Corinthian Gardens v.

Spouses Tanjangco
g.r no. 160795; June 27, 2008

Facts: Tanjangcos owned joined lots in Corinthian Gardens. Spouse Cuasos, on the other hand, own a lot
adjacent to the former’s. Before the Cuasos constructed their house, it was surveyed by De Dios Realty
(surveyor) as per recommendation of the petitioner association. Later on, the petitioner approved the
plans made by CB Paras Construction (builder). Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in
order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and
Regulations of Corinthian (MRRC). Unfortunately, after construction, the perimeter fence of the Cuasos’
encroached upon the Tanjangcos’ lot.

Issue: Whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and, if so, whether such negligence
contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.

Held: Petitioner is found negligent under the TEST. The MRRC provides that no new constructions can be
started without the approval of the petitioner association. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic
inspections of ongoing construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance
with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls. Corinthian’s failure to prevent
the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property – despite the inspection
conducted – constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the
Tanjangcos.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY et al. vs. Atienza

g.r no. 156052 March 7, 2007

Facts:Ordinance no. 8027 enacted by the sangguniang panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of business disallowed to cease and
desist from operating their business within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “pandacan terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc, petron corporation and Pilipinas shell petroleum corporation.

However, the city of Manila and the department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan terminals was the most viable and practicable option. In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zone surrounding the Pandacan terminals. In exchange, the city Mayor and the
DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The sangguniang panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce ordinance no. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the Pandacan terminals.
Issue: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce ordinance no. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan terminal.

Ruling: Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce ordinance no. 8027 because the local
government code impose upon respondent the duty as city mayor, to enforce all laws and ordinance no.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an
alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.

SPOUSES OMAR & MOSHIERA LATIP v. ROSALIE CHUA

GR No. 177809 16 October 16, 2009

Facts: Rosalie is the owner of Roferxane Building in Baclaran. A year after the commencement of the
lease, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a latter demanding payment of back rentals and should
they fail to do so to vacate the leased cubicles. When spouses did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer + damages against them. She attached to the complaint a contract of
lease over 2 cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Spouses Latip asserted that the lease of the 2 cubicles had
already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
P2,570,000. Spouses averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase
of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from
Rosalie’s counsel.

Issue: Whether the judicial notice by the CA is proper.

Held: No. The matter which the CA judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. Only CA
took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of
P2M+ simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. requisite of notoriety is belied by the
necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., Joint Affidavit of the stallholders. In short, the alleged
practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court—
What need not be proved.

JESUS CUENCO vs. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INC. and MATIAS B.
AZNAR III

[G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008]

FACTS:
Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. Upon expiration of the
contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner
participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder. Thereafter,
petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the return of his deposit in the
sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.

Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents acted in bad
faith in withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason. In their Answer,
respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to the leased premises and the cost
of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.

The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no inventory of
damages. The respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court.
The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. The CA reversed said decision.

ISSUES:
Whether a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.

HELD:
Yes.
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence of an
alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the
amount of damage sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner
exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by
respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The
stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of
judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing
that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus,
the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and
conclusive upon them.

Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the
same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and
may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt
therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence
of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act
performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of
 the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or
representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents'
evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

Toshiba information equipment phils inc v. cir

g.r no. 157594 march 9, 2010

Facts;

Toshiba is a domestic corporation registered with the Philippine economic zone authority (PEZA) as an
economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise. It filed two separate applications for tax