Tirol

Topic:
PICOP Resources v. De Guila
Doctrine: Abc
Action Sequence:
Facts: Ricardo Dequilla, Cesar Atienza and Aniceto Orbeta (private respondents) were regular
rank-and-file employees of Picop Resources, Inc. (PICOP) and members of the NAMAPRI-
SPFL, a duly registered labor organization and existing bargaining agent of the PICOP rank-
and-file employees. PICOP and NAMAPRI-SPFL had a CBA which would expire on May 22,
2000.
On May 16, 2000, the late Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes, Jr., then National President of the Southern
Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL), advised the PICOP management to terminate about
800 employees due to acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly campaigning, supporting and
signing a petition for the certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union
(FFW) before the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Such acts of
disloyalty were construed to be a valid cause for termination under the terms and conditions of
the CBA. Based on the CBA, the freedom period would start on March 22, 2000.
Acting on the advice of Atty. Fuentes, Atty. Romero Boniel (Atty. Boniel), Manager of the PICOP
Legal and Labor Relations Department, issued a memorandum directing the employees
concerned to explain within seventy-two (72) hours why their employment should not be
terminated due to alleged acts of disloyalty. Upon receiving their explanation letters, Atty. Boniel
endorsed the same to Atty. Fuentes who then requested the termination of 46 employees found
guilty of acts of disloyalty.
On October 16, 2000, PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31 of the
46 employees. Private respondents were among the 31 employees dismissed from employment
by PICOP on November 16, 2000.
Enraged at what management did to them, private respondents filed a complaint before the
NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. XIII, Butuan City, for Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal
Dismissal with money claims, damages and attorney's fees.
LA: Declared complainants’ dismissal illegal
NLRC Commissioner: Affirmed; Reversed on MR.
CA: Reversed NLRC Decision. The CA ruled, among others, that although private respondents
signed an authorization for the filing of the petition for certification election of a rival union,
PICOP Democratic Trade Unionist-Federation of Free Workers (FFW), such act was not a
sufficient ground to terminate the employment of private respondents. Imputations of an alleged
violation of the CBA should not arise from a vague and all-embracing definition of alleged "acts
of disloyalty." Neither should it arise from speculative inferences where no evidence appears
from the record that Respondent NAMAPRI-SPFL expressly defined "acts of disloyalty."
Besides, to Our mind, signing an authorization for the filing of the petition for certification
election does not constitute an act of disloyalty per se. There must be proof of
contemporaneous acts of resignation or withdrawal of their membership from the Respondent
NAMAPRI-SPFL to which they are members. Respondents miserably failed to present evidence
to justify a valid termination of employees in pursuance to the CBA allegedly violated.
The CA further agreed with private respondents that Article 256 and not Article 253, of the Labor
Code applied in this case. The issue of acts of disloyalty relates more to a direct connection on
the alleged violation or breach of loyalty to the majority status of the incumbent union than on
violation of the terms and conditions of the agreement under Article 253.
PICOP basically argues that Article 253 of the Labor Code applies in this case. Article 253 of
the Labor Code provides that the terms and conditions of a CBA remain in full force and effect
even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been reached. It claims that the
private respondents violated this provision when they campaigned for, supported and signed
FFW's petition for certification election on March 19 and 20, 2000, before the onset of the
freedom period. It further argues that private respondents were not denied due process when
they were terminated.
Issue: Whether the private respondents were validly dismissed pursuant to the CBA’s union
security clause.
Ruling: NO.
There is no question that in the CBA entered into by the parties, there is a union security clause.
The clause imposes upon the workers the obligation to join and maintain membership in the
company's recognized union as a condition for employment.
"Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union
shop," "maintenance of membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union
within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of
membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the
agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a
condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining
unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their
representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the
enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a
member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest
are a part.
There is no dispute that private respondents were members of NAMAPRI-SPFL who were
terminated by PICOP due to alleged acts of disloyalty. It is basic in labor jurisprudence that the
burden of proof rests upon management to show that the dismissal of its worker was based on a
just cause. When an employer exercises its power to terminate an employee by enforcing the
union security clause, it needs to determine and prove the following: (1) the union security
clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security
provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to
expel the employee from the union.
In this case, the resolution thereof hinges on whether PICOP was able to show sufficient
evidence to support the decision of the union to expel private respondents from it.
PICOP basically contends that private respondents were justly terminated from employment for
campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for the certification of FFW, a rival union, before
the 60-day "freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Their acts constitute an act of
disloyalty against the union which is valid cause for termination pursuant to the Union Security
Clause in the CBA.
The SC disagreed.
Considering the peculiar circumstances, the Court is of the view that the acts of private
respondents are not enough proof of a violation of the Union Security Clause which would
warrant their dismissal. PICOP failed to show in detail how private respondents campaigned
and supported FFW. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification
election before the freedom period does not necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty. It is far
from being within the definition of "acts of disloyalty" as PICOP would want the Court to believe.
The act of "signing an authorization for a petition for certification election" is not disloyalty to the
union per se considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the
freedom period which started on March 22, 2000.
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the CA, the records are bereft of proof of any contemporaneous
acts of resignation or withdrawal of union membership or non-payment of union dues. Neither is
there proof that private respondents joined FFW. The fact is, private respondents remained in
good standing with their union, NAMAPRI-SPFL.
Finally, PICOP insists that Article 253 of the Labor Code applies in this case, not Article 256
thereof. The Court agrees with the CA that its argument is misplaced. While it is incumbent for
the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent
even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for
certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such
agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that
such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative.
The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no certification election was filed
during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to
favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the
workers as to which labor organization would represent them.
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to
the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA.
An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When
there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the
creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where
the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause
existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for
certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the
employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a
statutory olicy that should not be circumvented, or compromised.
Dispositive: Petition DENIED.