Knowledge Communication Problems between Experts and

Decision Makers: an Overview and Classification

Martin J. Eppler
School of Communication Sciences, University of Lugano (USI), Switzerland
[email protected]
Abstract: In this article we examine the difficulties of knowledge communication among experts and decision makers.
We begin by outlining where and how the communication of expertise from specialists to managers is crucial. We then
review theoretical constructs that highlight knowledge transfer problems among experts and decision makers. On the
basis of this review and using the results from six focus groups and thirty interviews with engineers and managers, we
categorise these transfer challenges into five major groups. We distinguish among expert- and manager-caused
problems, reciprocal problems, problems due to the interaction situation and problems caused by the organisational
context. These categories can be used to guide research on the micro-aspects of knowledge transfer. Managers can use
these problem categories to identify and reduce knowledge transfer barriers in their interaction with specialists.

Keywords: Knowledge transfer, knowledge communication, expert, decision making, knowledge media, knowledge
dialogues

1. Introduction: The importance of knowledge communication in management

Communicating professional knowledge is a key activity for today’s specialised workforce. The efficient and
effective transfer of experiences, insights, and know-how among different experts and decision makers is a
prerequisite for high-quality decision-making and coordinated, organisational action (Straub and Karahanna,
1998). Situations of such deliberate (interfunctional) knowledge transfer through interpersonal
communication or group conversations (Gratton and Goshal, 2002) can be found in many business
constellations, as the following typical examples illustrate: Technology experts present their evaluation of a
new technology to management in order to jointly devise a new production strategy (McDermott, 1999).
Engineers who have discovered how to master a difficult manufacturing process need to convey their
methods to engineers in other business units (Szulanski, 1996, 1999). Legal experts brief a management
team on the implications of new regulations on their business model (Wilmotte and Morgan, 1984). Experts
from various domains need to share their views and insights regarding a common goal in order to agree on a
common rating of risks, requirements (Browne and Ramesh, 2002), industries or clients. Project leaders
need to present their results to the upper management and share their experiences of past projects in order
to assess the potential of new project candidates (Schindler and Eppler, 2003). Scientists who work as drug
developers present new avenues for future products that business unit managers must assess. Market
researchers present their statistical analyses of recent consumer surveys to the head of marketing (Boland
et al., 2001). Strategy consultants present the findings of their strategic company assessment to the board of
directors in order to devise adequate measures (Creplet et al., 2001). What these diverse situations all have
in common is the problem of knowledge asymmetry (Sharma, 1997) that has to be resolved through
interpersonal communication. While the manager typically has the authority to make strategic or tactical
decisions, he or she often lacks the specialised expertise required to make an informed decision on a
complex issue (Watson, 2004). Because of the wide scope of decisions that need to be made, a manager
frequently has to delegate the decision preparation to experts who – based on their professional training and
previous experience – can analyse complex situations or technological options in a more reliable manner.
The results of such analyses then need to be communicated back to the manager, often under considerable
time constraints. The knowledge communication challenge (Hagglund et al. 1992), however, begins long
before that, at the time when the manager has to convey his or her knowledge needs and decision
constraints to the experts in order to delegate the analysis task effectively.

2. Background: The concept of knowledge communication

Based on the reasoning described in the previous section, one can view knowledge communication as the
(deliberate) activity of interactively conveying and co-constructing insights, assessments, experiences, or
skills through verbal and non-verbal means. Knowledge communication has taken place when an insight,
experience or skill has been successfully reconstructed by an individual because of the communicative
actions of another. Knowledge communication thus designates the successful transfer of know-how (e.g.,
how to accomplish a task), know-why (e.g., the cause-effect relationships of a complex phenomenon), know-
what (e.g., the results of a test), and know-who (e.g., the experiences with others) through face-to-face (co-

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Reference this paper as:
Eppler M (2007) “Knowledge Communication Problems between Experts and Decision Makers: an Overview and
Classification” The Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management Volume 5 Issue 3, pp 291 - 300 , available online at
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Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management Volume 5 Issue 3 2007 (291 - 300)

located) or media-based (virtual) interactions. This type of knowledge communication can take place
synchronously or asynchronously 1 . The first mode of communication refers to (often face to face) real-time
interactions, while the latter designates delayed (usually media-based) interactions. We use the term
knowledge dialogues for the first type of (synchronous) knowledge communication, stressing the interactive
and collaborative style of knowledge exchange in this communication mode (see Isaacs, 1997, Nonaka et
al., 2000). Depending on the knowledge-focused goal of such dialogues, we distinguish among Crealogues
(that focus on in the creation of new insights), Sharealogues (facilitating knowledge transfer), Assessalogues
(focusing on the evaluation of new insights) and Doalogues (e.g., turning understanding into committed
action, i.e., ‘talk the walk’). Each type of knowledge dialogue requires different behaviour and interaction
patterns and support measures (e.g., whereas Assessalogues require critical, convergent evaluation tools,
Crealogues require an open atmosphere for divergent thinking and rapid idea generation without judgment).

With regard to asynchronous knowledge communication, we refer to the concept of knowledge media (see
Eppler et al., 1999) that enable knowledge transfer through technology-based communication, collaboration,
e-learning, aggregation, retrieval and archiving services. Knowledge media can be differentiated in terms of
their target community, e.g., scientific knowledge media, public knowledge media, professional knowledge
media, etc. The concept of knowledge media in general stresses the importance of a community that
collaborates regularly using a common platform that consists not only of IT-functionalities, but also of
common communication norms and (usage) rules. In this understanding, knowledge communication is more
than communicating information (e.g., facts, figures, events, situations, developments, etc.) or emotions
(e.g., fears, hopes, reservations, commitment) because it requires conveying context, background, and basic
assumptions. It requires the communication of personal insights and experiences. Communicating insights
requires the elicitation of one’s rationale and reasoning (i.e., one’s argumentation structure), of one’s
perspective, ratings and priorities, and of one’s hunches and intuition. At times it may even be necessary to
present an overview of the expert’s relevant skills along with his/her previous professional experiences and
credentials (Lunce et al., 1993) in order to build trust and enable an adequate atmosphere for effective
knowledge transfer. Thus, in addition to pure information (and at times emotion), a myriad of other indicators
need to be provided in order to transfer knowledge. These indicators help the person who requires insights
from another to understand the other’s perspective, to re-construct the other’s insights correctly, and to
connect them to one’s own prior knowledge. Still, knowledge communication does not only differ in terms of
2
what is communicated (knowledge in context rather than isolated data or information ), but also how one
communicates. The transfer of information can often be successful without additional effort beyond an
ordinary, every day communication style. Communicating expertise-based, complex insights, by contrast,
calls for didactic tricks and at times sophisticated indirect speech acts and visualisation means that help the
other side to become actively involved in the communication and engage in a collaborative, goal-directed
sense making process – a prerequisite for the construction of new knowledge (see Weick, 1995). The
process of knowledge communication hence requires more reciprocal interaction between decision makers
and experts because both sides only have a fragmented understanding of an issue and consequently can
only gain a complete comprehension by iteratively aligning their mental models. All of this means that when
we communicate knowledge, we are still communicating information and emotions, but we also create a
specific type of context so that this information can be used to re-construct insights, create new perspectives,
or acquire new skills.

This (interpersonal) communication perspective on knowledge transfer has already been emphasised by
other researchers – who explicitly label this view as ‘knowledge communication’ – (Scarbrough, 1995, p.
997; Antonelli, 2000; Harada, 2003; Reiserer et al., 2002) and by several practitioners (e.g., Watson, 2004).
Nevertheless, these authors have often treated knowledge communication as a kind of black box that is
described only in broad terms and general traits, such as the major communication goals or steps. By
examining the communication problems, which often impede knowledge transfer in detail, we can look into
this black box and propose pragmatic ways of improving knowledge communication, especially among
experts and managers where the chasm between in-depth knowledge and decision authority is particularly
apparent.

1
Both modes can be used in one-to-one or one-to-many contexts. Both modes can rely on speech, text, graphics, and other
means of communication (i.e., verbal and non-verbal).
2
Our distinction between data, information, and knowledge follows the main stream conception found in current literature (see
for example Davenport and Prusak, 1998). We view data as isolated recordings that are often generated automatically and cannot be
directly used to answer questions. Information is connected, condensed or generally processed data that allows an individual to answer
questions. Knowledge is what enables an individual to ask relevant questions (Newman and Newman, 1985, p. 499). It refers to the
capability of an individual to solve problems (Probst et al., 1999). Information only becomes knowledge, if a person interprets that
information correctly, connects that piece of information with his or her prior knowledge, and can apply it to problems or decisions (see
also Alavi and Leidner, 2001)

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3. Problems in communicating knowledge among experts and decision makers

In order to better understand the problems that can impede the effective transfer of decision-relevant
knowledge from experts to managers and from managers to experts, we will review relevant constructs and
prior findings from social and engineering sciences, as there are in fact numerous concepts that describe
issues related to sub-optimal knowledge transfer. These concepts regard topics such as interdepartmental
knowledge transfer, professional communication, decision-making, communication technology, or the nature
of expert knowledge. By screening these disciplines and topic areas, we can establish a first overview of
possible knowledge communication problems and we can create a systematic terminology to speak more
explicitly (and consistently) about knowledge communication barriers. Previously identified barriers of
knowledge communication are summarised in tables 1 through 3 (focusing on problems that primarily affect
for decision makers, those that are key challenges for experts, and those that are relevant for both roles).
There are three main criteria for including concepts in this table: first, the concept has to be closely related to
3
problems of interpersonal, professional knowledge transfer . Second, the concept has to describe a problem
of major impact on the quality of knowledge transfer (rare or very specific issues are not included). Third, the
concept has to be influential, i.e., it has to be cited with the same construct label by several authors (other
than the creator of the concept). The resulting list in Table 1 first includes ‘umbrella’ concepts that designate
a group of closely related problems, such as cognitive biases, decision making problems, argumentation
fallacies, communication biases, or defensive routines, and then concepts that label individual problems,
such as the not-invented here syndrome or the ASK problem. The ‘Impact on’ column designates whether
the particular concept is mostly a weakness of decision makers or of experts, or for both professional groups.
Table 1: Knowledge communication problems of decision makers
Key Concept / Knowledge Description References
Communication Barrier
Decision problems such as The decision maker may for example believe that Russo and
plunging in, shooting from the hip, he/she can make a complex decision right away without Shoemaker,
poor feedback, taking shortcuts, looking further at the provided analysis. 1989
frame blindness etc.
Defensive routines (skilled New knowledge is sometimes not accepted (or Argyris, 1986,
incompetence, learned provided) due to mechanisms or habits that prevent the 1990
helplessness, easing-in, etc.) identification and acceptance of one’s own ignorance.
This may lead to a reduced effort to understand
complex issues (learned helplessness).
Knowledge disavowal A number of factors have been found which limit Zaltman, 1983;
information use in organisations, such as not spending Deshpande and
enough time collecting advice, refusal to share, fear of Kohli, 1989
exposure, etc. Knowledge disavowal occurs when
reliable and relevant information is not shared among
decision makers.
Knowledge disavowal A number of factors have been found which limit Zaltman, 1983;
information use in organisations, such as not spending Deshpande and
enough time collecting advice, refusal to share, fear of Kohli, 1989
exposure, etc. Knowledge disavowal occurs when
reliable and relevant information is not shared among
decision makers.
Micropolitics of knowledge The ‘knowledge claims’ of an expert are discredited by Lazega, 1992
the decision makers due to their differing (hidden)
agenda, because of a coalition of people with an
alternative view, or due to the expert’s lack of formal
authority.
Internal knowledge stickiness Knowledge can sometimes not be transferred because Szulanski,
of arduous relationships or casual ambiguities regarding 1996, 1999
the knowledge or because of the lack of absorptive
capacity of the knowledge receivers.
Groupthink A (management) team may not truly listen to the input of Janis, 1982
an expert because of the team’s group coherence and
group dynamics sometimes block outside advice and
feel omniscient.
Information overload An individual is sometimes not able to integrate new O’Reilly, 1980,

3
The concept does not have to originate in the context of interpersonal communication research, but its application to it must
be obvious and fruitful, as in the example of the ASK problem. The ASK problem was first discussed in the information retrieval
community, but it has ramifications for interpersonal knowledge communication as well.

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Key Concept / Knowledge Description References

Communication Barrier
information into the decision making process because Eppler and
too much complex information has to be interpreted too Mengis, 2004
quickly.
Self/Other effect Individuals tend to discount advice and favour their own Yaniv and
opinion. Kleinberger,
2000
Knowing-Doing gap / Smart talk Sometimes organisations know where a problem Pfeffer and
trap resides and how to tackle it, but do not move from Sutton, 2000
knowledge to action (due to unhealthy internal
competition or lacking follow-up).
Absorptive capacity Limited ability of decision makers to grasp the Bower and
knowledge of the expert based on lack of prior Hilgard, 1981
knowledge.
Ingroup outgroup behaviour We tend to interact more with likewise groups than with Blau, 1977
others thus reducing our changes to acquire radically
new knowledge.
Task closure In our communication, we may choose to use a one-way Straub and
communication medium because it permits us to close Karahanna,
an open task without having to have a conversation. 1998; Meyer,
Thus leaner communication channels are used than 1962
may be necessary. In other words: We tend to want to
close a communication process in order to complete an
open task.
ASK problem Anomalous State of Knowledge: when a decision maker Belkin, 1980 ;
does not have the knowledge base to really know what Chen et al.,
to ask for. People need to know quite a bit about a topic 1992
to be able to ask or search for relevant information.
Not-Invented here syndrome Knowledge from others is sometimes rejected because Katz and Allen,
it originated elsewhere. 1982
Preference for outsiders This is the opposite of the NIH syndrome and describes Menon and
the tendency of managers to value outside knowledge Pfeffer, 2003
higher than internal knowledge because it has a higher
status, it is scarcer (because of difficult access) and
because it is less scrutinised for errors than internal
knowledge.
False consensus effect We assume others see situations as we do, and fail to Manzoni and
revise our framing. Barsoux, 2002
Inert knowledge The knowledge that the decision maker has acquired Whitehead,
from the expert does not come to mind when it is 1929
needed or useful for decision making or actions. The
transferred knowledge is stuck in the situation where it
has been acquired.
Hidden profile problem One often doesn’t know other people's background Stasser 1992;
(profile), i.e., what they know and could contribute to a Stasser and
problem’s solution. The knowledge that is thus Stewart, 1992
frequently shared in a discussion is what is expected by
everyone.
Cassandra syndrome The decision makers do not give sufficient weight or Mikalachki,
attention to an expert’s warning because they face 1983
many other important problems. Only when the situation
has deteriorated dramatically do they start taking the
expert’s advice.
Mutism Because of an inadequate understanding of the role and Cantoni and
capabilities of an expert, the decision maker does not Piccini, 2004
articulate his suggestions, but remains quiet when
asked about his expectations or needs.
Table 2: Knowledge communication problems of experts
Key Concept / Knowledge Description References
Communication Barrier
Knowledge sharing hostility Knowledge communication fails because the Husted and
‘knowledge giver’s are reluctant to share their insights Michailova, 2002
due to micropolitics, strenuous relationships, or due to

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Key Concept / Knowledge Description References

Communication Barrier
fear.
Paradox of expertise / Curse of Experts sometimes find it difficult to articulate their Hinds 1999;
Knowledge knowledge or rephrase their insights in a way that non- Johnson, 1983
experts can relate to. An insight seems to them self-
evident whereas for others it is in fact difficult to grasp.
Expert inconsistency Sometimes experts indicate other rules than they Johnson, 1983
actually apply in their problem solving.
Terminology Illusion Experts tend to overestimate the notoriety of terms at Rambow 2000
the limits of every day language and specialised
language. In consequence they overestimate the level
of understanding of non-experts of what they
communicate.
Projectionism In the communication of his or her analysis results, the Cantoni and
expert does not tailor his insights to the knowledge of Piccini, 2004
the decision maker, as he assumes that the target
group already has a similar understanding of an issue.
Table 3: Knowledge communication problems for decision makers and experts
Key Concept / Knowledge Description References
Communication Barrier
Cognitive biases (confirmation, Knowledge may not be correctly interpreted or used due Tversky and
availability, recency, to biases in one’s reasoning, such as listening only to Kahnemann,
dichotomised reasoning, framing, those insights that confirm one’s prior opinion. 1974
anchoring, representativeness,
etc.)
Communication biases The knowledge is inadvertently manipulated through Higgins, 1999
(audience tuning, misattribution communication itself:
bias, saying-is-believing, shared - Audience Tuning: Communicators spontaneously tune
reality) their messages to the personal characteristics of the
audience or to situational factors
– Misattribution Bias: Communicators tend to consider
their audience-tuned messages to be about the topic of
the message rather than about the audience
- Saying-Is-Believing Effect: Auto-persuasion has
stronger effects because one does not activate regular
mechanisms of critical reflection.
- Shared Reality: You consider your audience-tuned
message to provide objective, accurate information on
the message topic because it was shared with others.
Argumentation fallacies (begging In demonstrating one’s ideas and insights, people fall Van Eemeren et
the question, overgeneralising, into argumentative traps, such as begging the question al., 1992
personal attacks, defective (circular reasoning), over-generalising, appealing to
testimony, problematic premise, false majorities or false expertise, reasoning ad
slippery slope, red herring, etc.) consequentiam (what shouldn’t be true, can’t be true) or
reacting with direct attacks at a person (at hominem)
rather than at a knowledge claim.
Set-up to fail syndrome Managers are projecting their initial expectation of an Manzoni and
expert’s likely performance unto him/her, leading to the Barsoux, 2002
self-fulfilling prophecy of (at times) lower performance.
This is aggravated by de-motivating feedback to the
expert.
Common knowledge effect The tendency of a group to focus merely on commonly Gigone and
shared (rather than unique) pieces of information. Hastie, 1993
Lack of common ground Common ground refers to the manager’s and expert’s Clark and
assumptions about their shared background beliefs Schaefer, 1989,
about the world. If those assumptions are wrong or Olson and
inconsistent communication becomes more difficult. Olson, 2000
The problems listed in the three tables are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Nevert-
heless, the three tables summarise many of the key pitfalls in communicating knowledge. It is in the nature of
the phenomenon that these problems are not isolated, but that they rather interact in many, sometimes
unpredictable ways.

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4. Empirical evidence
On the basis of this review of already documented key communication problems, we have gathered further
empirical evidence. We have conducted six focus groups and ten personal interviews with engineers that
frequently collaborate with managers in their companies, as well as interviews with 20 IT managers who
regularly interact with experts for their decision making, we distinguish among five types of knowledge
communication problems. These problem categories are briefly summarised below. Each focus group lasted
for approximately one hour and consisted of eight to twenty participants. The focus groups were conducted
in 2002 and 2003 in Switzerland and Germany with engineers and IT specialists from eight companies (each
employing more than 1000 people). Focus group facilitation and documentation was provided by the
research team. The topic of the focus group discussion was “communication problems among
engineers/specialists and managers”. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes to two hours. Interviewees
were mostly senior IT managers or chief information officers of medium-sized and large Swiss companies, as
well as select line managers with considerable experience. The main topic of the interviews was “problems in
the knowledge communication with specialists.” The following table lists the focus group details. The focus
groups were all conducted prior to (in-house and public) seminars on professional communication.
Participants were asked one main questions by the facilitator: what do they, in their experience, see as the
major problems in the communication between managers and experts (and can they give specific examples
or anecdotes of each problem). Based on this question, the facilitator lead an approximately half hour long
discussion among the experts and collected the various problems that were mentioned.
Table 4: Focus group details
Group Number Duration Number of Participants Date
Focus Group 1 40 minutes 17 (mostly telecom engineers) 6.12.02
Focus Group 2 40 minutes 19 (mostly IT specialists) 23.1.03
Focus Group 3 30 minutes 20 (mostly engineers) 24.3.03
Focus Group 4 40 minutes 18 (mostly IT experts) 25.4.03
Focus Group 5 40 minutes 13 (mostly automotive engineers) 24.5.03
Focus Group 7 30 minutes 8 (marketing analysts) 5.6.03
Focus Group 6 40 minutes 16 (mostly telecom and IT experts) 1.9.03

5. Classification of problems
Based on this empirical evidence and the review presented in section 3, we distinguish among five types of
knowledge communication problems. These problem categories are briefly summarised below.

The first type of knowledge communication problems is expert-caused difficulties. These mistakes make it
cumbersome for the decision maker to grasp the insights of a specialist. This type of problem also includes
issues that make it difficult for the manager to explain his or her own constraints and priorities. Examples of
this kind of problem are the use of overly technical jargon, not relating the insights to the manager’s situation,
starting with details before an overview is given or lacking interest of the expert in related (but relevant)
issues. From the list provided in the above tables, knowledge-sharing hostility and the paradox of expertise
clearly belong to this category. This group of problems can be illustrated with the following quotes from an
international automobile manager and a financial information marketing executive:
“What frustrates me most in the collaboration with our experts is their disregard of context, of the big
picture or of how others will use their results.”
“These people [experts] start with Adam and Eve in paradise and work their lengthy way up to the
current business situation. That is tiresome, especially when you’re used to a headline type of news.“
The second type of knowledge communication challenges is manager-caused problems that leave it unclear
to the expert what the manager actually expects from him/her (briefing). This makes it difficult for the expert
to convey what he or she knows. Management mistakes make it harder for the manager to fully profit from
the offered expertise. A manager’s reluctance to discuss detailed problems may have major effects on an
issue, such as lack of concentration and attention or lack of technical know-how. From the previous problem
list on decision problems, the ASK problem, the Cassandra syndrome or the inert knowledge problem are
typical examples of this group. The following quote from a production engineer gives an example of this type
of manager-caused problem.
“I think it’s actually worse if a manager has a technical, but outdated, background. Not only do I have
to inform him, but also re-educate him on the changes that have taken place since he left his
engineering job.”

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The third type of knowledge communication problems is caused by the mutual behaviour of experts and
managers, including their experiences or attitudes (e.g., reciprocal stereotypes and role misunderstandings).
Examples from the list of concepts that belong to this group are lacking feedback on both sides, the set-up to
fail syndrome, groupthink, and ingroup outgroup behaviour on both sides.

Fourth, we see problems caused by the interaction situation of the expert-manager interaction, such as time
constraints, communication infrastructure, distractions, interventions from others, etc. The problem of
information overload above can arise due to the time constraints in a communication situation. But the
hidden profile problem can also be due to the communicative situation, where the background of the
participants is not fully revealed or discussed at the beginning of a manager-expert interaction. The following
quote from an energy specialist illustrates this at times problematic interaction situation:
“As an analyst and energy expert it’s tough for me to inform managers or investors about a promising
technology when they have just heard five such optimistic stories in the preceding expert
presentations.”
The fifth and final type of knowledge communication problems includes issues that are caused indirectly by
the overall organisational context of managers and experts, such as their organisational constraints and their
differing tasks, priorities and interests. The ‘micropolitics of knowledge’ concept listed above would be an
example of the (negative) impact of the organisational context on the transfer of knowledge. The following
two quotes, both from IT specialists working in the financial services sector, illustrate this important problem
area.
“Managers and we just seem to have different priorities and sensibilities. We look for quality and
reliability, whereas they focus on time and money.”
“As specialists, we find it frustrating that we’re not informed when priorities or responsibilities change.
Whether that’s due to internal politics or external market changes, we need to be in-formed if the
overall context of our assignment or even the people commissioning our work change.”
From this problem classification, we can derive requirements for high-quality knowledge communication:
High quality interactions between experts and decision makers can be possible if experts adapt their
communication style and content to the needs of decision makers, if managers fully brief experts on their
needs and give them explicit and regular feedback, if experts and decision makers develop relationships of
mutual trust and respect, if their interactions are supported by adequate infrastructures and tools, and if their
organisational environment allows them to be transparent and direct in their reciprocal communication.
Having examined and classified existing knowledge communication problems, we can now look at their
implications for knowledge management research and practice.

6. Implications and future trends

Many studies in knowledge management examine the structural, macro aspects of knowledge transfer on an
organisational level (Szulanski, 1999). There are also studies that examine the general motivational barriers
to such transfers (Husted and Michailova, 2002). The field of knowledge communication, by contrast,
examines the micro perspectives of knowledge transfer, thus highlighting the role of adequate or inadequate
communication behaviour patterns for knowledge transfer. These examined patterns go beyond the question
of motivation and encompass issues such as the use of adequate language, timing, group interventions, or
media use for knowledge transfer. This article has defined this approach as knowledge communication. It
has outlined the various problems that exist when individuals (particularly experts) communicate their
knowledge to others (e.g., managers). This problem jostle can lead to improved communication knowledge
for knowledge communication. Managers and experts alike can use it to label and thus signal emerging
communication issues and consequently reduce potential conflicts through explicit references to issues such
as stereotypes, lacking feedback, or unnecessary details. Future knowledge management research should
build on these insights and examine ways of facilitating and thus improving knowledge communication. This
can be achieved through such tools as knowledge visualisation suites, dialogue techniques, or knowledge
elicitation methods. In doing so, future research should pay particular attention to the influence of (expert and
manager) behaviour and to situational and organisational factors that affect the quality of knowledge
communication.

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