the Executive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

SEC. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be
composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive
Director who shall be designated by the President.

SEC. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the
president’s Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President.
Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Petitioner
was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected
Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in
the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the
Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Coseteng’s privilege speech was
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and
several other Senate Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent
citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects,
including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee. On
March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report
No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committee’s recommendations was “the prosecution by the
Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding,
relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest
bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a
valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by
COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation . . . of the anti-
graft law.”

ISSUES:

A.) WON the corporation chaired by the petitioner is a private corporation.

B.) WON the petitioners are public officer and thus within the jurisdiction of the ombudsman.

HELD:

A.) NO. E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the “need to
strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial
and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations.” It also referred to the “need
to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries.”

The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.”
The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. Clearly, the NCC
performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

B.) YES. In the Court’s decision in Uy, we held that “it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to
file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercise prosecutorial
powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.” The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon
motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its
Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal. The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains toany act or omission of any public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not
make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public officer or employee.

A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer.

A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary
is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a
naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as
NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to
which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Honasan vs Panel of Investigating Prosecutors

G. R. No. 159747, April 13, 200

Facts:
· August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:
o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator
Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II
o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located in San
Juan, Metro Manila
o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a
public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and
the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery
Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

· Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting
where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be
constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat
made by Senator Honasan when he said “Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa
mga kasamahang magtataksil.”
o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and
some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of
the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the
same as their blood compact wound.
· August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification
questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a
group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan
· Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and
its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his
respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation

Issues:
Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize the
prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published
Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public
officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1. No.
Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside
from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the
authority to prosecute
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an
investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance,
either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman
and the DOJ
The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The
prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers
and employees.
The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for
complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate
the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the
conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the
Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2. No.
· In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
· In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of
instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman,
Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the
conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition so as not
to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MADRIAGA and BERNARDO

G.R. No. 164316
September 27, 2006

The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Gertrudes
Madriaga, school principal of San Juan Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen Manager of the same
school, with violation of Section 1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. They were
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged. Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six (6) months
imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-month suspension meted out by the Office of the
Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is merely recommendatory to the Department of Education, the
Office of the Ombudsman filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to impose administrative sanctions over public officials

HELD:

Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to direct the
officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770
echoes the constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power to ―recommend‖ the imposition of penalty on erring
public officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith. The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the
“order” “to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute” an officer or employee — akin to the questioned
issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the
Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.
This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer
concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A. 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed
through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID. The word “recommend” in Sec. 15(3) must
thus be read in conjunction with the phrases “ensure compliance therewith” or “enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21” of R.A. No. 6770. In fine, the Ombudsman’s authority to impose administrative penalty and
enforce compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.