ALEXANDER

THE GREAT
HIS ARMY • HIS BATTLES • HIS ENEMIES

OSPREY
PUBLISHING
HIS ARMY • HIS BATTLES • HIS ENEMIES

EDITOR RUTH SHEPPARD

First published in Great Britain in 2008 by Osprey Publishing, Midland House,
West Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 oPH, United Kingdom.
443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Material from Duncan B. Campbell, Elite 121: Ancient Siege Warfare; Duncan B. Campbell, New Vanguard
78: Greek and Roman Siege Machinery; Duncan B. Campbell, New Vanguard 89: Greek and Roman Artillery;
Jack Cassin~Scott, Men~at~Arms 69: The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC; E. V. Cernenko,
Men~at~Arms 13T The Sc;ythians; Nic Fields, Fortress 40: Ancient Greek Fortifications 500-300 BC;
Nic Fields, New Vanguard 132: Ancient Greek Warship; Waldemar Heckel, Essential Histories 26:
The Wars ofAlexander the Great; Waldemar Heckel, Warrior 102: Macedonian Warrior; Nicholas Sekunda,
Elite T The Ancient Greeks; Nicholas Sekunda, Elite 42: The Persian Army 560-330 BC; Nicholas Sekunda,
Elite 66: The Spartan Army; Nicholas Sekunda, Men~at~Arms 148: The Army ofAlexander the Great;
Nicholas Sekunda, Warrior 2T Greek Hoplite; Philip de Souza, Essential Histories 2T The Pdoponnesian
War 431-4°4 BC; Philip de Souza, Essential Histories 36: The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC;
Michael Thompson, Campaign 182: Granicus;John Warry, Campaign T Alexander 334-323 BC;
Christopher Webber, Men~at~Arms 360: The Thracians.
© 2008 Osprey Publishing Ltd
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ISBN~13: 97 8 I 84 6 °3 3 28 5
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Index by Alison Worthington
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Front cover: akg~images/Erich Lessing. Back cover: Topfoto. Back cover flap: Werner Forman Archive/
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Nimatallah.
Pages 6-7 akg~images/ErichLessing.
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGY 6

I GREECE AND PERSIA IN THE 5 TH CENTURY 9

2 GREECE IN THE 5 TH AND 4TH CENTURIES 19
3 PERSIA IN THE 5 TH AND 4TH CENTURIES 33
4 THE RISE OF MACEDON 49
5 ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION 67
6 ALEXANDER'S ARMY 77
7 ALEXANDER ENTERS PERSIA 99
8 THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER GRANICUS III

9 THE BATTLE OF Issus 135

10 PHOENIC"IA AND EGYPT 151
II THE BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA 169
12 ALEXANDER TAKES PERSIA 185
13 THE INVASION OF INDIA 199
14 THE JOURNEY BACK 215
IS THE DEATH OF THE CONQUEROR 223

GLOSSARY 241
BIBLIOGRAPHY 245
INDEX 247
 CHRONOLOGY
All dates are BC unless otherwise indicated

c.65 0 Early hoplite armies in Greece

560-55 0 The rise of Cyrus the Great
547 Cyrus defeats Croesus of Lydia
5I 3 Darius I's invasion of Europe
499-493 The Ionian Revolt
49 0 Darius 1's invasion of Greece; battle of Marathon
4 80-479 Xerxes' invasion of Greece; battles of Thermopylae, Salamis and
Plataea
478-43 I The Delian League becomes an Athenian empire
449 Peace of Callias
43 I -4°4 The Peloponnesian War
40I Battle of Cunaxa; March of the Ten Thousand
39 6-394 Agesilaus in Asia Minor
394-3 87/3 86 The Corinthian War
3 87/3 86 The King's Peace
37 I Battle of Leuctra
3 68 -3 6 5 Philip, son of Amyntas, future king of Macedon, resides in
Thebes as a hostage
Battle of Mantinea
King Perdiccas III of Macedon killed in battle with Illyrians;
accession of Philip II
359-33 6 Reign of Philip II of Macedon
35 8 Philip II fights the Illyrians
35 6 Birth of Alexander the Great
35 2 Philip II's victory over the Phocians at the battle of the 'Crocus
Field'
Peace of Philocrates; Philip II becomes master of northern Greece
Battle of Chaeronea; Philip II becomes undisputed military leader
of Greece

6
337 Formation of the League of Corinth
33 6 Spring Expeditionary force sent to Asia
Death of Philip II; accession of Alexander III (the Great) to
the throne of Macedon
335 Alexander campaigns in the north against the Thracians,
Triballians and Illyrians; destruction of Thebes
334 Spring Alexander's force crosses the Hellespont
May Battle of the river Granicus; major coastal cities of Asia
Minor fall to Alexander
Sieges of Miletus and Halicarnassus
333 Alexander cuts the Gordian knot
September/October Battle of Issus
Capture of Phoenician coastal cities; sieges of Tyre and Gaza
Alexander in Egypt; founding of Alexandria at the mouth of
the Nile
September Battle of Gaugamela
Campaign against the Uxians
January Storming of the Persian Gates
Capture of Babylon, Susa, Persepolis and Ecbatana
33 0 Death of King Darius III
Alexander moves into Afghanistan; execution of Philotas
and Parmenion
3 2 9-3 2 7 War in central Asia between the Oxus and Iaxartes rivers
3 28 Death of Cleitus; Alexander's marriage to Roxane
32 7 Alexander begins the Indian campaign
3 26 Battle of the river Hydaspes
Macedonian army refuses to cross the river Hyphasis
Alexander at the mouth of the Indus river
March through the Gedrosian Desert
Alexander returns to Susa
June Death of Alexander in Babylon
The age of the Successors and formation of the Hellenistic
kingdoms
3 0I Battle of Ipsus

7
GREECE AND PERSIA
IN THE 5TH CENTURY
hen Alexander ascended the throne of Macedon following the

W death of his father in 336, the city--states of Greece and the huge
empire of Persia had already been in conflict for hundreds of years.
Ancient Greece was divided into hundreds of city--states (poleis, singular polis) .
The size of these states varied considerably but most comprised an urban centre,
where much of the population lived, and where the principal public buildings
were located, plus a surrounding rural territory. Although there were many
differences in the ways that each state was organized and governed, broadly
speaking they came in two types: democracy, where decision making was in the
hands of the majority of the citizens, or oligarchy, in which effective control of
decision making was limited to a minority of the citizens.
Armed conflict between the city--states was common. In his Laws Plato argued
that peace is but a word, and that every state was, by nature, engaged in a
permanent undeclared war with every other state (Laws, I.626a). Warfare
pervaded all spheres of political, cultural and intellectual endeavour in Greece:
it was the subject of most of the surviving Greek tragedies and comedies and
warriors and warfare are the most common subjects of Greek sculptures and
vases, while Classical Greek philosophy also addressed the role of the hoplite:
the citizen--soldier.
Conflict was also common within the Achaemenid Empire of Persia. At its
greatest extent, the empire covered a huge area, from Asia Minor to India, and
its subjects included numerous peoples. The kings of Persia expanded their rule
over several centuries, and were constantly challenged by the huge distances
involved in ruling and administering the provinces of their empire, known as
satrapies. In the late 6th century, King Darius I had a trilingual inscription OPPOSITE
carved into a rockface at Bisitun in Iran to record his actions as king. After This Greek 'Vase shows a
Greek hoplite and a
taking the throne, he had put down a number of rebellions across his empire
Persian warrior fighting.
over several years; the carving includes a representation of nine of the defeated (C. M. Dixon/Ancient Art
rebel leaders tied together. Revolt or rebellion among the peoples of the empire & Architecture Collection)

9
THE GREEK AND PERSIAN EMPIRES, C.400
SOGOIA

PARTHIA
AREIA

CARMANIA GEDROSIA

Susa

PERSIS

ARABIA

t f
CHRONOLOGY OF THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS
499-493 Ionian Revolt 480 Xerxes invades Greece; Persians win battle of
499 Persians attack N axos Thermopylae and sack Athens; Persian navy
494 Persians defeat Ionians suffers heavy defeat at Salamis
493 Persian rule extended to Ionia 479 Greeks defeat Persians at battles of Plataea and
490 Darius I launches military Mycale
expedition against Greece; Greeks 478/477 Formation of the Delian League, headed by
defeat Persians at the battle of Athens
Marathon 449 . Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia
486 Death of Darius I; Xerxes becomes 431-404 Peloponnesian War between Athens and
king of Persia Sparta

10
 GREECE l\ND PERSll\ IN TI-IE STI-I CENTUR)T

and the men who ruled the satrapies in the name of the king, and even involving
members of the king's own family, were common throughout the empire's
history. The Greek and Persian Wars grew out of what was originally classed as
one of these revolts.

THE GREEK AND PERSIAN WARS

Throughout the 5th century and into the 4th century a state of war existed
between the city--states of Greece and the mighty Achaemenid Empire of Persia.
These wars probably began with the rise to power of the Persian Empire under
the first Achaemenid king, Cyrus the Great. Soon after ascending the throne
of western Persis in 559, Cyrus conquered eastern Persis, then continued to
expand his empire by conquering the Median Empire, Lydia and Babylon. The
king of Lydia, the legendary Croesus, had brought the prosperous Greek cities
of Ionia on the west coast of Asia Minor under his rule and made them pay
tribute. When he was defeated, these cities acknowledged the rule of Cyrus, but
many participated in a revolt of the Lydians and had to be brought back under
Persian control by force. Some of the islands off the coast of Ionia retained their
independence for some time, but by 5 I 8 the Persians controlled all of Asia
Minor and most of the east Aegean islands. As with elsewhere in their empire
the Persians installed or sponsored local aristocrats as rulers of the Greek cities
in Asia Minor and the nearby islands, and exacted tribute from the Ionians.
In 499, following a failed naval expedition by the Persians against the island of
N axos, off the coast of Ionia, the Ionian Greeks revolted against the Persians. The
Ionians realized that they could not throw off the yoke of Persian rule unaided,
so they sought assistance from their kinsmen in mainland Greece. They were
unsuccessful in seeking the help of Sparta, the strongest Greek city--state, or
several other leading states, but they did persuade Athens and Eretria to send
military expeditions on warships, stressing the ease with which they would defeat
the Persians. By sending ships, the Athenians and Eretrians may have hoped to
dissuade the Persians from further expansion westwards. With the benefit of
hindsight, the historian Herodotus stated in his history that 'These ships were
the beginnings of evils for Greeks and barbarians' (Histories, 5.97.48). The first
target for the revolt was Sardis. When the Ionians were heavily defeated by
Persian cavalry, the Greek contingents realized that the easy pickings they had
been promised were unlikely to materialize and so returned home, leaving the
Ionians to fight on alone. Despite renewed efforts to incite wider rebellion among
the subjects of King Darius I, including supporting a short--lived revolt on Cyprus,
the Ionians were eventually crushed in 494, and Persian rule was restored in
Ionia by 493.

II
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREi\T i\T vVA.R

A year after Thermopylae,

the Greeks and Persians
met again, at Plataea.
The Greek army decided
to retreat from the plain of
Asopus, so after nightfall
the contingents of the
army began to withdraw,
except for the Spartans.
Amompharetos, the
lochagos of the Pitanate
lochos, refused to retreat
and disgrace Sparta.
As this threatened the
survival of the Greek forces,
Pausanias, the commander
of the Spartan army,
attempted to persuade
Amompharetos to lead
his loch os to the rear,
threatening to leave them
to die. At this point, the
Athenian herald arrived to
see what was happening.
I n an imitation of the
In 490 Darius launched a military expedition against Greece. He sought
Athenian voting ~stem revenge against those mainland Greek cities that had supported the Ionian
which used small pebbles Revolt. An invasion force landed on the plain of Marathon, roughly 20 miles
as ballots, Amompharetos
north of Athens, where it was met and defeated by a combined force of Athenian
threw a huge rock down
at Pausanias' feet declaring and Plataean hoplites.
that it was his vote against Ten years later, Darius' successor, Xerxes I, led another, larger expedition against
fleeing before the enemy.
Greece and the Athenians in particular. Crossing the Hellespont in 480, he
At daybreak, the army
began to retreat, without accepted Macedon's surrender and marched south through Thessaly towards
the Pitanate lochos. central Greece and Attica. Despite the legendary resistance of the Spartan warriors
Amompharetos reluctantry at Thermopylae, the Persians took the pass, leaving the road to Athens and the
followed. The untidy retreat
of the Greeks encouraged
Peloponnese open. Unable to confront the massive Persian army, the Athenians
the Persians to pursue them abandoned their city and looked to their powerful navy to face the Persians. The city
incautiousry which brought of Athens was duly sacked and burned but the Persian navy suffered a heavy defeat
about the Persian defeat.
(Richard Hook © Osprey
off Salamis. The following year the Persians returned. Having persuaded the
Publishing Ltd) Spartans to confront the Persians, the Greeks engaged and defeated the Persian
army at Plataea. In the same year the Persian navy was defeated again at Mycale,
ending Persian military adventures in Greece. However, although the kings of Persia
would not return to Greece with a military force, they constantly meddled in her
internal affairs through diplomatic and other means. Persian financial support and
the prospect of military intervention in favour of one city--state or another continued
to be a destabilizing factor in Greek internal relations until the mid--4th century.

12
 CiREECE AND PERSIA IN THE 5TH (~ENTURY

THE DELIAN LEAGUE The tombs of the Persian

Athens and Sparta had been the two leading states in the alliance formed to combat kings at Nagsh--e--Rustam
near the city--palace of
Xerxes' invasion in 480, and both could claim to have been instrumental in saving Persepolis in modern I ran..
the Greeks from conquest: the Athenians had taken a leading role at Salamis and I twas alreaefy a place of
Sparta had led the Greek army that had defeated Xerxes at Plataea. The alliance importance when Darius I
ordered his tomb to be
began to break up after their victory over the Persians. The Athenians formed a
carved into the cliff
new alliance in 478/477 to ravage the territory of the Persians in compensation for There are three other
the subjugation of Ionia and the invasion of Greece. Each ally contributed men, Achaemenid tombs at
the site which are careful
ships or money, and the effort was administered and commanded by the
copies of Darius' tomb.
Athenians. This alliance is known as the Delian League. The Spartans already had I t is thought that these
their own alliance known as the Peloponnesian League, made up of the small city-- are probabry the tombs
of Xerxes I, Artaxerxes I
states in the Peloponnese, and some larger ones. The cities had more autonomy
and Darius 11. The site
than in the Delian League, and the league was essentially a defensive alliance which also has a number of reliefs
was activated upon the presentation of a clear threat to a member. dating from the later
Sassanian dynasty.
The Delian League successfully waged war against the Persians, and in 449
( akg--images/Bildarchiv
the Athenians negotiated a formal peace treaty with Persia, known as the Peace Steffens)
of Callias, in which Persia disavowed any formal ambition of conquering Greece

13
ALEXANDER_ THE GREAT i\T\VAR

THE FATHER OF HISTORY

The events of the Greek and Persian Wars are Herodotus of Halicarnassus here displays his
recorded in one of the most important works of enquiry, so that human achievements may
Classical Greek literature, the Histories of Herodotus. not become forgotten in time, and great and
Herodotus was born in the first half of the 5th century marvellous deeds - some displayed by
in the Greek city of Halicarnassus in Asia Minor. Greeks, some by barbarians - may not be
He travelled extensively, collecting information from without their glory; and especially to show
people about themselves and their ancestors. He was why the two peoples fought with each other.
able to talk to many eyewitnesses of events or read
accounts from people who had been there. The idea of In this respect Herodotus can be seen as part of a
recording great achievements for posterity was not in much wider intellectual and cultural tradition of
itself a new one. Egyptian, Babylonian and Assyrian philosophical and scientific speculation and enquiry.
rulers had long been accustomed to set up memorials There is also an element of learning from the events.
to their own greatness, inscribing them with official Herodotus offers his readers his investigations into
versions of events. Herodotus' work is special because the origins and causes of the events he narrates, as
he sought to go beyond the mere collection of these well as his interpretations of their wider significance.
records and to enquire into their origins and causes. He invites his readers to learn from his Histories
He was consciously looking for explanation of the although some of his lessons can seem strange to a
events. This is how he introduces his work: modern audience.

in return for a similar respect for the Persian sphere of influence in western Asia,
Palestine and Egypt. The Delian League had proved a successful alliance, but
over the years it had changed from a league of states under Athenian leadership
to more of an Athenian empire. By the time of the peace Athens was receiving
annual tribute from other states in the league, dominating the economic life of
the subject allies, and putting down revolts by them with considerable ferocity.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

During the first half of the 5th century, Athens and Sparta had become the two
major powers in Greece. Athens was the main sea power, and Sparta was the main
land power. A major turning point in the relations between the two states and
their allies came in 462. In 462, Sparta appealed to all her allies for help putting
down a helot revolt. A small army of Athenians was among those who answered
the call. However, shortly after arriving in Messenia, the Athenians, alone of the
allies, were dismissed, apparently due to a growing sympathy for the rebelling
helots among the Athenians. This humiliated and insulted Athens, and following

14
 GREECE AND PERSIA IN THE 5TH (~ENTURY

GREECE AND WESTERN ASIA MINOR, C.3So

>' - 1:1 v p;/ BLACK SEA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA
t
100 miles
f-----------.-,----.J!
100km

this date there was considerable political tension between the two sides, with
both Athens and Sparta forming alliances with each other's enemies. Eventually
this escalated into the Peloponnesian War, which erupted in 431 and ended with
the surrender of Athens in 404. Although, after the Peace of Callias, Persia had
left Greece alone for 30 years, the lure of intervention in the Peloponnesian War
proved too difficult to resist. The peace agreed with Persia by Athens had not
been formally renewed with Artaxerxes 1's successor. Darius II allowed his
satraps to distribute funds to Sparta and her allies and then, following a
devastating defeat of the Athenians in Sicily, he agreed a treaty with the Spartans.
This was undoubtedly militarily expedient, but it was also politically harmful to
Sparta's reputation with the Greeks: in return for help in defeating the Athenians,
Sparta was agreeing to hand back Greek city,states in Asia Minor to Persia.
Darius sent one of his younger sons, Cyrus, to supply the Spartans with the
resources to defeat their enemies. Along the way, Cyrus formed a strong
friendship with the Spartan admiral Lysander. Lysander had political ambitions,
while Cyrus was eager to bring about a Peloponnesian victory in the war so that

IS
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

16
 GREECE AND PERSIA IN THE 5TH CENTURY

he could, in the near future, draw upon their soldiery, which he regarded as the OPPOSITE
best in the ancient world. Cyros' elder brother, Artaxerxes II, was the heir to the Two Spartan hoplites
and a Tegean aIry during
throne of Persia, and although Cyros had the support of a faction at court, he the Peloponnesian War.
would need troops to challenge his brother when the time came for the accession. (Angus McBride © Osprry
Shortly after the collapse of Athens, Darius II died, Artaxerxes II ascended the Publishing Ltd)

throne and Cyrus set in motion his scheme to overthrow his brother. A force of
some 11,000 mercenaries - which was to become known (after some defections
and casualties) as the 'Ten Thousand' - accompanied a much larger Persian
force from Lydia to Mesopotamia.
Not far from Babylon, at a place called Cunaxa, the armies of the feuding
brothers met in 401. Although the Greeks won an easy victory against the
The Acropolis in Athens.
Persians stationed opposite them, the effort was meaningless, since Cyrus
The Parthenon, a temple
himself was killed in an attack on his brother in the centre of the line. With to Athena, was built in
Cyrus' death, the revolt collapsed. But it was not entirely in vain, at least as a the 5th century to replace
an older temple of Athena
lesson to the Greeks: for the ease with which a relatively mobile and efficient
that was destroyed in the
army could strike at the heart of the empire exposed the weaknesses of Persian invasion of 480.
Achaemenid Persia. ( akg~images/
Rainer Hackenberg)

17
GREECE IN THE 5TH
AND 4TH CENTURIES
reek land warfare before the age of Alexander the Great was primarily,

G and often exclusively, infantry warfare. Chariots had been used in the
Bronze Age - either as moving and elevated platforms for archers or as
vehicles that simply delivered prominent warriors to the battlefield - but in the
Near East and Anatolia the effectiveness of the chariot was negated by new tactics
and weaponry, and in the Greek peninsula it had always been of limited value
because of the nature of the terrain. The difficulties of topography created similar
problems for the unshod horse. Although some regions, such as Thessaly and
Boeotia, were more conducive to cavalry warfare, the numbers of mounted troops
were limited by the expense of maintaining horses, and few 'horsemen' were
actually trained to fight in cavalry formation. Therefore, nature and economics
made the Greeks infantrymen - 'men of the spear'. OPPOSITE
The Treasury of the
By the mid--7th century, the Greeks had begun to develop the weaponry and
Athenians at the sanctuary
style of close--ordered combat known as 'hoplite warfare' . Although changes did of Delphi, which was the
occur in armour and equipment, the appearance and operations of hoplite location of the most
armies did not alter dramatically over the centuries, nor did the Greeks, despite famous oracle in ancient
Greece. A small building,
their overall reputation for inventiveness, show much interest in deviating from the Treasury contained
a tried and trusted method of warfare. It was only when the goals of war and trophies from important
the attempts to extend power significantly - as in the case of the Peloponnesian Athenian victories, and
votive objects dedicated to
War - brought the Greeks to a state of what approximated 'total war' that
the sanctuary. Athens built
lasting changes in the manner of waging war began to be made. the Treasury in the late 6th
or earry 5th century. I t is
HOPLITE WARFARE thought to express the
victory of democracy over
Hoplites, heavily armoured Greek infantry, dominated Greek warfare for some ryranny, although a
three centuries. The Greek word for 'weapon' is hoplon, and so a hoplite was different interpretation is
that the Treasury
literally a 'man at arms'. Hoplites fought in a close formation called a phalanx,
commemorates the victory
which in Greek has a general meaning of 'battle--formation', but which historians at Marathon. (akg~
frequently apply exclusively to the heavy infantry formation. images/Erich Lessing)

19
~~LEXANDER THE AT\VA.R

This relief sculpture comes The hoplite was, in essence, a citizen~soldier. The armies of the Greek city.-states
from a large tomb built were based on a levy of those citizens prosperous enough to equip themselves as
for a local aristocrat in
south~western Asia Minor
hoplites. Except for Sparta, whose warriors devoted their entire lives to military
around 400. I t shows training, and a few state.-sponsored units such as the Sacred Band of Thebes,
hoplites fighting in a the armies of the city.-states were composed of citizens who saw it as their moral,
phalanx formation.
social and political duty to fight on behalf of their city.-state. Conscription and
If the discipline and
cohesion of the formation mobilization were effectively universal, citizens enjoying the benefits of freedom in
was maintained it was exchange for their obligation to defend the state. Any assembly of citizens was by
very difficult to overcome.
definition a gathering of warriors past and present. Fundamentally, every Greek
An unexpected attack, or
one coming from the flank citizen was a hoplite. They went into battle not from fear of punishment or in hope
or rear, could however of plunder and booty. They fought alongside neighbours, brothers, fathers, sons,
panic the hoplites and
uncles and cousins. This meant that they did their utmost to demonstrate courage,
break up their formation.
(C. M. Dixon/Ancient Art side.-by.-side with their comrades, and that they had a vested interest in the
& Architecture Collection) outcome. This was the unseen glue that bound the phalanx, and the city.-state,
together. Only those who clashed with spear and shield, defying death and
disdaining retreat, were deemed worthy.

20
 ~
' -.. Jl.,...... ......i'-, ....., IN AND 4 Tl-I CENTURIES

It may seem surprising that Greek warfare was dominated by close--packed,

heavily armoured amateurs for so long. The situation endured because, as time
passed, the system was maintained for the sake of tradition, shared values and
social prejudice. Since hoplites were expected to provide their own equipment,
the majority of the population in any given city--state was necessarily excluded.
But the full rights of citizenship were only accorded to those who could afford
to take their place in the phalanx, so that the hoplites effectively were the
'nation in arms'. It was only in Athens, where the navy became important,
that the poorest citizens, the tbetes who rowed the triremes, came to have a
significant military role - hence Athenian democracy, a term derived from the
words demos (the people) and kratei (rule), or what Aristotle aptly called
'trireme democracy'. As the events of the two Persian invasions of Greece
showed, hoplites could be extremely formidable. However, during the Classical
period the hoplite lost his monopoly of the battlefield, and increasing use was
made of cavalry and light infantry.

Training and mobilization

In most states military training began for all young men when they were 18.
Most Greek city--states were organized on a territorial basis, and citizen registers
were kept in the smallest sub--division of the tribe, originally the pbratry. The
commander of each of the tribal regiments maintained his own list of all citizens
available for hoplite service on the basis of these registers. Upon 'coming of age'
the claims of a youth to citizenship would be checked against these lists and the
names of new members entered upon them. The new soldier--citizens would be
gathered together and would swear a common oath. These young men were now
called epbeboi (ephebes or 'youths'), and for the next two years they underwent a
programme of physical and military training, the epbebate. Some form of ephebate
is attested in most Greek states, but practice varied greatly. In Athens the first year
of ephebic training was taken up with a cycle of athletic contests, mainly running
races, organized by tribe. The second year of ephebic training was generally more
intensive and military in character. In many states the ephebes lived together, away
from home, in barracks. They provided permanent garrisons for the city--state's
key defensive points: the fortified citadel (acropolis) of the city and the forts and
watch--towers along the border, guarding against surprise attacks by neighbouring
states. Since the hoplite was not a warrior who fought individually, ephebic
training concentrated on group tactics. There was far less stress on individual
weapon skills, such as sword fencing.
Ephebes would rarely be called on to fight before their training was completed,
and usually only if the state was invaded and in the greatest danger. Likewise,

21
ALEXANDER TI-fE GREAT AT \V/\R

HOPLITE ARMOUR AND EQUIPMENT 5TH-4TH CENTURY

On the left is a hoplite of the Peloponnesian War, brightly dyed horsehair crests attached to Greek
on the right is a hoplite of the late 4th century. helmets were mainly designed to make the hoplite
The lightening of hoplite armour through the 5th appear taller and more imposing and also served as a
century was accompanied, and possibly caused, by badge of rank.
developments in tactics that required more speed on The principal offensive weapon of the hoplite was
the battlefield. By the Peloponnesian War his spear (dory). Conquered territory was said to be
sometimes the only armour carried was a 'spear.. won'. In his play, The Persians, Aeschylus
shield. The shield was the most important vividly portrays the Greek and Persian Wars as
item of hoplite equipment. a contest between the oriental bow and
Weighing about I3.slb (6. 2 kg) , the Greek spear. On vase"'paintings
the hoplite shield was the hoplite spear is normally
capable of turning a shortened for artistic convenience,
spear... or sword.. but is occasionally shown at its
thrust. The main true length of up to 9ft. Only
component of the ash could provide strong
shield was its shafts of this length
wooden base, which that were light
was covered in a thin layer enough to handle.
of bronze. Blazons were Ash trees could
painted directly onto the be found in the mountains
shield's bronze surface. Greece, but many cities imported
The rim provided rigidity their supplies from Macedon
to the bowl of the shield, or other Balkan regions.
preventing it from buckling easily in battle. In place of Spear.. makers would split straight seasoned ash logs
the close helmets worn earlier in the century the down into shafts, then shape them until they were
hoplite wears only a felt cap of the type previously round and smooth. Bronze or iron spear.. heads and
worn underneath a helmet for comfort. butts were produced in separate workshops and fitted
Developments in warfare in the 360s instigated to the narrower and thicker ends of the shaft
more changes in the equipment of the hoplite, and this respectively. The final stage ofproduction was to fit the
hoplite of the late 4th century wears a muscle.. cuirass spear with a hand.. grip at its centre of balance. As well
and a Phrygian helmet. The helmet was not expected as his spear, the hoplite of the Peloponnesian War
to ward off all blows: strength was sacrificed for carries the most common type of sword (xiphos)
lightness and reasonable all.. over protection. The which had a cruciform hilt and a straight, double..
inside was sometimes lined with fabric. Blows to the edged, leaf..shaped blade, broadening towards the tip.
head must have frequently resulted in injury. The (Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing)

22
 GREECE IN TI-IE 5TH AND 4TI-I CENTURIES

citizens were not liable for foreign service after a certain age. In Athens the
maximum age for mobilization for foreign service was 50, but citizens could be
summoned to serve at home until the age of 60. This means that at any time
there were up to 4 2 age classes liable for mobilization.
In all Greek states with a constitutional government matters of war and peace
were debated by an assembly of all male citizens who had completed their
military training. If war was decided on, the assembly then had to decide how
many men would be required, for how many days and how the army was
to be mobilized. There were several levels of mobilization, from entire
mobilization, through certain age classes of all the tribes, to just certain age
classes of some tribes.

Battle
Hoplite battle was, by its very nature, ritualistic - the idea was to defeat rather
than to annihilate. The Greeks had developed what has been called the 'Western
way of war' - a head--to--head collision of seasonal soldier--farmers on an open plain
in a brutal display of courage and physical prowess. Their battlefields were scenes
of furious fighting and carnage that usually lasted not more than an hour or
two. Every man was pushed to the limits of his physical and psychological
endurance - and then it was over, not to be repeated for a year or more.
That hoplites fought on the flattest piece of terrain was a point made by
Mardonius in a speech to his master, Xerxes, the king of Persia (Herodotus,
Histories, 7.9.I): 'When they declare war on each other, they go off together to
the smoothest and flattest piece of ground they can find, and have their battle
on it'. Although -Mardonius believed that the Greeks pursued their unique style
of warfare out of ignorance and stupidity, what he says here is incontrovertible.
Any unexpected obstacle could bring the phalanx to a complete halt or break its
formation, and Aristotle reminds us that it would break up if it were forced to
cross even the smallest watercourse. As a result generals selected level plains on
which to fight their battles.
Once a general (strategos) had deployed his hoplites and battle had been
joined, there was little or no room for command or manoeuvre, and the
individual general took up his position in the front rank of the phalanx and
fought alongside his men for the duration. Consequently, many generals
perished in the fray. It was for the most part outward displays of courage, not
strategic or tactical skills, which were all--important for a general.
Greek hoplites were mostly farmers, and were understandably reluctant to
leave their land unattended for long periods. Most states were in no position to
provide cash to buy food and to compensate the hoplite for his absence from the

23
ALEXi\NDER TI-IE GREf\T AT \Vf\R

farm. Consequently the hoplites would not vote for long campaigns. Greek
generals were therefore forced to adopt military strategies that would achieve
the political objectives in as short a time as possible. This meant that prior to
the introduction of efficient siege artillery in the mid--4th century, most Greek
states generally lacked the resources to besiege enemy cities for the necessary
months or years. Also, the ethics of hoplite warfare and the practical restrictions
imposed by the heavy equipment meant the hoplite was ill--equipped to deal with
the difficulties of cracking fortified positions. (For more information on siege
warfare see Chapter 10.)

Phalanx
It was the hoplite shield that made the rigid phalanx formation viable. Half the
shield protruded beyond the left--hand side of the hoplite. If the man on the left
moved in close his uncovered side was protected by the shield overlap. Hence,
hoplites stood shoulder to shoulder with their shields locked. Once this
formation was broken, however, the advantage of the shield was lost - as
Plutarch says (Moralia, 220a2), the armour of a hoplite may be for the
individual's protection, but the hoplite's shield protected the whole phalanx.
Thus the injunction of a Spartan mother to her son 'either with this or on this'
(Moralia, 24IfI 6), that is, he was to return home either alive and victorious
carrying the shield, or lying dead upon it after a fight to the finish.
As the phalanx itself was the tactic, two opposing phalanxes would head
straight for each other, break into a run for the last few feet, collide with a crash
and then stab and shove till one side broke. Thucydides says that an advancing
phalanx tended to crab to the right (Peloponnesian War,s. 7 I. I) - phalanx drift,
a phenomenon also seen in Macedonian armies. The men on the extreme right
tended to drift further to the right, either in fear of being caught on their
unshielded side, or to give themselves space to wield their spears, or possibly a
combination of the two. The rest of the phalanx would then naturally follow
suit, each hoplite edging into the shelter of the shield of the comrade on his
right, trying to maintain the line and prevent a gap developing. Thus each right
wing might overlap and beat the opposing left.
A phalanx was a deep formation, normally composed of hoplites arrayed eight to
12 shields deep. In this dense mass only the front two ranks could use their spears
in the melee, stabbing at the vulnerable parts of the enemy, those in the third rank
and beyond adding weight to the attack by pushing to their front. This was
probably achieved by pressing the shield squarely into the hollow of the man in
front's back, seating the left shoulder beneath the upper rim, and heaving, digging
the soles and toes into the ground for purchase. Both Thucydides (Peloponnesian

24
 GREECE IN THE 5TI-I AND 4TI-I CENTURIES

THE AFTERMATH OF A HOPLITE BATTLE

This plate shows the aftermath of a hoplite battle in The fallen were listed by tribe alongside their
the 360s when the equipment of the hoplite changed relatives and neighbours In a casualty list
dramatically in response to the new type of warfare first commissioned by the state and erected in the centre
developed by the Theban general Epaminondas and of the city. Sometimes an elaborate empty tomb, or
then perfected in Macedon. The muscle.-cuirass dips at cenotaph, was erected in the city to commemorate
the abdomen to cover the groin, which must have the sacrifice of its citizens, and a funeral oration was
made sitting or bending extremely difficult. The commissioned to celebrate their patriotism.
monograms painted on the shields are the emblems of The wounded could take a long time to die. Greek
the Achaean and Arcadian Leagues. medical writings contain descriptions of death from
The victors are looking after their wounded, carrying battle wounds. The Hippocratic treatise On Wounds in
off the dead and stripping the enemy corpses of armour, the Head describes the grim stages in which the victim
clothing and rings. Booty was normally pooled. Generals of a head.-wound dies over 14 days in winter or just
often vowed to dedicate a tenth of the booty to a seven in summer. Elsewhere the stages of death from
particular god if he granted victory. The rest might be peritonitis over five days after an abdominal wound are
given to 'booty.-sellers' who auctioned it to raise money described in agonizing detail. Casualties sometimes
for the state, or was simply divided among the troops. lingered on for considerably longer. It has been
Some of the captured armour would be used to erect a suggested that this may be why names are occasionally
trophy (tropaion) at the point where the 'tum round' added in different handwriting to the inscribed lists of
(trope) of the enemy had first occurred. Usually it was the fallen. (Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing)
nailed to a nearby tree as a
monument to the battle. Some of
the balance would be dedicated
to the gods, either at a local
sanctuary or at one of the great
pan.-Hellenic centres.
The defeated city would send
out its herald to request a truce to
bury their dead. According to the
customs of war this constituted
an admission of defeat, and so
was rarely refused. The request
was made as quickly as possible
so the bodies could be buried
before they began to putrefy
or were eaten by scavenging
animals. Normally the bodies
were buried together in a mass
grave on the battlefield.

25
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREf\T .AT \Vf\R

This Athenian vase depicts War, 4.43.3, 96.2, cf. 6·70.2) and Xenophon (Hdlenika, 4.3. 1 9, 6.4.14, cf.
a soldier taking leave of Memorabilia, 3.1.18) commonly refer to the push and shove of a hoplite melee.
his family as he goes off to
war. I t was part of a
Once experienced, such a thing was never easily forgotten and Aristophanes'
citizen's public dury to chorus of veteran hoplites is made to say: 'After running out with the spear and
fight when called upon. shield, we fought them ... each man stood up against each man ... we pushed
(R Sheridan/Ancient Art
them with the gods until evening.' (Wasps, 11.1081-85) The pushing with the
& Architecture)
shields explains the famous cry of Epaminondas, who had introduced a so--deep
phalanx, 'for one pace more' at Leuctra (Poryaenus, 2.3.2, cf. 3.9.27,4.3.8).
Once a hoplite was down, injured or not, he was unlikely ever to get up again.
This short but vicious 'serum' was resolved once one side had practically
collapsed. The phalanx became a mass, then a mob. There was no pursuit by the
victors, and those of the vanquished who were able fled the battlefield.

Greek armies in the 4th century

By the 4th century, the traditional clash of hoplite phalanxes had given way to
more sophisticated combat involving combined arms, using l-ighter--armed
peltasts, specialist skirmishing troops and, ever increasingly, cavalry. The
equipment of the hoplites themselves was adapted during the 4th century to
enable them to execute their tactical evolutions on the battlefield at speed and
without too much fatigue.
Peltasts were armed with javelins and daggers, or sometimes a thrusting spear
or sword. They had little or no armour, and their only protection was the
eponymous small shield, the pdte. After fighting against the lightly armed and
exceptionally mobile Thracian peltasts, the Greeks had created their own peltasts
and developed special hoplite tactics. Consequently, Greek states hired fewer
Thracian mercenaries, and the Thracians had to face more balanced Greek forces.
The much--debated reforms of the Athenian general Iphicrates, in the early
4th century, seem to have improved the equipment of peltasts, lengthening their
spears and swords, changing their armour and introducing special footwear,
altogether increasing speed and mobility.
Until the 5th century only the armies of the Boeotian and Thessalian Leagues
possessed anything more than a token force of cavalry. These two lowland areas
were the only ones with landowners rich enough to maintain horses, and land
suitable for cavalry warfare. Before the medieval invention of the horse--collar, the
motive power of the horse was not put to agricultural use: ploughing fields and
pulling wagons were jobs for yoked oxen. Horses were an indecently expensive
form of transport and a means of social display. Athens was able to develop a
cavalry force in the later 5th century thanks to the revenues of her growing empire.
The Athenians enacted legislation to compensate cavalrymen if their horses were

26
f\LEXi\NDER -fl-IE GREi\TATWi\R.

THE GREEKS IN PERSIA

Xenophon's Anabasis tells the story of the rebellion heaven, we have many glorious hopes of safety.'
of Prince Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes II, his (3.2.10) He roused the men saying 'Do not
defeat at Cunaxa in 40 I, and the fate of the Greek imagine that we are any the worse off because the
mercenaries in his army, the 'Ten Thousand'. native troops who were previously in our ranks
Xenophon, a young Athenian, joined the expedition have now left us. They are even greater cowards
as a volunteer and was elected commander by the than the natives which we have beaten, and they
mercenaries themselves after the battle. The make this clear by deserting us and fleeing to the
mercenaries decided to march 1,000 miles through other side.' (3.2.17) Though he was probably
the western satrapies of Persia back to Greece rather exaggerating to build the confidence of the Greeks,
than submit to the victorious Persian king, and these comments also show the way that many
Xenophon describes their arduous journey. He Greeks viewed the Persians at this time.
discusses how they dealt with the Persian forces To men like Isocrates, the march of the Ten
who attacked them, and draws sharp contrasts Thousand exposed the truth about the Persian
between the Greeks and the Persians through whose Empire: it was crumbling and a concerted
'barbarian' land they were travelling, finding the effort from the Greeks would bring it crashing
Persians weak and no match for Greek valour. down in ruins, even though the truth was that the
Xenophon was a supporter of the concept of the Ten Thousand had been mixed up in what was
pan.-Hellenic crusade. In the council of war he essentially a domestic wrangle. Persian forces
made a speech to the Greeks, persuading them not did not really attempt to stop the Greeks
to trust the Persians, but to act: 'If our purpose is leaving Persia, but they would react very differently
to take our arms in our hands and to make them to a Greek invasion. The revolt of Cyrus divided
pay for what they have done and for the future to Persian sympathies, but the unity of the empire
fight total war against them, then, with the help of against outside attack was, in 401, unimpaired.

killed on campaign, and the state paid an allowance for fodder, not just in time of
war, but on a permanent basis. Sparta and Corinth are the only other Greek states
known to have possessed forces of cavalry before the close of the 5th century. Most
states established cavalry contingents only in the 4th century.
The advent of larger, more permanent federal entities in Greece also led to
permanent armies raised from the citizens of the member cities. These troops,
many of them peltasts, had to be paid regularly, a new development for which
the states were not necessarily prepared. To solve this problem contingents of
Greek mercenaries were offered for service, particularly to the Persians. These
contingents were no longer paid individually; rather the Greek state was paid for
the loan of its army during times of peace.

28
 GREE(~E IN THE 5TH A,NO 4TH (~ENTURIES

THE RISE OF THEBES

The victory of Sparta in the Peloponnesian War and the destruction of the
Athenian Empire ended the balance of power in the Greek world. Nevertheless,
the price of victory had been great and domination of Greece made demands on
Sparta that she could not easily meet. Sparta was notoriously short of
manpower and the needs of empire - maintaining garrisons and fleets, and
providing Spartiate officials abroad - strained her resources and undermined the
simple but effective socio--economic basis of the state and its military power. But
the problems were not only domestic. Spartan power had already provoked
hostility in Greece, and so when the Spartan king Agesilaus took up the cause
of freedom for the Greeks in an expedition against the western satrapies of Asia
Minor in 396, Persia supported a coalition of Thebes, Corinth, Argos and a
resurgent Athens in a war against Sparta, which was known as the Corinthian
War. The Athenian general Conon was put in charge of the Persian fleet that
destroyed the Spartan navy in 394 and removed many Spartan garrisons from
the Ionian cities and islands. Following this however, the Athenians began to
rediscover their own imperial ambitions, so in 387/386 a Spartan envoy called
Antalcidas was able to negotiate a treaty with the Persian king, Artaxerxes II.
Under the terms of the King's Peace, a general truce was agreed between all the
.Greek states, with limited autonomy for the Ionian Greeks. Peaceful relations
were thus guaranteed by the power of the Persian king. Although Sparta had
withstood the Corinthian War, the bitter confrontations of this war were the
forerunners of a life--and--death struggle that would see the brief emergence of
Thebes as the dominant hoplite power.
The famous Theban wedge, where instead of meeting the enemy line in
parallel, the infantry formed an oblique wedge targeting just one area of the
opposing army, began to be used as a defensive measure in 394. Soon, however,
it became clear that it had tremendous offensive potential and, as a result of the
successful execution of Theban tactics by the renowned Sacred Band, Thebes
replaced Sparta as the leader of Greece, at least on land. Sparta's defeat at
Theban hands in the battle of Leuctra in 371 was catastrophic and it was
followed by Theban invasions of the Peloponnese, the foundation of
Megalopolis as a check on Spartan activities in the south, and the liberation of
Messenia, which had hitherto provided Sparta with slaves (helots) and its
economic underpinnings.
Meanwhile, Athens attempted to revive its maritime power by creating the
Second Athenian League. This fell far short of the Delian League of the 5th
century, for the member states were wary of Athenian imperialistic ambitions
and the Athenians themselves were incapable of asserting their domination by

29
ALEXANDER. THE GREAT A.T \VAR

force. The Social War of 357-55 began after several cities broke away from the
league. All these debilitating wars of the city--states had diverted Greek attention
from the growing danger in the north: Macedon, whose king, Philip II, used the
Social War to further his interests in the Aegean region.
During these power struggles in Greece, Persia maintained her interest in a
divided Greece by playing the city--states against each other. The allure of
Persian gold often proved a temptation too great amongst the warring city--states
in their struggles for hegemony.

30
 GREECE IN THE 5TH Lt\ND 4TH (~ENTlJRIES

A PAN-HELLENIC CAMPAIGN OPPOSITE

These internal divisions did not go unnoticed by some in Greece, such as the Desperate fights to the
death, with massive
rhetorician Isocrates, who lamented the exhausting and fruitless feuding casualties on both sides,
amongst Greeks. This, he thought, could best be overcome by their uniting were relativery rare in
in a crusade of retribution against Persia for the sacrilegious crimes which hop lite warfare. One
exception was the battle of
had been committed against Greece a century earlier, a theme expressed in his
Coroneia in 394. With the
Panegyricus of 380. The theory of pan--Hellenism in his rhetoric did not always outbreak of the Corinthian
match the reality of conflicts between the Greek states. Sparta had accepted War, the Spartan king
Agesilaus was recalled to
Persian support during and after the Peloponnesian War, and Macedon,
Europe after his successful
perhaps out of necessity, had gone over to the Persians during the invasions of campaign against the
the early 5th century; however, the ideal of pan--Hellenism remained a powerful Persians in Asia Minor.
On his march back
intellectual construct. A commitment to 'freedom', what we might today call a
through Boeotia he was
right to self--determination, was deeply valued throughout Greek society, opposed by an ar~ of
despite the apparently contradictory fact that city--states were not averse to Argives and Thebans.
sacrificing the freedom of fellow Greeks if it was in the interests of their own Xenophon, an eyewitness
of the battle, described the
city--state. The Greek city--states in Asia Minor had found their independence action in detail 'as there
under threat on several occasions when they had been sold out by fellow has been none like it in our
Greeks on the mainland who were attempting to curry favour with the time'. Agesilaus was
victorious on the right
Persians. This happened again with the King's Peace, when Sparta accepted
where the Argives fled
Persian dominion over the cities of western Asia Minor in return for Persian before Agesilaus' army
support of Spartan hegemony in Greece. Despite this apparent inconsistency, came into contact. The
other allies on this flank
'liberation' of Greeks from the yoke of Persian rule was a concept and project
fled. The Argives took
often lauded. If not exactly wrath, Sparta did incur some shame from fellow refuge on nearby Mount
Greeks in what could be portrayed as her treacherous dealings with the old Helicon. On the other
flank the Theban phalanx
enemy, Persia.
broke through and reached
Nevertheless, by the middle of the 4th century, after a half--century of internal the Spartan baggage train.
struggles, no one city--state in Greece was in a position to undertake Alerted to this, Agesilaus
leadership in the endeavour, nor, it seems, did any have the will to do so. A new wheeled his phalanx
around, prompting the
power to the north of the heartland of Greece, however, was soon to be in such Thebans to turn about in
a position and under the leadership of its king, Philip II, Macedon was gradually an attempt to reach the
to take up the call. Argives on Mount Helicon
and a desperate struggle
ensued. (Adam Hook ©
Osprey Publishing)

31
PERSIA IN THE 5TH AND
4TH CENTURIES
n the 4th century, the Persian Empire was the largest ever seen in the ancient

I Near East. The ruler of this vast realm was the Great King, known to the
Greeks as megas basileus. By the time of Alexander's invasion, the Persian
Empire extended from the shores of western Anatolia to the Indus Valley in the
east and from Bactria (modern Afghanistan) in the north to the southern
cataracts of the river Nile in Egypt. The inhabitants of Egypt had staged a
successful revolt in 405, and from then until just before Alexander's invasion a
main aim of the empire was to reconquer the province. The constant revolts
within the empire over many years had taken their toll on its economy, as putting
down each revolt incurred huge costs, and the loss of Achaemenid control over
areas such as Anatolia, India and Egypt also meant the loss of revenues.
From the time of Darius I (521-486), the Persian Empire was divided into
administrative units known as satrapies, each under the governership of a Persian
noble satrap. In return for protecting the empire they were granted a great degree
of autonomy. The Persian king was reliant on the support and co--operation of the
satraps. However, at times they proved less than loyal to the king. Rebellions
occurred, particularly in the 360s in Asia Minor when a number of now virtually
hereditary satraps attempted to carve out essentially independent kingdoms. In
addition, rivals and usurpers to the throne, like Cyrus the Younger, also emerged
from the satrapal ranks.
Persian nobles had a long tradition of being fierce warriors and independent
aristocrats, so they did not accept a minor role in the hierarchy of the empire.
Individuals who were closely related to the king were often made the satraps of large
or strategically important provinces, while others were given command over armies
or other positions of responsibility. They lived in magnificent palaces and enjoyed OPPOSITE
the use of large estates in the provinces. The public distribution of prestigious gifts, Enamelled brick relief
showing a procession of
particularly items of gold and silver, was a method used by the kings to indicate who
archers from the palace of
were the most favoured nobles. The Persians maintained their cohesion and Darius I in Susa. (a kg;
distinctiveness in several ways, including their dress, their use of the Persian images/Erich Lessing)

33
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \Vl\R

language and the education of their sons. Persian boys spent the first five years of
their lives away from their fathers in the company of their mothers and other
women of the household, but thereafter were taught to be soldiers and rulers.
Herodotus claimed that from the age of five to 20 young men were taught only three
things: riding, archery and honesty (Histories, I. 136). Expertise at the hunt and its

ACHAEMENID CULTURE
Zoroastrianism was the main religion of the As Zoroastrianism spread across the Empire, it
Achaemenids, and the main principles of the was subject to syncretic influences from the
Zoroastrian religion, with its emphasis on truth different nations and religions. Conquered nations
and justice, shaped the way that the Achaemenid were allowed to continue observance of their own
kings ruled the nations of their great empire. religions and languages. For example, Cyrus the
Herodotus recorded that the most disgraceful thing Great freed the Jews from their Babylonian
in the world to a Persian was the telling of a lie, and captivity, and aided them in their rebuilding of the
indeed the telling of a lie was punishable by death Temple in Jerusalem. The language of the empire
in some extreme cases. under Cyrus and Darius was Elamite, though in
inscriptions the Elamite texts are accompanied by
Akkadian and Old Persian versions. Following
the conquest of Mesopotamia, Aramaic
became the most used language in the
empire, although debate continues over
whether it was the 'official' language.
Just as Achaemenid religion was
subject to many influences, so
Achaemenid art and architecture
was a blend of many elements.
The inclusion of local styles and
motifs was acceptable so long as
the overall effect was Persian, and
it can be seen in Persian artefacts
and architecture, such as at the
palaces of Pasargadae and Persepolis.
(6th--century Achaemenid bowl, Werner
Forman Archive/Schimmel Collection,
New York)

34
 PERSIA IN THE 5TH AND 4TH CENTURIES

CHRONOLOGY OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

559 Cyrus the Great becomes king of Persia 499-386 Greek and Persian Wars
550 Cyrus takes control of the Median 499 Persians attack N axos
Empire 499-493 Ionian Revolt
547 Cyrus conquers Lydia and captures king 494 Persians quell Ionians
Croesus 491 Darius demands all Greek states submit
539 Cyrus conquers Babylon to Persian rule
530 Death of Cyrus; accession of Cambyses 40 I Artaxerxes defeats Cyrus at battle of
525 Cambyses invades Egypt Cunaxa
522 Death of Cambyses; Darius becomes 396- 394 Agesilaus establishes Persian bridgehead
king of Persia in Asia Minor
520/519 Darius campaigns against Scythia 394-387 The Corinthian War
519-518 Darius extends Persian control over the 387/386 The King's Peace
Ionians

associated skills of archery and spear--throwing transferred easily to the military OVERLEAF

sphere. On a rock inscription at Nagsh--e--Rustam, Darius the Great proclaimed the Persepolis. The Achaemenids built
a number of palaces, though onry
values of the Persian nobility: 'As a horseman I am a good horseman. As a bowman
those at Persepolis, Pasargadae
I am a good bowman both afoot and on horseback. As a spearman I am a good and Susa have been excavated.
spearman both afoot and on horseback.' After the age of 20, men were liable for Darius the Great began
construction of a grand series of
military service until they were 50.
palaces at Persepolis in the late
The ruling Persian elite did not remain completely apart from the subject 6th century, and the building
peoples of the empire. Intermarriage between Persians and non--Persians did continued under Xerxes. The

occur, with the daughters of Persian nobles marrying local princes and the palaces brought together artistic
sryles from throughout the empire,
Persians taking local aristocratic women as wives or concubines. Cyrus the Great creating the 'Persepolis sryle'.
had a policy of respecting local traditions and retaining some local aristocrats and The eastern stairs to Darius the

religious leaders in his administration of Media, Lydia and Babylonia, and Great's audience hall are covered
in carvings of subjects from
subsequent kings followed this policy in newly conquered areas. People from the different regions of Persia
conquered lands who had been in positions of power were often granted high bringing tribute to the king.
status and were accepted into the king's court with the honorary title of 'royal The tribute brought by the
subjects reflects the cultural
friend'. Similar treatment was sometimes granted to exiles from states outside the
and natural resources from their
empire who sought the protection and assistance of the Great King. regions, including camels from
The Persian kings exploited their huge empire in two main ways. They taxed Arabia and Bactria, gold from
India and horses from Scythia. As
the subject peoples, demanding regular payments of tribute and they utilized
well as tribute, the Achaemenid
their manpower in military expeditions to conquer new territories or to kings exacted a tax in silver.
suppress revolts in those they already ruled. In several satrapies lower--ranking (akg~images/Suzanne Held)

35
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREf\T l\T \Vf\R

ACHAEMENID KINGS OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

Cyrus II, the Great 559-53° Sogdianus 42 3
Cambyses II 52 9-5 22 Darius II Nothus 4 2 3-4°4
Smerdis 522 Artaxerxes II Mnemon 40 4-35 8
Darius I, the Great 522 -4 86 Artaxerxes III Ochus 35 8-33 8
Xerxes I 4 85-4 6 5 Artaxerxes N Arses 33 8-33 6
Artaxerxes I 46 5-4 2 4 Darius III Codomanus 33 6-33 0
Xerxes II 42 3 Artaxerxes V Bessus 33°-3 2 9

Persians and Medians were granted small estates that provided them with
modest revenues. In return they were expected to maintain themselves as
cavalrymen or charioteers, or to provide infantry soldiers for the king's armies.
In years when such services were not demanded their estates were subject to
taxes in silver or in kind, much like the rest of the satrapy.
Surviving records show that the Persian Empire created a complex bureaucracy
to administer the satrapies and dispose of their revenues according to the king's
instructions. Members of the royal court and many other persons of importance
were granted food and provisions from the royal storehouses. A system of roads
linked together the main centres, Sardis, Ecbatana, Babylon, Susa and Persepolis.
These roads were primarily for the use of soldiers and royal couriers who were
provided with way--stations, but the roads also facilitated the movement of trade
and tribute across the empire.
In addition to the satraps, there were rulers of smaller administrative units known
to the Greeks as hyparchs (byparcboi) , but the use of terminology is often
inconsistent in Greek sources and the titles 'satrap' and 'hyparch' are sometimes
used interchangeably. Both can be found commanding regionally recruited troops.

THE PERSIAN ARMY

Under the Achaemenids, the army of the peoples of the Iranian plateau
developed significantly. Earlier in Media, the army, known in Old Persian as the
spada, was first organized into distinct units at the end of the 7th century by the
Median king, Cyaxares. After the Medes were superseded and brought into the
Persian Empire, the Medes, along with the Persians formed the core of the
spada. As the Empire expanded, subjugated peoples, such as the Hyrcanians and
the Bactrians, were incorporated into the army, using their native weapons,
skills and techniques. The carvings at Persepolis, and official Persian documents

38
 PERSIi\ IN TI-IE 5TI-I l\ND 4 Tl-I CENTURIES

used by Herodotus, indicate that the closer a nation was to the Persians, the
more it shared in the domination of the empire, contributing more troops and
paying less tribute; hence the large numbers of Medes in the army and among
the commanders. The Persians were also prepared to adapt their warfare: they
were keen to make use of Greek mercenaries after their superiority as heavy
infantry had been learned at first hand during the Greek and Persian Wars.
The Persian army was composed primarily of satrapal levies, each of the
Achaemenid provinces providing troops. These troops were then divided into
decimal units. Herodotus and Xenophon speak regularly of myriads and
chiliarchies, units of 10,000 and 1,000, which the Persians themselves called
baivaraba and hazaraba (sing. baivarabam and hazarabam). Each baivarabam had
its baivarpatish (myriarch); and there was a hazarapatish (chiliarch) for every
hazarabam, which in turn was subdivided into ten groups of 100 (sataba) , and
these into ten units of ten (dathaba). These were, in reality, only nominal
strengths, and thus we can explain, at least in part, the wildly exaggerated numbers
of Persians in the Greek sources, especially in Herodotus' account of the Persian
Wars. Apart from the standing army, for major campaigns the Persians levied
troops from all the subject peoples of the empire, gathering men from as far afield
as Egypt and India, but the most reliable soldiers were always the Persians and the
mercenaries from Iran and central Asia.
Some type of uniform seems to have been worn in the Achaemenid army long
before it appeared in Greek armies. Cyrus the Great is documented as having
handed out Median cloaks to his officers in the 6th century. Uniformity in dress
seems to have applied to officers of the royal administration and units of the
central army. Regimental commanders had their own standards, behind which
the regiment would form up. These standards marked the commander so that
he could be quickly located on the battlefield or in camp by messengers, and the
standard was used to signal that the regiment should move.

Cavalry
Native Persian military strength lay in their cavalry. The horse stocks of Nisea
provided the finest mounts in the ancient Near East. The conquest of Lydia in
547 had demonstrated to Cyrus the Great the need for a reliable corps of
Persian cavalry, so he distributed conquered land among the Persian nobles so
that they could raise horses and fight as cavalry. The Persian king also used
Medes as cavalry and from the reign of Darius I onwards the Persians recruited
mercenary infantry and cavalry from the Saka tribes of central Asia.
The 3,000--strong cavalry of the Persian standing army are mentioned in
several sources. Under the command of the Master of Horse, they were

39
ALEXANDER TI-IE GRE1\T AT \Vl\R

DARIUS III AND SPEAR-BEARERS

The appearance of Darius III, on the right, is
based on the Alexander mosaic. He wears the
royal robe in purple with a wide white median
stripe. He wears a red belt and an akenakes
dagger with golden sheath. He wears his hood
upright, a distinction of dress reserved only for
the king. Other Persians wore the hood turned
down at the side or front. This kitaris headdress
is bound with a blue diadem. On the left is a
spear..bearer carrying the royal standard, as
shown in the Alexander mosaic. He is wearing
royal dress, the main component of which is the
purple tunic with central white stripe. The
sources indicate that royal dress could be
awarded by the king to individuals, or in the case
of the spear..bearers, to a whole group. Sea..purple
dye was the most expensive dye known in
antiquity, and even substitute shades were
expensive. Its value led the king to hoard purple
cloth and distribute it as a mark of his power.
Alexander captured large stores of the cloth, but
was so generous in his distribution that he had to he may be the hazarapatish, the commanding officer of
write to the cities of Ionia directing them to send the spear..bearers. The blue stripe on his tunic may have
him more so that he could dress all his been to differentiate him from the king. Presumably
Companions in purple. Saffron was the most such an important officer would have had decoration at
valuable luxury dye after purple. Harvested from the collar, but the sarcophagus is too faded to enable
the three pistils inside a crocus blossom, at least restoration. He wears a golden torque, given to him by
20,000 blossoms have to be stripped and toasted the king. It is not known who held the post of
to yield one kilogram of dry saffron. Thus after hazarapatish during Darius' reign, but as Plutarch
purple, yellow was the most common colour described Mazaeus as the greatest Persian after Darius,
used to dress elite Achaemenid units. it seems probable that he held the post, as well as that
The central figure is a man of some importance. of satrap of Cilicia. The evidence suggests that all
The details of his dress are taken from the members of the spear..bearers carried the hoplite shield.
Alexander sarcophagus, and seem to indicate that (Simon Chew © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

40
 PERSI1\ IN l~I-IE S-rH l\ND 4TI-I CENTURIES

supplied with horses from central studs. The Persian cavalry were mainly
recruited from the nobility, and the elite cavalry units would have been drawn
from the highest circles. It seems there were at least three regiments of elite
cavalry. Men in these units might have been marked out by distinctive badges
of status given to them by the king, such as golden jewellery, weapons or
clothes. At least one of these regiments, if not all of them, was composed of men
from the most esteemed group of nobles, the King's 'Kinsmen'. The 15,006
Kinsmen were not actual relatives, but were awarded this honorific status. They
alone were allowed to exchange kisses with the king, a form of greeting only
permissible between social equals, and dine with him at the King's Banquet, for
which a thousand animals were slaughtered daily. Diodorus Siculus mentions
that at Gaugamela, Darius himself commanded a squadron of 1,000 Kinsmen,
each chosen for their courage and loyalty.
Persian cavalry were armed and equipped in a variety of ways. Shields had
been carried since the mid--5th century, and from the late 5th century, horsemen
wore cuirasses and their mounts were equipped with armoured saddles and
breastplates. Reforms in their equipment in the early 4th century introduced
arm--guards, moving the cavalry one step further towards the fully armoured
cataphract seen in later Persian armies. They were armed in a similar manner to
the infantry, but with two spears.

A gold model chariot

from the Oxus Treasure,
Achaemenid Persian,
5th-4th century.
This is one of the most
outstanding pieces in the
treasure, which is the most
important collection of gold
and silver to have survived
from the Achaemenid
period. The model chariot
is drawn by four horses.
I nside are two men in
Median dress. The front
of the chariot is decorated
with the Egyptian
dwarf;god Bes,
a popular protective
deiry. (The British
Museum/HIP/TopFoto)

41
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREf\T l\T vVf\R

The 360s saw a number of satrapal revolts and intrigues. Due to the upheaval
during this period the quality of Persian cavalry began to deteriorate. The
Persian landholders in the western satrapies who provided the empire with its
cavalry regiments had been reduced by constant war. Previously they had
supplied men for service from their own households, and only garrison troops
were paid; now cavalrymen were recruited from wherever possible, and all of
them had to be paid. When Artaxerxes III came to the throne in 358 he decided
that the satrapal armies could no longer guarantee the security of the western
borders and ordered them to be disbanded.
Also fighting in the Persian army were units of camel--borne troops, chariots
and scythed chariots, which appear in some of the battles against Alexander.

Infantry
The principal soldiers seen in all Persian armies were usually infantrymen who
were Persian by birth and who carried large shields, often made of hide and osier
willow. They fought with a variety of weapons including long spears, axes,
swords and bows and arrows. Their armour was minimal, consisting at most of
a padded cuirass of linen and perhaps a helmet, although most images show
them wearing caps or hoods.
The most important unit of the army was the king's personal division, his
guards and the elite of the standing army. It unfailingly maintained its full
strength of 10,000 and hence was known as the 'Immortals'. This infantry unit
formed the elite - men selected for their physical excellence and their valour -
and appears to have included a contingent of 1,000 spear--bearers, known from
the golden apples that constituted their spearbutts as mdophoroi or 'apple--
bearers', though the sources are not conclusive. These spear--bearers would
therefore have been the first infantry regiment of the army.
The traditional fighting formation for infantry in the Near East in the first
millennium Be was the archer--pair. This consisted of an archer protected by
a large shield held by a partner. During the early empire, the majority of
Achaemenid infantry were sparabara, bearers of the large rectangular spara
shields. The ten men of the front line of the unit carried shields, while behind,
protected by the shields, were arrayed the other nine ranks, each man armed
with a bow and falchion. The front row would have short fighting spears to
protect the rest of the unit if the enemy reached the line. Sometimes, however,
the whole unit was armed with bows, and the shields were propped up as a
protecting wall at the front. After the battles ofPlataea and Mycale, the Persians
realized they needed to give the sparabara a means of protecting themselves if
the spara wall was broached. Some wore cuirasses, but what was needed was a

42
 PERSIf\ IN TI-IE 5Tl-I f\ND 4TI-I CENTURIES

THE IMMORTALS

Composite regiments in the Persian army are silver braiding, are restored from the Alexander
mentioned by Xenophon in the Cyropedia, sarcophagus, and are likely to represent several
comprising two ranks of infantry at the front, two different regiments of the Immortals, separate from
ofjavelinmen or takabara, two of archers, and then the spear--bearers and the yellow and blue regiments
at the back two ranks of 'file--closers', whose arms distinctly shown in the carvings. All these figures
are not noted. This formation was designed to seem to wear the purple tunic distinction and
combine heavy missile power with heavy infantry. yellow hoods, though the hoods are worn by
It is debatable whether such a formation really regiments other than the Immortals. The central
existed, although Alexander did attempt to form a figure carrying an axe wears a cloak with leopard--
composite phalanx of Macedonian and Persian skin trim, and a lining made of the fur of small
forces towards the end of his campaign. If the animals. The infantryman spearing the leopard is
composite regiment did exist, the evidence seems to equipped as a cuirassed foot--soldier or officer from
suggest that the ten regiments of the Immortals the front rank of a composite regiment. The archer
might have been organized in this way, with some at the left may also come from a composite
individuals carrying hoplite shields, others carrying regiment, one of several distinguished by scarlet
the taka and some equipped as archers. These tunics. Scarlet dye was obtained from the kermes
infantrymen, wearing tunics distinguished by oak, a tree especially abundant in ancient Iran.
purple collars and cuffs and hems decorated with (Simon Chew © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

43
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREAT i\T \Vi\R

shield to ward off the Greek spear--thrusts. 50 shields to be carried by the

individual were introduced. Called taka, they were constructed of wood or
leather, and had a segment cut out of the top to give the archer good vision.
Persia employed mercenaries from within and without the empire. Many
regiments of mercenary infantry were raised locally, often by the satrap.
However, there was not a vast number of available men to fight, for after each
nation was taken into the Persian Empire, military training for their young men
ceased. This meant that mercenaries were raised from areas that were still 'free'.
As well as Greek mercenaries, the Persians made use of mercenaries from the
5aka tribes to the north, and the peoples of northern India to the east. From
within the empire they could also call upon some hill tribes. These peoples,
such as the Kurds, Mysians, Pisidians, Hyrcanians and Bactrians, were almost
constantly in revolt against the authority of the Persian king, but the Persians
did not destroy them because they were such a important source of mercenaries,
and necessary to ensure the survival of the empire. Most of these troops fought
with spears and the taka, so were known as takabara, and frequently fought as
troops of the line in hand--to--hand fighting.
From at least the middle of the 5th century, Persia made extensive use of Greek
mercenaries, usually in the form of personal bodyguards for provincial chiefs and
garrisons for the Greek cities of western Asia Minor. In the 4th century,
increasing numbers of mercenaries were employed by the western satraps and
figured prominently in their periodic revolts against the Great King, most notably
the 10,000 who fought for Cyrus the Younger in 401. It is certain that many
mercenaries were recruited from the local Greek populations of Asia Minor.
Great numbers of mainland Greek mercenaries were recruited from the
mountainous regions of the Peloponnese, though their commanders came from
all areas of Greece. There is evidence that some of the mercenaries at the
Granicus hailed from Athens, Thebes and even Thessaly. During the 4th century,
the increase in federal states in Greece led to new permanent armies, and hiring
them out to Persia as a force rather than individually in peacetime was used as a
way to pay for their upkeep.
The invasion of Asia Minor by Agesilaus in the early 4th century and earlier
encounters had shown the Persians that their infantry were no match for
Greek hoplites. In their attempts to re--conquer Egypt they had employed Greek
mercenaries, among them the Athenian general Iphicrates, who created the
'Iphicratean peltast', converting the non--hoplite Greek mercenaries into
takabara but further strengthening their equipment. Iphicrates armed these
men with newly lengthened spears, and taka shields. These long spears may
have been part of the inspiration for the Macedonian sarissa. These men could

44
PERSIA IN THE 5TH A.NO 4TH (~ENTURIES

Achaemenid takabara
fighting Greek hoplite.
The scene on this Athenian
vase was probabry inspired
by war in the 390S. The
hoplite's shield,device may
preserve that of one of the
allied contingents fighting
on the Spartan side. (a kg,
images/Erich Lessing)

45
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAI~

fight in the front line of the army and stand up to hoplites. Limits on the
number of available Greek mercenaries following the battle of Leuctra in 371
then led to the equipping and training of 120,000 Asiatic mercenaries in the
king's employ as hoplites.
Around 354, the satrap Artabazus rose up in revolt, supported by first an
Athenian army, then a Theban contingent. Artaxerxes eventually put down the
revolt, and took over control of the Theban army. He then spent some years
settling other revolts, before turning to the reconquest of Egypt. For this
contingents of troops were hired from Thebes, Argos and the Greek cities of

46
 PERSIA IN THE 5TH AND 4 TH (~ENTURIES

COULD PERSIA HAVE DEFEATED ALEXANDER?

The stunning successes of Alexander have tended make contact with the Persian fleet. It failed to
to obscure the vitality of Persian military reach the coast. The Persians were depending on
operations during Alexander's invasion. There the cavalry to turn the situation around, and to
were significant attempts after Issus to seize the help them do this a large force of scythed chariots
strategic initiative, and to replace the troops lost in was created to open up gaps in the Macedonian line
battle. New infantry forces were raised in that the cavalry could then exploit. Gaugamela
Babylonia, and an army was sent into Anatolia to would be the test of Persia's last hope.

Asia Minor. Though kardaka were also present, the expendable Greek This reconstruction shows
contingents were supposed to take the worst of the fighting. The reconquest various rypes of infantry in
the Persian army in 333.
was complete by 343. On the left is an archer,
The kardaka seem to have been non--Persian, non--Greek, troops of the royal perhaps from an elite
household, or royal mercenaries. It is not clear how far back in time they had regiment since he has
silver braiding on his
existed, but they were present at Issus. It is possible that although they were not
tunic. In the centre
ethnically Persian, they were accorded the status of a Persian bondsman in return appears a kardaka
for their military service, and given some of the benefits restricted to the Persians. infantryman, based
on information from
Under Artaxerxes III the system of settling retired mercenaries on land in the
the Alexander mosaic.
empire was revived, and whole communities of retired kardaka were placed in He carries a painted
strategic locations in the empire with the aim of maintaining the local peace. The bronze hoplite shield.
On the right is a satrapal
full extent of the system is unclear, but there is evidence of settlements in Egypt,
infantryman, based on
Iran and Lycia. It seems the allotment of land to a retired mercenary incurred a a fresco in a tomb in
liability for service from him and his descendants. This was exploited by the Macedonia. He is probabry
Hellenistic rulers who followed Alexander, and the sources note regiments of a takabara in the service of
one of the western satraps.
kardaka in Hellenistic armies in the 3rd century. The kardaka system inspired He therefore may not have
changes in the Greek and Macedonian practice of military settlements. been an Iranian, but may
Discharged soldiers were now settled on allotments in return for military service have been recruited in
Anatolia. His white
from themselves and their descendants, allowing the East to be Hellenicized.
hood may indicate
his non--Persian status.
He carries a round
shield, and a sword in
a scabbard. His sword
is probabry his secondary
weapon, to be used after
losing the spear. (Simon
Chew © Osprry
Publishing Ltd)

47
THE RISE OF MACEDON
acedon, for the most part, had been exempt from the continual state

M of war in Greece because its geographical position and strategic

significance were of little account in Graeco.. Persian politics. Macedon
was the product of the union of Upper and Lower Macedon, which was
completed in the time of King Philip II and to which were added new cities
containing new - that is, naturalized - citizens. The country was not highly
urbanized and most of the population were herdsmen. The origins of the
Macedonian state in antiquity are obscure, as they were to the classical Greeks
who generally regarded the inhabitants of Macedon as semi.. barbarous and
residing on the periphery of the civilized world. According to tradition, the
Argead line of kings was established in the 8th century but little is heard of
them until Herodotus mentions them in his coverage of the Greek and Persian
Wars. The exact nature of Macedonian kingship is also unclear, but accession
to the throne was often subj ect to internal and foreign intrigue, including
assassination, with no fewer than 13 monarchs ruling between Alexander I and
Philip II, in a period of less than a century.
During the Greek and Persian Wars, Macedon had been a vassal kingdom of
the Persian Empire, and its king, Alexander I Philhellene, had acted primarily
in his own interests, despite his nickname, which means 'friend of the Greeks'.
He had dissuaded a Greek expeditionary force from occupying the Vale of
Tempe, which separated Macedon from Thessaly, because he did not want
Xerxes' large army bottled up in Macedon where it would be a drain on the
kingdom's resources. Later he advised the Athenians to accept the reality of
Persian power and surrender to Xerxes, which, of course, they decided not to do.
Alexander's son, Perdiccas II, ruled during the Peloponnesian War and OPPOSITE
maintained himself and the kingdom by vacillating between support of Sparta 4th . . century iron
breastplate with gold
and Athens, according to the threat that each posed and the changing fortunes ornamentation found in
of the war. By the end of the century, Perdiccas' son Archelaus II had begun to the tomb of Philip I I of
strengthen the kingdom: new roads were created and an effort was made to Macedon. (The Art
Archive/Archaeological
import Greek culture from the south. Indeed, the playwright Euripides died Museum Salonica/Gianni
in Macedon, where he had written his gruesome tragedy The Baccbae. But Dagli Oni)

49
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

4TH-CENTURY CHRONOLOGY OF MACEDON

368-365 Philip, son of Amyntas III, future king of 346 Peace of Philocrates; Philip becomes
Macedon, resides in Thebes as a hostage master of northern Greece
360/359 Perdiccas III killed in battle; accession of 33 8 Battle of Chaeronea; Philip becomes
Philip II, first as regent to Amyntas N master of all Greece
359-336 Reign of Philip II of Macedon 337 Formation of the League of Corinth,
356 Birth of Alexander the Great headed by Philip II
35 2 Philip II's victory over the Phocians at 33 6 Death of Philip II; accession of
the 'Crocus Field' Alexander III, the Great

4TH-CENTURY ARGEAD KINGS OF MACEDON

Craterus 399 Amyntas III (restored) 39 2 -37°
Orestes and Aeropus II 399-39 6 Alexander II 370-3 68
Archelaus II 39 6-393 Ptolemy I 368 -3 65
Amyntas III 393 Perdiccas III 365-3 60 /359
Pausanias 393 Amyntas N 359-35 6
Amyntas III 393 Philip II 359-33 6
Argaeus II 393-39 2 Alexander III, the Great 33 6-3 2 3

Archelaus did not live to fulfil his ambitions succumbing, as so many

Macedonians did, to an assassin's dagger.
The death of Archelaus was followed by a succession of short--lived rulers
until Amyntas III re--established a measure of stability. Nevertheless, the
kingdom was constantly threatened by the Illyrians to the west and the
imperialistic (or, at least, hegemonic) tendencies of the Athenians and Thebans.
By the queen Eurydice, Amyntas had three sons, all destined to rule. Alexander
II held the throne only briefly (370-368) before he was murdered. A brother..
in--law, Ptolemy ofAlorus, then served as regent for the under--aged Perdiccas III,
but was assassinated in 365. Perdiccas was now master of his own house and
throne, but the kingdom continued to be threatened by the Illyrians to the west,
and in 360/359 these destroyed the Macedonian army, leaving Perdiccas and
4,000 men dead on the battlefield and only a child as heir to the throne.
Amyntas Ill's remaining son, Philip II, now came to the fore at the age of 23,
probably initially appointed regent to his infant nephew, Amyntas N. To extricate
 THE RISE ()F MACEO()N

Macedon from its current precarious posItIon, and to secure his own future, In 382 the Spartans sent
Philip had to expand the power of the throne. For this to be possible, diplomacy an allied army to help King
Amyntas of Macedon win
and military innovation - the creation of a powerful army - were imperative. back his lands from the
During the reigns of his brothers, Philip had spent some time as a hostage in Orynthians. While Macedon
was mostlY famed for its
Thebes, where he had witnessed the Theban infantry reforms and had given
cavalry, some time around
thought to applying the same lessons to the Macedonian army. This experience the end of the 5th century
gave him the knowledge and skills to deal with the ongoing threat from Illyria. or the earry 4th century one of
the Macedonian kings raised
Indeed, he dealt with the crisis so effectively - combining military action with
a force of hoplites. On the left
diplomacy, or even duplicity - that the claims of Amyntas N were swept aside, is a Spartan on horseback.
and Philip became king in 359. The Macedonian hoplite,
in the centre, is equipped
Philip's diplomacy and army reforms elevated the status of the previously in a very similar manner to
derided Macedon. A contemporary historian, Theopompus of Chios, claimed the Spartans and their allies.
that 'Europe had never before produced such a man as Philip', and his Behind him stands a Cretan
mercenary archer, serving with
impressive and startling achievements should not be overlooked, even though the Spartans. (Angus McBride
they are inevitably overshadowed by those of his son. © Osprry Publishing)

51
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

PARMENION
Parmenion (c.400-330) fought in the Macedonian Alexander's second--in--command at all of Alexander's
army under both Philip II and Alexander. He was the major battles, where he controlled the Macedonian
son of a nobleman and Philip's most trusted general, left, and his sons Philotas and Nicanor obtained
winning a great victory over the Illyrians in 356. In major commands.
346 he was sent on the embassy to Athens that led to Parmenion continued as second--in--command until
the Peace of Philocrates. With Attalus and Amyntas 330 when he was charged with securing the captured
he led the advance force to Asia Minor in 336. treasure of Persia in Ecbatana. That year he was
When Parmenion was recalled to Macedon after sentenced to death after being implicated in Philotas'
Philip's murder he quickly associated himself with alleged plot against Alexander. There seems to be no
Alexander, helping him to secure the throne by proof that he was involved, but as he posed a possible
acquiescing in the murder of Attalus. This service threat to Alexander's ambitions, the conspiracy
won him and his family great rewards. He served as provided a convenient excuse for his murder.

PHILIP II'S ARMY

In reorganiz;ing the army Philip took into consideration the advances of the
Thebans. In particular, he is likely to have noted the tactical innovations of the
two great Theban military commanders, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, including
the Theban wedge. By lengthening the leftmost columns of the traditional
hoplite battle infantry line and co--ordinating cavalry to attack the flanks of the
enemy, Epaminondas was able to lead the Boeotians to victory over Sparta and
her Peloponnesian allies in decisive battles at Leuctra in 371 and Mantinea in
362, effectively ending Spartan supremacy in Greece. These innovations
highlighted the changing nature of warfare in the 4th century. No longer would
the traditional clash of heavy armed classical hoplites alone prove decisive on
the battlefield. Rethinking the use and nature of heavy infantry, the place and
role of lightly armed auxiliaries and, most importantly, the integration of cavalry
into the battlefield were crucial lessons to be learned.

The ~New Model' phalanx

Philip's military innovations had an immediate and enduring effect. Diodorus
Siculus wrote that:

Philip was not panic--stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils,

but, bringing together the Macedonians in a series of assemblies and
exhorting them with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their

52
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT WAR

event he made little use of the fleet or, in fact, of his Greek allies as military
assets during the campaign. Any concept of a pan--Hellenic campaign was clearly
subordinated to Macedonian hegemony. The ancient historian Polybius
maintained that Asia was attacked because Philip and Alexander believed it was
weak - simply another ripe picking for their military machine and meat for their
voracious appetite for expansion (3.6).
While clearly imperialistic, Philip's exact aims, in terms of territorial
acquisition, are unclear. Perhaps he would have contented himself, initially at
least, with the liberation of Asia Minor. This would certainly have been in
keeping with Philip's practices in the past. From the time that he overcame
internal opposition and secured his borders against barbarian incursions, Philip
expanded slowly and cautiously over a period of almost 20 years. Unlike
Alexander, whose practice it was to conquer first and consolidate later,
Philip was content to acquire territory systematically, without overextending
Macedonian power.
Whenever Philip's invasion plans were actually formulated, by 336 they were
being implemented. In that year he sent an advance force of 10,000 soldiers
under the command of two senior generals, Parmenion and Attalus, to 'liberate'
the cities of western Asia Minor in preparation for the full--scale invasion. This
force established Macedonian control from the Hellespont to Ephesus before it
was rolled back in 335 by a 5,000--strong mercenary force under Memnon of
Rhodes. Memnon was able to force the Macedonians out of Ephesus, Magnesia
on the Sipylus and Lampsacus but was eventually rebuffed in his attempt to take
Cyzicus. Despite the advance force's uneven success in this initial stage, a vital
bridgehead in Asia had been secured which would be maintained until 334.

THE ASSASSINATION OF PHILIP II

Despite the security Philip had brought to Macedonia, his violent death soon
threatened the new--found stability of the state. Macedonian kings, at least from
the time of Persian influence in the region (after 513), were polygamous, and
Philip married for the seventh time in October 337. Most of Philip's brides had
been foreigners, but this time the bride was a teenager of aristocratic
Macedonian background named Cleopatra. This marriage raised the possibility
of a fully Macedonian heir, a fact which the bride's uncle Attalus brought up at
the wedding party. Of the events Athenaeus said:

Philip took seven wives in total. In the twenty years of his rule Philip
married the Illyrian Audata, by whom he had a daughter, Cynnane, and
he also married Phila, sister of Derdas and Machatas. Then, since he

64
 THE l~ISE OF l\1A(~ED()N

wished to extend his realm to include the Thessalian nation, he had

children by two Thessalian women, Nicesipolis ofPherae, who bore him
Thessalonice, and Philinna of Larissa, by whom he produced Arrhidaeus.
In addition, he took possession of the Molossian kingdom by marrying
Olympias, by whom he had Alexander and Cleopatra, and when he took
Thrace the Thracian king Cothelas came to him with his daughter Meda
and many gifts. After marrying Meda, Philip also took her home to be a
second wife along with Olympias. In addition to all these wives he also Olympias, mother of
married Cleopatra, with whom he was in love; she was the daughter of Alexander. One of Philip's
seven wives, she had a
Hippostratus and niece of Attalus. By bringing her home as another profound influence on her
wife alongside Olympias he made a total shambles of his life. For son's character and also
straightaway, right at the wedding ceremony, Attalus made the remark created considerable
political mischief in
'Well, now we shall certainly see royalty born who are legitimate and not
Macedon during
bastards'. Hearing this, Alexander hurled the cup he had in his hands at Alexander's absence in
Attalus, who in turn hurled his goblet at Alexander. (13.557) Asia. From a series of
medallions commissioned
by Emperor Caracalla.
Alexander was understandably insulted by Attalus' remark and after the violent (© World History
altercation that inevitably ensued, he and his mother went into exile in Epirus, Archive/TopFoto)
Olympias' ancestral home. Diplomacy served eventually to bring
about the son's return and a reconciliation, but Olympias
remained in Epirus.
In 336 Philip married one of his daughters to
Olympias' brother, Alexander, king of Epirus.
At the celebrations of the wedding, Philip was
stabbed to death by a bodyguard, Pausanias.
The official explanation of the murder was
that Pausanias had been furious that Philip
had refused to redress a serious and
personal grievance that Pausanias had
against Attalus and so had decided to kill
the king. The details of this sordid event
are impossible to unravel satisfactorily and
conspiracy theories, ancient and modern,
abound. Whether Alexander or Olympias
were involved and what their motives might
have been cannot be known, though the reported
actions of Olympias, and the benefits she gained
from the death of her erstwhile husband, seem to make
her a strong suspect.

65
ALEXANDER'S ACCESSION
n acceding to the throne of Macedon, Alexander was quick to mete out

O punishment against those 'responsible' for his father's death, freeing

himself at the same time of rivals to the throne. Antipater, who had in
the past served as regent of Macedon in Philip's absence, supported Alexander's
claim, and it was then an easy matter to round up and execute rivals. Attalus
was found to have been corresponding with the Athenians - an unlikely
scenario - and executed on the new king's orders by his colleague, Parmenion.
A bloody purge masqueraded as filial piety, and those who could saved
themselves by accommodation with the new king or by flight. Alexander
acceded to more than just the throne of Macedon: he also inherited his father's
Persian campaign. He was doubtless eager to depart, for we are told that as an
adolescent he complained to his father that he was leaving little for him to
conquer. Things did not, however, proceed as planned and there were other
matters for Alexander to attend to before he could cross the Hellespont.

GREECE
The accession of Alexander incited rebellion amongst the subject states and the
barbarian kingdoms that bordered on Macedon. The new king was forced to
prove himself, especially in the south, where the Athenian orator Demosthenes,
the implacable enemy of Philip II, was deriding Alexander as a child and a fool.
Resistance to the new king in Thessaly was crushed by speed and daring, as
steps (known as 'Alexander's Ladder') cut into the side of Mount Ossa allowed
the Macedonians to turn the Thessalians' position. The Thessalians responded
with gestures of contrition and recognized Alexander as leader of the
Thessalian League, a position previously held by his father. An initial uprising
by Thebans, Athenians and Spartans was stifled by Alexander's timely arrival in
Greece, where he summoned a meeting of the League of Corinth, the very
existence of which was symbolic of Macedonian power. The meeting elected
him leader and Philip's successor as general of the pan--Hellenic campaign. OPPOSITE
Thracian 4th--century gold
Sparta, however, refused to join the league or make public recognition of ceremonial helmet found in
Macedonian suzerainty, claiming that it could not follow another leader because Romania. (akg--images)

67
ALEX.ANDER A.T \VA.I~

HARPALUS
Harpalus son of Machatas belonged to one of the Alexander's camp, presumably with a sum of
royal houses of Upper Macedonia, that of Elimea. Alexander's money. Alexander, however, forgave
Afflicted by a physical ailment that left him unfit him and recalled him, reinstating him as treasurer.
for military service, he nevertheless served Later in the campaign, when the king had gone to
Alexander in other ways. In the 330S he served as India and Harpalus remained in Babylon, the latter
one of Alexander's hetairoi, in this case, probably enjoyed a life of extravagance and debauchery,
one of his advisors; he was exiled by Philip for importing delicacies for his table and courtesans
encouraging Alexander to offer himself as a for his bed. When news arrived that Alexander
prospective husband of the Carian princess Ada, was returning from the east, he fled to Athens,
whom Philip had intended to marry off to his son taking with him vast sums of money, and
Philip Arrhidaeus. Harpalus was appointed attempted to induce the Athenians to go to war.
treasurer early in the Persian campaign, but he Rebuffed by the Athenians, he sailed away to
became involved with an unscrupulous individual Crete, where he was murdered by one of his
named Tauriscus, who persuaded him to flee from followers, Pausanias.

it was the Spartan prerogative to lead. Spartan intransigence

flared into open rebellion in 33 I, when Agis III attacked
Macedonian troops in the Peloponnese, only to be defeated
and killed at Megalopolis. For the time being, however,
Alexander was content to ignore the Spartans, although
they bore their military impotence with ill grace.
Nevertheless, the Greek city--states were not yet ready to
renounce all claims to independence and leadership.
Alexander clearly thought that he had cowed them into
submission with the mere show of force, and he now
turned to deal with the border tribes of the Illyrians and
Triballians before turning his attentions to Asia.

ALEXANDER IN THE NORTH

The Thracian tribes revolted on the accession of Alexander,
plotting to invade Macedon in co--operation with the Illyrians,
but Alexander forestalled them by quickly marching into
Thrace. He defeated the mountain tribes and continued
north, catching the Triballi while they were making camp.
The Triballi were a tribe independent of the Odrysian

68
 i\CCESSION

Empire (see page 71). They were a byword for savagery and their contact with OPPOSITE
Demosthenes.
the Scythians, Illyrians and Celts left influences upon the Triballi, and these
The Athenian orator
influences may be why they are sometimes referred to as distinct from the was a bitter opponent of
Thracians. They often used Scythian equipment. Macedon and of Philip I I
The Triballi took shelter in a wood by the river Lynginus. Alexander ordered in particular. At the time
of Alexander's accession he
his archers and slingers to move up and shoot into the woods. The Triballi surged mocked him as a 'child'
forward to get to grips with the Macedonian archers, whereupon Alexander and compared him with
ordered Macedonian cavalry to attack the Triballi right wing, and Greek cavalry the simpleton, Margites.
But Demosthenes soon
to attack the left. The rest of his cavalry attacked in the centre, followed by the
discovered his mistake.
main body of his infantry led by Alexander himself. The Triballi held their own (akg~images/Erich Lessing)
while the fighting was at long range, but were ridden down by the cavalry and
routed by the phalanx once they came into contact - some 300 Triballi were
killed. King Syrmus, the Triballi, and other Thracians took refuge on an island in
the Danube. Alexander manned warships with heavy infantry and archers, and
attempted to force a landing. However, there were not enough ships and men; in
most places the shore was too steep for a landing, and the current was too strong.
Alexander accordingly withdrew the ships and attacked the Getai instead.
The Getai lived between the Haemus range of mountains and the Scythians,
on both sides of the Danube. Herodotus called them 'the bravest and most
noble of all the Thracians' (Histories, 4.93). Their god Zalmoxis taught them

Thracians attacking the

Thyni tribe in south~eastern
Thrace in 400. (Angus
McBride © Osprey
Publishing Ltd)

69
A.LEXA.NDER THE GREf\T i\T Wf\R

THE THRACIANS

The Thracians were an Indo..European people who The Thracians migrated to south..eastern Europe
occupied the area between northern Greece, in the 7th millennium Be. After the 12th century
southern Russia and north..western Turkey. They they also settled in Asia Minor, especially in Bithynia
shared the same language and culture, although the and the Troad. Thracian tribes inhabited central
former had no written form. To a large extent they Macedon until the founding of the kingdom of
preserved the way of life of a tribal Homeric society. Macedon by the Temenids in the early 7th century, at
There may have been as many as a million Thracians, which time they were forced to move eastwards. In
divided among up to 40 tribes. Ancient writers were the end, the Thracian tribes were restricted mainly to
hard put to decide which of the Thracian tribes was the north..eastern area of the Balkans. From the 7th
the most valiant: the plains tribes - Getai, Moesi and century, many Greek colonies were founded on
Odrysai; or the mountain tribes - Thyni, Odomanti, Thracian shores, leading to intense conflict and
Dii, Bessi, Bisaltai and Satrai. Other Thracian tribes mutual influence between the Greeks and Thracians.
included the Triballi and, possibly, the Paeonians, In the first decade of the 6th century, the Persians
although the latter are usually referred to separately. invaded Thrace. Thracians were forced to join the
Herodotus described the Thracians as the most invasions of Scythia and Greece. However, Persian
numerous people of all, after the Indians. They had control was rather loose, and many Thracians
the potential to field large numbers of troops, and the resisted Persian occupation after Xerxes' invasion of
Greeks, and later the Romans, lived in fear of a dark Greece in 480. Only a few fought on the side of the
Thracian cloud descending from the north. Persians at Plataea in 479, and after the battle
Herodotus said that the Thracians would be the Thracians wounded the Persian commander and
most powerful of all nations if they did not enjoy annihilated parts of the army as it retreated through
fighting each other so much. They lived almost entirely Thrace. In about 460, the first Odrysian kingdom
in villages: the city of Seuthopolis seems to be the only was founded in territory vacated by the Persians. The
significant town in Thrace which was not built by the Odrysai was the most powerful Thracian tribe, the
Greeks. Herodotus states that Thracians honoured only one to briefly unite almost all the others.
warriors very highly and despised all other occupations During the Peloponnesian War, Thrace was an ally
(II, 167)' Thracian warriors were ferocious opponents, of Athens. They fought alongside both Macedonians
and in high demand as mercenaries, though they were and Athenians in some encounters. The Spartans
infamous for their love of plunder. There are also tried to persuade the Odrysian king to change sides,
several recorded instances of Thracian mercenaries but they failed and Spartan ambassadors on their way
switching sides if offered bribes, or because they to Persia were murdered in Thrace. The Thracians
preferred to fight for the other side. Because of their continued to be important in the affairs of both
savagery, they were often used to carry out executions the Spartans and Athenians throughout the
or massacres. Peloponnesian War.

70
 i\LEXANDER'S A.CCESSION

Despite the rise of Macedon, the period 400-280 a coalition of Athenians, Thracians, Illyrians and
represented a sort of Thracian golden age, when the Paeonians. His first Thracian campaign began in
Triballi and Getai formed kingdoms in northern 3471346, waged first by Antipater, and then by himself.
Thrace, and Thracian art flourished. Splendid gold He conquered southern Thrace in 341, founding
and silver vessels, ornaments, pectorals, helmets, and Philippopolis, Kabyle and other cities on top of older
horse--trappings were produced. Finds, such as this Thracian settlements. In 339 the Triballi defeated Philip
early 4th--century silver ornamental fitting from a when he tried to cross the Haemus range when
grave in Bulgaria, still make a strong impression returning from a campaign against the Scythians. After
today, with their elaborate workmanship and Philip's death, the Thracian tribes revolted again.
imaginative designs. Over the years after their dealings with Alexander,
When Philip II succeeded to the throne of Macedon the Thracians continued to face the Greeks, the
in 359, he bribed the Thracians to stop their joint Macedonians, and also the Celts, until they were
invasion of Macedon with the Illyrians. Shortly finally conquered by Rome in AD 46. (akg--
afterwards the Thracian king Kotys was assassinated, imagesIErich Lessing)
and the Thracian kingdom was divided between
his three sons. In 357, Philip defeated

71
l\LEXAN.DER THE GRE1\1"' .t'\1~ Wl\R

that they were immortal; death, merely the gateway to an everlasting paradise,
especially in battle, held no fears. Diodorus Siculus said that the Getai 'are
barbarous and lead a bestial existence, live in a wintry land deficient in cultivated
grain and fruit, normally sit on straw, eat from a wooden table, and drink from
cups of horn or wood' (31.11-12).
The Getai held the riverbank against Alexander with 4,000 cavalry and 10,000
foot. Alexander demonstrated his characteristic decisiveness and gathered
together many boats normally used by the local Thracians for plundering and
raiding, and crossed at night with about 1,5°0 cavalry and 4,000 infantrymen.
This daring crossing by so many men took the Getai totally by surprise; they
were shocked to see the Danube crossed so easily, and unnerved by the sight of
the phalanx advancing upon them in a solid mass. The first violent cavalry charge
led them to turn and flee to their town, but the town had few defences, so they
abandoned it. Taking as many women and children as their horses could carry,
they continued their flight into the steppe. Alexander plundered the town, razed
it to the ground and made camp. There he received envoys from various tribes in
the area, including the Triballi, who soon afterwards sent troops to join his army.
Thracian troops were later critical to Alexander's success: they formed about one--
fifth of his army and took part in all his battles. While Alexander was far away,
however, Thrace seethed with rebellion. In 331/330 this involved the
participation of Memnon, Alexander's general, and the Odrysian ruler Seuthes
III. Memnon was outmanoeuvred by Antipater, but came to such favourable
terms with him that in 325 Memnon led 5,000 Thracian cavalry to join
Alexander in Asia. In either 331 or 325, Zopyrion, governor of Thrace, and his
30,000--strong army perished in a campaign against the Getai and Scythians.
Tribal warfare similarly threatened Macedon from the Illyrian region adjacent
to the Adriatic coast. As part of his strategy to intimidate and overawe the
Illyrians, Alexander daringly drew his army up on some open ground and put
his army through a variation of parade--ground drill, accompanied by the
Macedonian war--cry. His bluff was successful, laying the groundwork for his
eventual victory. However, while Alexander was fighting the Illyrian tribes,
rebellion again broke out in Greece.

THEBES
Alexander's activities in the north gave rise to rumours - false, but deliberately
spread - that the young king had been killed. In spring 335 the Thebans threw
off the Macedonian yoke, besieging the garrison that Philip had planted on their
acropolis after Chaeronea. The Thebans now proposed to use Persian funds to
liberate Greece from the true oppressor, Macedon.

72
 l\LEXf\NDER'S lACCESSION

THE THRACIAN CAMPAIGN OF 336/335

Rugged terrain had always

challenged the phalanx, but
in his campaign against the
Thracians, Alexander was able to
maintain the cohesion of his
forces in a mountain pass and
to avoid the wagons of the
Thracians that were being rolled
down to disrupt his formations.
By placing the less mobile
pezhetairoi in the more level
areas, where they could form
alleys for the wagons to pass
through, he kept the main
portion of the phalanx intact
and ready to meet the enemy if
they should rush down the hill.
The more difficult ground was
occupied by the hypaspists, who
were unencumbered by the
sarissa and carried larger shields,
which they placed over their
bodies, linking them closely
together to allow the wagons
to pass over without doing
serious harm. Arrian describes
the incident but makes no
distinction between the two
types of troops, but clearly it would have been to grips with it while it was in disarray. The
impossible for the pezhetairoi, with smaller and less hypaspists, once the danger had passed, continued
concave shields, to find protection under them, to say uphill on the left side, led by Alexander and protected
nothing of the difficulty of grounding the sarissai in by the covering fire of the archers. The Thracians
massed formation. In this way the Thracians were were dislodged from their position with ease. (Christa
unable to disrupt the Macedonian phalanx and come Hook © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

73
 f\LEX1\NDER'S .ACCESSION

ANTIGONUS MONOPHTHALMOS
An officer of Philip II's generation, Antigonus inventing new siege machines. After Alexander's
Monophthalmos ('the One..Eyed') (c. 382- 30 I ) death, Antigonus emerged as one of the leading
was already approaching 60 when he accompanied Successors and, together with his son, made a bid
Alexander to Asia. In the spring of 333 he was left for supreme power. He died on the battlefield of
behind as satrap of Phrygia, which had its Ipsus in 301, and Demetrius, who experienced his
administrative centre in Celaenae. There he share of victories and defeats, proved to possess
remained for the duration of the war, attended by more showmanship than generalship. Ultimately,
his wife Stratonice and his sons, one of whom, Demetrius' son, Antigonus, named for his
Demetrius, was to become known as Demetrius grandfather, established the Antigonid dynasty
Poliorcetes ('the besieger'), due to his ingenuity in in Macedon.

Alexander's response was quick and brutal: within two weeks he was before the
gates of Thebes. He hoped that the Thebans would come to terms, but they
would not and he reacted accordingly. Athens and Demosthenes proved that they
were more capable of inciting others to mischief than of supporting the causes
they had so nobly espoused. Through their inaction, they saved themselves and
stood by as Alexander dealt most harshly with Thebes, which now became an
example to the other Greek city..states: Alexander would not tolerate rebellion in
his absence, and he regarded those who preferred the barbarian cause to that of
their fellow Greeks as Medisers and traitors to the common cause. Indeed, the
city had a long history of Medism, and there was a tradition that the allied
Greeks, at the time of Xerxes' invasion, had sworn the 'Oath of Plataea', which
called for the destruction of the city.
Officially, the razing of Thebes could be presented as an act of vengeance.
(Gryneum in Asia Minor later suffered a similar fate, with the same justification.)
Terror might prove a more effective deterrent than any garrison. To avert the
charge of senseless brutality, Alexander portrayed the decision to destroy the city
of Thebes and enslave its population as the work of the Phocians and disaffected
Boeotians. The example of Thebes was enough to produce a more conciliatory
mood in the rest of Greece. Persuaded by the orator Demades, the Athenians sent
an embassy to congratulate Alexander on his victories in the north and to beg
forgiveness for their own recent indiscretions. The king demanded that they Sculpture of Alexander
dating from the 2nd
surrender the worst trouble..makers, ten prominent orators and generals
century, found in
including Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Hyperides, but in the event only one, Magnesia. (a kg..
Charidemus, was offered up, and he promptly fled to the court of Darius III. images/Erich Lessing)

75
ALEXANDER'S ARMY
ORGANIZING THE ARMY
lexander's army, like the Macedonian state, was run from the court that

A always travelled with the king. This comprised a hundred or so courtiers,

known as 'Personal Companions', or sometimes simply 'Companions'.
These Companions are distinct from the Companion cavalry. The sources also
refer to the king's 'Friends', which may be either the highest grade of Personal
Companion at court, or just another name for Personal Companions. In battle the
Personal Companions fought alongside the king in the Royal Squadron of the
Companion cavalry. In Hellenistic times, the king would give his courtiers purple
cloaks as a sign of their rank, and there is evidence that the practice was already
established in Alexander's reign. Alexander often wore elaborate dress in battle,
but he normally dressed in the uniform of an officer of the Companion cavalry.
He is dressed as such on the Alexander mosaic, but he wears the purple cloak
with a yellow border of a Personal Companion instead of the regimental cloak.
The king ran the army from the royal tent, an impressive pavilion with a large
chamber where the council of war met (perhaps separate from the main tent).
The royal tent also included a vestibule beyond which none could enter without
passing Chares, the royal usher; the armoury (perhaps also separate from the
main tent); and beyond the vestibule, the king's apartments where he slept
and bathed. The tent was erected by its own work--party, commanded by a
Macedonian called Proxenus. The king was attended by his chamberlains, while
the royal tent itself was guarded by a watch from the Bodyguards, and the area
of the royal quarters was defended by a detachment of hypaspists (elite infantry).
Also accompanying the king would be an augur, to provide omens before battle.
The army that Alexander took to Asia in spring 334 was far from OPPOSITE
This mosaic from Pella
homogeneous. The core was the army of Macedon, but added to this were shows Alexander and
contingents supplied to the expeditionary force by the vassal princedoms on H ephaestion hunting.
Macedon's borders - Paeonians, Agrianians, Triballians, Odrysians and Illyrians. H ephaestion has a sword
and Alexander an axe.
Alexander was also head of the Thessalian army and head of the League of (World History
Corinth, so the states of Greece supplied Alexander with contingents of infantry, Archive/TopFoto)

77
A,LEXANDEl~ THE C:iI~EAT ~AT \VAR.

cavalry and ships from their own armed forces. Finally, the numbers of the force
were swelled by a large number of mercenaries. Most of these were Greek, though
some of Alexander's units of Balkan troops may also have been mercenaries.
Given the historical animosity between the different peoples in the army, and the
fact that the different groups could not for the main part communicate due to
language differences, it is a tribute to the leadership of the army that racial
tensions were kept low enough for it to function.
At the highest level the army was commanded by its staff officers, the Royal
Bodyguards, and by other generals. The army often divided into a number of
divisions (moirai) , especially during the later campaigns, and a general would be
appointed to command each division. It was usual for these generals to retain
direct command of an individual taxis too, so many of the infantry taxeis were
A Companion calJalryman, commanded by generals rather than taxiarcbs. Below the generals were the rest
a Royal Page and a of the officers selected from Macedonian aristocratic families. Command of
Companion hunting a
stag. (Angus McBride ©
individual units was very much a family affair: many of the units seem to have
Osprey Publishing Ltd) been commanded by members of families prominent in the area where they had

78
 ALEXANDEI~'S~"RJvr'f

been recruited. Command was centralized. The king himself would give the
army its orders. These were given by trumpet signals, first by Alexander's
trumpeter, and then taken up by the trumpeters attached to each unit.
The whole of Alexander's empire was run by a secretariat divided up into various
sections, each run by a Royal Secretary, comparable in rank to the Royal
Bodyguards. The Army Secretariat was under Eumenes of Cardia. The men who
made up the secretariat, though they might be able and even Personal Companions
of the king, were usually debarred by obscurity of birth or physical infirmity from
holding a field command, and were thus despised by the serving officers.
The Army Secretariat was based in the tent of the Royal Secretary of the
Army, which contained copies of all correspondence relevant to the army and
all army documentation. The bases of army documentation were the muster--
rolls and conduct sheets, which gave the current strengths of the various units,
and according to which pay and equipment, reinforcements and on occasions
rations were distributed and promotions made. Arms, armour, clothing, goblets
and baggage--animals were issued in this way, on an occasional general issue
basis rather than on a permanent one--for--one basis. It seems therefore that
stores were held centrally in the baggage train. Stores were distributed in this
way by locboi (units of 256 men) in the infantry, and ilai (squadrons) or
bekatostuas (century) in the cavalry. It was then the duty of the attendants to the
units to allocate the stores further.
The Army Secretariat was divided into various sections, each under a
Secretary assisted by a number of inspectors. There is evidence of a Secretary of
Cavalry, and a Secretary of Mercenaries for Egypt, who had two inspectors
under him. There is also evidence of inspectors being detached from the main
army to administer the military forces left in a province.

THE INFANTRY
At the lowest level the tactical unit of the infantry was the dekas (file of ten men)
which, as the name implies, had once consisted of ten men, but expanded to 16
well before Alexander's reign. Sixteen such files (16 x 16) formed a lochos Oater
known as a ~ntagma) of 256 men, under the command of a locbagos. Thus the
strength of the taxis was probably six lochoi (1,53 6 men) and that of a chiliarchy
was four lochoi (1,0 24 men). Half a chiliarchy would be a pentakosiarcby
(512 men). The size of the lochos made the relaying of commands more difficult,
for, according to Asclepiodotus, in a unit of 64 (8 x 8), the men could easily hear
all the commands, but with the doubling of the file--size and the creation of
squares of 256 men (16 x 16), it became necessary to add supernumeraries or
ektaktoi. The general who served as the taxiarches was almost certainly stationed

79
A.LEXANDEI~ THE CiREAT i\T WAR

behind the taxis and on horseback, from which position he sent orders to
the various ektaktoi whose job it was to distribute the orders. Each taxis of
pezhetairoi (1,536 men) would thus have had 30 supernumeraries.
Normally with the phalanx, the files would be drawn up in close order (pyknos,
pyknosis), 16 deep with each man occupying a yard square. Locked shields
(rynaspismose) was a formation usually only adopted when receiving rather than
delivering a charge. It was achieved by inserting the back half of each file into the
spaces between the front half of the file. The depth of the phalanx was now eight
yards, with each man occupying a frontage of one cubit (half a yard). Both
formations, however, were found to be too cramped for manoeuvring or
advancing in an orderly manner, so prior to contact the phalanx would be drawn
up in open order with a depth of two files with each double file occupying
a frontage of two yards. This was probably called 'deep order' (bathos) in
Alexander's army. In all these formations, obviously, the frontage occupied by the
phalanx remained constant. During all these evolutions the spear would be
pointed upwards to allow free movement. The lowering of the spear was only
ordered before the charge, which was sometimes carried out at the run. The
charge would be delivered to the accompaniment of the Macedonian battle--cry -
'Alalalalai' - offered to Enyalios, an epithet of Ares, the god of war.
When Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia in 334, he took with him
12,000 Macedonian phalangites: 9,000 pezhetairoi and 3,000 hypaspists, the
pezhetairoi or pezetairoi Cfoot companions'), the regional 'heavy infantry,' and
the elite infantry guard, the hypaspistai or hypaspists (literally, 'shield--bearers').
Within the pezhetairoi there were troops designated as asthetairoi, which could
be a term for elite battalions, for battalions recruited in Upper Macedon, or for
those who fought in a position closest to the king. The asthetairoi may have
been better equipped or trained to fight next to the hypaspists. Within the
hypaspists there were those who were distinguished by the adjective 'royal'
(basilikoi). In terms of equipment, the pezhetairoi and asthetairoi were identical,
but it is virtually certain that the hypaspists were not armed in the same way as
the pezhetairoi.

Pezhetairoi
There has been a great deal of debate concerning the formation of the
pezhetairoi and the name itself. It seems that the troops known as pezhetairoi
during Philip II's time were known as hypaspists by Alexander's time. The
extension of the name pezhetairoi to the heavy infantry seems to have
been accompanied by a name--change that saw the former pezhetairoi become
the hypaspists.

80
 i\LEX.AN[)ER'S AI~M'{

THE PHALANGITE

This Macedonian phalangite wears full armour.

A man thus equipped would have fought in the
front ranks. Towards the centre and the rear there
would have been many infantrymen who lacked the
linothorax or who wore the less protective slouch;
hat known as the kausia.
The soldier wears the Phrygian helmet, with cheek
pieces, which allows better hearing and visibility than
the old closed Corinthian;style helmets worn by
earlier Greek hoplites. The soldier is bearded, despite
the commonly accepted view that Alexander required
his troops to shave their beards in the belief that facial
hair gave the enemy something to clutch in close
combat. If this story is true, it need not have applied
to the phalangites, for whom close, individual combat
was undesirable.
The warrior is protected by a light cuirass of glued
layers of linen, a linothorax, worn over the short;
sleeved exomis tunic, the bottom of which extends
beyond the corselet itself. The various layers of there is no certainty about the existence of this
linen that made up the corselet are illustrated at the handgrip, without it the shield would have been all
upper right, with coarser linen on the inside and but useless to a phalangite out of formation.
smoother layers on the outside. The warrior also The end of the sarissa bears a butt spike like the
wears greaves. one found at Aegae (Vergina). Shown on the right are
A leather baldric slung over the shoulder the sarissa head and the butt spike, and also the
supports the shield. Details of the outside of the coupling link or collar. This joined the two parts of
shield, with the embossed eight;rayed star of the the sarissa and allowed it to be dismantled on the
Macedonian kingdom, can be seen at the bottom march (as shown in the top left;hand corner); it also
left. In battle, the soldier's forearm would have made repairs quicker and less expensive, and allowed
been drawn through the armband in the centre of replacement parts to be more easily transported. This
the shield, but the hand would have been free to warrior has slung at his side a kopis. The illustration
grasp the sarissa, which because of its length and shows the curved handle, which gave some protection
weight required the use of both hands. The to the knuckles and allowed for a more secure grip.
illustration shows a handgrip (antilabe). Although (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

81
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

The available evidence indicates that the Macedonian kings recruited their
infantrymen in two ways and that the bulk of the heavy infantry, known during
Alexander's campaigns as pezhetairoi, or 'foot companions', was regional levies,
commanded by members of its own aristocracies. This organization reflected the
age--old pattern of life in the mountain areas that had only recently been merged
into the greater Macedonian state. These were men proud of their origins and
loyal to their commanders. Not only were the commanders also from the same
regions as their troops, but an individual taxis was sometimes commanded by
members of the same family on different occasions. It may seem likely that
Alexander would take taxeis from all areas of Macedon with him, but the names
of all the known taxiarchai in the first three years of the campaign suggest Upper
Macedonian origins and it would be extremely unlikely that half or two--thirds of
the pezhetairoi were led by officers of their own region, whereas the remainder
were not. At least half the total number of infantry remained in Macedon with the
regent, Antipater, and it would make good sense to assume that those from the
politically volatile areas, like the uplands of Upper Macedon, would be removed
from the homeland and kept under Alexander's watchful eye.
All pezhetairoi were armed with the sarissa. The sarissa measured as much as
12 cubits (18ft/s.sm) in Alexander's time. By 300, the length had increased in
some cases to 16 cubits (24ft/7m), but these are maximum lengths, and many
sarissai may have been shorter. The historians do not mention a secondary
weapon for the phalangites, though clearly they must have had a sword or blade.
Later regulations list a machaira blade as a standard piece of equipment, but the
terminology is not clear. The xiphos was apparently the shorter, double--edged
sword, whereas the slashing weapon, the kopis (or 'cleaver'), was longer, curved
and more suitable for cavalrymen. By contrast the machaira could be a shorter,
curved knife - it is often translated as a 'dagger' - used for dispatching the
defeated foe. Yet Xenophon uses machaira as the equivalent of kopis. If the
Macedonian phalangite carried the kopis, it was most likely for use in open
fighting where the formation had disintegrated, and possibly a post--Alexandrian
addition to his equipment, resulting from the experience of fighting the
Romans, whose weapon of choice was the sword.
Armour would have varied according to what was available and where the
soldier stood in the phalanx. The pezhetairoi are not mentioned as wearing
cuirasses or corselets, except for officers. However, some kind of breastplate was
worn, at least in the front ranks; this was probably the linothorax, a cuirass made
of glued layers of linen. The weight of the corselet was about 11-141b (s-6.3kg),
and thus considerably lighter than the leather, bronze and (especially) iron
cuirasses worn by some infantry and cavalrymen. The skirt of the corselet, made

82
 ALEX~;\NDEI('S ARM'{

up of 'wings' (pteruges) , was loose and unstiffened for ease of movement.

Phalangites wore conical or Phrygian helmets, however all helmets in use in the
Greek world were probably represented in the Macedonian phalanx, as fully
functional equipment was often stripped from the dead on the battlefield and used
by the victors. Greaves appear to have been a standard feature, and later
regulations prescribe a fine for those who did not wear them. This may have been
a necessity because the butt spikes of the sarissai could easily harm the legs of the

PEZHETAIROI IN TRAINING

The butt spike of the sarissa was almost as potent The first five of the I6 rows of the lochos were so
a weapon as the sarissa head, and since the sarissa closely packed together that, when their sarissai
was held at a point that allowed I2-Isft to project were levelled, even that of the fifth man projected in
in front, with several feet extending to the rear, it front of the file leader. To allow for such a dense
was essential that the soldier learnt to position formation, each man must have been stationed
himself in relation to his comrades in the formation behind the next, with the extended sarissa gripped
in such a way as to provide maximum danger to the at nearly the same point where he was level
enemy and protection against the sarissa--ends of with the butt spike of the man in front of him.
his own colleagues. Exit from the file, in the event of injury or loss of
weapons, could thus only have been
possible by moving to the left and
backwards through whatever alley
the formation allowed. Those in
rows six and higher elevated their
sarissai in stages until those standing
from about the middle to the back
held their weapons upright.
This arrangement was also
advantageous in that it protected the
phalangites from projectiles launched
by the enemy's archers, slingers and
javelinmen. Furthermore, the gradual
elevation of the sarissai towards
the middle involved a concomitant
raising of the shields for added
protection. (Christa Hook © Osprey
Publishing Ltd)

83
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAJ~

phalangites in formation. Instead of the concave, larger shield of the hoplite, the
Macedonian phalangite carried a smaller, less concave shield, which was eight
palms in diameter (about 2ft/O'7m). It hung from a strap over the shoulder.
In Alexander's expeditionary army, the pe:z;hetairoi numbered 9,000, in six taxeis
of three lochoi each. The taxeis were normally named after their commanders.
Four taxeis had the same commanders down to 330, those of Coenus son of
Polemocrates, Perdiccas son of Orontes, Craterus son of Alexander, and Meleager
son of Neoptolemus. The taxis of Amyntas son of Andromenes was temporarily
commanded by his brother Simmias while Amyntas was back in Macedon levying
reinforcements. The last taxis was commanded by Philip son of Amyntas, at
Granicus, by Ptolemy son of Seleucus, at Issus, where he was killed, and afterwards
by Polyperchon son of Simmias. The battalions would be drawn up on the
battlefield in order of precedence for the day, although Coenus' taxis, which
seems to have been of elite status, occupied the position of honour on the
right wing at Issus and Gaugamela. Some of the taxeis, including Coenus', were
termed asthetairoi.

Hypaspists
By contrast with the regional levies of pe:z;hetairoi, the hypaspists were an elite
force, chosen on an individual basis for their physical strength and valour. For
this reason, a portion of them constituted the Guard (the agema) and in battle
all 3,000 of them were stationed between the pe:z;hetairoi and the cavalry, where
the king himself directed affairs. Recruitment was based on social standing, and
the hypaspists were divided into 'regular' and 'royal' hypaspists.
The hypaspists were almost certainly more mobile than the pe:z;hetairoi. In the
major battles they acted as a link between the heavy infantry and the cavalry.
They were taken by the king on special missions that involved speed and
endurance, often fighting in rugged areas. Named for their shields - and indeed
the hypaspist veterans formed the so--called argyraspids or 'silver shields' - they
were the infantry guard and, of all the infantry troops, they fought closest to the
king. Small detachments of hypaspists acted as guards at official events and
banquets, and also as a police force. There is a strong likelihood that, on occasion
at least, they were armed more like traditional Greek hoplites and they are often
referred to, loosely, as dorypboroi Cspear--bearers'). Those who commanded the
regular hypaspists as chiliarchs or pentakosiarchs were selected on the basis of
valour, although their overall commander, the arcbibypaspistes Oiterally, 'the
leader of the hypaspists'), was a Macedonian noble appointed by the king.
Between 334 and 330 this was Nicanor son of Parmenion; his successor may
have been Neoptolemus, one of the Aeacidae.

84
 1\LEX1\NDER'S i\RMY

The debate on whether the pezhetairoi and the hypaspists were normally
armed in the same fashion is ongoing. Some historians argue that there was no
significant difference in armament, others are coming around to the opposite
view. The Alexander sarcophagus shows a Macedonian fighter, in the midst of the
cavalry fray, carrying a slightly smaller hoplite shield about 34in (86cm) in
diameter and wearing a thorax with elongated pteruges - perhaps a linothorax -
and in the act of making an overhand thrust with what must have been a hoplite
spear (dory), although the weapon is lost. Although this could be a depiction of a
Greek mercenary, his proximity to Alexander suggests that he is a member of the
hypaspists. Certain functions of the hypaspists may have required them to put
aside the sarissa, or at least to use a considerably shorter one. Arrian's reference
to hypaspists as 'the lightest troops and best armed' implies that they carried a
lighter spear, which was just under 8ft (2.4m) in length. Hypaspists were used
primarily on rough terrain, in siege warfare, and in close hand--to--hand fighting.
In such situations the sarissa would have been at best cumbersome, and at worst
useless. In the taking of city walls it would have been difficult for the hypaspists
to scale ladders while carrying 18ft (5. sm) sarissai and protecting themselves
only with the 2ft (0. 6m) pelte. The term hyperaspizantes used of hypaspists who
held up their shields to protect the king or a comrade also implies something
larger than the 2ft (0. 6m) shield of the pezhetairoi.
The main difference between the regular and royal hypaspists was that the latter
were clearly of aristocratic background, and most if not all of them were formerly
members of the Royal Pages. We do not know how numerous the royal hypaspists
were or exactly how they fought in major battles. During the storming of city walls
they are found in the immediate vicinity of the king, and if they stayed close to the
king on the battlefield they may have operated as hamippoi, interspersed among the
horsemen. The known commanders of royal hypaspists are Admetus (probably),
Hephaestion (possibly), and Seleucus (certainly) . Of these, Hephaestion was
wounded at Gaugamela by a cavalryman's lance (xyston) in the thick of the action.
As commander of this group, he may himself have been mounted.
Crossing the Hellespont in Alexander's army were 3,000 hypaspists, who may
have been from the very start of the campaign assigned to I,024--man units called
chiliarchies, although it is possible that the chiliarchy structure was not imposed
until 33 I and that earlier references to chiliarchs and chiliarchies are anachronistic.

Argyraspids
Literally the 'silver shields', the argyraspids were named for the decoration of
their armour. The unit had its origins in Alexander's regular hypaspists, and
already in the accounts of Gaugamela, Diodorus Siculus and Curtius Rufus

85
l\LEXf\NDER THE GREAT AT Wf\R

Two members of the (following the same source) refer anachronistically to the hypaspists as
hypaspist corps, one argyraspids. Both units numbered 3,000 and their distinguishing characteristic
wearing the Thracian
helmet, the other a
was their shield. In fact, Diodorus says that 'the infantry unit of the argyraspids
'Vergina' type. What [was] distinguished by the brilliance of its arms and the bravery of its men'
makes the hypaspists (17.57.2). It is likely that their shields were not simply decorated but of a larger
distinct from the
size than those of the pezhetairoi. In the time of the Successors, the argyraspids
pezhetairoi is the use of
hoplite equipment. The spoke of themselves as a unit that had not known defeat in Alexander's lifetime
offensive weapon is the and as men who were advanced in age, victorious veterans who had been
spear (dory), including
dismissed in 3 2 4 but prevented by the turmoil that accompanied the king's
spear~head and butt spike.
Defensivery, the hoplon, death from reaching home and enjoying the fruits of a well,deserved retirement.
the larger and more In 318, they joined Eumenes in the war against Antigonus Monophthalmos,
concave, rimmed shield, or
and although they fought with distinction at Paraetacene and Gabiene in the
aspis, is the feature from
which the unit takes its following year they surrendered their commander to the enemy in exchange for
name - hypaspistai or their wives and baggage, which had been captured in the second battle.
'shield~bearers'. The
diameter of the shield
tended to be roughry 3ft.
Greek infantry
Such shields are also Some 7,000 Greek allied infantry crossed the Hellespont with Alexander. The
depicted on Macedonian corps was composed of contingents sent by the member states of the League of
tomb paintings, though one
Corinth. Each contingent was composed of selected men from the state's army
must distinguish in some
cases between ceremonial and served under its own officers. The corps as a whole was commanded by a
and functional shields. The Macedonian general.
rest of the hypaspist's
Following the shattering blow dealt them at Chaeronea, the armies of Greece
equipment differed little
from that of a front~line underwent a series of reforms. In Athens, the results of these reforms, carried
pezhetairos. I n this out under Lycurgus, can be seen on gravestones: body armour, abandoned since
illustration the central
the Peloponnesian Wars, was re,introduced in the form of the muscle,cuirass
figure wears the bronze
thorax, with pteruges and the Spartan piIos helmet (shaped like the conical piIos cap) is replaced by the
attached; the one to the Macedonian 'Phrygian' helmet. In Megara, the Phrygian helmet is not seen, but
right and in the distance a similar muscle,cuirass is adopted.
wears the linothorax. Both
wear the short~sleeved
The army also contained a large number of Greek mercenary infantry.
exomis, bronze greaves and Alexander led 7,000 allies and 5,000 mercenary infantry to Asia, and there was
sandals. (Christa Hook © a steady flow of reinforcements throughout the campaign. The main role of the
Osprry Publishing Ltd)
mercenary infantry was to provide garrison troops to keep newly conquered
provinces in check. Troops for this purpose were frequently enrolled on the
spot, usually from Greek mercenaries previously in Persian service. These
mercenary bands were not altogether reliable: many had anti,Macedonian
sympathies, and mutinies were not infrequent, particularly in the later years of
Alexander's reign. At the time of Alexander's death, some 10,000 men in the
upper satrapies were planning to abandon their posts and return to Greece,
something they had previously attempted upon hearing the false news of the

86
ALEX.ANDER THE GREf\1~ L\1~ Wl\R

A Roman bronze copy king's death in 325. Mercenaries were also used to supplement the number of
of a statue of Alexander infantry in the field army, but these units seem to have been composed of
the Great. It mcry
depict the original of a
altogether more reliable troops who had been with the army a long time or who
sculptural group Alexander had been recruited more recently from friendly states in Greece. The surviving
commissioned his sculptor, accounts of Gaugamela are incomplete and differ significantly, but they seem to
Lysippus, to make
mention two separate units of mercenaries participating in the battle. The
in honour of the
25 Companions who fell veteran (arcbaioi) mercenaries, who fought on the right wing, were probably the
at Granicus. The rudder 5,000 who crossed the Hellespont with Alexander either in part or in full. The
which supports the rearing
Achaean mercenaries, who fought on the left wing, were probably the 4,000
horse may signify the
crossing of the Granicus. mercenaries recruited in the Peloponnese who had joined the army at Sidon the
(akg~images/Nimatallah ) year before.

88
 f\LEXANDER'S ARM'Y

Greek mercenary infantry at this time were still equipped with bronze hoplite
shield and helmet but no other body armour, carrying the normal infantry spear
and sword, and dressed in red exomis tunics. Certainly Greek mercenary infantry
in Persian service appear with this dress and equipment on both the Alexander
sarcophagus and the Alexander mosaic. It is possible that those in Macedonian
service wore cuirasses, but given their position on the wings at Gaugamela, where
mobility would have been crucial, it is more probable that they did not.

Light infantry
There is little known about the light infantry (psiloi) of the army. They
presumably fought in open order, perhaps in less depth than the phalanx, and
their sub--units may have occupied greater frontages than those of the phalanx.
The basic sub--unit seems to be the company of 500, but it is not clear whether
these companies were called lochoi as they were in the phalanx.
The corps of archers (toxotai) as a whole was under the command of a
strategos, and was divided into a number of companies of 500, each, it seems,
under the command of a toxarch. The first strategos, Cleander, died in the
Pisidian campaign and was replaced by Antiochus, who in turn died and was
replaced by the Cretan Ombrion in Egypt in 33 I.
Alexander seems to have had a company of Cretan archers from the beginning
of his reign. These Cretans could have been mercenaries, but it is more likely
that they were an allied contingent supplied by those cities of Crete favourable
to Macedon. They are not mentioned after the dismissal of the allies at Ecbatana
in 330. Cretan archers were equipped with a small bronze pelte, which enabled
them to fight at close quarters as well as provide missile fire. The Cretans served
under their own officers - Eurybotas, who was killed at Thebes in 335, and
thereafter Ombrion who was promoted to the command of the whole corps of
archers at Memphis.
A second company of archers soon joined the expedition under the command
of the toxarch Clearchus, who died during the siege of Halicarnassus. He seems
to have been replaced by Antiochus, who is mentioned as a toxarch at Issus,
although he may have doubled as strategos of the whole corps after the death of
Cleander. The name of the toxarch appointed to command the second company
after Antiochus' death in 331 is not known, nor is the nationality of the
company, although they may have been Macedonian. A third company, under
Briso, joined the expedition before Gaugamela, and these are definitely called
Macedonians. The non--Cretans did not, it seems, carry the bronze pelte.
The Agrianian javelinmen, under the command of the Macedonian Attalus,
were the crack light infantry unit of the army. They were probably supplied for

89
l\LEX,ANDER THE

the expedition by the client king of the Agrianians, Langarus, out of his
household troops. Only one company was present at the crossing of the
Hellespont, but a second company joined the army before Issus, bringing up
their strength to 1,000.
Little is known of the other light infantry, who are given the general term
'Thracians' in the texts. They are the 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians and Illyrians
who appear in Diodorus Siculus' description of the army which crossed the
Hellespont. They could be mercenaries, but given Alexander's shortage of money
in the earlier campaigns, they are more probably further contingents sent for the
expedition by other client kings. Probably all the light infantry were javelinmen
(akontistai), divided into a number of taxeis, although there may also have been
some units of slingers. The Odrysians were commanded by Sitalkes, a prince of
the Odrysian royal house, and other units may also have been under native
commanders. Another unit of javelinmen was commanded by Balacrus.

THE CAVALRY
The ile (squadron) of 200 men in four tetrarchies continued to be the building
block of the cavalry. A number of ilai, usually two, three or four, might be
formed into a cavalry brigade, hipparchy, commanded by a hipparch. At first the
number of squadrons per brigade was variable, but later on the system became
more standardized.
Each cavalryman was allowed a groom, who might have been mounted, to look
after his horse and equipment. The grooms were stationed behind the squadron
in battle. The cavalrymen owned their own horses, though it was customary for
a man drafted into the cavalry to be granted an initial sum to enable him to buy
a mount of suitable quality. Horses lost in action were replaced from the pool of
remounts, a system run by the Secretary for Cavalry. He had a difficult job as huge
numbers of horses died in battle, and in an age before horseshoes, a horse could
easily be ruined by a long march. At Gaugamela, the cavalry, 7,000 strong, lost
1,000 horses; nearly one in three of the Companion cavalry lost theirs.

Commandeering was used to obtain remounts locally, but more usually it was the
duty of provincial governors to procure horses and send them to the remount
pool. Many cities or provinces paid tribute on the hoof. In the last resort, recourse
had to be made to sequestration of surplus mounts within the army itself.

Cavalry equipment
Alexander replaced the Phrygian helmet with the Boeotian helmet. Cavalry
helmets on the Alexander sarcophagus and mosaic seem to show insignia of
rank. Horsehair 'tails', gold or silver wreaths and the silvering of the helmet

90
 .A.LEXANDER'S ARMY

MACEDONIAN CAVALRY TACTICS

The cavalry formations that developed in the early turn his right flank would be kept at bay by
4th century allowed cavalry squadrons to redeploy successive charges of his light cavalry, delivered
rapidly and to reorient the axis of their attack, squadron by squadron. As the Persian cavalry was
giving them flexibility. Alexander's battle tactics forced to move further to the right, they would
exploited this flexibility. He aimed to advance his eventually lose contact with their main battle line.
army obliquely so as to cause dislocations in the As soon as a dislocation was observed in the
Persian line as it attempted to outflank him on his Persian battle line, Alexander personally led his
right. The Persian cavalry column attempting to heavy cavalry straight for it.

could all have indicated different ranks, although Alexander was known to give
gold crowns to his troops for bravery, which could be an alternative, though less
likely, explanation for the wreaths. Bracelets were also worn as badges of rank,
as they were by the Persians.
The long cavalry spear (xyston), though made of strong cornel wood, often
shattered in action, so was fitted with a second spear--head at the butt to allow
the trooper to continue fighting. The xyston was used to stab at the faces of
enemy riders and horses. The sword, a secondary weapon, was slung under the
left arm. The aristocratic cavalrymen may have chosen to use their own highly
decorated swords. Greek cavalry did not carry shields at this time, although it
was normal for generals to be accompanied by their personal shield--bearers to
enable them to fight on foot if necessary.
Some cavalrymen wore only a short--sleeved tunic, but most wore a long--
sleeved outer tunic over the first. The heavy cavalry - Companion, Thessalian
and allied - were issued with cuirasses. The cuirass was made of small metal
plates, linked together, lined or covered with leather or linen, which made the
cuirass resilient but flexible. In the early campaigns, Alexander himself rarely
wore a cuirass, and this may have been widely copied by the young nobles in the
cavalry, especially in the Companion cavalry. Cavalry boots seem to have been
standard throughout the cavalry. It is possible that saddle cloths, made of a
shaggy felt--like material, were dyed in the regimental colour and faced in the
squadron colour, but this is speculative. Over the saddle cloth a pantherskin
saddle cloth was sometimes seen, perhaps restricted just to officers. Persian
saddle cloths were sometimes used. These probably do not represent booty, as
highly decorated Persian saddle cloths were much favoured by the aristocracy
and had long been a luxury import into the Greek world.

91
f\LEXANDER THE GREAT 1\1- \VAR

ALEXANDER AND A COMPANION CAVALRYMAN

Alexander is seen here dressed as a senior officer of Normally the king would have worn a Boeotian
the Companion cavalry. His uniform details are helmet. The cavalryman is taken from the
taken from the Alexander mosaic. On the mosaic Alexander sarcophagus. He wears the long--sleeved
the tunic is a light purplish--grey, but the mosaic purple tunic and yellow Macedonian cloak
was copied from a painting several hundred years (chlamys) of a Companion cavalryman. Normally
old, and all the colours had faded. The cloak is the Companion cavalry would have worn white
damaged in the mosaic, but has been reconstructed cuirasses, similar but less ornate to that worn
with a yellow border. The green girdle on the by Alexander. A Persian saddle cloth IS

cuirass and matching edging on the saddle cloth used instead of the Greek saddle cloth. (Angus
may have some significance as a squadron colour. McBride © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

92
 Lt\LEXAND EI~'SARMY

Companion cavalry
The Companion cavalry, the senior regiment of the army, was recruited from the
noble youth of Macedon. Diodorus gives the regiment's strength at the start of the
expedition as 1,800, but perhaps some squadrons were left in Macedon. The
regiment comprised eight squadrons, the first of which was the Royal Squadron
(basilike ile), which was the vanguard squadron of the regiment, and held the position
of honour in the battle line. The Royal Squadron, in whose ranks the Personal
Companions fought, was kept at double strength. The other seven squadrons, at the
normal strength of 200 lances each, formed up on the left of the Royal Squadron
according to the order of precedence for the day. The line squadrons are generally
named for their commanders in the texts, but each may have been recruited from a
distinct area, and with appropriately territorial official names.

Thessalian cavalry
The sources frequently state that the Thessalians were the best cavalry unit in
the whole army. This is unsurprising as they were raised from the aristocracy
of Thessaly, the finest horsemen in the Greek world. For political and social
reasons, however, the Companion cavalry were the senior regiment. The
Thessalians fought on the left wing under the general command of Parmenion,
but since Thessaly belonged to the political orbit of Macedon and Alexander
was the leader of the Thessalian League, these troops must be regarded as
distinct from those of the 'allies'. The Thessalian cavalry equalled in strength
the Macedonian Companions (1,800-2,000 men), so it may be assumed that
the Thessalian regiment was also organized in eight ilai. Their vanguard
squadron was the Pharsalian ile, which formed Parmenion's personal bodyguard
on the left wing at Gaugamela. It was the Thessalian regiment's counterpart to
the Royal Squadron, so it was probably also double.-strength. The names of the
other seven ilai are not given by the sources, but it is fairly certain that they
were named after the other principal cities of Thessaly in which they had been
raised. Two hundred Thessalian horse joined the army at Gordion, but they
probably made up losses in the existing squadrons rather than creating a ninth.
The Thessalian regiment was disbanded at Ecbatana, when the allied
contingents were sent back to Greece, but 130 volunteers remained with the
army. These formed their own small unit, but after less than a year of mercenary
service, it was disbanded.

The Allied Horse

The Greek states of the Corinthian League were obliged to make contributions
of cavalry and infantry to the expeditionary force. Not all of these states were

93
ALEXANDEl~ CiREAT \VAfZ

asked to contribute cavalry, however, and no city seems to have made an

individual contribution of a full squadron; rather, each squadron seems to have
been formed by brigading together the various contingents from a particular area.
From their positions in the various battles it is likely that the Allied Horse were
a unit of heavy cavalry. No details of their dress or equipment have survived.
Diodorus Siculus mentions the presence of 600 Greek horse under the
command of Erigyius crossing to Asia with the army. These are probably the
three squadrons mentioned as fighting under Erigyius son of Larichus at
Gaugamela: the squadron of Peloponnesian and Achaean horse, the cavalry of
Phthiotis and Malis, and the squadron of Locrian and Phocian horse. At the
Granicus the allied cavalry were commanded by Philip son of Menelaus; this
was presumably a temporary command. Reinforcements which reached the
army at Gordion included a further ISO horsemen from Elis. At Issus, the
Peloponnesian and other allied horse fought with Parmenion on the left wing,
though their commander is not given. It is difficult to identify exactly the
reinforcements reaching the army in Asia. The allied cavalry were detached to
the satrap of Syria after Issus, and they probably received further reinforcements
while stationed there. It may be that an Acarnanian and Aetolian squadron
reached the army even before Issus. It is certain that a Boeotian squadron
reached the army in Asia. As well as Erigyius' three squadrons at Issus, there
was a second brigade of Allied Horse commanded by Coeranus, on the opposite,
left wing. This brigade probably also numbered 600, and comprised three
squadrons, probably one of Boeotians, and possibly another of Achaeans and
Acarnanians. The Eleians could have fought either in the Peloponnesian and
Achaean squadron on the right or in a third squadron on the left. The regiment
of Allied Horse was disbanded at Ecbatana, but many men were enrolled into
the Mercenary Horse.

Thracian cavalry
There were four squadrons of Thracian light cavalry belonging to Alexander's
army, supplemented by further squadrons of auxiliary Thracian cavalry.
The Thracians were considered a wild, uncivilized group of soldiers, much
tempted by drink, plunder and women.
Prodromoi (scouts, sometimes also called skopoi) is a name usually applied to
the Thracian squadrons of the main Macedonian army, but occasionally to the
other auxiliary squadrons. The prodromoi were probably recruited from inside
the border of Macedon, from the Thracian provinces annexed by Philip, and
served under Macedonian officers. The light cavalry squadrons seem to have
been under strength at the crossing of the Hellespont, as Diodorus says that the

94
 l\LEXr\NDER ENTERS PERSIl\

iron tent--pegs and guy ropes, were usually carried by the baggage animal. The
dekas also carried a hand--mill, and presumably other implements and
construction tools.
The cavalry usually marched on foot to spare the horses, as troopers have done
throughout history, and the horses were left unbridled unless action was
imminent; this was because the very severe bit used could ruin a horse's mouth
if left in too long.
The infantry marched with their own weapons and armour, though
replacing the helmet with the kausia slouch--hat. A personal pack was also
carried. This included a bedroll, a drinking cup and other domestic items. The
men also carried their food, which would have been ready cooked if rapid
movement were required. Cooking was slow and difficult before flint and steel
came into use in medieval times, so it was standard Greek military practice to
carry fire in some form or other inside earthenware pots. Other personal
possessions were carried in the baggage wagons, as was their booty. The sick
travelled in wagons, possibly in special ambulances. The baggage train
consisted of these wagons and others containing artillery and siege engines in
kit form, accompanied by the families of the soldiers and the sutlers who
followed the army, marching at the back of the army protected by a rearguard.
As rations were not generally issued, it was the responsibility of each soldier
to purchase his own rations from the traders who followed the army. Many of
the debts incurred by the common Macedonians were the result of
interactions with these traders, who offered the attractions of prostitution and
gambling. Commandeering was used as a last resort. If the army was about to
cross barren areas where the normal system would not function, rations were
collected and carried centrally in the baggage train.
The official baggage train of the army increased steadily as the army wound
its way across Asia, and the accumulated booty included slaves and
concubines, and ultimately large numbers of illegitimate children. At Susa, at
the end of the campaign, Alexander legitimized the unions of some IO,OOO of
his veterans. The camp--followers suffered the most on the difficult marches,
and formed a high percentage of those who perished in the Gedrosian Desert
in 3 2 5. In such situations the baggage animals doubled as emergency rations,
though their slaughter necessitated the abandoning of baggage, not all of it
non--essential.
For the soldier on the march there were also benefits to campaigning in the
Persian Empire. Its infrastructure, especially the system of roads, made
movement and communication relatively easy. The Macedonian army did
seem to be able to maintain its lines of communication and received a steady

107
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

108
 ALEXANDER ENTERS PERSIA

PUNISI-IMENT
The discipline imposed upon the Macedonian Other regulations clearly existed for the
phalangite was certainly harsher than that protection of property, including the women who
employed by 'democratic' armies, where citizen had become attached to the army. Although rape
soldiers had legal recourse against perceived abuses was a standard feature of the looting and destruction
by their elected officers. In Macedon, the ultimate of an enemy city or camp, the women who had been
authority rested with the king. He regulated the carried off as booty or those of the camp-followers
conduct of his officers and punished them, and the who had become, in effect, the common--law wives of
rules of conduct were the same, if not more severe, soldiers, were treated as personal property. Plutarch
for the rank and file. The sources say little about reports that when two men were being tried for
punishment for minor offences, though it appears seducing other men's wives, Alexander said that if
that flogging was a standard form of corporal found guilty they should be put to death.
punishment. Dress--code violations may have Serious offences were punishable by death by
invoked a fine. In Greek armies, soldiers guilty of stoning or javelins, or in a more dramatic way in
insubordination were required to stand at the case of mutineers. The ringleaders of the
attention in full armour for an extended period, mutiny at Opis in 324 seem to have been hurled
and this punishment was also used by the into the Tigris still in their chains. The men who
Macedonians. Others may simply have been mutinied against their officers at the time of
moved to disciplinary units, ataktoi, where the Alexander's death were treated to an even more
demands made of them were greater and their cruel form of punishment: some 300 were
behaviour was closely monitored. trampled to death by elephants.

flow of reinforcements and supplies. Individuals were therefore able to send OPPOSITE
and receive letters, though the time for such a letter to be delivered must have On the left is a light
cavalryman of the
been considerable. prodromoi of the early
The troops were treated to periods of rest and relaxation, and the army was 33os. In the centre is an
on occasion joined by troupes of actors and artists. Athletic and artistic infantryman in camp
dress. Around his arm is
competitions are recorded. The nobles probably indulged in the hunting of wrapped the ephaptis, the
exotic animals (as shown on the Alexander sarcophagus) just as they had military 'wrap ..around'
hunted at home in Macedon. cloak, which could be
wrapped around the arm
to form a makeshift shield.
On the right is a Foot
Companion in hunting
dress; he is an officer or a
senior soldier. (Angus
McBride © Osprry
Publishing Ltd)

109
THE BATTLE OF THE
RIVER GRANICUS
THE ROUTE TO THE RIVER GRANICUS
ather than set off south towards the Greek cities on the coast of western

R Asia Minor where the advance force had largely campaigned over the
last two seasons, Alexander headed east around Mount Ida towards
Dascylium, the capital of the Persian satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. Either
he had intelligence, or he (rightly) suspected that the satraps of the region
would be collecting forces to oppose him in this location. The ancient sources
also indicate that he now had provisions for only 30 days and that his treasury
amounted to only 70 talents, while he owed 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex., IS. I) .
If he could engage and destroy whatever field army the local satraps brought
against him, he would both gain the resources of the region and secure his
supply and communications line to Macedon.
Before setting off, Alexander decided to leave behind the 7,000 Greek allied
infantry and 5,000 mercenaries who had been brought over with the invasion
force. Perhaps he suspected the loyalties of his Greek allies after the revolt of
Thebes a year earlier. He probably assumed that since he was sure to face Greek
mercenaries as the most significant part of the Persian infantry he would
encounter, his own should be left behind. He would not test the loyalties of
mercenaries brought over from Greece in this initial engagement. Moreover,
this large force of allied and mercenary infantry would be a certain drain on his
already dwindling supplies. He may also have thought they could provide useful
consolidation and garrison duties in and around the Hellespont and Troad, with
the intention that they should rejoin the Macedonian army when it returned.
In addition to these considerations, Alexander was to move swiftly, covering
the roughly 60 miles from Arisbe to the Granicus in three days. For this sort
OPPOSITE
of movement, he would require only his Macedonian infantry, the six 'brigades'
Alexander the Great
(taxeis) of the sarissa--armed phalanx, and the hypaspists. These were all tough, addresses his troops. (a kg;
veteran and experienced campaigners. Although numbering only 12,000, images/British Library)

III
ALEXANDEH.. THE CiREAT AT\VAR

THE ROUTE FROM TROY TO THE GRANICUS

I
o

SATRAPY OF HELLESPON INE

PHRYGIA

~Alexander'sroute
~-PossiblealternativerouteofAlexander
~Crossingoftheinvasionforce

t
~Persianroute
? City location subject to conjecture
25 miles
1 - - - - - . - ,------',
25km

Alexander could be confident that they would be more than a match for the
infantry of the opposition, likely to be at best Greek hoplite mercenaries. On
the other hand, Alexander knew that Persian military strength, in number and
quality, lay in their cavalry, and he therefore opted to take all of the cavalry
available to him. The principal strike force of his army, the 1, 800--strong
Companion cavalry, and the 1,800 Thessalian cavalry were joined by the heavy
cavalry of his Greek allies, which, numbering 600, was less of a potential
concern regarding any questions of loyalty. The 900 light cavalry of prodromoi,
Thracians and Paeonians were also part of the force. They were too useful to
be left behind.
Leaving Arisbe, Alexander reached Percote and the following day came to the
city of Lampsacus. At the end of the day's march the army encamped near the
river Practicus, which may be identified with the river Paesus which empties
into the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) at the northern end of the Hellespont. The
following day the army struck camp for Colonae and must have arrived at the
town of Hermotus around midday. The exact route from Lampsacus to the

112
 THE BATTLE ()F THE I~IVER (JRANI(~US

Granicus is difficult to identify. Unfortunately, Colonae and Hermotus, the only

two place names mentioned regarding Alexander's route between Lampsacus
and the river Granicus, have not been positively identified. Unless otherwise
required, ancient armies generally followed coastal routes, and as Alexander
made the journey in three or slightly more days it is likely that he avoided the
mountainous region of the northern Ida uplands.
At some point after reaching Hermotus, Alexander dispatched a force under
the command of one of the Companion cavalry, Panegorus, son of Lycagoras, to
seize the coastal town of Priapus, which occupies a stretch of land roughly two
miles north of where the Granicus empties into the Propontis. At Hermotus,
Alexander was now just west of the river Granicus and from the hills would
have been able to survey the plain surrounding the river in the distance.
Scouts were now sent forward to reconnoitre the area. Alexander placed the
scouts under the overall direction of Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus, who led a
squadron of Companion cavalry recruited from Apollonia in Chalcidice.
Amyntas' squadron commander was Socrates son of Sathon and both of these
men were to see important action in the opening stage of the battle. In addition
to the scouts, four squadrons of the prodromoi were sent in front of the army.

PERSIAN MOVEMENTS
In early May the local satraps gathered in the region of Dascylium. Arsites, the
satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, the territory through which Alexander was now
marching, was joined by satraps from the other Anatolian provinces. Arsames
from Cilicia, the province north of Cyprus in the south--east of the peninsula,
Atizyes, satrap of 'Greater' Phrygia in the interior of Anatolia, Mithrobuzanes,
the satrap of southern Cappadocia, and Spithridates, the satrap of Lydia and Ionia,
and his brother Rhoesaces, gathered their forces in the fertile plain around
Dascylium, roughly 50 miles east of the Granicus. These were joined by other
Persian nobles, some of whom were relations of Darius, and the Greek mercenary
commander Memnon of Rhodes, who had earlier received estates in the Troad
from Darius.
Alexander's movement east would have been a point of concern, but perhaps
not unduly so. It is important to remember that in early 334 he was still very
much an unknown quantity. From intelligence, the Persians would have been
aware of his exploits, particularly since assuming the throne, but they had not
had any direct contact with the young Macedonian king. Darius III felt no
compulsion to rush to meet him. Over 1,000 miles away in the heart of his
empire, he must have felt confident in the ability of his local commanders and
their forces to stop the Macedonian incursion.

113
ALEXANI)EH. THE (JI~EAT AT \VAJ~

A low rise of hills about

room in height lies
roughly two~and~a~half
miles east of the river.
Much further away runs
another range of much
higher hills. (Michael
Thompson)

The forces that were marshalled by the satraps would have been raised locally.
Around 5,000 Greek mercenaries were gathered to provide the infantry, which
was how the Persian satraps of Asia Minor regularly raised infantry. Modern
historians have often placed Persian or native 'Asian' infantry at the battle and
this may be an attempt to account for the incredibly high infantry figure given
by Diodorus of 100,000. However there is no need to account for what it
certainly an erroneously high number of 'Persian' infantry by postulating native
infantry in addition to the Greek mercenaries. It is simpler and more coherent
to assume that only a relatively small force of Greek mercenaries was present.
Cavalry was traditionally the strongest arm of any Persian military force, and it
is likely that more than 10,000 were assembled by the satraps. Diodorus Siculus,
the only source for the Persian order of battle, indicates that Arsames brought his
own cavalry from Cilicia and that Memnon also commanded his own cavalry,
presumably raised from his estates in the Troad. Arsites, in the battle order,
commands cavalry from Paphlagonia, the region on the southern coast of the
Black Sea. Cavalry from Media, Bactria and Hyrcania are also listed as present,
which may appear anomalous as these provinces are from the central and eastern
parts of the Persian Empire. However, there is no need to believe that these were
brought to the region specifically to face Alexander. Rather, they would have been
raised locally from colonists of these regions who had long ago settled in Asia
Minor in return for their services to the Great King in this area.
The fertile plain around Dascylium meant this western Persian field army was
well provisioned. In addition, the town lay on an important crossroads in the
region. The road south led to the chief city of Lydia, Sardis, and access to the large
cities on the western Anatolian seaboard further south such as Ephesus and
Miletus. In fact, Sardis was the western terminus of the famous Persian Royal

114
 THE BATTLE ()F THE I~IVER (iRANI(~US

Road, which led eastwards to the capital Susa. North of Dascylium lay the
important coastal city of Cyzicus, which remained autonomous and supportive of
the Macedonians. As the interior of the Troad region is dominated by the Ida
mountain range, roads eastwards from the Hellespont took a north--easterly
direction and descended into the plain of Adrasteia through which the river
Granicus flows. As Alexander was approaching from this direction, the Persian
army and its commanders set out from Dascylium to the town ofZeleia (modern
Sarikoy) approximately 20 miles east of the Granicus.

The war council at Zeleia

The Persian force apparently reached Zeleia by late May and it was here that
Alexander's crossing into Asia was probably reported to the commanders. In
the histories ofArrian and Diodorus Siculus, there is a report preserved of a war
council that was held between the Persian satraps and Memnon very shortly
before, perhaps even on the eve of, the battle. Memnon initially suggested that
the best course of action was not to engage Alexander immediately because the
Macedonians were 'far superior' in infantry and had their own commander
leading them, while Darius was not present to lead his army. Rather, Memnon
counselled, the Persians should withdraw, destroying the fodder and provisions
in the area, burning the growing crops, and even destroying the towns and cities
of the region. This scorched--earth policy would deprive Alexander of the
supplies he would require, and it is perhaps tempting to wonder whether
Memnon had intelligence that Alexander's army was already reduced to a
month's supply of provisions, a claim made in Plutarch (Alex., 15.1). Diodorus
mentions that Memnon also advocated sending land and naval forces across to
mainland Europe instead of immediate engagement in Asia, in effect opening up
a diversionary second front. It is doubtful that this grandiose plan was actually
mooted before the battle of the Granicus, although it may have been more
seriously considered throughout the latter half of 334 and in 333 before
Memnon, the one man who might lead such an expedition, died of illness.
Memnon's proposal would have required a considerable sacrifice on the part of
those satraps whose territories he was effectively arguing should be surrendered
without a fight in the interests of the greater strategic objective. Arsites, the satrap
of Hellespontine Phrygia whose province would be the first to suffer under
Memnon's policy, flatly refused. The obligation of a satrap was to protect the lands
which had been conferred upon him by the Great King and simply abandoning his
satrapy to the enemy could surely be interpreted as a violation of his duties as a
Persian noble. Moreover, as Diodorus states, Memnon's advice probably struck at
the dignity and code of honour held by the Persian nobles.

115
ALEXA.NI)ER THE (iR.EAT 'VAJ~

The other satraps agreed with Arsites and Memnon's counsel was rejected.
Memnon's suggestion was apparently so outrageous that they even began to
distrust his motives. It may have been that the satraps were jealous ofMemnon's
position and it has been suggested that Arsites, as the satrap of Hellespontine
Phrygia, had particular reason to mistrust Memnon who held territories within
Arsites' own satrapy. Despite Memnon's earlier services to the Persian throne,
why should the local satraps defer to a Greek mercenary at the expense of their
own authority? On the other hand, it may be that those who wrote the report of
the council used by the extant authors desired to make a Greek, Memnon, appear
wiser than his Persian counterparts.
Although it has been suggested that Darius had made early preparations for the
Macedonian invasion, the fact that there was a war council at Zeleia implies that the
local satraps had not received explicit instructions from the Great King. The nature
of this war council raises the interesting question of the Persian command structure
at the battle of the Granicus. It has been argued that part of the reason for the
Persian failure there was that the Persians conducted a battle by committee.
However, it may have been the case that Arsites held a position closer to supreme
commander. It was his territory where a first engagement with Alexander would
take place; he also took the lead in rejecting, on behalf of the satraps, Memnon's
advice; and perhaps most tellingly, he survived the battle but later committed
suicide, which implies a responsibility and, indeed, culpability greater than those of
the other Persian nobility who survived.

PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE

Approaching the river, Alexander marched his army in a 'double' (diplon) phalanx
formation, with two phalanxes of infantry flanked by cavalry on either side and
screened by light infantry and scouts in the front. When the scouts reported that
the Persians were occupying the far bank of the river, Alexander was quickly able
to arrange the army in battle formation. With the phalanx in the centre drawn up
to a depth of eight men, the Macedonian line extended approximately 2.5 miles
(4km) from the confluence of the river where Alexander and the Companion
cavalry were stationed on the right wing northwards towards the cavalry under
Parmenion on the left wing.
A rough Persian order of battle is given by Diodorus Siculus. Surprisingly,
Memnon was not in command of the Greek mercenaries who were positioned
behind the full line of Persian cavalry. The contingents are variously reported at
strengths of 1,000 or 2,000 and the total cavalry force probably numbered more
than 10,000, or roughly twice the number of Alexander's cavalry. The number
of Greek mercenaries was around 5,000, significantly fewer than the 12,000--

116
 TI-IE RIVER GRl\NIC~US

strong Macedonian phalanx. The decision by the Persians to position their

cavalry at or near the river and place the infantry behind has been criticiz;ed as
a serious tactical error, but the practice was not unknown to the Persians;
Xenophon reports its use in the Anabasis. Similarly, at the Granicus, given their
inferiority in infantry, it would have made little sense for the Persians to have
placed their Greek mercenaries directly opposite the Macedonian phalanx
because the mercenaries would not have been able to match the length of the
Macedonian line without being spread hopelessly thin.
After the two armies had been arrayed, Arrian reports a conversation where
Parmenion advises that the battle be delayed until the following morning. This
advice is strongly rejected by Alexander, but the ultimate source of this story must
also have been known to Diodorus Siculus because he writes as if Alexander
accepted Parmenion's advice, encamped that night, crossed the river at dawn
and deployed his forces before the Persians could stop him. The irreconcilable
accounts of Diodorus and Arrian in this regard have caused difficulties for later
historians reconstructing the course of events. Plutarch was of the opinion that
Alexander attacked immediately, impetuously disregarding the reservations of his
officers, a view which is in accord with Arrian's depiction of events. It is highly
unlikely that Alexander would have delayed his attack once he had brought the
Persians to battle positions. In addition, it is even more unlikely that the Persians,
having sought what protection and advantage the river Granicus could afford,
would allow themselves to be caught unawares whilst Alexander's entire army
crossed the river and deployed for battle the following morning. It seems therefore
that Diodorus' account is confused on this point, and should be disregarded.
With both armies nervously lined up on opposite banks of the riverbed,
Alexander made himself conspicuous by his appearance and entourage. His
helmet with its two large white plumes would have clearly marked him out to the
Persians on the far bank and certainly to Memnon, Arsames and Arsites directly
opposite. The other satraps may have noticed this as well as in the course of
events many of them appear in battle near Alexander. In fact, the disposition of
Memnon and Arsites in particular may indicate that the immediate Persian
tactical objective was to kill Alexander himself. Attacking the head of an army was
a typical Persian tactic, and in this case particularly apt. At the battle of Cunaxa
in 401, Cyrus ordered his Greek mercenary commander, Clearchus, to attack the
Persian Great King directly, hoping that overpowering him would give them
victory. Perhaps by placing the cavalry in front of their mercenary infantry,
contrary to received wisdom and normal practice, they intended to reach
Alexander himself as soon as was possible, in the belief that killing the young
Macedonian king would end the war at its inception.

117
ALEXANDE.R THE (iR.EAT AT WAR

should be recalled that the infantry phalanx did not actually engage the enemy
until they met the surrounded Greek mercenaries on the plain beyond the river.
However, with the fierce and confusing cavalry fighting in the river higher cavalry
casualties might be expected.
Alexander made a point of visiting the wounded after the battle, and the
following day he buried the dead with much ceremony, not only the Macedonian
fallen, but also the Persian commanders and Greek mercenaries. The greatest
tribute was reserved for the 25 fallen Companions: Alexander commissioned his
personal court sculptor, Lysippus, to erect bronze statues in their honour at Dium
in Macedon, where they remained until removed to Rome in 146. For the parents

DESTRUCTION OF THE GREEK MERCENARIES

After the Persian cavalry had been routed at the river line phalanx before being immediately threatened with
and fled the battlefield, the 5,000 Greek mercenaries in contact themselves and very few of the Greek hoplites
their hire were left holding a very slight rise east of the would have been able to penetrate the wall of sarissai
river. They had hitherto taken no part in the battle. points before falling victim to them.
Refused quarter by Alexander, the front of the mercenary However, the heavily armed Greek hoplite was
position was attacked by the Macedonian phalanx as the formidable in defence and marshalled at even eight
cavalry completed their encirclement. Marshalled to a ranks was difficult to dislodge. If a hoplite could manage
depth of eight ranks, the Macedonians must have to pierce the Macedonian line he could cause damage
presented a formidable front of sarissai points to their through overarm or underarm thrusts of his spear. The
enemy. The Macedonian sarissa significantly outreached fighting in this final phase of the battle was tough going
the traditional hoplite spear in length, a devastating and the Macedonian infantry probably took most, if not
advantage for the Macedonian infantry. The long sarissa all, of their casualties here. Ultimately, the mercenary
enabled them to engage the first ranks of the mercenary resistance was in vain as they were gradually but
remorselessly destroyed. In this
scene, the diversity of uniform
and shield devices indicates the
multifarious origins of the
mercenaries, many of whom may
have hailed from Athens,
Thebes, Thessaly, or the
Peloponnese, as well as the Greek
cities of western Asia Minor. In
any event, those fortunate
enough to survive were unlikely
ever to see their homelands
again. (Richard Hook © Osprey
Publishing Ltd)

128
 THE Bi\TTLE OF THE RIVER GRi\NICUS

and children of the dead left behind in Macedon, Alexander remitted taxes and
relieved them of certain services due to the state. In addition, he sent 300 captured
Persian panoplies to Athens to be hung up on the Acropolis as a votive offering to
Athena. With these gestures, Alexander proclaimed the importance of his victory
at the river Granicus throughout Greece, Macedon, and Asia Minor.
At the Granicus Alexander showed not only the superiority of his army's skills
and training, but his ability as a commander. He employed the tactics he had seen
his father use, an angled cavalry charge to one wing, then turning into the centre,
followed up by the infantry in the centre. However, having appraised the field, he
preceded this by sending an advance force to disrupt the enemy line, before
leading his cavalry charge crashing into the disarrayed Persian cavalry. His
infantry in the centre then steadily advanced until the cavalry fled, and the Greek
mercenaries were left to the king's wrath. Following the Granicus, Alexander was
clearly no longer an unknown quantity. This is borne out by the reaction of cities
in Asia Minor to his advance. Some opened their gates to him, some decided to
hold out, but none disregarded his presence. Alexander was a threat, or a
welcome liberator, and he was clearly not finished yet.

THE MARCH SOUTH TO THE COAST

After the battle, Alexander appeared, as he had intended, as the liberator of Greek
cities in Asia. A move in this direction was an obvious next step for him.
Whether he already saw it as a first step in a grand strategy of world conquest
cannot be known. Liberation on Alexander's terms was now evidently more
acceptable to the provincial Persian government than to some of the Greek city--
states that were the object of his benevolent intentions.
Alexander made Calas satrap of the now conquered Hellespontine Phrygia.
The city of Zeleia from where the satraps had set out to the river Granicus was
pardoned because Alexander decided that it had been compelled to succour the
Persians. Parmenion was sent farther east to secure the provincial capital of
Dascylium, which he found abandoned by the Persian military. Alexander and
the army headed south to the city of Sardis and, about ten miles outside of the
city, he was met by Mithrenes, the garrison commander, who surrendered to
him the very defensible citadel and the significant treasury without a fight.
However, when Alexander turned his attention to the Greek cities of the east
Aegean coast that had been administered from Sardis, he met with a varying
reception. Four days later, travelling south--west towards the coast, Alexander
reached Ephesus where the Persian garrison and their mercenaries had
abandoned the city prior to his arrival. He established democracy there, subject
to his own suzerainty, and when the pre--existing pro--Persian oligarchy was

129
.ALEXf\NDER THE GREA:r i\T \V.AR

massacred, Alexander swiftly intervened to halt mob rule. The cities of Lydia
went over to Alexander without a quarrel, but farther south in Caria he was to
meet resistance.

Miletus
Memnon, having survived the Granicus, was now active on the Aegean
seaboard, conducting the kind of naval warfare that he had advocated before
the battle, supplying and supporting the Greek coastal cities against the
Macedonians. The other part of his plan, to lay waste to the hinterland to
deprive Alexander of supplies, was not possible for him to carry out, so the
Macedonian remained well supplied on land. Miletus, south of Ephesus, might
have surrendered easily enough to Alexander had the Persian fleet, containing
substantial Phoenician and Cyprian contingents, not been close at hand to
support resistance. The decision of Hegesistratus, the commander of the
garrison, to resist forced Alexander to commence his first siege of the campaign.
Fortunately, the Greek fleet of 160 ships reached the area three days before the
arrival of the Persian fleet from the south and anchored off the island of Lade
opposite the city. The Thracian and 4,000 other mercenary troops were
stationed on the island. However, once the Milesian commander realized that a
Persian fleet were on their way, he refused to surrender. When the Persian fleet
of 400 ships berthed opposite Alexander under the promontory of Mycale
on the mainland, he decided not to risk a sea fight against such numerical odds.
The Milesians now pleaded their neutrality, but Alexander was not listening any
more, and he brought up his siege engines. He had already been allowed to occupy
the outer city unopposed before his brief parley with the Milesian representatives.
Alexander's ships now slipped across from Lade and blocked the entrance of the
city harbour, anchored in line abreast to cut off the defenders from any hope of
seaborne relief. Alexander battered his way into the city with his siege engines.
Many Milesian citizens came out and surrendered, delivering themselves into
Alexander's hands, but a few fought alongside the hired garrison. As the besiegers
closed in, some of the garrison tried to save themselves by swimming, and 300
mercenaries reached a high rocky island not far out at sea; after capturing the city,
Alexander assaulted this island with scaling ladders mounted on boats. He admired
the desperate courage of the mercenaries, however, and took them into his service.
This signalled a more lenient policy towards Greek mercenaries.
Persian ships were small with no space for provisions, so needed daily contact
with supply bases. Alexander used this fact to deal with the Persian fleet waiting
outside Miletus. He sent several units to drive the ships off when they came in for
water and food along the coast from Miletus. They returned to Miletus, but still

130
 THE Bf\T]"LE l)F l~HE RIVER GRA.NICUS

unable to get water they sailed away south. Alexander now decided to disband the
bulk of his navy due to its cost, and instead capture the cities and ports on the
coast from which the Persian navy might operate and re--supply. By denying
access to safe harbours and supplies, Alexander could negate the power of the
Persian fleet. Dismissing the fleet was a hazardous option in the short term, but
Alexander was shrewd in his calculations and saw his strategy through to the
end.

Halicarnassus
The most important city and supply base in the vicinity was Halicarnassus.
Probably the strongest fortified city in Asia Minor, it was set in a natural
amphitheatre, and well fortified with a number of strong citadels. The defences
had been recently augmented with a I3.Sm (44ft) wide and 7m (23ft) deep
defensive ditch. Memnon of Rhodes, now given full command of the west by

DITCH-FILLING TORTOISES AT HALICARNASSUS

At Halicarnassus, Alexander needed to fill the newly cut as backwards and forwards, probably by briefly raising
ditch in order to bring up heavy machinery. To do this each corner in turn and changing the orientation of the
he used ditch.. filling tortoises. According to Athenaeus, axle. The large frame would have allowed a dozen or
the ditch.. filling tortoise could be rolled sideways as well more men to congregate around each wheel assembly
and take its weight. With
the machine in position,
there would have been
ample space in the interior
for men to work
unhindered, evening out
depressions in the ground.
The gap between the
rafters and the ground
would have been sufficient
to allow baskets of earth
and rubble to be brought
in at the rear, from where
they could be dragged
forwards for the task of
ditch filling. (Brian Delf ©
Osprey Publishing Ltd)

131
f\LEXANDER -THE GREA,T i\T Wl\R

Darius, had gathered the Greek mercenaries of the nearby cities to defend the
fortress, and without the possibility of a naval blockade by Alexander, the city
could be indefinitely supplied by sea. As the Persian fleet protected the seaward
side, Alexander had to attack from the north,east or west, where the outer walls
descended to fairly level ground. The sources minimize the difficulties of the
siege; however, it lasted two months, and the city was eventually attacked and
defended by every means known to the siegecraft of the ancient world. There
was a delay for Alexander at the beginning as he waited for his siege machinery
to be transported to Halicarnassus. After an unsuccessful attempt to take a sea
port 12 miles away, Alexander put his men to filling the ditch in front of the
walls, using ditch,filling tortoises. Once this was done the siege towers could
roll across and into position. Catapults were used to keep the defenders back,
while a section of wall was flattened. The defenders made defiant sallies at night,
then built an interior containing wall around the breach. A night attack against
the new wall, perhaps fuelled by drink, was quashed by the defenders, and for
the one and only time in Alexander's career, he was forced to ask for a truce to
recover his dead. Alexander continued to inflict heavy casualties and damage,
and despite effective counter,attacks and the construction of inner walls to
defend breaches created by the siege engines, Memnon and his commanders

The Myndus gate at

Halicarnassus where
Alexander first approached
the major fortifications of
the ciry. (]ona Lendering,
Livius.org)

132
 THE BATTLE ()F Tf·1E l~rVER CiRl\NIC:US

realized they could no longer hold the city. They therefore burned the outer
fortifications and the city itself and withdrew to the inner citadels. The next day
Alexander hurried into the city and allegedly razed it to the ground. This is
probably an exaggeration, but he would have needed to clear space for his
machines in order to besiege the remaining stronghold and to garrison the city.
Realizing that the Persians would not be easily defeated, Alexander left a
holding force of 3,000 troops under Ptolemy to continue the siege, and handed
back government of the city to the ruling family of Mausolus, as represented by
Mausolus' sister Ada. The citadel held out for another whole year, acting as a
supply base for Persian ships. Alexander's perseverance at Halicarnassus cannot
be doubted, but his success was mixed. Though he eventually took the city, it
was not by assault but because the outnumbered Persian garrison made the
strategic decision to forfeit the town and protect the supply base, a decision
validated by the fact that the stronghold continued to function as a base for the
Persian fleet for many more months.
After dealing with Halicarnassus, Alexander sent home on leave some of his
soldiers who had been newly married before their departure, and also sent one
of his officers on a recruiting drive to the Greek Peloponnese. That winter he
led his men into Lycia to the east. Travelling through the mountainous region
of Lycia he reached the coast at Phaselis. The army headed into Pamphylia via
a specially engineered pass over Mount Climax while Alexander and a smaller
group passed along the coast. After bivouacking in Aspendus, he campaigned
against the rugged mountain towns of Pisidia before reaching Caelenae on the
road to Gordion in the satrapy of Greater Phrygia. Reaching the city a few
weeks later, Alexander probably met up with Parmenion and the Greek allies
who had previously been sent to campaign against remnants of Persian forces
on the Anatolian plateau. He was also rejoined by the Macedonians returned
from leave and new levies from Macedon and the Greek mainland, 3,000
infantry and 300 horse, all Macedonian, with 200 Thessalian horse and ISO
Peloponnesian mercenaries under their own commander. (S~e map on p. 136.)
In Gordion, Alexander was shown the intricate knot that bound the yoke and
shaft of the legendary king Gordias' ox--cart. The local inhabitants held that
whoever should untie the knot would become king of Asia, a challenge
Alexander could not resist. According to Plutarch, Alexander became frustrated
at his inability to loosen the knot and resorted to hacking it free with his sword.
However, another account attributed to Aristobulus says that Alexander merely
pulled out the pin joining the yoke and shaft to reveal the loose ends which he
then unravelled. In any event, his blushes were spared and the oracular
prophecy appeared to be fulfilled.

133
THE BATTLE OF ISSUS
THE ROUTE TO ISSUS
uring his stay at Gordion in the summer of 333, Alexander must have

D received the unwelcome news that Memnon, formerly holed up in

Halicarnassus, was now freely operating against the islands of the
western Aegean. These actions endangered his supply and communications
line to Macedon and threatened to undo the work of the previous year's
campaigning. However, in one of the most fortuitous events of Alexander's
career, this potentially serious menace was removed when Memnon died of an
illness during the siege of Mytilene. Furthermore, it appears that Darius then
had a change of heart about carrying on operations behind Alexander's march
and ordered his fleet, and the mercenaries operating with them, to return east
with the intention of joining the army he was already collecting from all areas
of the empire.
Alexander now marched his army south through Ancyra towards the Cilician
Gates, which passed through the Taurus mountain range and into the fertile
Aleian plain at the north--east corner of the Mediterranean. Alexander led a
lightly armed highly mobile detachment against the Persian force under
Arsames which was holding the Cilician Gates. Arsames was supported by an
inadequate force and so did not offer battle, instead dropping back to burn
Tarsus to prevent it falling into enemy hands, but Alexander was too quick,
racing to the city in one day and capturing it before it could be burned.
While Alexander was taken ill after swimming in the freezing waters of the
river Cydnus near Tarsus, Darius led his vast native army from Babylon to
Sochi near the Amanus range east of the river Issus, where it encamped at the
beginning of autumn 333. Ancient historians estimated its size at between
312,000 and 600,000, swelled by 30,000 Greek mercenaries. The figure of

600,000 is most probably extrapolated from the total possible troops available OPPOSITE
from the empire, perhaps because units of varying size from most provinces This r6th--century painting
by Albrecht Altdorfer is a
were present. The true figure is likely to be closer to the lower figure, and even
romantic depiction of the
if the grand total was 600,000, they would not have necessarily all have been battle of Issus. (akg--
present on the battlefield. images)

135
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT \VAR

ALEXANDER S ROUTE FROM

GRANICUS TO Issus
~
DARIUS

BLACK SEA

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA t
After recovering from his illness, Alexander set out to find Darius. When
Darius learned that Alexander was still advancing, his first thought was to
remain in his present position. In the Syrian plain Persian numbers could be
used to their best advantage. However, as the situation developed, opportunity
for a master--stroke seemed to present itself, and Darius sei:z;ed his chance.

136
 THE BATTLE OF ISSlJS

Alexander, having camped with his army at Mallus in Cihcia, passed through the Persian national cavalry
coastal defile towards Syria and advanced on the small port of Issus, which had at Issus, based on figures
from the Alexander
already been occupied by a detachment under Parmenion. A temporary base was sarcophagus. (Simon
established where the Macedonian sick and wounded were left. Alexander then Chew © Osprey
marched southwards along the narrow low--lying coastal strip that separated the Publishing Ltd)

mountains from the sea, making for the Pillar ofJonah - the so--called Syrian or
Assyrian Gates - south of modern Iskenderun, which gave access to Syria.
Possibly he marched at night, as he had done in his swift advance on the Cihcian
Gates. But this time he led the main body of his army rather than a mobile striking
force. Darius may have been deceived by the similarity to the Macedonian strategy
in Cihcia. He decided to take a circuitous route in order to separate Alexander from
his local base at Issus and isolate him from the main body of his army. This
operation was made easier by a sudden violent storm, which halted Alexander at
Myriandrus, on the coast near the Syrian Gates. Darius took advantage of a valley
route just east of the Amanus mountain range and led his army north again, thus
avoiding Alexander's army and bypassing the coastal strip. His manoeuvre,
however, had the disadvantage that it brought the Persian army into the narrow
lowland area between the sea and mountain, leaving the much wider Syrian plain
where he could have deployed it more effectively.

137
l.\LEXl.\NI)EI{ Tf~IE (~I{EAT t\T \VAR

Issus: ALEXANDER'S ADVANCE Alexander was certainly surprised at the move and sent
a trireme up the Gulf of Issus to confirm the report that
had reached him. In fact this new development came
as a pleasant surprise: nothing could have pleased
Alexander more than the prospect of fighting on a
narrow battlefield. Darius on the other hand must soon
have been disappointed. When he descended from the
mountains near Issus, he found there no more than a
hospital base. The Persians massacred many of the
Macedonian sick and wounded and ensured a non--
combatant role for others by cutting off their right
hands. This was perhaps only to be expected - Darius
could not leave any possible threat to his rear.
Meanwhile, Alexander with his entire army had
wheeled about and was retracing his steps north.
Darius perhaps still considered that he was trying to
escape and accordingly advanced the Persian army
south of Issus to block his way. When the two forces
met, they were separated by the river Pinarus, a narrow
torrent in which comparatively little water now flowed.
Alexander faced north and Darius south.
MEDITERRANEAN In this position Darius sat astride the Macedonian
SEA
lines of communication; however, by the same token,
there was nothing to prevent Alexander from marching
into Syria except the danger to his rear. But if the
protagonists were to meet, it was advantageous for
Alexander to fight in the restricted terrain of Cilicia,
where the mountains and sea reduced the mobility of the
enemy's troops and diluted his numerical superiority.
Superficially, the situation was not very different from
that at the Granicus. But the fact that the Granicus had
been swollen with spring floods and that the Pinarus in
late autumn now ran low meant that this battlefield was
of another kind. Nevertheless, Alexander at once
prepared to implement standard Macedonian tactics,
with their effective co--ordination of infantry centre and
cavalry wing. As he marched slowly and deliberately
i
northward, the slender margin of coastal lowland
2 3Krn
widened slightly and he was able to deploy his army in

138
 THE BATTLE ()F ISSlJS

stages, advancing at last in line of battle. He positioned himself with the Companion
cavalry on the right wing, hard against the hills that restricted movement.

THE BATTLE
Darius had been persuaded that Alexander would not of his own accord seek a
pitched battle, so he must now have been taken aback. He sent a force of 30,000
horsemen and 20,000 light infantry south of the Pinarus in order to buy time for
the deployment of his own troops. He took up a defensive position, using the
banks of the Pinarus as protection; where the riverbanks gave insufficient defence,
he erected palisades.
Darius commanded 30,000 heavily armed Greek mercenaries, and these, with
60,000 Persian mercenary troops, now constituted the centre of his vanguard, in

which position they would confront the Macedonian phalanx. Darius certainly had
with him a much greater number of Asiatic foot--soldiers than his satraps had
commanded at the Granicus. These he posted in large bodies in support of his
forward troops, stringing them out in line as far as the narrow battlefield would
permit - the sea was not far distant on his right, and the hills were on his left. In
OVERLEAF
the centre of this array, Darius himself rode in his chariot. The central position was The Alexander mosaic is a
normal to Persian kings in battle, and from it they were able to dispatch orders in Roman mosaic dating from
one direction or another to any part of their large armies. At Issus, the contours of about 200, from the House
of the Faun in Pompeii.
the foothills were such that the Persian line actually curved forward, posing an
I t is a copy of an earlier
encircling threat to Alexander's right wing. In the centre, the Asiatic infantry units, painting, possibry a
drawn up according to the various localities from which they had been recruited, contemporary apotheosis--
painting of Alexander in
were so densely mustered that they could not easily be brought into action.
battle against the Persians
In Alexander's advancing army, all troops left of the central phalanx were under by Apelles. I t is usualry
the command of Parmenion. On the right, archers and lightly armed Agrianians taken to show the battle
of I ssus, although some
were sent to dislodge the outflanking enemy on the foothills. This was done very
scholars now think it
easily, and Darius' infantry were quickly dispersed, seeking refuge higher up the may show Gaugamela.
mountains where they posed no threat; nevertheless, 300 of Alexander's horsemen Alexander is shown
were detailed to watch them. sweeping into battle
at the left on his horse
At the last moment, Alexander withdrew two cavalry squadrons of his Bucephalus, focussed on
Companions from a comparatively central position and sent them to reinforce his Darius. Darius is shown
right wing. This readjustment was no doubt much needed, for he had already in a chariot, desperatery
commanding his charioteer
moved the Thessalian cavalry from its original right--wing position to his left,
to flee the battle. His hand
where the Persians were massing. Indeed, Darius, as soon as he had been able to is stretched out, either as a
retract his cavalry screen from across the river, had concentrated these horsemen mute gesture to Alexander,
or possibry after throwing
on his right against Parmenion. The plain here, close to the sea, no doubt
a javelin. His charioteer
seemed to favour cavalry combat. Both Alexander's late readjustments were made whips the horses as he tries
unobtrusively. The Thessalians rode around the rear of the advancing army, and to obey. (akg--images)

139
ALEXANDER ""fI.-JE GREi\r f\T Wt\R

the Companion cavalry, warned that the enemy must not observe them, apparently
found cover among the spurs that extended seaward from the inland foothills.
Alexander continued his slow advance, making sure that the whole army
preserved a level front, until he was within missile range of the Persian lines. He
then suddenly launched his attack on the right, personally leading his Companions
across the riverbed and driving back the enemy opposite him. (That Alexander, in
imitation of Cyrus at Cunaxa, charged directly at the Persian centre, where Darius
himself was positioned, may be more than mere fiction. It seems to have been
common in this period that leaders felt they had to seek each other out. If the story
is true, this must have occurred in the second phase of the battle.) As happened
often in ancient battles, the right wing's success carried it forward and out of touch
with the centre. The steep and unequal banks of the river, not to mention Darius'
stockades, here made it particularly difficult for the phalangites to keep abreast of
each other, let alone with Alexander and his cavalry.
Into the gap that had opened between Alexander's cavalry and the
Macedonian phalanx, Darius' Greek mercenaries now penetrated. This meant
they could soon be in a position to force the phalangites back into the river and
threaten from the rear the Macedonian cavalry that had routed the Persian left.
It may be that the gap in the Macedonian line had opened at this point partly as
a result of Alexander's last--minute decision to reinforce his right--wing cavalry at

OXATHRES AT Issus?
The sources say that the elite Persian cavalry were
drawn up around the king at Issus. During the
battle, Oxathres, the brother of Darius, -put his
cavalry between Alexander and Darius' chariot.
Oxathres fought valiantly, but eventually his
regiment was broken and Darius was forced to
abandon his chariot and flee. It has been suggested
that the figure in front of Darius on the mosaic is
Oxathres. If this is correct, then Oxathres must
wear the uniform of the commander of the elite
cavalry regiment of the whole Persian Empire. He
wears a tunic of either saffron, or cloth of gold
edged in purple, and a cloak with a purple border.
His horse is presumably a Nisean. (Simon Chew ©
Osprey Publishing Ltd)

142
 THE Bf\TTLE OF ISSUS

Issus: THE TURN OF THE TIDE

~DARIUS

As Darius' centre turns to face

Alexander's attack, Parmenion1s
left wing takes the offensive

MEDITERRANEAN o 0.5
I
1 Mile
SEA I I I

o 0.5 1.5 Km

the expense of his centre. The phalangites took heavy casualties, including
Ptolemy son of Seleucus, but they fought on. They turned back the dangerous
counter--attack and managed to contain the salient that had developed on their
right until Alexander was able to come to their aid.
Having put the Persian left to flight, Alexander now wheeled to his own left,
slamming into the Greek mercenaries and destroying their formation, forcing
them to retreat from the river or cutting them down where they stood.
The Macedonian phalanx was then able to advance once more, destroying those
infantry who had survived the impact of Alexander's cavalry.
Darius' army came closer to success on its right, against the Macedonian left wing
where Parmenion was in command. Here, on the beach and the adjacent lowland

143
ALEXANDER THE GREAT ATW.AR

plain, an overwhelming superiority in cavalry numbers could most obviously be

turned to advantage. Whether the Persian right--wing cavalry on this occasion took
its orders directly from Darius is not clear, but in any case its officers in this sector
were impatient of their purely defensive role, and the Persian horsemen soon surged
across the river to attack the Thessalian cavalry ranged against them. Desperate
fighting took place, but when the Persian right wing saw that the centre and left of
the army had collapsed, and that they were in danger of encirclement, they took to
flight. Perversely their bid for safety caused them to suffer more grievously as the
Thessalians pursued their confused retreat.
The rout of Darius' army in this sector soon became catastrophic. Many of
the fugitives were heavily armed and equipped horsemen. Either they were
encumbered in their flight or, discarding their weapons, were helpless when
overtaken. As they converged in mountain defiles amid increasing panic, horses
often fell with their riders, and many men were trampled to death by those who
pressed on from behind. Parmenion's pursuing cavalry did not relax its pressure,
and the fleeing Persian infantry, who had been posted behind their own cavalry,
now suffered equally with the horsemen.
Darius did not wait long enough to see the defeat of his right wing. The
moment that his left had crumpled before Alexander's onslaught, he had taken
to flight in his chariot, which carried him swiftly enough as long as the ground
was level. But when he found himself amid the rocky gorges that lay eastward
and northward, he abandoned his chariot together with weapons and items of
clothing, and mounted a horse to make good his escape. It is reported that the
horses that drew his chariot had been wounded and become unmanageable
and that the horse he ultimately mounted had been led behind his chariot for
just such an emergency. In any case, nightfall saved the Persian king from
Alexander's pursuit, and all that rewarded the Macedonian king was the capture
of Darius' abandoned chariot and equipment.

THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE

Ancient sources tell us of 100,000 dead or captured Persian infantry at Issus,
and of 10,000 cavalry casualties. This seems an inordinately high number, and
must be taken as another example of inflated enemy losses by Alexander's
historians. However, casualties were high for the Persian army. It would seem
likely that more were killed in the rout that followed the battle than in the actual
course of the fighting, not uncommon in ancient warfare. Several high--ranking
Persians, more resolute than Darius himself, were killed in the battle. Some of
them were survivors from the Granicus. By contrast, Alexander's losses were
slight. But we have only Macedonian propaganda to go by, and stories like the

144
 THE BArTLE OF ISSUS

THE AFTERMATH OF BATTLE

Despite unequivocal successes against Persia, victory in 200 cavalry killed. It is unknown how many of these were

battle always came at a cost, especially for the infantrymen, pezhetairoi or hypaspists, and it is impossible to estimate
whose casualties were almost always far greater that those how many of the wounded either died later, were invalided
of the cavalry. The infantry casualties for Alexander's home or left behind as garrison troops. The recovery of the
battles were most likely deflated for purposes ofpropaganda. dead and wounded from the battlefield was a gruesome
For example, it was reported that about 300 infantrymen scene to confront a warrior. Here, two men carry a corpse
were killed at Issus, although the hard fighting against the to a wagon. Others support and console a wounded
Greek mercenaries in the centre makes this number risible. comrade, while some men pick through the debris,
An anonymous historical papyrus found at Oxyrhynchus in salvaging usable weapons or despoiling the dead. (Christa
Egypt gives a more reasonable figure of 1,000 infantry and Hook © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

145
f\LEX1\NDER THE GREAT £\1- WAR

sensational tale of Alexander struggling with Darius in person must be treated

with caution.
Again at Issus, Alexander used the shock hammer blow of the cavalry to
crack open the enemy. Although his movement of the troops from the centre
allowed a gap to develop, putting pressure on the phalanx, his angled charge
from the right wing into the left wing of Darius' army, then turning into the
centre and following up the advantage, was perfectly executed. The difficulties
experienced by Parmenion on the left wing against superior numbers could have
told if the story had been different elsewhere on the battlefield, but even had the
Persian right not fled, the rest of the Macedonian army could have dealt with
them after the left and centre had been dealt with. Alexander's choice of
battlefield had helped him to negate Darius' superior numbers, but it was his
decisive leadership that took the battle.
The Macedonian army quickly occupied the Persian camp, where they found
and imprisoned the mother, wife and children of Darius himself. Alexander
treated the royal ladies with great chivalry, reassuring them that Darius was not
dead, and telling them that he had no personal grievance against him, but fought
merely in pursuit of a legitimate political claim - the control of Asia.
Money had also been left behind. Arrian refers casually to 'no more than
3,000 talents', but he was making comparison with the much greater spoils

found at Damascus. There was, at Issus, certainly enough to pay and supply
Darius' huge field army through the expected campaign.
Although wounded in the leg by a sword,thrust, Alexander attended to the

This section of the

Alexander sarcophagus
shows Alexander fighting
at Issus. He is mounted
and wearing a lions kin on
his head. I t has been
proposed that a second
mounted Macedonian near
the centre is H ephaestion,
and a third is often
identified as Perdiccas.
(akg~images/Erich Lessing)

146
 1~HE BATTLE OF ISS'US

honourable burial of the dead and visited all his wounded men, offering
consolation and congratulation as it was due, and conferring rewards on those
who had merited them in the battle.
After the defeat at Issus, Damascus fell into the hands of Parmenion. The
amount of treasure and the importance of the individuals captured there reveals
that the city was not merely a convenient place to deposit the treasures and
non--combatants, but that Darius had intended to move his base of operations
forward. He clearly did not expect to be routed in a single engagement and
forced to seek refuge in the centre of the empire.
Meanwhile Darius continued his flight eastward. He had been joined by other
fugitives to the number of about 4,000, and his main intention was to put the
river Euphrates between himself and Alexander as soon as possible. Some 8,000
Greek troops, who had previously deserted from Alexander to Darius, escaped
westward. Reaching the Phoenician coast at Tripolis near Mount Lebanon, they
found the ships that had originally brought them from Lesbos. Burning the
surplus ships to prevent pursuit, some sailed to Egypt via Cyprus and others
probably took service with King Agis of Sparta.
Considering the decisive nature of Alexander's victory and the scale of the forces
involved, the actual duration of the fighting must have been remarkably short. The
battle was fought on a November day, yet there seems to have been daylight enough
for a long and eventful pursuit of the defeated army. In the morning, Alexander had
advanced deliberately and slowly towards the Persian positions, and there had been
time for both sides to observe each other and re--order their battle lines accordingly.
The time taken by the battle itself cannot have been more than a few hours.
For Alexander the victory - particularly in the aftermath of Memnon's death -
provided the opportunity of pushing ahead with the conquest and leaving his newly
appointed satraps to deal with the continued resistance in Asia Minor. Antigonus
Monophthalmos, a certain Ptolemy (perhaps even a kinsman of Antigonus) and
Balacrus dealt effectively with what Persian forces remained behind.

AFTER ISSUS
On the death of Memnon, the Persian admirals Pharnabazus and Autophradates
had taken over command of Darius' Aegean fleet and continued to base
themselves at Chios. They also continued to implement Memnon's strategy,
which had been to erode Macedonian power in the Greek mainland and islands
while Alexander was occupied with a strategy of eastward conquest. Meanwhile
in Greece, King Agis of Sparta was thinking along the same lines as the Persians
and hoped to combine his efforts with theirs. He sailed with a single trireme to
meet Pharnabazus on the island of Siphnos in the Cyclades, his objective being

147
j\LEXANDER THE GREAr £\T'VAR

to obtain a subsidy of ships and money from the Persians in support of a war
against Antipater in Greece.
The news of Issus reached Agis and the Persian commanders precisely as they
were conferring in Siphnos. Pharnabazus hastened back to Chios. Indeed, there
was a danger that all along the east Aegean seaboard pro--Macedonian elements
might take heart at Alexander's victory and throw off Persian control. In the
circumstances, Agis certainly did not receive the contribution he had hoped for:
Autophradates gave him just ten ships and 30 talents of silver. These he sent to
his brother Agesilaus, with instructions that the rowers should be paid in full and
the flotilla dispatched to Crete, there to establish an anti--Macedonian presence.
This operation was successfully carried out. Some months later Agis was joined
by some of the Greek mercenaries who had opposed Alexander at Issus. However,
he received no support from Athens. In the Peloponnese several cities rallied to
Sparta's call, but Messene, Argos and Megalopolis - all Sparta's traditional
enemies - were in no mind to oppose the Macedonians. Agis' problem was thus
one of numbers, and when he was at last confronted before the walls of a hostile
Megalopolis by Antipater's Macedonian relief force, he was overwhelmed by an
army twice as large as his own. He himself died heroically, fighting on his knees
after a leg wound made it impossible for him to stand.
At about the same time, there was some revival of the Persian war effort in the
interior of Asia Minor. Darius' officers in Paphlagonia and Cappadocia managed
to raise local levies from these provinces, and they were joined by fugitives
from Issus, many of whom had made their way northward. These forces now
threatened Antigonus, the commander to whom Alexander had entrusted
Phrygia. Antigonus was all the more vulnerable because he had drafted troops to
support Alexander's own operations farther east and the Phrygian garrison forces
were now depleted. However, when the clash came, Antigonus vanquished the
newly constituted Persian army in three separate engagements. Again, there was
proof that Alexander had left the right man to fight the battles he left in his wake,
and he himself was never obliged to deviate from his original plan as he led his
forces south through Syria and Palestine.
At Damascus, Alexander captured a number of noble Persian ladies, from the
families of Darius' officers, who had been quartered there before the battle of
Issus. He treated them with scrupulous detachment, with only one exception:
Barsine, the widow of Memnon, herself a daughter of a Persian nobleman,
became his mistress, and she later bore him a son, whom he called Heracles in
honour of his claimed ancestor.
Having reached the other side of the Euphrates, Darius resorted to diplomacy,
sending letters to Alexander offering money and territory in exchange for his

148
 Tl-·IE Br\TTLE OF ISSUS

A wounded Foot
Companion is supported
by a servant, as a senior
soldier of the Foot
Companions covers their
withdrawal from the
battle. (Angus McBride ©
Osprey Publishing Ltd)

kinfolk. But the exchanges between the two kings demonstrated merely the P~rsian
king's refusal to recognize the gravity of the danger to the empire. Furthermore,
Darius persisted in treating Alexander as an upstart, an inferior who could, he
thought, be bought off with the cession of Asia Minor and 10,000 talents. But
Alexander held the trump cards and was not prepared to fold when diplomacy
offered less than he had obtained by conquest. Negotiations continued for almost
two years, with an escalation of the terms - Darius was eventually to offer Asia west
of the Euphrates, 30,000 talents and the hand of his daughter in marriage - but
Persian concessions failed to keep pace with Macedonian conquests. Darius no
longer had the authority to dispose of Alexander's 'spear--won land'.

149
PHOENICIA AND EGYPT
n Phoenicia, the news of Issus led to defection on a large scale.

I Representatives of the coastal cities brought Alexander crowns of gold to

symbolize their surrender: Aradus, Marathus and Byblus submitted in
short order. And, although the cities themselves received good treatment from
the conqueror, there were some rulers, like Straton of Sidon, who despite their
surrender were deposed. It appears that the Sidonians, who now welcomed
Alexander as a 'liberator' - for Artaxerxes III had put down an insurrection in
the city with the utmost brutality - were not inclined to retain in power a man
with a lengthy record of collaboration with the Persians. According to the
tradition, Alexander allowed his best friend Hephaestion to select a new king:
he found a member of the royal house, Abdalonymus, reduced by poverty to
working as a gardener, and upon him he bestowed the crown.
Possession of Phoenicia was critical for the survival of the Persian fleet.
Alexander had abandoned attempts at defeating the Persian navy at sea and had
disbanded the Macedonian fleet. Not only was the Persian fleet numerically
superior, having recruited even pirate crews, but the Macedonian ships and
sailors were of inferior quality; and, to make matters worse, the Greek naval
powers could not be fully trusted. It was better to deprive the Persian navy of
its bases and thereby reduce its power, without running the risk of a naval
disaster that might turn the tide of the war and would almost certainly tarnish
Alexander's reputation as an invincible foe. As it was, in attempts to guard and
threaten various points in the Aegean simultaneously, the Persians split their
forces too much. Units of the Persian navy that tried to recover command of the
Hellespont were defeated by Alexander's fleet under the Macedonian officers
Hegelochus and Amphoterus. Miletus was retaken by the Macedonians, and
Pharnabazus himself was captured at Chios. The pirate crews that the Persians
OPPOSITE
had enlisted were arrested and executed. A relief at the Ammon
Alexander's naval strategy worked. As the inhabitants and governments of Temple in Luxor showing
Alexander the Great
each region surrendered to him, their naval contingents abandoned the Persian
as pharaoh, greeting
cause. The Phoenicians found themselves in an awkward position, since large the God Ammon. (a kg;
numbers of their citizens, including many of their local dynasts, served with the images/Gerard Degeorge)

151
ALEXANDER THE GREf\T .AT \Vf\I{

SIEGE WARFARE

The history of siege warfare is characterized by always exposed to attack, and risked prohibitive
alternating periods when defensive or offensive casualties. An army might try to capture a city by
techniques dominate. In the Classical period escalade, but such attempts could be extremely
defence had almost total supremacy. Cities were costly if the defender was well prepared.
ringed by colossal fortifications which were all but Realistically, an invading army had little chance of
impregnable. Towns did surrender in terror at the taking the enemy city by storm. To take a city by
approach of their enemy, but more often, the investment the invader had to sit outside its walls
townsfolk barred the gates and hoped that their for months, if not years, until the food ran out. The
fortifications would discourage the aggressor. enemy city had to be circumvallated by encircling it
Under these circumstances, there were five with a ditch and rampart; then the rampart had to
courses of action available to the besieger. He could be constantly manned to prevent food entering the
attempt to go over the fortifications, using ladders city. A somewhat quicker method was to construct
or embankments. He could break through the a siege,mound. The first siege,mound known
defences using battering rams, or make the walls within the Aegean area was one constructed by
collapse by digging beneath them. Thirdly, tunnels the Lydian king Alyattes against Smyrna around
could bs: dug underneath the walls. This was 600. The Persians made effective use of siege,
dangerous, but if executed properly would give the mounds to reduce many fortified cities to their rule.
attackers the advantage of surprise. If the attacker However, both Lydia and Persia were rich and
failed in these methods, or lacked the means to populous empires that could afford the resources
attempt them, he might threaten the townsfolk necessary to construct siege,mounds, and field the
with starvation by blockading their supply routes. considerable army necessary for a suitable length of
This was a far less dangerous strategy, but time, which remained beyond the capacity of most
depending on the resources of the town and totality Greek states.
of the blockade, it could drag on indefinitely. The The usual goal of an offensive campaign was to
last option was to gain access by treachery or force the defender into battle in the open as quickly
trickery. The standard form of trickery involved the as possible. The key problem was to discourage
conspicuous departure of the besieging forces in him from retiring behind the safety of his city walls
apparent abandonment of the operation. The with his livestock. The so,called 'strategy of
relieved townsfolk would then be caught off guard devastation' was developed to force the defender
by a concealed strike force left behind. This force out of his city. When an invader reached the plain
would ideally infiltrate the town just as the of the enemy state - its prime agricultural asset -
besieging force returned. he sought to do as much damage as possible. For
The principal siege weapon was the battering maximum effect, cities were usually invaded
ram, able to breach a wall or gate if a vveak point immediately before the harvest season, when the
could be found, but the party operating the ram was crops were still in the fields. The invader did his

152
 Pf-IOENIC:IA ANI) EGYPT

best to spoil the crops, or to gather them in for his Philip was particularly associated in the ancient
own use. He would also damage fruit and olive consciousness with the development of siege
trees. If the defender did not accept terms, he machinery. It has been suggested that in around
would be forced outside his city walls to fight for 350, he established permanent workshops for
his crops. If he chose to fight, the action would mechanical engineering, but that inadequacies
unfold as a hoplite battle, and took place on the were shown up during the campaign of 340, and a
level plains near the city. If he chose not to fight new chief engineer, Polyidus the Thessalian, was
then the invader would invade again the next year, appointed for the siege of Byzantium, where he
and subsequent years, in the hope that the was linked with the building of a giant siege
cumulative damage caused to the agricultural tower.
infrastructure would either force the defender out Ancient writers preserve a long (but by no
to fight, or force him to eat his seed corn, which means exhaustive) list of Philip's conquests by
would ultimately result in starvation. Of course, if siege: Amphipolis in 357, Pydna and Potidea in
political rivalry existed within the town, one or 35 6, Methone in 354, Pherae and Pagasae in 352,
other faction might be persuaded to grant the Stageira in 349, Olynthus in 348, Halus in 347,
besieger access, thus saving time and avoiding Pandosia, Bucheta and Elataea in 342, not to
unnecessary losses. mention the 32 Thracian towns that he razed to
The Greeks realized the full potential of the ground. Methone was certainly taken by
mechanized siege warfare with the advent of assault, for it was here that Philip was struck in the
Philip II. Maintaining a siege train was expensive, eye by an arrow. Demosthenes alleged treachery at
and possessing one was only necessary if there both Amphipolis and Pydna. The king certainly
was intention to besiege many cities, which before had a reputation for bribery: the towns of
Macedonian imperialism was unusual. Also, it Mecyberna and Torone were also recorded as being
may be that Philip's full--time professional army taken by treachery, and there were probably more.
was willing to assault walls that would have However, Philip did not always enjoy success. In
daunted the citizen militias of the previous 340, his siege of Perinthus ended in miserable
century. More importantly, the professional failure, despite the deployment of a full siege train,
character of the Macedonian army allowed for the including 80--cubit (37m) siege towers, battering
incorporation of specialized craftsmen and rams, mining operations, and the use of arrow--
engineers, without whom Alexander would have firing catapults. However, with Persian and
had no siege train. Byzantine aid bolstering the Perinthian defence,
In his Third Philippic, Demosthenes, the great Philip was soon bogged down in an impossible
Athenian orator, railed against the Macedonian siege. Furthermore, his simultaneous strike on
style of warfare: fighting was no longer a fair and Byzantium, gambling that it had been left
open contest reserved for a summer's day; on the undefended, simply stirred up enmity among the
contrary, Philip might arrive outside a town at any neighbouring Greek communities, and Philip had
time of year, set up his machinery, and lay siege. to abandon both sieges.

153
l\LEX~\NDER -rHE GREA:r A1- 'Wi\R

Persian fleet. These rulers especially found it preferable to surrender to

Alexander in the hope of retaining their power rather than remain loyal to
Darius. By contrast, the inland Syrians were more inclined to stay with Darius,
and we find them joining their former satrap, Mazaeus, in the army that faced
Alexander again in 331 at Gaugamela.

TYRE
Whereas the northern Phoenician CItIes had capitulated on the news of
Alexander's approach, Tyre resisted the king's request to make sacrifices to
Heracles (Melqart) within their city. This was, of course, a transparent ploy to gain
control of the place. But the Tyrians could afford to be defiant, or at least so they
thought, for about half a mile (o.8km) of sea separated them from the Macedonian
army, and the city fathers responded that Alexander was welcome to sacrifice to
Heracles at 'Old Tyre', which was situated on the mainland. Furthermore, there
was the expectation - vain, as it turned out - of aid from their north African
colony, Carthage. Neither grand strategy nor Alexander's reputation, however,
could allow the young king to bypass the city. The whole purpose of Alexander's
present campaign was to leave no possible Persian base in his rear before marching
eastward to resume hostilities with Darius. He could make no exceptions,
especially in the case of a powerful naval centre like Tyre. The defences of the city
appeared impregnable, but Alexander already seems to have regarded himself as
invincible and was certainly so considered by the men who followed him.
Alexander realized that taking an island city would be no easy matter, and that
a lengthy siege would buy valuable time for his enemy. Hence, he sent heralds into
the city in the hope of persuading the Tyrians to surrender. But the diplomatic
approaches were rebuffed, and the heralds executed and thrown into the sea.
Alexander therefore decided to build a mole from the mainland to the island
across the narrow water that separated them. The building of Alexander's
causeway at first proceeded briskly. The water near the mainland was shallow and
the bottom muddy, and building material in the form of rock and timber was
easily obtainable. Stakes were soon driven into the mud, which also made good
binding material for the stone blocks above. But further out the sea became
suddenly deep, and close to the island it reached a depth of three fathoms
(I 8ftfs. sm). The builders' task here became both difficult and dangerous: not
only had they to contend with the deep water but they were now within missile
range of the city walls. Furthermore, the Tyrians were able to row their galleys in
from the sea and harass them, making work almost impossible.
To these tactics Alexander replied by building two towers on the mole,
covering their wooden structures with hides to give protection against missiles

154
 PfIOENI(~Ij\ ANI) E(~YPT

THE SIEGE OF TYRE:

THE ATTACK ON THE
MACEDONIAN MOLE

,
,"\" Trireme

Mole

Palisade

Towers
Fireship

,
Palisade

Trireme
o 220
I
o
I i

250
#### #'
Tyrian boats approaching
to attack palisade

and render the wood less vulnerable to incendiary attack. He mounted artillery When the fire;ship had
catapults in the tower and was thus able to retaliate against the raids of enemy been grounded on the mole
according to plan and
ships by counterblasts of heavy missiles. The Tyrians then realized that they the towers set alight, the
must at all cost destroy the towers, and they resorted to the use of a fire--ship. triremes that had grounded
They made ready a large vessel, which had been a horse transport, filling it with it lay close to the mole and
attacked Alexander's fire;
wood shavings, chips, pitch, sulphur and every combustible material that they fighters with missiles. As
could lay hands on. Double yard--arms were fixed to the masts, and on these soon as the towers were
were hung cauldrons of an oily substance that could be relied upon to feed the on fire other Ijrians sallied
out in boats and destroyed
flames. The fire--ship was also ballasted at the stern end in such a way as to tilt
the palisades on the mole.
the prow upward over the edge of the mole and close to the foot of the towers.
It was then towed in by triremes, and the crew that had manned the old hulk
easily swam away when she was alight.
The result was what had been hoped - the towers were soon ablaze. Other
Tyrian galleys cruised close to the mole, and put down a barrage of missiles,
which prevented Alexander's fire--fighters approaching the towers. A sally was
also launched from the city in small boats. Temporary landings were made on
the mole, and its defensive palisades were torn down. Artillery catapults that
had escaped the havoc wrought by the fire--ship were additionally set on fire by
the daring raiders.

ISS
ALEXANDEI~. THE GREAT .AT \VAR

This was obviously a great set--back for Alexander, but as a strategist he

possessed an indefatigable patience, which contrasted strongly with the fierce
impetuosity of his tactics in battle. He now gave orders that work should begin
again on the mole, although the ancient sources diverge on this matter, and it
is not certain whether Alexander began a new one, approaching the city from a
different angle, or merely widened the existing one. It seems more likely that he
had the original mole widened to accommodate more towers. While the work
was being carried out, he took with him a contingent of hypaspists and
Agrianian light troops and marched back to the friendly Phoenicians of Sidon,
where he had left his own triremes. He needed a fleet, for without superiority at
sea, Tyre could not be taken.
The naval commanders of Aradus and Byblus now joined Alexander, as did
ten triremes from Rhodes, I 3 ships from the cities of the Lycian and Cilician
coasts, and a so--oared galley from Macedon itself. The massive desertion of the

156
 PHOENICIA AND EGYPT

Phoenicians, with 80 ships, had its repercussions in Cyprus, whose kings were Several variations of the
also anxious to be on the winning side. A combined Cyprian fleet of 120 ships gastraphetes were probabry
already known by the earry
soon sailed to Sidon and swelled Alexander's already growing fleet as it lay there years of the 4th century.
in readiness. This naval 'windfall' may be considered a great stroke of good The gastraphetes was an
fortune, though of course the actions of the cities were motivated by earlier mechanical weapon
than the catapult. I twas
Alexander's resounding victory at Issus. He was in any case happy to overlook
powered by a large
his new allies' earlier hostility towards him. composite bow, which
consisted of a wooden core
sandwiched between a
Naval operations
layer of horn and a layer of
While the construction of his artillery engines was being completed, Alexander sinew. When the bow was
made a foray into Arabian territory inland, and after a ten--day demonstration of bent, prior to firing the
shot, the sinew on the
strength, in which he used a few cavalry squadrons with hypaspists and
outer side of the bow
Agrianians, he received the submission of the people in this area. He perhaps stretched, while the horn
regarded the raid as a military training exercise, but in any case it fitted well along the belry was
with his general strategy of leaving no active enemy in his rear. compressed. On release,
each element snapped back
On his return from this expedition, he found that Cleander, the son of to its original state,
Polemocrates, whom he had sent to Greece to recruit mercenaries, had returned powerfulry propelling the
with a body of 4,000 Peloponnesian troops. He was thus well prepared for a new arrow forwards. Besides
the original hand~held
confrontation with the Tyrians, and in terms of naval strength he now had the
gastraphetes, the machines
upper hand. The Tyrians did not realize until he was ready for battle that his fleet shown are the 'mountain'
had been dramatically increased by the Phoenician and Cyprian contingents. version, presumabry for use
over rugged terrain, and
Leading his fleet from a warship on their right wing, he had hoped at first to
the twin~bore version, both
tempt the Tyrians to a naval engagement in open sea. He had posted marines created by Zopyrus of
on the decks of his galleys and he was prepared either for boarding or ramming Tarentum. (Brian Delf ©
Osprey Publishing Ltd)
tactics. However, when they recognized the superiority of the numbers ranged
against them the Ty'tians prudently avoided this and concentrated merely on
holding the entrance of their harbours in the face of the oncoming enemy; any
fighting would then be in narrow waters, where Alexander's numbers could not
be deployed to advantage.
The two harbours of the island faced north and south respectively, one
towards Sidon, the other towards Egypt. Seeing their entrances heavily
defended, Alexander did not at once try to force an entry. The mouth of the
north harbour, as he approached, was blocked by triremes moored bow--on to
him. But his Phoenician galleys sank three of the enemy ships that were
anchored in a slightly exposed position, ramming them bow--on. The crews
escaped easily enough, swimming back to the friendly territory of the island.
After this brief encounter, Alexander berthed his ships along the mainland
shore and encamped on the adjacent land at a point where the mole gave some
protection from the weather. His own headquarters were southwards, looking

157
ALEXANDER ~rHE GREl\l' l\T Wl\R

I20 Cyprian ships

I.

under Andromachus.
THE SIEGE OF TYRE: ALEXANDER'S BLOCKADE
2. 80 Phoenician ships
plus 23 from Rhodes,
Lycia, Soli and Mallus,
and one Macedonian
penteconter (50..-oared
ship).
3. 1jrian ships.

Second Mole
(now complete)

Jj**_~ ~
##.,\'
®

o 220 440 Yards

I I i i

o 250

towards the island's southern harbour. He ordered the Cyprian fleet to blockade
the north side of the island and the Phoenicians the south.
He had meanwhile recruited a large number of engineers both from Cyprus and
the Phoenician coast. The construction of siege engines had proceeded swiftly, and
these were installed on the extremity of the mole as well as on the besieging ships,
both transports and slow triremes, which Alexander had caused to be anchored all
around the city preparatory to bombarding the high walls. These walls are
reported as being 150ft (46m) high on the side facing the mole. Even assuming
that this refers to the height of the towers rather than the curtain wall, the figure
seems exaggerated; the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, one of the seven wonders of
the ancient world, was only 134ft (4Im) high. The masonry opposite the mole
was massive, consisting of large mortared stone blocks. On top of these, the

158
 PHOENICIA AND EGYPT

ALEXANDER'S SIEGE OF TYRE

Alexander allegedly mobilized tens of thousands of towers, but Alexander's engineers set to work again
men to construct the causeway, 2 plethra (62m) wide and the causeway was finally completed.
and 4 stades (74om) long. Building materials came Nothing now remains of the town fortifications,
from the demolition of the old town on the mainland, but Arrian's claim that the walls were I soft (46m)
and timber was brought from the mountains of high is unlikely. Both Diodorus Siculus and Curtius
Lebanon; entire trees and rocks were added to build indicate that the walls were well furnished with
up the structure. Wicker screens protected the arrow.-firing catapults, and the city engineers had
workmen, and two siege towers were erected so that contrived all sorts of devices to counter the
missile troops could provide covering fire. The Macedonians. There were screens of stretched hides
Tyrians responded with a fire.-ship, a large transport to protect the defenders, and a screen, padded with
vessel filled with combustible material and guided seaweed, was later lowered over the battlements to
under sail against the causeway; cauldrons slung from absorb the impact of flying stones. Also illustrated is
the yard.-arms were rigged to set the boat ablaze when an example of the 'iron hand' or harpax, used to grab
it reached its goal. In the event, considerable damage individual men or machines. (Adam Hook © Osprey
was done, including the destruction of the siege Publishing Ltd)

159
ALEXANDER THE GREi\T A.T Wi\R

Midday: Alexander's ships

at anchor and almost
THE SIEGE OF TYRE: THE TYRIAN SALLY
unmanned.
I. 1j;rian galleys screened oI 100
I
200
I I
300 Yards
I
by ships in the harbour
mouth.
o 125 250 Metres

2. Three Cyprian ships

.
sunk.
3. Other Cyprian ships
driven ashore for -~
breaking up.
,
4. Approach of Alexander.
The 1j;rian ships raced *#~
for safety but were
mostry rammed by #_®
Alexander's flotilla (five
triremes and a few
quinqueremes) before
they could reach the
harbour.

Tyrians now built wooden towers in order that they might increase their height
advantage, and they showered down missiles of every kind, including fire--darts, on
the besieging ships. As a further device, the Tyrians piled rocks in the sea under
their walls, and this kept Alexander's vessels at a distance. As far as possible,
Alexander hauled away the rocks, but this work had to be carried on from ships
anchored nearby. The Tyrians accordingly armour--plated some of their triremes
and ran in against the anchored siege vessels, cutting their moorings. Alexander
retaliated by armouring some of his light, 3a--oared ships, and obstructing the
enemy triremes. The Tyrians then sent down divers to cut the mooring cables, so
Alexander replaced these ropes with chains. On the landvlard side, his men also
managed to throw out ropes from the mole and noose some of the rocks that had
been dumped on the seabed. These rocks were then winched out and slung into
deep water where they created no danger. The approach to the wall was thus at last
clear, and Alexander's ships were able to lie under it.
The Tyrians, now increasingly conscious of their danger, realised that they had
to challenge the blockading navy in some action at sea, and they decided to attack
the Cyprian contingent, choosing the hour of the midday heat when the vigilance
of the besiegers was relaxed, and Alexander himself had retired to his tent to rest.
The Tyrians manned three quinqueremes, three quadriremes and seven triremes

160
 PHOENICIA, ,AND EGYPI~

with picked crews and the best,armed fighting complements they could muster.
The sails of the Tyrian ships in the harbour were used to screen their
preparations, and the men went aboard unobserved by enemy watchers at sea or
on land. The Tyrian flotilla now glided out of the north harbour in line ahead and
at an angle where it was still unperceived by the enemy. On board, dead silence
was maintained - even the boatswains did not call the stroke to the rowers. Only
when they came within sight of the Cyprians did they permit themselves the
ordinary words of command and break out into battle,cries. They then achieved
a formidable surprise attack. At the first onslaught, they rammed and sank the
quinqueremes of the Cyprian king Pnytagoras, as well as those of Androcles and
Pasicrates - from the Cypriot cities of Amathus and Curion respectively. Other
Cyprian ships were forced ashore and broken up. Indeed, the attack had been
made when most of the anchored Cyprian fleet was unmanned.
However, the Tyrians were not entirely fortunate. It so happened that on this
day Alexander had not taken his usual siesta, but returned almost immediately to
the ships. Quickly aware of the enemy sally, he reacted at once and ordered men
aboard. The first ships that were manned were commanded to block the south
harbour mouth and to ensure that no further sortie was made from that quarter.
He then put out with a few quinqueremes and five triremes and sailed around the
city to challenge those of the enemy who had already broken out.
The Tyrian watchers on the battlements, observing Alexander's moves, tried
to warn their comrades on the sea and nearby shore, but the seamen were
deafened by the din of their own wrecking operations. When they understood
what was happening it was too late - only a few of their ships made it back to
harbour in time. The majority were rammed and disabled. A quinquereme and
a quadrireme were captured by Alexander's men. Human casualties, however,
were not many, for the Tyrian crews, as often happened in ancient sea fights,
saved themselves by swimming.

The breaching of the wall

The walls of Tyre were now closely surrounded, and even the defenders' sally
had been a costly and limited success. However, the walls themselves were still
a formidable obstacle. In the north, the Greek contingent towed up siege
engines, but the solidity of the walls defied their efforts. In the south, a part of
the wall was slightly shaken, and a small breach was made, into which gangways
were tentatively thrown. But the Macedonian assault party that tried to use the
gangways was easily repulsed by the Tyrians.
However, after a three,day interval, with calmer weather prevailing, more siege
engines were towed up to the same spot, and the breach was enlarged. Two ships

161
ALEXf\NDER THE GREAT l\T'VA.R

Mole completed. Siege

I.

engines made no
THE SIEGE OF TYRE: THE FINAL ASSAULT
impression on such
strong defences.
2.. Siege engines mounted
on ships.
3. Harbour mouths
defended by Ij;rian
ships and blockaded by
Alexander's fleet.
4. Diversionary tactics.
Ships were beached
under the walls for
beaching operations, or
lay close and launched
missiles.
5. Probing attacks.
6. Eventual breach. CD

o 220 440 Yards

I I i I

o 250

carrying gangways then approached, under the command of Admetus and

Coenus respectively, and the way was open for a fresh assault. This was led by
Alexander's best troops. The hypaspists were commanded by Admetus, who
distinguished himself by valour in the ensuing action. The pezhetairoi were led
by Coenus, who in the future was to prove one of Alexander's most trusted
commanders. At the same time, widespread diversions and feints were made all
around the perimeter of the city, as the besieging ships everywhere moved close
under the walls. Attempts were already being made to penetrate the two
harbours. The sector of the wall where Alexander himself was taking part in the
assault was the first to be captured, Admetus being the first man upon the
ramparts. Some of the towers that crowned the battlements were now occupied,

162
 PI-IOENICIA..AND EGYPT

and this gave the Macedonians control of the linking curtain walls. Soon
Alexander's men were fighting their way down into the city itself. Even when the
Tyrians had been driven from the walls, they defended the Agenorium at the
north end of the city - a citadel named after Tyre's legendary King Agenor. Many
of the defenders died fighting where they stood. Others were dispersed by
Alexander and his hypaspists. The city was now entered from the harbours as
well as from the walls. Alexander's Phoenician fleet broke the boom in the south
and destroyed the shipping it had sheltered. In the north there was no boom and
the Cyprians met little resistance when they sailed in. As Coenus' troops entered,
the city was a scene of bloody massacre. The Macedonians were embittered by
the length of the siege, and also by an incident in which the Tyrians had killed
prisoners upon the wall before the eyes of the besiegers. The Tyrian dead
numbered 8,000. Of Alexander's forces, up to 400 Macedonians are reported as
having lost their lives in the siege; of these, 20 were hypaspists who fell with
Admetus in the final assault. At the time ofTyre's capture, there were in the city
many Carthaginian pilgrims visiting their mother city to pay honour to Melqart,
the Phoenician Heracles - in whose temple they now took refuge. Alexander
spared them, but other foreigners, along with the Tyrian survivors, were sold into
slavery, in all about 30,000 people.
Alexander sacrificed to Heracles in fulfilment of his original avowed intent.
The god's complacency over the treatment of a city where he had received
supreme honour seems to have been easily assumed. The entire siege had lasted
from]anuary to]uly 332. Alexander had brought about the fall of an island city
by the use of new siege machinery, ingenuity and perseverance. At times it must
have seemed like an impossible task, yet in the end, the combination of ships,
siege machinery, artillery and a determined leader was too much for the Tyrians.

GAZA
Alexander now marched for Egypt in pursuit of his immediate strategic objective,
which was to secure the whole of the eastern Mediterranean coastline. No city
dared resist him, with the single exception of Gaza. This stronghold was
defended as fanatically as Tyre had been. Its Phoenician ruler recruited into his
service large numbers of Arab mercenaries and laid in considerable provisions.
The operations at Gaza are more difficult to analyze than those at Tyre, because
the details are few and the two surviving descriptions, by Arrian and Quintus
Curtius, are not entirely in agreement. Unlike Tyre, Gaza was not an island
although the town was protected by its location on a high occupation mound or
tell. This was clearly a formidable obstacle. Alexander's engineers protested that
the city was too high to be taken when he ordered the machines shipped from

163
L\LEXANDER

Tyre to be reassembled. But Gaza was a threat to Alexander's supply and

communication routes, so he came up with the solution: a huge mound. Arrian
claims that the embankment was 2 stades wide (370m) and 55ft high (17m).
Catapults and siege towers were to be dragged to the top, and the defenders were
to be battered from above. Curtius adds that the sandy ground subsided,
damaging the undercarriages of the siege towers. At the same time, tunnels were
dug under the walls, to cause them to subside; Curtius implies that the tunnels
were the main thrust of the assault. Gaza was finally taken after two months.
Attacked from above and below, the walls collapsed and the Macedonians poured
in. Most of Gaza's male population died fighting, putting up a heroic resistance.
Alexander himself sustained two wounds in the battle. After the city had
been taken, the women and children were enslaved, and the governor, Batis, was
punished, perhaps by being dragged behind Alexander's chariot around the city.
The taking of Gaza was one of Alexander's most remarkable achievements.
He motivated his weary army to see through an audacious and difficult plan,
creating a huge mound of sand in the late summer heat. He had reduced two
well--defended cities, one of them an island, within ten months, an almost
unique act in the ancient world.

EGYPT
With the example ofTyre and Gaza before them, the Egyptians were in no mind
to oppose Alexander. Egypt was unlike the other provinces of the Persian
Empire. It had been conquered in 525 by the Persian king Cambyses. The
successful resistance of the Greeks to Persian invasion in 490 and 480 had
shown that the Persians were not invincible, and Egypt had been restless and
rebellious throughout much of the 5th century, regaining independence in 404.
It had only been reconquered by Persia a few years before Alexander's arrival.
Sabaces, the Persian governor of Egypt, had in fact been killed at Issus, and his
successor accepted Alexander without demur. Thus ended the last period of
Persian occupation and the brief reign of the Thirty--First Dynasty.
The Egyptians welcomed the Macedonians as liberators, and Alexander in turn
flattered Egyptian national sentiment, doing conspicuous honour to their gods.
Alexander took over the official treasury from Mazaces, the new governor, and
garrisoned Pelusium at the eastern extremity of the Nile delta. He made a round
tour over the desert via Heliopolis and Memphis, the ancient Egyptian capital and
religious shrine, returning down the Nile to its mouth north of Mareotis.
From Egypt he marched across the desert to visit the oracle of Ammon at the
Libyan oasis of Siwah. He may have been prompted by piety, curiosity or a

164
 ANI) ECiYPT

ALEXANDER THE GOD

Throughout his reign, Alexander drew comparisons coins that show him with the horns ofAmmon, and
and connections between himself and gods and occasionally wearing both the lionskin and horns.
heroes. As well as his lifelong attachment to the Later after his campaigns in India, he added
Homeric hero Achilles, he had since youth Dionysus to his range of gods. After his death, the
compared himself with Heracles, and he often Successors often used his face on their coins to
appeared on coins wearing a lionskin to show this stress the legitimacy of their rule, and depicted him
connection. In Egypt he was proclaimed as the son as one of the gods he had emulated in life. (Left: akg--
of the Egyptian god Ammon, and there are later images. Right: TopFoto)

mixture of both. Command of a conquering army In any case made for

convenient travelling. At Siwah, the oracle was said to have hailed Alexander as
the son of Zeus, with whom the Egyptian deity Ammon was identified.
On return to Memphis, he reorganized the political administration of Egypt,
replacing Persian officials with Egyptians, but he left the garrisons of Pelusium
and Memphis under the command of his own officers. Modest reinforcements
meanwhile reached him from the Aegean area: 400 Greek mercenaries sent by
Antipater and 500 Thracian cavalry. Hegelochus, Alexander's victorious
commander in the north--east Aegean, had also arrived in Egypt, bringing

165
ALEXANIJER Tf-IE CIREf\T \Vf\I~

The Temple of the Oracle with him prisoners; but Pharnabazus, the Persian admiral captured at Chios,
at the Siwah oasis, built had escaped.
some time in the 6th
century. Alexander visited
the temple in 33 I, having UPRISING IN GREECE
apparentry followed birds When Alexander returned to Tyre, after his lengthy period in Egypt, he learned
across the desert.
of serious unrest in the Peloponnese. There the Spartan king Agis III, who had
(TopFoto II mageWorks)
begun his dealings with the Persian leaders in the Aegean very soon after
Alexander's departure from Europe, openly resisted Macedonian power. In a
bold move he defeated the army of Corrhagus, thus forcing Antipater himself to
lead an army to the south. Nor was Agis' force inconsequential: he had collected
22,000 men from the neighbouring states ofElis, Arcadia and Achaea, and with

these he now laid siege to Megalopolis. Antipater was, however, preoccupied

with affairs in Thrace, where the military governor of the region, Memnon, was
in open rebellion. However, Memnon quickly came to terms with Antipater,

166
 PHOENI(~If\ AND EG"Y'PT

thus freeing him to deal with the Greek insurrection. Furthermore, the fact that
Memnon later brought reinforcements to Alexander in the east suggests that
the king did not regard his actions as treacherous.
The Macedonian army confronted Agis at Megalopolis in the summer of
331 - certainly the entire rebellion had been suppressed before the battle of
Gaugamela was fought. The contest was a renewal of the bitter struggle
between Macedon and the Greeks, who had still not accepted the suzerainty of
the former. Although he fell on the battlefield, Agis did not sell his life cheaply;
nor did the 5,300 other Greeks who perished in the battle. Alexander, when he
learned of the engagement, dismissed it as insignificant. Plutarch said that
'Alexander even added a joke when he was told of the war waged by Antipater
against Agis. "Men," he said, "it appears that while we were in the process of
vanquishing Darius, there was a battle of mice over there in Arcadia.'"
(Plutarch, Life of Agesilaus, 15) But the contest had left 3,500 Macedonians
dead, and until it had been decided Alexander's activities in the east were
suspended in uncertainty.

167
THE BATTLE OF
GAUGAMELA
lexander had now completed the first phase of his grand strategy.

A He had firmly secured the whole of the east Mediterranean seaboard,

and in summer 33 I he again marched eastward in pursuit of Darius,
reaching Thapsacus on the Euphrates in August. Darius' forces, under
Mazaeus, had held the crossing of the Euphrates against the Macedonian
advance guard, but they fled on news that Alexander himself was approaching.
Numbering 3,000 cavalry in total, they could not prudently have done
otherwise.
After crossing the Euphrates, Alexander did not march on Babylon, which
might have seemed the next obvious target, but instead turned northwards,
hugging the foothills of the Armenian mountains, where foraging was easier
and the heat less oppressive. But he probably already suspected - as his scouts
soon confirmed - that Darius was waiting for him on the other side of the
Tigris, ready to fall on his rear if he turned southwards. At the same time, from
the intelligence he had gained, it appeared that the Persians intended to block
his passage if he attempted to cross the river. In fact, at the higher point where
he ultimately crossed, the Tigris was undefended. That did not mean the
crossing was easy, for his men were in danger of being swept away by the rapid
current, and it was necessary for the army to stop and rest after the river had
been crossed.
The Tigris was not the only natural hazard to face Alexander at this time. An
eclipse of the moon provoked agonized superstition among the Macedonian
soldiers, which could have ended in mutiny. However, the Egyptian seers whom
Alexander had taken on his march east out of respect for their learning served
OPPOSITE
him well. They knew how lunar eclipses were caused, and their knowledge of A romantic depiction of
astronomy was supplemented by an at least equal knowledge of human nature, Alexander's triumphant
so instead of trying to explain the movements of the sun, moon and earth, they entry into Babylon after
Gaugamela by Charles
declared the eclipse to be a good omen signifying Alexander's victory, which Le Brun. (akg~images/
reassured the army. Erich Lessing)

169
 C:i/\IJ(;AMELf\

cavalry fight was the result. The effect was certainly to delay Alexander in
providing help for Parmenion. However, the Companion cavalry eventually
dispersed the enemy, cutting them down or driving them out of the way. Those
who survived galloped away from the battlefield.

Ultimate victory
Alexander's relief operation, coupled with that of the rear phalanx, removed the
menace to Parmenion's right, and the Macedonian horse were now better able to
cope with the enveloping movement launched by Mazaeus, the cavalry
commander on the Persian right wing. Mazaeus had indeed, as he pressed
forward, lost touch with the king, and he was for a long while unaware of Darius'
flight and of the collapse of the Persian army on the left and in the centre. The
news, when it reached him, inevitably caused him to waver. His attack now lost
impetus. From his own point of view, there now existed the danger of
encirclement. It could only be a matter of time before the Macedonians, already
in possession of the central ground, wheeled in his direction. Apart from that, the
massive, variously derived Oriental host commanded by the king of Persia
was not psychologically conditioned to prolong the battle after the flight of the
king himself.
By the time Alexander approached Parmenion, the most serious threats to
the Macedonian left wing had been removed. It was no longer necessary for
Alexander to attack Mazaeus, because the Thessalian cavalry, after a heroic
resistance under heavy pressure, were now able to take the offensive themselves,
and Mazaeus' troops were giving way before them. Alexander turned once more
to the pursuit of Darius, and the whole Macedonian army moved forward on the
heels of its routed enemy.
The Persian centre had by no means relaxed its flight. Alexander pursued the
fugitives until dusk, then crossed the river Lycus and rested his men until
midnight. The pursuit was then resumed. Darius, for his part, never stopped to
rest. Parmenion, who in his own sector had lagged only a little behind Alexander
in the pursuit, now occupied the Persian camp. The Macedonians' own baggage
camp had been saved and the raiders killed or routed, but the seizure of
the Persian baggage train with its elephants and camels would have amply
compensated them for any losses suffered. Alexander hoped to capture Darius in
the town of Arbela, 75 miles east of the battlefield, but he was not to be found.
His abandoned treasure and possessions were seized by Alexander, including -
as at Issus - his chariot and weapons. As at Issus, it may be said that Alexander
failed to capture Darius through his refusal to abandon the centre and left wing
of his army in their difficulties. His caution seems appropriate given that history

181
ALEXANI)ER TIlE CJREf\T \Vf\I{

Alexander charging Darius tells us of other ancient battles where the victorious wing of an army rode in
in his chariot on a late disorganized and reckless pursuit, only to leave the enemy securely established as
4th~century amphora.
(The Art Archive/Musee
victors on the central battlefield.
Archeologique Casualty figures for the battle are variously reported by ancient historians,
Naples/Alfredo Dagli Orti) most of them hard to credit. According to Arrian, Alexander lost only 100 dead
among his soldiers but over 1,000 horses, half of these having been ridden by
the Companions. Persian losses are recorded as about 300,000 dead and an even
greater number captured. Most of the casualties would have occurred in the
course of the flight and pursuit after the battle.
At Gaugamela Alexander faced the Persian army on a wide plain that gave
Darius little opportunity to bring his superior numbers to bear. Darius reacted
to the beginning of what he thought was Alexander's flanking manoeuvre,

182
 TI--IE BATTLE OF GA1](~j\MELf\

remembering its devastating effect at Issus, but Alexander threw wave after wave
of cavalry against the Persian cavalry sent to envelop him. Whether this was an
adaptation of his original flanking manoeuvre, or whether it was a feint to allow
him to attack while the enemy was reordering, it was audacious. When Darius
continued to guard against the feared Macedonian cavalry charge to the extent
that he caused a gap in his centre, Alexander turned round his cavalry and struck,
hard and fast, at the weak centre. This characteristic, rapid snatching of a possibly
momentary advantage could only be taken by a commander at the very centre of
events, and Alexander yet again led his men to victory.
Darius fled north.. eastward into the mountains of Media, guessing correctly
that Alexander would immediately turn his attention to the great central cities
of the empire, which lay to the south: Babylon, Susa and Persepolis.

183
ALEXANDER TAKES
PERSIA
s Darius fled, his army dispersed to their territories, as was the custom.

A Those who commanded the garrisons and guarded the treasures in the
empire's capitals made formal surrender to Alexander. Mazaeus
surrendered Babylon, together with the gazopbylax ('guardian of the treasures'),
Bagophanes. Alexander entered Babylon in great ceremony, and the ancient city
now publicly turned its resources over to the new king. What the Alexander
historians depict as a spontaneous welcome was in fact ritual surrender, enacted
many times in the past - in ceremony for the legitimate heir to the throne, as
well as in earnest for a conquering king. In return, Alexander appointed
Mazaeus satrap of Babylon, though he installed a garrison in the city and
military overseers to ensure the loyalty of the new governor and the population.
Despite Gaugamela's ranking as one of the decisive battles of world history, the
fact is that it was only decisive for the Persian side. For Darius it was the final nail
in the coffin; Alexander, on the other hand, could have survived defeat in
northern Mesopotamia and still held the western portion of the empire. Victory,
however, belonged to the Macedonians, and the might of Persia was shattered.
Babylon had no hope of resisting, and Susa, too, avoided pillage by embracing the
conqueror. Again the defecting satrap, Aboulites, was retained and once more
a Macedonian garrison was imposed. With Darius still at large, Alexander
introduced military reforms to strengthen the army and the command structures.
Reinforcements continued to arrive, even as the avenging army moved ever closer
to its ultimate goal: Persepolis.

THE PERSIAN GATES

The satrap of Persis, Ariobarzanes, had mustered a sizeable force, and with
25,000 defenders he blocked the so--called 'Persian' or 'Susidan' Gates in the OPPOSITE
Zagros mountains in an attempt to stall the Macedonians until the treasures of The reconstruction of the
I shtar Gate at Babylon.
Persepolis could be removed. In fact, Ariobarzanes was only facing a portion of (akg;images/Bildarchiv
the Macedonian force: the slowest elements and the baggage train were following Steffens)

185
t\LEXt\NDEI~. TI--IE GI(EAT A~T WA](

the Royal Road into Persis under the command of Parmenion. Alexander led the
more mobile contingents through the mountains to the Persian Gates. It was
January and there was snow on the ground. A first attempt to pass through the
gates seems to have ended disastrously with the Macedonians having to abandon
their dead. Alexander then circumvented the satrap's position. The Macedonians
braved the perils of terrain and winter snow, and led by captive guides, they
approached Ariobarzanes' force from the rear. Ariobarzanes' troops were
slaughtered in the pass and it was now a relatively simple matter to bridge the
Araxes, whereupon Tiridates surrendered both Persepolis and its treasure to
the Macedonians.

PERSEPOLIS
The symbolic importance of the capture ofPersepolis - the very meaning of the
Greek form of the name Persepolis, 'City of the Persians', enhanced its actual
associations with Xerxes and the great invasion - dictated its fate: pillage, rape

MAZAEUS

Mazaeus was satrap of Cilicia, and later of Syria Thessalians and the demoralizing news of Darius'
and Mesopotamia in the time of King Artaxerxes flight. It is likely that the Alexander sarcophagus
III. Under Darius III he probably fought at Issus, depicts Mazaeus' valour at Issus, which
although there is no mention of him. In 33 I, he strengthens the argument that it was constructed
was ordered to prevent Alexander's crossing of the for Mazaeus, rather than Abdalonymus. Mazaeus
Euphrates at Thapsacus, but had insufficient fled from the battlefield to Babylon, which he
numbers to do more than harass the bridge; promptly surrendered to the Macedonians. In
builders. Upon Alexander's arrival, Mazaeus return he was installed as its satrap, the first
withdrew and rejoined Darius, who was now Persian to be so honoured by Alexander.
following the course of the Tigris north. At The Alexander sarcophagus also depicts a notable
Gaugamela, Mazaeus commanded the Persian Persian engaged in a lion hunt with Alexander and
cavalry on the right wing and led a charge of dense other Macedonians; one of the Macedonian riders
squadrons together with the scythed chariots. He may be Hephaestion. If this depicts a historical event,
then sent a squadron of Scythian horsemen to then it could not have occurred before late 331, and
capture the Macedonian camp, while he himself the most likely Persian with whom Alexander might
exerted pressure on Parmenion and the Thessalian have hunted would once again have been Mazaeus.
cavalry on the Macedonian left. Eventually Mazaeus remained in office and served his new
Mazaeus was overcome by the tenacity of the master loyally until his death in late 32.8.

186
 ,ALEXANIJE1Z TAKES PERSIA

The Persian Gates, held

against Alexander by the
satrap Ariobarzanes. (]ona
Lendering, Livius.org)

and massacre ensued. The palace too fell victim to the victor's wrath, but only
after the treasures had been removed and shipped to Ecbatana. Then, whether
by design or through a spontaneous urge for revenge, it was put to the torch.
One version attributed the burning to an Athenian courtesan, ThaIs, who was
OVERLEAF
to become the mistress of Ptolemy, the later king of Egypt.
The ruins of
The destruction of Persepolis was symbolic rather than total, for it continued Persepolis today. (a kg,
as the capital of the province during the age of the Successors. At this point, images/Suzanne Held)

187
 however, it illuminated the difficulties faced by Alexander. For one thing, the
destruction of Persepolis could be taken to signify the completion of the war of
vengeance, the attainment of the stated goal of the expedition. Therefore the allied
troops would naturally assume that it warranted their demobilization. Still,
Alexander could remind them that as long as Darius lived, the mission had not
been completed.
Conversely, the destruction of the palace and the maltreatment of the citizens
undermined Alexander's propaganda, which had at an early stage sought to
portray him as the legitimate successor of the Great King. Rightly had
Parmenion advised against such action, reminding Alexander that he should not
destroy what was now his own property. Nevertheless, what may have caused
resentment in Persia could well have been received with a degree of satisfaction
in Babylon and Susa, even Ecbatana, all of which had been overshadowed by the
advent of the Achaemenid dynasty and the growing power of Persepolis.

CHANGES TO ALEXANDER'S ARMY

On the road to Susa, passing through the fertile province of Sittacene, Alexander's
army was met by a large reinforcement from Macedon under the command of
Amyntas and consisting of 6,000 Macedonian infantry, 600 Macedonian cavalry,
600 Thracian cavalry, 3,500 Trallians, and mercenaries to a total of 4,000 infantry
and 380 horse. Alexander halted the army and carried out the first of a series
of thorough re--organizations. He also took the opportunity to introduce some
purely administrative reforms, and to promote officers of ability to the vacancies
created by the campaigns so far.
The large number of reinforcements, even after replacing losses and releasing
men from service, allowed Alexander to expand the infantry. Curtius seems to
be talking of the hypaspists when he says that the lochoi were grouped into
chiliarchies which had not existed before. New officers were appointed on the
basis of military virtue: eight names follow, including Philotas and Hellanicus, so
it seems that the number of lochoi was raised to eight. It also seems that a seventh
taxis was added to the pezhetairoi. The following year Alexander left 6,000
Macedonian infantry (four taxeis) at Ecbatana to guard the treasure, but took the
hypaspists and the taxeis of Coenus, Craterus and Amyntas with him in the
pursuit of Darius and the Hyracanian campaign. Seven taxeis are also mentioned
as being present at the Hydaspes.
The cavalry was also re--organized. Each ile was now divided into two lochoi of
two troops each, and officers were appointed to command on the basis of ability
after a close scrutiny of the military conduct sheets. This reform was probably
instituted to ease administrative efficiency, as the ile was rather a large force of

190
 i\LEXi\NDER ]i\KES PERSIA

Whether Alexander and

his men intended to burn
Persepolis down will never
be known, but it is
obvious that thry focussed
their attentions on the
palace of Xerxes to avenge
his destruction on Greek
temples back in the 5th
century. In this photograph
of one of the surviving
parts of his palace,
deliberate hammer damage
to the face of the king can
clearry be seen. (Werner
Forman Archive)

horses, grooms and riders for one man to administer. From this date on, the cavalry
was administered by century (bekatostuas), which becomes interchangeable with
lochos in the cavalry.
More major changes occurred when the army reached Ecbatana. The
Thessalian cavalry and the allied forces, both infantry and cavalry, were disbanded
and sent home. Many, however, remained with the army as mercenaries, and in
the later campaigns, much more use was made of mercenaries and Asian troops.
During the early part of 330, in preparation for the arduous campaigns lying
ahead in the mountains and deserts of Iran and central Asia, the pezhetairoi
started to lose their armour. A stratagem described in Polyaenus (4· 3· I 3)
tells us that Alexander re--equipped his soldiers with the half--cuirass
(bemitborakion) instead of the cuirass, after they had fled, in order that they would
not turn their backs on the enemy again. The incident referred to must be

191
 Alexander's first, unsuccessful attempt to storm the Persian Gates, and the
information should be accepted as genuine, even if the reason given for the change
is incorrect. During the Hyrcanian campaign, Coenus' taxeis is described as 'the
lightest armed of the Macedonian phalanx'; 'the lightest armed of the phalanx' are
mentioned a year later in operations near Maracanda; and in 326 in the advance
to the Aornos Rock 'the lightest but at the same time the best armed' men are
selected from taxeis other than that of Coenus. So it seems that other taxeis, or
ranks of other taxeis, may have also started to use lighter equipment.

INTO CENTRAL ASIA

Before moving north again through Media In pursuit of Darius, Alexander
placed governors over the territory he had recently conquered. These included
Persian administrators, and one may discern a new policy here, a foretaste
perhaps of those war aims of universal citizenship that he would later embrace
when the mere destruction of an enemy seemed no longer to justify the time,
trouble and suffering involved.
At the beginning of 330, Darius retained only one of the four capitals of the
empire, Ecbatana (modern Hamadan). It was a convenient location, from which

CALLISTHENES THE HISTORIAN

Callisthenes of Olynthus was, according to some he likened the receding sea near Mount Climax
accounts, the nephew of the philosopher Aristotle. in Pamphylia to a courtier doing obeisance
He joined Alexander's expedition as the official (proskynesis) to the Great King, he nevertheless
historian, and if - as appears t~ be the case - he sent resisted Alexander's attempt to introduce the
his history back to Greece in instalments, he was at Persian court protocol in 328/327. This caused him
the same time historian, propagandist and war to fall out with the king, and when some time later
correspondent. He also tutored the young men of a conspiracy was uncovered involving the Royal
the Macedonian court. His travels with Alexander Pages, Callisthenes was easily implicated. Convicted
took him to exotic places and he was able to of complicity in the conspiracy of the pages,
speculate on natural phenomena as well as describe Callisthenes was incarcerated and died some
the course of the war, for he appears to have months later. The Peripatetic philosophers, the
theorized about the source of the Nile. It was his followers of Aristotle, never forgave Alexander.
literary training that led him to depict Alexander as Callisthenes' history of Alexander is now lost,
a latter--day Achilles, and it would not be wrong although it was thought that he was the author of
to class him with the numerous flatterers who the Romance ofAlexander; the author of that work is
swelled the king's ego and entourage. But, although still sometimes known as Pseudo--Callisthenes.

192
 ALEXANDER TAKES PERSIA

ALEXANDER'S ROUTE TO BABYLON

BLACK SEA

~
'J)!Jrotes

I. Alexander crosses the Hellespont and sacrifices at the s te of

ancient Troy. in keeping with Panhellenic aspects of his paign.
2. Battle at the Granicus river. Alexander defeats a coalition
satraps (334).
3. Gordium.Alexander cuts the Gordian knot (spring 333).
4. Battle of Issus.November 333. First battle against Darius III.The
Persian King's mother, wife. daughters and son are captured.
~: ~::~: ~~2'~!S~~~~~~e~~~uotc~~~~r 332.
7. Alexander is crowned as Pharaoh of Egypt at Memphis.
8. Alexander goes to the oasis of Siwah, establishing Alexandria en
route. He is recognized as the 'Son of Amun'.
9. Alexander crosses the Euphrates at Thapsacus.
10. Battle of Gaugamela, northwest of Arbela. Second battle against
Darius III. I October 331.
I I. Mazaeus surrenders Babylon to Alexander and is retained as
satrap of Babylonia.

he could receive reports of Alexander's activities In Persia and at the same

summon reinforcements from the upper satrapies. Furthermore, it lay astride
the Silk Road, the great east-west corridor that ran south of the Elburz
mountains and the Caspian and north of the Great Salt Desert. Unfortunately,
many of the king's advisors warned against awaiting Alexander in that place,
and they urged Darius to withdraw in the direction of Bactria, which lay beyond
the Merv oasis, just north--west of modern Afghanistan.
This plan was adopted by Darius, but only when it was too late to elude
Alexander, who resumed hostilities once the mountain passes were free of snow.
The Great King's column was much too cumbersome: the royal equipment that
offered the necessary comforts, and the covered wagons that sheltered the
concubines on the journey, made slow progress through the Sar--i--Darreh or
Caspian Gates, even though they had been sent in advance of the army. Only

193
.ALEXANDER THE GREA,T AT\VAR

40,000 native troops and 4,000 Greeks remained with Darius, and deserters -
many of them prominent men - drifted back towards the Macedonian force that
was, every day, shortening the distance between the two armies.
In the remote village of Thara, the chiliarch, Nabarzanes, and Bessus, the
satrap of Bactria, challenged Darius' leadership. Aided by other prominent
figures, they arrested the king, only to murder him soon afterwards. His body
was left by the side of the road in the hope that when Alexander encountered it
he might break off the pursuit. N abarzanes himself attempted to rally support
in Hyrcania and Parthia; Bessus continued towards Bactria and Sogdiana,
accompanied by 600 horsemen and intending to usurp the throne.
Alexander had covered some 450 miles (720km) in three weeks: with a larger
force he had pushed east from Ecbatana to Rhagae (that is, from Hamadan to
Rey, on the edge of modern Tehran), a march of roughly 250 miles (4ookm), in
I I days; after a five--day rest, he took a much smaller, mounted force another

200 miles (320km) after Darius. He came upon Darius' body late on the sixth
day of pursuit. Alexander arranged a royal funeral for the murdered man. Bessus
himself had, for the present, eluded him, but the Macedonian army had
scattered in the chase and the daily arrival of high--ranking Persian deserters
made it necessary to take stock before turning to deal with the usurper.
Some Persians were installed as satraps - Phrataphemes in Parthia, Autophradates
amongst the Tapurians - while others remained in Alexander's entourage, awaiting
suitable employment and reward. Two dangerous men were pardoned, Nabarzanes
and Satibarzanes. The former ought to have considered himself lucky to escape
execution. Instead, he contrived to regain control of Parthia and Hyrcania; ultimately,
however, he was arrested and killed. The latter was reinstated in his old satrapy of
Aria (in the Herat region of Afghanistan), though a detachment of 40 javelinmen
under Anaxippus was sent with him to his capital of Artacoana. Satibarzanes
promptly murdered his escort and openly rebelled, encouraged perhaps by reports of
Bessus' usurpation.
Only two days after learning of Satibarzanes' treachery, Alexander was in
Artacoana, from which the rebellious satrap had fled. But when Alexander replaced
him with another native ruler, Arsaces, and moved on to subdue Afghanistan,
Satibarzanes returned with the aim of reimposing his rule. In this he failed, and he
was killed in single combat by the Macedonian cavalry officer Erigyius.
The problem of war aims now became acute. In his satrapy of Bactria, Bessus
was proclaiming himself King of Kings under the name Artaxerxes V, and
fomenting revolt in central Asia. But before making any northerly advance,
Alexander pursued the Greek mercenaries who had served under Darius and
forced their surrender when he overtook them in Hyrcania, south of the Caspian

194
 ALEXANDER TAKES PERSIA

Alexander comes across the

dead Persian king, in a
Persian manuscript
illustration. (I SI)

sea. During his campaigns in the north.. east of the Persian Empire, there were
conspiracies among his men, mainly in reaction to Alexander's ideal of an empire
of mixed Asiatic and European nationality. He executed Philotas, the son of his
once.. trusted second.. in.. command Parmenion, and then as a precaution arranged
the execution of Parmenion whom he had left in charge of the Median garrison.
In a drunken brawl he later killed Cleitus, who had saved his life at the Granicus.
In fact, Alexander often now appeared as a tyrant, a role in which many ancient
historians of later centuries saw him. Nevertheless the rank and file of his army
still followed him devotedly.
Alexander moved south and came upon the Ariaspians, who lived near Lake
Seistan. These supplied his army, just as 200 years earlier they had aided Cyrus
the Great of Persia and earned the title Euergetai ('Benefactors'). From there the
Macedonians followed the Helmand river valley, the course of which took them
in the direction of Arachosia. A new settlement was established at Alexandria.. in..
Arachosia (near modern Kandahar), one of many such foundations in the area.

195
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT\VA.R

Taken from figures on the In 3 2 9, Alexander entered Bactria, crossing the Hindu Kush via the Khawak
Alexander sarcophagus, Pass and reaching Qunduz. On his approach, Bessus' nobles sent word that they
these are reconstructions
of a javelinman (left),
were prepared to hand the usurper over; stripped naked, in chains and wearing a
a senior ranking soldier dog--collar, Bessus was left by the roadway to be picked up by Alexander's agent,
and an allied Greek Ptolemy. But those who had betrayed him fled, wary of submitting to Alexander
infantryman, all serving
and determined to maintain their independence in one of the most remote regions
in Alexander's army_
(Angus McBride © of the empire.
Osprey Publishing Ltd) Ancient historians differ on how Bessus was killed. Curtius Rufus says he was
crucified in the place where Darius III had been killed, Plutarch suggests that he
was torn apart in Bactria after a Macedonian trial, whereas Arrian states that he
was tortured and then decapitated in Ecbatana. Bessus had done more than
simply murder Darius: he had challenged Alexander's claims to the kingship.
Claims to legitimacy have little force, however, unless backed by military action,
as Darius' illustrious forefather and namesake had discovered in the years from
522 to 519. That king's imperial propaganda, inscribed in three languages on
the rock face of Bisitun, proclaims how he became king through the will of

196
 ALEX.ANDER TAKES PEI{.SI1\

Ahura--Ma:z;da; but it took the might of his armies and the public execution of
his opponents to confirm the god's will.
As Alexander reached the north--eastern limit of the empire, a new uprising
began in Sogdiana, spreading south to Bactria. The years of Alexander's fighting
in the north--eastern provinces of the Persian Empire are recorded by historians
in some detail, though with many discrepancies. We hear of battles and of
treachery, rapid marches and river crossings, the scaling of cliffs and the capture
of daunting mountain strongholds, with feats of arms in the course of which
Alexander was more than once wounded. At this time more than any, the sum
of effort and hardship suffered by the conquering army seems great and out of
all proportion to any useful purpose served.
However, by dint of war and diplomacy, Alexander subdued the intransigent
population. He sec,ured the whole territory by planting garrisons of Macedonian
and Greek soldiers throughout it.
The Scythians north of the river Jaxartes were a constant menace. They had
once lived in the lands the Persians later controlled, and there was also a danger
that they might make common cause with any resurgent movement in the
north--east provinces themselves. Before leaving the area, Alexander had to leave
outposts of war--weary men to hold the frontier of the Jaxartes and the town he
had founded there - Alexandria--Eschate (Alexandria the Farthest, modern
Khojend).
At Samarkand, Alexander married Roxane, the daughter of a Sogdian nobleman.
The wedding is depicted as a love match, which may be true, but the political
implications did not escape Alexander either. By means of a wedding ceremony,
the Macedonian king helped to terminate the lengthy guerrilla war that he had
been unable to bring to an end militarily. Philip II had used political marriage to
great advantage in his time; after seven years of campaigning, Alexander too had
come to appreciate its usefulness.
It is difficult to determine how much the marriage to Roxane influenced
Alexander's thinking about the benefits of intermarriage with the Persians, and
the forging of a Eurasian nation with a Graeco--Asiatic culture. Some ancient
writers mention other marriages between Macedonians and barbarian women at
this time, but these may anticipate the great mass--marriage ceremony at Susa
in 3 2 4. It is certain, however, that soon after marrying Roxane Alexander
attempted to introduce the Persian custom of obeisance (proskynesis) at his
court. This met with fierce resistance on the part of his Macedonian generals
and courtiers, and the king reluctantly abandoned the scheme.

197
THE INVASION OF INDIA
he political marriage of Alexander and Roxane had brought the guerrilla

T war in Bactria and Sogdiana to an end, but the fighting was to continue.
The Macedonian army now turned its attention to the last corner of the
Achaemenid Empire. Here three provinces remained: Parapamisadae, which lay
beyond the passes of the Hindu Kush east of the city ofBactra (Balkh, near Masar--
e--sharif); Gandhara (now part of northern Pakistan); and Hindush (Sindh), the
valley of the Indus. Once through the Hindu Kush, Alexander advanced into the
Bajaur and Swat regions, moving relentlessly towards the Indus, where an advance
force under Hephaestion and Perdiccas had constructed a boat--bridge across the
river, leading into the territory of Taxiles.
On the march, Alexander had encountered fierce resistance from the
Aspasians and Assacenians. The chief city of the latter was Massaga, located in
the Katgala Pass and defended by a woman, Cleophis, the mother (or possibly
widow) of the local dynast Assacenus. He had died only shortly before
Alexander's arrival at the city, probably in an earlier attempt to stop the
Macedonians en route. It was Assacenus' brother, Amminais, who conducted
the actual defence, with the help of 9,000 mercenaries, but legend chooses
instead to focus on the queen, who negotiated the surrender of the city and
retained her throne by dazzling Alexander with her beauty. Her story must be
read with caution, since her name and conduct are reminiscent of the famous
Egyptian queen, Cleopatra VII. The first historian to mention her may, indeed,
have written in the Augustan age, when Cleopatra herself had gained notoriety.
Some of the Assacenians fled to a seemingly impregnable mountain known to
the ancients as Aornus (probably Pir--sar, though some have suggested Mount
Ilam). Here, just as he had done in his siege of Arimazes, Alexander overcame
the rugged terrain, this time herding many of the terrified natives to their deaths
OPPOSITE
as they attempted to descend the steep embankment overhanging the Indus. By A medieval manuscript
capturing the place, the king could claim to have outdone his mythical ancestor, depicts Alexander's army
crossing the Oxus.
Heracles, who had been driven off by an earthquake.
(Ronald Sheridan/Ancient
In crossing the Indus, Alexander was pitching his ambitions even beyond the Art & Architecture
confines of the old Persian Empire. At this point, if any, Alexander's men could Collection)

199
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREAT AT \Vf\R

be expected to show those symptoms of mutiny that were later to frustrate him.
But the army, reassured by legends of the god Dionysus' visit to India, followed
their leader over the Indus without demur.
Alexander crossed into the territory of Taxiles. Taxiles' real name was Amphi,
but he is known in Arrian's history as 'Taxiles', which was probably a title
derived from his capital city. Taxiles ruled the region between the Indus and
Hydaspes 0helum) rivers and he gave Alexander a lavish reception in his capital
at Taxila (near modern Islamabad). He was at the time hard pressed by his
enemies - Abisares to the north (in the Kashmir) and Porus, rajah of the
Paurava, to the west. In exchange for support, he accepted a Macedonian
garrison and an overseer, Philip son of Machatas. But Taxiles remained nominal
head of the territory.
Porus meanwhile had urged Abisares to lend aid against Taxiles and the
Macedonian invader. Instead, he made perhaps token submission to Alexander,
content to await the outcome of events. When Porus went down to defeat,
Abisares sent money and elephants, but argued that he could not come in person
on account of illness, an old trick of rulers confronted by those more powerful.
Alexander understood that in making a friend ofTaxiles, he had assured himself
the enmity of Porus. Accordingly, intent upon a new war, he now marched east
again towards the river Hydaspes, beyond which Porus was mobilizing his army.

Alexander's army in India

It was perhaps when the army entered India that the sarissa first reached its
enormous length, giving the phalanx greater capability to fight elephants and
their drivers. The cuirass had now been abandoned and normal equipment now
consisted of shield, sword, javelin and sarissa, held in the left hand at first, then
transferred to the right after the javelin had been thrown.
The army in India must have presented a strange sight. Before the campaign,
Alexander had issued the hypaspists with silvered shields, the cavalry with gilded
bits, and the rest of the infantry with gilded and silvered equipment. This
sumptuousness was mixed with shabbiness. Eight years had passed since
Alexander had led his army across the Hellespont, and his men had covered
thousands of miles. The lines of supply had started to break down. At first Persian
tunics had to be worn, then re--cut Indian ones; cuirasses and other armour wore
out and had to be discarded. The morale of the troops was severely undermined by
the presence of Porus' elephants, and when rumours circulated that an army of
4,000 elephants waited beyond the Hydaspes, there was mutiny. This fear of

elephants was probably the main consideration which induced Alexander to re--
distribute armour to the infantry shortly afterwards.

200
 TI-·IE IN\!ASION OF INDIA

ANCIENT INDIAN ARMIES

Armies of the different Indian states obviously differed in

appearance and weaponry. Most had a combination of infantry,
cavalry, chariots and war elephants.
The archer was the most common type of infantryman in the
Indian army that faced Alexander. He was equipped with a large
and powerful bow, as long as the archer was tall, and fitted with a
hemp or sinew string that could be drawn to the ear. Arrows were
very long, of cane or reed and flighted with vulture feathers.
Arrow--heads were usually of iron, sometimes of horn and,
according to some Greek sources, could carry poison. Arrian says
that the Indian bow was very powerful, no shield or cuirass being
able to stop its arrows. Some of Alexander's officers maintained
that it was too heavy to aim accurately, however, and the effects of
Indian archery at the Hydaspes appear to have been negligible.
There seem to have been several different types of sword
employed by the infantry, and one can assume that some of the
infantry were designated as swordsmen, though it was noted by
Nearchus that Indian infantry were not eager for close combat.
Armour was minimal, if worn at all. Other infantry were
equipped with javelins; they may sometimes have been formed
up in front of archers. They are likely to have had shields with
which to protect themselves and the archers, but no armour.
War elephants were expensive to obtain and maintain, so not
all Indian states had the necessary resources to be able to use
them, but for those who could, they were valuable as 'mobile
fortresses'. They served the Indian cavalry and infantry
either as a refuge behind which they could retreat or as a
base from which they could sally forth. Both Diodorus
Siculus and Curtius compare the elephant line to a walled
city with towers raised at intervals. Arrian says that
the Indian infantry companies projected for a short
distance into the spaces among the elephants. Diodorus
co~pares the infantry to curtain walls between towering
elephants. (Richard Geiger © Osprey Publishing Ltd)

201
ALEXANDER TI--IE GREAT AT \VAR

BATTLE OF HYDASPES
Porus determined to face Alexander and Taxiles at the crossing of the Hydaspes
near modern Haranpur. When Alexander reached the Hydaspes, he found King
Porus' substantial army ranged against him on the opposite bank. In ancient
times, it often happened that battles were fought at river crossings: not only was
a river a defensive moat, it was also a water supply for the troops encamped on
its banks. The Hydaspes in any case was not a mere torrent or mountain
stream, nor even a river of moderate siz;e that could be forded easily at suitable
points. At this time of year in particular it was a full--flowing navigable waterway:
there would be no repeat of the charge at the Granicus.
Nevertheless the two armies were perfectly visible to each other across the broad
waters, which were, in early summer, swift and turbulent. The numerical strength
of Porus' army is variously recorded by different ancient historians, and modern
accounts do not always agree in the interpretation of the figures. The main body
of the Indian army seems to have numbered between 20,000 and 50,000 infantry,
between 2,000 and 4,000 cavalry, anything from 85 to 200 elephants and from
300 to more than 1,000 chariots. It is additionally reported that Porus' brother was
present with a force of 4,000 cavalry and 100 chariots. Margins of difference are
therefore considerable, and the best estimate is a mid--way figure.
Alexander led the Asiatic troops, except for a force of 5,000 Indian allies, from
further west, but the core of his army was still that body of Macedonian infantry
and Companion cavalry with which he had crossed the Hellespont, and the
army with which he faced Porus was probably no more than 40,000 strong. He
had always found that such a number gave him strategic and tactical mobility,
and he had proved that it was capable of defeating in battle Asiatic forces of any
siz;e that could be brought against it.
With the Hydaspes in flood, there was, of course, no immediate possibility of
fording the river. Alexander gave out publicly that he was content to wait for the
autumn months when the water would run very much lower. No doubt he
intended that such a pronouncement should come to the ears of the enemy -
but it is quite evident that he had laid other plans.
Porus strongly guarded all possible ferry crossings, and his elephants became
extremely useful in this role, for they would certainly terrify any horses that
confronted them, making a cavalry landing from rafts or barges quite impossible.
But Alexander was, as ever, resourceful. Before moving up to the frontiers of
Porus' territory, he had dismantled the boats and galleys he had used on the
Indus. The smaller craft had been broken into two parts, the 3o--oar galleys into
three parts; the sections had then been transported on wagons overland and the
whole flotilla reassembled on the Hydaspes. From the first, these boats had been

202
 TI-IE INVASION OF INDIA

STRATEGY AT THE BATTLE OF THE HYDASPES I. The preliminary Indian

chariot attack.
2. Craterus and Meleager
held the line of the river
and immobilized the
I ndian troops that
might otherwise have
been led off to confront
Alexander. Craterus
and Meleager then
crossed the river when
Alexander had been
victorious.

ALEXANDER ---
Porus' xxxx
camp

C8J
PORUS
0
I
0
I
I
2
2
I

4
3
I
I
6
4
I
5 Miles
I
8Km

able to navigate the river unmolested, the Indians having made no attempt to
deny them the use of the midway channel.
During the weeks that followed, Alexander moved his cavalry continually up
and down the river bank. Porus, to forestall the concentration of Alexander's
troops at any single point, dispatched forces to march level with Alexander's
men on the opposite bank, guided by the noise that the Macedonians were
deliberately creating. Any place at which a crossing seemed contemplated was
immediately guarded in strength by the Indians. Alexander's movements were

203
ALEXi\NDER TI-IE GREAT AT \Vl\R

however, mere feints. No attack materialized and eventually Porus relaxed his
vigilance. This, of course, was Alexander's intention. The Macedonians were
now in a position to make a real attack. Any sound of their movements would
inevitably be discounted by the enemy as another false alert.
As they moved up and down the riverbank, Alexander's cavalry had been
reconnoitring for suitable crossing places, reporting back to Alexander. He now
selected one, and made plans to cross the Hydaspes by night. He left his officer
Craterus in the area where the Macedonian army had originally encamped,
together with the cavalry unit this officer normally commanded, as well as
attached units of Asiatic cavalry and local Indian troops to the number of 5,000,
plus two units of the Macedonian phalanx.
Alexander himself set out for the chosen crossing place with a similarly mixed
but stronger force. It included the vanguard of the Companion cavalry and the
cavalry units of his officers Hephaestion, Perdiccas and Demetrius. These units
were hipparchies of greater strength than the squadrons he had used in Asia
Minor. He also led Asiatic troops that included mounted archers, and two
phalanx units with archers and Agrianians.
The purpose of leaving a substantial force at the base camp was to disguise
Alexander's movements from Porus. It was imperative that the Indians knew
nothing of the crossing until it was accomplished. His orders to Craterus were
that if Porus led away only part of his army to meet this emergency, leaving a
force of elephants behind him, then the Macedonians at the base camp should
remain where they were, covering the enemy on the opposite bank. However,
if Porus abandoned his position entirely, either in flight, or to face Alexander,
then Craterus and his men might safely cross. In fact, the main danger to
the Macedonian cavalry was from the elephants. Once these were withdrawn,
the river might confidently be crossed, no matter what other Indian troops
remained.

Night operations
The point selected as a crossing place was about 18 miles upstream from the
base camp. Here, on the opposite bank, was a headland where the river bent,
covered with luxuriant undergrowth, and in the river alongside it rose the
island of Admana, also densely forested and so providing concealment for the
proximity or presence of cavalry. Along the Macedonian bank Alexander had
already posted a chain of pickets, capable of communicating with each other
either by visual or audible signals. Similar to his previous practice, Alexander
had allowed the enemy to become accustomed to the shouts and nightly
watchfires of these outposts.

204
 THE INVASION OF INDIA

BATTLE OF THE HYDASPES: THE RIVER CROSSING

Alexander
[;iii Royal Vanguard ('agema')
& hipparchies of Hephaestion,
Perdiccas &Demetrius, with
Bactrians, Sogdians & Scythians
(including Dahae horse-bowmen)
Pike units of Coenus &
Ferry ~~~.;--iI;~~~=--...L....-CI_itu_s_w_ith_ar_Ch_e_rs_a_nd_A_g_ria_n_es_~
point I
I
,,
,
~
~
Guard posts ~
& Signal stations'
I
•
Meleager, Attalus, Gorgias I
Three pike units with some •
~
mercenary cavalry & infantry ~
~
.-----------------, ~

Craterus , Swamp
[;iii Craterus' own hipparchy , land
with Arachotians &Parapamisidae ,
Pike units of Alcetas & •
Polyperchon with local I
Indian allies 5,000 strong ,•
,
.. "" ",es
# -- ~~oaSY
Alexander's ~\~e{
basecamp ./
Porus'
base camp
o 2 3 4 5 Miles
I ' I ! I I' I
PORUS o 2 4 6 8 Km

Screened by such diversions, Alexander's march was made in great secrecy.

It followed an inland route, possibly a short cut. As the Macedonians marched
through the night, they were overtaken by a thunderstorm and heavy rain.
Though they cannot have enjoyed it, the storm must have rendered their
movement imperceptible to the enemy.
At the crossing place a ferry fleet had been prepared in advance. Many of the
ferries were rafts floated on skins that had been transported empty to the spot,
then stuffed with chaff and sewn up to make them watertight. Alexander had
previously used this technique for ferrying troops on the Danube and on the
Oxus. Alongside these waited the 3o--oar galleys carried overland from the Indus.

205
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT WAR

Close to the river bank, at an intermediate position between the base camp
and the ferry point, he stationed three of his officers, Meleager, Attalus and
Gorgias, each in charge of his own infantry unit, with attached cavalry and
infantry detailed from the mercenaries. Like Craterus, this force was ordered to
cross only when it saw that the enemy on the opposite bank of the river was
committed elsewhere. The crossing was to be made in three waves, probably
because there were not enough ferries to permit a transit in one body.
At dawn the storm subsided. As the ferry flotilla, led by Alexander and his
staff in a galley, moved out into the river, it was initially out of sight of the
opposite bank. But as they went further across the river they were obliged to
break cover, and enemy scouts galloped off to report their approach.
Alexander's men now ran into unforeseen difficulties, as the bank that had
seemed to be the mainland opposite in reality belonged to another island. A deep
but narrow channel separated it from the land beyond, and men and animals
barely managed to ford the fast--flowing current - sometimes with little more than
their heads above water. Emerging at last from this second crossing, Alexander
was able to marshal his troops unmolested by the enemy and without difficulty
on the opposite bank. Though the ancient sources vary, it seems that he now
advanced along the river to face Porus' army, marching in semi--deployed
formation. The Companions, with all the best cavalry, were massed in front of the
infantry, and ahead of these were 1,000 mounted archers serving as a screen and
equipped to deal with elephants at long range. The main cavalry, about 5,000 in
number, were provided with a flank guard of archers under the command of
Tauron, who was ordered to keep up with the horses as best he could.
Behind the cavalry marched the hypaspists under Seleucus. The main
phalanx, marching in battle formation, was guarded by Agrianians and javelin--
throwers on both its flanks. The position of the other cavalry not in a forward
role is not recorded; either they must have followed at this stage in the rear, or
guarded the left flank of the hypaspists.
Arrian suggests that Alexander was willing, if the occasion arose, to challenge
Porus' whole army with just his cavalry, but this can hardly have been the case.
Apart from anything else, the whole object of Alexander's tactics was to avoid
putting his cavalry up against elephants. He must have led his mounted troops
forward simply to repel any cavalry or chariot attack against the disembarkation
point. Indeed, the ferry operation was not complete, even after the landing of
his main body. He had not been able to transport the whole force in a single
crossing, as the infantry with which he first disembarked numbered about
6,000, certainly a smaller number than that with which he had set out from

base camp.

206
 THE INVASI()N OF INDIA

The Indian reaction

When news of the crossing reached Porus, he did not believe it had been made
in strength, and he thought that a mobile force, dispatched under the leadership
of his son, would be enough to cope with the situation. He could, after all,
see Craterus' men still encamped opposite him on the other side of the river,
and he imagined that these represented the Macedonian main army, just as
Alexander had hoped. The detachment sent against Alexander numbered only
some 2,000 cavalry and 12.0 chariots. (These at least are the figures recorded by
Alexander's officer Ptolemy and accepted by Arrian.) The chariot force was in
any case immediately routed, with a reported loss of 400 killed - among whom
was the young prince. Horses and chariots were mainly captured.
Porus now realized that he would have to march against Alexander with the
greater part of his army. However, Craterus' troops, already preparing to cross
the river in force, could not be disregarded, and the Indian king left a small body
of men to guard the riverbank, with some elephants, which he hoped would be
enough to daunt any oncoming Macedonian cavalry. He himself moved with his
main army against Alexander. His army numbered about 4,000 cavalry, 300
chariots, 200 elephants and 30,000 infantry. Much of the country over which
he marched was muddy and difficult, but finding a sandy plain that would give
his cavalry freedom of manoeuvre he halted, and made ready for battle.
The Indian front line was composed of elephants, stationed at intervals of
approximately 100ft (30.Sm). Behind the elephants and in the intervals between
them were more infantry, guarded on their exposed flanks by cavalry and further
screened by war chariots at each end of the whole front. When Alexander came
within sight of the Indian battle array, he halted and allowed his infantry to rest,
while the cavalry patrolled around them.
Before going into action against Porus, Alexander reshuffled the leadership of
his own army. His senior officers were variously assignable, their individual
competence not limited to one arm of the fighting forces. Coenus was appointed
to command of Demetrius' cavalry, Demetrius being perhaps retained as
second--in--command. Seleucus remained in charge of the hypaspists. But the
leaders of the pike phalanx were now Tauron and Antigenes. It is easy to see
how such changes might become desirable at this stage. Crossing a river and
fighting a battle are very different operations and so might reasonably call for
OVERLEAF
changes of leadership. A I7th~century painting
Porus enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in infantry numbers, but by Charles Le Brun of
Alexander and Porus, after
Alexander had the advantage in cavalry. The issue was whether the Macedonian
Porus' defeat at the
cavalry would be engaged by the Indian elephants and thrown into confusion, Hydaspes. (akg~
or whether such a confrontation could be avoided. Alexander avoided it. images/Erich Lessing)

207
ALEXA.NDER THE GREA.T AT'VA.R

The diagram shows 200 BATTLE OF THE HYDASPES: THE ELEPHANT LINE
elephants stationed at
Iooft (JO.5m) intervals.
The arrangement, in four
ranks, is conjectural.

~~ }I
l~ ••••••~•••••••••••••••••• ~•••••••••••••••••••.
~
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

He opened the battle with an attack by his horse--archers, which produced

considerable disorder in the enemy's left--wing formations.
Porus' chariots had been marshalled on both wings ahead of his cavalry. The
chariots on his left must have borne the first impact of Alexander's mounted
archers. They presumably presented large targets to the attackers, for each
chariot is reported as carrying six men, only two of whom bore shields.
It seems that the Indian king now had second thoughts about the deployment
of his army, for an attempt was made to lead his cavalry out in front of the
chariots. But Alexander, with his Companion cavalry, fell upon the Indian left--
wing horsemen while they were still advancing in column and before they had
time to deploy into line of battle. The whole of Porus' left wing was now forced
on the defensive.
On the other side of the field, the right--wing cavalry of the Indians did their
best to save the situation. They swept across the central plain to counter--attack
against Alexander's flank. Any opposing horsemen on the left flank of the
Macedonian infantry must have been too few or too far off to discourage the
Indian manoeuvre. But Alexander's officer Coenus, acting on a pre--arranged
plan, now detached himself from the other Companions and led his cavalry in a
circuitous ride - presumably at a gallop - to emerge on the tail of the counter--
attacking Indians in their transverse career across the battlefield. It cannot
be excluded that in order to carry out the operation Coenus actually passed
to the rear of the advancing Macedonian infantry before the enemy observed
his approach. He certainly came into view suddenly and unexpectedly, when
the Indian right--wing cavalry was already almost at grips with Alexander's
Companions.
The Indians were now threatened with battle on two fronts. They reacted by

210
 THE INVASION ()F INDIA

dividing their forces and facing in two directions simultaneously, against

Alexander and against Coenus. This meant re--forming. But Alexander suddenly
wheeled inwards and charged them as they were in the middle of their
manoeuvre. Without attempting to withstand the full onslaught of the
Companion cavalry, they fell back for cover among the elephants.

The defeat of Porus

The elephants now proved their value, moving forwards against the oncoming
Macedonian infantry, despite showers of missiles from Alexander's archers and
javelin--throwers. They savagely mangled the phalanx, trampling men underfoot
or attacking with tusk and trunk with an effectiveness which must have been
partly due to military training. Taking heart from the elephant charge, the
Indian cavalry now made a final sally against Alexander's cavalry, but they were
driven back once more among the elephants. The battle at this stage was rather
unusual, for the cavalry of both sides, instead of being distributed on either
wing, was concentrated as a dense and confused mass in the centre of the field.
The attack of the elephants soon lost its momentum: the drivers were
vulnerable to javelins and arrows, and the Macedonians were in a position to give
way before them as they charged, then renew their attack as the elephants tired,
using sabres to attack their trunks, and axes to cut off their feet. The elephants
were soon wounded and maddened to a point at which they were out of control,
even where they had not lost their drivers. It was a common experience of ancient
warfare that when frightened elephants became out of control, they could do as
much damage to their own masters as to the enemy. Porus' elephants at the
Hydaspes were no exception: the cavalry, penned in an ever--contracting space
among the elephants, jostling and huddling, were 'trampled and crushed. The
Indian infantry, deprived of any support from cavalry, chariots or elephants, were
no match for the Macedonian phalanx as it came on against them with shields
locked together.
At last, when all arms of Porus' forces were exhausted, Alexander's cavalry
and infantry moved in, surrounding and capturing the elephants, which had
now been reduced to a stationary role, trumpeting and bellowing in pathetic
protest. In this action, the Indian cavalry was annihilated as a fighting force, and
those of Porus' men who found a merciful gap in the encircling enemy lines
took to flight. However, flight did not save them all, as Craterus and the other
Macedonians posted on the west bank now crossed the river and intercepted the
exhausted fugitives. In the battle and the pursuit that ensued, 3,000 Indian
cavalry were reported lost, 20,000 infantry were killed, and all the chariots were
wrecked. The surviving elephants became the booty of the victors.

211
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT\VAR

TACTICS AT THE HYDASPES

Residual
Hypaspists Agrianes Cavalry

Archers

I. Alexander's horse-bowmen rain arrows at Indian

left wing cavalry.
2. Indian cavalry sally against them.
3. Alexander's Companions charge the Indian cavalry
and throw them into confusion.
4. Indian right wing cavalry ride to support the left.
s. Coenus moves to attack Indian right wing cavalry
Horse-bowmen in rear.
6. Indian cavalry, fighting on two fronts, is forced back
and defeated.

ttt I~yds

IOOOm

Elephants
Chariots Chariots

1111 ttttttttttttttttttttttttttt
Infantry
Cavalry Cavalry

Porus, a gigantic man, mounted on an elephant and protected by a stout

corselet, had, unlike Darius, continued fighting until the end. Only when he
was wounded did he abandon the struggle. Alexander sent his ally, Taxiles, to
pursue Porus and invite his surrender, but Porus, from the back of his elephant,
threatened Taxiles with a spear and drove him away. A second ambassador was
sent, whose relations with Porus had in the past been happier. The Indian king
was finally induced to dismount from his elephant and parley with Alexander,
who, full of admiration for a gallant enemy, and probably also aware of
diplomatic considerations, granted him the honourable terms he demanded and
concluded an alliance with him. It had not always been so: Alexander had often
been less than generous in his treatment of stubborn adversaries in the past.
The greater challenge lay, however, in the attempt to bring about lasting peace
between the Indian rivals. Curtius claims that an alliance between Taxiles and
Porus was sealed by marriage, the common currency in such transactions. But

212
 TI·IE INVASION OF TNDTf\

the arrangement was never entirely satisfactory. Though Taxiles was perhaps
more to be trusted than Porus, Alexander needed the latter for his upcoming
campaigns in the Punjab.
Alexander at the Hydaspes was at his most cunning, splitting his forces then
creeping upriver and making a secret crossing at night. In doing so, he caused
Porus to split his forces before the battle, weakening and confusing him. When
battle was joined, though cautious of using his cavalry against the elephants, he
deployed them against the enemy left wing as usual; however, he had clearly
planned for every eventuality, as can be seen with Coenus' mad gallop to appear
in the rear of the attacking Indian right-wing cavalry as they dashed to counter--
attack Alexander's cavalry. Soon Alexander had the Indian army fighting on two
fronts, and as at Gaugamela, he swooped in with a cavalry charge when the
Indians had to re--form to meet the Macedonians. Though this is not as clear an
example of Alexander's tactical brilliance as elsewhere, his opening moves were
highly characteristic, as is his quick thinking during the battle to take advantage
wherever it appeared.
Beside the Hydaspes Alexander founded two new towns, Nicaea and
Bucephala, the latter named after his warhorse, which had died of old age.
He rested his men for a month, and about this time received reinforcements
of Thracian troops drafted by his governor in the Caspian area. Hearing of
disaffection in Assacenia, he dispatched troops to restore the situation. But
Alexander was now defied by a second king called Porus. This second Porus soon
fled from Alexander's advance, but Alexander eagerly pursued him, crossing the
Acesines and Hydraotes rivers. This brought him into conflict with the tribe of
the Cathaei. Having subdued them, he marched to the river Hyphasis (Beas).

213
THE JOURNEY BACK
THE LIMITS OF CONQUEST
eyond the river Hyphasis lay the populous and little--known subcontinent

B of India proper. Arrian suggests that Alexander had hopes of reaching the
'Ocean Stream', which the Greeks believed encircled the landmass of the
world. However, on the banks of the Hyphasis, the war--weary Macedonians,
battered by the elements, their uniforms literally rotting off their bodies, called
a halt. Alexander yearned for further adventure and conquest, this time in the
valley of the Ganges. The soldiers, however, went on strike and even the bravest
and most loyal of Alexander's officers spoke on their behalf. The king sulked
in his tent, but the men remained obdurate. There was nothing to do but
turn back.
Behind this traditionally accepted view of the end of Alexander's eastward
march, there may be another, more complex story. After all, why would an
experienced and shrewd military leader like Alexander allow reports of
extraordinary dangers, or numerous enemies and exotic places, to come to
the attention of soldiers whom he knew were demoralized and tired? If the
fantastic report of India beyond the Hyphasis was 'leaked' to the Macedonian
soldiery, it was because Alexander wanted them to hear it. All this may have
been a face--saving gesture by a king who was just as tired as his men, but for
whom it would have been unheroic to decline further challenges. Instead, the
responsibility for ending this glorious march into the unknown was placed
squarely on the shoulders of the common soldier. The stubbornness of his
troops alone robbed Alexander of further glory. This was the accepted tradition,
and this is how it has come down to us. Further evidence of Alexander's
duplicity can be found in the fact that he ordered the men to build a camp of
OPPOSITE
abnormal size, containing artefacts that were larger than life, in order to cheat
Dionysus on a leopard.
posterity into thinking that the expeditionary force had been superhuman. Mosaic from Pella, 4th
Curtius states that Alexander had 12 altars erected to commemorate the century. When Alexander
expedition, then ordered the camp fortifications to be extended and over--sized reached India he began to
emulate Dionysus as well
couches to be made and left behind, in order to 'leave to posterity a fraudulent as H eracles.
wonder' (9.3.19). (TopFoto/HIP)

215
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREAT t\T \VAR

RETURN TO THE WEST

The army was returning to the west - but not directly. It was not necessary to
cross the Hyphasis in the quest for ocean. Alexander knew full well that the Indus
river system would lead him there, and he had transported boats in sections for

ENDURING ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS

Alexander led his men from the Balkans to the battle (apomachoi) . Sometimes their stay was
Indus, across desert wastes and some of the world's temporary, and they later rejoined the army, but for
highest mountain passes. It has been calculated that many it was a bleak and unwelcome 'retirement'.
the infantryman who campaigned with Alexander in The speech of the taxiarch (now promoted to
Europe in 336-334 and then joined the Asiatic hipparch) Coenus son of Polemocrates delivered at
campaign had covered 20,870 miles (33,S87km) by the river Hyphasis, indicates the cumulative effects,
the time Alexander died in Babylon in 323, an physical and moral, of the campaigns that
average of I,60s miles per year. For many this was Alexander's soldiers had undertaken:
not the end of it; for example, the argyraspids
marched from Cilicia to Egypt and back (if they did Whatever mortals were capable of, we have
not first make a detour to Media) and then achieved. We have crossed lands and seas, all
campaigned with Eumenes in Mesopotamia, Persia, of them now better known to us than to
and on the Iranian plateau, thus adding at least their inhabitants. We stand almost at the
another s,ooo miles to ajourney that was destined to end of the earth [and] you are preparing to
leave their bones scattered throughout distant lands. enter another world ... That is a mission
Alexander's route to Bactria and then to India took appropriate to your spirit, but beyond ours.
them twice over mountain passes that approached or For your valour will ever be on the increase,
exceeded I2,000ft (3,6s8m). Many of Alexander's but our energy is already running out. Look
veterans could claim to have crossed the Euphrates at our bodies - debilitated, pierced with all
and Tigris rivers, the Oxus and Iaxartes, the Indus those wounds, decaying with all their scars!
and three of its tributaries, as well as the Nile. In Our weapons are blunt; our armour is
addition to these natural obstacles, they had also wearing out ... How many of us have a
faced the seemingly impregnable fortresses of Tyre cuirass? Who owns a horse? Have an
and Ga:z;a, the Rocks of Ariama:z;es and Sisimithres, inquiry made into how many are attended by
and Aornus on the edge of the Indus, all of which slaves and what anyone has left of his booty.
combined natural and man--made positions with Conquerors of all, we lack everything! And
armed defenders. Disease and wounds carried off our problems result not from extravagance;
many, and settlements in central Asia were dotted no, on war have we expended the equipment
with colonists who included those men unfit for of war. (Curtius, 9.3.7-II)

216
 THE JOURNEY BACK

ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS

the very purpose of following the river to its mouth. On the way, he subdued
warlike tribes, troublesome neighbours for his new vassal, Porus. Among these
were the Mallians, a tribe of the Indus valley who had sympathized with
the Cathaei.
Disregarding his own safety and forgetting that the Macedonians' enthusiasm
for war was no longer what it had been, Alexander was the first to scale the
walls of the Mallians' main city and jump inside. Only a few bodyguards
accompanied him. When the troops saw that their king was trapped, they
scrambled up the ladders, overloading and breaking them. Inside the walls, the
king was showered with arrows; one officer, Abreas, died rescuing him, the
other two rescuers, Peucestas and Leonnatus, were later promoted and
decorated. Alexander was rescued, but he had an arrow lodged deep in his chest,
and once the troops poured over the battlements, they took vengeance, killing
every man, woman and child in the town.

217
ALEXANDER TI-IE GREAT AT WAR

This coin shows Alexander

wearing the elephant
headdress commemorating
his victories in India.
( akg~images)

Miraculously, Alexander survived, though for a good portion of the journey

downriver he was all but incapacitated. By the time he reached the Indus delta
he had recovered, and from here he sailed out into the Indian Ocean and
conducted sacrifices at the limits of his empire, just as he had done at the
Hellespont in 334.
Military and political considerations had led him to dispatch Craterus and his
main army on a homeward march through Arachosia and via the city of
Alexandria (Kandahar) that had been founded there. Alexander himself was
now bent upon exploration and discovery. He assembled his remaining troops
and an accompanying fleet at Pattala at the head of the Indus delta, preparatory
to a double homeward expedition made concurrently by land and sea.
It was planned that N earchus' fleet would sail alongside Alexander's land
forces as they moved westwards. However, the fleet was delayed by the
monsoon, and soon lost contact with Alexander's forces. The fleet sailed along
the coast, eventually passing through the Straits of Hormuz and entering the
Persian Gulf; it was a journey fraught with hardship, deprivation and danger.

218
 TI-·IE JOURNEY BACK

The crews were often terrified by the unfamiliar conditions of the Indian
Ocean, which included such unknown phenomena as tides and whales. Some
vessels were lost during the journey.
The land forces suffered more horribly. Led by Alexander, they struggled
through the Gedrosian desert. At first they trailed luxurious spoils acquired in
their eastern wars, as well as women and children. But soon they ran short of
food and water. Curtius describes the march:

Their provisions exhausted, the Macedonians began to experience first

shortage of food and eventually starvation. They rummaged about for
palm roots (that being the only tree growing there) but, when even this
means of sustenance ran out, they began to slaughter their pack--animals,
sparing not even their horses. Then, having nothing to carry their
baggage, they proceeded to burn the spoils they had taken from the
enemy, spoils for which they had penetrated the furthest reaches of the
East. (9.10.1 I - I 2)

Although tortured by thirst, the army met disaster in a torrent bed, where a
meagre trickle of water had encouraged them to pitch camp. A sudden
cloudburst over distant mountains turned the little stream into a raging flood
without warning, and many of the women and children drowned. There were
considerable casualties both among people and animals during the march. The
sick and exhausted were left to lie where they fell; none had the strength to help

CRATERUS

Craterus began the expedition as a taxiarch, a towards modern Kandahar. On the way he
commander of pezhetairoi. He served as the second-- apprehended rebels, whom he took to the king for
in--command on the left wing, under the direct execution.
authority of Parmenion, whom he was being In 324 Craterus was sent to replace Antipater as
groomed to replace. Craterus was an officer of viceroy of Macedon. This order was pre--empted by
unswerving loyalty to Alexander, and his promotions Alexander's death and the outbreak of the Lamian
squarely reflected his abilities. As the campaign War. In 321/320 Craterus returned to Asia and did
progressed, Craterus exercised more frequent battle with Eumenes near the Hellespont. He was
independent commands. During Alexander's return thrown from his horse and trampled beneath its
through the Gedrosian desert, Craterus led the hooves, an ignominious end for one of Alexander's
slower troops and invalids through the Bolan Pass greatest generals.

219
ALEXL\NDER TI-IE GREAT AT \VAR

HEPHAESTION

Hephaestion, son of Amyntor, had been a close blows in front of their respective troops and
friend of Alexander since boyhood. They had been Alexander had to intervene. Although he chided
at Mieza together as teenagers, where the heir to the Hephaestion because he failed to recognize that
throne was educated by Aristotle. Romanticized 'without Alexander he would be nothing', he
accounts compared the two with Achilles and remained devoted to his lifelong friend. In October
Patroclus. Whether they were lovers, as many 324, Hephaestion died of illness, and the king was
modern writers have asserted, is not entirely clear, inconsolable. According to Plutarch he gave orders
but Alexander certainly promoted Hephaestion's that as a sign of mourning the manes and tails of all
career despite the fact that he seems to have the army horses should be shorn, the battlements of
possessed poor leadership qualities and little neighbouring cities demolished, Hephaestion's
military skill. He was nevertheless a gifted organizer, doctor crucified and all music banned. Alexander
and Alexander left many matters of logistics - planned an elaborate funeral including a pyramid.
supply, transport of equipment, bridge--building and The project was never completed, although the lion
the founding of settlements - to him. By the time of Hamadan is said to have been part of the plan.
the army reached India, Hephaestion's promotion Many have tried to link the deaths of Alexander and
had brought about friction with other officers, Hephaestion, especially as Alexander died within
especially Craterus. At one point the two came to eight months of Hephaestion's demise. (akg--images)

220
 THE J()URNEY BACK

or carry them. When a violent wind obliterated all landmarks and erased the
tracks with sand, Alexander's guides, unable to read the stars, failed him. In this
emergency, Alexander took charge personally and, using his sense of direction,
led his desperate men back to the sea, where a fresh,water spring was discovered
under the shingle beach. Sustained by a succession of such springs, they
marched along the shore for seven days. Although Alexander stood up to the
hardships as well as any man, and indeed it was on this march that he displayed
some of his most noble qualities, the march was an unmitigated disaster.
Alexander eventually made contact with Craterus inland, in Carmania
(Kerman). Craterus brought pack,animals and elephants and the remainder of
the march was made in comparatively civilized conditions.
At the entry of the Persian Gulf, Nearchus' men had fallen in with a Greek--
speaking straggler from Alexander's army, and N earchus ventured north with a
small party to meet Alexander. After an emotional meeting, however, land and
sea expeditions continued on separate lines. Nearchus sailed up the Persian
Gulf, first to the mouth of the Euphrates, then to the Tigris, finally rejoining
Alexander at Susa. Reports of the time taken by this voyage differ wildly. But it
seems most likely that Nearchus sailed from the mouth of the Indus at the end
of the south,westerly monsoons in October 325 and reached Susa in spring
3 2 4.
When Alexander returned to Susa in 324, he celebrated mixed marriages on
a grand scale. Alexander himself married Stateira, daughter of Darius III, and
Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III. Another of Darius' daughters, Drypetis,
married Hephaestion, and nearly a hundred other noble Persian women were
given as brides to Macedonian officers. An even larger number of common
soldiers took barbarian wives, but this was probably just a way of legitimizing
common,law unions that had existed for some time. These marriages were part
of Alexander's plans for an empire which was a fusion of culture, nation and
race. The marriages appear to have been unpopular with the aristocracy, and
after Alexander's death most appear to have repudiated their Persian wives.

221
THE DEATH OF THE
CONQUEROR
CONSOLIDATION AND FUSION
he wars of Alexander had resulted in the conquest of an empire and

T the imposition of a Graeco--Macedonian ruling class upon a diverse

population that had hitherto been united under Persian control. Greek
was now to replace Aramaic as the official written language of the East,
although local tongues would endure - just as regional culture and religion
would not be wiped out by the mere change of rulers. But the success of
the expedition must be measured by the effectiveness of the process of
consolidation rather than the speed of conquest.
In fact, the Macedonian conquest was far from complete, as some areas were
only partially subdued and others were bypassed intentionally in a bid to come to
grips with the Persian king and to strike at the nerve--centres of the Achaemenid
Empire. Pockets of independent or recalcitrant states remained throughout the
East: Pisidia, Cappadocia and Armenia are notable examples from the north--
western region; the Uxians, who had collected payment from the Persians who
crossed their territories, and who had been chased from the invasion route by
Alexander, were again asserting their independence in the age of the Successors.
Now Alexander was back in the heart of Persia there was much work to be
done to consolidate his conquests and mould his new empire. However, first he
had to deal with immediate issues. His attempts to introduce the Persian court
ritual of proskynesis and obliging his officers to marry Persian wives had not
pleased his court, but it was the integration of large numbers of barbarian troops OPPOSITE
This illustration from
into the Macedonian army that gave offence to the soldiery. The army mutinied
a Isth . . century French
at Opis on the Tigris, complaining that they were being supplanted by manuscript of Curtius'
foreigners. These complaints Alexander countered with soothing words, but the history of Alexander shows
Alexander's war elephants.
ringleaders of the mutiny were seized, chained and thrown into the Tigris. Ten
(The Art Archive/
thousand veterans, many of them injured, were sent back to Macedon under the Bibliothe.que Municipale
command of Craterus, who was himself in poor health. Some of them would Reims/Gianni Dagli Orti)

223
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT ·WAR

An illustration of the funeral indeed reach their homeland, but only to fight again. Others would not advance
procession ofAlexander the beyond Cilicia before becoming embroiled in the wars of the Successors.
Great. (prismajAncient
Art &Architecture
In Alexander's absence there had also been much evidence of corruption at
Collection Ltd) the heart of his newly established empire. Harpalus, left in fiscal control, had
been guilty of grave irregularities and absconded to Greece. Alexander's first
impulse was to follow him and arrest him, but welcome news came that he had
been murdered by his own subordinates.
When Alexander the Great died, his notebooks (bypomnemata) included
grandiose plans for the conquest of North Africa and the circumnavigation of
the Arabian peninsula, though in truth there was much left to be done in areas
that had formerly been subject to, or else a thorn in the side of, the Persian
kings. The presence of would--be overlords who were even more alien than the
Achaemenids served only to strengthen the determination of these areas to
resist. Some regions rebelled in Alexander's lifetime, incited by the very Persian
officials whom he had appointed as satraps and hyparchs.
The border provinces in the east were disrupted by both the presence of hostile
elements on the fringes and a reluctance on the part of their Greek garrison
troops to remain there. Upon the premature news ofAlexander's death - after the
attack on the Mallian town In the Punjab the Greeks
of Bactria and Sogdiana, some 10,000 in number, had entertained hopes of

224
 TI-IE DEJ\Tl~1 OF Tl-IE CONQUEROR

also very successful at siegecraft. He had quite a different attitude to siegecraft

from his father's, rarely resorting to treachery or betrayal. Alexander's siegecraft
is especially characterized by the spectacular siege of Tyre, which, although a
long--drawn--out affair, impressed the ancients because of its technical aspects.
The sieges ofTyre and Gaza highlight Alexander's ability to visualize large--scale
operations and his willingness to carry them through to completion. His
perseverance is also clear at Managa in 327, and at the Rock of Aornus. There
was no place for the passive blockade in Alexander's dynamic style of siege
warfare. Although he occasionally adopted the strategy of encirclement, this was
never an end in itself. For example, during the campaign against the rebel
Sogdian towns in 329, Alexander instructed Craterus to encircle the strongest
one, Cyropolis, with a ditch and palisade. This contained the rebels there, while
he recovered the other towns. Returning to Cyropolis, he began a battering
attack then infiltrated the town along a dry watercourse.
His success as a besieger has been attributed to the possession of superior siege
machinery. Following on from his father's use of engineers, Alexander employed
engineers to develop siege machinery during his campaigns. Alexander's frequent
deployment of artillery was probably made possible by the technical advances of
his father's engineers. The development of the torsion catapult must have been
a slow process of trial and error, and the stone--projectors seen at Halicarnassus
and Tyre cannot have been particularly powerful. The massive and complex
machinery often deployed by Macedonian armies must have been expensive to
manufacture and troublesome to transport. After the fall of Miletus, Alexander
had his siege train carried to Halicarnassus by sea, and the artillery used at Gaza
was shipped from Tyre. Transfer by land must have been more difficult, but his
siege towers were designed to be disassembled, permitting Alexander to use
machinery in the mountainous terrain of the Hindu Kush.
Of course, many factors determined whether siege machines should be used,
not least the strength and situation of the defences, and Alexander was also
perfectly willing to launch an assault without the support of heavy machinery.
as at Thebes in 335. Similarly, the machinery assembled for attacking the main
town of the Mallians in 326/325 did not arrive quickly enough for Alexander,
so he stormed the place without it, and at Sangala, although he had machines
ready to batter the town wall, his men instead undermined it and crossed over
the ruins by ladder.
Alexander was an innovative and bold leader in military matters, but whether
he was a great ruler is a rather different question. He never had a chance properly
to rule his empire, and so how he would or could have done so will never be
known. The challenges of such a newly created, extensive and disparate empire

235
ALEX/\NDER TI-IE GREAT i\T \VAR

would surely have been large, but as the man - the god - who had conquered the
empire, he arguably would have had more success than the mere mortals who had
to follow his act. His education at the hands of Aristotle and others gave
Alexander skills which he wielded with confidence in creating his persona as
ultimate king and conqueror. He was the avenger of Persian wrongs against
Greece, until, as ruler of the Persian Empire, this became inappropriate, after
which time he began to portray himself as the heir of Cyrus. He modelled himself
on Achilles, he claimed to be the son of Ammon, and he identified himself with
the god Heracles. His benefaction to cities was also in keeping with the behaviour
of a god, and his fantastic deeds must have made him the equal of many gods. At
Siwah, even before Gaugamela, he asked the oracle which gods to honour when
he reached the Ocean, the edge of the world, not only showing his self-confidence
and ambitions, but also his piety, probably genuine, towards the gods he claimed
as family.

THE LEGACY OF ALEXANDER

The Hellenistic era
Alexander died as ruler of a huge empire that stretched from continental Europe
to the Indian sub,continent. Though it was split up among the Diadochoi, his
conquests had long,term cultural effects. To secure his empire, and because he
believed that culture and government meant cities in the Greek style, he had
founded settlements throughout his campaigns. There are 70 towns or outposts
scattered across Asia which it is claimed were founded by Alexander, many of
them named for him, including Alexandria in Egypt, Iskenderun in Turkey,
Iskandariya in Iraq and Alexandria on the Indus (Alexandria Bucephalous) in
Pakistan. These may be his most lasting contribution to history. By means of
these towns and his court, Alexander introduced Greek speech and customs to
Asia. In many areas of Alexander's empire Hellenistic civilization flourished,
affecting art, architecture, religion and philosophy. Greek became the lingua
franca of the civilized world, learnt by all those who wanted to succeed,
employed by the Romans for their intellectual discussions, and found in Indo,
Greek inscriptions and Hebrew scriptures.

The act to follow

A man who had achieved as much as Alexander, as quickly as he had, at such a
young age, was an inspiration to other ambitious individuals, who tried to
emulate his achievements, or use any real or imagined connection to the great
man to help them with their own ambitions. The Successors all realized the
importance of connecting themselves to Alexander. Perdiccas moved to become

236
 THE DEATH OF THE CON(2UEROR

regent so that he was ruling on behalf of the legitimate royal heirs to Alexander.
Ptolemy took possession of the king's corpse, and instead of sending it to Siwah
as apparently agreed, put it on display in Memphis, then Alexandria, where it This fanciful illustration
was still available to be viewed 300 years later. In the empires they had carved shows Alexander exploring
the sea in a glass diving
out for themselves, all the Successors issued coins with Alexander on them, and bell with a cat and a
coins of themselves in poses reminiscent of Alexander. rooster. I t is from a I 5th~
The Romans particularly admired Alexander, and many wanted to associate century manuscript of Le
Livre et la vraye histoire
themselves with him. Julius Caesar is said to have wept at the sight of
du bon roy Alexandre,
Alexander's statue, and bemoan that he had not even begun to equal now in the British Library.
Alexander's deeds. Pompey the Great actually found and wore Alexander's Legends and myths of
Alexander have been rife
cloak, while Augustus travelled to Alexandria to lay a wreath on Alexander's
throughout the 2,ooo~plus
coffin. Later, the emperor Caligula took Alexander's armour from his tomb, and years since his death. (akg~
wore it himself. images/Erich Lessing)

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ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT WAR

Legends and stories

Alexander the man will never be fully understood, his plans for further conquest
and his aims for his spear.. won empire lost in the distant past. Modern historians
Colin Farrell starring as view him in many different ways, and will continue to do so because the available
Alexander the Great in the
2004 film Alexander. information is not able to answer the many questions that even the briefest
(TopFoto) consideration of his life provokes. The primary texts, written by men who actually

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 THE DEATH OF THE C()Nf2UER()R

knew Alexander, or who gathered information from those present, are all lost,
apart from a few fragments. Contemporaries who are known to have written
accounts of his life include Callisthenes, Ptolemy, Aristobulus, Nearchus and
Onesicritus. Other influential works include those of Cleitarchus and Timagenes.
In the absence of these, we have access to five main surviving accounts of
Alexander's life which are based on these primary sources, by Arrian, Quintus
Curtius Rufus, Plutarch, Diodoms Siculus and Justin.
Arrian, a native of the Bithynian city of Nicomedia in Asia Minor, wrote his
History of Alexander in the first half of the 2nd century AD. A military man
himself, he modelled himself on Xenophon. Arrian's history is usually taken
to be the most trustworthy account of Alexander, because he used the
contemporary sources of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. This, along with his detailed
and consistent style, means that he has been highly valued by scholars. Diodorus
Siculus wrote his account of Alexander in the last half of the 1st century BC. He
used Cleitarchus, who had compiled an account ofAlexander based on first--hand
accounts around 300. Diodorus is often regarded as an uncritical compiler of
earlier historians, though this may be overly harsh. Plutarch also used
Cleitarchus, as well as other sources, in his Life ofAlexander. His Life is biography,
and included moralizing tendencies and anecdotes. Despite this, both Plutarch
and Diodorus are useful as counterbalances to Arrian's sometimes sanitized and
certainly court--centred history. Dating from around AD 200, Justin's Epitome of
the Universal History of Pompeius Trogus is an abridgement of an earlier 'universal
history' by Pompeius Trogus, a native of southern Gaul. It seems to stem from
the same tradition from which Diodorus and Plutarch also borrowed. Curtius
was a rhetorician who wrote a history of Alexander in ten books in the mid--1st
century AD for Roman readers. Based at least partly on Cleitarchus, the first two
books of the history do not survive, and sections are missing from some of the
other books. Curtius was not a critical historian, and in his desire to entertain and
focus on Alexander's personality, he elaborates, omits and dismisses chronology,
though he does not invent, except for speeches and letters inserted into the
narrative. Due to the writers' use or valuing of different sources and confusion
over certain details, the histories vary in both details and the main elements of
Alexander's life. The story, or tradition, that the writer was trying to tell or
perpetuate and the genre for which he was writing also have an effect, and all
the extant sources contain a certain amount of re--telling, if not sections of
pure fantasy.
Fascination with the person of Alexander started while he was still alive,
fanned by the myths and stories that he and his court started and encouraged -
such as his tryst with the queen of the mythical Amazons - and shows no sign

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ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT WAR

of stopping now. The exotic, colourful backdrops, the monumental battles, the
fortitude and perseverance of his men, thousands of miles from home, the court
scandals, and the uprisings and conspiracies at the end of his reign: all have
proved fertile soil for legends and myths over the centuries.
Throughout Europe, Alexander is a legendary hero, appearing in many folk
tales in Greece and elsewhere. A few centuries after his death, the Romance of
Alexander was written, or edited together from the more legendary material
about him. This text was revised and expanded throughout antiquity and the
Middle Ages. In late antiquity translations were made into Latin and Syriac.
From these, versions developed in all the major languages of Europe and the
Middle East, and it was one of the most widely read works of pre--modern times.
Just like the Achaemenid kings before him, Alexander is mentioned in the
Bible. A prophecy in Daniel refers to a king of Greece conquering the Medes
and Persians and then having his kingdom split into four. A brief resume of his
life also appears in the first Book of the Maccabees.
In much of south--west and central Asia, he is also a hero, known as Iskander
or Iskandar Zulkarnain; however, the Zoroastrians remember him as 'the
accursed Alexander', the conqueror of their empire and the destroyer of
Persepolis. The Shahnama of Firdowski, one of the oldest books written in
modern Persian, is a book of epic poetry written in about AD 1000. Alexander's
story follows a mythical history of Iran, and he is described as being the son of a
Persian king and a daughter of Philip, a Roman king. He may appear in the Koran
as 'the Two--Horned One', although this has been long debated; and the
Iskandarnama combines Persian traditions of the Macedonian king with those
from the Romance ofAlexander.
Alexander has continued to feature in culture and literature right up to the
present, inspiring works of art and sculpture down the centuries, many modern
works of fiction, music, Hollywood films, television programmes and computer
games. His ability to fascinate and perplex shows no sign of fading. The name
of Alexander the Great lives on.

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GLOSSARY
Achaemenids Ruling dynasty of the Persian Empire established by Cyrus
the Great.
Age of the The period following the death of Alexander during
Successors which his officers fought for control of the empire.
Agema a Guard comprised of hypaspists.
Akontistai Javelinmen.
Antilabe Hand-grip on the back of a shield.
Archihypaspistes Commander of the hypaspists.
Argyraspids Literally, 'silver shields', an elite force comprised of veteran
hypaspists.
Asthetairoi A sub-group of pezhetairoi; the term is subject to debate,
but could be a term for elite battalions, for battalions
recruited in Upper Macedonia, or for those who fought in a
position closest to the king. The asthetairoi may have been
better equipped or trained to fight next to the hypaspists.
Baivarabam A Persian unit of 10,000 men, equivalent to the Greek
myriad.
Baivarpatish The leader of a baivarabam.
Basilike lie Royal Squadron of the Macedonian Companion Cavalry.
Bathos 'Deep order' in Alexander's army.
Chiliarchy Four lochoi, totalling 1,024 men.
Dathaba A unit of ten men in the Persian army. Ten of these units
comprised a sataba.
Dekas Originally a file of ten men, later expanded to 16 men.
Delian League The alliance formed by Athens and other city-states in 477
to wage war on the Persians.
Diadochoi Successors of Alexander the Great.
Dory The usual hoplite spear, about 8ft in length.
Doryphoroi Literally, 'spear-bearers'. Another term that may be applied
to hypaspists when they are equipped as traditional hoplites.
Ektaktoi Supernumeraries. They did not fight in the ranks but
conveyed commands to the men in the lochoi.
In Alexander's army of the Hellespont in 334, one
ektaktoi was allowed to each dekas as an attendant in
charge of baggage.

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A.LEXANDER THE GREAT AT\VAR

Exomis Short-sleeved tunic worn by Greek and Macedonian

soldiers.
Hamippoi Infantrymen who fought on foot among the cavalry.
Hazarabam A Persian unit of 1,000, equivalent to the Greek chiliarch.
Hazarapatish The leader of a hazarabam.
Hetairoi Macedonian Companion cavalry, companions of the king.
Hipparch The leader of a hipparchy.
Hipparchy A cavalry brigade comprised of two, three or four ilai.
Hoplite Literally 'man-at-arms', the citizen soldier of the Greek city
state.
Hyparchoi Persian rulers of administrative units smaller than satrapies,
although the term may also be used interchangeably with
'satraps'.
Hypaspitai, Literally 'shield-bearers', the elite infantry guard, hand-
hypaspists picked for their strength and bravery.
Hypaspitai 'Royal hypaspists', hyspaspists of an aristocratic
basilikoi background and often former Royal Pages. If they had a
precise function in battle, it is unknown.
Hyperaspisantes Hypaspists who held up their shields to protect the king, and
probably carried somewhat larger shields than the usual pelte.
Hyperetes An aide in the Macedonian cavalry.
Ilarch (pI. ilai) A squadron commander.
lIe A cavalry squadron of 200 men in four tetrarchies, the
building block of the Macedonian cavalry force. The
basilikon ile was the Royal Squadron of the Companion
Cavalry.
Kardaka Non-Persian, non-Greek troops of the royal Persian
household, or possibly royal mercenaries.
Kausia A slouch hat.
King's Peace, The The peace imposed by the Persian king Artaxerxes II in 386.
Kopis Longer, curved sword used by cavalrymen.
League of The federation of Greek states formed by Philip II in
Corinth 338, of which he was head.
Linothorax A corselet made of layers of linen, with elongated wings.
Lochagos The commander of a lochos, later of a syntagma.
Lochos (pI. lochoi) A group of dekas organized 16 by 16, totalling

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 GLOSSARY

256 men.
Medism Sympathy with the Persians, also known as the Medes.
Melophoroi Literally (apple-bearers'. The 1,000 spearmen of the
Immortals, known as such from the golden apples that
constituted their spear-butts.
Peace of Callias The formal peace treaty negotiated between the Delian
League and Persia in 449. After this peace, Persia left
Greece alone for 30 years.
Peloponnesian The defensive alliance between Sparta and other city-states
League of the Peloponnese. The League would act if one of its
members was directly threatened.
Peltasts Lightly armed troops, usually equipped with a dagger, a
javelin, the pelte from which their designation derived, and
perhaps a sword, but with little or no armour.
Pelte A small shield with which a peltast was armed.
Pentakosiarchy Half a chiliarchy, 512 men.
Pezhetairoi Heavy infantry, armed with sarissai and perhaps a sword as
well.
Phalanx Literally (battle-formation'. Usually refers to heavy infantry
formation.
Phalangites The infantrymen who made up the phalanx.
Pilos Conical helmet.
Polis (pI. poleis) Greek city, city state, and the city's body of
citizens.
Prodromoi Literally (scouts', the term usually applied to the Thracian
cavalry squadrons of the Macedonian Army, but
occasionally to other auxiliary cavalry also. As the name
implies, their role was to scout ahead of the advancing
army.
Proskynesis The Persian custom that required individuals to approach
the throne on their knees as a mark of respect. On his
return to the west, Alexander attempted to introduce this
custom at his own court. It was decidedly unpopular.
Psiloi Light infantry.
Pteruges The (wings' of the corselet, hanging down below the waist.
Pyknos (Close order' in Alexander's army.
Sarissa (pI. sarissai) A spear between IS and 18 feet (4.5-5.5m) in

243
ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT\VAR

length.
Sarissophoroi Literally -sarissa bearers'; the term is used interchangeably
with prodromoi after Alexander's crossing of the
Hellespont, suggesting that the scouts were now armed
with a longer spear or sarissa.
Sataba In a hazarabam, in the Persian army, a unit of 100 men.
Satrapy Province of the Persian Empire, ruled by a satrap.
Sparabara In the Persian army, the shield men of the archer-pair.
Strategos -General'. The term is also used for the military governor
of a conquered region.
Synaspismose Formation with locked shields.
Syntagma The later name for a lochos.
Takabara Persian infantry armed with spear and taka shield.
Tara Individual shields carried by Persian archers for use if the
shield wall was broached.
Taxiarches Leader of the taxis; when the army was divided into
divisions, the general also acted as taxiarch.
Taxis (pI. taxeis) A unit of six lochoi, totalling 1,536 men.
Thorax A corselet.
Toxarch The leader of a company of 500 toxotai.
Toxotai Archers.
Trireme Greek galley powered by three banks of rowers.
Xyston A cavalryman's lance, made of cornel wood.

244
 BIBLIOGRAPl·IY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANCIENT SOURCES
Arrian, The Campaigns oj Alexander (trans. A. de Selincourt) (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Classics, 1971)
Curtius Rufus, Quintus, The History oj Alexander (trans. J. C. Yardley)
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984)
Diodorus Siculus, Library oj History) VIII (trans. and ed. C. Bradford Welles)
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical
Library, 1963)
Justin, Epitome oj the Philippic History oj Pompeius Trogus) Books 1 1-12: Alexander the
Great (trans. J. C. Yardley) (Oxford: Clarendon Ancient History Series
1997)
Plutarch, The Age oj Alexander (trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert) (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Classics, 1973)

MODERN WORKS
Adcock, F. E., The Greek and Macedonian Art oj War (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1957)
Boardman, J., Hammond, N., Lewis, D. and Ostwald, M. (eds.), The Cambridge
Ancient History VOl. 4: Persia) Greece and the vvestern Mediterranean c.525 to 479 Be
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
Borza, E. N., In the Shadow oj Olympus: The Emergence oj Macedon (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990)
Bosworth, A. B., Conquest and Empire: The Reign oj Alexander the Great (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988)
Bosworth, A. B., Alexander and the East: The Tragedy oj Triumph (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996)
Bosworth, A. B. and Baynham, E. J. (eds.), Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
Briant, ~, Histoire de [JEmpire Perse de Cyre d Alexandre (Paris: Fayard, 1996)
Cook, J. M., The Persian Empire (London: Dent, 1983)
Engels, D. w., Alexander the Great and the Logistics oj the Macedonian Army (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978)
Errington, R. M., A History oj Macedonia (trans. C. Errington) (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990)
Fuller, J. F. C., The Generalship oj Alexander the Great (New York: Da Capo, 2004)

245
ALEXf\NDER THE GREf\T l\T \Vl\R

Green, ~, Alexander oj Macedon J 356-323 BC: A Historical Biography (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 199 I, rev. ed.)
Hammond, N. G. L., The Genius oj Alexander the Great (London: Duckworth,
1997)
Heckel, W, The Marshals oj AlexanderJs Empire (London: Routledge, 1992)
Holt, F. L., Alexander the Great and Bactria: The Formation oj a Greek Frontier in
Central Asia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988)
Lane Fox, R., Alexander the Great (London: Penguin, 2004, rev. ed.)
Marsden, E. W, The Campaign oj Gaugamela (Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 1964)
Olmstead, A.1":, History oj the Persian Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1948)
Pearson, L., The Lost Histories oj Alexander the Great (New York: American
Philological Association, 1960)
Roisman, J. (ed.), Brilfs Companion to Alexander the Great (Leiden: Brill, 2003)
Stewart, A. F., Faces oj Power: AlexanderJs Image and Hellenistic Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993)
Wilcken, U., Alexander the Great (New York: W W Norton, 1967)
Wood, M., In the Footsteps oj Alexander the Great (London: BBC Books, 2004)

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