J.

Stephen Morrison and Todd Summers

United to Fight HIV/AIDS?

A new institutional order is emerging in the global fight against

HIV/AIDS. Although the United States has come to dominate this new
configuration, multiple actors, including national governments, multilateral
institutions, private foundations, businesses, and the newly created Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria, bring new resources and new
voices to bear in an increasingly diverse and, to some extent, competitive
and chaotic global environment. The United Nations, itself a diverse collec-
tion of institutions, stands warily among these players. UN secretary general
Kofi Annan and other key UN personalities have in the past five years
played leading roles in bringing the world’s attention to HIV/AIDS, leverag-
ing critical resources to curb the pandemic’s spread and mitigating its devas-
tating effects.
Their leadership, with critical U.S. backing, led to a historic UN General
Assembly special session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001 that for the first time
generated global acknowledgement of the pandemic as not only a public
health crisis but also a threat to societies and international security. The
special session further put virtually all of the world’s leaders on record as en-
dorsing a set of specific global targets in combating HIV/AIDS, ultimately
giving added impetus to the subsequent creation of the Global Fund in 2001.
The UN’s operational and coordinating agencies, beset in the early 1990s
by confusion over mandates and turf battles, have since significantly strength-
ened a shared understanding of their respective agencies’ comparative ad-
vantages and developed an appropriate division of responsibilities on HIV/
AIDS issues. They have also improved their ability to articulate their role to

J. Stephen Morrison is director of the CSIS Africa Program and the CSIS Task Force on
HIV/AIDS. Todd Summers is president of Progressive Health Partners, a Washington,
D.C.–based consulting firm.

Copyright © 2003 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 26:4 pp. 177–193.

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 l Morrison & Summers

one another and the outside world. Most importantly, the UN’s core compe-
tencies are now manifest, namely, its political and scientific leadership; its
ability to coordinate diverse actors; its provision of technical support; and
its capacity for direct implementation of programs, especially within weak
state environments in Africa.
These recent gains by the UN are substantial but not yet broadly ac-
knowledged or fully understood. Admittedly, there is still ample room for
improvement across the board at the UN, es-
pecially in strengthening agencies’ leader-
A new institutional ship and operational performance in acutely
order is emerging in affected African countries. Furthermore, glo-
bal security imperatives after the September
the global fight 11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq heavily
against HIV/AIDS. burden the UN system as a whole. Among
U.S. policymakers at least, the UN’s reputa-
tion as an effective mechanism for quick and
forthright action suffered mightily in the run-
up to the U.S.-led war on Iraq. As a result, the UN system is at risk of being
marginalized within an increasingly clamorous global effort against HIV/
AIDS. In addition, the critically important offshoot of UN leadership on
HIV/AIDS concerns, the Global Fund, is desperately short of cash at the
very moment when it should be taking off.
At this historical juncture, the United States, despite its dominance,
needs a full and effective partnership with the UN if it is to succeed in real-
izing the goals that President George W. Bush has articulated in the land-
mark Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (EPAR), a five-year, $15 billion initiative
slated to begin this year, and if U.S. global leadership is to be sustained into
the future.
Two critical challenges stand in the way of U.S. success, and the UN is
uniquely qualified to help find solutions for each. The first is the need to win
higher contributions and greater engagement from other wealthy members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to re-
dress the imbalance of U.S. preponderance in global funding for HIV/AIDS is-
sues. Among international actors, the UN system and its leaders are best
positioned to leverage substantial new non-U.S. commitments.
The second is the need to link U.S. ambitions with competent institu-
tions inside the countries critically affected by HIV/AIDS to surmount weak
institutional capacities and to bring order and coherence to proliferating in-
dividualized initiatives. In many countries hardest hit by HIV/AIDS, espe-
cially Africa’s exceptionally weak states, UN operational agencies occupy a
strategic space. They wield special in-country coordination and technical

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

capacities, command significant resources, and have extensive linkages to

ministries, state houses, and civic leaders. Where UN agencies and leaders
are mobilized and effective, they can be essential to bringing stability, coher-
ence, cooperation, and efficiency both to local and external responses to the
HIV/AIDS emergency.

The Emergent Global Response

The global HIV/AIDS pandemic has already killed more than 28 million
people and brought the HIV virus to another 42 million, an estimated 6 mil-
lion of whom have progressed to full-blown AIDS symptoms. 1 Outside
North America and Europe, fewer than 300,000 persons receive the combi-
nation of antiretroviral drugs, first introduced in 1996, that slows the pro-
gression of the virus and significantly extends lives. Initially, the annual cost
of treating a person exceeded $15,000. By 2003 that figure had been re-
duced to $300–600. 2 Within Africa, home to 30 million people living with
the HIV virus, recipients of antiretroviral drugs number a mere 50,000. Ac-
cording to the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the
UN’s coordinating secretariat for HIV/AIDS issues, and other epidemiologi-
cal forecasters, the pandemic will not peak until mid-century after having
spread to China, Russia, India, and other parts of Eurasia and after having
created tens of millions, and possibly more than 100 million, additional per-
sons living with the HIV virus—that is, unless a global response far greater
and more effective than that currently in place is realized.
Despite early warnings from experts and presidential commissions dating
back to the Reagan administration, the expanding scope and speed of the
virus did not begin to command serious international attention until 1998,
sparked largely by UNAIDS’s publication of comprehensive data on the
magnitude and trajectory of the epidemic and accelerated engagement of
the media, public health leaders, advocates, and politicians. Awareness and
response to the global epidemic have intensified even further in the past two
years, triggering multiple, potentially powerful global HIV/AIDS initiatives.
Collectively, these innovations have fundamentally altered the configura-
tion of institutions and power dedicated to addressing HIV/AIDS, raising
hope and expectations and generating complex challenges that will domi-
nate the new phase now unfolding.
Among new initiatives, the most impressive and arguably the most sur-
prising is Bush’s announcement of the EPAR, which would provide $15
billion over five years to a dozen critically affected African countries as
well as Haiti and Guyana.3 Asserting that “[t]his nation can lead the world in
sparing innocent people from a plague of nature,” the president outlined

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 l Morrison & Summers

in his 2003 State of the Union address the ambitious plan to bring treat-
ment to 2 million people, prevent 7 million new infections, and provide
care to 10 million people, including children orphaned by HIV/AIDS
deaths, largely through the rapid creation or strengthening of medical and
public health infrastructures. Subsequently, he nominated Randall L. Tobias,
a retired pharmaceutical executive, as head of a new global HIV/AIDS coor-
dination office at the U.S. Department of State.
Another bold response to the epidemic was the establishment in 2001 of
the Global Fund, an autonomous international organization created to at-
tract and manage financing for the escalation of programs to address three
of the world’s most deadly diseases. Leading proponents of the Global Fund,
including the United States and the UN, structured the new organization to
bring together public- and private-sector donors with recipients as vital to
accelerating funding to effective programs in hard-hit countries.
The Global Fund is a striking example of U.S. and UN collaboration.
Annan was one of the Global Fund’s earliest proponents, while its first (and
still largest) donor was the United States. In a relatively short time, the Glo-
bal Fund has garnered substantial support from donor governments and
foundations, financing country-driven proposals on an unprecedented scale.
By the spring of 2003, little more than a year after its first meeting, the Glo-
bal Fund’s board had approved $1.5 billion in grants to more than 150 pro-
grams in 92 countries. By the end of 2004, pledges permitting, the fund
strives to administer another $4–5 billion in new grants.4
In this same period, the influence of private foundations has moved to
center stage. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, founded in January
2000, immediately established itself as the hyperpower of foundations. From
the outset, it has focused considerable attention on HIV/AIDS, allocating
$250 million to HIV/AIDS concerns annually, including critical support for
HIV vaccine research and new technologies such as microbicides, which
hold the promise of blocking sexual transmission of HIV. The Gates Founda-
tion is the only private-sector organization to make significant cash donations,
now totaling $100 million, to the Global Fund. More mature foundations, most
notably the Kaiser Family, UN, Rockefeller, Levi Strauss, and Ford Foundations,
have built on their long-standing support for global HIV/AIDS programs de-
spite cuts in their respective overall grant capacities.
The World Bank, primarily through its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Pro-
gram, has reserved more than $1.3 billion for grants and concessional loans
to assist governments to respond to HIV/AIDS issues.5 Annual disburse-
ments for these multiyear commitments vary; UNAIDS estimates that the
World Bank disbursed around $95 million in grants in 2002.6 Bank lending
often complements U.S. bilateral efforts on HIV/AIDS issues, providing

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

some of its largest loans to middle-income countries such as India, Russia,

and Brazil that may not qualify for U.S. bilateral assistance because of their
relative wealth.7
Expansive, direct corporate engagement concentrated in southern Africa
has placed several firms in the forefront of programmatic innovation, often
far ahead (especially in South Africa) of government action. Large employ-
ers such as DaimlerChrysler, Anglo American,
DeBeers, Standard Charter Bank, Coca Cola,
Merck, and Tata Iron and Steel (in India) have T he Global Fund is
had to become quickly conversant with complex a striking example
biomedical and public health challenges, form
new partnerships outside the private sector, and of U.S. and UN
fend off criticism from skeptics to establish HIV/ collaboration.
AIDS programs for employees, their families,
and the communities in which they live. Drug
companies such as Merck, GlaxoSmithKline,
and Bristol-Myers Squibb have established reduced-price, no-profit, or free
drug programs in many highly affected poor countries.
The broader business community is also awakening to the threat that
HIV/AIDS poses to their human capital and markets. In just two years, the
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, under the leadership of former
U.S. ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke, has increased its corporate
membership from 20 to more than 120. Although it is difficult to estimate
the aggregate value of corporate commitments to HIV/AIDS programs, it is
clear that corporate engagement is rising swiftly and now involves multiyear
investments amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Large cash grants
from business in support of global HIV/AIDS efforts, however, remain elu-
sive. The Global Fund, for example, has attracted less than $2 million of its
$4.7 billion in pledges to date from businesses.8 In response, U.S. secretary
of health and human services Tommy Thompson, in his role as chair of the
Global Fund, has announced a trip to Africa with business leaders to spur
greater public/private partnerships and expand interest in contributing to
the fund.
Finally, the governments of the most acutely affected states, including
Cambodia, Rwanda, Kenya, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, although fis-
cally constrained and highly dependent on donors, have nonetheless be-
gun to make significantly higher commitments in leadership and internal
finances, moving them beyond the pervasive denial and sluggishness that
characterized most governmental responses in the 1990s. UNAIDS esti-
mates that national government commitments from developing countries
now exceed $1 billion per year. 9

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 l Morrison & Summers

Strategic Implications of Recent Historic Shifts

For many prescient leaders in acutely affected countries, battling HIV/AIDS

has become a matter of national survival. A transformation of the interna-
tional effort to assist these countries is unfolding, and its strategic implica-
tions are manifold. First, global assistance flows to combat HIV/AIDS have
more than quadrupled in less than three years, to about $4 billion in 2003.10
Accordingly, ambitions are now set vastly higher, competition for funds has
intensified, and attention is increasingly turning to the formidable impedi-
ments to implementation, namely, a lack of trained and stable personnel;
government ministries resistant to appeals for urgent action; and the in-
creasingly overwhelming burden on small, fragile African countries of prolif-
erating donor demands for comprehensive planning, reporting, verification,
and monitoring. Many observers believe that all of these problems will only
worsen until there is a concerted effort to build coordinated and effective
implementation mechanisms inside acutely affected countries in Africa and
elsewhere.
Greater resources have also helped to rapidly change the donors’ ap-
proach to HIV/AIDS issues from a monocular focus on prevention to a more
comprehensive strategy involving prevention, treatment, and the mitigation
of the disease’s broad impact. Going into the General Assembly’s Special
Session on HIV/AIDS in July 2001, policymakers vibrantly debated whether
to focus on prevention or treatment. A year later, leaving the 2002 interna-
tional AIDS conference in Spain, many declared the “prevention versus
treatment” debate over and heralded a new comprehensive approach of
wide-scale prevention and treatment made plausible by promises of increased
funding and decreasing drug costs. Despite these hopeful declarations, strik-
ing the appropriate balance between treatment and prevention efforts will
remain a challenge to countries sorely strapped for resources.
Second, U.S. predominance both in leadership of and funding for the glo-
bal response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic increased significantly in 2002 and
2003, including bilateral U.S. government programs, support for multilateral
initiatives such as the Global Fund (the United States accounts for about 40
percent of pledged resources), and private foundations. Although Ameri-
cans can and should be proud of this leadership position, the imbalance
among funding sources presents serious challenges and risks and may ulti-
mately be unsustainable. The deepening disparity between U.S. commit-
ments and those of other wealthy countries reflects a failure to mobilize
other OECD countries that, in turn, breeds disaffection among U.S. con-
gressional appropriators who increasingly insist on greater burden-sharing.
Unless a smart and effective strategy of diversification among donors is ad-

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

U.S. Spending on Global HIV

1800
1600
1400
1200
Millions $

1000
800
600
400
200
0
FY 1995

FY 1996

FY 1997

FY 1998

FY 1999

FY 2000

FY 2001

FY 2002

FY 2003

FY 2004
Sources: Priya Alagiri, Todd Summers, and Jennifer Kates, “Spending on the HIV/
AIDS Epidemic: Trends in U.S. Spending on HIV/AIDS,” July 2002, www.kff.org/
content/2002/6044/6044v2.pdf (accessed July 22, 2003); Raymond Copson, “HIV/
AIDS International Programs: Appropriations, FY 2002–FY 2004,” CRS Report for
Congress, RS21181, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/21352.pdf (accessed
July 22, 2003).

vanced, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain and broaden U.S.

leadership on HIV/AIDS issues, which will require steady increases in future
U.S. financial commitments.
Finally, U.S. dominance of global HIV/AIDS efforts may also give greater
weight and visibility to divisive ideological tendencies shared by the Bush
administration and some of its key congressional allies, including a marked
antipathy toward the UN, a preference for bilateral over multilateral initia-
tives, and rigidly conservative positions on sexuality and reproductive rights
that will likely acquire even greater salience in the upcoming U.S. election
cycle.
The lead-up to war in Iraq exposed a strong anti-UN and anti-multilat-
eral sentiment that has since crept into discussions of Washington’s future
support for multilateral efforts on HIV/AIDS issues, most notably in its allo-
cation of new finances to the Global Fund. Although Bush announced a
goal of spending $15 billion over five years for his new AIDS plan, he also
made clear that the Global Fund was not to be a major beneficiary. Of the
$15 billion Bush plan, only $1 billion was earmarked for the Global Fund—
a scant $200 million per year. Debate persists in Congress, which recently fi-
nalized foreign policy legislation on AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.

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 l Morrison & Summers

Although some key lawmakers pushed for authorizing $5 billion for the Glo-
bal Fund over five years, the White House and its congressional allies
pressed for a greater emphasis on funding for bilateral efforts. Eventually,
Congress passed and the president signed legislation authorizing up to $1
billion in fiscal year 2004 for the Global Fund, provided that this amount is
no more than one-third of total commitments to the fund.
The president and administration officials have explained their reluc-
tance to put more resources into the Global Fund as an incentive in their ef-
forts to see larger donations from others. In fact, the United States took the
lead in advocating greater pledges from
members of the European Union at the re-
The imbalance cent Group of Eight summit in Evian and
between U.S. and the EU summit in Greece, often citing U.S.
generosity and the matching requirement
other funding sources imposed by Congress as a challenge to the
may ultimately be Europeans. Ironically, however, in oppos-
unsustainable. ing higher appropriations for global AIDS
programs, the administration argued that
it would have difficulty spending more than
the $2 billion it requested from Congress.
The initial plans for implementing the president’s initiative exhort other
donors to support multilateral programs while at the same time seeking to
redirect U.S. funding almost exclusively to bilateral channels. Little use of
UN agencies is envisioned, risking the predomination of unilateralism in
ways that dramatically narrow U.S. options and abilities. So far, the Bush ad-
ministration has failed to recognize the centrality of the UN, both in terms
of mobilizing other forms of support and of advancing in-country implemen-
tation, to realizing its urgent aims of bringing other wealthy partners to the
table as well as creating capacity to provide care, prevention, and treatment
in impoverished settings.
The upcoming 2004 U.S. electoral cycle will add an additional wrinkle.
Pressures will inevitably build within the Bush administration to maximize
the unilateral disbursement of resources for the sake of controlling grantees
and programs, rewarding allies, and currying favor with conservative U.S.
constituencies. Under such circumstances, U.S. dominance might increas-
ingly and conspicuously transfer a number of U.S. priorities into African and
other settings, such as U.S. domestic debates over abstinence versus condoms,
women’s access to reproductive services, needle exchange, outreach to pros-
titutes, and use of explicit prevention materials targeting high-risk groups.
Left unchecked, this phenomenon could politicize implementation in Africa
and elsewhere, limiting effectiveness by distracting, confusing, and con-
straining programmatic flexibility.

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

The UN’s Comparative Advantage

The major new international initiatives outlined above operate largely out-
side of UN coordination and oversight. Financially, U.S. giving alone on
HIV/AIDS programs is more than twice the $550 million in programmatic
commitments that all UN agencies combined will spend in 2003,11 prompt-
ing the question, Has the UN become largely peripheral to the emergent
global mobilization against HIV/AIDS? In short, the answer is “no.” Since
1998, the UN has been integral to mobilizing the U.S. effort as well as that
of others effectively, and its leadership and programmatic strengths will be
essential to future U.S. leadership on this problem, especially in leveraging
commitments from other wealthy donors and building in-country implemen-
tation capacities. Yet at the same time, as U.S. bilateral engagement in-
creases, the UN risks marginalization unless its activities are tied more
closely to U.S. priorities and unless the performance of its operational agen-
cies is systematically enhanced.
In earlier eras, UN leadership and UN operational programs unquestion-
ably led the charge against global health challenges such as polio, childhood
diarrhea, and smallpox. By contrast, in combating HIV/AIDS today, the UN
must assert more aggressively its comparative advantages. Until the late
1990s, the governments of the majority of acutely threatened African states
were silent about the disease ravaging their countries while the United
States and other Group of Seven member states failed to mount a serious ef-
fort to address the pandemic. The UN was of little help either. Its agencies
were slow in and resistant to responding to the threat that HIV/AIDS posed
to developing societies, prone to intense institutional rivalry and bickering
and overly protective of vulnerable, established budgets and mandates.
The World Health Organization (WHO), the UN’s leading public health
arm, has had a conspicuously mixed history in its response to the spread of
HIV/AIDS. As the agency first charged with mounting a global response to
the epidemic, the WHO helped establish the Global Program on AIDS in
1987 under the leadership of the late Dr. Jonathan Mann. At the time, it
was the WHO’s largest program. Yet despite Dr. Mann’s efforts, the program
foundered as disagreements flared with a new WHO director general, vari-
ous UN agencies fought over the scraps of funding then available, and lack-
luster performance within developing countries generated ill will among
member states.12
A strategic opportunity to galvanize a global response to the global epi-
demic was lost, and in 1992–1993, stewardship for coordinating the UN’s
response was passed to UNAIDS, then newly established. Modeled on ear-
lier joint research efforts on tropical diseases, UNAIDS was designed not to

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 l Morrison & Summers

implement UN programs but rather to coordinate and represent them, par-

ticularly at the country level. Once formed, UNAIDS quickly discovered
the difficulty of its charge as the coordinating entity of eight diverse member
agencies whose budgets it did not control or even effectively influence and
whose respective governing boards and directors did not share UNAIDS’s
sense of urgency.
Executive Director Peter Piot endowed UNAIDS with gifted and deter-
mined leadership, but even Piot’s exhortations were insufficient to move
several UN agencies out of their indifference
and lethargy in the early years of UNAIDS’s
U .S. financial existence. Half a decade later, determined ca-
joling by UNAIDS, backed by Annan; the
dominance might
United Nations Children’s Fund’s (UNICEF)
transfer domestic Carol Bellamy; World Bank president Jim
U.S. priorities Wolfensohn; and, more recently, James Morris
overseas. at the World Food Program, has resulted in an
emerging consensus on the division of respon-
sibilities among UN agencies and other insti-
tutions, brought dynamism to the UN system,
and sparked a new will to demonstrate the UN’s competitive edge. To be
sure, territoriality and mistrust remain powerful challenges to UN effec-
tiveness, but the overall trend remains very promising.
The depth and complexity of UN engagement has paralleled the expan-
sion and growing complexity of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. UNAIDS is charged
with leading global advocacy efforts, establishing baseline global facts on the
pandemic, and coordinating and encouraging its eight cosponsoring agen-
cies, all of which maintain substantial HIV/AIDS programs: the Interna-
tional Labor Organization focuses on the pandemic’s impact on workers and
employers; UNICEF focuses on the disproportionate impact of HIV/AIDS
on young people and mothers; the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) and the World Bank have taken leadership roles in addressing the
threat to development posed by HIV/AIDS and in building national capaci-
ties across key ministries; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in-
creasingly focuses on preventing HIV transmission through illicit drug use;
and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities focuses on the con-
nection between reproductive health and HIV.
The WHO remains a principal partner as well. Its capacity to muster a
robust institutional response to HIV/AIDS, diminished in the early 1990s
when its Global Program on AIDS was dissolved and UNAIDS was estab-
lished, was partially rebuilt under outgoing director general Gro Harlem
Brundtland. Today, the WHO, under the new leadership of Dr. Jong-wook

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

UN Agency HIV Spending

800

700 1996-2000

600 2001-2005

500
Millions $

400

300

200

100

0
UNAIDS World WHO UNFPA UNDP UNICEF
Bank

Source: Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, “Report on the State of HIV/AIDS
Financing,” March 2003, www.internationalbudget.org/resources/library/UNAIDS.pdf
(accessed July 22, 2003).

Lee, has quickly enlisted several prominent HIV/AIDS experts to join Lee
and appears poised to enlarge its efforts significantly, particularly in expand-
ing access to the most effective treatments and medications. Lee’s “3 by 5”
goal of providing AIDS treatment to 3 million people by 2005 dovetails
neatly with the Bush initiative’s goal of providing treatment to 2 million (by
an unspecified date) in the 14 focal countries that account for 70 percent of
the world’s population living with HIV. Indeed, the UN system offers a broad
range of skills and capacities needed for Bush’s plan to succeed and for the
global community to mount a more effective and comprehensive response to
the HIV/AIDS pandemic, including the following competencies.

MOBILIZING BROAD POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP

The single, most important ingredient to success in addressing the HIV/
AIDS crisis is leadership, both in affected and donor countries and among
leaders of multilateral institutions and the private sector. In the oft-cited
success stories of Uganda, Senegal, Thailand, and Brazil, active strategic en-
gagement at the highest levels of government has resulted in successful
campaigns to forestall or dramatically reduce new HIV infections.
The UN deserves substantial credit for helping galvanize this kind of
high-level leadership and for mobilizing the donor resources that have helped
finance these and other successful efforts.

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Annan, leveraging his status, has regularly used his access to first-tier
politicians to encourage their leadership on AIDS issues and is widely cred-
ited with playing a lead role in the establishment of the Global Fund. Like-
wise, senior staff at UNAIDS have traveled the globe, using their well-earned
integrity and knowledge of the epidemic to help articulate its status, make
the case that its course can be changed, and plead for faster and expanded
funding. Often joined by the directors of the UN agencies, these interna-
tional leaders use their distinct audiences and mandates to describe the im-
pacts of the epidemic as it relates to their respective areas of focus. Wolfensohn,
for example, uses his entrée with finance ministers, business leaders, and
economic development specialists to articulate the impact that AIDS has on
poverty reduction, education, health care, and national budgets—areas in
which he and his agency have particular credibility.
The various UN agencies have been reasonably effective at providing or
mobilizing from others the intellectual capital needed to build and sustain
an effective global effort on HIV/AIDS issues: providing strategic informa-
tion and data on which sound policies can be made; documenting and circu-
lating best practices and practice guidelines; developing technical guidance;
and more generally helping the world understand HIV/AIDS’s impact on
gender, civil and human rights, child welfare, labor and business develop-
ment, and poverty reduction. Although persistent spats over credit and au-
thorship remain, these UN agencies have provided a wealth of information to
assist local, national, and international policymakers in all aspects of pro-
gram design, implementation, evaluation, and financing.

COORDINATING ACTION
The same global mandate allows the UN to work throughout the world (some-
times in places where Americans or other foreign nationals would be less wel-
come or effective), helping to organize national efforts, mobilize new partners
to join the effort, and gather data (such as surveillance and spending data)
useful to monitoring the course of the epidemic and the magnitude of the
world’s response. This coordinating function is increasingly important as more
and more actors join the effort to address HIV/AIDS issues. Although
UNAIDS was created specifically to coordinate the UN system’s response, it
has also demonstrated its strategic value in coordinating a broad array of mul-
tilateral, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
This traffic cop role is needed at international, national, and local levels
where the intensity, quality, and comprehensiveness of responses vary
widely. If, for example, too many groups are focused on preventing mother-
to-child transmission (PMTC) of HIV/AIDS while other at-risk groups are
being ignored, the UN is in a strong position to recognize the problem and

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

promote a more balanced response. Similarly, if an increasing emphasis on

HIV/AIDS diverts resources from other critical efforts—pulling resources
from non-AIDS–related maternal and child health programs to fund PMTC
initiatives, for example—the UN is well positioned to support systems that
measure and address that imbalance both
because it has global access to information
and because it is less burdened by the po-
litical pressures and sensitivities that some-
The UN risks
marginalization unless
times cause these imbalances. For example,
recent administration and congressional ac- its activities are tied
tions have restricted U.S. funding to HIV/ more closely to U.S.
AIDS programs focused on commercial sex priorities.
workers, a population consistently identi-
fied by public health experts as critical to
prevention efforts, and to reproductive
health services that help women avoid HIV infection. Who other than the
UN is going to help identify and fill the program and finance gaps created by
these U.S. actions?
UNAIDS sometimes plays a similar role within the UN system it is charged
with coordinating. When politically marginalized populations, such as men
who have sex with other men and injection drug users, were left out of the
strategic plans of its cosponsors, UNAIDS took on the responsibility for ar-
ticulating and responding to their needs.

PROVIDING TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE

Notwithstanding increases in funds and the proliferation of new and ambi-
tious HIV/AIDS programs seeking resources, great challenges persist at the
front lines of the epidemic. Local governmental organizations and NGOs
charged with doing the actual work to prevent new infections and care for
those infected and affected by HIV face serious, preexisting deficits in infra-
structure, funding, and human capacity. Making sense of all of the various
needs, bringing the numerous sectors together, and helping them to formulate
and implement comprehensive prevention and care programs are daunting
challenges, especially in impoverished countries lacking even the most basic
systems of health care and physical infrastructure (clean water, sanitation,
transportation, and education).
Coordinating is a core strength of the UN and a principal focus of a re-
cent independent evaluation of UNAIDS. 13 The reviewers found that in
some cases UNAIDS excelled at establishing strong and inclusive coordinat-
ing bodies that bring together the various UN agency representatives with
government officials, business leaders, people living with and affected by

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 l Morrison & Summers

HIV/AIDS, health professionals, NGOs, and religious leaders. These groups

have built solid and comprehensive programs, regularly benefiting from the
expertise of the UN personnel. Yet in other cases, UN agency representa-
tives failed to come together, and the UNAIDS coordinator lacked author-
ity, hampering effectiveness at the national and local levels. This problem
and others identified in the recent evaluation could benefit from heightened
U.S. activism on the oversight boards of the different UN agencies.

IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS
To supplement local capacity, some bilateral and multilateral agencies have
implemented HIV/AIDS programs, either directly or indirectly through con-
tracted employees and organizations. A variety of bilateral programs are
supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as well as the Departments
of Defense, Labor, and Agriculture. Yet, these agencies give the United
States an operational presence in only a small number of countries.
Furthermore, the president’s new EPAR initiative is limited to a subset of
14 African and Caribbean nations while at least a dozen other acutely af-
fected or threatened African countries require urgent mobilization with sub-
stantial external support. Russia, identified in a recent National Intelligence
Council report as one of five “Second Wave” countries (along with India,
Nigeria, China, and Ethiopia), faces a catastrophic increase in HIV infec-
tions during the next decade.14 It receives only limited USAID funding for
HIV/AIDS issues, and that support is to be phased out over the next five
years, precisely when critical action is most needed.
In many countries acutely affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS, and espe-
cially in Africa, the UN is the dominant institutional presence on a variety of
HIV and development issues with a significant in-country presence, estab-
lished relations with governments and key actors that no other bilateral or
multilateral entity matches, and direct implementation capacities. The UN
has demonstrated the strength of its institutional base and networks repeat-
edly in fights against other global diseases, including smallpox, childhood diar-
rhea, and most recently SARS. It can and should play a similar role regarding
HIV/AIDS, especially in weak state environments.

U.S. Success Rests on the Essential U.S.-UN Partnership

Any notion that the United States’ dramatically rising national equities in
battling the global spread of HIV/AIDS are inherently at odds with the core
competencies and interests of the UN is outdated and dangerously mis-

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

placed. Indeed, the opposite is becoming apparent as Washington quickly

moves to implement Bush’s historic plans and test his assertion that U.S.
global leadership can bring significant concrete results and begin to reverse
the course of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. Acting alone, the United
States will not effectively move other wealthy states to play their part and
will unnecessarily raise the risk that its own investments will shortly be seen
by the American public as unilateral overreach into uncertain and chaotic
environments in Africa and the Caribbean.
To succeed in meeting the ambitious
goals that it has set for itself, the United T he UN is the
States will soon discover that it is in its
dominant institutional
best interests to create a fuller, more effec-
tive, and less ambiguous partnership with presence in many
the UN. Establishing this partnership re- acutely affected
quires close, high-level collaboration with countries.
the UN’s impressive political and intellec-
tual leadership and taking full advantage of
fora such as the UN Security Council. The
UN leadership is receptive to working closely with the United States to
leverage additional monies from EU member states, Japan, and others—es-
pecially for the Global Fund. These leaders have a strong, enduring motiva-
tion to cooperate extensively with the United States in pressing recalcitrant
leaders in Russia, India, China, South Africa, and elsewhere to acknowledge
the magnitude of the threat and begin to respond seriously to preempt a
full-blown, generalized epidemic in these countries. U.S. leadership would
be particularly welcome in October, when the United States assumes the Se-
curity Council presidency and could use the council to examine the accu-
mulating impact of HIV/AIDS on global security; assess progress since the
Security Council first examined HIV/AIDS issues in January 2000; and up-
date aggressive performance measures for national governments, UN agen-
cies, and wealthy member states.
Operationally, U.S. success in heavily affected countries requires system-
atically linking U.S. programs with the UN’s evolving technical strengths,
the UN’s ability to coordinate diverse actors in complex national settings,
and the UN’s direct implementation capacities, especially in weak state en-
vironments in Africa. Such efforts in turn require a concentrated U.S. focus
on enhancing the performance of UN operational agencies.
The United States and other members of the executive boards of key
UN operational agencies should press for more robust and specific targets
on HIV/AIDS programs and the means to finance as well as monitor exist-
ing initiatives. Stronger UN coordination and leadership should be sought

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 l Morrison & Summers

in the most acutely affected countries and should articulate more clearly
how UNAIDS, its cosponsoring agencies, and the Global Fund are to join
efforts inside these countries where success or failure will ultimately be
judged. The United States and other wealthy powers should create within
their respective embassies and aid missions far greater public health exper-
tise, integrate them more closely into the formulation of foreign policies,
and lend senior scientific and managerial talent to the lead UN agencies—
UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF—to bolster their capacities and coordi-
nate bilateral and multilateral strategies.
All of these steps are feasible and affordable. Taking them will give
the United States the best prospect of creating the in-country mechanisms
in Africa and elsewhere that will be essential to rationalize proliferating pro-
grams, build coherent national infrastructure, track progress, and strengthen
accountability. Only if these steps are taken, however, will the United States
succeed in winning greater commitments from other wealthy countries;
lessen its share of the global burden; and persuade an edgy U.S. Congress
that, despite a historic deficit, it should appropriate significantly higher fu-
ture resources to this global health emergency.

Notes

1. Jennifer Kates, “The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic: Current and Future Challenge,”
February 19, 2003, http://cph.georgetown.edu/aging/extras/hiv.pdf (accessed July
24, 2003).
2. Michel Kazatchkine and Jean-Paul Moatti, “Antiretroviral Treatment for HIV-Infected Pa-
tients in Developing Countries: A Change in Paradigm Is Now Attainable,” www.unaids.org/
publications/documents/care/acc_access/cdrom/Contributions%20of%20experts/Resources/
Pharmaceutical%20Issues/ARV%20treatment%20in%20developing%20countries.pdf (ac-
cessed July 24, 2003).
3. The countries of focus for the EPAR are Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana,
Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, and Zambia. See U.S. Department of State, “The President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief,” (fact sheet), www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/17033.htm (accessed
July 28, 2003).
4. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria, “Financial Prospectus: Status and
Forecasts for Resource Mobilization,” Geneva, January 29–31, 2003, www.aidspan.org/
gfo/docs/gfo37.pdf (accessed July 24, 2003) (revision 1).
5. World Bank, “Lending on HIV/AIDS,” www1.worldbank.org/hiv_aids/lending.asp
(accessed July 24, 2003).
6. Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), “Report on the State of
HIV/AIDS Financing,” March 2003, www.internationalbudget.org/resources/li-
brary/UNAIDS.pdf (accessed July 22, 2003).
7. See World Bank, online HIV/AIDS project database, www.worldbank.org/projects
(accessed July 24, 2003).

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 United to Fight HIV/AIDS? l

8. Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis and Malaria: Pledges, www.globalfundatm.org/files/pledges&contributions030716.xls
(updated July 16, 2003).
9. “Report on the State of HIV/AIDS Financing” (UNAIDS/PCB(14)/03, conference
paper 2A, June 25, 2003) (hereinafter UNAIDS financing report).
10. Ibid.
11. Raymond Copson, “HIV/AIDS International Programs: Appropriations, FY 2002–
FY 2004,” CRS Report for Congress, RS21181, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/orga-
nization/21352.pdf (accessed July 24, 2003); UNAIDS financing report.
12. UNAIDS, “Five-Year Evaluation of UNAIDS,” December 2002, www.unaids.org/
about/governance/files/PCB13_Five-YearEvaluationofUNAIDS_en.doc (accessed
July 24, 2003).
13. Ibid.
14. National Intelligence Council, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, In-
dia, and China, ICA-2002-04D, September 2002, www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/
ICA%20HIV-AIDS%20unclassified%20092302POSTGERBER.htm (accessed July 24,
2003).

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