Effects of Quality and Quantity On Decision Effectiveness: Journal of Consumer Research February 1987
Effects of Quality and Quantity On Decision Effectiveness: Journal of Consumer Research February 1987
Effects of Quality and Quantity On Decision Effectiveness: Journal of Consumer Research February 1987
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KEVINLANE KELLER
RICHARDSTAELIN*
One major concern of policy makers and research- effectiveness. Second, using this definition, we develop
ers interested in how individuals use available in- a model of how decision effectiveness is affected by two
formation is the determination of the maximum different dimensions of information: information qual-
amount of information that a consumer can effectively ity, which can be thought of as the information's in-
process before experiencing decreased accuracy in as- herent usefulness to consumers in assessing the utility
sessing the value (utility) of available choice alternatives. of an alternative; and information quantity, defined as
Currently, advocates for providing substantial amounts the number of items or attributes describing an alter-
of information often act as if this maximum is a large native (e.g., brand) (Summers 1974; Wilkie 1974). The
number. Although it is difficult to dispute the concept basic assertions to be tested are that in situations where
of the consumers' "right to know," some researchers a consumer is given a particular set of information, and
have warned that policies aimed at increasing infor- thus external search costs are not relevant, (1) increases
mation can lead to poorer decisions, citing numerous in the total quality of information made available,
laboratory experiment findings that show humans to be holding fixed the quantity of information, increase the
cognitively limited (e.g., Kelly and Fiske 1951; Miller likelihood of effective decisions (to be defined more
1956; Simon 1969; Streufert and Driver 1965). precisely below), and (2) for a fixed total quality level
In this article, we explore the effects of the available of information, increases in the quantity of information
information environment on the consumer's ability to decrease the likelihood of effective decisions.
make an accurate assessment of the best alternative in
a choice set. In doing so, we deviate from prior mar- CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
keting studies of this topic in a number of ways. First,
we explicitly define what we mean by a consumer mak- About a decade ago, Jacoby and his associates (Ja-
ing an accurate assessment-a concept we call decision coby, Speller, and Berning 1974; Jacoby, Speller, and
Kohn 1974) presented the results of two experiments
*Kevin Lane Keller is Assistant Professor of Marketing, Graduate designed to ascertain the influence of the amount of
School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Richard information available to a consumer on his/her ability
Staelin is Edward and Rose Donnell Professor of Business Admin- to make a correct choice among food products. This
istration, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC work, which claimed to establish the existence of "in-
27706. This research was supported in part by a Duke University
formation overload," was questioned immediately by
Research Council grant and an Office of Naval Research grant. The
authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Jim a number of researchers (Russo 1974; Staelin and Payne
Bettman, Dipankar Chakravarti, Mike Hagerty, Eric Johnson, J. Ed- 1976; Summers 1974; Wilkie 1974) on both conceptual
ward Russo, the Duke Marketing Seminar participants, and four and methodological grounds. One criticism concerned
anonymous reviewers, one of whom suggested the specific formulation the question of what is the best choice, i.e., how does
for Equation 1. The cooperation of Donn Saunders, Placement Di-
rector at the Fuqua School of Business, is also acknowledged. one determine the alternative a consumer would have
chosen if the information environment were optimal.
200
?3 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH* Vol. 14 * September 1987
A second criticism was that these studies varied not Given this uncertainty, we decided to address the prob-
only the number of attributes provided, but also the lem again.
choice set size, thereby varying the probability of getting The approach taken here differs from the previously
a correct choice by chance alone. Russo, Wilkie, and discussed studies in a number of ways. First, we center
Staelin and Payne all attempted to circumvent this sec- our attention on the construct "decision effectiveness,"
ond concern by reanalyzing the Jacoby et al. data after which is concerned with how consumers assess the value
controlling for the effects of guessing. Although these of each alternative. This is in contrast to the prior stud-
analyses differed slightly from one another, each found ies' measure of the "best" choice. Second, we explicitly
little or no decrease in choice accuracy associated with acknowledge that processing additional information has
increases in the amount of attribute information pro- both benefits and costs. This is done by considering the
vided, controlling for choice set size. effects of the two components of information, quality
Following these exchanges (see Jacoby, Speller, and and quantity, on decision effectiveness. Third, we de-
Berning 1975; Jacoby 1977 for replies), Scammon velop a conceptual model of how decision effectiveness
(1977) published the results of a study that fixed the affects choice. This model influenced the types of mea-
number of alternatives among food products at two sures taken in our study, the sequencing of these mea-
while varying both the number of attributes for which sures, and the forms of analyses used subsequent to the
information was provided and the format of the infor- data collection. Given the importance of these consid-
mation. Subjects were asked to identify the brand that erations, we discuss each in detail in the next sections.
was nutritionally superior instead of choosing their most
preferred brand. She reported no increase in the selec- MODEL OF DECISION CHOICE AND
tion of the most nutritious brand resulting from in- DECISION EFFECTIVENESS
creases in attribute information.
Malhotra, Jain, and Lagakos (1982) presented yet In order to determine what is a best choice, it is either
another analysis of the Jacoby et al. data base as well necessary to have a universally accepted standard of
as an analysis of the Scammon data base. These anal- what is best or to establish how each consumer ideally
yses, which used a variation of the multivariate analysis evaluates alternatives. The studies by Scammon (1 977)
model originally used by Staelin and Payne (1976), si- and Muller (1984) took the former route using a choice
multaneously controlled for the number of alternatives task where presumably there was a "right" answer, i.e.,
and the number of attributes per alternative available. choose the most nutritious brand. However, many nu-
They found, in general, no decrease in accuracy as the tritionists (and consumers) believe what is best (i.e.,
amount of attribute information increased. Malhotra most nutritious) for one person may not be best for
(1982) also collected a new data base utilizing the same another person. Given this difficulty of finding a uni-
basic design first introduced by Jacoby et al. He found versally accepted standard for best choice independent
that when consumers were asked to choose among of individual consumer's tastes, we decided instead to
houses, choice accuracy decreased when the number of develop a general conceptual model of how highly mo-
attributes increased from 5 to 15 or more (up to 25) tivated consumers would ideally value alternatives in a
and when the number of alternatives increased from 5 choice task. This model assumes that under ideal con-
to 10 or more (also up to 25). ditions consumers want to review all of the important
More recently, Muller (1984) reported the results of attribute information available for each alternative and
a field study that varied the amount of nutritional in- assign an overall utility score to each alternative in their
formation provided to consumers (via point-of-pur- choice set by summing the attribute level utilities. They
chase signs hung in the aisles of grocery stores) and then choose the alternative with the largest overall util-
measured purchase behavior for a two-week period. He ity score. Said more directly, we assume (1) motivated
found that varying the information load on these signs consumers like to be compensatory decision makers,
produced no systematic shifts in purchase behavior over and (2) compensatory decision models are appropriate
the two-week period analyzed. Finally, Best and Ursic standards to measure decision effectiveness (Hagerty
(1986) following the basic methodology of Malhotra and Aaker 1984; Johnson and Payne 1985).
(1982), reported that choice accuracy was more sensitive The above conceptualization is appropriate for "per-
to the degree of preference similarity among brands than fect" informational environments and processing con-
to the number of attributes or brands provided. ditions, i.e., situations where the information is relevant
The preceding results provide no unified picture of and consumers can accurately process all available in-
the relationship between the amount of information formation and are willing to incur the "cost of thinking"
available at the time of choice and choice accuracy. (Shugan 1980). Notationally, u* represents this "ideal
This inconsistency may be due to methodological compensatory utility" for alternative i based on the
problems and/or differences in statistical power across available information, where the cost of processing the
studies. However, it also may be due to the fact that information is not included in the value of u*.
there is no such phenomenon as information overload. In reality, the informational environment and pro-
cessing conditions are often less than perfect. Such im- Specifically, our conceptual model of how quality and
perfections can decrease consumers' motivation, lead quantity affect decision effectiveness rests on the fol-
to processing "short cuts," and cause confusion and/ lowing premise:
or inaccurate inferencing. Define uzito be the consumer's
Pla: Increasing the quantity of attribute infor-
utility assessment for alternative i formed under such
imperfect environment and/or processing conditions mation while fixing the total quality of the
available information leads to a decrease, on
and let Ei= u - uzi.Small absolute values of Eiindicate
average, in decision effectiveness, although
a person is effective in assessing the ideal or true utility
value of the alternative while large absolute differences this decrease occurs at a decreasing rate.
are associated with ineffective assessments. In this way Plb: Increasing the total quality of information
lEilis inversely related to our concept of decision effec- while retaining the same quantity of infor-
tiveness. mation results in an increase, on average, in
More formally, we operationalize our concept of de- decision effectiveness, although this increase
cision effectiveness, yv*',as follows: occurs at a decreasing rate.
Mathematically,
=
(1)
* +* lei
y*= -g1(N) + g2(TQ) + 2i (2)
We use this definition for two reasons. First, larger val- where N is the quantity of information, TQ is the total
ues of y*~imply greater decision effectiveness. Second, quality of the information, E2i is an error term, gj( )
y*' is independent of the metric chosen for u* and uzi. are the functions that reflect the effects of quantity and
quality on decision effectiveness, with first derivatives,
MODEL OF INFORMATION g'( *) > 0, and second derivatives, g'( *) < 0, for i = 1,
2. The first partial derivatives capture our assumption
QUANTITY AND QUALITY EFFECTS of the direction of the effect while the second partial
Another criticism of the original Jacoby et al. meth- derivatives reflect our assumption of the decreasing
odology was that it did not acknowledge that each at- marginal influence of both factors.
tribute varies in the amount of evaluative information Although the constructs quantity and total quality
that it provides to people. For example, information are conceptually distinct, these two constructs, as de-
on the nutrient content of a food might be very relevant fined, are related. One way of making this relationship
to one consumer but not to another. We capture this explicit is to define AQ to be the average quality level
concept with the theoretical construct, quality of in- of the attributes available. Then TQ = AQ N, and .
g2(AQ. N) for values of N greater than N*. The latter served values uis. This requires us to assess the degree
two points imply that any functional form used to rep- of correspondence between the uis and the ^is. We do
resent Equation 3 must be flexible enough to incorpo- this by noting that the two variables are linked by the
rate both conditions. We address this issue again when construct u* . More precisely, the probability that BEST
we operationalize Equation 3. equals one increases as the value of uziapproaches ui.
The major objectives of this study are to test the This will occur as uziapproaches uO'holding fixed ui or
Proposition and to determine if information overload ui approaches u* holding fixed uzi.The former corre-
exists in at least one type of choice task. One way of spondence is increased with increases in decision effec-
accomplishing these objectives is to estimate gl( * ) and tiveness, while the latter is increased with decreases in
g2(*) of Equations 2 and 3 directly. However, such an the magnitude of the variance of measurement error
approach requires measuring the dependent variable E3i, Var(E3i) In addition, the probability that BEST
yV*',which is derived from two unobserved variables, equals one should be influenced by the relative values
u0' and uzi.Measuring u0"may not pose too much of a of the uO's, i.e., the degree to which the alternative with
problem since in a high-involvement situation there are the highest utility dominates the other available alter-
established measurement techniques to assess a person's natives (in particular, the alternative with the second
utility, e.g., conjoint analysis (Green and Srinivasan highest true (ideal) utility).
1978) or multiattribute utility models (Huber 1974; Ja- This discussion can be quantified as follows. First,
coby et al. 1974a; 1974b). Using any one of these pro- operationalize the task environment, TE, to be the dif-
cedures would produce a fallible but unbiased measure, ference between the true compensatory utilities of the
ui, of the construct up'. Mathematically, first and second ranked alternatives, i.e.,
+ E3i,
Ui= U1*' (4) TE=u*_U2*+E4 (5)
where E3i reflects the inability to measure precisely a = U1 - U2 + (4 + E32 - E31
person's ideal compensatory utility function for alter-
native i. The construct ui, on the other hand, may be where u* is the true utility for the highest ranked alter-
more difficult to measure since it represents the person's native, u2*is the true utility for the second highest ranked
utility assessment in less than ideal informational or alternative, and (4 is the error term, which captures the
processing conditions. Any attempt to measure uticould fact that the task difficulties can be caused by other
easily cause a subject to be "more careful," thereby alternative utility differences, e.g., ut' - uT, uT - U4,
biasing the assessment of ut?. and so on. Large values of TE imply an easy task, while
Fortunately, there is another approach that can be small values imply a difficult task.
used to estimate the effects gl( *) and g2( * ) as specified Second, operationalize our opinions on the relation-
in Equations 2 and 3. In this approach, we postulate a ship between yi* and N and TQ using a functional form
relationship between Y1*and an observable outcome that reflects the premises set forth in the Proposition,
measure. We then substitute for y* (after assuming a Equation 2, and Equation 3, i.e.,
specified form of gl( * ) and g2( )), thereby replacing the yj* = -log(N) + al log(TQ)-a2TQ2 + E2i (6)
unobserved variable yi* with observed variables (i.e., N
and TQ or equivalently N and AQ). Interestingly, this where al and a2 are positive constants that are restricted
resulting "reduced form" equation approach still en- to insure that the relationship between y'* and TQ is
ables us to identify (and estimate) the effects of N, TQ, monotonically increasing over the relevant range of
and AQ on decision effectiveness as defined in Equations TQ.1Next, relate yi* to a measure such as the probability
2 and 3. that variable BEST equals one by specifying how we
We limit our remaining discussion in this section to believe decision effectiveness, task difficulty, and mea-
one particular observable variable, BEST, defined to surement errors affect this variable, i.e.,
equal one if the person chooses the alternative deemed
best from all of the alternatives under consideration, P(BEST= 1) = bi + b2yI#+ b3TE-b4Var(E3i) + (5, (7)
based on the fallible utility measure ui, and zero oth-
erwise. In later sections, we develop and discuss a second where bi > 0, i = 2, 3, 4 and (5 is an error term. Sub-
observable measure, PAIR, which is identical to BEST
except the choice set is limited to two possible alter-
natives. 'Equation6 is no less generalthany;* = co- clog(N) + c21og(TQ)
The variable, BEST, as defined, is identical to the - c3TQ2 + Ecisince coand cl can be absorbedby rescalingthe unob-
dependent measure used by Jacoby et al. and Malhotra servedconstructy;* The specificforms of g, and g2 were chosen in
(1982). However, the development differs from prior recognitionof the fact that g'(N) had to be less than g2(AQ. N) for
small N and that the overall function should be flexibleenough to
analyses by explicitly acknowledging that the person's allow for Yi*to be eithera monotonicallyincreasingfunctionof N or
actual choice is based on the unobserved utilities uzis an increasingandthendecreasingfunction,i.e., g'(N) couldbe greater
while the determination of BEST is based on the ob- thang2(AQ Q N) for values of N greaterthan N*.
where Uki = wkekj(i)and n signifies the number of at- 1 99.5 99.5 1099.1 17
tributes given. Thus, the overall utility of an alternative 2 92.0 191.5 999.6 16
equals the sum of the associated attribute part-worth 3 88.0 279.5 907.6 15
utilities, where these part-worths reflect the attribute's 4 85.0 367.5 819.6 14
importance and the evaluation of its particular level. 5 82.0 446.5 734.6 13
6 79.0 525.5 652.6 12
Of course, other compensatory models could have been 7 75.0 600.5 573.6 11
used. For example, one could hypothesize a compen- 8 71.5 672.0 498.6 10
satory model that incorporates interactions. However, 9 67.7 739.7 427.1 9
since the additive, noninteractive model has been shown 10 63.3 803.0 359.4 8
11 58.9 861.9 296.1 7
to be very robust in a wide variety of circumstances, 12 53.5 915.4 237.2 6
we use this form. 13 48.3 963.7 183.7 5
In Phases II and III, subjects were asked to choose 14 43.1 1006.8 135.4 4
between pairs of hypothetical job alternatives in addi- 15 36.9 1043.7 92.3 3
16 31.5 1075.2 55.4 2
tion to choosing the best alternative among a set of five
17 23.9 1099.1 23.9 1
different hypothetical job alternatives in informational
environments that were precontrolled for specific values
of information quantity, information quality, and task
ease. The control in these choice tasks was accomplished The two major design variables were information
by using the Phase I utility data to construct the specific quantity with four levels (4, 8, 10, or 12 attributes) and
job alternatives presented for each subject according to information quality, also with four levels (cumulative
the following procedure. importance scores respectively of 365, 510, 655, and
Information quantity was operationalized as the 800-plus or minus 35). The information quality levels
number of attributes provided for each job alternative. represent approximately 33, 46, 60, and 73 percent, re-
Information quality was operationalized as the cumu- spectively, of the average cumulative importance scores
lative score of the individual's importance weights (i.e., for all of the 17 attributes. Although crossing the two
the sum of the WkS) for the attributes provided. Table factors would yield a design with 16 possible quantity-
1, for example, displays the importance scores for the quality combinations (cells), it was not feasible to con-
17 attributes obtained by first ranking the attributes for struct choice sets that fit in all of these cells for two
each individual and then averaging the ranked attribute reasons. First, since the maximum quality score for four
scores over all individuals. If we were to assume for the attributes was 400 (=4 X 100), it was not theoretically
moment that these data reflect one particular subject's possible to provide a medium quality informational
importance ranking, then a choice set of jobs where the environment (a quality score of 510) or higher with only
first eight ranked attributes were given would reflect an four attributes in our job choice set, thus negating the
informational environment of eight attributes with a use of three cells. Second, it was usually empirically
total quality level of 672. Similarly, if the last eight impossible to find individuals whose importance scores
ranked attributes were provided, the informational en- allowed them to be placed in four other cells (e.g., when
vironment would have a total quality level of 359. quantity was set at 12, almost no individuals had a cu-
By selectively choosing attributes for each individual, mulative importance score of 510 or less for any com-
given the Phase I data, it was possible to construct choice bination of attributes).
sets of approximately equal cumulative importance for Therefore, we were able to potentially develop choice
each subject. The Phase I data were also used to choose sets of job alternatives that fell into nine of the 16 cells
attribute levels for each of the individual's five job al- (see Table 2). Even then, many individuals had utility
ternatives to insure that the average utility difference functions that only allowed us to construct choice sets
between alternatives was approximately held constant, that placed them either into cells 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7 or
i.e., (Uj- (u
-Uj -uj+2) for j = 1, 2, 3 where j cells 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 as defined in Table 2. Since subjects
orders the alternatives and uj is based only on those placed in the former group received a given quality of
attributes provided in the choice task. In this way we information using fewer attributes, the two groups dif-
controlled for task ease across different job choice sets. fered with respect to the average quality level per at-
In addition, the attribute levels were chosen so that no tribute. In this way the group identity captures any
one alternative was dominated on every attribute, en- between-subject differences that might be due to the
couraging compensatory processing. contextual influence of receiving informational envi-
information desired (1 = none, . . . , 7 = a lot), and measures, however, was adjusted for ties. Thus, in gen-
the number of specific attributes subjects listed that were eral the upper bound for the correlation coefficient was
not provided but were desired. The first provides a direct not one, nor was the lower bound for average absolute
measure of subjects' perceptions of the quality of the differences in rank equal to zero. Moreover, no allow-
informational environment. The latter two provide in- ance could be made for the fact that the Phase I question
direct measures. concerned ratings while Phase III concerned rankings.
There were either 10 or 5 observations per subject Therefore, our reliability measures should be viewed as
depending on whether they took part in both Phase II the ceiling of the change over time of subjects' rankings
and III. Given these multiple observations, a repeated of attribute importance.
measures main effects model was run for each of the Given this instability, the question becomes, are these
three above-mentioned dependent variables with the measures of instability associated with any of our in-
following independent variables: quantity (measured at dependent variables (particularly our quality and
four levels), quality (measured at four levels), subject, quantity measures)? Two separate analyses were con-
group (high or low quality/attribute) format (matrix or ducted to address this question. First, for the 43 Phase
paragraph), order (1st, 2nd, . . . 5th), and task ease as III subjects the average rank of the attributes used in
defined in Equation 5. In each of the three multivariate constructing the job alternatives for the choice task in
analyses, quality was significant at the 0.001 level after each cell was calculated assuming both Phase I and
adjusting for all other factors. Moreover, the adjusted Phase III rankings. Then, assuming the importance
means of the four levels of quality indicated an almost weights were distributed as displayed in Table 1, cell
linear relationship with lower quality levels associated means for the quality levels were calculated for both
with (1) a greater desire for more information, and (2) the Phase I and Phase III data by combining the average
a perception that the information provided was less rank orders with the average importance weights. Al-
useful. though there was more variation in the information
Because our design did not fully cross TQ and N, it quality means within a quality level based on Phase III
was impossible to check for possible interaction effects data as compared to Phase I data, there never was an
of TQ and N on the dependent variables over the total overlap for the four quality levels used. Thus, instability
range of TQ and N. However, we could test for an in- in the importance weights over time did not impede us
teraction between TQ and N using the data from cells from designing job tasks with significantly different in-
3 through 6 and 6 through 9 (see Table 2) since both formational quality levels.
of these groups of cells represented a fully crossed de- A second analysis investigated whether the magnitude
sign. In both groups of cells, the interaction effect was of the error in measuring utility, E3i (i.e., from Equation
nonsignificant for all three dependent variables, indi- 4), was associated with N. This is important since any
cating that the effects of TQ and N were noninteractive positive relationship between Var(E3i) and N would
with each other, at least within the range tested. cause our results to overestimate the effects of N on
decision effectiveness and consequently would cause us
Reliability of Importance Weights to overestimate the effects of information overload. The
Over Time analysis was conducted by first regressing our measure
of information quality (i.e., IWk) against the three ma-
One possible concern about our design is the time nipulation check variables. Then the squared residuals
lag between the Phase I measurement of the importance were calculated for each of the nine different quality-
weights and the Phase II and III job choice tasks. Al- quantity cells and averaged over subjects. For the 15
though such a lag helps insure these Phases are not con- possible cell comparisons where TQ is fixed and N in-
nected in the minds of the subjects, it also increases the creases (five comparisons for each of the three manip-
possibility that the subjects revised their importance ulation check variables), only two showed an increase
weights over this time period, introducing error into in the squared error, holding TQ fixed, for increases in
our quality manipulation and our estimation of u*, (i.e., N. Thus, there does not seem to be a positive relation-
increasing the variance of E3i). To assess the degree to ship between the Var(E3i)and N (holding TQ fixed).2
which subjects adjusted their importance weights, Phase In summary, we interpret the above analyses as strong
III subjects were asked, after completing the basic ex- evidence that our manipulation of information quality
periment, to rank all original 17 attributes in terms of is highly related to the subjects' perception of usefulness
their importance. These rankings were then compared and desire for more information and that there is little
to rankings derived from the Phase I importance ratings.
Reliability (stability) was measured two ways for each
subject: rank order correlations (Mansfield 1980) and 2A third and more complex analysis was performed to assess re-
absolute differences in ranks. Both measures are lower versals in rankings from Phase I and Phase III. Proportionally more
reversals were found among attributes with large weights than small
than most reported reliability figures. The average rank weights (holding fixed the initial difference in weight), yielding results
correlation across subjects was 0.57 and the average compatible with the premise that the Var(E3E)increases with ur, not
absolute difference in rank was 3.6. Neither of these N. The details of this analysis are available from the authors.
TABLE 3
DECISION EFFECTIVENESS AND CONFIDENCE AS A FUNCTION OF INFORMATION QUANTITY AND QUALITY, TASK EASE,
AND COVARIATES: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES (P VALUES)
0 = matrix, 1 = paragraph.
bO = high average quality, 1 = low average quality.
NOTE: * indicates that individualsubject coefficients are not reported.
or no interaction effect between TQ and N on these attributeinformation (GROUP), and format of infor-
manipulationchecks. Also, although our measureof a mation (FORMAT). (A similar LOGIT analysis of
subject'simportanceweightsmay have been unreliable BEST was also conducted,yieldingresultsalmost iden-
(or unstable)over time, the effect of this instability on tical to those from OLS, and thus is not reported.)The
our ability to establishdistinct quality levels was min- quantity variable,N, was coded as 23, 47, 59, or 71 to
imal. In addition,the magnitudeof the errorin assessing reflect the percent of available attribute information.
importanceweightsappearsto be unrelatedto N holding The total quality variable, TQ, was coded 33, 46, 60,
TQ fixed. Thus, the instabilityin attributeimportance and 73 to reflectthe percent of the averagecumulative
weights across phases does not invalidate any finding importancescores made available.
of statisticalsignificance,exceptformatperhaps,in that The results from the two OLS covariance analyses,
the only possible effect of instabilityis to decreasethe shown in Table 3, indicate the significanceof the coef-
statisticalsignificanceof any true relationshipthrough ficients in the reduced form equations. For BEST we
the introduction of random error. Moreover, we ac- had five observationsper subject.For PAIR we had 25
count for individual specific variance attributableto observationsper person(i.e., five pairedchoices for five
factorssuch as importanceweightinstabilitythrougha differentchoice tasks).Using the estimatesof b2, (b2a1),
repeated measure analysis that covaries out any sys- and (b2a2), it is possible from Equation 9 to derive the
tematic subject-specificeffectsof instability on the de- structuralmodel coefficientestimatesof interest,a, and
pendent measuresof interest. a2, and to sign the coefficientfor the log(N) term. The
estimates of a, are 2.05 and 2.27 for the BEST and
PAIR equations, respectively, and for a2 are -2.33
RESULTS X 10-4 and -4.04 X 10-4. In both cases the coefficient
for log(N) was negative.
To test the Proposition,we need estimatesof the pa- The above estimates are compatible with the Prop-
rametersof the structuralequationas statedin Equation osition. The negative coefficient for log(N) indicates
6. As shown earlier, an estimate can be obtained by that increasesin information quantity, holding infor-
relatingy*' to some observed measure such as BEST mation quality fixed, lead to decreasesin decision ef-
and then derivinga reducedform equation (e.g., Equa- fectiveness.Similarly,both estimatesof a, areconsistent
tion 8). Two such measuresused wereBEST and PAIR, with the premisethat increasesin informationquality,
the lattermeasuringthe "correct"selection from a pair holdinginformationquantityfixed, initially lead to in-
of alternatives.We now presentthe resultsof these two creasesin decision effectiveness.When the estimatesof
analyses. a2aretakeninto consideration,the resultsindicatethat
The two reducedformequationswereestimatedusing decision effectivenessincreasesat a decreasingrate and
OLS after controlling for repeated measures (SUBJ), eventually decreases with increases in total quality,
order of presentation (ORDER), high or low average holdingquantityfixed. This is equivalentto sayingthat
when the average quality level is increased (holding the in our study in situations where the average quality per
number of attributes available fixed), the model results attribute available is held constant.
imply an eventual decrease in decision effectiveness. At Finally, Table 3 also provides estimates of the influ-
first blush, such a finding may appear counterintuitive. ence of task ease and the covariates on the two observ-
However, the reader should note that such a finding is able choice measures. The results indicated that in-
a direct consequence of the implications derived from creases in task ease led to statistically significant in-
the Proposition, Equations 2 and 3, and the functional creases in BEST and PAIR. Only two of the eight
forms assumed. Thus, by assuming the functional forms possible control variables were found to affect actual
found in Equation 6 (thereby insuring the conditions choice; both of these were found in the PAIR reduced
as specified in footnote 1), it is easy to see that form equation. They indicated that the individual sub-
g'2(AQ.N) must eventually decrease in AQ (holding N ject and order of presentation affected the probability
fixed) if information overload exists, i.e., g'2(AQ N) that the alternative deemed best was chosen.
< g'1(N) for N > N*. Said differently, decreases in de- We previously noted that SUBJ captured the degree
cision effectiveness with increases in average quality of instability of the subject's importance weights. When
(holding N fixed) go hand in hand with decreases in SUBJ was replaced with a stability measure such as the
decision effectiveness with increases in N holding AQ rank order correlation of importance weights from
fixed. Phases I and III, the coefficients on quantity and quality
Although the above discussion is mathematically were only minimally affected (changes occurring in the
precise, it provides little insight into the behavioral rea- second or third significant digit), again indicating that
sons for such a finding. We postpone such an investi- importance weight instability was unrelated to our
gation until we look at the process measure results. It quality and quantity manipulation. Finally, although
should be noted, however, that this nonlinear effect of signs were consistent with our priors, there was little
TQ is not due to a perceived variation in TQ dependent statistical proof that subjects were more likely to choose
on the level of N because, as stated previously, the sub- the alternative deemed best when given the matrix as
jects' perceptions of the manipulation of TQ and N in- opposed to paragraph format.
dicated no interaction between these two variables. We also conducted an analysis of covariance using
We next determine the point where adding attribute as the dependent variable the subject's perceived con-
information of identical quality to the average quality fidence (CONF) in making the correct choice. The four
of the attributes already available begins to degrade de- items that were summed to measure confidence in the
cision effectiveness. To do this we substitute AQ * N for most preferred choice (choice statisfaction, confusion,
TQ in the reduced form equations for BEST and PAIR certainty, and likelihood of regret) had a coefficient al-
and then use the coefficient estimates found in Table 3 pha (Cronbach 195 1) of 0.87, exceeding the research
to derive the maximum as a function of N. This max- standard suggested by Nunnally (1978). Although we
imum is derived by differentiating the reduced form initially thought that such a variable also could be used
equations with respect to N and solving, i.e., to identify the structural equation parameters, we soon
came to believe that subjects' perceptions of confidence
*(*)/N= -b2/N+ (b2a )/N-2(b2a2)AQ2N= O, (11) also are directly affected by the informational environ-
ment, i.e., quality and quantity. This implies that either
or N or TQ (or both) directly enter into the reduced form
-1 +a, -2a2AQ2N2 = 0. (12) as well as enter through y*', making it impossible to
identify the structural effects a, and a2 without knowing
Solving for the maximum N yields N* = ((a, - 1)/ a priori the magnitude of this direct effect. Therefore,
2a2AQ2)"12, which can be solved once a value for AQ is in presenting the analysis of covariance results for this
specified. In our scaling, TQ increases almost identically dependent measure we restrict our discussion to reduced
to N (i.e., when N = 23, TQ = 33, when N = 47, TQ form implications, i.e., the aggregate effect of Nand TQ
= 46, when N = 59, TQ = 60, and when N = 71, TQ on the subjects' confidence in making a correct choice
= 73). Thus since AQ = TQ/N, we let AQ = 1 for our without specifying how these effects occur.
situation. The results of this analysis are shown in the last col-
The implication of this analysis is that the maximum umn of Table 3. Four things are evident. First, increases
for BEST and PAIR occurred when N = 40 and 47 in the quantity of information, holding total quality
percent, respectively. Said slightly differently, using our fixed, decrease the subjects' perceived confidence. Sec-
model and the estimated coefficients, we can infer that ond, unlike the decision effectiveness results, increases
when average quality levels are held fixed, maximum in total quality holding quantity fixed increase the sub-
decision effectiveness is reached in our information en- jects' confidence over the total range of quality values.
vironment when the number of attributes available is (The linear term is highly significant if the quadratic
between 6.8 (=.40 X 17) and 8 (=.47 X 17) attributes. term is dropped from the analysis.) Moreover, by con-
In this way, we have roughly determined the point where ducting an analysis similar to that outlined in Equations
information overload occurs for the 'average subject' 1 1 and 12, we note that subjects showed increased con-
fidence over the total range of quantity (allowing total mation. However, individuals accustomed to receiving
quality to vary). Thus, consumers' expressed confidence higher levels of quality information (i.e., Group 1) use
does not reflect the fact that increases in the average less information than individuals who previously re-
quality level, holding fixed the quantity of information, ceived lower quality information (i.e., Group 2) when
eventually lead to decreases in their decision accuracy; both groups receive information of equal quality (i.e.,
nor do consumers appear to perceive that increases in cell 6). No other variables were found to be statistically
attribute information eventually cause them confusion significant. We interpret these results to indicate that
even when the average quality level is held fixed. Third, individuals altered the amount of available information
the difficulty of the task was significantly related to con- that they used according to the perceived usefulness of
fidence; the easier our measure of the choice task, the the informational environment.
more confidence the subject reported. Finally, all co- We next investigated how the percentage of infor-
variates were statistically significant. Subjects expressed mation used affects decision effectiveness, as reflected
more confidence in their choice when they were given by the measures BEST and PAIR. This was done by
the matrix form, when for equivalent informational en- postulating a relationship where PUSED directly affects
vironments (e.g., identical values of N and TQ) they y*'. This relationship was then substituted into Equation
were members of group 2, and when they were making 7 for BEST and its equivalent for the measure, PAIR,
the earlier choices. The group effect is interesting be- along with two process-related dummy variables. The
cause it suggests that, given the same informational en- first dummy variable reflects whether subjects said they
vironment (i.e., cell 6), those subjects who had been tended to incorporate attributes for which no infor-
previously exposed to lower average information qual- mation was given into their decision process (INFER
ity, all else being equal, were more confident when they = 1) or not (INFER = 0) during the course of the choice
made their choice in cell 6 than were those previously tasks. As such, it is a general measure of the subject's
exposed to the higher average quality information. Such tendency to infer and can be thought of in terms of an
contextual effects will also be shown to be associated individual difference variable. The second variable,
with how subjects actually process the available attribute STRA T, indicated whether subjects reported using a
information. compensatory (STRA T = 0) or noncompensatory
(STRA T = 1) decision strategy in choosing their most
PROCESS EXPLANATION preferred alternative. Table 4 contains the results of the
appropriate multiple regressions.
OF MANIPULATION EFFECTS
Overall, the reported percentage of information used
All of the results discussed are compatible with the had a statistically significant impact on choice accuracy
Proposition, common sense (e.g., easier tasks result in as measured by BEST and PAIR. As Table 4 shows, an
greater decision effectiveness), or past empirical findings inverted U relationship was found with respect to
(e.g., confidence is monotonic in N). Although the find- PUSED for BEST and PAIR, solving the quadratic
ing that decision effectiveness eventually decreased with yields maxima when subjects used, respectively, 68 and
increases in average quality, holding quantity fixed, can 75 percent of the available attribute information. Thus,
be derived from the fact that information overload was it appears that subjects made more effective decisions
observed, we next look more closely at what might have when they were somewhat selective, using most but not
caused such a result and, in the process, gain some in- all the available attribute information.
sights as to how people went about using the available To check the adequacy of our process model, we con-
information to reach their final choices. We do this by ducted analyses identical to those shown in Table 4 but
analyzing the fallible, but potentially insightful, retro- that also included N and AQ directly. In both cases,
spective process measures reported by subjects after they these variables were not statistically significant; nor was
completed their fifth and final choice set task. the maximum altered more than one or two percent.
To explore how subjects went about their choice We take this as evidence that our process model captures
tasks, we constructed a process measure, PUSED, the the time path of events, i.e., N and AQ do not directly
percent of available information used by the subject in affect decision effectiveness, but only the mediating
making his/her choice. This variable was obtained by variable, PUSED.
dividing the number of available attributes used as de- We find these reported process results satisfying in
termined by the question, "List the attributes used in that they help explain why decision effectiveness even-
making your choice," by the number of attributes tually decreases with increases in average quality. The
available for that choice situation. first process model analysis indicated that as the average
We then conducted a multiple regression analysis quality level of available information is increased people
with N, A Q, TE, GROUP and FORMA T as independent tend to report using more of the available information.
variables and PUSED as the dependent measure. The However, the next analyses indicate that decision ef-
results indicate that when the informational environ- fectiveness first increases and then decreases as the per-
ment is changed by increasing the average quality level, centage of information used increases. Thus, increases
individuals increase their use of the available infor- in average quality motivate individuals to incorporate