ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioner, vs.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent

G.R. No. 168081                |              October 17, 2008
 

TOPIC: Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications

FACTS:

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight of Philippine Arlines,

Inc. He stands at 5’8”. As mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of
PAL, the proper weight for a man of this height is from 147-166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds.

To address his weight concerns, petitioner was advised to go on leave without pay. But
after gaining 43 pounds over his ideal weight, petitioner was removed from flight duty,
as per company policy.  He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and
report for weight checks on several dates. However, instead of losing weight, he gained
them instead.

On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded
until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards and was
directed to report every 2 weeks for weight checks.

After petitioner’s repeated failure to report for weight checks, he was formally warned
that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He
was given another set of weight check dates which petitioner ignored. When petitioner
finally tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds which is way over his
ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case
requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner claimed that PAL
discriminated against him because “the company has not been fair in treating the cabin
crew members who are similarly situated.”

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which
spanned a period covering a total of almost 5 years,” his services were considered
terminated “effective immediately.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s dismissal for obesity can be predicated on the “bona fide
occupational qualification” defense

RULING:

In British Columbia Public Service Employee CommissionA (BSPSERC) v. The British

Columbia Government and Service Employee’s Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of
Canada adopted the so-called “Meiorin Test” in determining whether an employment
policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the
standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the
employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of that workrelated purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that
the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, the SC held that in order to
justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is
reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to
BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.”

A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. It
is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common
carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to
comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a
common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards
for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain
agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the
passengers when something goes wrong.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending
to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin
crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an
emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. On
board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to
consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles
and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that “whether the airline’s flight
attendants are overweight or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting
passengers to their destination”; and that the weight standards “has nothing to do with
airworthiness of respondent’s airlines,” must fail.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding
passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a
cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft
safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency
situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes.
Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. G.R. No. 187417

Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. Brent is an institution of the
Episcopal Church in the Philippines. She was suspended from employment in 2006 on the grounds of
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. The suspension will be lifted
upon her marriage to her boyfriend. The Labor Tribunal ruled that there was just cause for her dismissal.
She was not entitled to reinstatement until the marriage, as well as to backwages and vacation/sick
leave pay. She could only receive her 13th month pay (April 12, 2007). Cadiz appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA decision ( December 10, 2007). The Court of
Appeals also dismissed her petition due to technical defects in the petition (July 22, 2008).

Issues: 1. Whether Cadiz’s premarital relations with her boyfriend and the resulting pregnancy out of
wedlock constitute immorality.

Ruling:

No. The foregoing circumstances do not readily equate to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Brent’s
Policy Manual and Employee’s Manual of Policies do not define what constitutes immorality. As laid
down in the case of Leus v. St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, a disgraceful conduct should be
detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact
that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is
not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and
secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that premarital
sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock

is considered disgraceful or immoral. The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically
subject Cadiz to its religious standard of morality.

 2. Whether marriage can be a condition for reinstatement. 

No. It is true that the doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment. However, there are statutory
laws that protect labor and promote equal opportunity in employment which may contravene this
prerogative. In consideration of Art. 136 of the Labor Code and RA No. 9710, Brent’s condition is
coercive, oppressive, and discriminatory. Brent failed to prove that the said marriage is an employment
qualification that is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved and that the
absence of said condition will result to Cadiz’ inability to properly perform the duties of the job. The
imposition of such condition deprives her of her freedom to choose her status.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. LILIA S. CHUA, respondent. 

Facts:
Respondent Chua was employed by Far East Bank rising from the ranks to AVP until her termination of
employment. Dismissal was due to a finding that she engaged in multiple kiting transactions which was a
serious violation of Far East Bank's Code of Conduct. This involved drawing of money from a bank
account that does not have sufficient funds in order to cover a check. Chua filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims before the Regional Arbitration Branc XII in Cotabato City. Parties were
ordered to submit respective Position Papers but despite the extension, Far East Bank failed to timely
filed its Position Paper. The Bank filed Motion to Admit its Position Paper which was denied. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that there was illegal dismissal. LA held that Chua is entitled to reinstatement and full back
wages inclusive of allowances and other benefits in the amount of P1.81M. Far East Bank directly filed
its Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC. NLRC reversed the decision of the LA
holding that the few days delay in filing of its Position Paper was excusable considering its counsels were
based in different cities and that Chua committed irregular acts as AVP. Chua filed an MR which was
denied by the NLRC. Chua filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. The CA reversed
NLRC's ruling stating that Far East Bank's appeal before the NLRC was not perfected. Petitioner filed MR
that was denied by the CA, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the LA’s Decision has attained finality in light of petitioner’s direct filing of its appeal
before the NLRC instead of the Regional Arbitration Branch XII in Cotabato City. 

Ruling:

Art. 218 on the Powers of the Commission provides that it shall “promulgate rules and regulations
governing the hearing and disposition of cases before it and its regional branches, as well as those
pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the Code.” Rule VI, Section 3 of the 1999 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that were in effect
when petitioner appealed from LA’s Decision provides for the requisites that must be satisfied for an
appeal from the LA’s decision may be perfected: (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period; under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond; accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the
arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant
received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
(b) The appellee may file with the Regional Arbitration Branch, Regional Office or in the POEA where the
appeal was filed, his answer or reply to appellant's memorandum of appeal, not later than 10 calendar
days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the appellee who was properly furnished with a copy of
the appeal to file his answer or reply within the said period may be construed as a waiver on his part to
file the same. (c) Subject to the provisions of Article 218, once the appeal is perfected in accordance
with these rules, the Commission may limit itself to reviewing and deciding specific issues that were
elevated on appeal. Rule VI, Section 4 of the same rules stipulates that appeal shall be filed with the
respective Regional Arbitration Branch, the Regional Office, or the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration where the case was heard and decided. The CA was correct in saying that “the
memorandum on appeal must be filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch which rendered the decision
sought to be appealed." Thus, "no appeal before NLRC could have been perfected." The logical
consequence is that the LA’s Decision "has attained finality." While the Court held that petitioner
violated the rule on venue for filing an appeal, a mere procedural lapse in the venue where petitioner
filed its Memorandum of Appeal is not fatal to its cause. Since respondent is estopped for failing to raise
the issue of jurisdiction while petitioner's appeal was pending before the NLRC, respondent is bound by
her inaction and cannot belatedly invoke the issue of jurisdiction on certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.

The Court has held that "[a]lthough the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from
raising it on ground of laches or estoppel." A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. Also,
the error of petitioner pertains to the place for filing appeals and not the requisites for perfecting an
appeal which Rule VI, Section 3 enumerates as: (1) Filing within the applicable reglementary period as
provided by Section 1; (2) That the appeal was under oath; (3) That the appeal fee must have been paid;
(4) That the appeal bond must have been posted; (5) A memorandum of appeal which states: a. the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support of the appeal; b. the relief sought; and c. a statement
of the date when the assailed decision was received; and (6) Proof of service of the appeal on the
adverse party. The same rules allow for the liberal application of procedural rules. In Rule VII, Section 10:
“The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and
the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law procedure, all in the interest of due process.” As the
agency statutorily vested with jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal, petitioner could very easily have
mistaken that the filing of its Memorandum of Appeal was rightly made before the NLRC. The NLRC
could have very easily advised petitioner if there was anything irregular with its direct filing of a
Memorandum of Appeal. The matter of the propriety of the NLRC's assumption of jurisdiction was never
raised by respondent before the Commission. Even after petitioner's appeal had been initially decided
against her and she filed her MR, respondent totally overlooked this matter. Respondent cannot profit
from her own inaction. She actively participated in the proceedings before the NLRC without the
slightest indication that she found anything objectionable to the conduct of those proceedings. NLRC’s
findings that the requisites of substantive and procedural due process were satisfied in terminating
respondent's employment now stand undisturbed. Petition is granted, CA decision was reversed and set
aside and NLRC decision was reinstated.
Convoy Marketing Corporation and/or Arnold Laab v. OLIVER B. ALBIA, Respondent. G.R. No. 194969,
October 07, 2015

FACTS: Based on his sinumpaang salaysay, petitioner Oliver Alvia started working as a common laborer
for the respondent Convoy Marketing, a distributor of bottled wines, liquor and bottled water, in 2001.
He was assigned the job of a pahinante, who loads and unloads cargoes transported to customers by the
delivery vehicles of the company. A year later, he was promoted to delivery van driver.

On July 22, 2004, he did something that cost him his job. He smelled of liquor upon his arrival from the
delivery route. It was reported to the logistics manager, respondent Arnold Laab, that he was under the
influence of liquor. In a memo the next day, he was told that management decided to terminate your
delivery agency agreement with Convoy Marketing Corporation effective July 23, 2004. The petition was
addressed in the communication signed by Laab as a per trip driver with notice to the HRAD manager,
the present-day title for the company official who supervises the company’s rank-and-file, the personnel
manager.

Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of wage benefits.

The respondents Convoy Marketing and Laab contended that the petitioner was not an employee of the
company but an independent contractor, and presenting papers to document it. The respondents came
forward with a series of delivery agency agreements signed by the petitioner to correspond to particular
periods of service.

LA DECISION: Dismissed Albia’s complaint for lack of merit, that the record shows that herein
complainant signed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of the respondent corporation on 19 April 2004.
That during one of the settings herein (on 17 August 2004), complainant manifested in open
proceedings that his claims for unpaid salaries and cash bond had already been settled. “In the case at
bench, there is absolutely nothing on record tending to show the existence of such factors or variables
which may have the tendency of invalidating or affecting the validity and binding effect of the quitclaim
and release executed by herein complainant in respondents’ favor.”

NLRC DECISION: Aggrieved, Albia appealed to the NLRC; but it dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision. “It is, therefore, incorrect for the complainant to state that the quitclaim only
covered his money claims. Said quitclaim specifically made reference to the termination of the juridical
relationship between the parties on July 23, 2004 which was the same date when complainant alleged
that he was dismissed from employment.” MR denied.

CA DECISION: Unfazed, Albia filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed
and set aside the NLRC’s Resolutions. The private respondent Convoy Marketing Corporation is ordered
to reinstate the petitioner to his former position and pay him full backwages from the date of his
termination on July 23, 2004 until payment, plus 10% of the monetary award of attorney’s fees. This
case is remanded to the NLRC for computation of the award. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners insist that Albia was not a regular employee of Convoy, but merely a contractual one whose
services ended upon the expiration of the period agreed upon. They aver that the activities which he
was called upon to undertake are not necessary and/or desirable in the company business. They point
out that Albia was only an on-call driver who did not have to report for work every day, but only when
excess deliveries could no longer be made by Convoy’s fifteen regular drivers; that he was not even
included in the company payroll because he was paid on a per trip basis; and that Convoy did not have
control over him and his helpers.

Petitioners fault the CA for not giving weight to the fact that the quitclaim was voluntarily executed by
Albia after he filed an illegal dismissal complaint. They argue that the issue of whether or not he is an
employee of Convoy should have been laid to rest, since the validity of the quitclaim where he had
admitted to be a mere independent contractor, was upheld by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Albia was dismissed for a just cause.

HELD: The Court agrees with the CA that Albia was dismissed without a just cause. While an employee’s
right to security of tenure does not give him such a vested right to his position, it bears stressing that
employment is not merely a contractual relationship. In the life of most workers, it assumes the nature
of a property right which may spell the difference of whether or not a family will have food on their
table, roof over their heads and education for their children. 

In termination cases, therefore, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal
is for a just and valid cause, and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.

For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due
process: The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of
the act of dismissal constitutes substantive due process.

Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The
employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment
can be effected: (1) the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied
with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be
conducted.

Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a
just or authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.

It must be noted that Albia’s termination came as a result of a lone incident on July 22, 2004 when he
admitted that after finishing their deliveries, he and his helpers decided to drink bottles of beer at a
store outside the company compound before returning to work to finish loading the deliveries for the
next day.

While an employer is given a wide latitude of discretion in managing its own affairs, in the promulgation
of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of its employees, and in the imposition of
disciplinary measures on them, the exercise of disciplining and imposing appropriate penalties on erring
employees must be practiced in good faith and for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not
for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.
While it is true that under Convoy’s code on employee discipline, the penalty for “performing work
while under the influence of liquor” is “suspension to dismissal depending upon the gravity of the
offense,” nothing in the records would support the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal
against Albia.

It is also clear that there was no valid grounds for the termination of petitioner. His misconduct was not
gross. He was not guilty of any seriously offensive conduct, nor was there any untoward incident that
occurred. The penalty of dismissal was certainly not commensurate to the infraction committed. It has
not been shown that he has by his conduct become unfit to continue working for the respondents.

Convoy terminated Albia without the requisite first notice apprising him of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought, as well as the requisite hearing or conference. Convoy thus
failed to afford Albia with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and defend himself when he was issued
a termination letter on July 23, 2004, the following day after he admitted having consumed bottles of
beer after finishing his driving duty before the security department and the logistics manager, Laab.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2010 and the
Resolution dated December 28, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 98958, are AFFIRMED.