Criminal offenses (RPC) that may be committed by judges/justices and lawyers

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

Arellano University School of Law – Arellano Law Foundation
2021-2022

WARNING
Unauthorized reproduction or claim of ownership of this original [derivative] work by any person
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• Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.

• Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. — Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.

Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory
order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he
shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree
be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of
justice.

Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. – The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in
dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the
punishment if violators of the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
• Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the
proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor
( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned
by him in his professional capacity.

• The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who,
having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client
in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the
consent of his first client.

Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the
administration of justice.

• On April 27, 1996, Sanlakas ng Barangay Julo, San Antonio, Incorporated [SANLAKAS] filed two
separate criminal cases for malicious mischief against Felicitas de Leon Bascara before the Municipal
Trial Court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija presided by respondent Judge Tiburcio V. Empaynado, Jr.

• The filing of the case against accused Vasquez was recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor on June
13, 1996. However, nothing happened to this case due to respondent Judge’s inaction.

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…….
The records reveal that the two cases for malicious mischief were filed on April 27, 1996 and seven (7)
months later, or on November 20, 1996, when the instant complaint was filed, the two cases had not been
set for hearing.

Respondent Judge had several options in disposing the case of malicious mischief filed by the complainant
against Bascara which includes dismissing the case outright, requiring the opposing parties to submit their
respective responsive pleadings, or set the case for arraignment and trial. There is no showing that
respondent Judge did any of the foregoing, resulting in unreasonable delay of the proceedings.

…..
We find no malice or fraud on the part of respondent Judge. Malice implies that the act complained of
must be the result of an evil intent that excludes a mere voluntary act, deliberated to inflict damage on either
party to a case before him. We see no such evil intent in his persistence to check the veracity and authenticity
of the documents. Clearly, his ardent pursuit of the truth in these two cases cannot be the basis of the
charge for malicious delay in the administration of justice. It is a well-established rule that in the
absence of malice, fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even if such acts are erroneous. – Sanlakas v. Judge Tiburcio V. Empaynado, Jr.,
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1174. February 6, 2001

…..
As to Article 207, the investigator says: "With the evidence at hand, the accusation for malicious delay in the
administration of justice, within the purview of Article 207 of the Revised Penal Code, cannot also be
sustained. The essence of such malefaction is malice. Mere delay sans malice does not bring a judge
within the ambit of said penal provision." - Fagtanac v. Judge Yrad, A.M. No. R-54-RTJ June 9, 1985
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and
suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the
interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

When the inferior courts were reorganized pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in January, 1983, Civil Case
No. V-4338 was re-assigned to respondent Judge Yrad who reiterated execution of the judgment in an
order dated March 15, 1983. However, on June 14, 1983, he issued another order which reads in part as
follows:

After taking into consideration the arguments of the motion and opposition, and taking into consideration
the facts obtaining in the records of this case, this Court must take into consideration the following:

…..
1. That this case is for collection of rentals filed by a supposed landowner against tillers of the soil and in
accordance with Section 12 of Pres. Decree 946, this must be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform:
2. That there is an allegation that defendants in to case are tenant-tillers cultivating rice and cornland which
to the mind of this Court is within the coverage of operation land transfer. Had the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform Identified the tenant-tiller of the landholding as covered by operation land transfer and in
accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 29, implementing Pres. Decree No. 27 and Pres. Decree 316,
cases of this nature may be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at any stage of the
proceedings even during the execution.

……
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the records of this case are hereby ordered referred to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform for certification whether the landholding in question is under operation land transfer,
whether defendants in this case are Identified as tenant-tillers and whether the case is proper for trial or not.

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Pending the period of referral, the resolution of all incidents are hereby held in abeyance and in the
meantime the records of this case are placed in archive without prejudice.
Because of Judge Yrad's order mentioned above, Francisco Fagtanac accused the former of violating
Articles 206 and 207 of the Revised Penal Code; Fagtanac alleges that, "the said Interlocutory Order as
issued is unjust and it was issued to unduly delay the administration of justice, by maliciously and
unduly delaying the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 4338 and the Order of
Execution of the decision aforesaid."

…….
• The undersigned, in compliance with the above circular and without the intention of delaying the
proceedings, as alleged by the complainant, ordered the referral of this case. It is the honest
opinion of the undersigned that before the Court issues the order of execution, the Court must
seek the aid of other agencies of the government.

• According to Justice Purisima, "it cannot be said that respondent Judge knowingly or feloniously
issued" the questioned order. And the investigator adds that, "So also, inexcusable negligence or
ignorance cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge under the attendant circumstances."
This takes care of Article 206. - Fagtanac v. Judge Yrad, A.M. No. R-54-RTJ June 9, 1985

Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the
judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is
firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the
evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

Good faith is a defense

• The law requires that:
• (a) the offender is a judge;
• (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
• (c) the judgment is unjust;
• (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust.

• This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust
and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a
defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.

……..
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia, where therein respondent judge, although absolved of any guilt for the
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:
In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably erroneous
action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We have repeatedly stressed that a municipal
trial judge occupies the forefront of the judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he
must accordingly act at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any kind of failure in the
discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to maintain the faith of the public in
the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of them resort for redress. - Diego v. Judge
Silverio Q. Castillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673. August 11, 2004

Article 204 can only be committed by a judge

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This petition for review assails the resolution dated September 11, 1996 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-96-1175, dismissing the complaint against private respondent [Hearing Officer Enrique L. Flores Jr.]
for violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, and the order dated
September 29, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

……
In this case, we find the assailed resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint
against private respondent legally justified. This is so because before one can be held liable under Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the person subject of the complaint must
be shown to have committed the act in bad faith.

We held in Guerrero vs. Villamor, 296 SCRA 88, 98 (1998), that a judge will be held liable for rendering an
unjust judgment where he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive.

Notice should also be made of the fact that under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must
be a judge. In this case, the alleged offender is a hearing officer of the SEC. – Flores v. Office of the
Ombudsman and Atty. Flores, Jr., G.R. No. 136769. September 17, 2002

Can the Office of the Ombudsman entertain a criminal complaint against Supreme Court Justices
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices
of the Supreme Court?
Section 3(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.

In the present case, the matter that gave rise to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum was a criminal
complaint filed by the complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

……
As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the
Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted
through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its
Members, seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively,
such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional mandate, is
final and already beyond question.

……
In In re Wenceslao Laureta, the client of Atty. Laureta filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan charging
Members of the Supreme Court with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for having
knowingly, deliberately and with bad faith rendered an unjust resolution in a land dispute.
The Court unequivocally ruled that insofar as this Court and its Divisions are concerned, a charge of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is unjust should
not prosper; the parties cannot relitigate in another forum the final judgment of the Court, as to do
so is to subordinate the Court, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to another body.

……

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In re Joaquin T. Borromeo reiterates the Laureta ruling, particularly that (1) judgments of the Supreme
Court are not reviewable; (2) administrative, civil and criminal complaints against a judge should not be
turned into substitutes for appeal; (3) only courts may declare a judgment unjust; and (4) a situation
where the Ombudsman is made to determine whether or not a judgment of the Court is unjust is an
absurdity. The Court further discussed the requisites for the prosecution of judges, as follows:

That is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable
requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding
of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of
malice and bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence on the part of the judge in rendering said
judgment or order.

………
Plainly, under these rulings, a criminal complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, based on the legal
correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme Court, cannot prosper and should not be
entertained. This is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during their
term, for they are not. The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to
seek their removal from office if they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Only after removal can
they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions. While in office and thereafter, and for their
official acts that do not constitute impeachable offenses, recourses against them and their liabilities therefor
are as defined in the above rulings.

…….
As a rule, all decisions and determinations in the exercise of judicial power ultimately go to and stop at the
Supreme Court whose judgment is final. This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted
through a criminal complaint that, under the guise of imputing a misdeed to the Court and its Members,
seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. Effectively, such
criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of this Court that, by constitutional
mandate, is final and already beyond question.

……..
Thus, consistent with the nature of the power of this Court under our constitutional scheme, only this
Court not the Ombudsman can declare a Supreme Court judgment to be unjust. – Re: Subpoena duces
tecum (dated January 11, 2010) of acting director Aleu A. Amante, Office of the Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-
SC, March 2, 2010.

Distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings against judges

• The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at one and the same time a violation of the
criminal law and an administrative offense. In Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stressed the
distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings in the following manner:
• . . . [T]he Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings
must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the others.

• It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does not apply in the
present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was administrative
in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature.

………
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision
and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging

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justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction.
Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same
acts subject of the administrative case require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, while the acts or omissions attributed to a judge may well constitute a violation of the Revised Penal
Code, this consideration has not deterred the Supreme Court from exercising its administrative disciplinary
authority over judges. –Moroño v. Judge Lomeda, A.M. No. MTJ-90-400 July 14, 1995

Final declaration of an appellate court that the judgment is unjust is a requisite

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing considerations, the
indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and
there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgement or order.
That final declaration is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in
which the decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged. In Re JOAQUIN
T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0
February 21, 1995

…….
Even in this case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the
manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in question.

Until and unless there is such a final, authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question
is "unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be
entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite. - In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

Civil action for damages against judges in the exercise of their judicial functions
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and general
jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in the exercise
of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction." Based on Section
9, Act No. 190, the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or
court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of
damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of
his legal powers and jurisdiction."

…….
• Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which
rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution); — shall be
liable to the latter for damages.
• However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses
therein described have "unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential
element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat
already mentioned: that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless
there be a final judicial pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in
issue.

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• - In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

Remedy for an “unjust judgment” or “order”

Such a pronouncement may result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court
impugning the validity of the judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this be not
proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for
promulgating an unjust judgment or order. - In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. — Revelation of secrets.

The aforequoted criminal sanction for unprofessional conduct of an attorney is without prejudice to
proper administrative action, such as disbarment or suspension of attorneys. – Halili v. CIR, G.R. No. L-
24864 April 30, l985

The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of confidence
as a result of a consultation with a lawyer. – Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007

CANON 21 – A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated.

……
• Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.

• Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third
person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

…….
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files
to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.

Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof
unless prohibited by the client.

……..
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are
utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.

Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his
family.

Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid
possible conflict of interest.

……
 General Rule: Obligation to keep secrets covers only lawful purposes

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 Exceptions:
• announcements of intention of a client to commit a crime
• client jumped bail and lawyer knows his whereabouts; or client is living somewhere under an assumed
name
• communication involves the commission of future fraud or crime

…….
• Confidence – refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege (RRC)
• Secret – refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
regulated to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be
detrimental to the client.
• An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an
attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employees, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity (Rule 130, Sec. 21
(b), RRC)

Other Applicable laws

Art. 210 of the RPC or Direct bribery
Art. 211 of the RPC or Indirect bribery
Art. 212 of the RPC or Corruption of public officials
R.A. no. 3019 or the Anti-graft & Corrupt Practice Act
R.A. no. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
R.A. no. 7080 or An Act defining & penalizing the crime of Plunder
P.D. no. 46 or Making it punishable for Public Officials and Employees to Receive, and for private reasons to
give, gifts on any occasion, including Christmas
P.D. no. 749 or Granting Immunity from Prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to their
accomplices in bribery and other graft cases against public officers

Reasons for the Prohibition

First, the practice of judges accepting gifts would most probably promote unjust decisions by members of the
judiciary.
Secondly, even if the judge accepted the gift in perfect good faith, the possibility is very great that he might
subconsciously favor the donor."'
Finally, there is the threat of public scandal. If a judge accepted a gift and it became a matter of public
knowledge, the public would, most likely, suspect his integrity and impartiality.

Prohibited Acts and Transactions

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. — Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly
or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in
the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office.
xxx
- RA no. 6713Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Who can be the gift giver

any person but should not be a member of the public officer’s immediate family
specifically:
a litigant

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one who practices before him or
those who are likely to be involved in litigation before him.
corporation

"Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise. - R.A. no. 3019,
Section 2(d), Anti-graft & Corrupt Practice Act

Meaning of "Gift"
(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right disposed of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of another who
accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not
include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange
for, a favor from a public official or employee. - Section 3, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, RA no. 6713

"Receiving any gift"

Receiving any gift includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a
member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or
relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances
manifestly excessive. – R.A. no. 3019, Section 2(c), Anti-graft & Corrupt Practice Act

"Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise. – R.A. no. 3019,
Section 2(d), Anti-graft & Corrupt Practice Act

Manners of receiving a gift

Direct – public officer accepts the gift himself
Indirectly – the public officer accepts the gift in behalf of any member of his family or relative within
the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or
national festivity like Christmas.

Anytime or during a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas.

For a gift to be legal:

1. The value of the gift is not manifestly excessive

Unsolicited gifts or presents

Section 14. Exception. — Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a
mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage, shall be excepted from
the provisions of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted to prejudice or prohibit the practice of any profession, lawful trade or
occupation by any private person or by any public officer who under the law may legitimately practice his
profession, trade or occupation, during his incumbency, except where the practice of such profession, trade
or occupation involves conspiracy with any other person or public official to commit any of the violations
penalized in this Act. - R.A. no. 3019, Section 14, Anti-graft & Corrupt Practice Act

Meaning of “ill-gotten wealth”

d) “Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
xxx

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2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
xxx - An Act defining & penalizing the crime of Plunder, Section 1 (d)(2), RA. No. 7080

Rule X
Grounds for Administrative Disciplinary Action
(Implementing Rules of RA no. 6713)
xxx
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated
by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of, his office. The propriety or impropriety of
the foregoing shall be determined by its value, kinship or relationship between giver and receiver and
the motivation. A thing of monetary value is one which is evidently or manifestly excessive by its very
nature.
Gift refers to a thing or a right disposed of gratuitously, or any act of liberality, in favor of another who
accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof.

…….
Loan covers simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing arrangement or accommodation
intended to ensure its approval. Commodatum refers to a contract whereby one of the parties delivers to
another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and return it.

This prohibition shall not include:

(1) Unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor
from a public official or employee or given after the transaction is completed, or service is
rendered. As to what is a gift of nominal value will depend on the circumstances of each case
taking into account the salary of the official or employee, the frequency or infrequency of the
giving, the expectation of benefits, and other similar factors.

…….
(2) A gift from a member of his family or relative as defined in the Code on the occasion of a family
celebration, and without any expectation of pecuniary gain or benefit.
(3) Nominal donations from persons with no regular, pending, or expected transactions with the department,
office or agency with which the official or employee is connected, and without any expectation of
pecuniary gain or benefits.
(4) Donations coming from private organizations whether local or foreign, which are considered and
accepted as humanitarian and altruistic in purpose and mission.
(5) Donations from government to government entities.

………..
As to gift or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant
or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grant or expense for travel taking place entirely
outside the Philippines (such as allowances, transportation, food and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and permitted
by the head of office, branch, or agency to which he belongs.

Gift giving Prohibited

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xxx do hereby make it punishable for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local
governments, to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift,
present or other valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other
valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for
past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future
from the public official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions. Included within the
prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainments in honor of the official or employee or his
immediate relatives. - PD no. 46, Making it punishable for Public Officials and Employees to Receive, and
for private reasons to give, gifts on any occasion, including Christmas

Prohibited acts
for any public official or employee, whether of the national or local governments, to receive, directly or
indirectly any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift,
present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the
same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the
future.

for private persons to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion,
including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by reason of his official
position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver hopes or expects to
receive a favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or employee concerned in the
discharge of his official functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainments in honor of the official or employee or his immediate relatives. - PD no. 46, Making it
punishable for Public Officials and Employees to Receive, and for private reasons to give, gifts on any occasion,
including Christmas

Thank you for your attention!!

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