War and Imperial Capital Public Order, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul 1914-1918

WAR AND IMPERIAL CAPITAL:
PUBLIC ORDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISTANBUL, 1914-1918
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY
DENİZ DÖLEK SEVER
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
MARCH 2015
Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences
Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Director
I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.
Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan

Head of Department
This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut

Supervisor
Examining Committee Members
Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur (METU,HIST)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut (METU, HIST)
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Attila Aytekin (METU, ADM)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay Özel (BİLKENT, HIST)
Assist. Prof. Dr. Selçuk Dursun (METU, HIST)
I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and
presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare
that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all
material and results that are not original to this work.
Name, Last name: Deniz Dölek Sever
Signature :
iii
ABSTRACT
WAR AND IMPERIAL CAPITAL:

PUBLIC ORDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISTANBUL, 1914-1918
Dölek Sever, Deniz

Ph.D., Department of History
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut
March 2015, 373 pages
The Great War was the last and the most important part of the series of wars
that the Ottoman Empire had been involved in since 1911. This was also a total war, as
the boundary between the front and home front became almost indistinguishable.
Therefore, the Great War, which lasted four years, had a great impact on state-society
relations in all belligerent countries.
This study aims to examine state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire by
specifically addressing wartime policies related to public order, crime and punishment
implemented in Istanbul. While doing this, there will be particular focus on issues such
as the consolidation of modern state apparatus; the increasingly authoritarian rule of
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP); and the government’s capability and/or
incapability to penetrate into the society.
In order to make this analysis, the chapters of this dissertation focus on topics
as follows: the structure of police and Criminal Code; travel documents, passports and
reports of the Travel Office; policies implemented on vagrants, refugees, countrymen,
foreigners and minorities; criminal policy of the CUP government agaist theft,
profiteering and bribery; official attitude towards some crimes regarded as threat to the
iv
survival of state and continuation of the CUP government; the practice of collecting
arms; and amnesties.
Keywords: First World War, Istanbul, Public Order, Criminal Policy, Wartime State-
Society Relations.
v
ÖZ
SAVAŞ VE İMPARATORLUK BAŞKENTİ:

İSTANBUL’DA ASAYİŞ, SUÇ VE CEZA, 1914-1918
Dölek Sever, Deniz

Doktora, Tarih Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ferdan Ergut
Mart 2015, 373 sayfa
Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun, 1911 yılından itibaren

müdahil olduğu savaşlar silsilesinin sonuncusu ve en önemlisiydi. Topyekün bir savaş
olan Büyük Savaş sırasında, cephe ile cephe gerisi arasındaki sınırlar neredeyse
kaybolmuştu. Bu nedenle, dört yıl boyunca devam eden savaş, savaşa katılan tüm
ülkelerde, devlet-toplum ilişkileri üzerinde son derece büyük bir dönüştürücü etkiye
sahip oldu.
Bu çalışma, İstanbul’da savaş yıllarında uygulanan asayiş, suç ve
cezalandırmaya dair politikalar üzerine yoğunlaşarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun
devlet-toplum ilişkilerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu analiz özellikle üç
meseleye odaklanılarak yapılmıştır: modern devlet aygıtlarının konsolidasyonu;
gittikçe otoriter bir yapıya kavuşan İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC) yönetimi;
hükümetin topluma nüfuz edip edememe kapasitesi.
Bu doktora çalışmasının bölümleri şu başlıklar üzerine detaylı bir analiz
içermektedir: polisin ve ceza kanunun yapısı; seyahat varakaları, pasaportlar ve
Seyrüsefer Kalemi tarafından hazırlanan raporlar; serserilere, göçmenlere, taşralılara,
yabancılara ve azınlıklara uygulanan denetim politikaları; hırsızlık, vurgunculuk ve
rüşvet ile ilgili İTC hükümeti tarafından geliştirilen suç politikası; devletin bekasına ve
vi
hükümetin devamlılığına tehdit olarak algılanan suçlara resmi yaklaşım; silah toplama
pratiği; ve aflar.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Birinci Dünya Savaşı, İstanbul, Asayiş, Suç Politikası, Savaş
Dönemi Devlet-Toplum İlişkisi.
vii
To my parents, Duygu & Doğan Dölek
For their deep affection and belief in me throughout my life
&
To AYTEK
For every single moment we share together
viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis is not only the outcome of my personal studies that spans nearly six
years. There were also other people who supported me and contributed to this study in
different ways. First of all, I would like to express genuine appreciation to my advisor,
Ferdan Ergut, not only for his guidance and contributions to this study, but also for his
great impact on my academic life through his lectures and historical perspective. Had
his lectures on historical methodology not been the initial courses I had taken from
Department of History when I was an undergraduate student of Department of Political
Science and Public Administration, I would probably never have decided to pursue an
academic career in the field of history. Moreover, I would also like to express my
special thanks to him for accepting to become my thesis supervisor and for his
encouragement in this difficult process.
I would also like to thank the dissertation committee members, Oktay Özel,
Attila Aytekin, Recep Boztemur and Selçuk Dursun for their conscientious readings,
valuable critics and contributions, which has definitely done much to improve the
quality of this study. Selçuk Dursun was always ready to help me in reading Ottoman-
Turkish documents. Also, his guidance in writing styles and suggestions about
theoretical readings was particularly helpful in constructing the conceptual framework
of this dissertation. Oktay Özel and Attila Aytekin also provided invaluable
contribution in the development of this dissertation. They were always ready to read
initial drafts of each chapter and helped to improve the quality of the dissertation
through their constructive criticism and suggestions.
I want to express special thanks to Oktay Özel whose contribution was
certainly beyond being a committee member. Without his detailed readings of every
single part of this study and without his valuable suggestions, this thesis would not
have taken its final shape.
ix
I am also grateful to Mustafa Aksakal who kindly accepted to become my
supervisor at the Georgetown University during my study there as a visiting researcher
between September 2012 and June 2013. He was always helpful especially in the
earlier phases of this study. Without his guidance about initially focusing on archival
documents, I would probably have lost great deal of time in constructing the basis of
this dissertation.
I would like to express my gratitude to The Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey (TUBİTAK) for supporting me with an abroad
scholarship during my research at the Georgetown University, Washington DC, USA.
Faculty Development Program and State Planning Organization (ÖYP-DPT) also
funded my archival research at the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, İstanbul,
Turkey.
I am also grateful to my colleagues Eyüp Kurt and Çağdaş Sümer who shared
the same office with me during last two years. They were always understanding and
kind, providing me a peaceful and comfortable working sphere.
My friends were always around me with their love, encouragement and
patience. I am grateful to my dear friends, Alptekin Top, Ali Alptekin, Ezgi Sarıtaş,
Erinç Erdal, Zöhre Koçkan, Ayşe Karınca, Oya Gözel, Hatice Dalkır, Serdar Dalkır
and Gözde Kök. For the last two years, in order to study on this dissertation, I had to
reluctantly refuse almost every plan they did for spending time together. Therefore, I
feel obliged to thank them for their understanding and patience.
I also owe so much to my dear parents, Duygu and Doğan Dölek, and my dear
sister Devrim Dölek Çetinkaya for their limitless love, support and encouragement in
every moment of my life. Without their deep affection and trust, this dissertation
would not have been possible for me. I would like to express special thanks to my dear
mom for always being a role model for me as the strongest, smartest and kindest
woman I have ever met.
I am also grateful to my dear cats, Mercimek, Kati and Şampiyon, for their
companionship under every circumstance. I am learning so many things from them
x
every day. However, the most important thing they have taught me in this extremely
stressful period of study was to be happy, joyful and unconditionally at peace with life
despite all kinds of difficulties.
Finally, my beloved Aytek Sever deserves the greatest gratitude for his
unconditional understanding, patience and love. I am grateful to him for his
proofreading, corrections and suggestions which took hours and days. Literally, this
dissertation would have not possible without his academic support, motivating stance
and belief in me. As a ‘man of words’, his presence in my life, which has enriched me
so much in countless ways, is the greatest gift of the cosmos to me.
xi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLAGIRASIM……………………………………………………………… iii
ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………… iv
ÖZ…………………………………………………………………………... vi
DEDICATION……………………………………………………………... viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS…………………………………………………. ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………... xii
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………….. xvi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………. xvii
CHAPTER
1.INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 1
2.ISTANBUL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY………................................................................................. 39
2.1 Demography.........................…………………………………. 39
2.1.1 Nineteenth Century……….................................... 40
2.1.2 The Balkan Wars & The Great War …………..... 41
2.2 Economic Life........................................................................... 46
2.2.1 Provisioning……………………………………... 48
2.2.2 Inflation, Black-Market and Speculation ……….. 55
2.3 Social Life ………….………………………………………… 60
2.3.1 Nineteenth Century……………………………… 60
2.3.2 The Great War………………………………....... 64
3. STRUCTURES: POLICE & CRIMINAL LAW………................... 77
3.1 Policing in Istanbul: An Institutional Transformation as a Part
of Ottoman Modernization and Centralization………….………. 78
xii
3.1.1 A Brief Historical Background: From Jannisaries
to Zaptiye Nezareti (Ministry of Police)……………… 78
3.1.2 Security Forces of the Constitutional Regime….. 86
3.1.3 Security Forces during the Great War………….. 90
3.2 Legal Structure of Crime and Punishment: An Overview of
Penal Code as a Tool of Administrative Authority ……..……….. 96
3.2.1 Legal Regulations on Crimes: Transition from
Islamic Law to a Modern Penal Code………………… 97
3.2.2 The Penal Code of 1858………………………… 102
3.2.3 The Constitutional Regime and the Penal Code
of 1858: Amendments ………………………………... 111
4. INSTRUMENTS OF SURVEILLANCE & CONTROL: TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, PASSPORTS AND REGISTERS OF THE TRAVEL
OFFICE………………………………………………………………... 120
4.1 The Revival of Travel Permits: Seyahat Varakası (Travel
Document…………………………………………………………. 130
4.2 Legal Regulations about the Passport….……………………... 134
4.3 Reports of Travel Office and General Measures for
Controlling Travel………………………………………………... 141
4.4 Practice of the Policies related to Surveillance and Control … 144
5. POLICING THE POPULATION: “SUSPECTS” AS 91
“DANGEROUS CLASSES” …………………………………………. 152
5.1 Refugees, Countrymen and Vagrants: “Probable Criminals”
and “Usual Suspects”……………………………………………... 154
5.2 Foreigners…………………………………………………….. 166
5.3 Non-Muslims…………………………………………............. 174
5.3.1 Greeks………………………………................. 177
5.3.2 Armenians……………………………............... 187
6. CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALITY AND DELINQUENCY:
xiii
THEFT VERSUS PROFITEERING AND BRIBERY…………...…. 207
6.1 Petty Theft (Adi Sirkat) and Violent Theft (Cinayet Nevinden
Sirkat)……………………………………………..…………........ 212
6.2 Profiteering (İhtikar)…………………………………………. 234
6.3 Bribery (Rüşvet)………………...……………………………. 249
7. SURVIVAL OF THE STATE, AMNESTIES AND A VICIOUS
CIRCLE OF CRIMINALITY………………………………………… 260
7.1 Battery and Insult on Duty (Esna-yı Vazifede Hakaret ve
Darb)……………………………………………………………... 262
7.2 Opposition to Decisions and Regulations (Mukarrerat ve
Nizamata Muhalefet)……………………………………………... 268
7.3 Other Crimes and Punishments: “Invisible” in Crime Tables
but ‘Visible’ in Criminal Policy…………………………………. 271
7.4 Amnesties Declared during the Great War…………………... 279
8. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………….. 293 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………... 310
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Wartime Istanbul: A Brief Chronology …………….. 334
APPENDIX B: Photos and Personal Informations of Persons
Expelled from Istanbul for Their Connection with
White Slave Trafficking…………………………....... 338
APPENDIX C: Crime Table Indicating the Comparison between the
Crime Raters in February 1914 and 1915 …………... 340
APPENDIX D: Crime Table Indicating the Comparison between the
Crime Raters in June and July 1917 ………………... 342
APPENDIX E: Crime Statistics of Istanbul in January 1917 ………... 344
APPENDIX F: Photos of Repetitive Criminals in Istanbul, November
1916 ………………………………………………… 345
xiv
APPENDIX G: Rates for Pick-pocketing, Fraud, Robbery and
Seizure in Istanbul during the Great War …………... 346
APPENDIX H: Rates for Abuse of Confidence in Istanbul during the

Great War …………………………………………… 347
APPENDIX I: Rates for Homicide & Battery and Wounding in
Istanbul during the Great War ……………………… 348
APPENDIX J: Rates for Indecent Sexual Behavior, Adultery,
Sodomy and Seducing a Virgin in Istanbul during the
Great War …………………………………………….. 349
APPENDIX K: Curriculum Vitae ……………………………………. 350
APPENDIX L: Turkish Summary …………………………………… 353
APPENDIX M: Tez Fotokopisi İzin Formu …………………………. 373
xv
LIST OF TABLES
TABLES
Table 1 Population of Istanbul in 1914 ............................................................... 43
Table 2 Population of Istanbul in 1885: Natives and New Comers .................... 46
Table 3 Cost of Living Index in the Ottoman Empire During the Great War ..... 56
Table 4 Increase of Retail Prices in Istanbul during the War years .................... 58
Table 5 The Changes in the Penal Code of 1858 on June 4, 1911 .................... 111
Table 6 The Greeks that were deported from Yeniköy, Şile ............................. 181
Table 7 Rate of Petty Theft in Istanbul during the Great War .......................... 216
Table 8 Rates for Violent Theft during the Great War...................................... 224
Table 9 Rates of Bribery in Istanbul during the Great War .............................. 251
Table 10 Rates of Battery and Insult When on Duty in Istanbul during the Great3
War ....................................................................................................... 266
Table 11 Rates of Opposition to Decisions and Regulations in Istanbul during the
Great War…………………………………………………………......269
Table 12 Total Crime Rates in Istanbul during the Great War .......................... 292
xvi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BOA Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

CUP Committee of Union and Progress
DH.EUM Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeri
DH.EUM.1.Şb Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Birinci
Şube
DH.EUM.2.Şb Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, İkinci Şube
DH.EUM.3.Şb Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Üçüncü
Şube
DH.EUM.6.Şb Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Altıncı
Şube
DH.EUM.ADL Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Takibat-ı
Adliye Kalemi
DH.EUM.AYS Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Asayiş
Kalemi
DH.EUM.ECB Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Ecanib
Kalemi
DH.EUM.EMN Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Emniyet
Kalemi
DH.EUM.KLU Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Kalem-i
Umumiye Müdüriyeti
DH.EUM.MEM Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Memurin
Kalemi
DH.EUM.MTK Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Muhaberat
ve Tenkisat Müdüriyeti
DH.EUM.MH Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Muhasebe
Kalemi
xvii
DH.EUM.SSM Dahiliye Nezareti, Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, Seyrüsefer
Kalemi
DH.MB..HPS Dahiliye Nezareti, Mebani-i Emiriye Hapishaneler Müdüriyeti
DH.MB..HPS.M… Dahiliye Nezareti, Mebani-i Emiriye Hapishaneler Müdüriyeti
Müteferrik Evrakı
DH.ŞFR Dahiliye Nezareti, Şifre Kalemi
MAZC Meclis-iAyan Zabıt Ceridesi
MMZC Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi
NARA The US National Archives and Records Administration
xviii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Great War had a considerable impact on state-society relations in all

belligerent countries. States had to extend their role into the lives of individuals in
order to maintain mass mobilization at the homefront as well as being effective on the
battlefronts. In that respect, policies on internal order and security became instruments
for belligerent states to restructure the society in accordance with their wartime
political and socio-economic priorities. This study aims to analyze state-society
relations in the Ottoman Empire by particularly focusing on wartime policies regarding
public order, crime and punishment implemented in Istanbul.1 While doing this, there
will be specific focus on issues such as the consolidation of modern state apparatus;
the increasingly authoritarian rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP); and
the government’s capability and/or incapability to penetrate into the society.
When the Great War began, many people being not only ordinary people but
also statesmen had certain predictions about it which were later to be proven wrong as
the war proceeded. The war started with the declaration of war by Austria-Hungry to
Serbia on July 28, 1914. First of all, it was thought that this was a local war that would
be a Balkan issue.2 Nevertheless, the political polarization in Europe had reached its
peak in the early twentieth century. The Treaty of Triple Alliance was signed between
Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy in 1882. In fact, Italy would change her side in
the following years of the war, but the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany
1
Istanbul as the imperial capital is chosen as the object of this analysis. Therefore, this thesis does not
make an overall evaluation of the policies related to public order, crime and punishment implemented in
different regions of the Empire. It is clear that the implementation of such policies had radical
differences in Anatolian provinces and Arab lands.
2
Marc Ferro, The Great War, 1914-1918, (Boston, London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1973), p. 25, 40.
1
was one of the most long-lasting diplomatic relations in the late nineteenth century.3
On the other side, there was the Triple Entente, which was composed of France, Russia
and Britain.4 Hobsbawm argues that international competition, imperialist expansion,
conflicts and war became inevitable in the early twentieth century as a consequence of
the rise of capitalism.5 To sum up, contrary to the initial predictions of a local
European conflict, this war became a World War soon at the end of 1914, and its scope
became greater after 1917 with the entrance of USA and China to the war.
At the initial phases of the war, all the states and their citizens believed in their
own final victory. But as the war continued for four years, all the sources of the
belligerents were exhausted. In other words, whether victorious or defeated, all the
countries had lost a substantial part of their power and material means by the end of
the war.6 One other inaccurate estimate was about the possible duration of the war.
Since it was a modern war, according to many it would not last long. People were
mobilized easily and, in general, voluntarily with regard to this estimation.7 However,
in fact, the war lasted four years with all its “modern” destructive dimensions.
3
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914, (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), pp. 312-313.
4
The relationship among the Triple Entente was much more complex than the relationship of the Allied
Powers. France and Britain were historical rivals, and they were antagonists in European wars during
the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century. However, the situation changed as a result of
the rise of Germany as a rival force against Britain. Furthermore, France lost its economic power during
the nineteenth century. Britain, therefore, began to evaluate Germany as her biggest rival in Europe.
According to Hobsbawm, the roots of the World War can merely be understood through a correct
comprehension of British-German antagonism. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, pp. 314-315. For
detailed information about this issue, also see, Ferro, The Great War, pp. 18-21. James Joll, The Origins
of the First World War, (London and New York: Longman, 1985), pp. 123-145.
5
Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p. 316.
6
Ferro, The Great War, pp. 127-128. European states and the Ottoman Empire had become worn out at
the end of the war. The only exception which was not terribly affected from the war was the US. On the
contrary, she became more powerful after the war and she consolidated her hegemony in the post-war
era. Following the First World War, Britain lost her primary position in the world politics. Moreover,
the golden years of Europe came to an end since the world politics and economy began to be dominated
by the USA. For detailed information, see, Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth
Century, (London: Abacus, 1995), pp. 28-29, 52.
7
Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, p. 326, Ferro, The Great War, p. 27.
2
Certainly, the Great War of 1914-1918 was different from the wars of the
previous eras. As a result of technological developments, especially improvements in
communication and transportation, distances had become shorter. People from
different regions of the world, could at that time easily be transferred to fight on the
fronts which were quite distant from their homelands.8 Furthermore, it was the first
total war in the history of the world. The number of states that were engaged in that
conflict increased rapidly during its first year. Moreover, it was a total war for each
belligerent state in the sense that they attempted to commit all their sources for such a
long-lasting conflict.9 The wars of previous eras had been limited to frontlines where
armed confrontation took place. Nevertheless, since the Great War’s effects were not
anymore limited to the armies and the fronts, a new terminology had to be produced.
For instance ‘home front’, which meant the territory populated by the citizens of the
belligerent state, became as important as the front lines.10 In other words, for the first
time a war was so influential on the society in the ‘home front’ due to several reasons:
development of modern and effective weapons; conscription of a large number of
males as part of mandatory military service (an important element of modern state), an
increasing relationship between the front and its hinterland; and mobilization of
masses through nationalist discourse.11
Moreover, the Great War was also an ‘indirect war’ unlike the previous ‘direct
wars’. Direct war means the destruction of enemy forces in a battle, whereas indirect
8
Canadians fighted for France; units from Australia and New Zealand combatted on behalf of Britain in
Turkey; a Chinese unit came to Europe, and Africans struggled on the French side. Hobsbawm, Ages of
Extremes, p. 23.
9
Hobsbawm argues that the Great War was the first and the last total war in the history of the world
which was based on consent during the world history. European armies were mobilized easily since
most of the soldiers were volunteers, Age of Empires, p. 326. At the end of the war, however, most of
the soldiers who returned their home were anti-militarists and they formed up a new class: the class of
victims. Ferro, The Great War, p. 145. For mobilization experience of the Ottoman army, see Mehmet
Başikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and
Resistance, (Leiden: Brill, 2012).
10
Murat Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam, (Istanbul: Homer
Kitabevi, 2007), p. 16.
11
Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye, p. 16.
3
war indicates the struggle to gain advantage by disrupting enemy’s morale and
material resources.12 In the latter, the civilians of the home front become direct targets
for the enemy.13 In brief, the Great War, as a total and indirect war, which lasted four
years and affected the entire world, promoted the importance of society and social life
for historical studies.
Actually, as mentioned before, the Great War inevitably brought about
profound changes in state-society relations for all belligerent countries. Since ‘the
survival of the state’ became a major concern for states, policies implemented on the
society were primarily shaped by this concern. Each state began to spend extra effort
to maintain internal order and status quo.14 In fact, since the level of threat from
“enemy within” and “enemy without” reached a peak, the support for increasing
central control raised everywhere.15 Nevertheless, under the war conditions, the
maintenance of internal order was not an easy task for governments. On the one hand,
in every belligerent country, a large number of police and gendarme officers were
enrolled in the army, thereby causing an overall institutional deterioration in security
forces in terms of personnel. On the other hand, the war created its own context within
which different dynamics of disorder and conflict came into play.
As a matter of fact, governments’ success or failure in provisioning policies
became a foremost issue with regard to “internal order” during the Great War.
Especially, the feeding of capital cities became critical. Capital cities, with their big
populations, demanded massive scales of food. In fact, the feeding sources of capital
12
Ferro, The Great War, p. 98.
13
For instance, the Entente Powers tried to mobilize Arabs and Armenians against the Ottoman State
through propaganda, whereas Germans used the same method in order to raise Russian minorities
against the Tsarist state. Economic dimensions of indirect were also remarkable. The Entente Powers
tried to dry up the Allied Powers’ sources of supply in order to galvanize an economic crisis. For
instance, Germany used submarines with the same intention, undermining the transportation of
necessities. Ferro, The Great War, pp. 105-108.
14
Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, “Introduction”, Policing Western Europe: Politics,
Professionalism and Public Order, 1850-1940, Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (eds.), (New
York, Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. ix.
15
Emsley and Weinberger, “Introduction”, p. xi.
4
cities had been different from each other before the Great War. For instance, while
London had been largely dependent on international food-supply network, the feeding
of Paris had been based on internal market. The situation of Berlin had been
somewhere between the British case of dependency on overseas supply and the French
self-sufficiency.16 Similar to London, Istanbul had been dependent on abroad in terms
of agricultural products.17
When the war began, all countries encountered several problems of
provisioning. First of all, the connections between exporting and importing countries
were disrupted. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Britain experienced
scarcity of food. Moreover, there were a number of problems even in the countries
having self-sufficient agricultural production. Since, the majority of male population
was conscripted to armies, the efficiency of agricultural production diminished to a
great extent. Furthermore, the feeding of armies became the primary aim of all states
for better warmaking. In fact, civilians did not initially oppose the fact that armies
automatically became qualified for the biggest portion of available food. 18 Yet, as war
extended over time and governments began having troubles in the distribution of food,
discontent began among civilians.
To sum up, there was a considerable degree of shortage alongside price
increases for certain basic goods in all capital cities. Governments had to intervene in
the market in order to provide better distribution of vital goods. Although market
forces were controlled to an extent, in the end, they could not be totally eliminated.19
The crisis situation was more successfully handled in some cases, such as Britain and
France, than it was in the cases of Germany and the Ottoman Empire. A direct
consequence of rising prices and shortages was the development of ‘black markets’ in
16
Thierry Bonzon and Belinda Davis, “Feeding the Cities”, Capital Cities at War: Paris, London,
Berlin 1914-1919, Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (eds.), (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), p. 309.
17
Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in the World War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), p. 270.
18
Bonzon and Davis, “Feeding the Cities”, p. 312.
19
5
capital cities. Whereas there was black market in Paris and London, “it did not usually
impinge directly on the daily struggle for survival.”20 The majority of traders in
London and Paris tried to comply with laws and regulations, and the reason for this
was the success of state intervention in terms of proper price controls and efficient
wartime emergency legislations.21 On the contrary, in Berlin, especially after 1916,
most traders tended to circumvent the laws in order to make huge amounts of profits
by supplying the basic necessities for the harried population.22 “The great complexity
of regulations, and above all a lack of vertical integration between authorities at
different levels led confusion’ and provided a broad field to profiteers for their illegal
acts.”23 As will be discussed in the second and sixth chapters, the case in Istanbul was
similar to the case in Berlin. The existence of black market and inequalities in the
distribution of food and other basic items resulted in discontent in the societies of all
combatant countries.
As a matter of fact, the government of Britain was much more successful than
the Central European states in alleviating the popular discontent. This ran parallel to
the fact that there was relatively lower level of price increases and scarcity owing to
the existence of better organized provisioning strategies in Britain.24 On the contrary,
in Germany, official authorities were far from managing provisioning needs which in
turn led to a continuous social tension. Civilians inevitably blamed political authorities
for their failure “whether through lack of leadership, lack of sufficiently focused
attention or collision with profiteers.”25 In Berlin corruption reached a peak as the war
20
Jon Lawrence, “Material Pressures on the Middle Classes”, Capital Cities at War: Paris, London,
Berlin 1914-1919, Jay Winter and Jean-Louis Robert (eds.), (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
21
Lawrence, “Material Pressures”, p. 246.
22
Lawrence, “Material Pressures”, p. 246.
23
24
25
6
continued. It became a part of the chain of unequal distribution of food and access to
the black market. All these resulted in riots and street protests. The first serious food
protests in Berlin took place in October 1915 in the districts mostly populated by the
working class.26 Similar to Germany, there were several food riots in Austria-
Hungary. Hüseyin Cahit, a prominent journalist and member of the Committee of
Union and Progress (hereafter CUP), witnessed one of these protests during his visit to
Pilsen (Plzen).27 A crowd mostly composed of workers and people from lower classes
stoned the windows of the hotel Hüseyin Cahit was staying and pillaged a number of
bakeries. According to his memoirs, the attitude of the police and soldiers was almost
friendly to the protestors. Rather than harsh attacks on the protestors, police maneuvers
resembled “a scene of opera”.28 Probably, the government and security forces tried to
avoid provoking the protestors further through violent attacks.
In London, different from other European capitals, almost no food protests took
place despite the fact that there was a degree of food shortage. 29 The situation in Paris
was a little bit different. Although there were no serious food protests in Paris,
workers, particularly women, voiced out their anger through mass riots concerning the
official abolishing of price controls and allowing prices to fluctuate in the spring of
1917.30 Actually, whether it turned to mass protests and riots or not, problems in
provisioning, emergence of black market and unequal opportunities of access to basic
food resulted in rising social tension all over Europe.
The same was the case in Istanbul. Although according to memoirs and
archival documents there was not any recorded mass protest or riot in the city during
26
27
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000), p. 325.
28
Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar, p. 325.
29
30
The protests in Paris had a great impact on the government’s policy change. In March, first, sugar was
rationed and it was followed by rationing of bread and coal. These policies lowered tension over vital
supplies and reinforced the feeling of greater social justice. Bonzon and Davis, “Feeding the Cities”, p.
334.
7
the Great War, there was an unquestionable rising discontent among people as they
found it even impossible to access the supply of basic food items such as bread.
Charles Vinicombe, a British national living in Istanbul at that time, described the
situation as follows: “[in August 1915] Bread awfully scarce, fights around the
bakeries being of daily occurrence, we got a Police permit to purchase two loaves per
day, but it was awful stuff, black with straw in it and God knows what else, sometimes
it stank abominably and uneatable, as it produced stomach trouble and many people
died.”31 As will be examined in the second chapter, after 1916, the CUP government
felt the necessity of taking measures against rising food prices and unequal access to
basic necessities. The rising tension in society probably had a certain impact on these
policies. From time to time the CUP government, similar to the governments of other
belligerent states, attempted to find remedies for the increasing social tension in order
to prevent riots and mass protests.
Actually, worsening living conditions, rising inflation and impoverishment
resulted in concerns about increasing crime. In fact, in majority of belligerent
countries, the Great War initially caused a decline in crime and then promoted new
waves of criminality.32 In England, the reason of decline in crime rates during the first
years of the war was attributed to ‘first, the keeping of better hours, after the darkening
of the streets and the early closing of public houses; second, the new consciousness of
national duty and the impulse of patriotism; and third, the greatly increased prosperity
31
Charles Vinicombe was a British national who had been in the Ottoman service for forty-five years
before the Great War. Although there is no information about his exact duty in the Ottoman Empire, it is
clear that he had an important position because the Ottoman government did not let him leave the city
when the Ottoman Empire entered the War. According to him, the main cause of the government’s
decision for keeping him in Istanbul was that he had too much confidential information. His letter dated
October 25, 1920 to a friend includes many details about wartime Istanbul. Vinicombe, Charles of
Istanbul, Letters Describing Wartime Life in Istanbul, 99/9/1, (Located in Imperial War Museums,
London, United Kingdom). Mrs. Marie Lyster, another British national living in wartime Istanbul,
described in her diaries disputes taking place in front of bakeries as a result of scarcity of bread. Ian
Lyster (ed.), Among the Ottomans: Diaries from Turkey in World War I, (London, New York: I.B.
Tauris, 2011), p. 2.
32
Clive Emsley, Crime, Police and Penal Policy: European Experiences, 1750-1940, (Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 232.
8
of many of the poorer classes and the absence of unemployment.’ 33 In France, the
decline in crime rates was short-lived and also variational from offence to offence. In
Russia, mobilization, alongside with prohibition of production, sale and consumption
of alcoholic drinks, were argued as the main reasons of decline in offences.
Nevertheless, as the war extended over time, crime rates increased in all belligerent
countries.34
In fact, there has been a considerable academic lacuna on the social dimensions
of the Great War in Turkish historiography. There are several books and scholarly
studies on the military and diplomatic dimensions of the war; however, social life
during the war, despite its importance, was not sufficiently investigated.35 For instance,
a rare academic work concerning the social life in the Ottoman State during the war
years is Ahmed Emin’s book entitled Turkey in the World War.36 It was published in
the US in 1930 and has not been translated into Turkish up to now. This situation is
also an indicator of the academic lacuna on this issue. In fact, Zafer Toprak contributed
to the socio-economic literature on the Ottoman Empire with his prominent books
33
Emsley, Crime, Police and Penal Policy, p. 232.
34
35
There are several studies about the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the Great War. One
such study was written by Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. See, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi, Vol. III: 1914-1918 Genel
Savaşı, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991). There are also recent studies that aim at placing
the Ottoman Empire in the Great War within a broader international context. Mustafa Aksakal provides
an original perspective about the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the Great War in terms of international
and internal political dynamics of the time. See Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire
and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Michael A. Reynolds argues
that in order to understand the collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, one should focus on
geopolitical competition and the emergence of a new global international order. See Shattering Empires:
The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011). The economic dimensions of the Great War was also studied by several
historians. Vedat Eldem’s work on wartime economics provides a large body of valuable descriptive
information though with only limited social analysis. Vedat Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomisi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994). Gündüz
Ökçün’s book about Ottoman Industry between 1913-1915 includes useful information about the
industrial developments in the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. This book is mainly based on
statistical data as well and contains little theoretical analysis. Gündüz Ökçün, Osmanlı Sanayi: 1913-
1915 Yılları Sanayi İstatistiki, (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1984).
36
Ahmed Emin Yalman, Turkey in the World War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).
9
Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, Milli Burjuvazi and İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi.37 These
books provide detailed information about wartime economic policies, development of
a Muslim-Turkish bourgeois class, provisioning and economic problems of the
Ottoman Empire during the Great War.
Concerning social aspects of the Great War in the Ottoman Empire, important
studies have been made and published especially in the last ten years,. For example,
Yiğit Akın’s PhD Dissertation entitled The Ottoman Home Front during World War I:
Everyday Politics, Society and Culture is one of these.38 He focuses on several topics
having far-reaching repercussions on the Ottoman society such as conscription, state-
controlled economy, provisioning, forced deportations and voluntary displacements.
According to him, the extraordinary expansion of the state during the war years
resulted in new sites of interaction between the Ottoman State and society. Mehmet
Beşikçi is another historian evaluating state-society relations during the Great War in
terms of the mobilization process.39 His study contributes to the Ottoman
historiography on the Great War a detailed analysis about different aspects of the
mobilization process, particularly focusing on Muslim male population in Anatolia.
Erol Köroğlu provides us another aspect of the Great War. In his analysis about
Turkish literature at that time, Köroğlu argues that the Ottoman State and intellectuals
lacked necessary infrastructural instruments to influence the Ottoman society in depth
through propaganda; but, despite that fact, the masterpieces of Turkish literature from
that era served for the construction of national identity.40
37
Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat Milli Burjuvazi, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1996). Zafer
Toprak İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2003)
38
Yiğit Akın, The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society and Culture,
(unpublished PhD Dissertation), (Ohio: The Ohio State University, 2011).
39
Mehmet Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between
Voluntarism and Resistance, (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Mehmet Beşikçi, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı
Seferberliği, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015).
40
Erol Köroğlu, Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 1914-1918: Propagandadan Milli Kimlik
İnşasına, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).
10
Although these studies provide plentiful information and new perspectives
about different socio-economic and socio-political aspects of the war, internal security
and criminality in that period has so far not been studied in detail. Actually, public
order, crime and punishment in the late Ottoman Empire are topics that have recently
started receiving scholarly attention. There are a number of valuable studies on these
topics. Ferdan Ergut’s PhD dissertaion entitled State and Social Control: The Police in
the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican Turkey, 1839-1939 and his book
named as Modern Devlet ve Polis, Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin
Diyalektiği could be evaluated as a pioneer in that respect. These scholarly works
provide detailed study of the rise and transformation of the police organization in the
Ottoman State and afterwards. He analyzes the institutional evolution of the police
force, its separation from military and the rise of public order policing, all being
crucial elements of the modernization and centralization of the Ottoman Empire after
1839. In addition, he makes a thorough analysis of changes and continuities in the
police organization during the Republican period up to 1939.41
Furthermore, the edited book entitled Osmanlı’da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza includes
a number of recent studies about the historiography on public order, crime, punishment
and prisons.42 Polis ve Jandarma: Fransız ve Osmanlı Tarihçiliğine Çapraz Bakışlar,
being another edited book, provides readers a general and comparative view about the
institutional structure of police and gendarme in the Ottoman Empire and France.43
İlkay Yılmaz’s recent study is a detailed analysis on policing strategies during the
reign of Abdülhamid II as part of modernization process.44 She focuses on a number of
41
Ferdan Ergut, State and Social Control: The Police in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early
Republican Turkey, 1839-1939, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), (New York: New School for Social
Research, 1999) and Ferdan Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal
Denetimin Diyalektiği, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004). Also see, Ferdan Ergut, “Policing the Poor in the Late
Ottoman Empire”, Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No.2, (2002), pp. 149-164.
42
Noémi Lévy and Alexandre Toumarkine (eds), Osmanlı'da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza, 18.-20. Yüzyıllar,
(İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2007).
43
Noémi Lévy, Nadir Özbek and Alexandre Toumarkine (eds), Jandarma ve Polis: Fransız ve Osmanlı
Tarihçiliğine Çapraz Bakışlar, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009).
11
security policies implemented on seasonal and foreign workers, vagrants, and
anarchists. According to the author, state elites’ new perception of “internal threat”
played a major role in shaping such policies, whereby geographical mobilization also
became influential. Therefore, she made her analysis through focusing on the practices
of passport and internal travel permits as well as hotel regulations.
Kent Schull’s dissertation entitled Penal Institutions, Nation State
Construction and Modernity in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1919 and his book
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity examines prisons
during the second constitutional period with specific regard to prison statistics. He
argues that prisons of the late Ottoman Empire should be evaluated as part of an
institutional modernization.45 Gültekin Yıldız also studies Ottoman Prisons. In his
book named Mapushane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni, 1839-1908, he
argues that “modern” prisons began to be established in the Ottoman Empire as a part
of bureaucratization and modernization process, whereas the standardization of
punishments and penalty institutions resulted in many unforeseen problems.46
Despite the valuable contribution of these studies to the late Ottoman
historiography on public order and criminality, none of them actually covers in detail
the Great War Years. This dissertation intends to contribute to the existing literature by
focusing on ‘public order’, ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ in Istanbul at that time. Being
aware of the limited number of scholarly works on wartime Istanbul,47 as opposed to
44
İlkay Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Güvenlik Politikaları
Ekseninde Mürur Tezkereleri, Pasaportlar ve Otel Kayıtları, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,
2014).
45
Kent Schull, Penal Institutions, Nation State Construction and Modernity in the Late Ottoman
Empire, 1908-1919, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), (Los Angeles: University of California, 2007);
Kent Schull, Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire: Microcosms of Modernity, (Edinburgh University
Press, 2014).
46
Gültekin Yıldız, Mapushane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni, 1839-1908, (İstanbul:
Kitabevi Yayınları, 2012).
47
The present literature consists mostly of articles. The edited book named Istanbul, 1914-1923 includes
a number of articles about wartime Istanbul. Stefanos Yerasimos (ed.), Istanbul, 1914-1923, (Istanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 1997). Lokman Erdemir in his article entitled “I. Dünya Harbi’nin İstanbul’da Sosyal
12
the broad wartime literature on European capital cities, this thesis aims to add material
to the groundwork for more comprehensive and/or comparative studies regarding the
social life in the Ottoman capital city to follow in the future.
Before presenting a summary on the content of the chapters, the conceptual
framework and the problematic of this study will be propounded.
Conceptual Framework and Problematic
The Great War being in a comprehensive sense the first destructive war of the
twentieth century involved modern states. Despite their differences and original
characteristics, there were features common to all these states. In order to understand
what we mean by ‘public order’, ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ as the basic concepts of this
research, first of all we need to have a useful conceptualization of modern state. Weber
describes the modern state and its basic characteristics as follows:
The primary formal characteristics of the modem state are as follows: It

possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to
which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also
controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of order claims binding
authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom
have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all
action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory
organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is
regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or
prescribed by it…48
Hayata Etkisi” studies the wartime Istanbul by focusing on provisioning, social relief and health services
as well as education. Lokman Erdemir, “I. Dünya Harbi’nin İstanbul’da Sosyal Hayata Etkisi”, Birinci
Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Devleti, Ali Arslan and Mustafa Selçuk (eds.), (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2015),
pp. 305-327. Apart from these, Yalman’s book titled Turkey in the World War provides information
about Istanbul although its primary focus is not the imperial capital.
48
Max Weber, Economy and Society, An Outline of Interpretitive Sosiology, Guenter Roth and Claus
Wittich (eds.), (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1978), p. 56.
13
The modern state description of Weber, which influenced a great number of social and
political scientists, is very useful in understanding the main features of the modern
state. According to Weber, there were four main characteristics of the modern state:
administrative and legal order; administrative staff (bureaucracy); territorial basis; and
legitimate use of force. Similar to Weber, Tilly describes modern nation states as
“relatively centralized differentiated organizations the officials of which more or less
successfully claim control over the chief concentrated means of violence within a
population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory.”49 In this sense, centralized
structure was another distinctive feature of the modern state. In fact, during the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, wars between the European states necessitated
centralization. As populations increased, the existing lands of states began to be
insufficient. In consequence, wars became inevitable, and in order to manage wars
more centralized political structures were needed.50 Centralization did not only relate
to institutional structure. Monopoly on physical force as one of the most distinctive
features of the modern state was also an essential component.
In order to monopolize legitimate use of force, the governments in modern
states used the discourse of ‘protecting’ their citizens against enemies. At this point,
Tilly makes an analogy between governments and racketeers. According to Tilly,
governments, just as racketeers, stimulated or even constructed threats of external war,
and monopolized violence in the name of protecting citizens. Therefore, although
governments, with their repressive activities, often constituted an actual violent threat
to the persons, they sought to legitimize their actions with the claim to provide
49
Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”, Bringing the State Back In, Peter
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 170.
50
Özkan Agtaş, Ceza ve Adalet, (İstanbul: Metis, 2013), p. 171. Also see, Norbert Elias, The Civilizing
Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, Vol. 2, Translated by Edward Jephott,
(Oxford, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers: 2000), pp. 268-277. According to Elias, central authority
on financial resources and military force are inseperable from one another as important elements of
modern state.
14
protection. What makes legitimate use of force by state more credible and more
difficult to resist was that claim of protection.51
According to Weber, the monopolization of legitimate use of force by the
modern state was related to domination. He claims that “modern state is a compulsory
association which organizes domination... It [modern state] monopolizes the legitimate
use of physical force as means of domination.”52 Domination, in general terms, refers
to “modes of control, whereby some agents seek to achieve and maintain compliance
of others.” 53 Therefore, domination is directly related with the power of the state.
Mann’s conceptualization of state power as ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ is
useful for analyzing the control and domination mechanisms of the state. Despotic
power is the empowerment of the state elites to use their authority without any routine
and institutionalized negotiation with the society.54 In other words, the state, which has
despotic power, can act arbitrarily in all spheres of political life without the consent of
citizens. Using arbitrary coercion is also a characteristic of this power. In majority of
traditional states, rulers possessed this kind of power. Subjects have been presumed to
‘obey’ all commands as a result of coercion. Nevertheless, the capacity of these rulers
for penetration to the society had been extremely low because the rulers having
despotic power lacked the necessary instruments and mechanisms for influencing the
daily lives of their subjects.55 ‘Fear’, rather than ‘consent’, was actually the main
motive behind obedience.
Unlike traditional states, modern states generally have infrastructural power
referring to “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to
51
Tilly, “War Making and State Making”, pp. 171-172.
52
Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation”, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1978), pp. 82-83.
53
Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, Vol. Two A Contemporary Critique of Historical
Materialism, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), p. 9.
54
Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism, (Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), p. 5.
55
Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, p. 10.
15
implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”56 The modern state
with greater infrastructural power possessed the following features: regular taxation;
monopoly over military mobilization; permanent bureaucratic administration; and a
monopoly of lawmaking and enforcement.57 When these features are evaluated one by
one, it is clear that modern state have a capability to regulate virtually every sphere of
life. Above all, through regular tax collection, the state apparatus could manipulate
economic life. Similarly, monopoly over military mobilization provides use of
manpower. Furthermore, permanent bureaucratic administration allows for a great
capacity to regulate socio-political life. Finally, the monopoly of lawmaking and
enforcement, through which state virtually attempts to determine boundaries for all
acts, certainly has special importance. In fact, ‘legality’ and functional ‘competence’
based on rationally created rules constitute the basis of justification for modern state
dominance.58 All these indicate that infrastructural power provides states a capability
for penetration into the everyday life of the society more than did any historical state.59
The modern state has its own means to achieve such in-depth penetration into daily
life.
56
Micheal Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”,
Eupopean Journal of Sociology, Vol. 25, No. 2, (November, 1984), p. 189.
57
Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State”, p. 209. As a matter of fact, modern sates having
infrastructural power did not necessarily possess all these features equally. It means that while some
states could have greater capacity in collecting taxes, some others could have a better bureaucratic
administrative system. Policies of a modern state through which it penetrated into society directly
related to the features it possessed. At this point, Skocpol’s conceptualization of unevenness of state
across policy areas can be helpful. According to her, different institutional patterns of states useful in
explaining why different countries have different policy instruments for dealing with particular
problems. She gives the following example: ‘...the Japanese and the French, which apply policies at
particular instruments that enable them to apply policies at at the level of particular industrial sectors,
and other states, such as the British and U.S., which must rely on aggregate macroeconomic
manipulations of fiscal and monetary parameters.’ Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In:
Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, Diethrich
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocbol (eds.), (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
pp. 17-18.
58
Weber, “Politics as Vocation”, p. 79.
59
Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State”, p. 189.
16
First of all, different from pre-modern states, the modern state has a great
ability to collect information about the society.60 The most important and helpful
means of collecting information is statistics. Foucault claims that statistics “is the
science of the state.”61 Censuses and several records such as crime statistics,
commercial statistics, prison statistics, et cetera. provide plentiful information related
to different aspects of the population. Second, ‘surveillance’ is used as an effective
means of penetration into the daily life of the society. Surveillance means control of
information, and superintendence of the activities of some groups by others.62 In this
sense, surveillance has two dimensions. On the one hand, governments store
information and develop their policies in accordance with the knowledge (savoir)
derived from statistics. Through these policies, that state has the ability to manipulate
and also control society. This can be argued as an ‘indirect’ way of surveillance.
Nevertheless, modern state has also the capability of direct supervision of the activities
of persons pertaining to institutions such as schools, prisons and hospitals.63 Therefore,
through direct and indirect surveillance, the state has capability to penetrate the society
in a profound way.
It is clear that population has gained a special importance for the modern state.
In pre-modern states, population was regarded as a sovereign power especially in
quantitative terms. Nevertheless, since rulers of the pre-modern states governed their
subjects through ‘indirect rule’ of the intermediaries such as feudal lords, ayans, et
cetera, they did not have enough infrastructural power to effectively and directly
manipulate this population.64 On the other hand, in modern state, population becomes
the ultimate end of government. In other words, population is to be the main object in
60
61
Micheal Foucault, “Governmentality”, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 96.
62
63
64
Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 49.
17
the hands of government because government must take population into consideration
“in all its observations and savoir in order to govern effectively.”65 According to
Foucault, a specific and very complex power structure has emerged to be dominant
since the eighteenth century. He uses the term “governmentality” for this power
structure. In fact, importance of population for the modern state mentioned above
becomes clearer when the meaning of “governmentality” is taken into consideration.
“Governmentality” refers to “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures,
analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this specific,
albeit complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its
major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as its essential technical
instrument.”66 In this sense, the government must manage population, as its main
target; but how? According to Foucault, the answer to this question rests in the term
‘discipline’. Discipline provides the means to manage a population in its depths and
details.67
Parallel to Foucault, Giddens pays specific attention to the disciplinary power
of the modern state. Giddens coins the term ‘internal pacification’ which in its general
aspects means the replacement of severe and overt punishments by discipline through
collecting information, surveillance and modern policing.68 In other words,
governments of modern states manage population through various disciplinary
methods and control mechanisms. Furthermore, modern state generally implements its
discipline and control policies in accordance with an understanding of legitimacy. One
65
Foucault, “Governmentality”, p. 100. Selçuk Dursun argues that since the early nineteenth century the
Ottoman State began to pay special attention to population just like its counterparts in Europe. For
detailed information about population policies of the Ottoman State during the Tanzimat era see Selçuk
Dursun, “Procreation, Family and ‘Progress’: Administrative and Economic Aspects of Ottoman
Policies in the 19th Century,” The History of Family, No. 16, (2011), pp. 160-171.
66
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population : Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78,
Translated by Graham Burchell, (Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan : République Française,
2007), p. 144.
67
Foucault, “Governmentality”, p. 102.
68
Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, p. 187-190.
18
of the most useful discourses for such a justification of policies is ‘the maintenance of
public order’.
Actually, ‘maintenance of public order’ along with ‘crime-prevention’ are two
inseparable functions of modern policing. State fulfills these functions by benefiting
from one of its indispensable characteristics: legitimate use of force. Since modern
state reproduces a continuous perception of threat, it is in a position to easily legitimize
its security policies, which are justified as aiming to eliminate this threat. Therefore,
protection of its citizens against “threats” is a fundamental discourse for modern states.
Moreover, modern state requires collection of detailed information to develop
“efficient” security policies. Crime statistics, prison registers, travel documents and all
kinds of reports prepared by security forces are a prerequisite for the establishment of
security policies alongside with a set of surveillance and control mechanisms. Since,
the understanding of the ‘maintenance of internal order’ is at the core of these policies,
it is necessary to clarify what governments mean by ‘public order’.
In fact, ‘the maintenance of public order’ could be evaluated as the very
essence of government as well as its defining activity.69 Because, to a great extent, the
legitimacy of the state relates to whether it maintains order. Furthermore, order ‘is a
criteria for determining whether government can be said to exist at all.’70 It is clear that
the maintenance of public order is a crucial function for all governments for their
‘existence’; nevertheless how they actually perceive ‘public order’ is exactly not
similar in all cases.
There are two basic approaches to ‘public order’. One of them is the Anglo-
Saxon understanding of ‘public order’ led by Britain, and also shaping the ‘public
order’ understanding of the United States. The second approach is the French model,
69
A. R. Gillis, “Crime and State Surveillance in Nineteenth Century France”, American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Sep 1989), p. 310.
70
David H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1985), p. 5.
19
also generally accepted by continental European states. The Ottoman State, which is
our case, is also congruent with that type.71
In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, public order is the opposite of public disorder
which is directly linked to the existence of crimes. The role of police as the main
figure of maintaining public order in the name of government is directly fighting
against crimes. Therefore, the prevention of crimes and apprehension of criminals is
seen as the main purposes of policing in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.72 On the other
hand, public order understanding in France goes beyond the prevention of crimes. In
that respect, the security of the state was always considered an essential element of
policing in France.73 Thus, first of all, the policies for the maintenance of public order
have been shaped on the basis of the security of the state. However, the activities
against state, such as riots and uprisings, have not been the only targets of police for
the maintenance of public order. ‘Public order’ in French tradition has corresponded to
a wider concern for administration and ‘good order.’ In this sense, the maintenance of
public order “means the regulation of society for the general purpose of assuring
public order... [and] it covers the regulation of an extremely wide range of matters in
social and economic fields as well.”74 In this thesis, what we mean by public order is
this broader meaning.
According to Neocleous, modern state has structured society through policing,
which has conventionally meant the maintenance of ‘good order.’ In this sense,
policing can be evaluated as a series of methods through which social order is
71
In the current literature of Ottoman historiography, Ferdan Ergut’s book entitled Modern Devlet ve
Polis is the most comprehensive work about the development of public order policing in the Ottoman
Empire. Actually, Ergut’s detailed conceptual analysis about public order policing, crime and modern
state inspired the general approach of this thesis. See Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, pp. 41-76.
72
Ferdan Ergut, “Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No.2,
(2002), p. 150. George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, “The Evolving Strategy of Policing”,
Perspectives on Policing, No. 4, (November 1988), p. 7.
73
Gillis, “Crime and State Surveillance”, p. 333.
74
F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969),
p. 160.
20
constructed.75 The ‘order’ expected to be maintained by police is the order of the state.
Therefore, policing had to cover all spheres where state power takes part in social
life.76 Foucault states with the following words how the jurisdiction of policing is
tremendous in a modern state: “[P]olice must take responsibility for all of this kind of
sociality. So what police thus embraces is basically an immense domain that we could
say goes from living to more than just living.”77 It is clear that, alongside with public
order, boundaries of policing are extremely ambiguous. The main reason for this is that
‘disorder’ is a condition, not an act that can be defined easily.78 In fact, public order
issues have been one of the most useful instruments through which security forces
increase their discretionary power.79 They determine specific acts, situations and
groups as threatening for public order by using this discretionary power.
Since capitalism and state-making are two interrelated processes, the defining
characteristics of public order have been shaped in accordance with the demands of the
bourgeoisie as the dominant class. In other words, whatever the bourgeoisie regarded
as a threat, the police have struggled against it. 80 Therefore, in modern state, although
maintaining public order promises ‘good order’ for all, it is clear that government
intentionally protects the interests of some particular groups or classes. 81 In capitalist
states, certainly the protected class is the upper class having economic and political
power whereas lower classes are the main target of policing.
75
Mark Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power, (London,
Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000), p. 8.
76
Neocleous, The Fabrication of Social Order, p. 8.
77
Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, pp. 420-421.
78
George Kelling L., “Acquiring a Taste for Order: The Community and Police”, Crime and
Delinquency, Vol. 33, No. 90, (1987), p. 94.
79
Ergut, “Policing the Poor”, p. 154.
80
81
21
In early nineteenth century, as a result of industrialization and urbanization,
cities became centers of attraction. As populations of industrialized cities increased,
the city poor also increased. City administrators conceived that they could not manage
the rise in the number of the poor. In order for the control, repression and even
banishment of the city poor a new category called “dangerous classes” was
conceptualized. In this regard, “dangerous classes” was a product of class antagonisms
of early industrial society.82 The “dangerous class” as a ‘constructed threat’ composed
of beggars, vagrants, and all other city poor that was identified with idleness. They
were considered as distinct from pervasive criminality, because they generally were
not actual criminals. However, their image constructed by the state was eventually
related to criminality because according to state, they were “potential criminals.”
Although, governments and security forces justified their repressive policies against
the “dangerous classes” by using the claim that they were “potential criminals”, the
actual cause of these policies was related to the existing economic and political system.
The “dangerous classes” had to be repressed and controlled because their existence as
‘unproductive’ elements of society constituted a threat to the ‘prosperity and strength
of the state depended on productive power of the labor force.’83 Therefore, ‘idleness’
constituted the basis of the problem which was to be struggled against. At this point,
82
Allan Silver, “The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of
Urban Crime, Police nad Riot”, The Police: Six Sociological Essays, The Police: Six Sociological
Essays, David J. Bordua (ed.), (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley&Sons, Inc, 1967), p. 4. Karl
Marx made an analysis about the historical and economic roots of the city poor and the transformation
of these people to “potential criminals” in the eyes of state, argued as follows: ‘The proletariat created
by the breaking up of the bands of feudal retainers and by the forcible expropriation of the people from
the soil, this “free” proletariat could not possibly be absorbed by the nascent manufactures as fast as it
was thrown upon the world. On the other hand, these men, suddenly dragged from their wonted mode of
life, could not as suddenly adapt themselves to the discipline of their new condition. They were turned
en masse into beggars, robbers, vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of
circumstances. Hence at the end of the 15th and during the whole of the 16th century, throughout
Western Europe a bloody legislation against vagabondage. The fathers of the present working class were
chastised for their enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers. Legislation treated them as
“voluntary” criminals, and assumed that it depended on their own good will to go on working under the
old conditions that no longer existed.’, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, Friedrich
Engels (ed.), Translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co.,
1906-1909), p. 515.
83
22
for example, the imprisonment of a beggar or a vagrant did not mean anything on its
own: the best punishment was to force her/him to working.84
In accordance with this mentality, several laws were promulgated about the
poor. In Britain, The Poor Law was enacted in 1834. Through this law, the government
aimed at making the poor as much disciplined as possible through employment in
workhouses in order to impose them a hardworking way of life. In other words, the
workhouses were regarded as rehabilitation camps for the poor where they would
become used to regular work.85 In a different way but for the same end, the Vagrancy
Act of 1824 was used against “suspected” characters, prostitutes, beggars and people
selling in public areas in order to prevent alternative economic modes of life.86 These
laws had two main aims: first, controlling the city poor by transforming them into
efficient labor force, and second, preventing all kinds of alternative economic modes
of life that would constitute threat for existing economic system. With similar aims,
the first regulation about vagrancy in the Ottoman Empire entitled the Regulation on
Vagabonds and Suspected Criminals (Serseri ve Mazanna-i Su-i olan Eşhas Hakkında
Nizamname) was promulgated in 1890.87 Although the details of this regulation and its
transformation over time will be examined in detail in the fifth chapter, here, we must
note that it was the first legal text systematically regulating the official approach to the
“dangerous classes” in the Ottoman Empire.
It is clear that the city poor have been an indispensable element of the
“dangerous classes”; however, it can still be argued that the content of the “dangerous
classes” was always subject to change as the context required. This means that the
state was ready to add new elements to the “dangerous classes” in relevance with who
were regarded as “threatening” in particular conditions. According to Gillis, political
84
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, Translated by Alan Sheridan,
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 106.
85
86
87
Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 245; Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde, pp. 132-133.
23
threat generally results in expanded surveillance; and, parallel to this, state’s
interpretation of “dangerous” might bear more propensity to be influenced by political
acts than criminal ones.88 Despite the unquestionable importance of political
considerations, criminality has at least at the discursive level been used by states to
implement repressive and disciplinary policies.
This thesis work argues that in the Ottoman case ‘public order policing’ aimed
at regulating the society has always gone hand in hand with ‘preventive policing’
concentrated on the struggle against crimes. In other words, for the state, although
public order policing was one of the main strategies of regulating the society,
‘preventing crime’ has always been the strongest discursive justification for repressive
and disciplinary policies for the maintenance of public order. Therefore, our analysis
will take into consideration ‘crime’ as an important concept in security and public
order issues.
There have been different approaches to ‘crime’ since the nineteenth century.
According to a prominent social scientific approach in the nineteenth century, crime is
constructed by society. The proponents of this approach argue that some ‘wrong’ acts
and behaviors are regarded as violation of socially accepted norms. Due to the social
disturbance they cause, some of these acts and behaviors are included within the scope
of penal codes as offences and crimes.89 Another approach tries to explain crime
through the concept of ‘anomie’ first used by Émile Durkheim while describing the
notion of suicide. According to Durkheim “in modern societies traditional norms and
standards become undermined without being replaced by new ones. ‘Anomie’ exists
when there are no clear standards to guide behavior in a given area of social life.”90
Therefore ‘anomie’ can be described as the situation of alienation and purposelessness
experienced by a person or a social class as a result of lack of standards, values, or
ideals. The proponents of this approach focus on the immigration movements towards
88
89
90
Anthony Giddens, Sociology, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), p. 177.
24
industrialized cities in the nineteenth century to uncover how ‘anomie’ emerged
among the masses of new comers lacking access to welfare assistance and traditional
support networks in these cities.91 Therefore, according to this approach, crime has
originated from ‘anomie’.
From a Marxist point of view, ‘crime’ must be analyzed on the basis of class
conflict and economic relations. Interestingly enough, except a series of articles about
wood theft, Karl Marx himself made very little reference to ‘crime’ in his studies.92 In
1939, George Ruche and Otto Kirchheimer published a book entitled Punishment and
Social Structure as the first and the most comprehensive Marxist analysis of
punishment. According to them, ‘every system of production tends to discover
punishments which correspond to its productive relationships.’93 In other words, social
forces and, especially, economic and fiscal forces determine the intensity of penal
practices.94 Therefore, without examining these social forces, it is impossible to
understand why some specific punishments are implemented while some others are
intentionally avoided in a society. Ruche and Kirchheimer also made detailed analysis
about the relationship between crime rates in different countries and respective
severity in punishments. The conclusion they drew was that there is no direct
correlation between the penal policy and the rate of crime. Instead, they argue rates of
crime are closely dependent on economic developments.95 In fact, the impact of
economic system on the definition of what is criminal cannot be ignored. During the
91
92
Emsley, Crime, Police and Penal Policy..., p. 4. The articles about Parliamentry debates on wood
theft were published in Rheinische Zeitung, No. 298, 300, 303, 305 and 307 on October 25, 27 and 30,
November 1 and 3 1842. For these articles see
https://marxists.anu.edu.au/archive/marx/works/1842/10/25.htm.
93
George Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, (New Brunswick, London:
Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 5.
94
Rusche and Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, p. 5.
95
25
twentieth century, many social scientists took this reality into account in their analysis.
Nevertheless, the role of political authorities in this process must not be overlooked.
Foucault is a foremost social theorist who produced a large body of works on
crime and punishment. Actually, his elaborate analysis about crime and punishment
was predominantly based on power relations. According to him, through crime and
delinquency, the totality of social sphere could be controlled by the state. 96 Therefore,
‘crime’ is something inherently political. Specifying what is criminal and delinquent is
a consequence of a political process within which rules and regulations are produced.97
Since ‘the bureaucracy created the laws and the law created the public view of the act,
[then] government bureaucrats have a force of their own which increasingly influenced
what is defined as criminal and delinquent.’98 In capitalist society, needs, demands and
concerns of the upper classes has directed governments in this process. There were two
main components of upper classes’ security needs: first, social order and the
continuation of status quo; second, the protection of private property. 99 Therefore,
since the nineteenth century, protection of private property became one of the most
important security concerns of the state. It is not a coincidence that theft and other
crimes against private property have constituted the most important part of penal
codes.100 As a matter of fact, lower classes have been perceived as a threat to private
property, and thus came to be identified with crimes against it. This has gone alongside
with their being perceived as a threat to social order and status quo, and has in turn led
to the repression of lower classes.101
96
Foucault, Discipline and Punishment, p. 281.
97
William J. Chambliss, “The State, the Law, and the Definition of Behavior as Criminal or
Delinquent”, Handbook of Criminology, Daniel Glaser (ed.), (Chicago: Rand McNally College
Publishing Company, 1974), p. 39.
98
Chambliss, “The State, the Law”, pp. 27-28.
99
Robert Reiner, The Politics of the Police, (New York, London, Toronto: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1992), p. 27.
100
Chambliss, “The State, the Law”, p. 25.
26
In fact, governments, lawmakers, and police have a great discretionary power
in security issues. From the very beginning of the law-making process to its
enforcement, at each level, state officials use discretionary power. For example,
although there is a very comprehensive title as ‘crimes against private property’, the
boundaries of these ‘crimes’ have been determined by the lawmakers using this
discretionary power. While a petty theft case could be perceived as the biggest threat
to private property, lawmakers and those who enforce them could in certain cases
tolerate more serious crimes. Foucault pointed out the following about this issue:
[…] Are you not afraid that the poor man put into the dock for snatching a
piece of bread from a baker’s stall will not, one day, become so enraged that
stone by stone he will demolish the Stock Exchange, a wild den where the
treasure of the state and the fortune of families are stolen with impunity. But
this delinquency of wealth is tolerated by the laws, and, when it does find its
way into the courts, it can depend upon the indulgence of the judges and
discretion of press.102
In fact, the biggest fear of government and upper classes is actually the ‘rage’ of this
poor man who is imprisoned for years because of stealing a piece of bread while ‘big
players’ of the capitalist system are ‘stealing’ big portions from state and society in a
way ignored by official authorities. In that respect, according to the state, lower classes
have to be controlled as much as possible. Constructing criminality served as one of
the most efficient ways of achieving this end. Therefore, in modern states, behaviors
perceived as a ‘threat’ to the existing political and economic system are criminalized,
and people who tend to commit these ‘crimes’ are easily repressed. This argument
might be helpful for understanding the penal system of modern state.
Governments and lawmakers do not only define what is criminal, but also
decide on ‘proper’ punishments. Therefore, penal code “is first and foremost a
reflection of the interests and ideologies of the governing class… Those who sit at the
101
Reiner, The Politics of the Police, p. 27.
102
Foucault, Discipline and Punishment, pp. 287-288.
27
top of the political and economic structure of the society can manipulate the criminal
laws to suit their own purposes.”103 In this sense, laws, and in particular, criminal laws
could be evaluated as tactics used by governments to govern a society. In other words,
governments use laws as tactics in order to achieve their specific ends.104 Therefore,
amendments to penal codes and promulgation of punitive regulations reflect needs of
governments in particular periods. As will be discussed in the fifth chapter, the change
of penal codes in the Ottoman Empire between 1840 to the end of the Empire might be
evaluated from this perspective.
In sum, this thesis will examine ‘public order’, ‘preventive policing’, ‘crime’
and ‘punishment’ as elements of an ensemble defined as a system through which the
ruling classes construct control over society. Since states justify and legitimize their
control mechanisms and disciplinary activities through the use of all of these
mechanisms, without going deeper into these issues one by one, it would be impossible
to understand the total. The ultimate aim of the state is to penetrate into the society and
provide continuous central political authority in all aspects regarding daily life. 105 In
this way, governments have the opportunity to restructure society in accordance with
specific aims and necessities.
This thesis work will focus on the attempts of the Ottoman government for the
maintenance of public order; the attitude towards crimes; and relevant punishment
strategies in a particular time period: the Great War years. It is a fact that examining
these issues within the specific context of war will have its own connotations. As
mentioned earlier, the Great War had a great impact on state-society relations. The
belligerent states had to turn their face to internal order and status quo for better
103
104
105
Silver, “The Demand for Order’, pp. 12-13. Reiner, The Politics of the Police, p. 34. Jennifer Davis,
“Urban Policing and its Objects: Comparative Themes in England and France in the Second Half of the
Nineteenth Century”, Policing Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-
1940, Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (eds.), (New York, Westport, Connecticut, London:
Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 2.
28
warfare; elimination of “enemy within”; and ensuring the ‘survival of the state’.
Braudel examines the relationship between internal security and warfare as follows:
State violence and rough treatment guaranteed internal peace and, the safety of
roads, the reliable provisioning of markets and towns, defense against outside
enemies and effective conduct of wars, which succeeded each other
indefinitely. Domestic peace was a jewel beyond compare.106
This was exactly the case for the Ottoman State during the Great War. Since Istanbul
was the political, economic and social center of the Empire, maintaining public order
in the city was both a requirement for and indicator of domestic peace. Similarly, it
was essential for better war-making. Nevertheless, under the war conditions,
‘maintaining public order’ was not easy for the government. Since at that time there
was a perception of high “internal threat” from the state’s point of view, a series of
extra-ordinary measures were put into practice. Groups of people who were not
regarded as potentially dangerous during peacetime came to be seen as principal
targets for state’s control. In this respect, the state made use of harsher punishment,
oppression and control mechanisms in the name of the well-being of society. Thus, the
state attempted at legitimizing its violence through the maintenance of public order for
the sake of ‘public good’.
During war periods, governments and other state institutions begin exercising a
high degree of discretionary authority. Here, discretion means the power and authority
to define who is ‘deviant’ in any social context.107 In this sense, during the Great War,
in the Ottoman Empire, the Ministry of Interior and, under it, the General Directorate
of Security assumed extraordinary power. These institutions especially attempted to
use power of discretion to the utmost point possible in order to ‘maintain public
security’ in Istanbul. Although the war provided advantages to the security forces of
the belligerent states in terms of increasing their discretionary power, it also had an
106
Fernard Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century: the Wheels of the Commerce, Vol.
II, Translated by Sian Reynolds, (London: Book Club Associates, 1983), p. 518.
107
29
overall detrimental effect on police and gendarme organizations, especially in terms of
qualified personnel.
The manpower need during the Great War resulted in the recruitment of
policemen and gendarmes in the army. In continental Europe, police officers
remaining at the home front were generally older men who were over the age of
conscription.108 It was also the case in England. Just a few months after the Great War
began, eleven percent of the provincial security forces of England and Wales were
recruited in the army or navy. The vacant positions were filled by pensioners of police
and by temporary appointments of men over military age.109 Consequently, for
example in Britain, the lack of manpower led to the experiment of using women police
officers during the war years.110
Alongside with deterioration of security forces in terms of personnel, the
policing duties of security forces also changed in accordance with the requirements of
the war. In England, during the war, some duties overtaken by the police were as
follows: requisitioning of forage, registration of foreigners, enumeration of agricultural
laborers, management of military and maintenance of their dependents, and the
operation of liquor licensing controls.111 During the war, these duties became part of
routine policing activities also in other continental European countries. Furthermore, in
France and Italy, it was a widespread opinion that both the Gendarmerie and
Carabinieri (national military police of Italy) became spoiled because of their wartime
roles that were restricted to ‘policing military transport, checking that that troops were
not out of bounds, and arresting deserters and men accused of inflicting wounds upon
themselves to avoid the front.’112 Therefore, in all belligerent countries the duties of
108
109
David Englander, “Police and Public Order in Britain 1914-1918”, Policing Western Europe:
Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940, Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (eds.),
(New York, Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 92.
110
111
Englander, “Police and Public Order”, p. 96.
30
security forces were more or less determined by military needs and the changing
notion of ‘security’ during the Great War.
Actually, sources of ‘disorder’ also changed with the war. For instance, in
every country, hostilities between the immigrants and locals already existing during
peacetime became sharper and more explosive.113 Especially, immigrants being
citizens of enemy states became direct target of anger and violence. In England, during
1915, anti-German riots occasionally turning into mass violence took place.114 In
1917, riots were directed against the Jews in England. The main cause of anti-Jewish
campaign was about conscription. According to native population, the Jewish
profiteers evaded military responsibility for securing unfair advantage in terms of
economic gain within war conditions.115 Alongside with rising hostility against
immigrants, disruption of food supply, rising food prices and unemployment were
other sources of distress in England during the war.116 Similar things could also be said
for the Ottoman case at that time. Economic hardships definitely led to higher crime
rates. In those circumstances, in all belligerent states, governments had to create new
formulas to provide remedies. Criminal policies also changed as the war conditions
required.
There was an increasing need for manpower during the war. Therefore,
criminals had to be taken into consideration. In 1916 and 1917, the Ministry of Justice
in Germany published several decrees ‘requesting the courts to take into consideration
the possible usefulness of the convict in auxiliary war service before deciding to
permit any sentence.’117 Similar policies were implemented in France, and as a result
112
Emsley, Crime, Police and Penal Policy, pp. 246-247.
113
114
In May 1915, an English ocean liner was sunk by a German torpedo with the loss of almost 1200
lives. This event was the starting point of anti-German campaigns in England. The riots with changing
intensity continued during 1915. Englander, “Police and Public Order”, p. 106.
115
116
Englander, “Police and Public Order”, pp. 100-104.
31
of these policies the total prisoner population remarkably diminished between the
years 1913 and 1916.118 Likewise, the CUP government had to take war circumstances
into consideration while developing crime policies. As will be examined in the seventh
chapter, several decrees and amnesties were enacted during the war years so as to opt
for using convicts as manpower in the army.
It is clear that the war conditions represented a new setting in terms of the
understanding of ‘public order’ and ‘criminality’. Although policies concerning ‘public
order’, ‘preventive policing’, ‘crime’ and ‘punishment’ remained as tools in the hands
of the state to penetrate into the society and restructure it, their content was changed
and adapted according to war conditions. In this regard, the chapters of this thesis
intend to answer the following questions: What were the tools of the CUP government
used for surveillance and control during the Great War? How were these tools utilized
for ‘the maintenance of public order’ in Istanbul? Who were considered as “dangerous
classes” in the Ottoman Empire during the Great War? What were the policies
implemented concerning these groups in Istanbul? What were the sources providing
basis for the legal definition of crimes in the late Ottoman Empire? What kind of
changes did the Penal Code of 1858 which was the main legal text embodying the
official understanding of crime and punishment undergo during the second
constitutional era as part of modernization and centralization efforts? How was the
Penal Code modified during the war years? What were the most important categories
of crimes in Istanbul at that time? What was the attitude of the CUP government
towards these crimes? Do the penal policy and the attitude of the CUP concerning
different types of crimes provide us an idea about the general political and socio-
economic inclinations of the governing party?
To answer these questions the following primary sources are taken into
consideration in this study. The main source is Ottoman archival documents. First of
all, documents of the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti),
117
118
32
the Directorate of Prisons and Buildings Administration (Mebani-i Emiriye ve
Hapishaneler Müdiriyeti) and Office of Code (Şifre Kalemi) under the Ministry of
Interior are examined for this research. Furthermore, reference will be made to
documents of Department of State, US National Archives. Morgenthau Papers located
at the Library of Congress alongside with a number of documents from the National
Archives of the United Kingdom constitute other primary sources. Codes of Laws
(Düsturs) published between the years 1876-1918 are analyzed in order to see what
kind of legal changes took place in ‘public order’ and ‘criminality’ issues. The Penal
Code of 1858, which was in effect during the Great War, is another primary source
used in this study. Debate Registers of Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt
Ceridesi) and Debate Registers of the Senate (Meclis-i Ayan Zabıt Ceridesi) including
debates on some topics related to public order, and The Police Journal (Polis
Mecmuası) providing regular crime tables for Istanbul were also checked. Memoirs
and secondary sources have also been helpful for this research. To sum up, the bulk of
data obtained from these primary and secondary sources are analyzed in accordance
with the conceptual framework made clear above.
Outline of the Study
This study is composed of eight chapters aimed at answering the research

questions above. The first chapter giving general information about the Great War, the
current literature in the Ottoman historiography and the conceptual framework of this
study will be followed by the second chapter that will be about the demographic,
economic and social structure of Istanbul during the Great War. Since this dissertation
is a study focusing on public security, crime and punishment in Istanbul, the overall
demographic, economic and social features of the city must be examined in order to
become familiar with the object of our analysis.
The population of Istanbul as the political and economic center of the Empire
assumed specific significance for the Ottoman State beginning with the nineteenth
33
century. There were several reasons for that. For instance, there was particularly a
remarkable change in the city population as a result of a series of wars and
immigration following each of these. Therefore, faced with a different demographic
structure, the Ottoman state elites had to develop new strategies and methods to control
and govern the city population. Apart from this reason, in general terms, as Foucault
argues, population became a particularly important factor for modern states with
regard to the fact that ‘population becomes the object that the government must take
into account in all its observations and savoir in order to be able to govern
efficiently.’119 In the same manner, throughout the nineteenth century, in the Ottoman
Empire population came to be perceived “as a source of wealth, as an economic
resource from which the state obtained income for its treasury and conscripts for its
armies,”120 and, accordingly, it became a matter of topmost significance to collect
regular and detailed information about population, especially that of Istanbul while
formulating economic and social policies. Thus, an overview of the demographic
characteristics of the Ottoman capital will correspond to an essential part in the second
chapter.
Economic dynamics of the city is another topic that will be analyzed in the
second chapter. As mentioned above, economic conditions of capital cities changed
extensively during the Great War. Government policies to cope with the newly-
emerging economic problems of capital cities had a great impact on their own success
in the maintenance of public order. Furthermore, crimes such as theft, profiteering and
bribery became direct or indirect consequences of wartime economic dynamic.
Therefore, economic conditions of Istanbul will be analyzed in terms of issues such as
provisioning, high inflation, speculative business and black market. Finally, the social
life in the city will be discussed. Especially, understanding the changing social roles
and worsening socio-economic inequalities are necessary to shed light on government
policies in terms of maintaining public order and preventing crimes.
119
120
Dursun, “Procreation, Family and ‘Progress’”, p. 161.
34
In the third chapter, policing and criminal law will be held into analysis as two
important realms of the formation of modern Ottoman State. This analysis will also
constitute a basis to be able to uncover the CUP government’s wartime security and
crime policies. In this sense, first, the institutional structure of security forces as the
main actors of policing will be examined. During the war years, in Istanbul, police and
gendarme were cooperating for the maintenance of public order. In fact, the separation
of police from military and its foundation as a new civilian security force was still a
recent development in the Ottoman Empire at the time it entered the Great War.
Therefore, first of all, the historical basis of the formation of police organization and
gendarme as part of the modernization and centralization processes will briefly be
analyzed. Then their cooperation during wartime as well as power struggle on issues
concerning policing will be discussed. As mentioned earlier, in all combatant
countries, the Great War caused a structural deterioration of security forces especially
regarding loss of qualified personnel. The same situation in Istanbul will also be
discussed in this part.
The second topic of the third chapter will be the Penal Codes of the Ottoman
State. Initially, the evolution of Ottoman Penal Codes in terms of their content will be
traced. Next, there will be an attempt to show how the Penal Code of 1858 became an
instrument of the Constitutional Regime for a more effective penetration of the state to
the society. The CUP government aimed at achieving that goal both by the way of
virtually becoming the sole authority in lawmaking and by continuously restricting the
scope of Islamic Law in criminal issues. Particularly, during the Great War years, the
CUP government almost became the only political authority in the Empire. Therefore,
its attitude towards crimes represents an important subject in considering crime and
punishment during the war.
The maintenance of public order will be the topic of the following two
chapters. In the fourth chapter, the reports of Travel Office (Seyrüsefer Kalemi) under
the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet-i Umumiyye Müdüriyeti) as well as the
implementation of a set of policies about travel documents and passports will be
35
analyzed as basic instruments of surveillance and control. The CUP government used
these tools both to collect information about people who travelled to and departed from
Istanbul, and to maintain strict control over the city population. Actually, some groups
of people were regarded as “suspect” by the government and security forces.
According to the ruling elites, these people were “threats” to public order. The CUP
government and the security forces used instruments of surveillance to control and
repress them.
Actually, the Great War brought about a new setting within which the content
of “dangerous classes” changed remarkably. The city poor of Istanbul including
countrymen, vagrants and refugees continued to be elements of “dangerous classes” as
before. However, during the war, foreigners and minorities became the new elements
of “dangerous classes”. As a result, these people were categorized under “suspected”
in the Ottoman official records. In this thesis, being aware of the fact that the
“suspected” actually corresponded to “dangerous classes” for the CUP government
during the Great War, it will be accurate to use the original concept of the “suspected”
elements or “suspects” instead of “dangerous classes”.
In the fifth chapter, the CUP policies concerning vagrants, countrymen,
refugees, foreigners, and minorities will be discussed in detail. It is clear that the war
enhanced the discretionary power of the CUP government in terms of determining who
to be qualified as “threatening” for public order. Moreover, the government and
security forces became able to implement harsher and more repressive policies on
“suspected” elements. These policies were generally justified on the grounds of
maintaining public order. In that respect, the “suspected” were “potential criminals” in
the eyes of the government. Therefore, prevention of crimes became another source of
legitimacy for repressive official practices.
The sixth chapter will be on three types of crimes directly related to the
realities of war conditions. First, ‘theft’ as an essential element of crime tables and
statistics will be examined in detail. According to the tables in the Polis Journal (Polis
Mecmuası) petty theft was the most frequent crime at that time. Especially during the
36
last two years of the war, the rate of this crime increased strikingly. The worsening
living conditions during the war probably led to the rise of petty theft rates.
Nevertheless, as Gillis states ‘although these accounts [official records on incidents,
arrests, charges and etc.] may give a generally accurate portrait of visible crime, their
validity as a measure of hidden crime and actual levels of criminality is uncertain.’121
Therefore, it is clear that the government consciously made petty theft a publicly
visible crime with the possible intention to legitimize its repressive policies directed to
lower classes.
On the other hand, while profiteering was an obvious crime exacerbating socio-
economic inequalities, neither the crime statistics nor the crime tables included this
category. Thus, profiteering will be analyzed in the sixth chapter as an ‘ignored crime’
by the government. Neocleous states that “the institutions of the criminal justice
system are geared to conceal rather than reveal the crimes of the powerful.”122 It can be
argued that not only the institutions of criminal justice system but also governments
and lawmakers have tended to ignore crimes of the propertied classes.
Bribery is another crime to be examined in the sixth chapter. Despite the fact
that this crime was included in crime tables and statistics, the numbers presented for
this crime was far from being convincing. According to a number of memoirs of that
time, bribery became widespread throughout the war. Especially considering the
economic conditions of the time, it was inevitable that bribery became a frequent crime
among state officials whose fixed income became devalued as inflation rates soared.
Yet crime tables only reflected a small fraction of that as if there were occasional
individual cases of bribery. Thus, the reasons behind such distorted statistics require
due attention. It must be kept in mind that theft, profiteering and bribery were crimes
closely related to the economic dynamics of the war years, implying that the official
attitude towards each of these promises to provide us hints about the priorities of the
government regarding criminality.
121
122
Neocleous, The Fabrication of the Social Order, p. 83.
37
As a matter of fact, the survival of the state and, particularly, the continuation
of the CUP regime became the foremost concern for state elites during the Great War.
Therefore, two specific crimes, one being the exercise of battery or insulting remarks
against state officials during office, and the other being opposition to the decisions and
regulations of the government, were included in the crime tables in 1916. In the
seventh chapter, these crimes will be analyzed in detail with respect to their
implications for the CUP government. In addition, the seventh chapter will also focus
on two other topics about which the CUP government made a series of legal
amendments and addenda, also publishing a number of regulations. One such
regulation is about firearms. This relates directly to the interest of the state in
monopolizing legitimate use of force. In this regard the realities of wartime provided
much more room compared to earlier periods, such as in the case of collecting arms
from civilians. Another similar issue was about the imitation or alteration of official
documents, which also led the government to enact a number of legal amendments.
As mentioned above, in all belligerent states, criminal policy remarkably
changed during the Great War. The final issue to be analyzed in the seventh chapter
will be about amnesties and provisional laws aimed at making use of criminals as
manpower for the military. This was a two-sided policy in the sense that it also
presented a remedy for the problem of overcrowd in prisons. In fact, there is no exact
data about the number of criminals conscripted as such; but in some indirect way,
rising criminal rates could be accepted as an indicator of the effect of convicted
persons reappearing in social life after their release. Therefore, it might be argued that
although the CUP government justified its repressive policies for ‘the maintenance of
public order’ and ‘preventing crimes’, the criminal policy it implemented caused a
vicious circle of criminality in Istanbul during the war years.
Finally, the Chapter 8 of the thesis will present concluding remarks.
38
CHAPTER 2
ISTANBUL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Istanbul, as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, witnessed wide-encompassing

demographic, economic and social transformations during the nineteenth century.
Since it is quite difficult to analyze public order, crime and punishment in Istanbul
during the war years without reference to the socio-economic and demographic aspects
of the city, this chapter aims to make a detailed analysis of these.
As will be discussed in the following chapters, during the Great War, the CUP
government developed a number of surveillance mechanisms for controlling the
population of Istanbul. In the following section population characteristics of the city
will be analyzed with respect to the wide-encompassing transformations of the
nineteenth century. In this way, there will be an attempt to become familiar with the
demographic structure the CUP government faced during the war years.
2.1 Demography
Istanbul was the city that had the largest and most heterogeneous population in
the Ottoman Empire just before the Great War. It was the city of Muslims, non-
Muslims, Levantines and foreigners. This heterogeneous population characteristic
made the city special. Although the population had begun to change in favor of the
Muslims after the second half of the nineteenth century, there was still a considerable
non-Muslim population in the city before the Great War. In this part the demographic
characteristics of Istanbul will be evaluated in detail.
39
2. 1. 1 Nineteenth Century
The nineteenth century brought about great social, economic and physical
transformations in Istanbul. This made the city a center of attraction for the people
who were living in other parts of the empire, as well as for foreigners.123 People began
migrating to Istanbul in order to find new jobs, especially during the second half of the
nineteenth century. In addition, Ottoman armies had been defeated in several wars and
the Empire had lost vast territories during the second half of the nineteenth century.
Istanbul was one of the centers where refugees came after these wars.
One of the most important immigration waves from Caucasia to Anatolia took
place following the Crimean War (1853-1856). Especially after 1859, when general
resistance of Muslims to the Russian Empire came to an end, big mass immigrations
began.124 Istanbul was one of the temporary settlement centers for refugees. Actually,
to send these refugees to the settlement centers in Anatolia as soon as possible was the
main target of the Istanbul government. However, it took some time and many
refugees stayed in the city for years. In 1860, even though most of the refugees were
sent to other cities, there were 14,000 Circassian and Noyan refugees in Istanbul. In
December 1863, a thousand more refugees came to the city according to records.125
Unfortunately, health problems became widespread among the refugees. Since the
population density was rapidly increasing in Istanbul and the city’s infrastructural
conditions were not sufficient for the rising population, the city administration tried to
send these refugees to Anatolia. The mayor (Şehremini) was responsible for the issues
of refugees until 1860. When the number of the refugees increased rapidly,
Commission for Refugees (Muhacirin Komisyonu) was established in January 1860.
123
Kemal Karpat, “The Population and the Social and Economic Transformation of Istanbul: The
Ottoman Microcosm”, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics,
Kemal Karpat, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986, p. 102.
124
Nedim İpek, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler, (Trabzon: Serander, 2007), p. 29.
125
İpek, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler, p. 42.
40
At the end of 1865, two thirds of the refugees were sent to other settlement centers
from Istanbul and mass immigrations came to an end. As a result, Commission for
Refugees was abolished.126 However, it was a fact that one third of these refugees
remained in Istanbul.
1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War was another important incident that had great
impact on demographic characteristics of Istanbul. As a result of this war, refugees
began pouring in from Russia and the Balkans. Istanbul was not a center for permanent
settlement but a great number of refugees came to the city in order to be sent other
regions. Due to the malfunction of sending the refugees to other parts of Anatolia,
most of the refugees coming from Russia and Balkans settled in Istanbul.127 According
to several official sources, the number of refugees in Istanbul increased from 30,000 in
1880 to 200,000 in 1906.128
The refugees caused several security problems in Istanbul. For instance, in
November 1883, Istanbul administration received intelligence about the Circassian
refugees in Istanbul that they would involve in some illegal acts against the security of
the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Ali). As a result of this information, Circassians were
forbidden to ramble in groups of 3-5 people. The decision of sending them to Anatolia
was expedited and until the end of this process, the military forces were mobilized to
protect the security of the city.129
2. 1. 2 The Balkan Wars & The Great War
Wars and immigration were important causes of demographic change in

Istanbul at the beginning of the century. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) resulted in
mass immigration movements from the Balkans to Anatolia. Istanbul was the first
126
İpek, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Göçler, p. 43.
127
Karpat, “The Population and the Social”, p. 103.
128
129
İpek, İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete, p. 61-62.
41
station for these refugees. In fact, the government tried to keep them outside Istanbul
and instead directed them to some shipping centers (sevkiyat merkezi) away from the
city center such as Ayastefanos (Yeşilköy). However, many refugees somehow
succeeded in entering the city.130 These refugees generally stayed in mosques, mescids
(small mosques and prayer rooms), medreses (religious schools), empty houses and
hans (inns).131 Although it is known that hundreds of thousands of refugees came to
Istanbul during the Balkan Wars and afterwards, there is no exact number for these.
Most of them were intended to be sent to Anatolia immediately. The Red Crescent
Organization included to a detailed table about refugees in the institution’s yearbook of
1913-1915. According to this, 3,709 families (14,856 refugees) were staying in several
mosques, hamams (public baths) and medreses in various districts of Istanbul.132
Certainly, these immigration waves had great impacts on the socio-economic
and cultural life of the city. The population of the city changed in favor of the
Muslims. Turkish nationalism rose following the Balkan Wars. The rise of Turkish-
Muslim population certainly prepared a convenient population base for Turkish
Nationalism. When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, the population figure
of Istanbul was as follows:
130
Ahmet Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912-1913), (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), p. 69.
131
Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, p. 70.
132
The refugees were staying in Koca Mustafa Paşa, Zincirlikuyu, Karagümrük, Şehremini, Edirne
Kapı, Üsküdar, Sultanahmet, Aksaray, Topkapı, Eyüp, Unkapanı, Yedikule, Cerrahpaşa, Fatih,
Kumkapı, Defterdar, Küçük Mustafa Paşa, Göksu, Kartal, Alibeyköy, Çarşamba, Kadırga, Eğrikapı,
Silivrikapı and Mahmut Paşa. For example only in Sultan Ahmed Camii, there were 1334 refugees (346
families). Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi Sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri, pp. 72-76.
42
Table 1: Population of Istanbul in 1914
Beyoğlu Üsküdar
Makriköy Adalar ve ve Gekböze
Istanbul Kartal Beykoz Şile
(Bakırköy) (Islands) Boğaziçi Boğaziçi (Gebze) Total
Şehri Kazası Kazası Kazası
Kazası Kazası Rumeli Anadolu Kazası
Ciheti Ciheti
Muslims 279,056 28,967 1,586 117,267 70,447 26,22 8,257 14,466 14,168 560,434
Greeks 64,287 11,221 8,725 75,971 19,832 5,856 6,862 3,708 8,913 205,375
Armenians 22,575 5,734 596 22,18 13,296 47 3,209 325 72,962
Jews 13,441 364 79 31,08 6,836 21 13 292 52,126

Greek
32 46 5 272 31 387
Catholics
Armenian
520 220 56 8,462 653 7 9,918
Catholics
Protestants 221 6 6 739 240 1 1,213
Latins 139 8 2,669 89 2,905
Suryani 18 5 5 511 23 562
Chaldeans 476 476
Gypsies 280 280
Serbians 1,603 52 21 1,467 196 3,339
Total 386,892 46,896 11,087 261,095 111,643 32,144 18,348 18,792 23,081 909,978
Source: Memalik-i Osmaniyye’nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği, (Dersaadet: Hilal Matbaası, 1336), pp.
8-9.133
When this data is compared with Ottoman General Census of 1881/82-1893, it

is clear that Muslim population increased significantly. According to the General
Census of 1881/82-1893, the Muslim population in Istanbul was 425.365, the Greek
population was 188.012 and the Armenian population was 152.399.134 The growth in
Muslim population was more than 100.000 according this data. This rise was probably
related to the immigration wave following the Balkan Wars. According to the present
data, the Armenian population in 1914 seems to have reduced to nearly its half in
1893.135 Although there is no exact information explaining that significant change,
133
According to this statistics there was also one Wallacian living in Bakirköy.
134
Karpat, “The Population and the Social”, pp. 148-149.
43
there are two possible explanations. First, since the General Census of 1893 was not
reliable enough, the number given for the Armenian population might be incorrect.136
Second, presuming both numbers to be correct, this decrease might be related to the
migration to the United States and/or European countries after the Armenian incidents
and massacres during 1890’s. However, there is no exact data to explain the difference
between the numbers given in the General Census of 1881/82-1893 and the Population
Statistics of 1914.
From 1914 to 1921 there is no data about Istanbul population. In 1921,
İhsaiyyat Mecmuası (Journal of Statistics) published the population of Istanbul by
reference to the Directorate of Population: 661.649 male and 468.006 female, being in
total 1.129.655. According to Toprak, this data is suspicious. First, the number of
foreigners in this statistics was exactly the same as the number of 1914. Furthermore,
the number of children increased to 25.046 since 1914 and reached 104.438. This rise
was not logical because during the war years there was a grave problem of
provisioning as well as outbreaks of epidemics. Therefore, a lot of children had died
during the war. Moreover, the male population reduced making an increase as
specified in the tables impossible. Therefore, the data was not reliable.137
There is one more data about the population of Istanbul after the Great War.
This was a kind of census, which was prepared by police stations during 1922. By the
order of Miralay Esad Bey, Chief of Police, police stations divided Istanbul’s
population into ‘millets’ and registered the people neighborhood by neighborhood.
135
According to Talat Pasha’s registers, Armenian population living in Istanbul in 1915-1916 was
80,000. Murat Bardakçı, Talat Paşa’nın Emval-i Metrukesi, (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2009), pp.
108-109. This number is close to the number specified as 72,962 in the Population Statistics of 1914.
136
According to Karpat, the Ottoman General Census of 1881/1882-1893 was the first comprehensive
Ottoman census being relatively more sophisticated compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, it suffered
from some deficiencies. For instance, Karpat states that even for the population results of more
developed areas the margin of error ranged between 2 and 5 percent, whereas this margin became 6 and
12 percent for remote areas. Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population: 1830-1914: Demographic and Social
Characteristics, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 34.
137
Zafer Toprak, “Nüfus”, Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. VI, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı
Yayınları ve Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1994), p. 110.
44
According to this census, 373.124 Muslims, 158.219 Greeks, 87.919 Armenians,
40.018 Jews and 51.006 people from other millets, totally 710.286 people were living
in Istanbul in 1922. Male population was 48.6 percent of the total population whereas
the female population was 51.4 percent of it. Toprak argues that this census result
seems more reasonable than the numbers given by İhsaiyyat Mecmuası.138 Population
decreased nearly 200.000 people from 1914 to 1922 as a result of famines, epidemics
and scarce living conditions during the war years. Furthermore, the male population
became lower than the female population as a result of losses in war. The Greek
population also decreased nearly 50.000. This might be because of the migrations
during the war years. Armenian population rose nearly 15.000. This rise might be due
to the immigrations from Anatolia to Istanbul, especially following the end of the war.
Although the Ottoman government tried to prevent any kind of migration from
deportation areas to Istanbul, after 1918, a great number of Armenians began coming
to into the city.
Up to here, the population change in Istanbul has evaluated from the second
half of the nineteenth century to early of 1920’s. It is clear that wars were the most
influential socio-political events that effected in the city population. Especially as a
result of the Crimean War, 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War and Balkan Wars, a large
number of Muslim population immigrated to Istanbul and changed the population of
the city in favor of the Muslims. Furthermore, the economic, social and physical
transformation of Istanbul during the nineteenth century made the city one of the most
favorite destinations in the Empire. Therefore, not only the refugees but also people
looking for new jobs came to Istanbul. The following table shows the percentage of
new comers in Istanbul at the end of the nineteenth century:
138
Toprak, “Nüfus”, p. 110.
45
Table 2: Population of Istanbul in 1885: Natives and New Comers
Religoious Those born in Istanbul Those born outside Istanbul

Group Male Female Male Female
Total No % No % Total No % No %
Muslim 143,586 55,300 27.5 88.286 48.1 241.324 146,039 72.5 95,285 51.9
Greek 68,764 23,292 25.3* 45.472 74.6 83,977 68,512 74.7* 15,465 25.4
Orthodox
Armenian 78,679 24,995 29.8* 53.684 81.7 70,911 58,875 70.2* 12,036 18.3
Orthodox
Bulgarian 46 22 0.6* 24 6.0* 4,331 3.955 99.4* 376 94.0
Catholic 3,722 1,533 47.8 2,189 67.7* 2,720 1,676 52.2 1,044 32.3
Jewish 42,363 21.029 94.0* 21,334 97.1 1,998 1,365 6.0* 633 2.9
Protestant 225 118 24.2 107 30.5* 594 370 75.8 224 69.5*
Latin 609 261 48.5 348 62,9 473 267 51.5 206 37.1
Total 337,994 126.550 211,444 406,328 281,059 125,269
Source: Karpat, “The Population and the Social”, p. 105.
According to this data, new comers were more than the natives of Istanbul in 1885.
Especially Muslim male population coming from outside became strikingly high
compared to the population of native Muslim males born in Istanbul. As will be seen
in the following chapters, these new comers were regarded as “a threat for public
order” during the war years. As a security measure, a great number of people would
either be sent to their homelands or other parts of Anatolia just because they had come
from outside Istanbul.
The economic life of Istanbul, as a city with large and dynamic population, will
be examined in the following chapter. Especially, the economic conditions of the city
during the war years will be focused on. These economic conditions were certainly the
main cause of many crimes during the Great War.
2.2 Economic Life
Istanbul was a major port city in the Ottoman Empire therefore and became a
center of socio-economic transformation during the nineteenth century.139 Parallel to
46
economic developments, Pera witnessed a remarkable rise in importance the second
half of the nineteenth century. It was not only the symbol of a Europeanized Istanbul,
but also the center for the rising non-Muslim commercial bourgeoisie.140 According to
Karpat, the contrast between the shops in Pera –modern, full of attractive display on
the windows–, and the bazaar in the old city –traditional, no displays on the windows
or anything else for attracting the attention of costumers– was an indicator of the mode
of transformation during the nineteenth century. Thus Karpat argues that there were
two faces of Istanbul in terms of socio-economic life: on the one hand there was a
district where modern shops, amusement places, modern schools were present; on the
other hand, there was a region where economic and social life was continuing in the
same rhythm as it already was since long time ago. 141
When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War the economic dynamics of
Istanbul changed rapidly. As a result of commercial treaties, European States had
gained economic concessions in the Ottoman lands in the second half of the nineteenth
century. The Ottoman Empire had turned into an open market for European goods, and
the CUP aimed at was putting an end to this situation. The war provided convenient
conditions for the Ottoman State to abolish the capitulations unilaterally. This was an
important attempt to overturn the semi-colonial situation of the Ottoman Empire.142
The CUP government also began implementing national economic policies during the
war years.
Implementation of nationalist economic policies had two aspects. First, in a
nationalistic way, the element of Turkishness gained a hightened importance because
the CUP aimed at creating a national identity from a multi-national and multi-religious
139
140
Karpat, “The Population and the Social”, p. 99-100.
141
142
Eric Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003), pp. 179-183.
47
imperial one.143 As stated in the previous part, the demographic structure of the empire
had changed for the favor of the Muslim-Turkish element after the second half of the
nineteenth century. This new demographic structure provided a convenient
environment for the implementation of national economic policies. Second, a Turkish
bourgeoisie had to be created both in order to improve the economic conditions of the
Empire and to render this group the capacity to act as the conveyor of the national
identity.144 From the CUP’s point of view, in order to save the Empire, the creation of
a bourgeois class composed of Muslim-Turkish elements was necessary. In short,
nationalist economic policies, already in effect prior to the Great War, became the
appropriate economic strategy within war conditions. During this long and
comprehensive war, there came about profound structural changes in the Ottoman
economy.
There were mainly two important issues related to the economic situation of
Istanbul during the Great War years. These were the provisioning of the city and price
speculations as well as high inflation rates.
2.2.1 Provisioning
In 1914, the level of harvest was high in many parts of the Empire. However,
the Istanbul government did not show due prudence in storing crops and efficiently
using them. The reason was because neither politicians nor ordinary people expected
the war to last long. At the time the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, the state
conscripted almost all the male population between 20 and 45 years old. Therefore, old
men, women and the children were left to do the harvest work, which eventually
resulted in the wasting of the plentiful harvest of 1914.145
143
Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat Milli Burjuvazi, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), p.25.
144
Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli İktisat, p. 33.
145
Ahmet Emin Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim, Vol. 1, (Istanbul: Yenilik Basımevi,
1970), p. 270.
48
Actually, even in normal times the Ottoman Empire, although being an
agricultural country, was unable to feed itself sufficiently. It was dependent on other
countries, especially Ukraine, Romania and Russia, in agricultural products. Istanbul
was an enormous consumption center and almost all provisioning of the city was
dependent on agricultural imports, especially flour coming from other countries. When
the war began, transportation between the countries selling agricultural products and
the Ottoman Empire totally closed down.146 Different from other provinces of the
empire, Istanbul became unable get sufficient food supply from hinterland, whereas
there was self-sufficient agricultural production in most provinces in Anatolia. The
traditional ways of producing and distributing hindered Istanbul from receiving
adequate supply from the interior.147 In this sense, entrance to the Great War without
any preparation for the provisioning of Istanbul would prove to be disastrous.
A critical food shortage began in Istanbul already at the beginning of the war.
According to Yalman, food shortage was not the real trouble for Istanbul; the crucial
point was the problem of distribution.148 The CUP established several commissions in
order to make distribution efficient; however, it was soon understood that the CUP
lacked the capacity to govern economic life in such a crisis situation. At the beginning
of the war, the Commission for Essential Needs (Havaic-i Zaruriye Komisyonu) was
founded under the directorate of the Ministry of Interior. The function of this
commission was to deal with provisioning issues and provide necessary consumer
goods to the people and the army. Moreover, the commission was responsible for
determining the goods to be stacked and collecting them in case it was necessary in
order to prevent price increases.149
However, the failure of this commission led to the removal of basic necessities
from the market by the traders. In 1915 the Central Commission of the CUP took the
146
Yalman, Turkey in the World War, p. 270.
147
148
149
Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 128.
49
responsibility. Then, the Trade Commission (Heyet-i Mahsusa-i Ticariye) was
established under the directorate of İzzet Bey who was the secretary of the Bakery
Commission (Ekmekçiler Cemiyeti).150 Kara Kemal, the leader of the local party
organization in Istanbul, had a great influence on the commission, being in fact the
only person responsible for the provisioning of Istanbul.151 Kara Kemal was a very
important important political figure during the war years. Having strengthened the
craft organization in the city, he had a strong network among the grocers (bakkallar),
porters (hamal) and the bakers (fırıncılar). In addition, he appointed someone loyal to
him as the leader of craft organizations (esnaf teşkilatı). Especially, the porter
organization became extremely powerful as a result of Kara Kemal’s support.
According to Yalman, the porters began to act as the ‘commando’ force of Kara Kemal
while he threatened the CUP to provoke an uprising among the craftsmen and other
people that were loyal to him in case the CUP did not accept his demands.152
However, when the memoirs of Talat Pasha are taken into consideration, it is
clear that the CUP leaders were not highly critical of craft organizations. On the
contrary, Talat Pasha described these organizations and their leaders as committed
elements of the national economic policy. According to Talat Pasha, “the leaders of
these craft organizations were studying kindheartedly like fathers and none of them
thought of obtaining even the slightest interest for themselves.”153 It is clear that
according to the CUP leaders there was a direct relationship between the craft
organizations and the national economic policy. In fact, when the ethno-religious
compositions of craft organizations are taken into consideration, this relationship
150
Zafer Toprak, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Istanbul", Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 2,
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1993-1994) p. 240.
151
Toprak, İttihat Terakki Cemiyeti ve Cihan Harbi, p. 129.
152
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim, p. 268.
153
Nevertheless, Talat Pasha also accepted the fact that although the aim for foundation of craft
organizations was to serve for national economic policies, a great number of people being close to the
leaders of craft organizations made eventually huge profits thanks to such connections. Alpay Kabacalı
(ed.), Talat Paşa’nın Anıları, (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), p. 35.
50
becomes much clearer. The craft organizations were exclusively composed of Muslim-
Turkish elements, meaning that their institutional structure deliberately left out non-
Muslim craftsmen and tradesmen.154 Thus, becoming indispensable members of
economic life during the war years, these organizations served for the formation of a
Muslim-Turkish commercial bourgeoisie. Yet they were not the only elements of the
national economic policy. During the first war year, a considerable number of national
companies were founded in Istanbul and Anatolia as the first corporate organizations
of national economy. Kara Kemal was once again a prominent figure in the foundation
of these.
In the first years of the war, Kara Kemal was only responsible for the
provisioning of Istanbul, whereas through time he became involved in regulating all
the economic life in the city, especially using his network in craft organizations. This
actually meant that he was the foremost figure at the top of a huge body of money
circulation. He used most of the cash endowments of national companies in support of
national economic policies.155 On 23 September 1915, Anatolia National Crops
Ottoman Incorporated Company (Anadolu Milli Mahsulat Osmanlı Anonim Şirketi)
was founded in Istanbul. It was the first national company that was established under
the leadership of Kara Kemal.156 In 1916, the second national company National
Importation Scale Incorporated Company (Milli İthalat Kantariyye Anonim Şirketi),
half of whose capital was provided by the Trade Commission, was founded in Istanbul
for importation and distribution of bread and sugar.157
The facilities of national companies, the Trade Commission under the
leadership of Kara Kemal, and the monopoly of the CUP on the provisioning of
Istanbul were in a strict sense only criticized by a few members of the Senate. There
154
Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İttihat ve Terakki, Vol. 3, (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı
Yayınları, 1989), p. 336.
155
156
157
Other goods that were imported and distributed/sold by Heyet-i Mahsusa-i Ticariye were gas, wheat,
barley, olive oil and soap Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 132.
51
was the general opinion that some people close to the CUP were becoming rich as a
result of the CUP’s monopoly on provisioning. Similarly, the national companies
mentioned above had privileges in using transportation facilities thanks to their
relations with the CUP government working on their own advantage.158 Thus they
could easily transport their goods, whereas other tradesmen did not benefit from such
advantages of transportation. This fact led to unfair competitive advantages for some
companies, allowing them to set a monopoly in the market. Therefore, they would able
to determine the prices and earn huge profits.
In short, national companies, the Trade Commission and craft organizations
were regulating the provisioning of Istanbul. Kara Kemal as the head of the local party
organization had enourmous influence over each of these organizations. In fact, Kara
Kemal as well as other CUP members denied the fact that the former had engaged in
these facilities capitalizing on his political identity. However, especially the foundation
of national companies was widely considered an outcome of his personal endeavour.159
The capital accumulation used in the establishment of national companies was in any
case achieved through the interests gained from provisioning.160 There was a network
in provisioning facilities in the city while the CUP government had an indirect
monopoly over these. According to Yalman, “the monopoly was little interested in the
actual provisioning of the people in wartime. The possibilities of future trade that
could be Turkified, and considerations of personal and party interest were more
dominant.”161
In fact, ordinary people were not satisfied with the distribution facilities
which were insufficient to solve the provisioning problem of Istanbul. As a result of
rising opposition, the CUP included the problem to the agenda of the Party Congress in
158
Vahakn N. Dadrian and Taner Akçam, ‘Tehcir ve Taktil’ Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi Zabıtları: Ittıhat ve
Terakki’nin Yargılanması, 1919-1922, (İstanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları, 2008), p. 297.
159
Dadrian and Akçam, ‘Tehcir ve Taktil’, p. 295, 303, 315. Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-
Terakki’nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması, (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1998), p. 457.
160
161
52
1916 for discussion.162 In order to make clear the commercial activities of the CUP,
Kara Kemal presented a report about the provisioning work for the last three months,
intended to be a justification of the activities of the Trade Commission.163 In this party
congress, the CUP tried to justify all economic undertakings of the Trade Commission
related to the provisioning of Istanbul with reference to the necessity of establishing a
national economy. It was overtly stated that “as a result of the activities of this
Commission [Trade Commission], not only some basic goods were properly provided,
but also a number of national companies were founded with national capital.
Moreover, within the last two years all economic facilities of the country had been
transferred from non-national hands to national hands.”164 This is in a sense an
acknowledgement of the fact that the CUP government had deliberately used the
profits of the Trade Commission as founding capital for the first national companies.
Although the CUP government supported the provisioning facilities of the
Trade Commission, this did not prevent discontent among people about the
distribution of basic goods. In the face of rising opposition and complaints, the duty of
provisioning was assigned to the city municipality (Şehremaneti) in March 1916.
Nevertheless, İsmail Hakkı (Canbulat), the mayor of Istanbul, was not successful in
managing the issue. There emerged a serious shortage of food in the city. Hereupon,
the Central Provisioning Commission (Merkez İaşe Heyeti) was formed on 23 July,
1916 taking as its model the German Provisioning Organization.165 The main idea here
was to recognize provisioning by dividing the country into regions and precluding any
162
The debates of CUP Congress in 1916 was published as a booklet by Tanin Matbaası. For full text
translation see, Mete Tunçay, Cihatve Tehcir: 1915-1916 Yazıları, (İstanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1991), pp.
56-112. For debates on provisioning of Istanbul, national companies and Trade Commission see Cihat
ve Tehcir, pp. 71-72, 83, 99-103.
163
For detailed information about the content of this report, See, Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi,
p. 134.
164
“Sırf bu heyetin [Heyet-i Mahsusa-i Ticariyye] faaliyeti sayesinde bir takım havayic pek iyi denecek
bir surette temin edilmiş olduktan başka meydana tamamen milli bir sermaye ve milli bir idare ve gaye
ile birkaç büyük ve kuvvetli şirketler çıktığı gibi iki seneden beri memleketin bütün faaliyet-i
iktisadiyyesi gayr-i milli ellerden milli ellere intikal etmiştir.” Tunçay, Cihat ve Tehcir, pp. 101-102.
165
Toprak, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Istanbul", p. 240.
53
kind of food trade among these. Istanbul was in the first provisioning region and
continued to occupy primary place in the provisioning issue. It was a fact that the
capital city was the most influential center in determining the price movements all over
the Empire. Kara Kemal became the director of the First Provisioning Region.166
In 1917, the war still continued. Although the government had applied
different methods and had found a variety of commissions in order to solve the
provisioning problem of Istanbul, the city was still suffering from food shortage. In
August 1917, the General Directorate of Provisioning (İaşe Umum Müdürlüğü) was
established as affiliated to the Ministry of War. All the vehicles necessary for trade
were in the hands of the Ministry of War. Therefore, the Ministry of War was
considered as the most appropriate government institution for solving the problem of
food supply.167 The General Directorate of Provisioning banned the trade of grains that
were used for bread and as forage. This institution was collecting wheat, sugar, flour,
olive oil and other food from the depots and shops of tradesmen and shopkeepers,
meaning that free trade of these items in open market was prohibited.168
Although the activities of General Directorate of Provisioning solved the
provisioning problem of Istanbul to a certain extent, the government was compelled to
establish the Ministry of Provisioning (İaşe Nezareti) in July 1918.169 Not surprisingly,
Kara Kemal became the Minister of Provisioning.170 This Ministry would be
responsible for the regulation of provisioning until the end of the war.
166
For detailed information about the Provisioning Regions and the administration of these regions see,
Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, pp. 139-143.
167
168
169
“İaşe Nezareti hakkında kararname, 11 Şevval 1336/30 Temmuz 1334 (July 30, 1918)”, Düstur,
II/10, (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928), pp. 558-563. In fact, Ahmed Rıza, who was a prominent
member of the Meclis-i Ayan (Ottoman Senate) and one of the founders of the CUP, had recommended
the foundation of the Ministry of Provisioning in early 1917. However, the government rejected his
proposal, claiming that existing commissions dealing with provisioning were successful enough.
MAZC, 3/3, 31, 6 Şubat 1332 (February 19, 1917), pp. 488-490; 497-502. For detailed information see,
Chapter 6, pp. 238-239.
54
It is clear that the CUP government attempted to solve the provisioning
problems of Istanbul, in particular, and the Ottoman Empire, in general, through the
foundation a number of institutions. However, it is quite difficult to argue that
effective provisioning could be achieved in Istanbul. Considering all the policies about
provisioning during the war years, the CUP had inarguably failed to be effective.
Yalman noted that:
... During the War, production decreased and the means of transport became
more inadequate. The elements of the mismanagement, abuses and waste
vastly complicated the situation. As a consequence more or less acute state
of famine existed during the last two years of the War in all parts of the
country. The high death rate during the War can, in part, be directly
attributed to the famine. 171
Due to the mismanagement of provisioning in Istanbul, the city witnessed some other
economic problems during the war years such as inflation, black-market and
speculation.
2.2.2 Inflation, Black-Market and Speculation
Belligerent states of the World War used mainly two different ways to finance
the war expenses. The first was the most preferable one: financing the war by
extraordinary taxes. However, as the war lengthened, people became reluctant to pay
taxes. Nevertheless, this option remained as the most desirable one, and continued to
be practiced in Britain. Since people were persuaded that the Great War was a matter
of life and death, and that every segment of society had to sacrifice something for the
sake of victory, mobilizing people and collecting taxes seemed as necessary strategies.
Extraordinary taxes imposed the mentality of sacrifice. Taxpayers were mostly the
170
Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İttihat ve Terakki, p. 337.
171
55
entrepreneurs of war industry who made huge profits at that time. Thus, this also
served to alleviate deepening social inequalities.172
The second way was domestic borrowing, which was mainly followed by
Germany during the Great War. This was not a healthy option due to two reasons.
First, this did not allow the state to infuse people with the mentality of sacrifice.
Second, when defeated at the end of the war, states such as Germany would not be able
to repay their debts, thereby being forced to descending into an economic crisis as well
as having losing their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.173
Ottoman Empire did not have the necessary financial infrastructure neither for
collecting extraordinary taxes nor for internal borrowing. From the beginning of the
war, the Ottoman State issued money to cover the war expenses. This strategy resulted
in rapidly rising inflation rates and, accordingly, black-market and speculation in a
short period of time.174 The cost of living in the Ottoman Empire during the war years
was as follows:
Table 3: Cost of Living Index in the Ottoman Empire During the Great War
Year Cost of living index

(cost of living in 1914 is assumed as
100 )
1914 100
1915 130
1916 212
1917 846
1918 1823
Source: Toprak, “Birici Dünya Savaşı’nda Istanbul”, p. 242.
172
173
174
56
The prices of basic consumption goods increased while wages were not rising.
Besides, in the beginning of the war, the Ottoman government decided to cut half of
civil servants’ salary, in order to reduce expenses. Purchasing power of the people,
especially those living on fixed income, diminished rapidly. Consequently, civil
servants became instant losers of the Great War in the Ottoman Empire, becoming
poorer and poorer as the war lengthened. Although, the State decided to make a salary
increase of 10 to 20 percent, in 1916 and 1918, as the cost of living was rising, the
salary increase proved to be futile. For instance, the monthly salary of an ordinary
teacher in Istanbul was 840 kuruş (piastre) in 1918, whereas the total price of
necessary consuming goods according to the cost of living index was 4.594 kuruş.175
Therefore, the salary of a teacher was enough to afford only a small part of his/her cost
of living. Workers’ daily wage increase was much better than the salary increase of
civil servants. However, the salary of the workers was still far from meeting the cost of
living.176
Increase in prices (kıyye*/kuruş) in Istanbul during the war years is as follows:
175
Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 153. Also see the table that indicated the salaries of civil
servants and officers in the Great War, p. 156.
176
For detailed information about daily wages increase of workers see Vedat Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke
Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomisi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları), 1994 pp.
54-55.
* Kıyye is an Ottoman weight unit equivalent to 1.282 kilograms.

57
Table 4: Increase of Retail Prices in Istanbul during the War Years
1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

Bread (free) 1.25 1.65 9.5 18 34 13
Bread(distributed with fixed price) - - 1.6 2.5 2.5 -
Flour 1.75 2.3 12 30 45 20
Pasta 3.0 4.5 12 30 45 20
Rice 3.0 5.0 20 45 92 45
Sugar (free) 3.0 7.5 30 112 195 46
Sugar (distributed with fixed price) - - - 20 30 -
Coffee 12.0 25.0 110 300 800 105
Tea 60 120 250 400 500 250
Onion 0.5 1.0 4 8 15 7
Beans (free) 4.0 7.0 15 40 65 35
Beans (distributed with fixed price) - - - 10 15 -
Potato 1.0 1.6 3 14 27 16
Milk 2.0 3.5 7 15 45 40
Cheese 12.0 20.0 40 100 210 120
Clarified butter 10.0 18.0 30 85 170 130
Butter 20.0 50.0 90 155 350 300
Olive Oil 8.0 14.5 25 88 160 115
Eggs (per unit) 0.5 0.8 1.2 3 6 4.5
Salt 1.5 1.5 2 2.5 4.5 12
Mutton (sheep meat [?]) (for free) 7.0 8.5 16 35 125 70
Mutton (distributed with fixed price) - - - 30 50 -
Soap 7.0 12.6 20 53 140 70
Gas oil 1.5 3.0 50 80 140 22
Firewood (çeki, weight of 250 kilos) 45 70 150 235 540 500
Wood coal 0.5 1 2 4 11 7
Shoes 70 130 230 350 1,100 700
Cloth (male) 450 625 900 2,000 6,000 3,000
Coal (ton) 115 126 200 420 975 3,000
Cigarette (per package) 2.5 2.5 5 10 15 20
Source: Eldem compiled this information from the data of Düyun-i Umumiye İdaresi (Public Debt
Administration), İaşe Teşkilatı (Provisioning Organization) and Istanbul Belediyesi (Municipality of
Istanbul). Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında, pp. 50-51
In order to prevent price increases, the government began to set fixed prices on
some basic consumption goods after 1916. However, this practice resulted in
speculation. While entering the war, the Ottoman politicians made a miscalculation,
predicting that the war would end latest in the second half of 1915. From the table
above, it is clear that the prices did not increase much until 1916. However, as war
58
lengthened and the stocks began to exhaust, the prices began to rise rapidly.
Furthermore, merchants were over-sensitive to the news from the fronts, which also
became influential on price rises.177 Merchants began stocking consumption goods
because they realized that the prices would rise in the following months and years.
They sold these goods with high prices when there was a scarcity in the market. As a
result, the gap between the prices determined by the state and the actual market prices
grew dramatically. Black-market became an important part of economic life in
Istanbul. Speculative entrepreneurs gained huge profits, and there emerged a new class
called ‘profiteers’. The new riches were generally merchants and bureaucrats who
were close to the CUP.178 The CUP policies towards profiteering as an ‘ignored crime’
will be analyzed in the sixth chapter. Nevertheless, here, it can be argued that the
traditional social structure almost totally changed. Civil servants, who had constructed
a respectable class until the war, became the ‘new poor’. On the other hand, the
merchants who engaged in speculative enterprise became the ‘new rich’.
Therefore, in many aspects, the economic policies of the CUP were
unsuccessful. First, the provisioning problem of Istanbul could not have been solved
until the end of the war, although the government tried many different ways and
established various institutions to deal with this problem. Besides, the Ottoman State
was deprived of the financial and economic ability to improve successful projects to
finance a long war. The Ottoman government issued paper money during the war in
order to finance the war expenses. Actually, most of the belligerent states issued
money; however, for other states, this was only one way among others such as
collecting taxes, internal and external borrowing. Since the government used this as the
primary way of financing the war, there was inevitable hyperinflation during the war
years, and the cost of living increased tremendously.
177
178
François Georgeon, "Gülüşün ve Gözyaşlarının Kıyısında", Istanbul, 1914-1923, Stefanos Yerasimos
(ed), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 82.
59
The state was also unprepared for a long war in terms of food stocks. Different
from many other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, Istanbul was historically fed by
agricultural products coming from Romania, Ukraine and Russia. When trade routes
were closed down during the war and the food stock finished, a shortage of food began
in Istanbul in the late 1915. This, in turn, caused the boom of speculative enterprise
and black-market. On the one hand, merchants engaging in speculative enterprise
earned huge amounts of money and began living in luxury; on the other hand, the
majority of Istanbul population was struggling with hunger and high costs of living.
The next section will deal with the dramatically changing social relations and
other social dynamics of wartime Istanbul.
2.3 Social Life
Demographic and economic changes in the late nineteenth century and during
the war years examined in the previous parts had great impact on the social life in
Istanbul. This part will analyze the social life in Istanbul mainly in two parts. Initially,
the social structure of the city in the second half of the nineteenth century will be
examined in terms of the settlement organization of city-dwellers and the rising classes
in city life. Then, social life during the Great War will be analyzed with regard to
changing social relations as a result of emergence of new classes (new poors and new
riches); the situation of the women; and the problems of the city, as well as reforms
attempts.
2.3.1 Nineteenth Century
Istanbul, as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, had a dynamic and

heterogeneous population. The city became a center of attraction through the economic
and social transformations of the second half of the nineteenth century. Although there
was no clear-cut ethno-religious separation in the boroughs of the city, the
60
concentration of population in terms of ethno-religious identity displayed certain
characteristics: Eyüp, Kasımpaşa, Şehremini, Fatih, Unkapanı, Eminönü, Aksaray and
Beyazid were boroughs of the Old City mostly concentrated by Muslim-Turkish
population. Jews were predominantly living in Hasköy, across the Golden Horn, and
Balat. Pera, several neighborhoods and villages across the Golden Horn, and Fener
were the boroughs where Ottoman Greeks had a visible concentration. Armenians
were living mostly in Samatya and Kumkapı. The Armenian Patriarchate was located
in Kumkapı whereas the Greek patriarchate was in Fener.179 Pera and Galata, as the
most westernized and modernized part of Istanbul, were predominantly inhabited by
Europeans.180
Istanbul was one of the most important port cities of the Ottoman Empire.
Especially, during the second half of the nineteenth century, trade increased and
economic opportunities expanded. This was the main reason of internal immigration to
the city until 1880’s. Most of the immigrants had a dream of finding new opportunities
in this lively city. Half of the Istanbul population was composed of non-Muslims
between the years 1844-1880.181 However as a result of immigrations, which
intensified especially following the Ottoman-Russian War (1877/1878), the
demographic structure of the city changed in favor of the Muslim-Turkish
population.182
Bureaucracy had risen as a powerful social group throughout Ottoman
modernization.183 These were predominantly graduates of the modern schools. Having
179
Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, p. 21.
180
Karpat, “The Population and Social”, p. 86.
181
182
183
Karpat makes a detailed evaluation about the rise of the bureucracy in Istanbul during the second half
of the nineteenth century. See “The Population and Social”, pp. 92-95. Fatma Müge Göçek also deals
with the rise of bureaucracy as a part of bourgeois class in the Ottoman Empire. See, Rise of
Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, New York Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996.
61
official posts, they had regular salaries from the state. Their consumption tendencies
had a great impact on Istanbul’s socio-economic life, as their purchasing power was
enough to affect changes in three main sectors in the city’s economy: food, clothing
and housing.184 For instance, when this group began to prefer buying European goods,
and demanded a European way of life, alongside with foreigners whose number had
increased during the nineteenth century, Pera became the rising commercial district of
Istanbul, with its modern shops, new banks and European-style buildings. Bureaucrats
became regular visitors of Pera, as the district became dominated by by the foreigners
and non-Muslim Ottomans.185
Merchants as another important social group in Istanbul were mainly divided
into two parts in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, as indicated earlier, a
modern commercial life began to arise in Pera. Merchants there, most of whom were
non-Muslim Ottomans and Levantines, were a rising commercial bourgeois class.
These had close ties with European capitalist centers. The language of communication
in Pera and Galata was French, although almost all of the merchants had a different
native language, especially Greek and Armenian. Moreover, most of them knew
Turkish.186 However, the European impact in Pera as well as in Galata was not limited
to language. Pera was different from all other parts of Istanbul, in the sense that it
reflected a Europeanized side of the Ottoman Empire.187 After 1850, merchants of
Galata and Pera began to buy big houses in Pera and live there, becoming neighbors to
European missions. According to Karpat, as a result of this close relationship, a
considerable number of Greek and Armenian merchants converted into Protestant and
Catholic.188 Besides, European way of life made these merchants much more secular
184
185
186
187
For physical change of Pera and Galata see İlber Ortaylı, Istanbul’dan Sayfalar, (Istanbul: Alkım
Yayınları, 2006), pp. 295-296.
188
62
compared to earlier generations. Consequently, the influence of the clergy on the
newly emerging commercial bourgeoisie was limited.189
On the other hand, traditional commercial life continued in the bazaar,
especially in the Old City. Here, shops here were humble. They were selling relatively
cheap commodities to the lower classes of Istanbul. There were over a thousand shops
owned by Muslims, Greeks, Armenians and Jews in the central bazaar of Istanbul.
Turkish-Muslim merchants in the grand bazaar were selling furs, clothing, books,
perfumes and engravings. Greeks were specialized in cotton goods. They also worked
as tailors and leather workers. Jewelry, watch making/repairing and embroideries were
the main fields that Armenians were active in. The Jews were specialized in a variety
of occupations.190
Other commercial activities outside that of the bazaar were in the hands of
bekars (single men, bachelors). Most of them were immigrants and worked as porters
(hamals), water distributers (saka), candy makers (helvacı, şekerci), sellers of fried
liver (ciğerci), and in other small occupations.191 The number of bekars in Istanbul was
approximately 75.000 in 1853. Two fifth of these were Muslim-Turkish men and the
rest were Greeks, Armenians and men from other nationalities. Porters were the most
powerful group among the bekars. As the streets in Istanbul were narrow and
downslope, containing many steps, porters were an important part of transportation.192
Their importance and power increased during the Great War years under the leadership
of Kara Kemal.
As indicated in the previous part on demographic changes, nineteenth century
Istanbul witnessed an influx of immigration from the Balkans, Caucasia and Anatolia.
These immigrants began to establish the first slum areas in Istanbul, in neighborhoods
of Eyüp, Kasımpaşa, Hasköy and Üsküdar. Such slum areas were close to more
189
190
Karpat, “The Population and Social”, pp. 94-95.
191
192
63
developed parts of the city. For instance, Kasımpaşa, Okmeydanı and Hasköy were
near Pera and the life in these slum areas was totally different from the life in Pera.
The same thing was the case for Üsküdar and the slum areas nearby.193
In conclusion, just before the Great War, Istanbul was a transforming and
vibrant city in terms of modernization and burgeoning capitalist life. There was the
rising class of bureaucrats. In addition, the merchants in Pera were an other rising
class. Throughout the nineteenth century, Pera and Galata changed physically, socially
and economically. However, the rest of the city continued traditional ways of living.
Certainly, this situation resulted in a cultural and social dichotomy in the city. Besides,
there emerged slum areas close to historical parts of the city as a result of immigration
waves. When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, still more changes were to
come.
2.3.2 The Great War
As indicated in the previous part, economic difficulties during the war years
resulted in the emergence of new class structures. This left its mark on many
dimensions of social life. For instance, officials and bureaucrats who had been as well-
educated, European-minded and prestigious classes during the nineteenth century
became losers of the war, as a result of their impoverishment in the face of high
inflation. Istanbul, as the capital, had a large number of officials and civil servants,
which further increased through the immigration of provincial administrative cadres
from Anatolia during the war and afterwards.194 However, in the meantime, the
purchasing power of officials in Istanbul decreased 60-80 percent.
On the other side, there emerged ‘new riches’ acquiring tremendous wealth
through speculative enterprise in a short period of time. Most of them were Muslim-
Turkish merchants, including some officials close to the CUP. Because these
193
Ortaylı, Istanbul’dan Sayfalar, p. 297-298.
194
Georgeon, "Gülüşün ve Gözyaşlarının Kıyısında", p. 85.
64
merchants made use of war conditions, they had an interest in being in a state of
war.195 As a result their consumption patterns were also contradictory with the war
conditions. They were living in luxury whereas common people including civil
servants suffering from poverty.
Whereas the new rich indulged in expensive food in luxurious hotels and
restaurants, the regular meal of an upper-middle class family was a moderate one
composed of bread, tarhana (a kind of traditional soup made of yoghurt, flour and
mint) and kapuska (cabbage stew).196 The situation of lower classes was even worse,
as most lower class families fed only on bread –if they were lucky enough to find it–
which was produced by a kind of flour that was a mixture of wheat and broom
seeds.197 The inequalities in the society further exacerbated towards the end of the war.
There was widespread discontent about the economic policies of the CUP. In 1917, the
CUP loosened tight censorship and left room for journalists to criticize economic
policies, intended to be a kind of buffer for the government against the anger among
people. Sabah and Vakit were the main newspapers includeding such critiques.
In the later years of the war and during the occupation period, nightlife gained
a momentum especially around Pera. This was closely related with the emergence of
the new riches. Immigration of Russians added further dimension to that. In a short
period of time, Russians became dominant in different branches of nightlife such as in
restaurants, pubs, cabarets, casinos and prostitution, especially in Pera.198 The
following words of Mazhar Osman, the head physician of Haseki Psychiatric Hospital
during the war years, serve as a testimony to the impact of Russian immigrants:
195
Georgeon, "Gülüşün ve Gözyaşlarının Kıyısında", pp. 82-83.
196
Adnan Ergeneli, Çocukluğumun Savaş Yılları Anıları, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1993), p. 56.
197
Cemil Filmer, Hatıralar: Türk Sinemasında 65 Yıl, (Istanbul: Emek, 1984), p. 65.
198
Zafer Toprak, “Önsöz”, Istanbul 1920, Clarence Richard and Johnson, M. A. (eds.), Sönmez Taner
(trans.), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), p. xi.
65
[…] Istanbul was in a mess (allahlıktı), every government was interfering and
none of them could do anything. The people were lost. Forty countries of the
world could not have oppressed Istanbul through artillery, rifle, airplane and
bombs, but [now] the city surrendered to cocaine and prostitution. Istanbul,
which had resisted against the Tsarist armies for 600 years, was defeated to the
Russian prostitutes.199
As a matter of fact, prostitution became also widespread also among Muslim

women.200 The main reason was the changing living conditions. On the one hand, war
conditions allowed women to become economically independent as they were
compelled to earn money and look after their families in the absence of males. On the
other hand, war conditions meant though living conditions and scarcity of proper jobs,
which were actually more difficult for women as they had not been active parts of
public life before the Great War. Many had been deprived of education and training to
acquire necessary qualities for technical jobs. Therefore, for many women, prostitution
became a way of earning money.
From the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era, there emerged a certain
awareness and inclination toward activism among intellectual women about the
subordinate position of women in the Ottoman society. However, prejudices inherited
from the Hamidian Era affecting women and the public opinion about the place of
women in the society were so strong. Most of the time “the Young Turks felt
themselves obliged to issue police orders regarding the changing dress of women, and
remind both women and their male guardians that carelessness in veiling constituted a
grave religious offence.”201 In fact, the issue of veiling had become a class-based one
especially during the second half of the nineteenth century. In big cities, especially in
Istanbul, upper class women followed new trends and created their own lines of
fashion. Once in a while a style of veiling became famous for a day and totally
199
Toprak, “Önsöz,” p. xii.
200
Zafer Toprak, “Fuhuş: Osmanlı Dönemi”, Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 3, (İstanbul:
Tarih Vakfı ve Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999), p. 343.
201
66
disappeared after a short time. Women from poorer classes were disturbed by this
situation, blaming women from upper classes as the cause of curse on the country that
was sent from heaven as a punishment.202 Thus, when the Constitutional Regime was
restored in 1908, despite the rising feminist ideology among intellectual women in
Istanbul, neither the state nor the public opinion was ready to make radical changes
about women’s place in the society. Nevertheless, the Great War conditions brought
about broad structural changes in everyday life and prepared a concrete base for
women emancipation.
New social and economic needs emerged during the wartime. Especially, after
1916, nearly all the male population of Istanbul was conscripted. Many business
sectors suffered as a result of lack of labor force. Thus, for the first time, women were
hired in diverse vacancies. In August 1916, the CUP founded the Ottoman Islamic
Association for the Employment of Women (Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyet-i
İslamiyesi).203 In four months, 14,000 Muslim women living in Istanbul applied to the
Association for a job.204 Thousands of women were employed in state offices and
factories. Women became street cleaners and volunteers in charitable organizations
and hospitals. 205 The facilities of the Association were not limited to finding jobs for
women. As a result of numerous pleas, the Association opened up soup kitchens to
provide regular meal to women and their children suffering from poverty.206
Furthermore, the first labor battalion, composed entirely of women, was founded
202
203
This society was not only providing jobs to women, but also functioned as a matchmaking
organization. On December 14, 1917, the society made it compulsory that all its single employees
should marry. The list of eligible members was published in local papers. This was in fact a part of the
CUP’s policies on family at that time. Zafer Toprak, "The Family, Feminism and the State During the
Young Turk Period, 1908-1918", Première Rencontre Internationale sur L’Empire Ottoman et la
Turquie Moderne, (Istanbul, Paris: Éditions ISIS, 1991), pp. 447-450.
204
Alan Duben, Cem Behar, Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880-1940,
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 44.
205
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, p. 280.
206
Duben and Behar, Istanbul Households., p. 44.
67
through the mediation of this society on February 9, 1918. 207 Alongside with the
facilities of this Association, the School of Commerce organized special courses for
girls who wanted to have education on business. As a result, educated men and women
began meeting in public life more frequently than before.208
Emancipation of women led to the rise of women organizations and
publications. In the major cities of the Ottoman Empire, nearly fourty different
women’s journals were published between the years 1867 and 1927. The journals
before 1913 conventionally agreed that the primary responsibilities of women were
motherhood and wifehood. Eventually, by 1913 and afterwards, there were women had
become radical enough to declare themselves as feminists and demand social change.
Their voice became even louder during the war years.209 The leading feminist
organization, Association for the Defence of the Women’s Rights (Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u
Nisvan Cemiyeti), was established on 28 May 1913 in Istanbul. The journal of this
association, Kadınlar Dünyası, began publishing on 4 April 1913, actually before the
foundation of the Association.210
This journal aimed at raising awareness about women’s identity as well as
problems. It also struggled to stimulate changes in social roles of women while
contributing to the momentum of the feminist movement in the Ottoman Empire.211
The emergence of this association and its continuation during the war years was a
direct consequence of changing social relations. In turn, the facilities of the
Association and publication of the Kadınlar Dünyası also contributed to these changes.
There were many other women’s organizations of which women became members or
volunteers. The Ottoman Association for the Protection of Women (Osmanlı Himaye-i
Nisvan Cemiyeti), Ottoman Association for the Employment of Women (Osmanlı
207
208
209
210
Serpil Çakır, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi, (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1996), p. 57, 80.
211
Çakır, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi, p. 57.
68
Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyeti) and several charity organizations worked actively
during the war years. The difference between these organizations and the Association
for the Defence of the Women’s Rights was that the latter was not a state-sponsored
organization,212 whereas the others were state-sponsored organizations and instruments
of mobilization. Nevertheless, they were still noteworthy regarding their contribution
to the promotion of women in public sphere.
The change of women’s place in the society was also influential on the
resistance movement during the occupation years. Women’s resistance began with
Reunion for the Martyrs at Fatih Tomb in March 1919. It was followed by the famous
Fatih Demonstration that was organized by women on 19 May, 1919. 213 Halide Edip
Adıvar, a prominent feminist, journalist, novelist and intellectual, was the leader of the
demonstration. These were remarkable developments in the Ottoman society. Women,
who had been mostly inactive elements of public sphere and political life before the
war, became active contributors to the political movements as well as economic life
during the War years.
The participants of the demonstrations were women who had lost their
husbands, sons and/or fathers in the war. It is a fact that the life of women was very
difficult from the beginning of the war and afterwards. They had to look after their
family. The economic and social conditions of women were similar to each other
regardless of ethnicity and religion. Many Turkish-Muslim women who had lost their
husbands were living in mosques, medreses or their own places at that time. Most of
these had children. The women who stayed in their own places generally lived in a
single room with their children.214 The most common job among the Turkish-Muslim
212
213
Toprak, “Önsöz,” , p. xiii.
214
C. Marbelle Phillips, “Dul Kadınlar”, Istanbul 1920, Clarence Richard and Johnson, M. A. (eds.),
Translated by Sönmez Taner, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), p. 250. This article is the
outcome of a survey conducted on 400 widows in 1920. A hundred widows were chosen as sample from
each of Turkish-Muslim, Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities. Although the research included the
lives of only four hundred women, it provides a general idea about women’s life in the aftermath of the
69
women was laundering. They also worked as housekeepers and tailors.215 Due to lack
of sufficient income, most of these women were probably attending the soup houses of
the Red Crescent Organizations.
The situation of Armenian women was not much different. They were mostly
living in the European part of Istanbul. Galata, Pera, Şişli, Gedikpaşa, and Makriköy
were the regions where Armenian women resided. A small number of Armenian
women were living on the hills around the Golden Horn.216 Most of these women were
not accustomed to work; however under the war conditions they had no other option.
A great number of these became launderers and house workers.217 They earned a
minimum wage barely sufficient for subsistence.218 Therefore, they probably received
support from the Near East Relief Agency.
Greek women were mostly living in villages around the Golden Horn. There
were also Greek women in Gedikpaşa, Balat, Valino, Balat, Fener and Üsküdar. The
population living in the villages had a rural way of life, cultivating their own gardens
and dealing with husbandry. Thus, they had fewer problems in finding food compared
to Greeks living in the city center. The latter generally worked as house workers and
launderers. 219 Their economic situation was only slightly better than their Turkish and
Armenian counterparts.
Jewish women were living in Hasköy, Balat and Kasımpaşa along the Golden
Horn and in Sirkeci inside the city walls (Sur İçi), as well as in three Jewish villages,
Kuzguncuk, Dağhamamı and Haydarpaşa, on the Anatolian side of the Bosphorus.
Their situation was much worse than the others in terms of work opportunities, as they
war. Probably, during the war years, lower class women had similar living conditions described in this
article.
215
Phillips, “Dul Kadınlar”, p. 256.
216
217
218
Phillips, “Dul Kadınlar”, p. 269-270.
219
Phillips, “Dul Kadınlar”, pp. 262-265.
70
were living in the most crowded regions of the city and worked twice harder in order
to gain money.220 In addition, they were paying less rent than the other three ethnic
groups probably because the living conditions of their accommodation were much
worse.221 In conclusion, all widows were living in poverty, and heavy living
conditions compelled some of them to prostitution in order to earn money.
Before the war, the rate of non-Muslim prostitutions was higher than the
Muslim one because prostitution was “officially” tolerated only to non-Muslim
women.222 As a matter of fact, in the early twentieth century, Istanbul became one of
the biggest centers of prostitution and white slave trade in Europe and Asia.223 In
March 1914, the Ottoman government, together with a number of ambassadors, took
decision to struggle against the white slave trafficking in Istanbul. The leader of this
attempt was Henry Morgenthau, the ambassador of America. As a result of a meeting
on March 12, 1914, the foundation of a Committee for struggle against white slave
trafficking was agreed upon.224 Thus the ambassadors and representatives of a number
220
221
Phillips, “Dul Kadınlar”, pp. 269-270.
222
Yalman, Turkey in the World, p. 243; Rıfat Bali, “Yirminci Yüzyılın Başlarında Istanbul’un Fuhuş
Aleminde Yahudilerin Yeri,” http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/mahrem3.pdf
[accessed May 25, 2012], pp. 10-11. During the nineteenth century, although Muslim women could not
openly have been prostitutes, there were a number of Muslim prostitutes working at the neighborhoods
dominantly populated by Muslims such as Aksaray. Aydın Yetkin, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde
Toplumsal Ahlak Bunalımı: Fuhuş Meselesi,” Tarihin Peşinde Uluslararası Tarih ve Sosyal
Araştırmalar Dergisi, Issue: 6, (2011), p. 28.
223
Until the Great War, owners of brothels and women working therein were under the protection of
Capitulations as long as they held foreign passports, meaning that the Ottoman State did not have any
right for legal prosecution on prostitution performed by persons having foreign passports. Therefore,
most of the brothel owners alongside with prostitutes in Istanbul were predominantly non-Muslims
holding foreign passports. Mark David Wyers, “Wicked” Istanbul: The Regulation of Prostitution in the
Early Turkish Republic, (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2013), p. 12, 88. Actually, the
existence of Capitulations and lack of routine legal prosecution added to the difficulty of controlling
prostitution in Istanbul during the nineteenth century.
224
Alongside with Morgenthau, the ambassadors of Britain, Italy, Germany and the representatives of
Belgium and Romania attended the meeting. Reşad Bey, the minister of Commerce and Agriculture,
and Oksan Efendi, the minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephone were the representatives of the
Ottoman Government. Bedri Bey, the Chief of Istanbul Police Directorate would be the executor of the
process. NARA, Department of State, 867.1152, RG 59, March 13, 1914.
71
of foreign countries and the Ottoman government would perform a combined struggle.
Although there were committed steps in that direction after March 1914, “the war
unfortunately prevented the effective continuation of that work.”225 Between March
1914 and April 1915, a total of 168 white slave traders were expelled from Istanbul.226
Nevertheless, there are no registers about organized struggle against the white slave
trafficking after April 1915.
In fact, prostitution increasing as a result of poverty remained as an issue to be
tackled during the Great War and afterwards.227 For the control of prostitution and
prevention of venereal diseases, on October 18, 1915, the Ottoman government
published a regulation entitled By-Law Appended to the Published Regulation on the
Prevention of the Spread of Venereal Diseases (Emraz-ı Zühreviyyenin Men-i Sirayeti
Hakkında Nizamname).228 For the first time, this regulation included the legal
definition for prostitute in the modern Ottoman legal system. According to this
regulation “a prostitute is a woman who offers herself for the pleasure of others and in
this way has relations with numerous men, for the purpose of monetary profit.”229
Actually, the main aim of this regulation was not to criminalize prostitution but to
regulate and control it in order to prevent the spread of venereal diseases.230 Therefore,
225
NARA, Department of State, 867.1152/3, RG 59, March 24, 1915.
226
Morgenthau sent a report to Washington DC including photographs as well as a list of the personal
information of white slave traders expelled from Istanbul. According to the report, white slave traders
being Ottoman subjects were banished to somewhere inside the Ottoman Empire whereas persons
holding foreign passports were expelled abroad. Out of 168 white slave traders 18 were Ottoman, 100
were Russian, 23 were Romanian and 10 were Austrian. There were also a small number of white slave
traders from Greece, Persia, England, Italy, Brasil, France and Argentina. NARA, Department of State,
867.1152/3, RG 59, March 24, 1915; NARA Department of State, 867.1152/2, RG 59, April 6, 1915.
For photos of nine white slave traders out of 195, see Appendix B, pp. 338-339.
227
Wyers, “Wicked” Istanbul, p. 91.
228
Wyers, “Wicked” Istanbul, p. 68.
229
Wyers, “Wicked” Istanbul, p. 67-68.
230
The regulation made routine health controls obligatory for all registered prostitutes. This was because
venereal diseases became widespread in Istanbul during the war years. For instance, cases of syphilis,
which had not been widespread in the Empire, reached a peak during the war. Toprak, "The Family,
Feminism and the State”, p. 449. Therefore, the regulation of 1915 was an important step for the
72
the government demanded all prostitutes and brothels to be registered. Accordingly,
brothels could only be opened in the districts determined by the Directorate of Police,
and through official application.231 In this way, brothels and prostitutes would be under
state control.
There were three main regions of brothels on the European side of Istanbul
during the war years: Abanoz and Zibah districts (at Beyoğlu), and Galata. Actually,
Galata had historically been the largest prostitution area in Istanbul, and this situation
continued during the war years. There were two districts of prostitution on the Asian
side of Istanbul: Bülbülderesi at Üsküdar, and a region composed of five to six houses
in Kadıköy. Non-Muslim prostitutes were mostly working at the brothels in Beyoğlu
and Galata, whereas Muslim prostitutes were mostly in the brothels located on the
Asian side.232
Unfortunately, there is no exact information about the number of registered
prostitutes in Istanbul during the war years. After the Great War, there were 2,126
registered prostitutes in Istanbul. Interestingly, this time, the registered Muslim
prostitutes were placed at the top of the list with a total number of 774, followed by
Ottoman Greeks (691), Armenians (194), Jews (124), Russians (171) and Greeks
(90).233 This indicates that prostitution became widespread among Muslim women as
opposed to the situation before the war. According to Toprak, there were 979 non-
registered prostitutes in Istanbul in the post-war years. Furthermore, 1,000 women
prevention of the spread of venereal diseases. Before the war there had not been a specific hospital for
venereal diseases. Forty beds of Haseki Hospital had been allocated for patients having venereal
diseases. Following the publication of regulation about venereal diseases in 1915, a hospital was opened
at Galata. However, since the venereal diseases became extremely widespread, this hospital became
inefficient to meet the need. In 1917, the Bulgarian Boy School at Şişli was transformed into a hospital
for venereal diseases with 600 beds. Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü, p. 138.
231
Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü ve Feminizm (1908-1935), (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları, 2015), pp. 133-135; Wyers, “Wicked” Istanbul, pp. 68-71.
232
Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü,, p. 127.
233
There were also 81 registered prostitutes, being from different nations. Yetkin, “II. Meşrutiyet
Dönemi’nde Toplumsal Ahlak”, p. 42.
73
were occasionally working as prostitutes. When all of these numbers are taken into
consideration, there were about 4,500-5,000 prostitutes in Istanbul just after the war.234
As mentioned above, the aim of the regulation was not to criminalize
prostitution, but it still had some punitive sanctions for persons acting against the
requirements. For example, the owners of brothels allowing unhealthy prostitutes to
work would be punished in accordance with the Article 99 of the Penal Code. 235
Another sanction specified in the regulation of 1915 in case of non-compliance with
rules and regulations was banishment from Istanbul to abroad the wrongdoers who
were foreigners, and to other parts of the Empire those who were Ottoman subjects.236
According to a report prepared by the General Directorate of Security, between
March 1916 and April 1917, 54 prostitutes, one white slave trader, two procurers and
two owners of brothels were banished from Istanbul.237 Contrary to the regulation of
1915, almost all of these people were banished to other provinces of the Ottoman
Empire even in case they were foreigners. Bursa was the main area where prostitutes
and procurers were sent.238 Although there is no exact explanation as to why these
people were banished, it seems probable that they had acted against the rules
determined in the regulation of 1915.
Although the CUP government tried to develop further control on women’s
sexuality through the regulation of 1915 and succeeded in the registration of a great
number of prostitutes, secret prostitution also increased during the war years.
According to Yalman, secret prostitution became much more common than the
registered one. New riches began to keep Turkish-Muslim mistresses and showed them
234
Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü, p. 145.
235
Yetkin, “II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi’nde Toplumsal Ahlak”, p. 38.
236
Toprak, Türkiye’de Kadın Özgürlüğü, p. 138.
237
Out of 54 prostitutes, 15 were Muslim and 39 were non-Muslim. Most of the non-Muslim prostitutes
were Russians. BOA.DH.EUM.1.Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (Novermber 4, 1917).
238
Ankara and Kastamonu were the other cities where prostitutes and procurers were expelled.
BOA.DH.EUM.1.Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (Novermber 4, 1917).
74
off in public, which was unusual before the war.239 Some stories written about that
period provide similar evidence. For example, in a story written by Hüseyin Rahmi
Gürpınar, a young bride named Düriye Hanım who had lost her husband at the Great
War became the mistress of a bulgur (a kind of cracked wheat grains) merchant. Her
mother-in-love had to accept whatever she brought to them for the sake of saving the
life of Düriye’s daughter. The following words of the mother-in-love project the socio-
economic conditions of the war years:
[…] Today nobody can subsist without committing sin. Did not all journalists,
grocers and merchants do the same?...Everybody sells whatever makes money.
[The family in this story also sold all their valuables.] We do not have sons and
sons-in-love anymore [because they died at the fronts]; you [the old husband of
the speaker] cannot earn anything; I cannot work; [so] if our daughters and
daughter-in-love do not bring money, we would all die starving… What matter
of indecency while we are at the hands of hunger… Most people are like us,
[so] feel free and comfortable…240
It is clear that the war caused the dissolution of traditional social structures in
the Ottoman society. In fact, such changes were considered by the state as moral
deterioration. Hence state policies for the establishment of a new social structure were
mostly based on this perception and at a discursive level it served as an instrument for
legitimacy concerning policies intended to penetrate into the society.
This chapter aimed at examining the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the Ottoman capital after the second half of the nineteenth century,
specifically focusing on the Great War years. It is clear that the Ottoman State faced a
series of socio-economic problems as other belligerent states did during the war. The
239
Yalman, Turkey in World War, pp. 244-245.
240
“...Şimdi günah işlemeden kimsenin karnı doymuyor. Gazetecisi, bakkalı çakkalı, tüccarı, bulgurcusu
hep böyle yapmadılar mı? Herkes nesi para ederse onu satıyor. Damadımız, oğlumuz kalmadı, sen
kazanamazsın, ben çalışamam, kızlarımız da para getirmezse açlıktan ölürüz...Bu açlıkla namus
sorunu...Çokları bizim gibi oldular, keyfine bak...” Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar, Açlıkla Namus Meselesi,
(Istanbul: Atlas Kitabevi, 1972), p. 13.
75
severeness of these problems was evident in a report, which was submitted by Mustafa
Kemal to Enver Pasha on September 20, 1917. According to that:
The relationship between the government and the people has totally dissolved.
Today, what we call as the people is composed of women, disabled men and
children. In the eyes of all these people, the government is a power that pushes
them towards hunger and death. Administrative mechanism has lost its
authority. Public life is in anarchy. Each step of the government caused further
hatred of the people. All officials are corrupt and are ready to involve in all
kinds of wrongdoings. The mechanism of justice has totally stopped. The
security forces are out of order. Economic life is rapidly going towards
depression. Neither the people nor the officials have hope about the future…241
The government did not take effective action against these problems. Instead of
ensuring proper provision, authoritarian policies continued to be implemented until the
end of the war. Worsening socio-economic problems made public life chaotic. This
situation was not only threatening ordinary people but also became a menace for the
state.242 Although the maintenance of public order constituted the most important part
of government’s discourse for the implementation of security policies, it is quite
difficult to argue that the CUP government could achieve this target. In the following
chapters, the maintenance of public order which became a critical issue for the
Ottoman State and for the society will be examined in terms of government policies
and their repercussions on the society. However, before making this analysis the
structure of the police and criminal law will be the topic of the next chapter.
241
242
76
CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURES: THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL LAW
Modernization process of the Ottoman State began in the early nineteenth

century. Actually, centralization was equally important component of that
modernization process. Replacement of traditional institutions with new ones;
establishment of a centralized bureaucratic structure; involvement of the state into the
daily life of the society through surveillance and security policies; and restructuring of
the society through centrally made and implemented rules, regulations and laws were
the main indicators of a modern state in the Ottoman Empire. When the CUP came to
power as a result of the Constitutional Revolution in 1908, it inherited the
accumulation of almost a hundred year’s modernization efforts. With changes and
continuities, the CUP maintained the process. It is a striking fact that from 1911 to
1918, the Ottoman Empire was in a continuous state of war. Therefore, the
contribution of the CUP to the modernization process was radically shaped by war
conditions.
In this chapter, structures of policing and criminal law will be analyzed in
terms of their evolution beginning from the early nineteenth century up to the end of
the Great War. Such analysis will intend to clarify the structural basis of the CUP
government’s security and criminal policies. Thus, the following sections will focus on
security forces acting as the representatives of the Ottoman State for the maintenance
of internal order.
77
3.1 Policing in Istanbul: An Institutional Transformation as a Part of Ottoman
Modernization and Centralization
The maintenance of order and security in Istanbul, as the capital and one of the
most populous cities of the Ottoman Empire, became an important issue during the
Great War years. Actually, public order of the city had historically been important.
Since Istanbul was the administrative, political and economic center of the Empire, the
order therein had always been a symbol of legitimate power and authority.
Furthermore, Istanbul was one of the most important port cities that had strong
relations with the external world. Parallel to it, foreign population of the city was
extremely high. In other words, Istanbul was the mirror of the Ottoman Empire to the
external world, especially to Europe. The image on this mirror had to be well enough
in order to convince the European countries that the Ottoman Empire was a “strong”
state. Internal order was one of the most crucial indicators of strength in the
international arena.
Police and gendarme were responsible for security issues in Istanbul during the
war years. The institutional formation of security forces will be analyzed in the
following parts from a historical point of view.
3.1.1 Brief Historical Background: From Janissaries to Ministry of Police (Zabtiye

Nezareti)
Before the Tanzimat era, several different forces were responsible for the
maintenance of security in Istanbul. Sadrazam (grand vizier) was the highest level of
security hierarchy in Istanbul. There were many other positions and groups of people,
who were attached to Sadrazam, in security issues. The Janissary kethudasi (the
steward of janissaries), who was dealing with security, was responsible for selecting
the kullukcular, the janissaries that were only responsible for maintenance of order in
78
Istanbul. The local people were paying the salary of the kullukcular.243 These
janissaries were engaging in security issues at the karakulhanes (what we call today
karakol, the police station). Apart from kullukcular, there were ases (night watchman)
and bekçi (watchman) who were providing security during the nights. Bostancıbasi,
the commander of the Bostancı guards, was responsible for protecting the Sultan.244
Kadı (Muslim judge) was the key figure of public order. He had administrative,
judicial as well as policing functions.245
The abolishment of the Janissaries in 1826 was an important turning point in
security issues because the Janissaries, which had been historically the most important
institution of security, disappeared. Following the abolishment of the Janissaries, the
new army named as Victorious Soldiers of Islam (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye)
became the main figure for maintenance of public order in Istanbul. Two corpses, each
of which was composed of 1.500 soldiers, were responsible for providing security in
Istanbul during the daytime and nights. However, maintenance of public order
preserved its complex and unstructured features in Istanbul until 1846.
Although, this new army was the main security force in Istanbul, some former
institutions also continued to provide security in the city through insignificant
institutional and legal arrangements. For instance, the Guild of Artillery (Topcu Ocagi)
remained with the same name until 1832 and continued its security functions under the
name of Field Marshall of Artillery (Topçu Müşiriyeti) after 1832. The main duty of
246
this institution was maintenance public order in Galata and Beyoglu. The Chiefdom
of Dues (Ihtisab Agaligi), which was turned into Ministry of Dues (Ihtisab Nezareti)
after 1826, was another traditional public security institution that continued its
243
Ferdan Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Toplumsal Denetimin Diyalektiği,
(İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), p. 97.
244
Zafer Toprak, “Güvenlik Hizmetleri”, Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 3, (İstanbul:
Ratih Vakfı ve Kültür Bakanlığı, 1999), p. 457.
245
Ergut, , Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 97.
246
Nadir Özbek, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İç Güvenlik, Siyaset, Devlet, 1876-1909”, Türklük
Araştımaları Dergisi, Vol. 16, (2004), p. 66
79
functions under a new name. It contributed to the maintenance of public order in
Istanbul until the foundation of Field Marshall of Policing (Zabtiye Müşiriyeti) in
1846.247 It is clear that following the abolishment of the Janissaries the security forces
in Istanbul were still unstructured. There were several security forces and each of them
was attached to different offices. In order to prevent this fragmented structure, Police
Organization was found in Istanbul in 1845. A memorandum was sent to the embassies
in Istanbul informing them about the new organization. Police Statute was enacted on
April 10, 1845. This Statute indicated that a police force was established in Istanbul in
order to maintain security and public order in the city.248
Main obligations of the police force according to this Statute were controlling
the entrance and exit of the city, the passports and places of entertainment as well as
houses of the bekars; preparing documents of travel; controlling beggars; preventing
strikes and protests that would be organized by workers.249 Actually, the main aim of
the newly emerging police organization was the maintenance of public order through
providing direct control over urban poor and new comers – especially that were from
lower classes, and workers. They had the potential for crime in the eyes of statesmen.
As a result the police was responsible for providing control over the places where these
people were living or working.250 Although the Police Organization did not live long,
it was the first attempt to establish a ‘civil’ security force that was separated from
247
Ihtisab Agaligi and then Ihtisab Nezareti had an extremely important place in security of Istanbul. In
1820’s the officials of this institution was controlling who were entering the city. It was the top office of
signing Mürur Tezkiresi (Permit for Travel). After 1826, they began to travel in Istanbul and to collect
information about who were not fasting or performing daily prayer from the imams (Muslim religious
leaders at mosques). Furthermore, they were controlling commercial activities of the tradesmen. They
had the right to punish people, who were performing against the rules and regulations, through falaka
(bastinado). For detailed informtion about the duties of this institution see Necdet Sakaoğlu, “İhtisab”,
Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 4, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları ve Kültür
Bakanlığı,1994), pp. 147-148.
248
Toprak, “Güvenlik Hizmetleri”, p. 458.
249
250
80
military. Furthermore, the understanding of ‘preventive policing’251, which was
explicit in the Statute, would be the main maxim of the following security forces.
In 1846, the Field Marshall of Policing (Zabtiye Müşiriyeti) was founded in
Istanbul. By the foundation of this institution, military and civil security forces were
combined under the same organization. Due to this characteristic of the institution and
ongoing institutional regulations about public order, the period between the years
1846-1879 was called as Unity of Policing (Tevhid-i Zabtiye). In the foundation statute
of the Field Marshall of Policing, it was explicitly claimed that the military forces
could not have focused on their own duty –defense of the country against foreign
threats- due to their internal security functions.252 Therefore, this new institution would
totally deal with the internal security of the Ottoman Empire while the army would
deal with external security of the country. Although, the military and civil security
forces would be functioning under the same organization, there emerged a
differentiation among the army and internal security forces by the foundation of the
Field Marshall of Policing.253 It was an important development in the
institutionalization of security forces.
Zabtiye officers, the personnel of the Field Marshall of Policing, were
responsible for the maintenance of public order. They were the unique security force
that undertook to fulfill the duties of both the gendarme and the police. 254 In 1851,
Ministry of Dues (İhtisab Nezareti) was abolished and its functions were delegated to
Field Marshall of Policing. Furthermore, a new institution that was called Assembly of
Fixed Price (Esar Meclisi) was established under the Field Marshall of Policing. The
main duty of Assembly of Fixed Price was controlling the fixed prices.255 In this way,
251
As examined in the Chapter 1, preventive policing means to prevent emergence of crimes before they
caused any material loss. This understanding was an important part of the CUP’s struggle with vagrancy
and its policies on oppression of lower classes. See, Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 243.
252
Toprak, , “Güvenlik Hizmetleri”, p. 458.
253
Özbek, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İç Güvenlik”, p. 68.
254
81
all the duties about public order and security were to be monopolized under a single
institution. However, it was not so easy to dissolve the traditional relations between the
security forces and the local authorities. According to Ergut, the institutionalized
police force under the Field Marshall of Policing was an instrument to articulate the
local authorities to the State.256 In other words, monopolization of security forces
under the Field Marshall of Policing can be evaluated as a strategy of centralization.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the zabtiye officers and the local elites caused
some complaints among the people. In order to prevent these complaints and to
provide efficiency in maintenance of public order, a separate civil police force was
found named as Investigation Officers (Teftis Memurlari) in 1867 under the Field
Marshall of Policing. They were the predecessors of the modern police force in
Turkey. The organization of Investigation Officers was also short-lived and it was
replaced by Military Police (Asakir-i Zabtiye) in 1869.257 Interestingly enough, the
Military Police was the predecessor of the gendarme in terms of its duties and
institutional structure.258 Nevertheless, the foundation statute of the Military Police of
1869 explicitly indicated that they would be attached to administrative authority in the
provinces and towns rather than having been dependent on the military authority. In
this sense the Military Police was a mixture of civil and military security forces. This
dichotomy in security forces would come to an end in 1879.
Following the Ottoman defeat in the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, the
Ottoman statesmen and the Sultan perceived the importance of the internal security as
well as the vitality of a much more professionalized army that would provide integrity
of the country.259 In 1879, a separate office, the Gendarme, was found in the army.
The personnel of Military Police were employed under the Commander in Chief
255
256
257
258
259
82
(Serasker) as the gendarme.260 In this manner, the military security forces were
separated from the civil security forces and they formed a distinct office in military
that was totally responsible for internal security. This specialization in military also
constituted the convenient bases for establishment of civil security forces. The Field
Marshall of Policing was abolished and the Zabtiye Nezareti (Ministry of Police) was
established in 1879 as the head institution of civil security forces. Ministry of Police
was responsible for maintenance of public order in Istanbul.261 Furthermore, there
would be a Gendarme Regiment in Istanbul in order to maintain public order.262
Institutional separation of the military and civil security forces was an important
development in the professionalization of the internal security services.
Foreign influence in the emergence of professional police organization was
explicit especially in terms of the organizational structure and statutes. There were two
basic models for police organizations in the nineteenth century: British model and
French model. The difference between these models was that the French police was
much more oppressive and centralized than the British police. The main characteristic
of the British police was its reconciliatory manner, which provided the organization
the capacity to penetrate to the society. One more difference was about the security of
the rural areas. In the French model, the gendarme was responsible for the
maintenance of security in the rural areas, whereas in Britain, the county police was
providing security services in the rural areas.263 Since 1845, the Ottoman State
preferred to follow French model of internal security forces in terms of organizational
structure.
The main cause of the acceptance of French police organization as a model was
related to the general French influence on Ottoman modernization. During the
260
261
262
263
Noémi Levy, “Polislikle İlgili Bilgilerin Dolaşım Tarzları: Osmanlı Polisi İçin Fransız Modeli mi?”,
Osmanlı'da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza, 18.-20. Yüzyıllar, Noémi Lévy and Alexandre Toumarkine (eds),
(İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2007), p. 162.
83
Tanzimat Reform Era (1839-1876), French influence was clear in many areas from
cultural and educational modernization to administrative and legal transformation.264
During the reign of Abdulhamid II, although in some fields such as army, German
organizational structure was accepted as a model of modernization due to the tensions
between the Ottoman State and France in international affairs, French Police
Organization remained as a role model for modernization of internal security forces.
265
Actually, the Police Organization of Paris was much more developed than the
police organizations of other European capitals. The special attention of Paris Polis
Organization for the maintenance of public order was attractive for the Ottoman
statesmen for whom the survival of the State was closely related to the public order of
Istanbul.266 In France and in other countries that followed the French model, the police
power went beyond arresting criminals and preventing crimes. Police power meant
good order in the society. While fighting against crimes was the main target of the
British police, it was a subcategory of the maintenance of public order and
administration for the French police.267 Therefore, the Ottoman understanding of
public order as the main issue of the security forces was convenient to French point of
view about public order. The Ottoman State did not only benefit from the
organizational structure of the French police, but it also received support of French
experts.
The first expert who came to Istanbul in order to make reforms in the police
organization was Inspector Bonnin. Security Directorate of Paris sent him to the
service in the Ottoman Empire in 1884. Inspector Lefoulon assisted him beginning
with mid 1890’s and became the main figure of reform process following the
resignation of Inspector Bonnin in 1900. Inspector Lefounon had specialized in
264
Levy, “Polislikle İlgili Bilgilerin Dolaşım Tarzları”, p. 161.
265
266
267
Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 42-43.
84
struggling against the revolutionaries in Paris. He might have attracted the attention of
Abdulhamid II, who perceived the revolutionaries as the main threat for the Ottoman
State. He became the General Inspector of Police of the Ottoman Empire (Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu Polis Müfettiş-i Umumisi) and Counselor of Ministry of Police (Zaptiye
Nezareti Müşaviri) during his term of office.268 According to the French experts, the
existing police officers and commissioners were incapable in terms of their
requirements and they had some condemned behaviors. In order to increase the
efficiency of newly-formed police organization, the personnel might have been
selected from more educated or at least among the literate men. Ex-officers and
dismissed sergeants would be given priority for becoming police officer or
commissioner. Furthermore, French experts made some regulations for regular
payment of salary to the security forces. This would also help rise of efficiency.269
These regulations were incorporated into the Police Statute of 1907 (Polis
Nizamnamesi of 1907). According to this Statute, police candidates would be subjected
to an examination. Furthermore, the age range for being a police officer was specified
as 25 to 40.270 Apart from these, Istanbul Police Organization was divided into three
offices in accordance with this statute: ‘Administrative police’ (idari polis) would
provide preservation of public order and would control population movements in
Istanbul. ‘Political police’ (siyasi polis) would protect the interests of the regime and
would struggle against its political enemies. Finally ‘criminal polis’ (adli polis) would
deal with crimes and guilt.271 This separation was crucial because it indicated the
‘security’ understanding of the Hamidian Regime. First two offices would directly deal
with the ‘survival of the state and the regime’ therefore policing was perceived as
something more than struggling against crimes. There was only one office dealing with
268
Levy, “Polislikle İlgili Bilgilerin Dolaşım Tarzları”, p. 153-154.
269
Levy, “Polislikle İlgili Bilgilerin Dolaşım Tarzları”, p. 155-156.
270
Halim Alyot, Türkiyede Zabıta: Tarihî Gelişim ve Bugünkü Durum, (Ankara : İçişleri Bakanlığı
Yayınları, 1947), p. 197.
271
85
crimes and criminals. Actually this understanding, which gave priority to the ‘survival
of the state and the regime’ through “maintenance of public order”, would inherit to
the Second Constitutional Regime.
During the Hamidian era, control of the elites in Istanbul was an important part
of policing. Therefore, apart from the official police organization, an undercover police
organization was founded in Istanbul with its 4.000 agents. These agents were
collecting necessary information for the Sultan and controlling the houses and private
life of the pashas, bureaucrats and big merchants.272 Although, the surveillance system
of the Hamidian Regime was successful in controlling the elite, it failed to control
popular movements and actions of ordinary people. Failure of the Police Organization
during the 1908 Revolution was an indicator of this argument.273 Probably, this
deficiency of the Hamidian Regime constituted a lesson for the CUP politicians. They
were much more alert to the social opposition. As a result, the policing activities
during the Second Constitutional Regime aimed at penetrating into the society.
3.1.2 Security Forces of the Constitutional Regime
Following the Constitutional Revolution in 1908, the issue of internal security

was one of the most important topics for the new regime. The existing Ministry of
Police remained through some improvement efforts until 1909.274 However, it was one
of the state institutions on which the old regime had strong influence. Ministry of
Police became an institution of surveillance rather than security organization. Most of
its cadre was composed of the officials who were loyal to Hamidian Regime. 31 March
Incident (31 Mart Vakası), which was the first anti-revolutionary movement, proved
that Ministry of Police was not capable of protecting the new regime. On the contrary,
Istanbul Police explicitly showed tolerance to the demonstrators.
272
Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 143-144.
273
274
86
It was not the Istanbul Police that suppressed the uprising. The uprising had
been suppressed by the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu), which came from Macedonia
only for this aim.275 Following the suppression of the Incident, the government
abolished the Ministry of Police. Galip Bey, one of the commanders of the Action
Army, was appointed as the General Inspector of Police and Gendarme (Polis ve
Jandarma Müfettiş-i Umumisi). He was in charge of policing activities in Istanbul as
well as in the whole country until the foundation of General Directorate of Security
(Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti) on August 4, 1909 through the Law on Istanbul
Province and Organization of General Directorate of Security (Istanbul Vilayeti ve
Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti Teşkilatına Dair Kanun). Galip Bey became the Head
of General Directorate of Security.276 This new organization was directly attached to
the Ministry of Interior. Actually, General Directorate of Security would form the roots
of modern police organization today.
After Galip Bey became the Head of General Directorate of Security, he made
his first visit to London in order to see and discover the Police Organization of Britain.
It was clear that the Constitutional Regime began to search new organizational models
for the police rather than the French model. Probably, in accordance with the
characteristics of the Constitutional Regime, a more liberal model of security forces
was sought. Another dimension of this effort was the need for clear-cut detachment
from the Hamidian Regime, which had accepted the French Police Organization as a
model.277 Nevertheless, the pursuit of liberal model of security forces did not live long.
Due to the rising social and political threats, the new regime had to turn its face to the
French model, which was more convenient to the centralized and increasingly
278
oppressive governance of the CUP. Consequently, the General Directorate of
275
276
Toprak, , “Güvenlik Hizmetleri”, p. 458.
277
Levy, “Polislikle İlgili Bilgilerin Dolaşım Tarzları”, p. 164, 167.
278
87
Security was administered and organized in accordance with the Statute of Police of
1907. In 1913 a new Statute of Police was enacted.
When the General Directorate of Security was founded, a separate Directorate
was established for Istanbul. Different from the security forces of other provinces,
which were under the General Directorate of Security, the General Police Directorate
of Istanbul was subject to governor of the city.279 Actually, Istanbul had a special place
in the maintenance of public order. It was the capital city of the Empire. It was the
center for all the state institutions and political groups. If public order in Istanbul were
not maintained, it would have disastrous consequences for the new regime. Being
aware of this reality, the government paid special attention to the city.
The number of police officers in Istanbul was an explicit indicator of Istanbul’s
importance compared to other provinces. In 1910, there were 2.350 police officers in
Istanbul while the number of police officers in some other provinces was as in the
following: 135 in Syria, 138 in Beirut, 149 in Sivas, 189 in Manastır, 318 in Salonika,
210 in Edirne, 355 in Aydın, 116 in Aleppo.280 Nevertheless, some deputies were still
unsatisfied with the number of police officers in Istanbul. In 1911, the number of
police officers in Istanbul increased 2.500 but according to Halil Bey, the Minister of
Interior, this number was under the average of the number of police officers (5.000-
8.000) in European capitals. He claimed that Istanbul was a dispersed city in terms of
its geographical structure. Furthermore, the streets of the city were not in good
condition and lighting was not enough. In this sense, he argued that the number of
police officers in Istanbul might have been more than the number of police officers in
the European capitals.281 Actually, Istanbul as the cultural and socio-economic center
of the Empire was the first place where the CUP wanted to consolidate its power.
Therefore, the politicians demanded more police forces in Istanbul in order to maintain
279
Alyot, Türkiyede Zabıta, pp. 493-494.
280
281
88
public order. By this way they might control the oppositional movements that would
threaten the survival of the regime.
In 1911, General Police Directorate of Istanbul was directly attached to the
Ministry of Interior.282 It was clear that there was deliberate centralization of the
security forces, especially in Istanbul. 1911 was the year when the CUP faced first
organized opposition. Freedom and Accord Party (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Partisi) was
founded in November 1911.283 Several books and handbooks about the security forces
were published in 1910 and 1911. It was also an indicator that the CUP tried to shape
the security forces in accordance with the contemporary needs.284 Centralization of the
police organization in Istanbul and monopolization of CUP’s power over this
organization would continue in the following years. On February 10, 1912, the
undercover police organization was established under the name of Committee of
Intelligence (Heyet-i İstihbariyye). In Istanbul, vacant cadres of 250 were assigned to
the undercover police organization.285 In this way, the CUP created another channel to
consolidate its power.
The Police Statute of 1907 was in force until 1913. A new statute was enacted
in 1913. According to Ergut, it was one of the most crucial attempts of centralization
and penetration to the society. Especially, the article about weapons was noteworthy.
Through this Statute the State tried to strengthen its monopoly of violence. Ergut
indicates that:
282
Since the General Police Directorate of Istanbul was under the governorship of Istanbul, there
emerged conflicts of authority. In order to prevent these, Istanbul Police Directorate was attached to the
Ministry of Interior on May 22, 1911. Alyot, Türkiyede Zabıta, p. 494.
283
Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, pp. 201-202.
284
Ahmed Refik, Jandarma Karakol Kumandanlarına Mahsus Malumat-ı Adliye (Selanik: Asr
Matbaası, 1326 (1910),İbrahim Feridun, Polis Efendilere Mahsus Terbiye ve Muamelat-ı Meslekiye,
(Cağaloğlu: Matbua-i Hayriye ve Şürekası, 1910), Tevfik Tarık, Zabıtaya Malumat-ı Kanuniye,
(Istanbul: Şems Matbaası, 1326 (1910)), Osman Vefik, Rehber-i Muamelat-ı Zabıta (Dersaadet: Bekir
Efendi Matbaası, 1327 (1911), Hüseyin Hakkı, Polis ve Jandarmalara Rehber, (Dersaadet: Sancakcıyan
Matbaası, 1327 (1911), Hasan Neşet, Meşrutiyette Polis, (Dersaadet: Mahmud Bey Matbaası, 1327
(1911).
285
89
[…] The police reached their goal with a regulation promulgated in 1913
which restricted the use of weapons such as daggers, wedges, or big knifes,
which had previously been allowed. The reason for their restriction was stated
as that these were mostly used in crimes that violated personal security. They
were licensed by police stations. Arms seizure was a prerequisite for the CUP
in their effort to curb the power of the societal forces; it went hand in hand
with the centralization attempts in the administration system of the Empire.286
In conclusion, the CUP had important attempts for the centralization of security forces
in Istanbul since 1908. Just before the war, Istanbul Police Organization was
responsible for the maintenance of public order in the city. Although, it was directly
attached to the Ministry of Interior since 1911, it was also in relation with the General
Directorate of Security and General Commandery of Gendarme during the war years.
3.1.3 Security Forces during the Great War
During the war years discussion about the police organization left its place to
the understanding that public order might have been provided in a militarist way. 287 As
a matter of fact, there was martial law (idare-i örfiyye)288 in Istanbul similar to the
other parts of the Empire during the Great War. However, the implementation of
martial law in Istanbul did not start within the war years. Actually, the situation of
martial law in Istanbul began with the Incident of 31 March (31 Mart Vakası) and
286
Ferdan Ergut, State and Social Control: The Police in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early
Republican Turkey, 1839-1939, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (New York: New School for Social
Research, 1999), p. 172.
287
288
The first regulation about idare-i örfiyye (martial law) was made in 1877 following the Ottoman-
Russian War. According to İdare-i Örfiye Kanunu (Law of Martial Law), conditions for declaration of
martial law at a certain location were determined as follows: war, rebellions and several situations
resulting in the deterioration of internal and external security. For the first time, martial law was
declared in Istanbul on May 24, 1877 following Ottoman defeat in Ottoman-Russian War to be followed
by a series of other then on. Osman Köksal, Ösmanlı Devletinde Sıkıyönetim ile İlgili Mevzuat Üzerine
Bir Deneme¨, AÜ,Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. 12, (2001), pp. 159-
161.
90
continued till the end of the Great War except a three-month period between July-
September 1912.289 Therefore, in practice, military forces became an actual part of the
maintenance of public order in Istanbul after 1909. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
the CUP as a civilian power never totally delegated its authority to military forces in
issues of security. On the contrary, from 1909 to the end of the war, the existence of
martial law became an instrument for the CUP to justify repressive and authoritarian
policies. Therefore, the Ministry of Interior and under it the General Directorate of
Security and the General Security Directorate of Istanbul preserved their primary role
in the implementation of policies related to order and security. However, the
importance of the Gendarme should not be underestimated.
Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war, the Gendarme as a part of
internal security forces, had played a crucial role in the maintenance of public order in
Istanbul. In January 1914, the Gendarme cadres of Istanbul had been sent to Anatolia
in order to fulfill the vacancy. According to the Chief of Istanbul Police Organization,
as a result of this transfer, there emerged a deficit of 211 infantries and 205 cavalries in
Istanbul. He indicated that during the previous year, a great number of police officers
had been employed in the police organization therefore there was no vacancy in the
police organization. Nevertheless, it was still impossible to maintain public order
without support of the Gendarme in Istanbul.290
It is a fact that, although the police needed the support of the gendarme for the
maintenance of order in Istanbul, already before the war, the police organization was
also disturbed by the dominance of the gendarme patrols in the streets of the city.
According to the police organization, this scene gave the impression of the lack of
public order to city inhabitants as well as to foreign states. Nevertheless, the gendarme
289
Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi, Cilt 1 (İstanbul: İletişim
Yayınları, 1998), pp. 346-348.
290
This document is composed of several reports sent from the Istanbul Police Organization to the
Ministry of Interior. The initial complaints about inadequacy were dated as January 1914. The final
complaint was dated as 1 April 1330 (14 Nisan 1914). It was clear that within the period from January
to April, necessary regulations did not take place. BOA.DH.EUM.EMN.47/9, 16. Safer. 1332 (January
13, 1914).
91
was an important part of the security forces and the decrease in their number resulted
in security problems.291 In April 1914, the Province of Trabzon demanded
reinforcement of the gendarme from Istanbul. The Ministry of Interior refused this
demand due to the security conditions in Istanbul.292 Eventually, the gendarme, whose
area of jurisdiction was theoretically rural areas, was an important figure for the
maintenance of public order in Istanbul, as an auxiliary force of the police. The
number of the security forces –approximately 2.500 police officers293 and 2.098
gendarmeries294 - was still not enough to provide public order in Istanbul.
When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, most of the qualified
personnel of the Istanbul Police Organization had to be recruited to the army.
According to the information given by Ahmet Rıza Bey, during the initial years of the
war, 1.600 of 2.500 police officers in Istanbul were composed of the literate ex-
soldiers who had been wounded in the fronts whereas a great number of well-educated
police officers were recruited to the army.295 Unfortunately, this situation affected the
quality of the organization negatively. It was certainly the case for the Gendarme. In
October 1917, a by-law was enacted about the Gendarme.296 According to the Article 9
of the by-law, as long as mobilization continued, two thirds of the soldiers and half of
the officers of the Gendarmerie would be recruited in the army. The vacancies
emerging as a result of the recruitment of the gendarmes in the army would be filled by
291
BOA.DH.EUM.EMN.47/9, 16.Safer.1332 (January 13, 1914).
292
BOA.DH.EUM.EMN.114/84, 9.Receb.1332 (June 3, 1914).
293
NARA, Department of State, 810/5, RG 84, February 13, 1914.
294
Infantries constituted the majority of the gendarmeries in Istanbul. 1801 of 2098 gendarmeries were
infantries whereas there were 297 cavalries and 75 officers. Although, total number of the gendarmeries
in Istanbul was 2173 when the number of the cavalries, infantries and officers were taken into
consideration, the document indicated total number of the gendarme as 2098. Probably, there was a
calculation error. In any case, there were more than 2.000 gendarmeries in Istanbul in 1914.
BOA.DH.EUM.EMN.52/19, 16 Rebiulevvel. 1332, (February 12, 1914).
295
296
“Kavanin ve Nizamat: Jandarmanın vezaif ve teşkilat-ı esasiyesiyle cihet-i merbutiyyeti hakkında
Kararname”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 95, 16 Muharrem 1335/ 1 Teşrinisani 1333 (November 1, 1917), pp.
209-210.
92
ex-officers and ex-soldiers over the age of 40.297 Thus, the requirements of the Great
War resulted in the deterioration of the security forces in terms of personnel.
Although there was a remarkable scarcity in professional security cadres, in
July 1915, new security units were founded, entitled as Inspectorship of Security
(Emniyet Müfettişliği), for the purpose of tightening control at docks, harbored stations
and entry on the Ottoman frontiers.298 Since, Istanbul was one of the most important
entrance points, Istanbul Inspectorship of Security (Istanbul Emniyet Müfettişliği) was
found there. The Inspectorships of Security were directly subordinate to Ministry of
Interior. There was one inspector and, if necessary, one deputy inspector in each
Inspectorship of Security. Deputy inspector, passport officials, police commissioners,
assistant police commissioners and policemen were responsible for their duties to the
Inspector of Security. Furthermore, all the security forces that assigned to the train
service were also subject to the Inspector of Security. They had to perform in
accordance with the orders of Inspector of Security and in conformity the law and
regulations.299
The sphere of authority of these security forces were limited to railroad
stations, the stations and its yards to the end of last switch, the frontier points of entry
where there is no railroad, the place reserved for the customs and on docks to the space
allotted to travelers.300 Railroad employees and ship captains had the obligation to
inform the inspectors about illegal acts of the travelers while in transport. They also
had to inform and alert the security forces, which were subject to the Inspectorship of
297
“Kavanin ve Nizamat: Jandarmanın vezaif”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 95, p. 210.
298
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkufelerinde ve iskelelerde emniyet müfettişliği teşkilat ve vezaifi
hakkında nizamname, 22 Şaban 1333/22 Haziran 1331 (July, 5, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, (Dersaadet: Matba-
i Amire, 1336), pp. 639-641. The full text translation of this regulation also exists at the National
Archives of the United States, see NARA, Department of State, 867.10/1, RG 59, July 12, 1915.
299
NARA, Department of State, 867.10/1, RG 59, July 12, 1915. “Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu
mevkufelerinde”, Düstur, II/3, p. 639-641.
300
NARA, Department of State, 867.10/1, RG 59, July 12, 1915. “Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu
mevkufelerinde”, Düstur, II/3, p. 639-641.
93
Security, at the stations and docks, about any people on their vehicles suspicious of
301
constituting direct or indirect threat to public security. Furthermore, the customs
examiner had to inform the inspector of security, if he found newspaper or any kind of
printed material whose entrance to the Ottoman Empire or sale within the borders of
the county was prohibited due to political or moral reasons.302 Certainly, the
foundation of the Inspectorship of Security was closely related to the “security
requirements” of the wartime. The government intended to increase control over
travelers as a security measure. The next chapter will examine this issue in detail.
Alongside with the foundation of new security units, the responsibilities of
existing security forces was also adapted to the requirements of the war. From that
point on, the gendarme was not only responsible for the maintenance of security and
public order but also dealt with provisioning and agricultural issues.303 Although
responsibilities of security forces expanded, the number of qualified personnel in the
units decreased during the war years. Another problem was the wages of the staff.
According to the report prepared by the General Commander of Gendarme, wages paid
to the security forces was extremely low with respect to their efforts.304 Thus low
wages, increasing responsibilities and heavy economic conditions of the war might
have caused the rise of abuse and bribery among the security forces.
As a matter of fact, bribery and abuse were notoriously the main problems of
the security forces in Istanbul. After the Constitutional Revolution in 1908, the
government tried to prevent corruption as much as possible. As will be examined in
the sixth chapter, almost all articles of the Penal Code related to bribery were modified
301
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkufelerinde”, Düstur, II/3, p. 639-641, NARA, Department of
State, 867.10/1, July 12, 1915.
302
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkufelerinde”, Düstur, II/3, p. 639-641. Actually, entrance and sale
of printed documents, deemed as misguiding the thoughts of the public, was prohibited just a few days
before the Ottoman Empire entered the war. BOA.DH.EUM.MTK. 55/13, 12 Zilhicce 1332 (November
1, 1914). Probably, restrictions in that sense increasingly continued during the war years.
303
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.15/61, 29 Receb 1335 (May 21, 1917).
304
94
by the CUP government. Just before the War, Ravndal, the Consul General in Istanbul,
indicated that the bribery among the police organization was decisively decreasing. 305
Nevertheless, during the War years and after the War, bribery became widespread in
the dealings with the police organization. For instance, in 1916, the inspectors
(muayene memuru) of the Bosporus permitted the pass of young men, who were at the
age of conscription and did not pay bedel-i nakdi (the money paid to the state in order
to be excluded from military service), to Romania in exchange for an amount of
money.306 In 1917, officers from Central Commandery (Merkez Kumandanlık) of
Istanbul began to interfere the jurisdiction of the police organization. The Istanbul
Police Organization had warned the Central Commandery due to the malpractices of
its personnel; however corrupted practice of the officers did not come to an end. For
instance, an official of Beyoğlu Telegraph Office was arrested because he had
prepared an illegitimate petition. The officers of the Central Commandery took six
liras as a penalty fine from him. Chief of Istanbul Police Organization indicated that
these kinds of practices were out of the jurisdiction of the military. 307 As we see in the
second chapter, the rise of inflation rate especially after 1916 resulted in decrease of
purchasing power of the officials. Probably, bribery and abuse became a way of
earning money for the security forces. As will be discussed in the sixth chapter, during
the war years, the government did not struggle against bribery and abuse in a
committed manner.
To sum up, during the nineteenth century there were important steps for the
professionalization, centralization and modernization of security forces. When the
Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, there was, at least on paper, a ‘division of
labor’ among the police officers and the gendarmeries in issues related to public order
in Istanbul. In fact, the police organization as the civil part of internal security forces
of the city was not pleased with the existence of gendarmeries in the city.
305
NARA, Department of State, 810.5, RG 84, February 13, 1914.
306
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb. 54/39, 29. Muharrem. 1335 (November 26, 1916).
307
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb. 17/1, 1 Ramazan 1335 (June 26, 1917).
95
Nevertheless, they could not have maintained public order without the support of the
gendarme. Furthermore, under the martial law, the presence of military forces inside
the civilian life of Istanbul became an everyday reality. According to Ahmed Rıza and
Osman Paşa, duties of the police and gendarme became exactly the same after the
beginning of the war.308 It means that the war caused a blurring of the division between
the functions of the civilian and military security forces. However, from the documents
above, it is possible to argue that some problems still emerged between the police and
gendarme because they interfered the realm of authority of each other.
Actually, the security forces were the government’s agents in the
implementation of security policies. In this respect they were the “law enforcement
bodies”. The Penal Code was the main legal text that the criminal policy was based on.
In the next part will be examined in detail.
3.2 Legal Structure of Crime and Punishment: An Overview of Penal Code as a

Tool of Administrative Authority
The war as a ‘crisis situation’ provided the CUP government further

discretionary power, not only for determining who to be qualified as “threatening” for
internal order, and which acts to be accepted as criminal and delinquent, but also for
putting into practice extra ordinary rules and regulations. During the Great War, the
Empire was administered through provisional laws which were the products of a group
of CUP ministers rather than being parliamentary decisions. 309 However, the Penal
308
MAZC, 3/2, 2, 2 Teşrinisani 1331 (November 15, 1915), p. 10.
309
As a matter of fact, kanun-ı muvakkat (provisional law) became a foremost legal and political
element of the CUP administration. According to the Article 36 of the Ottoman Constitution,
promulgation of provisional law was an exceptional case. Nevertheless, when the number of provisional
laws enacted is taken into consideration, it is quite difficult to argue that these laws were exceptional
during the Constitutional Regime. Between the years 1908-1918, 1061 provisional laws were
promulgated. Tarık Zafer, Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Vol I: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi,
(Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1988), pp. 8-9.
96
Code of 1858, which was in effect during the Great War, was still the main legal
document embodying official understanding of crime and punishment.
This part will deal with the Penal Code of 1858 in detail. Actually, this Penal
Code has to be evaluated as part of a longer process of legal modernization and
centralization in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, first, the formation of the earlier
penal codes of 1840 and 1851 will be analyzed. Next, promulgation of the Penal Code
of 1858 will be examined with regard to its main characteristics making it distinct from
the others. As mentioned in the first chapter, penal codes stand as the main legal
documents reflecting official ideologies. In this sense, the state elites having political
and economic power intended to manipulate penal codes in accordance with their own
purposes.310 Actually, the CUP government made remarkable changes in the Penal
Code of 1858 so as to adapt it to its political and ideological agenda. Lastly, the
amendments of the CUP government in the Penal Code of 1858 will be examined.
3.2.1 Legal Regulations on Crimes: Transition from Islamic Law to a Modern

Penal Code
The declaration of Tanzimat Fermanı (Gülhane Decree) on November 3, 1839

was a turning point in terms of transition to a modern penal code in the Ottoman
Empire. It was the first official document that emphasized the security of honor, life
and property of all the Empire’s subjects.311 Nevertheless, the realization of this goal
was not possible all-at-once under the existing Ottoman legal system. Before
declaration of this Decree, the Ottoman legal system was based on Islamic Law to a
great extent especially in terms of criminal issues.312 In fact, örfi hukuk (customary
310
311
Gabriel Baer, “The Transition from Traditional to Western Criminal Law in Turkey and Egypt”,
Studia Islamica, No. 45, (1977), p. 142.
312
In Islamic Law, crimes and their punishments are separated into three categories. First, had (the
punishment in canonical manner) punishments are implemented for crimes which are explicitly
mentioned in Quran and sunna. Adultery, theft, slander of adultery are some of these crimes, their
97
law) was also an important part of the Ottoman legal system, however, its jurisdiction
area was limited with administrative law. The Sultans had no legislative power on
private law that regulated the relationship between persons.313
The legal status of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire was also
determined according to the Islamic Law. In Islamic Law, the non-Muslim subjects of
a Muslim ruler were called as dhimmi (protected people). Whereas in terms of private
law, each dhimmi group was subject to the legal principles of their respective religious
rules and regulations nevertheless in the public issues they were subject to the rules of
the Islamic Law.314 Thus, despite the religious, cultural and social freedom allowed
for dhimmis, there were still restricted by the scope of Islamic Law. As a result, for
instance, they could not work in state service and they were not conscripted in the
army.315 However, these restrictions had come to be perceived as problematic during
the nineteenth century when the understanding of equal citizenship began to rise in the
Ottoman Empire.
In the early nineteenth century the legal system of the Ottoman Empire was
composed of four elements: the Islamic Law; the laws, rules and regulations that were
implemented to the non-Muslim elements; customary law based on regulations that
were made by the Sultan; and several concessionary legal rules and regulations based
punishments being clear in terms of magnitude and application methods. Second, there are kısas (the
application of the law of talion) punishments. These punishments are identical to offenses such as the
execution death penalty in return for an act of murder. Third, tazir (a term used in the Islamic Law for
punishments about which there is no specific religious statement) punishments are applied to crimes
whose punishments could change according to time and space. Therefore, the determination of tazir
punishments is left to judges or legislative bodies in the Islamic Law. Although, the judges, legislative
bodies and/or the Sultan have a kind of power for deciding on the tazir punishments, these still had to
derive from Islamic Law. In this sense, penal law, different from administrative law, was strictly within
the boundaries of Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmet Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı
Hukuku Külliyatı, (Diyarbakır: Dicle Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1986), p. 804.
313
Günihal Bozkurt, Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996),
p. 39.
314
Günihal Bozkurt, “The Reception of Western European Law in Turkey (From the Tanzimat to the
Turkish Republic, 1839-1939),” Der Islam , 75/2 (1998), p. 283.
315
Bozkurt, Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi, p. 283.
98
on capitulations that the foreign population living in the Empire were subject to.316
This multiple structure of the legal system was an obstacle beyond achievement of the
ideals of the Gülhane Decree. The Islamic Law, which regulated the relationship
between the persons, could not be implemented to the non-Muslim subjects. Therefore,
the issue of securing honor, life and property of all subjects regardless of religious
affiliation stood as an unresolved challenge. The need of making a penal code
applicable to all of the subjects of the Empire came into question within this context.
Just six months after the proclamation of the Gülhane Decree, the first Penal
Code of the Ottoman Empire was issued in May 1840. It was clear that this law was
prepared in great haste; therefore, it was incomplete and limited in scope. 317 A
legislative body composed of forty-five members including those from the ulema (the
body of scholars who were authorities on Muslim religion and law), as well as officials
and military officers made the Code of 1840. 318 The Code included thirteen parts,
forty-three articles and an epilogue.319 It was in effect both for the Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects of the Empire.
According to Kırlı, a foremost distinctive characteristic of the Penal Code of
1840 was its emphasis on bribery. For the first time, bribery and corresponding
punishments were specified in detail in accordance with the understanding on
‘equality’ regarding state officials. In this sense, Kırlı argues that Tanzimat bureaucrats
gained opportunity to accomplish their aims through political and hegemonic functions
of law.320 One of the most important aims of this Penal Code was to gain central
316
Bozkurt, Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi, pp. 39-40.
317
Baer, “The Transition from Traditional”, p. 142. In the epilogue part of the Penal Code, it was
explicitly claimed that this law was open to necessary addenda. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve
Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 819. In this book, there exist full text transcriptions of the Penal Codes of 1840,
1851 and 1858.
318
Baer, “The Transition from Traditional”, p. 154.
319
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 809-820.
320
Cengiz Kırlı, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı: 1840 Ceza Kanunu, İktidar ve Bürokrasi”, Tarih ve Toplum Yeni
Yaklaşımlar, Vol. 4, (Güz 2006), p. 51.
99
control over bureaucrats. In other words, this Penal Code must be evaluated as an
attempt towards centralization.321 Apart from this importance, the Penal Code of 1840
had several deficiencies.
The thirteen parts had no specific topics and some of the parts included articles
for irrelevant crimes. Furthermore, some deeds requiring punishment were mentioned
in the Code without their punishments being specified. The crimes that were indicated
with their punishments were as follows: opposition to the law, crimes against the
Sultan and State, rebellion, battery, vituperation, insulting, bribery, draw a weapon,
brigandage, and etc. The Code of 1840 narrowed down the crimes to be punished by
death sentence. Moreover, death sentence was left to the approval of the Sultan. Other
punishments were kürek (hard labor punishment), imprisonment, exile and removal of
public office.322 The Penal Code of 1840 regulated only tazir punishments while
addressing to the Islamic Law for had and kısas punishments.323 In short, this Penal
Code was not sufficient to meet the expectations and necessities. Thus, on February
17, 1851 a new Penal Code was declared.324
The Penal Code of 1851 was composed of three parts and forty-three articles.
The three parts were for the three different issues –security of life, property and honor-
that the Gülhane Decree had previously mentioned. The first part of the Penal Code of
1851 was about crimes against lives and individual security; second part dealt with
crimes against honor and dignity; and the last part was about crimes against
property.325 Some new crimes added to the Code of 1851 such as drunkenness,
321
Kırlı, “Yolsuzluğun İcadı”, p. 116.
322
323
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 805. For detailed information for had, kısas and
tazir punishments see footnote 312 in this chapter, pp. 97-98.
324
325
Bozkurt, “The Reception of Western”, p. 287. In the preface, this categorization and its relation with
the Gülhane Decree was explicitly mentioned. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp.
821-822.
100
gaming, abduction of a girl, fraud and forgery.326 In fact, both the Penal Code of 1840
and 1851 were substantially based on Islamic Law.327 For instance, falaka (bastino), as
a wide spread traditional punishment, remained in place in both of the Codes.328
Nevertheless, there was still Western influence in these legal documents. For instance,
a legal commission, not the Sultan himself, prepared these Penal Codes. Furthermore,
these Codes did not discriminate between Muslims and non-Muslims.329 Another sign
of change was the attitude towards punishment. Some traditional punishments in
Islamic Law were extremely heavy. For example, previously, the punishment for theft,
forgery of decrees or legal certificates and clipping coins had been the mutilation of
hands. With the Penal Codes of 1840 and 1851, the punishments for these crimes were
determined as exile, hard labor, imprisonment and bastinado. Similarly, before
Tanzimat, any person abducting a girl was to be punished by castration. The same
crime began to be punished by imprisonment according to the Penal Codes of 1840
and 1851.330 Another important feature of these Penal Codes was the development of
the understanding of ‘public case’ (kamu davası). According to the Article 11 of the
Penal Code of 1851, even in case when a person was remitted of punishment for a
crime in accordance with Islamic Law, she/he could still be punished for the relevant
deed through a public case.331 Although the Penal Code of 1840 and 1851 were the
first steps toward a modern criminal law, they were still largely based on Islamic Law.
Furthermore, they were limited in terms of their categorization of crimes and
punishments. In short, they were inadequate to meet the needs of the time.
326
327
328
Baer, “The Transition from Traditional”, p. 147
329
Baer, “The Transition from Traditional”, pp. 154-155.
330
Baer, “The Transition from Traditional”, pp. 155-157.
331
101
In 1856, another important decree named as Islahat Fermanı (The Reform
Edict of 1856) was declared. The Reform Edict was to affirm once again that the non-
Muslim subjects of the Empire would live according to the principles of Tanzimat.
Nevertheless, this document went further than the previous decree by guaranteeing the
historical privileges of the non-Muslim subjects.332 In this sense, the Reform Edict of
1856 had a contradictory character. On the one hand, it accepted and affirmed the
understanding of equality before the law; on the other hand, it guaranteed the legal
privileges of the non-Muslim subjects, which were principally against the
understanding of equality.333 This document also incorporated the idea of many
reforms including reforms in the Penal Code. One of the earliest results of the Edict
was the preparation of a totally new Penal Code on August 2, 1858.334 This Penal Code
would be in force till the end of the Ottoman Empire.
3.2.2 The Penal Code of 1858
The Penal Code of 1858335 was based on the French Criminal Law of 1810.336
One of the most important characteristics of the Penal Code was ‘the principle of
punishment by the state of persons committing crimes against the public order, even in
the absence of the filing of a complaint against the person’.337 It means that the
332
333
Bozkurt, Batı Hukukunun Türkiye’de Benimsenmesi, p.50.
334
John A. Strachey Bucknill and Haig Apisoghom S. Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code: A
Translation from the Turkish Text, (London: Oxford University Press, 1913), p. xiii.
335
For the original text of the Penal Code of 1858 see “Ceza Kanunname-i Hümayunu”, Düstur, I/1,
(Dersaadet: Matba-i amire, 1289), pp. 537-597. For the transcription of the whole text of the Penal Code
of 1858 from Ottoman Turkish to Turkish, see Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp.
834-877. For English translation of the Penal Code of 1858, see Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
Ottoman Penal Code. This is a useful work because it comprehends all changes and addenda to the
Penal Code until 1913, the publication date of the book. Furthermore, for a great number of articles, it
makes a comparison between the Penal Code of 1858 and The French Criminal Law of 1810.
336
102
understanding of ‘public case’ in the criminal issues, which had entered to the legal
life of the Ottoman Empire with the Penal Code of 1851, went a step further. In that
respect even when there was not any complain about a person who committed a crime
against public order, she/he could possibly be punished by the state.
Although the Penal Code of 1858 was based on the French Criminal Law of
1810, the first article clearly stated that there would be no contradiction between the
new Penal Code and Islamic Law. The first article of the Penal Code of 1858 was as
follows:
Article 1: Whereas the punishment of offences taking place directly against the
Government lies with the State, and the consideration that offences taking place
against a person disturb the public tranquility likewise concerns the State, this
Code also guarantees and secures the determination of the degrees of the
punishment the fixing and execution of which the Sacred Law of Islam;
without prejudice, however, in any case to the personal rights prescribed by the
Sacred Law of Islam.338
It is clear that the lawmakers tried to state that the publication of a new Penal Code did
not mean an entire rupture from the Islamic Law. On the contrary, the first article
mentioned that the Penal Code of 1858 would fix certain tazir punishments and would
guarantee their execution. Therefore, despite the promulgation of a new Penal Code,
since Islamic Law continued to be a legal source for criminal cases, a dualism within
the Ottoman legal system stayed in place. In fact, this point indicated the continuity
between the Penal Code of 1858 and the previous Penal Codes of the Ottoman Empire.
Nevertheless, there were still very important differences among these legal texts.
337
Bozkurt, “The Reception of Western”, p. 287.
338
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 1. Birinci Madde: Doğrudan doğruya
hükümet aleyhine vuku bulan ceriamin icra-yı mücazatı devlete ait olduğu gibi bir şahıs aleyhinde vuku
bulan cerayimin asayiş-i umumiyi ihlal eylemesi ciheti dahi kezalik devlete ait olduğundan, tayin ve
icrası şeran emr-i ulül-emre ait olan tazirin tayin-i derecatını dahi işbu Kanunname mütekeffil ve
muntazammın olup ancak herhalde şeran muayyen olan hukuk-ı şahsiyeye halel gelmeyecektir.
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 834.
103
The Penal Code of 1858 was much more detailed and well-established than the
Penal Code of 1840 and 1851. Therein, crimes and punishments were categorized in an
order. There were four main sections and 264 articles in the Penal Code of 1858. The
preliminary section was composed of four parts and forty-seven articles. This section
made an analysis of crimes and punishments in general terms. According to the Penal
Code of 1858, there were three kinds of crimes: cinayet (felony), cünha (misdemeanor)
and kabahat (police offence).339 Cinayet was the general term for crimes requiring
heavy penalties such as execution (idam), perpetual or temporary imprisonment with
hard labor (müebbeden ve muvakkaten kürek), confinement in a fortress (kalabend
olmak), perpetual exile (nefy-i ebed), perpetual deprivation of rank and office
(müebbeden rütbe ve memuriyetten mahrumiyet), and loss of civil rights (hukuk-ı
medeniyeden ıskat).340
Most of the crimes that were considered as against the external and internal
security of the Ottoman State were those categorized as cinayet. In this regard, some of
the cinayet crimes that endangered the external security of the Ottoman Empire were
collaboration with the enemy states through taking up arms with them against the
Ottoman State; making communication or intrigues with them resulting in hostile
movements or war against the Ottoman State; and facilitating their entrance to the
339
In the full text translation of the Penal Code of 1858 in English, there is a long discussion about
English terms that would be used for cinayet, cünha and kabahat. Charles George Walpole, who
translated the Penal Code of 1858 from French to English in 1888, used the following three words
respectively: felony, misdemeanor and police offence. According to Bucknill and Utidjian, these terms
would cause confusion, ¨for, although they may popularly indicate some idea of degree in the gravity of
offences, their use is from a legal point of view open to rather serious objection¨. Redhouse translations
of these words were as follows: cinayet: a wrong, offence, crime, especially an offence against the
person resulting in a wound or mutilation. Cünha: a crime, offence, fault. Kabahat: a fault, offence, a
sin, guilt. According to Bucknill and Utidjian, felony, misdemeanor and police offence did not
correspond to the meaning of cinayet, cünha and kabahat, or their French equivalents crime, délit and
contravention. Therefore, the authors decided to retain the terms cinayet, cünha and kabahat throughout
the text. Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 5. Likewise, in this dissertation,
original Ottoman Turkish terms cinayet, cünha and kabahat will be used since there is no appropriate
single set of English terms for these words.
340
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 835, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
Ottoman Penal Code, p. 6.
104
Ottoman dominions or delivering to them a city, fortress, fortified places, harbor,
storehouse, dock-yard or vessel of the Ottoman Empire.341
Among the crimes that were against the internal security of the Ottoman State,
the following were among instances of cinayet: inciting the Ottoman subjects to revolt;
making inhabitants arm themselves against each other and/or provoking them to
commit mutual slaughter; manufacturing, hiding or using dynamite, bombs or other
destructive instruments for a revolutionary object; mischievously burning or
demolishing buildings or any kind of storehouses belonging to the government; and
being the leader of an armed band of ruffians whose purpose was seizing, pillaging or
raiding the assets, properties and cash of the government.342 According to the Penal
343
Code of 1858, stealing State properties and goods; diminishing the value of the
coins that legally circulated within the Ottoman Empire;344 imitating or altering of
official damga (official seal) bearing tuğra (the Imperial Cypher);345 homicide;346
causing miscarriage of a pregnant woman by beating; 347 forced indecent sexual
341
Articles 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, and 54 were related with external security of the Ottoman Empire.
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 841-842. Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 37-40.
342
Articles 55, 56, 61 and 62, see Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 45-48,
55-56. Also see, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 842-844.
343
Article 82, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 69. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli
İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 847.
344
Article 143, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 107. Akgündüz,
Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 857.
345
Article 149, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 110-111. Akgündüz,
346
347
105
behavior/rape;348 and committing theft with several people on a public road at night349
were among some other instances of cinayet crimes that required heavy penalties.
The second category of crimes were cünha that were ‘acts which call for
corrective/educative punishments (mücazat-ı tedibiyye). Corrective punishments are
imprisonment for more than one week; temporary exile (muvakkaten nefy); dismissal
from office (memuriyetten tard); and fine or cash penalty (ceza-yı nakdi).’350 A great
number of crimes were categorized as cünha within the Penal Code of 1858. For
example, most of the cases related to oppression and/or ill-treatment of the government
officials towards individuals;351 assuming official capacity without having the right or
authority to do so;352 interference to the rites and religious ceremonies which were
officially authorized;353 causing forged names to be written in travel permits and
passports;354 and drawing a weapon on one for frightening355 were only some of the
crimes which could be categorized as cünha.
Kabahat were the acts that required reprimanding and admonitory treatment
(muamele-i tekdiriye). Admonitory treatment was imprisonment for from twenty-four
348
Article 198, Bucknill and Utidjian translated the phrase ‘cebren fiil-i şeni’ as ‘abdominal act’;
however in this Article, it clearly meant “rape” therefore forced indecent sexual behavior or rape was
more appropriate. Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code pp. 150-151, Akgündüz,
349
Article 219, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 173-174, Akgündüz,
Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 869,
350
Article 3, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 6, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli
351
Articles 104-111, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 80-86, Akgündüz,
Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 850-852.
352
Articles 130-131, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 99-100, Akgündüz,
353
Article 132, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 101, Akgündüz,
354
Article 156, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 114-115 Akgündüz,
355
Article 179, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 134-135, Akgündüz,
106
hours to one week or a cash penalty up to one hundred piastres (kuruş).356 The crimes
that could be categorized as kabahat were generally indicated in the last chapter of the
Penal Code of 1858. For instance, not complying to the administrative regulations or to
the regulations published by the municipal authorities;357 firing pistols or guns inside
the cities, towns and villages;358 false or improper registration of the arrivals to the
inns, hotels or lodging-houses and/or not submitting the registers to the authorities in
due time;359 causing injury to the movable properties of other;360 and making noise and
361
uproar in a manner to disturb others without cause are some of the kabahats
according to the Penal Code of 1858. In the preliminary section of the Penal Code,
after a brief introduction about the crimes in terms of definition of cinayet, cünha and
kabahat, details of the punishments were examined. Furthermore, the circumstances
serving as grounds for excuse or responsibility were mentioned in the last part of this
section.362
The first chapter was entitled as ‘sets forth the cinayets and cünhas of which
the injury is general [public] and the punishments provided thereof’.363 There were
356
Article 5, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 7, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli
357
358
359
360
361
362
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 15-36.
363
Bucknill and Utidjian translated the word ‘amm’ as ‘general’. Nevertheless, when the content of the
crimes are taken into consideration, it is clear that this word had to be translated in English as ‘public’.
The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 37. Birinci Bab: Zarar-ı Amm Olan Cinayet ve Cünha ile
Mücazat-ı Müterettibeleri Beyanıdır. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku …, p. 841.
107
sixteen parts and one hundred and twenty one articles. This chapter included the
following crimes: disturbing internal and external security of the state; theft of state
properties; abuse the influence of the office and not fulfillment of official duties;
oppression and ill-treatment of the government officials towards individuals;
opposition, disobedience and/or insulting the government officials; helping escape of
prisoners or hiding criminals; breaking seals; assuming official capacity without
having the right or authority to do so; interfering with religious privileges or
destroying and damaging certain ancient monuments; deranging telegraphic
communication; opening printing house without permission; counterfeiting
(kalpazanlık); forgery (sahtekarlık) and arson (kundakçılık).364 This chapter regulating
the punishments for the crimes against public order was the most comprehensive part
of the Penal Code.
The second chapter named as ‘cinayets and cünhas against persons and the
punishments provided thereof’365 was composed of twelve parts and eighty-six articles.
This chapter regulated punishments for the crimes that took place between the
individuals. Actually, this part had a distinct importance in the history of law in the
Ottoman Empire. There was not a separate section for ‘crimes and offences against
private persons’ in the previous Ottoman Penal Codes (1840 and 1851). It is a fact that
the previous Penal Codes concerned primarily with the crimes and punishments related
to public order and security, and tyranny and corruption of state officials. 366 Although
the first chapter of the Penal Code of 1858 dealt with these issues in a detailed manner,
the presence of a separate chapter about the crimes and offenses against private
persons was significant. It was the first legal document comprehensively dealing with
364
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 37-122, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam
ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 841-861
365
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 124, Bab-ı sani: Eşhas hakkında vuku
bulan cinayet ve cünhalarda mücazat-ı müterettibeleri, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı
Hukuku, p. 861.
366
108
the criminal issues which previously had almost been entirely under the realm of the
Islamic Law.
The crimes in the second chapter were as follows: homicide, wounding, beating
and threatening; abortion, selling adulterated drinks or poisons; violation of honor
(hetk-i ırz) including rape and adultery; imprisoning or detaining persons contrary to
rules, stealing infants and abduction of girls; giving false testimony and swearing
falsely; calumny, vituperation and divulgence of secrets; theft; abuse of confidence;
bankruptcy and swindling; fraud in auction and commercial affairs; gambling; and
destruction of property and causing loss to people.367 This chapter was followed by the
last chapter entitled as ‘sets forth the punishments for persons guilty of kabahats
against matters of sanitation, cleanliness and police’.368 It was the shortest section of
the Penal Code. There were eleven articles about petty crimes.369
In conclusion, there were some distinctive characteristics of the Penal Code of
1858 from the previous Penal Codes of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, we are talking
about a story of less than two decades. The first Penal Code that was published in 1840
was a “naïve” attempt to meet the requirements of the Gülhane Decree. When it
became clear that this attempt was insufficient, another Penal Code was published in
1851. Nevertheless, the second attempt in 1851, similar to the Penal Code of 1840, was
far from being a well-organized criminal law that regulated all issues about the crimes
and punishments. They were both extremely short in size and they did not cover most
of the crimes, which were in the realm of Islamic Law. Actually, a wholesale and all-
at-once break from the traditional Ottoman legal system that had been in force for
centuries was not possible. Therefore, the importance of the first Penal Codes should
367
ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 861-875.
368
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 200. Bab-ı Salis: Umur-ı tahaffuziye ve
tanzifiye ve zabıtaya muhalif hareket eden ashab-ı kabayihin cezaları beyanındadır Akgündüz,
369
ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 875-876. For detailed information about the kabahats see p. 9.
109
not be underestimated. Despite their deficiencies, they opened up a way for the Penal
Code of 1858.
In fact, the publication of the Penal Code of 1858 was the result of a series of
factors. European Powers, particularly France and Britain, which supported the
Ottoman Empire against Russia in the Crimean War (1853-1856), recognized the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war.370 In return, they
insisted on some reforms through which non-Muslim subjects would be protected in
the Ottoman Empire. Actually, Ottoman bureaucrats were also aware of the need for
reforms because otherwise European states could interfere the internal affairs of the
Ottoman Empire capitalizing on its economic and administrative weaknesses. As a
result, the Reform Edict of 1856 was declared. The publication of a new Penal Code
was one of the practical requirements for the legal reforms promised in the Reform
Edict of 1856.371
Despite the great impact of the Reform Edict of 1856 on the promulgation of a
new Penal Code, the new code was no means solely a product of external pressure
coming from the European States. On the contrary, internal developments since the
early nineteenth century in terms of modernization and centralization of the Ottoman
State led to the promulgation of the Penal Code of 1858. In other words, the
promulgation of a totally new Penal Code reflecting the official understanding of crime
and punishment from the perspective of an increasingly modernizing and centralizing
Ottoman State was inevitable. The Penal Code of 1858 was promulgated within this
national and international context. With a long series of amendments and addenda, the
code would be in effect till the final collapse of the Empire. It must also be noted that
the most comprehensive changes in the Penal Code took place during the Second
Constitutional period.
370
Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: I. B.Tauris, 2004), p. 54.
371
Gültekin Yıldız, Mapushane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin Kuruluş Serüveni, 1839-1908, (İstanbul:
Kitabevi Yayınları, 2012), p. 192.
110
3.2.3 The Constitutional Regime and the Penal Code of 1858: Amendments
The Penal Code was one of the realms where the Constitutional Regime could
reproduce its ideological and political aims. In this sense, there were two options for
the CUP: on the one hand, they might continue the existing Penal Code and, in
accordance with their aims, make necessary amendments on it; on the other hand, they
might promulgate a totally new Penal Code. The CUP preferred the first option. In
fact, during the Constitutional Regime, the CUP made most of the amendments and
reforms about the Penal Code as a part of a broader political project aiming to ‘reform
the Empire by creating a centralized, efficient, progressive, and rational administrative
system so as to expand and centralize the state power over society’.372 The most
important wave of changes took place on June 4, 1911. In total, sixty-nine changes
were made as in follows:
Table 5: The Changes in the Penal Code of 1858 on June 4, 1911
Repeal of an Abolition of an Addendum to Promulgation of a Total

article by article and/or an article new article
substituting a an addendum
new one
Preliminary 9 - 1 - 10
First Chapter 15 7 6 - 28
Second Chapter 22 1 6 - 29
Third Chapter 1 - - 1 2
Total 47 8 13 1 69
Source: This information is compiled from “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını
muaddel kanun, 6 Cemaziyelahir 1329/22 Mayıs 1327 (June 4, 1911)”, Düstur, II/3 (Dersaadet: Matba-i
Osmaniye, 1330), pp. 436-460.373
372
Kent Schull, Penal Institutions, Nation State Construction and Modernity in the Late Ottoman
Empire, 1908-1919, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation), (Los Angeles: University of California, 2007), p.
121.
373
The changes were also included in Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code. In the
Preliminary section, the repealed articles by substituting new articles are as follows: 8, 11, 12, 37, 39,
111
This table indicates that sixty-nine changes took place in the Penal Code that was
composed of 264 articles. It means that the CUP government changed almost a 25
percent in itself of the Penal Code in accordance with its policies and ideology. Most
of the changes were in the way of repealing the old article and substituting a new one.
Therefore, rather than making addenda to old articles, which was the traditional way of
making changes, the CUP preferred to substitute totally new articles. In this part, rather
than focusing on the changes one by one, they will be evaluated in a general way. In
the next chapters, when the crime rates will be examined, the articles related to specific
crimes will be analyzed in a detailed way.
The changes in the Preliminary section of the Penal Code reflected that the
CUP agreed on the existing categorization of crimes and punishments as well as
circumstances for excuse to a great extent. It is a fact that most of the articles in this
section remained as they had been. Only seven articles out of forty-seven articles were
substituted by new ones. The changes in the Preliminary section could be summarized
as follows: much clearer and more detailed punishments for the repetitive crimes;
abolishment of the use of physical pressure which had been accepted as a way for
extracting fine, stolen properties, compensation and other expenses; new regulations
about the seizure of materials prepared or used for committing a crime; standardization
of “pecuniary fines” and the use of incarceration for unpaid fines; regulations about
crimes committed by children; implementation of punishments for the crimes
40, 45, 46 and 47. In this section there is only one addendum to the article 42. In the First Chapter there
were fifteen new articles that were replaced by the older ones. These articles are as follows: 55,67, 68,
69, 76, 102, 105, 106, 113, 114, 115, 116, 130, 134, 135 and 136. There were six addenda to the
following articles: 55, 99 (two addenda), 130, 155 and 166. Furthermore, the government repealed 6
articles and one addendum of an article in this chapter. Article 70,71,72,73,74 and 75 were totally
abolished and addendum of the Article 67 was also repealed. In the Second Chapter twenty-two articles
were substituted by new ones. These articles were the Articles 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 188,
189, 190,191,192, 197, 206, 213, 214, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226 and 253. There were seven addenda to
several articles: 179, 201, 202 (two addenda), 230 and 252. Furthermore, the Article 186 was abrogated
on June 4, 1911. There were only two changes in the Third Chapter: the Article 255 was repealed and
replaced by a new article; a totally new article was added to the end of the Penal Code as the Article
265.
112
committed in the case of self defense; the procedure for collectively committed crimes;
and new applications about mitigation of punishments.374
The aim of the amendments in this section was to standardize and specify
punishments without making any changes about the understanding of crime in the
Penal Code. Especially, some points related to crimes committed collectively or those
committed in the case of self-defense, which had not been precise enough in the Penal
Code of 1858, were clarified. Nevertheless, main points such as the categorization of
crimes in three groups (cinayet, cünha and kabahat) and punishments in accordance
with the crimes remained as they were. Probably, the government preferred to make
changes about topics that continuously created problems. For example, the payment of
pecuniary fine was one of these topics.
Fifteen new articles were substituted in the First Chapter that was about crimes
against public order. The changes in this chapter concentrated on some parts. For
instance, there was no change in the first part related to crimes against the external
security of the Ottoman State. Nevertheless, the first article of the second part (Article
55) was substituted by a new article corresponding to the crimes against internal
security of the Ottoman State. The last paragraph of the new article was as follows:
‘The person whose forcible attempt to alter, change or destroy the Constitution, or the
shape of form of the Government, or the system of succession of the Ottoman Empire
is to be put to death.’375 According to this article, the government perceived any
attempt to alter, change or destroy the Constitutional Regime as the primary and the
most important threat to internal security. The CUP tried to guarantee the survival of
the Constitutional Regime with this new article.
In the First Chapter, another topic about which the CUP regime made many
arrangements was bribery. There were fifteen articles about bribery in the Penal Code
374
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 10-11, 12, 13, 24-26, 29-30, 31, 32-33,
36. Schull made a list of changes in the Penal Code, see, Schull, Penal Institutions, Nation State, p. 122-
123.
375
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 47. Kanun-ı Esasiyi ve hükümetin şekil
ve heyetini veya saltanat-ı seniyyenin usul-i verasetini tagyir ve tebdil veya imhaya cebren teşebbüsü
sabit olan şahıs idam olunur. “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, p. 443.
113
of 1858. The CUP government changed four of the articles totally and abolished six
articles on June 4, 1911.376 For the sake of our analysis, ‘bribery’ will be one of the
topics of the next chapter and it will be discussed in detail. However, here, it must be
stated that the CUP government tried to shape the issue of ‘bribery’, which had been
an important problem during the Hamidian Regime, in accordance with its own
understanding of administration.
Furthermore, almost all articles of the part about opposition, disobedience
and/or insulting government officials were changed.377 Deranging telegraphic
communication was another topic in which all of the articles about the issue were
repealed to be substituted by new articles.378 Other topics that the government
amended in the First Chapter were as follows: abuse office and neglect of official
duties; oppression and ill-treatment by government officials of individuals, especially
unlawful entry to houses of persons, and torture or bodily harm; assuming official
capacity without having the right or authority to do so; forgery; and arson. 379 Although
all of these changes had importance for the CUP government, it is clear that the most
critical changes were about bribery and situations of disobedience, opposition and/or
insulting government officials. Both of these issues will be analyzed in detail in the
following chapters.
The greatest number of changes was in the Second Chapter related to the
crimes against persons. Out of eighty-six articles, twenty-two articles were repealed
and new articles were placed instead in this Chapter. As mentioned earlier, the crimes
376
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 62-66. “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli
Kanun-ı Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 443-444.
377
This part was originally composed of five articles. Four articles out of five were changed on June 4,
1911. For the new versions of Article 113,114,115 and 116 see “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı
Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 445-447, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 88-
92.
378
“28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 447-448, Bucknill and Utidjian, The
Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 102-104.
379
“28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 444-445, 447-448, Bucknill and
Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 77, 79, 81-83, 100,114, 123.
114
and offenses in the second chapter were historically under the realm of Islamic Law.
Therefore, it can be argued that the CUP increasingly tried to restrict the jurisdiction
and the primacy of Islamic Law in criminal cases. Another meaning of the changes
made on the Second Chapter was that the CUP tried to institute a legal system in which
the tazir punishments were increasingly systematized and standardized. 380 There were
minor or comprehensive changes in almost in all parts of the Second Chapter.
On May 11, 1914, there was another wave of reform in the Penal Code of 1858.
Nevertheless, it was a less comprehensive reform attempt. There were twelve changes
in different parts of the Penal Code: seven articles were repealed to be substituted by
new articles; one article corresponding to the theft of state property was abolished;
three articles were modified; and an addendum was made to an article about the abuse
of office.381 Six of the articles which were repealed to be substituted by new articles
belonged to the part about giving false testimony and swearing falsely. Actually, this
part was composed of six articles; therefore, all the articles were changed with this
law. The new articles gave in detailed the conditions that could be regarded as false
testimony and swearing. Similarly, the punishments were also determined in an
elaborate way.
The reforms in the Penal Code during the Constitutional Period indicated that
the new regime tried to monopolize its power over criminal issues. The CUP
government attempted to expand penetration power to the society through a
centralized, efficient, progressive and rational administrative system.382 Actually, the
criminal law was one of the most important realms to realize this aim. At this point, it
was not a coincidence that the greatest changes were made in the first and especially in
the second chapters of the Penal Code of 1858. The CUP revisions in the Penal Code
could be summarized as follows:
380
Schull, Penal Institutions, Nation State, p. 121.
381
“28 Zilhicce 1274 tarihli Ceza Kanununun bazı mevadını muaddel kanun-ı muvakkat, 15
Cemaziyelahir 1332/ 28 Nisan 1330 (11 Mayıs 1914)”, Düstur, II/6, (Dersaadet: Matba-i Amire, 1334),
pp. 644-651.
382
115
[…] Rationalizing punishments and criminal proceedings; expanding and
centralizing governmental power to determine and adjudicate criminal activity
at the expense of Islamic law; gaining greater monopoly over the use of force
by assuming sole authority in exacting, determining and imposing
punishments; and eliminating intermediaries between the state centralized
power and criminals.383
In this way, the CUP gained the chance of a greater penetration to the society and to
daily lives of persons. As a matter of fact, before the Great War, at least in theory, the
CUP achieved this aim to a great extent through revisions in the Penal Code.
There were a number of adjustments in the Penal Code during the War years.
Actually, some of these were slight and ordinary changes.384 However, there were also
reflecting on the one hand, government’s attempts of penetration to and control of the
social life, and, on the other hand, wartime needs and concerns. For instance, an
addendum to the Article 200 stand as a good example of government’s attempts of
further penetration to the social life. This article was about seducing a virgin with a
false promise of marriage.385 Therefore, the article regulated punishments for the
offenders that seduced a virgin and did not keep promise of marriage. On March 4,
383
384
On December 12, 1914, Article 261, which was about the grazing of animals at plantation areas
belonging to other persons, was replaced by a new Article. “28 Zilhicce 1274 tarihli Kanun-ı Ceza’nın
261. Maddesini muaddel kanun-ı muvakkat, 24 Muharrem 1330/30 Teşrinisani 1328 (December 12,
1914)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 132. This article was modified once again on March 13, 1916. “28 Zilhicce 1274
tarihli Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 261. Maddesini muaddel kanun, 8 Cemaziyelevvel 1334/29 Şubat 1331 (March
13, 1916)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 674. During the War years, battery and wounding were two other elements
about which modifications were made. The addendum to Article 179 indicated that if battery and
wounding did not cause a bodily injury for more than ten days, legal proceeding could be enacted
through the submission of an indictment (şikayetname). Furthermore, the withdrawal of the lawsuit for
perpetrators of such battery and wounding cases would necessitate the abatement of Common Law
(Hukuk-i Umumi) case. “Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 179. Maddesinin 6 Cemaziyelahir 1329 tarihli ilavesini
muaddel kanun, 18 Rebiülahir 1334, 9 Şubat 1331 (23 Şubat 1916)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 398. An addendum
was made to Article 264 about the use of places allocated to public use in March 1916. “28 Zilhicce
1274 tarihli Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 264. Maddesine müzeyyel fıkra hakkında kanun, 20 Cemaziyelevvel
1334/ 12 Mart 1332 (March 25, 1916)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 867.
385
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 865; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
116
1914, the article was amended with an addendum regulating the conditions in the case
that the woman’s side could prove the promise for marriage.386
This amendment was replaced by a new addendum specifying the conditions
for marriage in this case on October 24, 1917.387 According to the amendment,
marriage had to take place in front of judges through official legal ceremony
(merasim-i kanuniyye). People who violate this rule would be imprisoned for one
month to six months and their witnesses would also be imprisoned. Furthermore, the
judges and delegated judges (naib) executing and endorsing the marriage agreement
without proper legal ceremony; or religious leaders such as imam or priest who made
religious marriage agreement in the absence of judges would be imprisoned for one
month to six months. This addendum was a crucial attempt to increase control over
social life. It is clear that the CUP aimed at monopolizing its power in controlling
issues about ‘marriage and family’. Standardization of procedures and registration of
proceedings were instruments to achieve this aim. Especially, there was intention to
bring under state control the marriages taking place as a result of sex-related crimes.
Alongside with such adjustments aiming at further penetration to social life,
there were also some changes reflecting the wartime concerns of the government. For
instance, three articles about the sale of unhealthy, decayed and poisonous nutriments
and medicines changed remarkably. Through the addendum and enactment of new
articles, the crimes related to public health were specified, while relevant punishments
also became stricter.388 Therefore, it can be argued that the CUP government felt the
need of making some revisions to protect public health. Probably, feeding which was a
major concern of the state elites during the war turned to be even more problematic as
386
“Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 200. maddesinin 26 Cemaziyelahir 1277 tarihli zeyl-i evveliyle 11 Ramazan 1331
tarihli zeyl-i sanisini muaddel kanun-ı muvakkat, 19 Rebiülahir 1332/4 Mart 1330 (March 17,1914)”,
Düstur, II/6, p. 316.
387
“Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 200. Maddesinin 19 Rebiülahir 1332 tarihli zeyl-i sanisi ber-vech-i ati tadil
edilmiştir, 8 Muharrem 1336/24 Teşrinievvel 1333 (October 24, 1917)”, Düstur, II/9, p. 782.
388
“28 Zilhicce 1274 tarihli Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 194. Maddesine müzeyyel fıkarat ile 196 ve 257.
Mevadd-ı muaddelesi hakkında kanun, 9 Rebiülevvel 1336/24 Kanunuevvel 1333 (December 23,
1917)”, Düstur, II/10, pp. 49-51.
117
a result of the sale of unhealthful, decayed and poisonous products. Thus, the relevant
articles related articles of the Penal Code might be considered as a direct outcome of
wartime sanitation policies.
The addenda made to the Article 206 also reflected wartime concerns of the
CUP government.389 The addendum put into effect on September 16, 1915 stated that
‘During mobilization, as long as martial law continues, whoever commits sexual
assault (cebren fiil-i şeni) to spouses, daughters of soldiers or other women in their
families would be punished with death penalty’.390 This was a radical change for
punishments given to offenders of sexual assault. In fact, according to the Penal Code,
although sexual assault was a crime requiring heavy penalties –generally, incarceration
with hard labor for two to seven years- death penalty was never taken into account as a
punishment for that type of crime.391 Therefore, this addendum could only be
explained with regard to the war conditions. Actually, the government made this
provisional law in order to motivate males to conscription and war making. When they
were fighting on the fronts, the state would “protect” their women by implementing
heaviest punishments against whoever dared to harm them.
Alongside with these revisions in the Penal Code, there were a group of other
amendments reflecting another major concern of the CUP government during the
Great War: the survival of the state and the continuation of the CUP administration. In
that respect, a number of adjustments in the Penal Code about firearms, and the crime
389
The Article 206 was in the fourth part was entitled as ‘Hilaf-ı Usul Hapis ve Tevkif-i Eşhas ve Sabi ve
Mürahik Sirkati ve Kız Kaçırmak Fezahati’ (The Shameful Act of Imprisoning or Detaining Persons
Contrary to Rule, of Stealing Infants or Murahiqs and of Abduction of Girls). Akgündüz, Mukayeseli
İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 867; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 161.
390
‘Seferberlikte, idare-i örfiyyenin ilanı ve devamı müddetince asker zevce ve evlatlarıyla ailelerinde
bulunan sair maharime cebren fiil-i şeni icra edenler idam olunurlar.’ “Kanun-ı Cezanın 206’ıncı
maddesine müzeyyel fıkra hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat”, Düstur, II/7, p. 725.
391
In the Penal Code of 1858, there was a separate part on sex-related crimes and corresponding
punishments in the Second Chapter. The third part entitled Hetk-i Irz Edenlerin Mücazatı Beyanındadır
(Sets forth the Punishment for Persons Who Violate Honor) included six articles about indecent sexual
behavior, adultery and sexual assault. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 864-866;
118
of imitating and altering official documents, will be discussed in the seventh chapter in
detail.
In this chapter the formation of the modern Ottoman State has analyzed in
terms of developments in policing and criminal law. As a matter of fact, for a better
evaluation of security and criminal policies of the CUP government during the war
years, it is necessary to analyze the transformation of these realms in the nineteenth
century and early twentieth century. The transformation in policing and criminal law
provided necessary assets to the CUP government for the implementation of its
policies on public order and security. Surveillance and gathering information about the
city population became an issue of foremost importance for the CUP government in
this sense. In the next chapter, travel documents, passports and regular reports
prepared by the General Directorate of Security will be evaluated as means of
surveillance and control.
119
CHAPTER 4
INSTRUMENTS OF SURVEILLANCE & CONTROL: TRAVEL

DOCUMENTS, PASSPORTS AND REGISTERS OF THE TRAVEL OFFICE
One of the main targets of modern state has been to get information about its
population. According to Foucault, since the eighteenth century, “the art of
government requires a set of analysis and forms of knowledge.”392 Certainly what
Foucault means by ‘knowledge’ is the ‘knowledge of population’. By using this
knowledge, governments of modern states do not only develop administrative policies
but also gain important ‘assets’ for the surveillance and control of their citizens.
Giddens argues that surveillance for modern states refer to the storage and unification
of information for administrative objectives.393 Therefore, getting detailed and regular
information about population has become a prerequisite for modern state to develop
administrative policies aimed at restructuring the society.
For modern states there are a number of ways of collecting information about
the population. Statistics, censuses, travel documents, identity cards and all kinds of
registers about population are instruments of collecting regular data about people. By
using these instruments, modern state makes its population ‘legible’.394 In this way, it
could manage this ‘legible population’ in depth and detail. Another advantage of
392
393
394
James Scott uses the concept of ‘creation a legible people’ to account for the invention of permanent
and inherited surnames. According to him it is an inevitable part of modern statecraft. See, James Scott,
Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes tp Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 65. Cengiz Kırlı benefits from the same metaphor,
‘creation of a legible people’ in his analysis about the surveillance understanding of the Ottoman State.
Cengiz Kırlı, “Surveillance and Constituting the Public in the Ottoman Empire”, Publics, Politics and
Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and North Africa, Seteney Shami (ed.),
(New York: Sociasl Science Research Council, 2009).
120
creating a ‘legible population’ is to develop much more appropriate policies of
surveillance and control. In this sense, the creation of ‘legible people’ could be
regarded as a hallmark of modern statehood through which people become open to the
scrutiny of officialdom.395
In this chapter three types of instruments related to travel will be analyzed in
this context: travel documents (seyahat varakası), passports and reports of the Travel
Office (Seyrüsefer Kalemi). By using these documents the CUP government could
collect detailed and regular information about people intending to travel to and from
Istanbul. Furthermore, during the Great War, these documents became effective
surveillance instruments of the CUP government to control city inhabitants and new
comers. The main discourse of the government was to ‘maintain public order’ when
the issue was to implement such control mechanisms.
The maintenance of public order in Istanbul always had a symbolic meaning as
well as its practical importance for the Ottoman State. The public order of the capital
city meant the public order of the country in a broader. Therefore, when several
rebellions or disorders broke out in Istanbul, its possible repercussions in other parts of
the Empire was always worrying for statesmen. Furthermore, since Istanbul was the
administrative center of the Empire, the public order of the city provided a “secure”
atmosphere for taking important administrative decisions. Besides, Istanbul was the
first place where these decisions were initially applied. In order for these decisions to
be implemented in the city, there was a prerequisite for public order from the
perspective of the governments. Therefore, public order was one of the most important
realms for the structuring and restructuring of state-society relations.
The Ottoman governments and state elites historically argued that as well as the
daily acts and interactions of the city population, mass migration movements and
individual migration to Istanbul had to be under control in order to provide public
order. According to them, newcomers generally brought with them lots of problems to
395
Jane Caplan and John Torpey, “Introduction”, Documenting Individual Identity, Jane Caplan and
John Torpey (eds.), (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 1.
121
the city. Unemployment, lack of proper accommodation and as a result of these, a
vagrant way of life were grave threats for public security. From the state’s point of
view these people tended to crime since they did not have regular jobs and salaries. In
other words, the state elites argued that these people sooner or later engaged in several
crimes such as pick pocketing and theft in order to survive. In this sense, poverty itself
constituted a problem from the perspective of the state. Therefore, the governmental
policies shaped in accordance with the idea that “whether they were newcomers or
inhabitants of the city, the poor had to be kept under control or even be banished from
the city if necessary.” For the state, ex-convicts (sabıkalı) were by themselves a
potential problem for public security therefore they had to be under the surveillance of
the state. In case of a crisis they constituted the first group of people that would be
exiled all at once from the city. The main aim behind the foundation of separate
security forces, their institutionalization and professionalization and the enactment of
new laws and regulations while exploring new and more effective ways of control was
to eliminate or at least suppress “potential criminals”.
During periods of crisis, such as the situation of war, maintenance of internal
order became much more essential for the states. Accordingly, during the Great War,
the maintenance of internal security had a special meaning for the government. The
Great War, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, was the most destructive war in
the history of Ottoman State. It continued for four years and the Ottoman State had to
mobilize people for this duration. Public order in the home front was necessary for
better warfare. Particularly, the government aimed at providing order in Istanbul as
much as possible. Actually, the issue of public order in Istanbul had historically been a
major concern for Ottoman statesmen and therefore, there were already some policies
on surveillance and control of the city population dating back to centuries ago.
Since the second half of the sixteenth century, the state had begun to control
the people, who came to Istanbul for purposes such as immigration, searching
temporary jobs, doing trade or travelling. Especially, curbing individual and family
immigrations to Istanbul became an important issue for providing public order. As a
122
matter of fact, the following factors resulted in immigration from rural areas to urban
centers in the late sixteenth century: “the weakness of the central government;
financial difficulties; the undesirable practices of government officials; the burden of
heavy taxes; the increasing rate of unemployment; lack of sufficient arable land;
epidemics and natural diseases…”396 The migrations that began due to these reasons in
the second half of the sixteenth century reached a peak in the end of the century as a
result of Jelali Revolts (Celali Revolts).397 Istanbul, as the capital of the Empire was an
attractive city for individual and family immigration.398 The rise of population in
Istanbul during the second half of the sixteenth century and during the seventeenth
century caused economic and social problems. Therefore, the Ottoman State began to
develop strategies to control the city population.
As a means to prevent population rise in Istanbul, immigration from Rumelia
and Anatolia to the city was prohibited. Furthermore, the people, who had come to city
immediately before this decision, were sent back to their hometowns. Similarly,
sponsorship (kefalet) was required from the people who came to Istanbul to find jobs.
Apart from these, a struggle began against beggars, thieves and vagabonds. 399 In this
respect, application of several travel documents was to become the most useful way of
control. From sixteenth century to the nineteenth century several travel documents
such as il-can-name, hükm-i şerif, izn-i şerif (travel permits with different names) were
396
Osman Gümüşçü, “Internal migrations in sixteenth century Anatolia”, Journal of Historical
Geography, Vol. 30, (2004), p. 236.
397
The most intensive migrations in Anatolia were between the years 1593 and 1610 during the Jelali
Revolts. This migrations were called the ‘great flight’. Gümüşçü, “Internal migrations... ”, p. 243. In
fact, Jelali Revolts caused by a number of economic problems as well as demographic and climatic
changes had important consequences. According to Oktay Özel the most important consequence of
these revolts was that “violence became the underlying at all levels of seventeenth-century politics and
society, both in the provinces and in Istanbul.” Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis, 1550-
1700 ”, The Ottoman World, Christine Woodhead (ed.), (London and New York: Routledge Press,
2012), p. 191.
398
The variety of jobs and professions as well as better public services made big cities attractive for
migrations. Gümüşçü, “Internal migrations”, p. 238.
399
Mehmet Demirtaş, “XIX. Yy.da Istanbul’a Göçü Engellemek için Alınan Tedbirler: Menn-i Mürur
Uygulaması ve Karşılaşılan Güçlükler”, Belleten LXXII, no. 68, (Aralık, 2009), p. 723.
123
used.400 The main idea behind the use of these travel documents was to prevent the
entrance of “undesirable elements” to Istanbul.
Despite these measures, migrations to Istanbul continued during the eighteenth
century. According to the state elites, unstoppable immigrations to Istanbul constituted
the main cause of chaos and social instability in the city.401 Therefore, two basic
methods were used in order to provide internal order in Istanbul in the end of the
eighteenth century. On the one hand, security forces tried to prevent the entry of
persons to Istanbul if they did not have any meaningful reasons for their presence in
the city. For that, traditional methods were used such as acceptance to the city of only
persons having sponsorship (kefalet). On the other hand, strict scrutiny and control
were in place for persons who could make it into the city.402 Kefalet registers prepared
for six-month intervals and including detailed information about specific segments of
the society became one of the most efficient tools of surveillance in Istanbul during the
late eighteenth century.403 The main targets of surveillance and control were vagrants
and single males who were officially regarded as “potential criminals”.404
In the nineteenth century, standardization of travel documents became an
important part of control policies. Travel permit (Mürur tezkeresi) was the main travel
document used during the nineteenth century all over the Empire. It was a more
standardized travel document than the travel documents of the previous centuries. The
need of a more standardized control over the population in the nineteenth century was
400
Nalan Turna, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri: Mürur Tezkereleri, (Istanbul:
Kaknüs, 2013), p. 13.
401
Betül Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth
Century, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014), p. 4.
402
Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing, p. 4; Betül Başaran, “III. Selim ve Istanbul Şehir
Siyaseti, 1789-1792”, Osmanlı'da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza, 18.-20. Yüzyıllar, Noémi Lévy and Alexandre
Toumarkine (eds), (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2007), p. 117.
403
Başaran, Selim III, Social Control and Policing pp. 110-117.
404
Başaran, “III. Selim ve Istanbul Şehir Siyaseti”, p. 121.
124
related to several dynamics of the period.405 Especially, the rise of rebellions in the
nineteenth century caused a chaotic situation in the cities. The control over population
movements became a prerequisite for the maintenance of public order.
Apart from many other dynamics of the nineteenth century, according to Turna,
there were two significant events which increased the need of a much more strict
scrutiny over the population in Istanbul.406 The first event was the Mora Revolt of
1821. According to Zürcher, the Greek insurrection was one of the most important
events that took place in the early nineteenth century. As a result of the Greek
insurrection, the Ottoman state elites argued that most of the Greek leaders would
struggle for full independence.407 Based on this assumption, the state elites lost their
trust to the Ottoman Greek population that had a crucial role in diplomatic and
economic international relations of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Greek
population living in Istanbul began to be scrutinized. For example, the number of
Greeks in the hans (inns) and neighborhoods were surveyed. Furthermore, entry to the
city without travel permits was prohibited for both Muslims and non-Muslims.408
The abolishment of the janissary corps in 1826 was another noticeable incident
that negatively affected the public order in Istanbul.409 Actually, the janissaries had lost
their military character many years before their abolishment. They had become an
405
The issue of control over population through travel documents is generally considered as a security
issue. In addition to that being a security measure, widespread and compulsory usage of travel
documents by people tells us a lot about modern state practices. Fatmanur Samastı examined the travel
permit as an instrument of identification and she links it to practices of modern state. See, Fatmanur
Samastı, History of Identification in the Ottoman Lands: From the Security of the Person to the Security
of the State: Implementation of Mürur Tezkeresi in the Ninenteenth Centuty, (unpublished Master
Thesis), (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2010). Nalan Turna evaluates travel permit as a useful
instrument of surveillance. According to her, the application of mürur tezkeresi inholds several
important elements such as regulating the migration movements, maintenance of security and collecting
taxes, which are different practices of surveillance. See, Turna, Nalan, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat,
Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri: Mürur Tezkereleri, (Istanbul: Kaknüs, 2013).
406
Turna, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri, pp. 60-61.
407
Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 31.
408
Turna, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri, p. 60.
409
125
important power in social and economic life.410 A lot of people, whether, they were
janissaries or not, had begun to use the power of this title. Groups such as grocers
(bakkallar), boatmen (kayıkçılar), porters (hamals), middlemen (d/tellaks) and
greengrocers (manavs) paid tribute to the janissaries in order to be protected by
them.411 Moreover, these tradesmen who were not janissaries in reality, had used the
title to gain some kind of prestige and tax exemption. In the eyes of state elites,
janissaries were problematic group rather than being a military power. 412 Furthermore,
they caused many criminal acts within the city and proved difficult to control. The
janissaries also acted on may occasions as the most important opposition group within
the city, especially when the attempts of formation of a modern army began. In 1826,
Mahmud II abolished the janissary corps. Many janissaries were massacred or exiled.
A number of tradesmen, who had not been involved in any crimes, were exiled to the
other parts of the Empire just because of their ties with the janissaries.413 Following the
abolishment of the janissary corps, the security of the city gained further importance.
Applications such as travel permit (mürur tezkeresi)414 and travel bans (men-i
mürur) actualized within this context. Security of Istanbul was extremely important for
410
Mehmet Mert Sunar, “When grocers, porters and other riff-raff become soldiers: Janissary Artisans
and Laborers in the Nineteenth Century Istanbul and Edirne”, Kocaeli Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler
Enstitü Dergisi, No. 17, (2009), p. 185.
411
For detailed information about the relationship between the Janissaries, tradesmen and immigrants in
Istanbul see, Sunar, “When grocers, porters and other”, pp. 186-187; Başaran, “III. Selim ve Istanbul
Şehir Siyaseti”, pp. 124-125; Mehmet Mert Sunar, “XIX. Yüzyıl Başları Istanbul’unda Esnaf
Yeniçeriler”, Güneydoğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, No. 18, (2010), p. 79.
412
413
414
Travel permit (Mürur tezkeresi) was a kind of internal passport. Regulation of Chiefdom of Dues
dated 1826 (İhtisab Ağalığı Nizamnamesi) was the first legal document that included several articles
about travelling and travel permits. This document formulated measures about travel and regulation of
travel permits in terms of security. Mainly, the articles about travel reflected discomfort about the
security of Istanbul. According to the Regulation, drifters and vagabonds had flooded in Istanbul and
this situation had remedied. For this purpose, solution was to register the inhabitants of Istanbul
neighborhoods. As such, the regulations prohibiting travel had to be strictly applied where as travel
permits of newcomers had to contain information about intention of these people in coming to Istanbul.
In 1841, a more detailed regulation was enacted. The first article of Regulation of Prohibition of Travel
126
the government. In order to provide security, there began a strict control to the
entrance of people who were “suspected of having ambiguous criminal intentions”
through several precautions.415 The practice of requiring personal reference from
newcomers continued during the nineteenth century. Furthermore, people who applied
for travel permits had to convince officials that they had valid reasons for travelling to
Istanbul. In spite of all these measures, the State was not successful in completely
controlling the population of the city during the nineteenth century. 416 As a matter of
fact, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, policies related to surveillance and control
continued to be implemented in a committed manner.
A number of events taking place during 1890’s in Istanbul such as March of
Bab-ı Ali (Bab-ı Ali Yürüyüşü), Demonstration of Kumkapı (Kumkapı Nümayişi),
Occupation of the Ottoman Bank (Osmanlı Bankası Baskını) and the unsuccessful
assassination attempt against Abdulhamid II in 1905 largely contributed to the
“internal threat” perception of the Sultan and state elites. Especially after 1880’s,
repressive policies in the name of ‘maintenance of public order and security’ were
applied.417 Actually, the main target of these policies was vagrants, anarchists and
(Men-i Mürur Nizamnamesi) was about the procedure for people who would arrive in Istanbul or depart
from the city. Furthermore, it specified what kind of information would be included in a travel permit.
According to this regulation, name, title (ünvan), age, occupation, appearance (eşkal), city of birth, city
of residence, place(s) of destinations, country of citizenship and issue date had to be indicated in a well-
ordered travel permit. Legal sanctions also clarified the case of traveling without a travel permit and/or
with a forged travel permit. The Regulation of 1844 named as Travel and Transit in the Ottoman Empire
(Memalik-i Mahsure-i Şahane’de Mürur ve Ubur) covered some articles about passports different from
the previous regulations. The final Regulation about travel permits was enacted in 1887. This was the
most comprehensive Regulation about travel. This Regulation was composed of three chapters and
fifteen articles. As a result, rules and regulations about travel became more standardized through the
Regulation of 1887. Turna, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri, pp. 64-89.
415
Mazanne-i su (suspected criminal), serseri (vagrant) and mechul–ül-ahval eşhas (nondescript and
dubious persons) were the suspected people who had to be kept out of the city. Demirtaş, “XIX. Yy.da
Istanbul’a göçü engellemek”, p. 747.
416
Demirtaş, “XIX. Yy.da Istanbul’a göçü engellemek”, p. 753. Turna also gives many samples of how
people resisted to the travel measures. For detailed information see, Turna, 19. YY’dan 20. YY’a
Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri, pp. 175-183.
127
immigrant workers in Istanbul. Since the Armenians were the main actors in the events
mentioned above, they also came under the close scrutiny of the state.418 According to
Yılmaz, during the reign of Abdülhamid II, the control of geographic mobilization was
shaped in accordance with the understanding of ‘public order’ greatly influenced by
the perception of “internal threat”.419 Therefore travel permits and passports continued
to be in place as efficient instruments of surveillance and control.
The practice of travel permits came to an end when the Second Constitutional
Regime was founded after the Revolution of 1908. Travel permits and other scrutiny
mechanisms were considered as being against the understanding of freedom in the
Constitution. Accordingly travel permit was to be abolished in 1910. Ottoman identity
card (Tezkere-i Osmaniye) would substitute passport and travel permit.420
Nevertheless, the Great War brought about an eclipse to the atmosphere of freedom in
terms of travel.
During the War years, control over travel became crucial for the government to
maintain public order. Between the years 1914-1918, travel was the issue about which
regulations were most frequently made. Furthermore, in 1915, a separate office, Travel
Office (Seyrüsefer Kalemi), dealing with travel issues was founded under the General
Directorate of Security.421 The foundation of the Travel Office within the war
conditions was remarkable for two reasons. First, since the security perception of all
belligerent states became more radical during the war, the CUP government felt the
417
İlkay Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Güvenlik Politikaları
Ekseninde Mürur Tezkereleri, Pasaportlar ve Otel Kayıtları, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,
2014), pp. 69-77.
418
Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde, pp. 88-89.
419
Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde, p. 77.
420
421
Main duty of the Travel Office was to control entrance into and departure from the country and
internal travels. Requests for seyahat varakası (travel document), lists of the passengers travelling inside
the country and going abroad and reports (including identities, nationalities and numbers) about
travelers. Yusuf İhsan Genç (eds. al), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, (Istanbul: Başbakanlık
Arşivi, 2010), p. 374. Therefore, this office provided plentiful information to the State for controlling
the population.
128
necessity to control the movements of its citizens as well as foreigners travelling to and
inside the Ottoman Empire in a more systematic manner. The second reason making
the foundation of the Travel Office remarkable is about the broader requirements of
modern statehood. Since all issues about travel would be under the control of this
office, it was once more a centralization attempt in line with modern statecraft.
Similarly, the foundation of the Travel Office sould be seen a step of the Ottoman
State toward to the ‘monopolization of legitimate means of movement’. According to
Torpey, use of passports and internal travel documents has been a requirement of
modern statecraft for achieving the following objectives:
[E]xtraction of military service, taxes, and labor; the facilitation of law

enforcement; the control of “brain drain”…the restriction of access to areas
deemed “off-limits” by the state, whether for security reasons or to protect
people from unexpected or unacknowledged harms; the exclusion, surveillance,
and containment of “undesirable elements,” whether these are ethnic, national,
racial, economic, religious, ideological, or medical character; and social
composition of populations within their territories.422
These objectives, which have also been the basic motives for modern state in various
policies, have necessitated the ‘monopoly of legitimate means of movement’.
Therefore, by the foundation of the Travel Office in 1915, the CUP government took
an important step.
Along with the regular reports prepared by the Travel Office, travel documents
and passports provided the CUP government crucial information storage about
Ottoman citizens as well as foreigners. By using this information, the CUP
government developed further surveillance and control mechanisms during the Great
War.
422
John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, (Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 7.
129
4.1 The Revival of Travel Permits: Seyahat Varakası (Travel Document)
On March 16, 1915, through a provisional law, the travel document was
enacted as compulsory for everyone who would travel inside the borders of the
Ottoman Empire.423 This law explicitly claimed “subjects of the Ottoman Empire and
foreigners, who would travel in the regions and parts of the Ottoman Empire
determined by the government, were required to get travel document as long as the war
continued as a precautionary measure of military and security.” On March 18, 1915, an
ordinance (talimatname) about travel documents and passports was enacted.
According to this ordinance, travelers would take the travel document from the
highest-rank police officer in the place of their departure. In the districts (kazas)
where there was no police office, the district governor (kaymakam) would issue the
travel document. Later, upon arrival in the place written on the travel document,
people had to submit their travel documents to the highest-rank police officer therein.
In the districts where police station did not exist, the district governor was to be the
authority for submission. The companions (kith and kin, servants) of a person had the
right to travel with in the scope of a single travel document. 424
Istanbul was also an entrance point to the Ottoman State through sea route.
People entering the Ottoman Empire from Çirmen and Mandıra [through land route or
railroad] and proceeding to Istanbul, were allowed to use their passports until their
arrival to Istanbul. If thereon they would pass to another province, they were
compelled to take a travel document.425 The provisional law also mentioned the
423
“Hal-i harb dolayısısyla dahilde geşt ü güzar edeceklere verilecek seyahat varakası hakkında kanun-ı
muvakkat, 29 Rebiülahir 1333/3 Mart 1331 (16 Mart 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, (Dersaadet: Matba-i Amire,
1336), p. 493.
424
BOA.DH.EUM. 3.Şb. 15/23, 7 Zilkade 1334 (September 6, 1916), “Seyahat varakasına mütedair 29
Rebiülahir 133 tarihli kanunu-ı muvakkat ahkamıyla 28 Rebiülevvel 1333 tarihli pasaport kanunu-ı
muvakkatın beşinci maddesine tevfikan müttehiz mukarrerat-ı mutazammın talimatname, 2
Cemaziyelevvel 1333/5 Mart 1331 (18 Mart 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, (Dersaadet: Matba-i Amire, 1336), p.
525.
425
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.15/23, 7 Zilkade 1334 (September 6, 1916), “Seyahat varakasına mütedair 29
Rebiülahir 1333 tarihli”, Düstur, II/7, p. 525.
130
exceptions of travel permit. For example, people who would travel between the
provinces of Hicaz, Yemen and the Guards unit of Medine (Medine Muhafızlığı) and
Zor, Urfa and Asir were not required to obtain travel documents unless they would
pass any other provinces and districts. Furthermore, people not exit the borders of a
province or sanjak were left free to travel without a travel document.426 The Ordinance
included only one short article regarding who had no right to obtain the travel
document. According to that “people, whom the government prohibited from obtaining
travel document due to military and political reasons, were not allowed to take travel
document.”427 However, this explanation was too broad and open-ended. As will be
seen in the following sections, a lot of people were included in this description and
especially due to political reasons many people found it impossible to get the travel
document.
The initial version of the provisional law of the travel document did not have
any regulation about higher-level officials. It was at the end of 1915 that the imperial
decree (irade-i seniyye) was enacted (November 30, 1915) about senators and deputies
specifying that those who possessed the identity card (hüviyet varakası) did not need to
take the travel document for their journey.428 Apart from deputies and senators, all
other officials including security forces had to get the travel document. However, there
was still a kind of differentiation among the ordinary people and the elites. There were
two kinds of travel document being temporary or permanent. The temporary travel
document, which was given only for a limited period of time, was more common than
the permanent travel document. It was given for a round trip as well as one-way. If the
travel document was for a round trip, the person submitted the travel document to the
426
“Seyahat varakasına mütedair 29 Rebiülahir 1333 tarihli kanun-ı muvakkat”, Düstur, II/7, p. 525.
427
“Seyahat varakasına mütedair 29 Rebiülahir 1333 tarihli kanun-ı muvakkat”Düstur, II/7, p. 525.
428
“Seyahat varakasına mütedair kanun-ı muvakkat ahkamıyla pasaport kanun-ı muvakkatın beşinci
maddesine tevfikan müttehiz 2 Cemaziyeevvel 1333 tarihli talimatnamenin altıncı maddesine müzeyyel
fıkra hakkında irade-i seniyye, 22 Muharrem 1334/17 Teşrinisani 1331 (30 Kasım 1915)”, Düstur, II/8,
(Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928), p. 176.
131
police and the police signed the document indicating the validity of the same travel
document for return.
There was an interesting detail in this regulation. Veiled Muslim women
429
(muhadderat-ı İslamiyye) were exceptional to get travel documents. Turna argues
that this implementation was a consequence of the problems caused by difficulties in
specifying the facial features (eşkal) of veiled Muslim women.430 Since the CUP
government could not formulate a solution to this problem, veiled Muslim women
were exempted from the implementation of travel documents. It means that the CUP
government did not want to disturb the ‘privacy’ (mahremiyet) realm of the Muslim
women.431 It can be argued that this situation left a more room for Muslim women in
terms of travelling. Nevertheless, some documents indicate that travel documents
became compulsory for even veiled Muslim women in the following war years.432
Permanent travel documents were given to the civil servants that traveled with
official duties and also to the well-known notable people in the case of a valid
necessity. These travel documents would be valid till the end of the War.433 In other
words, they were designated for an indefinite scope of time. Different from temporary
travel documents, these were issued by the Ministry of Interior. The person who
demanded permanent travel document would submit a file to the Ministry including
information about their identity, age, nationality, address of residence, appearance,
intended places to go as well as a photograph. The Ministry of Interior issued the
429
“Evamir ve Mukarrerat: Memalik-i Osmaniye dahilinde seyahate mahsus sayahat varakalarının suret-
i it’a ve isti’mali hususunda teshilat-ı atiyye dahi icrası takdir eylemiştir”, Polis Mecmuası, 15 Mayıs
1331 (May 28, 1915), No. 45, p. 134.
430
431
Nalan Turna, “Son Dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Seyahat ve Kadın”, (Unpublished Conference
Paper), First International Conference on Empire, Nation and Gender: Perspectives from World
History, (Nov 26, 2014).
432
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.10/101, 24 Recep 1335 (May 16, 1917).
433
“Evamir ve Mukarrerat: Memalik-i Osmaniye dahilinde seyahate”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 45, p. 134.
132
permanent travel document after due investigation.434 It is highly probable that to get
this advantageous permanent travel document was quite difficult and only a limited
number of people were allowed to obtain this type of travel document during the war
years.
At the end of 1916, an ordinance about the travel document was published once
again. Actually, this ordinance composed of almost exactly the same articles of the
ordinance of March 18, 1915. There were small additions such as time duration of a
travel document. This new ordinance explicitly claimed that the travel document was
given for one-way or for round-trip. If it was given for a round-trip, the time duration
of the travel document was to be one month. Furthermore, the ordinance indicated that
travelers had to show their travel permits to the officials if demanded.435 The
provisional law about the travel document became a law on March 1, 1917.436 To the
end of the war the travel document was used in accordance with this law.
The travel document, which can be evaluated as a kind of internal passport,
was a useful instrument for the Ottoman State to provide control over population
during the Great War years. Nevertheless, this document was only used for internal
travels. During the war years, scrutiny on international travel also gained importance.
In the following part, legal developments about passports as international travel
documents will be examined.
434
“Evamir ve Mukarrerat: Memalik-i Osmaniye dahilinde seyahate”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 45, p. 134.
435
“Seyahat varakası hakkında Talimatname, 20 Safer 1335/3 Kanunuevvel 1332 (December 16,
1916)”, Düstur, II/9, (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928), pp. 10-12 .
436
“Hal-i Harb dolayısıyla dahilde geşt ü güzar edeceklere verilecek seyahat varakası hakkında kanun
[1], 7 Cemaziyelevvel 1335/1 Mart 1333 (March 1, 1917)”, Düstur, II/9, (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası,
1928), pp. 241-242.
133
4.2 Legal Regulations about the Passport
Similar to internal travel documents, passports became important documents

used by modern states for information storage and surveillance during the nineteenth
century. In 1792, the first regulations about modern passport were made in
revolutionary France.437 After that, many other European countries began to
promulgate laws and regulations for international travel and passport. Thus, passports
came to a number of functions in modern states: providing information about persons
as being certificates of identity; allowing state officials to differentiate citizens from
foreigners and to implement legislations particularly about foreigners; and controlling
travel of citizens and foreigners.438 As mentioned earlier, these functions were in a
broader sense directly related to the requirements of modern states.
Parallel to the developments about international travel in Europe, the Ottoman
government felt the need of making new regulations about national and international
travel. Actually, the first regulation of passport was enacted on February 14, 1867.439
This was followed by the Passport Laws of 1884, 1894 and 1911.440 The Passport Law
of 1911, which was in force until the publication of a new Passport Law during the
War years, was a comprehensive one.441 Nevertheless, the regulations of this law were
437
Andreas Fahrmeir, “Governments and Forgers: Passports in Nineteenth-Century Europe”,
Documenting Individual Identity, Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds.), (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton
438
Fahrmeir, “Governments and Forgers”, pp. 119-120.
439
The regulation named as Pasaport Odası Nizamnamesi (Regulation of Passport Office) was the first
legal document which regulated the processes of issuing passport. It was composed of seventeen
articles. “Pasaport Odası Nizamnamesi, 9 Şevval 1283 (February 14, 1867)”, Düstur, I/1, (Dersaadet:
Matba-i amire, 1289), pp. 776-779.
440
For detailed information about these laws of passport see, Rona Aybay, “Son Dönem Osmanlı,
TBMM Hükümetleri ve Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemlerinde Pasaportlar”, Tarih ve Toplum, Vol. 3/13,
(Ocak 1985), pp. 46-53. For regulations about passports and their meaning for the formation of modern
state in terms of surveillance and control during the reign of Abdülhamid II see, Yılmaz, Serseri,
Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde, pp. 202-247.
441
The Passport Law of 1911 was composed of four parts and nineteen articles. It was a detailed law
compared to the previous laws however it was still less complicated than the Passport Law of 1915.
134
still not sufficiently detailed and only reflected the understanding of freedom of travel
in general terms. Actually, just before the Great War, many countries in Europe
began to abolish or at least loosen regulations about passports. The following words of
a German student of passport controls reflect the ‘liberal’ atmosphere in terms of
international travel just before the Great War:
[B]ecause in recent times the position of foreigners has grown much different
from before…most modern states have, with a few exceptions, abolished their
passport laws or at least neutralized them through non-enforcement…
[Foreigners] are no longer viewed by states with suspicion and mistrust but
rather, in recognition of the tremendous value that can be derived from trade
and exchange, welcomed with open arms, and for this reason, hindrances are
removed from their path to the greatest extent possible.442
However, the Great War changed this situation to the contrary and effective system of
controls on travel once again became “inevitable” for all belligerent states. Especially,
since “external threat” perception of the belligerent states reached a peak, the war
governments aimed at restricting movements of foreigners within their territories.
Actually, not only foreigners but also nationals were subjected to strict documentary
surveillance through regulations on passport.443 For the governments of the belligerent
states, there had to be strict controls on international travels of their own citizens. As a
consequence, new regulations were made and new passport laws were promulgated in
all European countries as well as in the USA.444
First of all, considering the language of this document, it was clearly a product of peacetime. The
sanctions were smoother. There were exactly fewer and less certain restrictions for the entrance to the
Ottoman Empire. For the full text of the law see “Pasaport Kanunu, 6 Cemaziyelahir 1329, 22 Mayıs
1327 (June 4, 1911)”, Düstur, II/3 (Dersaadet: Matba-i Osmaniye, 1330), pp.462-467.
442
Cited from John Torpey, “The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Passport System”,
Documenting Individual Identity, Jane Caplan and John Torpey (eds.), (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton
443
Torpey, “The Great War and the Birth”, p. 257.
444
For detailed information about regulations and laws related to passport in France, Britain, Germany,
Italy and USA see Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, pp. 112-121.
135
In the first war year and only one day before the publication of the Provisional
Law of Travel Document, the Provisional Law of Passport had been enacted on March
15, 1915.445 As mentioned above, the Passport Law of 1911, which was in effect when
the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, had some deficiencies. Furthermore,
according to the CUP government, as a product of peacetime, the Passport Law of
1911 was far from meeting the requirements of the Great War in terms of international
travel.
Different from the previous regulations of passport, the new provisional law
indicated a group of people whose entrance to the Ottoman Empire were totally
forbidden even when they had proper passports. According to the third article of the
provisional law, first, beggars and vagabonds; second, people who were exiled out of
the Empire for an uncertain period of time, or people who did not fulfill their exile
punishment yet; third, people who were suspected for their actions threatening internal
security; next, the immigrants who tried to migrate to the Ottoman Empire illegally;
and finally, people who were expelled from Ottoman citizenship were prohibited from
entrance to the country.446
This article and following two articles gave the government broad authority to
control the people who entered the Empire during the Great War years. Especially, the
description of the third group of people who were forbidden to enter the Ottoman
Empire was so ambiguous that everyone might be subjected to be labeled as a “threat”
to the internal security. In that sense the decision authority were the security forces
controlling passports at checkpoints. Thus if they viewed a person as suspect, there
445
This provisional law was much more detailed compared to earlier passport laws. It was composed of
four parts and thirty articles. The first part included general rules and regulations about passports. The
second part was composed of articles that regulated content, issuance conditions and expiration dates of
passports. Third part was about fee of passports and visas. The articles of the last part were related to the
punishments in case of using or issuing a fake passport. “Pasaport Kanun-ı Muvakkatı, 28 Rebiülevvel
1333/2 Mart 1331 (March 15, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 486-491.
446
Apart from the prohibition of such people’s entrance into the Empire, the provisional law gave broad
authority to the government to make new regulations about restrictions due to the war conditions. See,
the forth and fifth articles of the provisional law. “Pasaport Kanun-ı Muvakkatı, 28 Rebiülevvel 1333/2
Mart 1331 (March 15, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 486-491.
136
seemed no way left to enter the Empire legally. Nevertheless, very harsh and detailed
punishments for the illegal activities about passports were also determined under this
provisional law.
For instance, the people who used or issued passports in fake names or those
who used a passport that had been prepared for another person would be punished with
imprisonment from six months to two years in accordance with the 156th article of the
Penal Code. Furthermore, people who used or issued fake passports would be
imprisoned for one to three years in conformity with the 157th article of the Penal
Code. Even a foreigner, who used a fake passport issued by a foreign state, would also
be subjected to the same punishment processes. An Ottoman citizen, who used such a
fake passport abroad, would be penalized in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, an
Ottoman citizen who used a passport of a foreign state in the Ottoman Empire would
be sentenced to imprisonment from six months to two years.447 Moreover, the
provisional law also regulated punishments for the captains, drivers, carters and all the
people who transferred passengers to the Ottoman Empire through places without
designated checkpoints. According to the provisional law, these people would be
imprisoned for one month to two years; and if they committed such acts repetitively,
they would be imprisoned for six months to three years.448 For instance, the Passport
Law of 1911 had only set punishment of fine (from 10 Ottoman gold to 50 Ottoman
gold) and a trifling prison sentence for three days to ten days. 449 Such great difference
between the degrees of punishments determined for the same crime underlines the
distinction between the need of governmental control over passengers during wartime
and peacetime. In order to provide maximum control over travel, punishments became
much harsher and more detailed during the Great War.
447
“Pasaport Kanun-ı Muvakkatı, 18 Rebiülevvel 1333/2 Mart 1331 (March 15, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7,
pp. 486-491.
448
“Pasaport Kanun-ı Muvakkatı”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 486-491.
449
“Pasaport Kanunu, 6 Cemaziyelahir 1329, 22 Mayıs 1327 (June 4, 1911)”, Düstur, II/3 (Dersaadet:
Matba-i Osmaniye, 1330), pp.462-467.
137
As a result of increasing need of control, the CUP government decided to found
new security corps dealing with passport controls at entry points. On July 5, 1915,
security units were formed named as Inspectorship of Security (Emniyet Müfettişliği)
for the purpose of tightening control at docks, harbored stations and entry on the
Ottoman frontiers.450 Since, Istanbul was one of the most important entrance points,
Istanbul Inspectorship of Security (Istanbul Emniyet Müfettişliği) was found there.451
As mentioned earlier, internal security gained additional importance for the CUP
government during the war years. One of the most effective ways to provide public
order was to control newcomers and thus, for the state elites, to intervene beforehand
in any situation deemed necessary to prevent the entry of suspected people the country.
The foundation of new security units has to be evaluated with reference to the
‘security’ perception of the government during the war years.
It was clear that the local security forces, which had fulfilled duty of the
Inspectorship of Security until the foundation of these new corps, were insufficient to
provide necessary control at the stations, docks and entry points at the frontiers. Just a
few days after the publication of the regulation of Inspectorship of Security, the Police
Journal (Polis Mecmuası) published a proposal about this issue.452 According to the
journal, controlling the passengers, who travelled to or from a country, was a natural
right of every state. Therefore, the employees were definitely qualified to question
travelers in terms of their destination, purpose of travel and general personal
information in order to evaluate the appropriateness of their travel according to the
actual political and security conditions of the country. Nevertheless, although these
control measures and their importance were indicated in the Passport Law, local
450
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkufelerinde ve iskelelerde emniyet müfettişliği teşkilat ve vezaifi
hakkında nizamname, 22 Şaban 1333/22 Haziran 1331 (July, 5, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, (Dersaadet: Matba-
i Amire, 1336), pp. 639-641. The full text translation of this regulation also exists at the National
Archives of the United States, see NARA, Department of State, 867.10/1, RG 59, July 12, 1915.
451
For detailed information about Inspetorships of Security see Chapter 3, pp. 93-94.
452
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkıflarında ve iskelelerde emniyet müfettişliği teşkilat ve vezaifi
hakkındaki nizamnamenin esbab-ı mucibi layihası”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 49, 15 Ramazan 1333/15
Temmuz 1331 (July 15, 1915), pp. 231-233.
138
security forces responsible for this duty were generally inefficient. Therefore,
according to the proposal, the foundation of new security corps was a clear necessity.
The proposal also commented on the 3rd article of the Provisional Law of Passport that
was about people whose entrance to the Ottoman Empire was totally forbidden even if
they had proper passports. It was pointed out that the number of this kind of people
had reached to thousands and making it extremely difficult for ordinary passport
officers to deal with the control, registration and prevention of their entrance. In this
regard, it was proposed that a separate and professionalized security corps be formed
to cope with this situation.453 Although, the foundation of the Inspectorship of Security
was highly related to the wartime necessities, it remained in existence after the War.
However, consolidation of its institutional structure seemed incomplete even after the
war. 454
On November 20, 1918, the Provisional Law of Passport undergoing slight
changes became an effectual law.455 Nevertheless, in the application of the law there
emerged some problems. According to the Istanbul Police Directorate, issuing
passports had to be in their capacity. In accordance with the Passport Law and some
other regulations, passports were obtained from the passport office under the Ministry
of Interior. However in that case, the police would be not informed about incoming
travelers and this situation would constitute security problems.456 In spite of this fact,
the government did not change the procedure and the passports continued to be issued
by the passport office under the Ministry of Interior.
According to Kurt, one of the main aims of the Passport Law of 1918, as well
as the Provisional Law of Passport promulgated in 1915 and remaining in effect during
453
“Hudud kapılarıyla demiryolu mevkıflarında”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 49, pp. 231-233.
454
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.40/4, 5 Rebiülahir 1338 (December 28, 1919).
455
For instance, the duration of imprisonment for the people who issued or used fake pasports, was
abolished from the last version of the Passport Law. Instead, the new law declared that these people
would be punished in accordance with the Penal Code. “Pasaport Kanunu, 15 Safer 1337/20 Teşrinisani
1334 (November 15, 1918)”, Düstur, II/11, (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928), pp. 53-59.
456
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 40/4, 5 Rebiülahir 1338 (December 28, 1919).
139
the war years, was to regulate and to restrict travels of the Ottoman Armenians having
foreign passports.457 According to the 23rd Article of the Provisional Law of Passport,
the Ottoman subjects having foreign passports would be imprisoned from six months
to two years, in case of their attempt to enter the Ottoman Empire.458 Kurt argues that
this article of the Passport Laws was deliberately used for preventing the return to the
Ottoman Empire the Armenians who had to leave the country after 1915.459 As
mentioned above, the third article of the passport law also forbade the entrance of
several groups of people to the Ottoman Empire. Along with the third article, the
twenty-third article of the passport law indicated that passport as an international travel
document served as an instrument for surveillance as well as for exclusion of
“undesirable elements” during the Great War.
After the evaluation of travel documents and passports as means of control and
surveillance, the next section will be dedicated to the analysis of the regular reports of
the Travel Office. These reports, which provided detailed information about
newcomers to the city, must be evaluated as a complementary means of scrutiny.
Furthermore, general regulations about controls over travel documents will be
examined alongside the sanctions applied to people who traveled without travel
documents or with forged ones.
457
Ümit Kurt, “Varlık ve Yokluk Kıskacında Ermeniler: 1915 Ermeni Kırımının Ekonomik Şiddet
Boyutu”, Türkiye’de Siyasal Şiddetin Boyutları, Güney Çeğin and Ibrahim Şirin (eds.) (Istanbul: İletişim
Yayınları, 2014), pp. 98-99, 117.
458
Madde 23: Ecnebi pasaportunu hamil olarak Memalik-i Osmaniyeye dahil olan tebaa-i Osmaniyye
altı aydan iki seneye kadar habs edilir. “Pasaport Kanun-ı Muvakkatı”, Düstur, II/7, p. 490. The same
article existed in the Passport Law of 1918 with slight changes. To the beginning of the article a phrase
was added claiming that “without any compulsory reasons”. Madde 23: Tebaa-i Osmaniyyeden birisi
zaruret-i mübrime müstenid olmaksızın ecnebi pasaprtunu hamilen memalik-i Osmaniyyeye dahil olursa
altı aydan iki seneye kadar habs olunur. “Pasaport Kanunu”, Düstur, II/11, p. 58.
459
Kurt, “Varlık ve Yokluk Kıskacında Ermeniler”, pp. 98-99.
140
4.3 Reports of Travel Office and General Measures for Controlling Travel
The Travel Office, founded in the initial year of the Great War, became the
main office of the state dealing with all movements of Ottoman subjects as well as
foreigners that traveled to or from the Ottoman Empire. The reports of the Travel
Office were mainly composed of tables including information about travelers. The
frequency of the tables varied through time. We may find daily460 reports as well as
tables that were prepared weekly461 or monthly462.
The tables of passengers traveling to or from Istanbul can be categorized as
following: table of travelers who travel to and/or from Istanbul by ship; table of the
travelers who came to Istanbul through the road of Dimetoka463, Selanik and
Dedeağaç; the table of travelers who travel to and from foreign countries; travelers
who went to the Trace from Istanbul by train; table of travelers coming to Istanbul
from Konya and Eskişehir; table of the travelers going to the several regions of the
Ottoman Empire. Generally, these reports included name, age, nationality, occupation
and hometown information of the traveler as well as his/her destination and
information about where she/he would stay in Istanbul. Some tables were much more
detailed than the others.
For instance, the tables of April 1915 indicate different characteristics. There
were four tables including above-mentioned information of one hundred thirty-seven
460
For instance, a document gave information about the passengers that came to Istanbul on November
16, 17 and 19, 1915. BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 8/72, 22 Muharrem 1334 (November 30, 1915). Another
table indicated the information of the passengers who went to Istanbul by mail train on February 13,
1916. BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 4/7, 8 Rebiülahir 1334 (February 23, 1916). For similar tables see
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 65/24, 17 Şaban 1334 (June 19, 1916), BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 5/6, 6
Cemaziyelahir 1334 (April 10, 1916), BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 12/15, 25 Şevval 1335 (August 14, 1917).
There are also other documents under the catalogue of the Travel Office that contain daily reports about
passengers who travel to and from Istanbul.
461
Weekly reports were less frequent than daily and monthly reports. For instance, a table was prepared
for the passengers who travelled from Istanbul to the Thrace through railway between the dates August
18, 1915 and August 25, 1915. See BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.53/73A, 14 Şevval 1333 (August 25, 1915).
462
Monthly reports were the most frequently prepared ones between the years 1914 and 1920.
463
A district of Bulgaria on the frontier of the Edirne Province.
141
passengers in a file.464 Nevertheless, in the same file there was a separate table
composed of four passengers about whom there was detailed information. These
passengers came to Istanbul on April 30, 1915. Actually, it is difficult to uncover what
made these four passengers different from other travelers that came to Istanbul
approximately in the same days. They were all subjects of different states: an Austrian,
a Greek, an Italian and a Spanish. The occupations of the passengers were also
different from each other: an employee in a factory, a farmer, a forger and a clerk.
Therefore, there were no common points for these people. However, although there
was no explanation in the document, it can be inferred that these people were
“suspects” in the eyes of the government. In contrast with the other travelers, detailed
appearance information was given about these people: their length, hair, eye, beard,
moustache and any other distinguishing characteristics.465 It must be noted here that
this kind of information was rare in the traveler tables of the Travel Office.
The Istanbul Inspector of Security and the Istanbul Investigation Officer
prepared traveler tables and sent them to the Travel Office. Detailed tables were
compiled until the end of the War. Although, general information was similar in each
table, there were some differences from one to the other. For instance, tables showing
the passengers who travelled to Istanbul in January, February and May 1918 indicated
the code number of travel document and its date whereas it did not specify the
temporary residence address of the traveler in Istanbul.466 However, in the last column
of the table, named as explanation, temporary residence address of some passengers
was noted down. Furthermore, at the end of each table the number of Ottoman subjects
was categorized in terms of Muslims, Greeks and Jews. As such, the number of men
and women was indicated separately. The majority of passengers were Muslim men,
464
Most of the passengers in the tables were Ottoman subjects however there were also some passengers
from Italy, America, Germany and Austria. Therefore, the passengers who were not the Ottoman
subjects were subjects of whether cobelligerent states or neutral states. BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 1/24, 17
Cemaziyelahir 1333 (May 2, 1915).
465
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.1/24, 17 Cemaziyelahir 1333 (May 2, 1915).
466
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.21/17A, 4 Şaban 1334 (May 15, 1918).
142
whereas there was a small number of Greeks and Jews. However, there were no
Armenian passengers in the tables. The probable reasons of this situation will be
examined in the next chapter in details.
There were hundreds of tables and reports about the passengers who traveled to
and from Istanbul. Especially during the last two years of the War, such reports were
compiled almost everyday. Although, these reports were composed of tables without
any detailed interpretation, it was clear that the control over population was tightened
as the War continued. These tables provided a plentiful source of demographic
information about newcomers and leavers to and from Istanbul.
Well, why did the government need so detailed demographic information about
travelers? One of the most important reasons is implied in the phrase ‘public security’.
Living conditions in Istanbul became worse and worse especially after late 1916. As
the population of the city increased, the government’s ability to overcome problems of
provision became more difficult. Furthermore, for the CUP government, the
importance of the maintenance of public order increased year by year. Istanbul, as the
capital city and administrative center, had to be administered with control. If public
security in the city had been under threat, the government would lose its credibility of
governing and its ability of warfare. Thus, the government was forced to take more
strict measures to control the population. Regulations about travel permits and
passports, foundation of Inspectorship of Security and data storage through the travel
reports and tables of the Travel Office were the main instruments of state’s control
mechanism. Nevertheless, up to now only legal procedures and regulations about the
control mechanisms have been taken into consideration. The next section will attempt
to investigate the reflection of these aspects to the daily life in the city.
143
4.4 Practice of the Policies related to Surveillance and Control
The application of scrutiny mechanisms on travel had always been problematic

for the Ottoman State.467 When considering the Great War conditions, it is easy to
guess how difficult it was to control people’s movements within the country. Actually,
the government regarded the control over travel as a necessity to maintain the public
order particularly in Istanbul and generally in whole country. The frequency of
introducing new rules and regulations, the revival of the travel permits and the
foundation of new security units under the Inspectorship of Security were indicators of
this tendency. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that since Istanbul was the capital of
the Empire, it was the city where these regulations were exercised most ambitiously.
Nevertheless, there were still lots of problems about the lack of application of these
rules and regulations.
For instance, there were frequent cases of travel with invalid travel documents
or even without having one. Actually, there were mobile security forces on the trains
making routine and random controls for travel documents. When they caught someone
who had invalid travel document or no travel document, they made the person get off
the train at the nearest station and surrendered her/him to the security forces there.468
Then the security forces at the station sent an informative note about this kind of
travelers to the relevant officials at the station where the train departed from and would
go to. In such a case, the police officer at the station of departure would fall under
suspect of complicity as well as the passenger her/himself. For instance, on May 15,
1917, the mobile police officers detected three people having invalid travel documents
467
Despite enactment of several laws and establishment of various rules and regulations, the travels to
and from Istanbul could not have brought under control during the nineteenth century. See, Turna, 19.
YY’dan 20. YY’a Seyahat, Göç ve Asayiş Belgeleri, pp. 175-180. Demirtaş, “XIX. Yy.da Istanbul’a göçü
engellemek”, pp. 753-754.
468
For example, on May 7, 1917, there were several passengers on the Eskişehir-Istanbul train who did
not have travel documents. These people were forced to get off the train at the nearest station and their
travel to Istanbul was prevented this way. BOA.DH.EUM.SSM. 10/101, 24 Recep 1335 (May 16,
1917).
144
for Istanbul.469 They had got on the train from the Muradlı Station. The mobile police
officers took their invalid travel documents and submitted them to the Istanbul Vice-
Security Commissioner (Istanbul Emniyet Komiser Muavinliği). The Istanbul Vice-
Security Commissioner put a marginal note (derkenar) to this correspondence.
According to him, the police officer of the Muradlı Station, who approved the travel
document by signing the underside of the document as ‘checked’, was responsible in
this case.
This instance indicates that there were several phases of control. Furthermore,
it was clear that there was no national or religious discrimination in the control
mechanism. Both Muslim-Turkish subjects and Christian subjects (in this incident they
were Greeks) were subject to the same strict control procedures in case they were
travelling with invalid travel documents. Looking at this example, one may argue that
despite the absence of any nationality or religion based discrimination, the rules and
procedures were applied more strictly to lower classes because the persons in this case
were all as such. However, other documents indicate that there actually was not a huge
class-based distinction in terms of application of control measures. To illustrate,
Şazimend Hanım, the wife of Ali Rıza Bey, the Director of the Kefken Harbour, and
her Greek servant were detained on the Eskişehir-Istanbul train with invalid travel
documents.470 They were surrendered to the Derince Gendarmerie Station Command
for necessary investigation, and, this way, their travel to Istanbul was prevented. This
is an instance showing that even people from upper classes were applied the same
procedures if they acted against the rules. Therefore, even though it can still be argued
that people from upper classes had some advantages in receiving their travel
documents it was a fact that in case of any breach of rules and regulation, almost
everybody faced the same legal procedures.
From those control measures covering the whole duration of travel from
departure up to destination can be understood that some groups of people were
469
470
145
‘unwelcomed’ within the capital’s borders. Who were these people? Who were labeled
as “threatening for public security” during the Great War years? For instance, beggars,
vagabonds or city poor had always been undesirable elements of Istanbul.471 Certainly,
as the living conditions worsened because of the War, the presence of these people in
Istanbul came to stand as a serious problem for the government. On January 20, 1915,
the Ministry of Interior published a notification about this issue.472 The notification
stated that the number of the beggars had been increasing day by day in Istanbul and
this was causing disturbance. According to the notification, although most of these
people were able to work, they preferred begging. Therefore, those people were
considered as “potential criminals” having no reason to refrain from committing
wrongful acts. Moreover, according to the official view, these people also damaged the
moral life of the city only by their presence in Istanbul. As a result, viewed officially,
on the one hand entrance of this kind of people had to be prevented, while on the other
hand necessary measures had to be taken “to clean” the city from beggars.473
During the war years, another group of people who “threatened the public
security” in Istanbul were orphans coming from other regions. The number of the
orphans in Istanbul increased especially during 1917. As it was discussed in the second
chapter, war conditions became graver in 1917. Therefore, even the children of
families who found it hard to subsist in smaller towns and cities, felt compelled to try
471
Nadir Özbek made a detailed study of the beggars and vagabonds in Istanbul. Until the eighteenth
century, although the inhabitants of the city were sometimes irritated by the existence of beggars and
vagabonds in streets, these people were not totally excluded from the city life. Especially, the disabled
and old beggars had a certain kind of legitimacy. However, this approach to beggars began to change
during the eighteenth century. During this century, people’s capacity of production gained importance.
Furthermore, discipline as measure of punishment began to take the place of physical punishments.
Moreover, people who were disabled or too old to work became the main target of social welfare
programs of the state. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, during the Hamidian Regime,
vagabonds and beggars came to be seen as a general social and moral problem. The Serseri ve
Mazanna-i Su olan Eşhas Hakkında Nizamname (Regulation on Vagabonds and Suspected Criminals)
of 1890 was the first legal document evaluating the poverty as a criminal issue. For detailed information
see, Nadir Özbek, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet, Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet, 1876-1914,
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 65-92.
472
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…19.19, 10 Rebiülevvel 1333 (January 26, 1915).
473
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…19.19, 10 Rebiülevvel 1333 (January 26, 1915).
146
their luck in the capital. However, the situation in Istanbul was already not good
enough to welcome incoming people. In this respect, on August 7, 1917, the general
police director of Istanbul sent a correspondence to the Ministry of Interior about this
issue.474 In this letter, the polis director complained about the rise in the number of
orphans in the city. According to him, some of these children came to the city for
education, and some others for treatment. Most of them were children of War martyrs.
He particularly emphasized that the children who came for treatment had to be
immediately sent back to their hometown as soon their treatment finished.
Nevertheless, since this required local governments to meet their travel expenditures,
most of these children remained in Istanbul, and mostly lived in streets due to lack of
proper accommodation.475 Besides, under the War conditions, the government had
reduced its social welfare expenditures. The general police director of Istanbul stated
explicitly this situation in his complaint. First of all, the orphanages in Istanbul were
completely full. In addition to that, a part of the Hospital of Wounded (Yaralı
Hastanesi) under the Ministry of War had been transformed into an orphanage and its
capacity had already been reached. In this sense, the number of orphans roaming about
the streets was increasing continuously. According to him, this situation was a threat
for public security as well as for the provision of the city. 476 He demanded from the
Ministry of Interior that they send notifications to local governors in order for them to
prevent sending such children to Istanbul– even in the case that they were children of
War martyrs.
The Ministry of Interior took into consideration the complaints of the Istanbul
Police Directorate. A notification was published dated as September 20, 1917. 477 This
document claimed that “the number of orphans in Istanbul living in bad conditions was
increasing day by day and that they had no chance to find jobs to work or/and places to
474
BOA.DH.EUM.6. Şb.18/60, 18 Şevval 1335 (August 7, 1917).
475
BOA.DH.EUM.6. Şb.18/60, 18 Şevval 1335 (August 7, 1917).
476
BOA.DH.EUM.6. Şb.18/60, 18 Şevval 1335 (August 7, 1917)..
477
BOA.DH.EUM.KLU.16/41, 30 Zilhicce 1335 (October 17, 1917).
147
stay. Furthermore, these orphans were not children of refugees; and even if the case
had been so, they still should not be allowed to stay in Istanbul. Since there was not
sufficient means of accommodation for them in Istanbul, those children who had come
to the city without any official permission had to be sent back to their hometown.”478
In the given conditions, the Ministry of Interior nominated the Istanbul Police
Directorate to send these children back to their hometowns. Furthermore, local
governors were informed about the issue with a warning about not allowing the travel
of orphans to Istanbul.479 There is no exact information about whether these
precautions were successful. However, the implementation of some other methods
such as the banishment of “undesirable elements”, including orphans, from Istanbul
indicate that the government was not effective in establishing control over the
movement of people during the war period.
In the Ottoman Empire, the exclusion of “undesirable elements” out of the
capital city was historically called tebid (banishment).480 Actually, banishment was a
penal sanction (cezai müeyyide). Since crime and penalty will be examined in the
478
479
480
As a matter of fact, tebid and nefy were two words used to define the act of exile in Ottoman official
documents. Generally, these two words were used interchangeably in the documents. Nevertheless in
the Penal Code of 1858, the punishment of exile was named as nefy rather than tebid. Nefy-i muvakkat
(temporary exile) and nefy-i müebbed (perpetual exile) were two important categories in the Penal Code.
Actually, exile had historically been one of the most frequently used ways of punishment in the Ottoman
Empire. There had been a variety of crimes that were punished by exile, in the seventeenth century, such
as involvement in banditry activities; causing harm to public order; disobedience to laws, rules and
regulations; insulting and threatening; abducting (a girl); fraud and corruption; adultery and prostitution
and running a brothel; slander and bearing false witness and theft. Then, exile became a part of the
Penal Code as a punishment for similar crimes. For detailed information see Kemal Daşcıoğlu, Osmanlı
Devleti’nde Sürgün Siyaseti (XVIII. Yüzyıl), (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 29, 66-91.
Although, the meanings of tebid and exile are close to each other, in this chapter, the term ‘banishment’
will be used for ‘tebid’. The main reason of using ‘banishment’ and ‘to banish’ instead of exile is related
to the nature of tebid during the Great War years. The dictionary meaning of ‘to banish’ is ‘to expel
from or relegate to a country or a place by authoritative decree’ whereas exile means ‘expulsion from
one’s native land’. In the documents the act of banishment called as tebid rather than nefy. As a matter
of fact, the people who were banished from Istanbul were generally not natives of Istanbul. There was a
great number of people who were from other parts of the Empire or even from other countries.
Therefore, these people were not exiled from their homeland, they were banished from a place to
another because they were either suspected persons or criminals.
148
following chapter, here, banishment will not be evaluated in details. In accordance
with the content of this chapter, banishment will be examined as a security measure
especially exercised against “undesirables”.
Most of the banishment decisions in Istanbul during the War period were made
by the administrative authorities rather than by the courts. Therefore, banishment as a
penal sanction was applied by the government during the war period as a measure of
the “maintenance public order”. According to a document dated as November 4, 1917,
five hundred and eighty eight people were banished out of Istanbul between March
1916 and April 1917.481 There was a variety among these according to their reasons of
banishment: among them were suspected people, vagabonds, immigrants, criminals,
ex-convicts and people without any networks in Dersaadet.
For instance, seven people were expelled from Istanbul since they had no
legitimate reason to stay there, meaning that these people did not have any relatives or
occupations in Istanbul.482 It is interesting in this case that the reason of banishment
was indicated as ‘travel to Istanbul without travel document’ for only one person.
From the other documents that were evaluated in the previous paragraphs, it was
shown that the number of people who had travelled to Istanbul, without travel
documents was not little. Even the children could go to Istanbul without any official
documents. This contradiction might have stemmed from the phrase that was used for
reason of the banishment. For instance, thirteen children were expelled by the decision
of court-martial (idareten) to be submitted to their families. There were seventeen
481
BOA.DH.EUM.1.Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917). Additionally there is one more
document in the same character. Both of the documents were composed of tables about banishments out
of Istanbul. The information that these tables included is as the following: name, hometown, nationality,
occupation, age of the person, date, place and reason of banishment, and the office giving the decision to
banish. Moreover, another document included banishment information of sixteen people.
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.47/35, 5 Şevval 1334 (August 5, 1916). Compared to the former document, this
one provides information about a limited number of people. Ten of the sixteen people were banished
because of one of the following reasons: not having a relationship with Dersaadet, being vagabond,
homeless and unemployed.
482
On the document there is a phrase as ‘alakasız’ (unrelated) or ‘iş ve alakası olmamasından’
(unrelated with no occupations). BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917).
149
vagabonds among five hundred eighty eight people.483 Probably, most of these people
entered to Istanbul without travel documents however this situation was not explicitly
indicated on the tables.
During the War years, one of the most frequent reasons for banishment was
being identified as “şüpheli” (suspect). For instance, according to a document, between
March 1916 and April 1917, there were one hundred and nine “suspected” people that
were expelled from Istanbul.484 Seventy-five of the suspected were foreigners; twenty-
three were Ottoman subjects and the origin of eleven being unknown. There was no
explanation for the definition of being “suspect”. As a matter of fact, this category was
extremely ambiguous. Everybody could be identified as “suspect” under the war
conditions. In fact, the category of “suspect” brought espionage to mind in case of war.
However, it must be noted here that “suspects” did not refer to espionage because in
this table there was also a category for the banished people as being spy, which made
up a small part of all banishments.
The Ministry of Interior gave most of the banishments decisions for those
identified as “suspect”.485 Majority of these were foreigners. This is no coincidence
considering the fact that within the war conditions central governments tended to be
more cautious against everybody, especially those who are foreign elements.
Naturally, among these the citizens of hostile countries were perceived as the principal
threat. Of course there were also “suspected” Ottoman subjects who were banished out
of Istanbul. These “suspected” Ottoman subjects were generally from other provinces.
483
BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb. 8/15,19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917).
484
BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb. 8/15,19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917).
485
Seven out of one hundred and nine people were expelled as a result of the Ministry of Justice’s
decision. Twenty-one people were expelled from Istanbul as a result of decision taken by court-martial
(idareten). Therefore, twenty-eight people were banished from Istanbul as a result of court decision
whether military or civilian. It is clear that majority of the suspected people were exiled from the capital
as a result of administrative decisions. Twenty-three people were banished through the decision of
military government (hükümet-i askeriye). The rest of the suspected (almost sixty people) were
dismissed through the decision of the Ministry of Interior. BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem
1336 (November 4, 1917).
150
In this table, among the “suspected” people, there was only one Istanbulite person.486
Fifteen of twenty-three Ottoman suspected people were Muslims and the rest eight
people were non-Muslims. Furthermore, the eleven suspected people, whose
nationality was not indicated in the table, had non-Muslim names.
This table indicates that the government evaluated some people as “threat” to
the public order during the war years. Although, these people were not criminals
and/or ex-convicts, their presence at the capital was perceived as a problem on its own
for the government. These groups of people had to be expelled from the city or even
had to be under control in order to prevent their ‘probable’ harmful acts. Next chapter
will examine three groups of people in terms of ‘policing the demographic structure’:
the refugees, countrymen (taşralı) and vagabonds;487 the foreigners; and finally the
non-Muslim elements.
486
BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917).
487
The refugees, countrymen and vagabonds will be evaluated together because during the war period
these three categories were closely related to each other. For instance, if a person migrated to Istanbul
and failed to find a job, then she/he would be categorized as vagabond. Or a vagabond would be sent to
his hometown being categorized as a countryman.
151
CHAPTER 5
POLICING THE POPULATION: “SUSPECTS” AS “DANGEROUS CLASSES”
Discretionary power of security forces and administrative authorities provides

them a broad space to decide on who to be considered as “threatening” for internal
order. At this point, the priorities of state elites and administrators become the main
factor in specifying particular groups of people as “suspect”. Different from ordinary
time periods, during war periods, state elites’ perception of “enemy within” becomes
especially influential in specifying “suspect”.
This was exactly the case for the Ottoman State during the Great War.
According to the CUP government, since Istanbul was the political, economic and
social center of the Empire, maintaining public order in the city was certainly a
prerequisite for better warfare. Groups of people, who were not regarded as potentially
dangerous during peacetime, came to be seen as elements of “enemy within”. In this
respect, the government and security forces began to implement harsher punishments
as well as to develop extraordinary mechanisms of surveillance and control for
repressing “enemy within”. The typical discourse of the government in justifying this
was the maintenance of public order for the sake of ‘public good’.
The discretionary power of the government and under it, the Ministry of
Interior and the General Directorate of Security increased remarkably during the war
years. Therefore, being the authority to define “enemy within”, they could accordingly
label some groups of people as dangerous. Furthermore, within the war conditions,
they easily found “appropriate” basis for the implementation of radical measures to
control these people.
In fact, labeling some socio-economic groups as “threatening” to internal order
was not a case specific to war periods. In nineteenth century, as a result of socio-
economic changes in the big cities of Europe, some groups of people came to be
152
categorized as “dangerous classes” since, from the perspective of ruling elites, these
people were threatening to disrupt the existing economic and political system.
Beggars, vagrants, prostitutes and other city poor were typically among such elements.
Likewise, similar social groups also became a target for the governments in the
Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century. In the Ottoman archival
documents these people were generally categorized as “suspect”.
During the war, refugees, countrymen and vagrants were as usual regarded as
“suspects”. However, there was inevitably a change in the content of “dangerous
classes” as the war conditions required. For instance, foreigners not being a part of
“suspects” during peacetime came under close scrutiny. Similarly, minorities including
Ottoman Greeks and Armenians became the target of strict state surveillance.
Although they had already been regarded as potentially “dangerous” during the
nineteenth century, the government had never been able to implement far-reaching
policing strategies as were later possible during the Great War.
Whereas foreigners and minorities were considered as a threat in the sense of
being “potential political criminals”, refugees, countrymen and vagrants were
predominantly treated as “non-political potential criminals”. However, such
demarcation was in practice never so cler-cut. Furthermore, as will be analyzed in the
sixth and seventh chapters, crime is a ‘politically defined’ and ‘contextually
constructed’ socio-economic phenomenon meaning that ‘criminalization’ is by itself
‘political’. As will be examined in the next section, most of the countrymen were
banished from Istanbul just because they were Armenians. Thus, it can be argued that
although the apparent reason for scrutinizing certain groups of people was non-
political, in reality the whole process turned to be political. The next section will focus
on the surveillance and scrutiny of refugees, countrymen and vagrants.
153
5.1 Refugees, Countrymen and Vagrants: “Probable Criminals” and “Usual
Suspects”
There were mainly two types of migration to Istanbul during the nineteenth
century. On the one hand, Anatolian single men (bekars) came to Istanbul in large
numbers for finding jobs. On the other hand, the inhabitants of the lost lands of the
Empire began migrating to Istanbul.488 As discussed in the second chapter, Istanbul
was one of the centers where refugees489 from the Balkans and Caucasia came to. The
main target of the state was to send these refugees from Istanbul to other parts of the
Empire as soon as possible. Nevertheless, as Istanbul had always been a centre of
attraction, the refugees somehow tried to stay in the city. Furthermore, even if the state
had settled them down in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, they tried to migrate back
to Istanbul again. This situation became a massive problem after the Great War broke
out. Along with problems regarding the provisioning of the city, public security
assumed utmost importance during the war for the state elites, and newcomers came to
be regarded as “threatening” from both aspects.
In 1915, the Ministry of Interior published an ordinance about the issue.490
According to this ordinance refugees who migrated to any other region in the Ottoman
488
For detailed information about migrations to Istanbul, see Chapter 2, pp. 40-42.
489
In the Ottoman documents muhacir (refugee, immigrant) was used as a general term for the people
coming from lost parts of the Empire. Besides, the number of documents in which there was a
distinction between muhacir and mülteci (refugee) was few. As a matter of fact, there was confusion at
this point in the minds of the Ottoman statesmen. On January 3, 1918, at a parliamentary debate, there
were questions about what the difference between muhacir and mülteci was. Hamdi Bey, the director of
the General Directorate of Tribes and Refugees, explained the difference between muhacir and mülteci
as the following: “we call all the people without any restriction of nation and religion as mülteci who
took refuge to the inside of the Ottoman borders due to the invasion of their cities and towns by the
enemy states. The people, who were called as muhacir, migrated to the Ottoman Empire from the lands
which were left to other states by agreement.” Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan
Politikası, 1913-1918, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 227-228. Nevertheless, most of the time,
muhacir was used in the documents to denote mülteci. In English, the word ‘refugee’ corresponds to
both of these words. In the Ottoman documents, the people coming from Anatolia or other parts of the
Ottoman Empire to Istanbul were called as taşralı (countryman). Therefore, in this thesis taşralı
(countryman) and muhacir (refugee) will be used in the same way as in the Ottoman documents.
490
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.154/80, 17 Şaban 1333 (June 30, 1915).
154
Empire would not be allowed to stop in Istanbul. On the other hand, these refugees
would be allowed to go their destinations without travel documents, as their
passports491 would be considered as sufficient for their internal travel up to their final
places of settlement. Probably, this regulation was put in force in order to prevent the
accumulation of refugees in Istanbul.
In May 1914, there was a series of correspondence among the Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Istanbul Police Directorate about Albanian
refugees. According to the correspondence, Albanian refugees were trying to go to
Mudanya, Istanbul and its vicinity without any official permission. Actually, despite
the fact that Ottoman authorities had given an order to prevent their migration to
Mudanya, Istanbul and its vicinity these refugees still tried every opportunity to
migrate to Istanbul by colluding with agents. The Ministry of Interior indicated that
Dersaadet (Istanbul), İzmir, Edirne, Hüdavendigar (Bursa), Çatalca, Karesi, Kale-i
Sultaniye (Biga), İzmit and Menteşe were forbidden for the entry of Albanians and
Bosnians. Instead, these refugees were to be directed to Syria and Sivas.492
Yet, the problem of Albanian refugees continued in the following months. In
November 1914, the General Directorate of Tribes and Refugees sent an order to
Edirne Province stating that Albanian refugees would be kept there whereas other
refugees would be permitted to travel to Istanbul.493 There was no explanation for the
reason of this selection – accepting refugees other than those being Albanians – but it
is clear that the migration of Albanian refugees to Istanbul constituted a problem for
the government. It was certainly related to the Albanian Revolt of 1912, as a result of
491
The ordinance provides detailed information about the passports of the refugees. There were two
kinds of passports that the refugees carried: travel passports and immigration passports. If a refugee
came with immigration passport, she/he would be directly registered and settled down without any
additional procedures. There would be additional procedures for the owners of the travel passports. If a
refugee with travel passport had been expelled from the citizenship of the country where s/he came from
and requested Ottoman citizenship, the government would make an inquiry about the refugee. If s/he
qualified as eligible for the citizenship, the procedures of the Muhacirin Nizamnamesi (Regulation of
Refugees) would be applied. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.154/80, 17 Şaban 1333 (June 30, 1915).
492
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.23/14-H, 22 Cemaziyelahir 1332 (May 18, 1914).
493
BOA.DH.ŞFR.46/261, 20 Zilhicce 1332 (November 9, 1914).
155
which the government had lost its confidence towards the Albanians.494 Thus, the
migration of Albanians to the Ottoman capital in great numbers was considered as a
potential threat. As a matter of fact, during the nineteenth century, the Albanian
refugees, especially those having rural origin, were associated with crime and violence
by the Ottoman state elites. This strong bias was later to constitute the basis for the
justification of migration and settlement policies regarding these refugees during the
war years.495 In 1917, the CUP government tried to regulate Albanian entrance and
settlement in the Ottoman Empire through an ordinance including six main guidelines.
This ordinance once again repeated the official decision to preclude Albanians from
travelling to and settling in Istanbul. 496
Actually, Albanians were not the only group of refugees trying to migrate to
Istanbul. When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, additional refugees started
coming to Istanbul from invaded lands. These newcomers were regarded as a burden
over the existing economic circumstances of the city. Thus, for instance, if a refugee
did not have any relative or/and job in Istanbul, the Istanbul Police Directorate was
inclined to send this person to other parts of Anatolia. For example, in March 1915,
Istanbul Police Directorate sent a correspondence to the Ministry of Interior about a
refugee from Prizen.497 According to this correspondence, Halil bin Bayram was a
refugee from invaded lands, having no relative and job in Istanbul; thus his presence in
the city was not appropriate. However, the Ministry of Interior declined the demand
for his banishment stating that the reasons were not sufficient. Besides, other probable
places where he might be sent to were already not available for refugees. Therefore, it
494
Ryan Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-
1923, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 48.
495
For instance, Albanian refugees were recruited in the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa)
operating as paramilitary forces of the Ottoman Army, meaning that the CUP government made use of
the “crime and violence tendencies” of the Albanians. Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores.”, pp. 49-51.
496
Other locations forbidden for Albanian settlement were the provinces of Aydın, Edirne and
Hüdavendigar and the livas of Çatalca, Kale-i Sutaniye, Izmit and Gelibolu. For detailed information,
see Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores”, p. 47.
497
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.2/37, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1333 (April 28, 1915).
156
would be more appropriate to allow Halil bin Bayram and others in similar situation to
stay in the city as long as they did not commit any wrong doings against public
order.498 Despite that, Istanbul Police Directorate continued regarding the existence of
this kind of people in the city as a security problem on its own even in case they were
not involved in any illegal doings. Thus, the attitude compared to the Ministry of
Interior was stricter during the initial years of the war.
In any case, the Ministry of Interior was interested in maintaining control over
refugees coming Istanbul. For instance, in February 1915, some refugees came to
Istanbul with unsealed or improperly sealed travel documents. The Ministry of Interior
fearing an increase in the number of such refugees felt the necessity of an official order
about the issue. The order stated that any person without solid and officially approved
reasons should be denied from travelling to Istanbul. Moreover, even in cases of
compulsory migrations, it was the duty of officials to declare and recommend
whatever was required from people for official travel documents. 499 Therefore,
although, these documents indicate that the number of refugees trying to settle in
Istanbul increased during the war, there is no exact statistics for that. Probably the
number of refugees in Istanbul became higher and higher during the following years of
the Great War.
In 1917, when the war conditions became graver, an imperial decree for the
maintenance of security and order was promulgated.500 The first article of the decree
stated that people, who wanted to be tenants at the bedsitter (bekar odası), hotels,
apartment buildings etc, had to present a proper notification of identity to landlords,
including information about their names and titles; religion and citizenship; the place
and date of birth; date and reason of their arrival; proposed duration of their stay; name
and title of their fathers; and finally, name, citizenship, religion and age of women,
498
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.2/37, 13 Cemaziyelahir 1333 (April 28, 1915).
499
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M… 19/65, 24 Rebiülahir 1333 (March 3, 1915).
500
“Takrir-i emin ve inzibata müteallik bazı tedabiri havi mukarreratı hakkında irade-i seniyye, 11
Zilkade 1335/ 30 Ağustos 1333 (August 30, 1917)”, Düstur, II/9, (Istanbul: Evkaf Matbaası, 1928), pp.
717-719.
157
daughters and wives accompanying them. Accordingly, landlords would have to
submit notifications to police stations within 24 hours. If tenants did not present
information of their identity, then, landlords would refuse to accept these people as
tenants to their places. Furthermore, male persons up to the age of eighteen had to
present separate notification of identity even when they were under the care of their
families.501 In this way, the security forces were supposed to have on hand detailed
records about the newcomers.
The third article of the decree was also an indicator of strict control mechanism
over “suspected” persons, criminals and ex-convicts. According to this article, security
forces were authorized to take the fingerprints and photos of the following: those who
committed an offense that violated the public order and security (theft, fraud, pick-
pocketing, gambling, deterioration of public order, debauching especially young
people and seduction); those highly suspected of committing the crimes mentioned
above; vagrants, runaways from foreign countries to the Ottoman Empire, refugees,
beggars; people banished from one place to another within the Ottoman Empire or to
out of the country; persons who made false declaration of their names to security
forces when they were detained; persons whose fingerprints and photos were
requested by courts and prosecutors; gypsies evaluated as suspect by security forces;
persons habitually involved in prostitution.502 The fifth article was about punishment
in case of opposition to this decree. Accordingly, people who did not respect the
requirements of the decree would be punished in compliance with the third addition to
the 99th article of the Penal Code.503
501
“Takrir-i emin ve inzibata müteallik bazı tedabir”, Düstur, II/9, pp. 718-719.
502
“Takrir-i emin ve inzibata müteallik bazı tedabir”, Düstur, II/9, pp. 718-719.
503
“Takrir-i emin ve inzibata müteallik bazı tedabir”, Düstur, II/9, p. 719. According to the third
addition to the 99th article of the Penal Code, the people who opposed to the regulations, decrees and
rules of the state for maintenance public order and general morality would be imposed a fine from one
to fifteen liras or be sentenced to imprisonment from 24 hours to one month. “28 Zilhicce 1274 tarihli
Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını muaddel kanun, 6 Cemaziyelahir 1329/22 Mayıs 1327 (June 4, 1911)”,
Düstur II/3, (Dersaadet: Matba-i Osmaniyye, 1330), p. 444.
158
This decree, with its punitive sanctions, indicated how the authority of security
forces became broader in scope through legal regulations during the war years. In this
respect, anyone considered as “suspect” by security forces were treated as probable
criminals and received similar treatment as actual criminals. The government
increased the surveillance power in the name of maintaining public order. One of the
main reasons of publication of the imperial decree was probably maintaining control
over countrymen in the Istanbul because countrymen, who migrated to Istanbul from
smaller Anatolian provinces, were immediately regarded as “suspect”.
From March 1916 to April 1917, six people were banished from Istanbul on the
grounds that they were from other provinces.504 Four of these were Muslims and two
of them were non-Muslims. They were either sent back to their homelands or expelled
to other provinces. Although, the numbers are in case not big enough to make
generalizations, there were many other individual instances of banishment from the
capital on grounds of being a countryman. As a matter of fact, Mustafa Reşat
[Mimaroğlu], the director of the political section (siyasi kısım) of Istanbul Police
Directorate, stated in his memoirs that during the war there was a deliberate policy of
sending single countrymen – whether Muslim or non-Muslim – to their homelands in
order to prevent probable security and provisioning problems in Istanbul. 505 Therefore,
by reference to this official policy, it can be argued that the number of Muslim and
non-Muslim countrymen banished from Istanbul was probably higher than actually
stated.
In fact, most of the time being a countryman was the apparent reason for
banishment decision whereas in the base there might be other reasons. In this sense,
especially following the Armenian deportation, Armenians from other provinces were
forbidden to travel to Istanbul. Nevertheless, in the documents the reason of their
banishment was denoted as ‘being a countryman’ rather than being an Armenian. In
504
BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb. 8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (November 4, 1917).
505
Mustafa Reşat Mimaroğlu, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim’den Memurluk Hayatımın Hatıraları,
(Ankara: T.C. Ziraat Bankası Matbaası, 1946), p. 56.
159
one instance, in June 1917, an Armenian from Edirne, who had been relieved of
military duty by the way of redemption payment (bedel-i nakdi), came to Istanbul.506
Then a series of correspondence took place between the Ministry of Interior, Istanbul
Police Directorate, Istanbul Central Commander (Merkez Kumandanı) and the Edirne
Police Directorate about Armenians in similar situation. According to these
correspondences, similar Armenian countrymen that had been discharged from
military duty in exchange for redemption payment or through sick leave were trying to
go to Istanbul. Talat Bey, the Minister of Interior, indicated that such Armenians
being countrymen and having no relation with Istanbul must be banned from traveling
there. Furthermore, according to the comment of Talat Bey, such Armenians in
Istanbul must have expelled from the city and led to settle in Koçhisar and Tuzgölü
regions of the Konya province.507
As a matter of fact, the migration of countrymen to Istanbul was considered as
problematic by the government due to existing provisioning problems. However, the
migration of Armenian countrymen to Istanbul must have had other implications for
the government. Since, Armenian subjects in Istanbul had not been obliged to mass
deportation, Armenians in general considered the capital as a relatively safer place.
Yet, the government aimed at deporting the Armenians in provinces and towns within
the close vicinity of Istanbul. Therefore, Armenians who had recently arrived in
Istanbul from other places were subjected to banishment from the city and generally
sent to Anatolia and Zor where native Armenians had been deported. For instance, an
Armenian from İzmit who had come to Istanbul in 1912 and had been working there
for four years was deported to Anatolia in 1916. The reason of his deportation was
indicated as having been identified as “suspect” in addition to being a single
countryman.508 Therefore, as this example demonstrates, not only having been a
506
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Sb.24/42, 19 Ramazan 1334 (July 20, 1916).
507
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Sb.24/42, 19 Ramazan 1334 (July 20, 1916).
.
508
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Şb.30/49, 22 Muharrem 1335 (November 18, 1916) Another instance was an
Armenian woman from Adapazarı. Since her family in Adapazarı was deported, her application for
160
countryman but also being a ‘single countryman’ could be considered as a valid reason
for banishment from the official perspective.
In August 1915, a fifteen years old Armenian boy called Nazaret was deported
to Konya.509 On December 15, 1915, his mother wrote a petition to the General
Directorate of Security, Ministry of Interior indicating that Nazaret had been detained
while he was returning home from his school in Kadıköy on August 21, 1915.
According to the petition, security forces had identified him as an orphan despite the
fact that he was living together with his mother and sisters in Kadıköy. He had been
deported to Konya on August 22. The mother requested the return of her son to
Istanbul since all his family was living there. The General Directorate of Security sent
a correspondence to the Istanbul Police Directorate conveying the petition and
requesting the reason of his deportation. According to the response of the Istanbul
Police Directorate, Nazaret had been deported on grounds of being among the people
who were countrymen and single.510
As this case shows, there were instances of abuses and mistreatments. Nazaret
was a schoolboy at the age of fifteen living with his family in Istanbul. Therefore, his
identification as a ‘single countryman’ had no valid basis. However, he was forcefully
deported to Konya with no right of objection and made to remain there for more than
three months. Although, there is no exact information about the frequency of such
mistreatments, it is not difficult to guess that the number of such cases had not been
low, as in war conditions the government and security forces gained extreme power in
the name of maintaining public order.
Another suspected group were the people who did not have any occupation in
Istanbul. Generally, in the documents two words, serseri (tramp or vagrant/vagabond)
and işsiz güçsüz (jobless and idle), were used for describing these people. In sum,
registration to the Istanbul Population Registry (Dersaadet Sicil-i Nüfus) was denied.
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Şb. 32/4, 02 Rebiülevvel 1335 (December 27, 1916)
509
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Şb.15/16, 20 Safer 1334 (December 28, 1915).
510
161
vagabond/vagrant suffices to meet the meaning of these words. Actually, vagrants had
historically been undesired elements in Istanbul. Especially during the nineteenth
century their number had increased. Since they had been evaluated as “potential
criminals”, their existence in Istanbul had been regarded as a problem on its own by
officials.511 The first legal document about controlling vagabonds entitled Regulation
on Vagabonds and Suspected Criminals (Serseri ve Mazanna-i Su-i olan Eşhas
Hakkında Nizamname) published in 1890.512 Following the Constitutional Revolution
of 1908, on May 10, 1909, the same regulation was reformulated as a law named as
‘Law on Vagabonds and Suspected Criminals’ (Serseri ve Mazanna-i Sui olan Eşhas
Hakkında Kanun).513 This law was in force during the war years and afterwards.
According to the fourth article of the law, any person, whose vagrancy was
ascertained by security forces and a prosecutor, would be employed in the municipality
or other public works for a period of two to four months. In the case when there were
no appropriate positions in the city for that, he would be sent to his homeland or any
other place for similar employment. Such decision of a court would be closed to appeal
and became effectual immediately.514 Vagrants who assumed the public duty assigned
to him or who found a permanent job during in the meantime would be allowed free.
According to the eighth article, if a vagrant absconded from public work or failed to
work properly or was arrested for a second time as a vagabond during the same year,
then in any of these cases, he would be banished for a period of three months to one
511
For detailed information about surveillance and control mechanisms implemented on vagrants during
the reign of Abdülhamid II, see Yılmaz, Serseri, Anarşist ve Fesadın Peşinde, pp. 126-134.
512
513
This law was composed of three parts and twenty-two articles. The first part was about the
vagabonds. The first article was about the description of vagrant: a person having had no job for two
months and not seeking any permanent job in the meantime. A person who had made beggary the means
to earn his living despite being eligible for work was also counted as vagabond. The second part was
about the suspected. The third part was composed of joint provisions for vagabonds and suspected
criminals. “Serseri ve mazanna-i su-i eşhas hakkında kanun, 19 Rebiülahir 1327, 27 Nisan 1325 (May
10, 1909)”, Düstur, II/1, (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Osmaniyye, 1329), pp. 169-173.
514
“Serseri ve mazanna-i su-i eşhas hakkında kanun”, Düstur, II/1, p.170.
162
year.515 Security forces were authorized to arrest and send to prosecutors the vagrants
who made a habit of rambling around places prohibited for that or who displayed other
suspicious behavior. These vagabonds would be imprisoned for one week to six
months or would be exiled for three months to two years.516
Although being a vagabond had some punitive conclusions for these people,
vagrancy was not a part of the Penal Code. On the contrary, the state made a separate
regulation for vagrancy and determined its punishments in a separate law. Actually,
the mentality behind this regulation was to prevent crimes before they were
committed. Therefore, the punishments for vagabonds were actually for crimeful acts
that had not been committed yet.517 There were two aspects of the regulation about
vagrants. On the one hand, there was an attempt to put people who were idle into
working life by employing them in public works. This way, these people would be
“harmless” to public life and become “productive” elements of the society. Instead, on
the other hand, vagabonds who were “incorrigible” would be kept away from city life
and be banished to the other places.
Certainly, in war conditions, employing vagrants in public works was
challenging for the government. In any case, it was also impossible to keep vagrants in
Istanbul. Therefore, starting with the first year of the war, there was a policy of
banishing vagabonds from Istanbul. For instance, in February 1915, a person from
İzmit was sent out of Istanbul since he had no job or any connection with the city. 518
The reason of sending him out of the city was indicated as a ‘security measure’. In
another instance, a vagrant of Greek origin was banished to Ankara. While the court
decision about him stated that he would either be employed in public work or sent to
515
“Serseri ve mazanna-i su-i eşhas hakkında kanun”, Düstur, II/1, pp. 170-171.
516
“Serseri ve mazanna-i su-i eşhas hakkında kanun”, Düstur, II/1, p. 171.
517
Ergut, , Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 250.
518
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.4/5, 5 Rebiülahir 1333 (February 20, 1915).
163
another place to find a job,519 the Istanbul Police Directorate preferred to banish him
out of Istanbul just as many other vagabonds.
Actually, the number of vagrants sent to other provinces was not small. In
March 1915, a correspondence was sent from the Ministry of Interior to the
Hüdavendigar province and İzmit and Kütahya sanjaks about vagrants sent there from
Istanbul.520 According to this correspondence, governors at these localities had to
transfer the persons sent as vagabonds to appropriate places within the sanjak or
province with regard to their nationalities. Thus the banishment of vagabonds was a
regular process in which nationality was a decisive attribute.
The government regarded the banishment of vagrants from the capital city as
essential for the maintenance of public security. Nevertheless, officials also had to take
into account the security of other places. For instance, ninety-nine vagabonds were
sent from Istanbul to Balıkesir in April 1915.521 The officials transferred these persons
to Soma that was on a military route. Since the security forces there were insufficient,
the local governor wrote to the Ministry of Interior requiring that they did not send any
other groups of vagrants to the province. Hereupon, the General Directorate of
Security warned the Istanbul Police Directorate about the issue. The General
Directorate of Security indicated that people classified as vagabonds would be
separated into three groups by the Istanbul Police Directorate and then would be
banished from Istanbul in a specific order. First, some would be sent to other regions
of the Empire and would be left free to settle therein. Second, some others would be
transferred to their hometowns. Finally, some would be banished to pre-determined
destinations where they would be directed to settle in precise locations. Hence,
probable disorder would be minimized.522
519
BOA.DH.EUM.MH.269/32, 3 Recep 1334 (May 6, 1916).
520
BOA.DH.ŞFR.50/194, 20 Rebiülahir 1333 (March 7, 1915).
521
BOA.DH.EUM.KLU.8/38, 19 Cemaziyel 1333 (April 4, 1915).
522
BOA.DH.EUM.KLU. 8/38, 19 Cemaziyel 1333 (April 4, 1915).
164
The banishment of vagrants continued during 1916 and 1917. The table from
these dates summarizing people banished from Istanbul to other regions or even out of
borders of the Empire also included those banishments as vagrants. Seventeen
vagabonds were expelled from Istanbul according to this table.523 Six of these were
women. Most of them were sent to Ankara. Only three were sent to their hometowns.
One Iranian vagabond was exiled outside the Empire. This table, as well as other
documents, specifies Ankara as one of the centers for the banishment of vagrants.
Konya and Kütahya were among other cities of exile. It is likely that these places were
selected according to their distance from the fronts and military routes due to security
concerns.
Although the government tried to get rid of vagrants in Istanbul during the war
years it is not clear to what extent the policy was successful. Probably, the regulations
about travel and the rise of the de facto power of administrative mechanism on
controlling the city population resulted in the banishment of a large number of
vagrants from the city. However, this time, the local administrative authorities
complained about increasing security problems in the regions where vagrants were
sent. Nevertheless, because under the war conditions the government’s priority was to
control the capital city, the Istanbul Police Directorate neglected the situation of other
regions to an extent.
The next section will be on foreigners constituting an other group of “suspects”
not being identified as “potential threat” to internal order in peacetime, they came to be
seen as such and became targets for scrutiny policies and policing measures during the
war.
523
165
5.2 Foreigners
Istanbul had a notable foreign population when the Great War broke out.
Actually, Istanbul historically had been one of the Ottoman cities with the highest
foreign population. This fact had stemmed from several features of the city. First, it
had been the administrative and political center of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a
great number of people working at the consulates, embassies and other diplomatic
institutions had been living in the city with their families. Next, Istanbul had been one
of the biggest harbor cities of the Ottoman Empire with a dynamic commercial life.
Thus a great number of foreign tradesmen had been living in Istanbul or visiting the
city from time to time. Finally, Istanbul had been the financial center of the Ottoman
Empire where considerable number of foreign banks and international corporations
were present.
The legal status of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire had been determined by
the capitulations since 1650.524 Foreigners had several privileges in their entrance to
and residence in Istanbul, as well as other parts of the country. Ottoman governments
had tried to change this situation from time to time however they had never succeeded
in bringing the legal status of the foreigners within the scope of the Ottoman laws. 525
When the Great War began, an opportunity for the elimination of capitulations
appeared for the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations were abolished unilaterally in
September 1914. This development also provided the government a chance to
reorganize the legal status of foreigners in terms of their travel and residence in the
country.
In 1914, the foreign population in Istanbul was 129.927. The majority of this
population was composed of males. The male foreign population was 101.554 whereas
524
Nejdet Bilgi, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin 1917 Yılı Yabancı Nüfusu”, Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi, Vol.
XXV, No. 1, (July 2010), p. 102.
525
Bilgi, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin 1917 Yılı”, p. 103.
166
the female foreign population was 28.373.526 There is no exact information about
distribution of this number in terms of nationalities. Nevertheless, when the city
population, which was 909.978 according to the Population Statistics of 1914, is taken
into consideration, the number of the foreign population was remarkable.527
When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, the CUP government felt the
necessity for new regulations regarding the scrutiny of foreign population living in the
Empire. Charles Vinicombe, a British national living in Istanbul during the war years,
stated that following the Ottoman Empire’s entry to the Great War, the first
implementation of the government regarding foreigners was to make their registery to
the police stations compulsory.528 In addition, foreigners were prohibited from staying
out later than 9 pm in the evenings, therefore being subjected to a curfew in a sense.529
As a matter of fact, similar to the situation of foreigners living in other belligerent
states, the Ottoman Empire’s entry to the Great War became a turning point for the
foreigners living in Istanbul.
Following the declaration of jihad on November 14, 1914, a great number of
Muslims joined mass demonstrations in Istanbul against enemy states.530 During these
demonstrations, several places owned or run by foreigners being citizens of enemy
states – France, Britain and Russia – were attacked. The famous hotel of Tokatlıyan
located at Pera became the target of such an attack due to being owned by a Russian-
Armenian. Another such attack targeted the Russian monument located in Ayastefanos
(San Stefano), in which a group of demonstrators occupied and damaged the
526
Bilgi, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin 1917 Yılı”, p. 110.
527
Memalik-i Osmaniyye’nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği, pp. 8-9. Actually, these statistics did not
include the number of foreigners. Therefore, total population number 909.978 did not include foreign
population.
528
Vinicombe, Charles of Istanbul, Letters Describing Wartime Life in Istanbul, 99/9/1, (Located in
Imperial War Museums, London, United Kingdom)..
529
Imperial War Museums, London, United Kingdom)..
530
Dilek Kaya Mutlu, “The Russian Monument at Ayastefanos (San Stefano): Between Defeat and
Revenge, Remembering and Forgetting”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1, (January 2007), p. 79.
167
monument with the mob from neighboring villages. 531 In fact, there was an implicit
official consent to these attacks. Following the publication of news in Tanin, a pro-
government newspaper, approving the attacks, on November 18, the monument was
totally blown up by a military division led by Cemal Pasha, the Minister of Navy. 532 It
is clear that the government aimed at using this incident in a symbolic way to provoke
anti-Allied sentiments of Muslim-Turkish subjects in the Ottoman Empire.
Capitalizing on these incidents, the government opted for taking more concrete
steps to specify the legal status of foreigners living in the Empire. Initially, an official
message was sent to the embassies of several states. According to this message, the
consulates had no longer any right to intervene in the issues about foreigners in the
Ottoman Empire. The foreigners were subject to the legal procedures of the Ottoman
State. Accordingly, they had the right to apply to their consulates, only after having
consumed all the legal ways that the Ottoman State had determined. 533 In this sense,
the CUP government could finally closed the legal gap allowing the foreigners to act in
accordance with the laws and regulations of their own countries. This regulation would
gain a more organized structure through the provisional law of March 8, 1915.534
The first article indicated that, although, foreigners did not have the chance to
benefit from the political rights granted by the Constitution, they were subjected to the
laws and regulations prescribed in the personal law (hukuk-ı hususiyye). According to
the second article of the provisional law, all the laws and regulations about security
and public order of the Ottoman Empire were also valid for the foreigners. With the
third article of the provisional law, all the legal cases of the foreigners including
531
Kaya Mutlu, “The Russian Monument at Ayastefanos ”, p. 79.
532
Kaya Mutlu, “The Russian Monument at Ayastefanos”, p. 79.
533
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an official message to the embassies of Greece, Sweden, Spain,
Romania, America, Italy, Austria, Iran, Germany and Denmark on March 1, 1915. “Evamir ve
Mukarrerat: 17 Teşrinisani sene 1330 tarihli ve 790 numerolu tahrirat-ı umumiyyeye zeyldir”, Polis
Mecmuası, No. 42, 29 Cemaziyelevvel 1333/1 Nisan 1331 (14 Nisan 1915), p. 61.
534
“Memalik-i Osmaniyye’de Bulunan Ecnebilerin Hukuk ve Vezaifi Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat, 21
Rebiülahir 1333/ 23 Şubat 1331 (March 8, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 458.
168
commercial, penal and any other issues would be decided at the Ottoman Courts.535 In
this sense, the legal status of foreigners was totally placed under the authority of the
Ottoman State.
Following this provisional law, on March 15, 1915, the Ottoman government
promulgated another provisional law about the travel and residence of foreigners in the
Ottoman Empire.536 According to the second article of this law, foreigners who arrived
in the Ottoman Empire had to present a declaration to the police station of the city
where they were to reside. This declaration would include their names, place and date
of birth, their title and profession, reasons of the travel, names of their fathers and
mothers and their titles, the name of their wife and/or kids as accompaniers, their age
and nationality and the localities in the Ottoman Empire where they would visit. If
foreigners were to visit any other locality, they had to present their travel documents to
the police station of this locality too. Foreigners who declared false information about
themselves or their accompaniers would be sentenced to sixteen days to two years
imprisonment or 5 to 100 Ottoman gold fine.537
The fifth article of the provisional law assigned the Ministry of Interior broad
authority for expelling foreigners from localities or sending them out of the country.
The article is as the following:
Article 5: The Minister of Interior can, either by his own initiative, or by virtue
of a decision of the Council of Ministers, send away sine die or for a fix period
from the cities or zones in which they are, foreigners who are travelling or
residing in Turkey, if he judges it necessary as a measure of a political nature
or one affecting public security; or he can notify them to live in other parts of
the Empire, or expel them from Ottoman territory, using the police or other
forces in case of need. Any foreigner, who having been notified to leave a
locality or to leave Ottoman territory, does not comply with such notification
within the period fixed, shall be sent away or expelled by force. If persons who
535
“Memalik-i Osmaniyye’de Bulunan Ecnebilerin”, Düstur, II/7, p. 458.
536
“Ecnebilerin Memalik-i Osmaniyye’de Seyahat ve İkametleri Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat, 28
Rebiülahir 1333/2 Mart 1331 (March 15, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 484-486.
537
“Ecnebilerin Memalik-i Osmaniyye’de”, Düstur, II/7, p. 484.
169
break this rule resists and hide themselves, they shall be imprisoned for from 3
to 6 months and shall not be sent elsewhere or expelled until they have suffered
such punishment. Those who have been sent elsewhere or expelled by force
because of failure to obey cannot return again to the place from which they
were sent away or to Ottoman territory.538
As a matter of fact, the Minister of Interior could expel every foreigner from Istanbul
by his own decision or through the decision of the council of ministers. If a decision of
banishment was affected, the foreigner would not have any option except obeying the
decision according to this law. In fact, this practice must be evaluated as a product of
martial law and war conditions. Since the government and state elites continuously
broadened the coverage of acts considered as threat to the survival of the state, they did
not hesitate to take radical decisions and to implement direct measures in order to
eliminate any potential “danger”.
Between March 1916 and April 1917, seventy-five foreigners were expelled
from Istanbul because they were identified as suspected.539 Probably, the Ministry of
Interior as well as Ministry of Justice and Military Government gave banishment
decision for these foreigners by reference to fifth article of the provisional law in the
above paragraph. The majority of these people were subjects of enemy states. There
were thirty-six Russians, twelve Montenegrins, six British, six Romanians and four
French.540 The number of males and females was almost half to half. Most of the
thirty-seven suspected women were prostitutes and they were Russians or Romanians.
The “suspected” foreigners were sent to four cities: Ankara, Hüdavendigar (Bursa),
Çorum and Konya; and all the prostitutes were expelled to Hüdavendigar. Actually, an
additional group of one hundred and three foreigners were banished out of Istanbul
538
The Consulate of America in Istanbul sent full-text translation of this provisional law to Washington
DC. NARA, Department of State, 867.111/30, RG 59, March 27, 1915. “Ecnebilerin Memalik-i
Osmaniyye’de”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 484-485.
539
BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem 1336 (Novermber 4, 1917).
540
The rest were as in the following: one Moroccan, two Egyptians, one Dutch, one Italian, two Greeks
and one American. There were only three Austrians as the subject of a cobelligerent state.
170
between March 1916 and April 1917. Fifty-three were prisoners of war. The reason of
banishment for the rest was different for each one. Some were ex-convicts and some
were banished for committing criminal acts.541 They were predominantly Italians,
Greeks, Russians and French.
In short, during the Great War, the Ottoman Government tried to control
foreigners as much as possible. The security measures and the legal procedures that the
foreigners had to be subjected were established through two provisional laws and some
other official notifications. The Minister of Interior gradually acquired massive
authority to make decisions about foreigners through these laws. Furthermore, the
police became responsible for following every step of foreigners within the country. If
the administrative offices identified a foreigner as suspected, s/he could be banished
out of Istanbul or even from the Ottoman Empire all at once. In the provisional laws,
there seemed no legal way to oppose such decisions. Vinicombe described the
situation of foreigners living in Istanbul, particularly the British, as follows:
The British colony was now much upset for the police used to make raids on
British houses about 1 A.M. when the inhabitants were in bed and in ½ an hour
marched their victims off into exile to villages and towns in the interior 200
miles away, where some remained for years, they had even to pay their own
fares and those of the police who were in charge of them and keep themselves
while in exile – this fate was a constant fear to us.542
The Police Journal published an official report to legitimize these regulations.543

According to this report, it was the natural right of any state to be informed about who
entered, travelled and reside within her territories. This was a requirement for security
and public order. Nevertheless, up to 1915, the Ottoman State was deprived of this
541
542
Imperial War Museums, London, United Kingdom).
543
“Ecnebilerin Memalik-i Osmaniyyede seyahat ve ikametlerine mütedair kanun layihasının esbab-ı
mucibe mazbatasıdır”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 43, 13 cemaziyelahir 1333/15 Nisan 1331 (April 28, 1915),
p. 84.
171
security information due to the former agreements preventing the Ottoman State to
promulgate necessary laws. Since these agreements were abolished, the Ottoman State
was free to enact provisional laws about the legal status of the foreigners as well as
their travel and residence conditions within the country. The report also emphasized
that with the provisional law about travel, the proceedings of security, which the
foreigners had to be subject to, were determined.544
It must be noted here that, in this report, there was no reference to the war
conditions. However, from the perspective of the government, the war conditions had
made these legal regulations a necessity. Furthermore, under the war conditions, the
Ottoman government, through the Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of
Security, acquired extraordinary power for applying security measures within the
country and taking crucial decisions of exile, banishment and deportation. As a result,
most probably, foreigners started feeling themselves insecure in Istanbul during the
War. In August 1915, Henri Morgenthau, the ambassador of the United States in
Istanbul, sent a correspondence to Washington D.C. indicating that many Americans
had already left and were leaving Istanbul via Dedeağaç. Furthermore, he stated that
‘[I] am advising all Americans having no definite business here to go home’.545 This
suggestion definitely had to do with the Armenian deportation and following
massacres that began in April 1915.
When the United States entered the Great War on the side of the Triple Entente
in April 1917, the American Consulate in Istanbul was closed down and American
citizens began to leave the Ottoman Empire via Istanbul.546 Nevertheless, this time,
departure was as difficult as entrance. According to a memorandum sent from the
Swedish Legation to the American Officials, the procedures of the Ottoman State
about the departure of foreigners varied from time to time. No foreigner was allowed
to travel in or out of the Ottoman lands without an appropriate permit. The political
544
“Ecnebilerin Memalik-i Osmaniyyede seyahat ve ikametlerine”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 43, p. 84.
545
NARA, Departtment of State, 867.111/36, RG 59, August 7, 1915.
546
NARA, Department of State, 867.111/50, RG 59, August 9, 1917.
172
section of Istanbul Police Directorate issued this document. The memorandum
indicated that civilian Ottoman authorities acted more favorably in issues concerning
American citizens. Nevertheless, military authorities were predominantly Germans and
they were harsher. Military authorities tried to prevent American male citizens’
departure, especially the males who were at the age of conscription.547
Furthermore, the Ottoman government had a different attitude towards the
American citizens of Ottoman origin – these mostly being Armenians. The Ottoman
government had not considered these people as American citizens for many years and
it was the case during the Great War. According to the memorandum above, Ottoman
government did not take any special measures about these American citizens with
Ottoman origin but they were not allowed to leave the country. 548 Although there was
no explanation about the ethnic background of these American citizens, they were
mostly Armenians. In this respect, the same memorandum stated that “the number of
persons so affected in Constantinople is small but there are naturally a great many of
American citizens of Ottoman origin elsewhere in Turkey, especially at Aleppo and in
Syria.”549
In the summer of 1917, the foreign population in Istanbul had reached a
strikingly low level as a result of war conditions and constraints imposed on
foreigners. According to the reports of the Ecanib Kalemi (Office of Foreigners) under
the General Directorate of Security, the number of the foreigners living in Istanbul was
30.956. Two third of this population was composed of males whereas female
population was one third. These foreigners were from twenty-four countries.550 Greeks
547
548
549
550
Nejdet Bilgi used the document coded as BOA.DH.EUM.ECB. 17/39, lef 15, 52. According to the
statistics, in Istanbul, there were 17 Argentineans, 1.829 Germans, 146 Americans, 2.231 Austrian-
Hungarians, 2 Afghans, 283 Spanish, 6 Swedish, 204 Swiss, 929 British, 2.029 Italians, 3.736 Iranians,
78 Belgians, 1.353 Bulgarians, 24 Portuguese, 29 Chinese, 28 Danish, 1.245 Russians, 406 Romanians,
34 Serbs, 953 French, 24 Dutch, 875 Montenegrins, 2 Norwegians and 14.493 Greeks. Bilgi, “Osmanlı
Devleti’nin 1917 Yılı...”, p. 134.
173
(14.493) composed the largest foreign population in Istanbul. Probably, the Greek
population also included the people who had been Ottoman in origin and had gained
the Greek citizenship afterwards. The British population (929) and the French
population (953) as the population of the enemy states was actually not very low. Total
population of the Germans (1.829) and Austrian-Hungarians (2.231), as the
cobelligerent states of the Ottoman Empire, only constituted 13.11 % of the total
foreign population of the city.
As mentioned above, just before the Great War, the foreign population in
Istanbul was 129.927. Under the war conditions, as a result of the government’s
security measures and diminishing living standards, 98.971 foreigners had left
Istanbul.551 In conclusion, as the historical commercial and industrial centre of the
Ottoman Empire, Istanbul lost a great number of foreign population during the Great
War. From the perspective of the state, the foreigners began to constitute a threat to the
state since the beginning of the war. Several laws and regulations were made in order
to determine the legal status of foreigners and to control them.
The non-Muslim minorities living in Istanbul became another group of
“suspected” people that faced surveillance, scrutiny and harsh policing measures
during the Great War.
5.3 Non-Muslims
Up to here, we have analyzed several groups of people whom the government

and the security forces regarded as suspicious and tried to keep under control or even
expel from Istanbul. These people in common were not Istanbulites. They were
foreigners, refugees, countrymen, and vagabonds generally from other provinces
551
Before the Great War, Istanbul had the largest foreign population in the Ottoman Empire. Total
foreign population in the Ottoman Empire was 196.335 in 1914 and 66,2 % of this population was living
in Istanbul. In 1917, Istanbul did not have the largest foreign population anymore. The foreign
population of the Aydın Province was 45.014 and this number was 48,5 % of the total foreign
population, which diminished to 92.743 during the war years. Istanbul had 33,4 % of the total foreign
population in 1917. “Osmanlı Devleti’nin 1917 Yılı ...”, p. 110, 118.
174
whom the state regarded as suspected elements and potential criminals making
Istanbul not an appropriate place for their temporary or permanent stays. On the one
hand, the government did not want additional burden over provision of the city; on the
other hand, under the war conditions, the maintenance of public order was considered
by the security forces as possible through the elimination of the number of suspected
people within the city. Provisional laws, regulations, ordinances and de facto practices
of administrative and security providing offices have so far been analyzed in detail.
Apart from non-Istanbulites, non-Muslims were also regarded as a threat by the
government and security forces during the war years. In contrast with the previous
groups, non-Muslims had been inhabitants of Istanbul for centuries. As a matter of
fact, the perception of non-Muslims as a threat to public order was not totally an issue
of the Great War years; instead the issue historically dated back to the beginning of the
nineteenth century, when the rise of nationalism among non-Muslim elements began to
constitute a problem for the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks were the first non-Muslim
group whose nationalist awareness turned into a political activity. 1821 was the year of
the Mora Revolt and, after a long struggle the Greeks received independence in 1829.
Following that, the security forces in Istanbul started paying special attention to
scrutinize the Greeks of Istanbul.552
The Armenians began to occupy the agenda of Ottoman statesmen especially
during 1890’s. The Armenian revolutionary activities in the eastern Anatolia and
extremely harsh counter-measures of the Ottoman State deteriorated the relations
between Armenians and the Ottoman State. As a result, Armenians, who had been
historically accepted as a loyal element of the Empire, started to be seen as threat.
Although, the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 led to a degree of improvement for
the situation of Armenians, this did not last long. Following the Balkan Wars and
especially during the Great War the relationship between Armenians and the Ottoman
government totally collapsed. The Armenians in Anatolia had to face wholesale
deportation from their homelands since the government regarded them as the principal
552
175
internal threat. Despite the fact that the Armenians of Istanbul did not experience a
mass deportation, on April 24, 1915, more than two hundred Armenian intellectuals
and notables were deported from the city to Anatolia, most of them faced death. Thus,
the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire had to go through a disastrous phase of their
history. And in that respect, as for the life of Istanbulite Armenians, it would never be
same as it was before the Great War.
In this part, the policies of the Ottoman government regarding non-Muslim
elements in Istanbul will be analyzed in detail. There were several aspects of these
policies; nevertheless, due to the main interest of this dissertation, these policies will
be examined according to their relevance to the maintenance of public order and
security. Therefore, this part will only cover two non-Muslim communities: the Greeks
and the Armenians. In fact, the Jewish community was the third biggest non-Muslim
group in Istanbul;553 however, since the Jewish population in Istanbul had never been
regarded as a threat to public order either before the Great War or during the war
years, they will be excluded from the analysis in this part. On the contrary, the Jewish
community in Istanbul generally supported the Ottoman rule.554 According to Ottoman
553
According to the Population Statistics of 1914, there were 52.126 Jews in Istanbul. Most of the Jews
(31.070) were living around Beyoğlu and the European shore of the Bosporus. Second region where the
Jews (13.441) were concentrated was the old city, which was composed of Fatih, Beyazit and
Cerrahpaşa. There were 6.836 Jews at Üsküdar and Anatolian side of the Bosporus. There was also a
relatively small Jewish population in Bakırköy (364), Adalar (79), Gebze (21), Kartal (13) and Beykoz
(292). Memalik-i Osmaniyye’nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği, p. 8.
554
The relationship among the Ottoman State and the Jewish community had been peaceful during the
Hamidian Reign. In 1893, Abdülhamid II expressed to the religious leadership of the Jewish community
his idea about the military conscription of Jewish males in return to which the leadership responded
positively. Yet, probably due to reservations about other non-Muslim communities, this plan never
materialized. However, it had been an important indicator of the trust of the Ottoman State towards
Jews. Naim Güleryüz, “Yahudiler”, Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 7, (Istanbul: Tarih
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları ve Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), p. 406. Despite the good relations between the Jews
and Hamidian Regime, the Jews supported the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Actually, in the years
preceding 1908, the Jews in Salonika, the city where Ottoman Jewish community was most
concentrated, had close relations with the Young Turk movement. The Jews supported the mentality
behind the Young Turk Revolution, which was based on the fraternity of all the elements of the
Ottoman Empire including non-Muslim communities as well. Following the revolution, the Jews took
important positions in the CUP. In the elections of 1912 and 1914, the CUP reduced the representation
of the Greeks and the Albanians, who were regarded as the most defiant opponents of the committee.
Furthermore, some Armenian representatives of the CUP were replaced. Only the representation of the
176
archival documents, US official records and personal memoirs, there were no special
security measures applied to the Jews in Istanbul during the war years. For instance, in
contrast to Greeks and Armenians, they never experienced deportations from
Istanbul.555 There were only some individual cases of banishments insufficient to be
evaluated as a part of general security policy against the Jewish community.
5.3.1 Greeks
The Greeks were the most populated non-Muslim community in Istanbul. The
Mora Revolt in 1821 and the foundation of an independent Greek State in 1829 were
turning points regarding the relationship between the Greek community and the
Ottoman State. The Greeks, who had for centuries been an Ottoman millet became all
at once part of an independent state.556 As a result they became a matter of concern for
the Ottoman State. Yet, this situation changed once more during the second half of the
Jews in the CUP remained unchanged in these elections. The CUP regarded the Jews as ‘loyal’ until the
end of its reign. Certainly, the Jewish community had valid reasons for supporting the Young Turks.
Initially, the Muslim-Turks and the Jews had common economic interests from the revival of the
Ottoman Empire. Next, the Jews had always regarded the Turkish rule as the best protector against
Christians. Walter F. Weiker, Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity: A History of the Jews of Turkey,
(Lanham, New York and London: University Press of America and The Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, 1992), pp. 231-234. According to Kocahanoğlu, during the Great War, a great number of Jewish
tradesmen benefited from the economic policies of the CUP. As examined in the second chapter, the
policies of the CUP based on favoritism and protectionism as well as profiteering and black market
resulted in the huge capital accumulation in the hands of some tradesmen. Although most of these
trademen were Turkish-Muslim origin, there were also some Jewish tradesmen such as Avram and his
partners, Aslan Franko and his sons, Isak Kamhi, Bensuram, Nesim Toledeo, Moiz Yunatan, Ilyas
Menahim, and Bulgar Pavli. Such economic relations might also have some explanatory value for the
good rapport between the CUP and the Jewish community. Kocahanoğlu, Ittihat-Terakki’nin
Sorgulanması, p. 33.
555
A number of Jews were arrested in İzmir and deported to interior Anatolia during the war years.
Actually, these were French protégés that had declined Ottoman citizenship. The Ottoman government
commented that these Jews, whose ancestors had immigrated to the Ottoman Empire about a hundred
years ago, had no right to enjoy French protection any more. Their deportation decision was taken with
reference to that basis. Mr. Horton, Consul General in İzmir, sent a telegram to Istanbul indicating that
only Jews being French protégés were affected from these measures, whereas the situation of other Jews
remained unchanged. NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/82, RG 59, July 27, 1915.
556
Herkül Milas, “Rumlar”, Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 6, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları and Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), p. 364.
177
nineteenth century as the Greeks restored official trust for themselves and started being
employed in important state posts.557
However, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) caused another rupture in the
relationships of the Ottoman State and Greek community. Following the Balkan Wars,
in the summer of 1914, an economic boycott of the businesses and goods belonging to
the Ottoman Greeks and Armenians began in the Marmara region and Istanbul.558
According to Gingeras, this boycott was a part of a two-track policy – economic
prohibition and forced relocation – implemented by the CUP government in order to
“deal with the dangers posed by the presence of such large numbers of Armenians,
Greeks and Albanians [in the region].”559 According to the Greek Patriarchate, this
boycott caused deprivation of the Ottoman Greeks from their means of livelihood.560
Greek shops were plundered and shut up in Istanbul.561 As a result, in many
neighborhoods such as Topkapı, Tekfursarayı, Kasım Paşa, Samatya, Yedi Kule,
Sirkeci, Beşiktaş and Ortaköy, trade virtually came to a standstill.562
According to Akçam, when the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, the
CUP government followed a prudent policy towards the Ottoman Greeks until the end
of 1916 due to two reasons. First, through a fair treatment to the Ottoman Greeks, the
Ottoman Empire and Germany tried to ensure neutrality of Greece at the beginning of
the war. Second, the Ottoman government might have considered that if it
implemented harsh policies on the Ottoman Greeks, then this would provoke the Greek
government to enact similar policies on Muslims living in Greece. Therefore, Akçam
argues that the Ottoman government avoided mass deportations of the Ottoman Greeks
557
Milas, “Rumlar”, p. 365.
558
Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores, pp. 39-40.
559
Gingeras, Sorrowful Shores, p. 39.
560
Greek Patriarchate, Persecution of the Greeks in Turkey, 1914-1918, (Constantinople, 1919), p. 140.
561
Greek Patriarchate, Persecution of the Greeks, p. 148.
562
178
until the end of 1916.563 However, according to the U.S. Records, in 1915, from the
first of May up to July 13, more than 40.000 Ottoman Greeks were deported to interior
Muslim villages from the islands564 and Marmara coast.565 Moreover, Muslims coming
from interior regions were made to settle in the evacuated regions.566
The control of Greek community in Istanbul became an important security
issue for the Ottoman government. Actually, beside Thrace and Aegean costs, Istanbul
was the region where the Greeks were most populated in the Ottoman Empire.
According to the Population Statistics of 1914, there were 205.375 Greeks living in
Istanbul.567 This corresponded to 22,5 % of the total population of the city. The
Ottoman government had already begun taking some security measures against Greeks
before the Great War. In this respect, one of the main aims of the government had been
to prevent the rise of the Greek population in Istanbul.
The government had forbidden the immigration and settlement of Greeks in
Istanbul before the Ottoman Empire had entered the Great War.568 Although, local
officials had been informed about this decision, a number of Greeks managed to
563
Akçam, ‘Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur’, pp. 111-112.
158
These were the islands of Marmara. There were more than ten islands called Marmara Islands, while
four of them were open to settlement. Before the Great War, these islands were mostly populated by the
Greeks.
565
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/75, RG 59, July 13, 1915. One of the main reasons of the
deportation of Greeks from the Marmara coast and islands was to prepare the Sea of Marmara for the
Gallipoli War. In this sense, the Greek population living there was evaluated as a threat. Also see, Fuat
Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki’nin Etnisite Mühendisliği, 1913-1918, (Istanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 2008), pp. 233-234.
566
Although, the Greek Patriarch argued that this deportation took place under the assistance of German
and Austrian Ambassadors, the Ottoman officials denied this argument by indicating that they never
tolerated any interference to the internal affairs. Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi..., pp. 233-234. For
detailed information about settlement of refugees in places evacuated by the Ottoman Greeks, see Taner
Akçam, ‘Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur’: Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere
Yönelik Politikalar, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), pp. 124-127.
567
A large number of Greeks (75.971) inhabited Beyoğlu and villages alongside the European shore of
the Bosporus. The proportion of Greeks in other regions of Istanbul was as the following: Old city
(64.287), Üsküdar and Asian shore of Bosporus (19.832), Bakırköy (11.221), Şile (8.913), Adalar
(8.725), Gebze (5.856), Beykoz (3.708). Memalik-i Osmaniyye’nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği, p. 8.
568
BOA.DH.EUM.2.Şb.2/74, 29 Zilhicce 1332 (November 18, 1914).
179
migrate to Istanbul secretly with their household goods. Security measures became
much stricter when the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War. Besides, the
government found room to act freely while putting security measures into practice. As
a matter of fact, Greeks, who were living in villages and neighborhoods distant from
the central parts of Istanbul, were deported more easily. For instance, a number of
Greeks living in Kemerburgaz, within the borders of Bakırköy, were deported to
Anatolia in the first year of the Great War.569 Furthermore, according to the registers of
the Greek Patriarchate, 320 inhabitants of İstinye (Stenia) were deported by the order
of the Chief of Police of Arnavutköy, in July 1915. The Patriarchate stated that: “they
[the deported Ottoman Greeks] all took shelter in the suburbs of the Capital, with the
exception of five families whose leaders were in the Government employ of the
locality.”570 Although, there is no exact number of the deported Greeks in Istanbul, we
understand from the archival documents that some villages were almost totally
evacuated in 1917.
Yeniköy571 was one of these villages. The report of the Istanbul Regimental
Commandery of Gendarme (Istanbul Jandarma Alay Kumandanlığı) records the
evacuation of this village in October 1917.572 As a matter of fact, not only the Greeks
of this village but also the Greek population of surrounding villages were evacuated.
All male inhabitants of Yeniköy over the age of fifteen were called to the church on
October 10, 1917. According to the report, the village had been isolated from its
environs the night before. Next, the Greeks that gathered at the church were questioned
569
BOA.DH.ŞFR.55A/98, 26 Şevval 1333 (September 6, 1915).
570
571
There are two places named as ‘Yeniköy’ in Istanbul. One of them, a village populated by the Greeks
within the borders of Şile. The other one, which is under the borders of Sarıyer today, is located between
Tarabya and İstinye. It has been historically one of the most prosperous neighborhoods of Istanbul. The
district took the name Yeniköy during the reign of Süleyman I (Kanuni). During the Ottoman Period it
was inhabited by wealthy non-Muslims. Greeks being among the communities living there called this
district as Neohorion. Tülay Taşçıoğlu, “Yeniköy”, Dünden Bugüne Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, Vol. 7.
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları and Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), p. 485. The Yeniköy mentioned
above as one of evacuated villages is the former.
572
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.25/9, 18 Muharrem 1336 (November 3, 1917).
180
about people engaged in brigandage activities; the acts committed by these persons and
the means to their refuge in the village. Then, they were informed about the
government decision to prevent the brigandage activities as soon as possible.
Following the gathering at church, the deportation of the Greeks started. On October
10-11, 1917, seventy-eight deserters hiding in houses surrendered. In four days, 2.674
Greeks were deported from Yeniköy and its environs through the route of Ömerli and
Şile. The daily deportation numbers were as follows:
Table 6: The Greeks that were deported from Yeniköy, Şile
Date Men Women Children Total

October 11, 1917 104 214 267 585
October 12, 1917 - 483 1.278 1.761
October 13, 1917 153 22 38 213
October 14, 1917 25 43 47 115
Total 282 762 1.630 2.674
Source: BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.25/9, 18 Muharrem 1336 (November 3, 1917).
The numbers presented in the report indicate that most of the deportees were
women and children. The government took the decision of deportation as a security
measure against the rising brigandage activities but the number of deported men was
surprisingly low. At the end of the report, there is a statement that “…the evacuation of
Yeniköy started on 11th [of the present month]; no person remained in the whole
village and there remained no Greek from Yeniköy in the town.”573 Thus, the
government had tried to get rid of all the Greeks of Yeniköy from age of seven to
seventy that were considered as an important “threat” for the public security of
Istanbul.
573
“[…]Yeniköy’ün tahliyesine şehr-i halin onbirinde başlanıp onbeşinde tekmil köy ve şehirde
Yeniköylü kalmamıştır.” BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb. 25/9, 18 Muharrem 1336 (November 3, 1917).
181
In fact, since 1913 the government had been following similar methods for the
evacuation of the Greek villages in different parts of the Empire. Generally, first
villagers would be accused of hiding Greek bandits and deserters as well as helping
them; and then the gendarme would come to the village and notify them about the
decision to evacuate the village in a specified period of time.574 This was also the
method applied in Yeniköy in 1917. Although the report did not provide any detailed
information about the relationship between bandits and the inhabitants of Yeniköy, the
rising activities of banditry in the region might have played a role in the deportation
decision.575 As a matter of fact, the government preferred the evacuation of the whole
village as a security measure, rather than implementing other measures such as sending
additional security forces.
The number of losses during deportation was also indicated in the report.
According to that, three adults and one child passed away due to illness. In addition,
evacuated houses were sealed and household goods were secured. Moreover, the cattle
of villagers was confiscated and submitted to the “incorrupt hands of the Commission
of Abandoned Properties (Emval-i Metruke Komisyonu).”576 Also indicated in the
report was that during the deportation women were not exposed to any violence. They
had left their villages willingly as a result of the advice given to them and their
husbands. According to the report, although special attention was paid for the
protection of deported women’s purity (namus) and property, an artillery officer had
574
Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, p. 196.
575
There are not so many documents about banditry activities in Yeniköy and its surronding. One such
rare document about banditry activities in Yeniköy also gives information about the banditry activities
in Sarıkavak, another village within the borders of Şile. However, this document does not give any idea
about the frequency of banditry activities in this region. BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.21/13, 27 Zilkade 1335
(September 15, 1917). An other report dated February 21, 1918 stated that banditry activities of
Yeniköy bandits (Yeniköy eşkiyası) still continued in the region meaning that the evacuation of the
Greek population living in Yeniköy had not provided a remedy for prevention of banditry activities in
the region. BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.31/51, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1336 (February 21, 1918).
576
“[…]Yeniköy civarındaki sığır, koyun, keçi hayvanat daha ilk gün karakol civarında celb edildi.
Yeniköy’e gelen Emval-i Meruke Komisyonu namuslu ellere tevdi edilmiş ise de bidayette iyice tedbir
alınmamaktan hayvan mikdarı hiç bir suretle mikdar edilememiştir.” BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb. 25/9, 18
Muharrem 1336 (November 3, 1917).
182
raped a woman and due legal procedure had begun for this case.577 However, the
destination of the deportees was not mentioned in the report.
Apart from this, there are no reports about mass deportations of the Greek
villages in Istanbul.578 Nevertheless, there are some documents about individual cases
of banishment.579 Both through mass deportations and individual ones, it is evident
that the government tried to keep the Greek population under scrutiny. In September
1916, security forces detected eight to ten Greek families from Erdek and its vicinity
while secretly trying to go to Istanbul with their household goods. 580 Although they
claimed that they had received their travel documents from Erdek, the seal under their
travel document was illegible. These Greeks, being from Erdek, should have followed
the Bandırma route but instead they had used the route of Mudanya. Therefore, the
security forces at the ship had become suspicious and prevented these families from
traveling to Istanbul. Furthermore, it was discovered that their travel documents had
actually been obtained from Tire instead of Erdek. Actually, the government tried to
prevent mass migrations to Istanbul.581 Therefore, although there were a few number
577
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.25/9, 18 Muharrem 1336 (November 3, 1917).
578
Although, there are not detailed reports about the deportation of some other villages, we know from
the archival documents that there were further deportations in some regions of Istanbul. For instance,
there is a report of events that took place in Safra Köy when the deported Greeks returned to their
village. BOA.DH.EUM.AYS.15/110, 19 Şevval 1337 (July 18, 1919) Bahçeköy was another location
where the Greek population was deported. BOA.DH.EUM.AYS.17/1, 1 Zilkade 1337 (July 29, 1919)
579
For instance, in 1916 four Greeks were exiled from Istanbul to Ankara due to some crimes such as
theft, pick pocketing and abuse of security. Actually, these were subjects of Greece and Greece
Embassy demanded their submission to Greece. Nevertheless, the Istanbul Polis Directorate claimed
that due to war conditions and as a measure of security these people must have remained in Ankara.
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.16/33, 16 Muharrem 1335 (November 12, 1916). Another sample was banishment
of a man, who had come to Istanbul following the Balkan Wars. According to the document, since the
emigration of the non-Muslims was forbidden, this man having no relationship in Istanbul was sent to
out of the borders of the Ottoman Empire. BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb. 15/54, 2 Zilhicce 1334 (September 30,
1916).
580
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.15/23, 7 Zilkade 1334 (September 6, 1916)
581
In August 1917, the General Directorate of Security requested information about the security
intelligence stating the emigration intention of many Greek families to Istanbul. The Travel Office
replied that they did not have any information and would investigate about the issue.
BOA.DH.EUM.SSM.12/8, 21 Şevval 1335 (August 10, 1917).
183
of instances that ordinary people managed to obtain individual travel documents, most
of the time it was prestigious, well-known and upper class Greeks that were permitted
to travel to Istanbul during the war years.582
In sum, the policy of controlling the Greeks of Istanbul was complicated. On
the one hand, the government tried to prevent mass Greek immigrations to the city and
from time-to-time banished those who were identified as suspects. On the other hand,
in some cases, officials spent extra effort to keep Greeks in the city. In one instance,
the Greeks that had come from Cezayir-i Bahri Sefid constituted an issue of several
memorandums for the General Directorate of Security.583 According to these
memorandums dated January 20, 1915, January 25, 1916 and September 2, 1916, the
Greeks who had come to Istanbul four or five years ago and had become married to
local spouses should be registered in Istanbul and continue to live there. Furthermore,
Greeks who were single but possessed a regular occupation should also be allowed to
stay in Istanbul provided that authorities found it acceptable. Nevertheless, the status
of Greeks who were evaluated as mischievous (muzırr) or those identified as suspected
and having no residence was questionable. Although the memorandums stated that the
existence of these people was problematic, the General Directorate of Tribes and
Refugees requested once again the opinion of the General Directorate of Security for
the process about these people.584 Therefore, there must have been some other reason
for the re-questioning of the process for them, although former memorandums had
clearly indicated the relevant procedure for the single Greeks having no job and
residence in Istanbul. Another similar document about this issue gives an idea about
the reason of this confusion.
582
For instance, mother and two relatives of Papa Yuvan Efendi were permitted to go to Istanbul.
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.15/98, 27 Zilhicce 1334 (October 25, 1916) Two Greek women from Bursa, the
associate director of Ottoman Bank and a tradesman were among other examples of obtaining travel
permission from the Ministry of Interior. BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.16/26, 13 Muharrem 1335 (November 9,
1916). Nevertheless, even the issuance of travel documents for these people was possible after a series
of correspondence.
583
584
BOA.DH.EUM.3.Şb.17/17, 15 Safer 1335 (December 11, 1916)
184
According to this document, due to war conditions there had been some
problems in sending Greeks from other regions present in Istanbul to their homelands.
In this respect, the Ministry of War had decided to benefit from these Greeks through
military conscription.585 In order to be conscripted, these Greeks had to be registered.
Yet, there was another problem at this point. On December 27, 1915, a general
correspondence was sent to the General Directorate of Tribes and Refugees indicating
that the registry of non-Muslims and submission Ottoman identity cards to them was
forbidden. This regulation was still in force when the Ministry of War had decided to
conscript the Greeks. Therefore, there was confusion about the procedure. At the end,
the General Directorate of Tribes and Refugees decided to predicate its decision upon
another regulation of the Ministry of Interior dated as March 9, 1915. Although the
details of this regulation are not provided, it was indicated that application of this
regulation would prevent any incompatibilities.586
From the beginning of the war, the government tried to provide a kind of
scrutiny over the Greeks living in Istanbul or travelling there. There were several
correspondences even for individual Greeks travelling to Istanbul. In October 1918,
the travel regulations began to slacken. For instance, the Ministry of Interior sent a
notification to the governorship of Niğde about granting necessary permissions to
Greeks intending to travel to Istanbul.587 In this case, Niğde should not have been the
only region where there were Greeks traveling to Istanbul. In November 1918, the
Ministry of Interior sent a correspondence to fifteen provinces and sixteen sanjaks
585
The Ministry of War transmitted its decision through a general correspondence on January 27, 1916.
BOA.DH.EUM.ECB.4/42, 15 Cemaziyelahir 1334 (April 19, 1916)
586
There were several mistakes about dates in this document. The document itself was dated as April
17, 1916. Nevertheless, the date of the correspondence of the Ministry of Interior was given as
December 27, 1916. Since it was a later date than that of the document, the former was accepted as
December 27, 1915. Furthermore, the regulation of the Ministry of Interior, which the procedure would
predicate upon, dated as March 9, 1915 at the beginning of the document and then date of this
correspondence written as Mach 9, 1916. BOA.DH.ECB.4/42, 15 Cemaziyelahir 1334 (April 19, 1916).
587
BOA.DH.ŞFR.92/167, 13 Muharrem 1337 (October 19, 1917).
185
reporting that the number of the Greeks and Armenians coming to Istanbul without
travel documents was increasing rapidly.588
According to the correspondence, a procedure was set for travel. First, the
places where Greeks and Armenians intended to travel had to be evaluated in terms of
accommodation and provisioning. If these places were confirmed as convenient for
newcomers, then, the officials of provinces or sanjaks would approve the travel. Also
travel documents were compulsory for Greeks and Armenians. Although, the Ministry
of Interior had informed localities about this procedure, a great number of Armenians
and Greeks continued to reach Istanbul without travel documents. The Ministry of
Interior regarded them as fugitives, while these people had to face severe problems of
accommodation and provisioning in Istanbul. Therefore, these people had to be warned
about the circumstances in Istanbul while they were still in their provinces. It is clear
that the government started to change its attitude towards travel of Greeks to Istanbul
just before the Armistice of Mondros on October 30, 1918. When the armistice was
signed the doors of the capital was almost fully opened to Greek population.589
Greeks living in Istanbul were not the only group of non-Muslims that the
Ottoman government tried to control during the war years. Armenians were also
588
The correspondence was sent to the provinces of Adana, Edirne, Erzurum, Ankara, Aydın, Bitlis,
Hüdavendigar, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Konya, Mamuratülaziz, Musul and Van and to
the sanjaks of Eskişehir, Urfa, İzmit, İçel, Bolu, Teke, Canik, Çatalca, Karesi, Kale-i Sultaniye,
Menteşe, Kayseri, Karahisar-ı Sahip, Kütahya, Maraş and Niğde. BOA.DH.ŞFR.93/158, 10 Safer 1337
(November 15, 1918).
589
Certainly, following the Armistice of Mondros, there emerged a number of conflicts between the
Greeks returning to their homes in Istanbul and the Muslim refugees that had settled down in their place,
as well as between the Greeks, security forces and local administration. For instance in Bahçeköy, the
deported Greeks found out that their houses had been damaged while they were away. This caused
certain unrest in Bahçeköy, which was a village within Bakırköy. There were two reports about this
case. The first report dated as July 13, 1919 was a general report prepared by the Commander of
Kemerburgaz Battalion. This report did not specify the causes of the event. BOA.DH.EUM.AYS. 15/40,
14 Şevval 1337 (July 13, 1919) The second report prepared by Commander of Istanbul Gendarme
Battalion (Istanbul Jandarma Tabur Kumandanı) was a detailed one providing the causes of the event
and proposing solutions. BOA.EUM.AYS. 17/1, 1 Zilkade 1337 (July 29, 1919). Another instance of
ethnic conflicts took place between Greeks and Muslims in the regions where the deported Greeks
returned was the conflict in Safra Köy. BOA.DH.EUM.AYS. 15/110, 19 Şevval 1337 (July 18, 1919).
The events in Yeniköy could be regarded as another such instance. BOA.DH.EUM.AYS. 29/64, 10
Rebiülahir 1338 (January 1, 1920).
186
“suspected” elements. Although, the Armenians living in Istanbul did not experience
mass deportation like their Anatolian cognates, they lived under close scrutiny during
the war years. The next part will examine the situation of the Armenians and the
government policies towards them during the Great War.
5.3.2 Armenians
The Armenians were the second most populated non-Muslim community in

Istanbul before the Great War. There were 72.962 Armenians, mostly living in the old
city, Beyoğlu and the neighborhoods alongside the Bosporus. There was also
remarkable number of Armenians in Üsküdar and the neighborhoods alongside the
Asian shore of the Bosporus.590 Istanbul had a special importance for Ottoman
Armenians. The Armenian Patriarchate had been located in Kumkapı since 1641. The
Armenian National Assembly, which was the governing body of Ottoman Armenians
founded by the Armenian National Constitution in 1863, was in Galata. This city had
been historically regarded as the cultural and intellectual center of the Armenian
community living in the Ottoman Empire. Although, Istanbul Armenians constituted
only 5 % of the total Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, 90 % of the
representatives in the Armenian National Assembly were from Istanbul.591
The relationship between the Armenians and the Ottoman State had been
volatile since the second half of the nineteenth century.592 Yet, the foundation of
590
According to the Ottoman Population Statistics of 1914, the number of Armenians living in different
parts of Istanbul was as follows: 22,575 in Istanbul Sehri (old city); 22,180 in Beyoğlu and European
shores of the Bosphorus; 13,296 in Üsküdar and Anatolian shores of the Bosphorus; 5,734 in Bakırköy
(Makriköy); 3,209 in Kartal; 596 in Adalar (Islands); 325 in Beykoz; and 47 in Gebze. Memalik-i
Osmaniyye’nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği, p. 8.
591
Nesim Ovadya İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, Istanbul, Çankırı, Ayaş and Ankara, (İletişim: Istanbul, 2013),
p. 46.
592
The relationship between the Armenians and the Ottoman State became problematic especially in
1890’s. In this respect, there were several dynamics causing conflicts among the Armenians and the
Hamidian Regime: Abdülhamid’s despotic rule; the foundation of the Hamidian Cavalry Corps in
Eastern Anatolia; the international conjuncture following the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878; the
187
Constitutional Regime in 1908 immediately led to betterment as Armenians supported
the new regime. Following the Constitutional Revolution, the secret Armenian political
and revolutionary organizations of Tashnak Party (The Armenian Revolutionary
Federation) and Hunchak Party, transformed into open political parties. Moreover,
both parties expressed their loyalty to the Constitution and the Ottoman Empire.593
Nevertheless, the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars reversed the trend once more.
While Rumelia, one of the most valuable parts of the Empire in terms of commerce,
culture and agriculture, was lost, Anatolia, mostly populated by Muslims and Turks
remained as the heartland of the Empire. Turkish nationalism started replacing
Ottomanism that had been the predominant ideology in the CUP before the Balkan
Wars.594 This ideological shift alienated the Armenians as well as other non-Muslim
and non-Turkish elements of the Empire.
Actually, Armenians had a high expectation of local autonomy while
supporting the Constitutional Regime.595 However, the developments following the
Balkan Wars showed that the Constitutional Regime was far from fulfilling this
expectation. In September 1913, Germany, the new supporter of the Ottoman Empire
rise of nationalism among the Armenians and the foundation of political and revolutionary Armenian
organizations. For detailed information about the issue see, Taner Akçam, İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni
Sorunu, (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1999); Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian
Question, (Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988); Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary
Movement, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Stephen Duguid, “The
Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.9 No.2, (May
1973), pp. 139-155; Bayram Kodaman, “Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alayları, 2. Abdülhamit ve Doğu
Anadolu Aşiretleri”, Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, No: 32, (1979), pp. 427-
480. Manoug Somakian, Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920, (London:
Tauris Academic Studies, 1995).
593
Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question, (Istanbul: Documentary
Publications, 1988), p. 833.
594
Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-
1914, (Oxford: Clerandon Press, 1969), p. 153; Kudret Ünüvar, “İhya’dan İnşa’ya”, Modern Türkiye’de
Siyasi Düşünce: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi, ed. Ömer Alkan, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları,
2002), p. 132.
595
The Tashnak Party revised its program in 1908 following the Constitutional Revolution. According
to the first article of the new program ‘the Turkish Armenians, within the borders of the Ottoman
Empire will be granted full local autonomy with political and economic liberties based on federative
principles.’ Uras, The Armenians in History, p. 833.
188
in international arena, and Russia reached a consensus among themselves about
reforms to be implemented in the Ottoman Armenia. On February 8, 1914, Constantin
Goülkevitch, the Russian Maslahatgüzarı (chargé d’affaires) and Said Halim Pasha,
the Grand Vizier, signed an agreement about reforms to be made in Eastern
Anatolia.596 Although the Ottoman government had to sign this agreement, the CUP
regarded it as a direct result of Tashnak’s efforts to get foreign states to intervene in
the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Hence it formed a severe rupture among the
Armenians and the Ottoman State before the Great War.597 Another turning point was
the declaration of mobilization for the Great War in August 1914.
The mobilization had been already declared when the Tashnak Party made its
th
8 Congress in Erzurum on August 2-14, 1914. In the Congress, the attitude of the
Armenians in a state of war was discussed. It was clear that the Ottoman Empire would
enter the war on the side of Germany. In fact, the Armenians were against the Ottoman
Empire’s entry into the Great War on the side of Germany; but they still decided to be
conscripted in the Ottoman Army as other Ottoman citizens.598 The Ottoman
government sent delegates to the Congress for making the following proposal: “if the
Tashnak Committee could help the Ottoman army to conquer Transcaucasia by
provoking a rebellion in Russia, the Ottoman government would grant Armenia
autonomy.”599 Yet, the Armenian not trusting this promise after the experience of last
six years, refused this proposal. Instead, they claimed the impossibility of inciting
Russian Armenians against their country.600 However, Bahaddin Şakir, one of the
delegates and a prominent founding member of the CUP, regarded Tashnak’s position
in this issue as a kind of treason, commenting that the Tashnaks preferred supporting
596
597
598
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, p. 32.
599
Uras, The Armenians in History, p. 842.
600
189
Russia by refusing to collaborate with the Ottoman Empire at such a critical
moment.601 Thus, the Ottoman government lost trust in Armenians.602 The CUP
government started taking measures against the Armenians. For instance, from
September 6, 1914, Armenian political parties and their activities were brought under
surveillance.603 Certainly, such measures intensified when the Ottoman Empire
officially entered the Great War in November 1914.
In order to mobilize the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, jihad was declared in
Fatih Mosque on November 14, 1914. Another aim in that was to provoke Muslims in
the colonies of the Allied Powers, as jihad meant the Muslim holy war against infidels.
However, the Ottoman Army as well as the armies of the enemy states was composed
of both Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, the cobelligerent states of the Ottoman
Empire were Christians. As a matter of fact, this declaration failed to fulfill its aim.
Nevertheless, it led to a rise of enmity in the Ottoman public against Christians of
enemy states and the non-Muslims within the Ottoman Empire.604 In fact, there had
been many Muslim and non-Muslim deserters since the declaration of the
mobilization. The declaration of jihad evidently increased the number of non-Muslim
deserters.
The Ottoman Empire faced several defeats in the battles in the beginning of
1915. The Battle of Sarıkamış (December 22, 1914-January 17, 1915) between the
Ottoman Empire and Russia ended with the result of Russian victory. In the Russian
Army, there were a number of Armenians mostly being Russian subjects. However,
there was also a small number of Ottoman Armenians in the Russian army. This
601
Dündar, Modern Türkiyenin Şifresi, p. 261.
602
Apart from the disagreement between the Ottoman government and Tashnaks, some other incidents
further reinforced the idea that the Armenians were ready to collaborate with the Allied Powers. For
instance, according to a document, in Istanbul, twenty-one Greeks and Armenians were arrested while
they were voluntarily registering to the French army on the eve of the Ottoman Empire’s entry to the
Great War. BOA.DH.EMN.117/53, 17 Ramazan 1332, (August 9, 1914)
603
Dündar, Modern Türkiyenin Şifresi, p. 263.
604
190
situation caused a kind of irritation and panic on the CUP government.605 As
mentioned earlier, the Great War was an indirect war meaning that the belligerent
armies tried to gain advantage by disrupting each other’s morale and material
resources. Civilians on the home front also became a target for the enemy. Thus, while
the Ottoman State tried to provoke the Muslims living in Caucasia against Russian, it
was faced with the same threat.606 The Battle of Sarıkamış showed that a most feared
possibility for the CUP government – the provocation of Anatolian Armenians against
the Ottoman Empire– could come true.
The Ottoman government began to take some measures from the fifth day of
the Battle of Sarıkamış. Armenian civil servants, police officers and police
commissioners identified as suspicious and unreliable were dismissed as a result of
official order.607 The Raid on the Suez Canal (January 26, 1915-February 4, 1915) was
another disappointment for the Ottoman Empire. Following the heavy defeat there
Armenian incidents broke out in the southern Anatolia in Zeytun and Dörtyol.
According to the Ottoman government, the Armenians of the region were collaborating
with the enemy. While the conflicts between the Armenian guerillas and the Ottoman
Army continued in Dörtyol and Zeytun, Cemal Pasha, the Commander of the Forth
Army, sent a code to Talat Pasha, the Minister of Interior, advising the deportation of
Armenians from the region. In reply, Talat Pasha accepted the suggestion through a
code dated March 2, 1915.608 The conflicts and deportations in the southern Anatolia
had repercussions in Istanbul. In spite of the fear caused by the limited news coming
from Anatolia, the Armenians in Istanbul were hopeful about the ongoing battle in the
Dardanelles.
605
606
607
608
Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, p. 267; BOA.DH.ŞFR.50/141, 17 Şubat 1330 (March 2, 1915)
For the full text of the code in Turkish and Ottoman Turkish see Dündar, Modern Türkiye’nin Şifresi, p.
478.
191
Actually, the naval operations of Allied Powers in the Dardanelles had started
on February 17, 1915. Although the other battles were far away from Istanbul, the
Battle of Gallipoli was close to the capital. For the first time the people of Istanbul and
the Ottoman statesmen felt a real threat of occupation. In the end of February, several
plans were made in case such a possibility materialized: women and children would be
sent to Anatolia; liquid assets in banks would be transferred to Edirne and Konya; and
the Ottoman archives would be carried to Eskişehir. The government warned all the
ambassadors including Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, to leave the city as
soon as possible.609 In short, the occupation probability of the Ottoman capital was
considered as extremely high. However, the sentiment of Muslim and Armenian
inhabitants in Istanbul was totally different from each other. While, the Muslims were
afraid of a probable occupation, the Armenians felt that they were on the eve of their
salvation. As a matter of fact, from the beginning of the Great War, Istanbulite
Armenians were in belief that the Allied Powers would be coming to save them.610
Therefore, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly they hoped for a possible
victory of the Allied Powers. Odian, a prominent Armenian author and satirist, in his
memoirs, transmitted this situation from Karagöz, a well-known Ottoman newspaper,
as in the following: “If you want to know about the progress of the war, look at
Armenian faces. If they are smiling, it means that the French and Russians are
winning. If their faces are troubled, you may be assured that the Germans are.”611
When the first naval operations began in the Dardanelles, Armenians raised
their hopes. Balakian, an Armenian Priest and survivor of the Armenian deportation,
described the situation in Istanbul before April 24, 1915 as in the following:
609
Alesandr Jevakof, “Çanakkale’nin Istanbul’dan Görünümü”, Istanbul 1914-1923, Stefanos
Yerasimos (ed.), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 66.
610
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, p. 46-47; Jevakof, “Çanakkale’nin Istanbul’dan Görünümü”, p. 65; Grigoris
Balakian, Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918, Translated by Peter
Balakian and Aris Sevag, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), pp. 33-34.
611
Yervant Odian, Accursed Years: My Exile and Return from Der Zor, 1914-1919, Translate by Ara
Stepan Melkonian, (London: Gomidas Institute, 2009), p. 13.
192
Popular enthusiasm reached such a pitch as to surpass that of Armenian
exultation back in 1894. Now once again groups of Armenians were running
every day to the shores of the Sea of Marmara to watch the majestic British
fleet pass toward the Bosporus, it is mission to save the Armenians, of course.
We had quickly forgotten the historic words of the British government officials
who said that English fleet could not climb Mount Ararat…In the meantime,
while the Armenians in Constantinople were frolicking and rejoicing, more
than two million elsewhere were abandoned to a black fate.612
From the narratives above, it is understood that the Armenians in Istanbul were not
extremely apprehensive before April 24, 1915. Just a few days before the first arrests
in Istanbul, Armenians celebrated the Easter enthusiastically. They even did not
recognize the increasing number of undercover police officers on the streets. These
who recognized undercover police officers interpreted it as a requirement of the
martial law that had been continuing since the mobilization decision in August. 613 In
fact, the government had been preparing an operation against a number of Armenians
perceived as prominent political and intellectual figures for the Armenian community
in Istanbul.
The government viewed that operation as a necessary security measure within
the existing situation. Talat Pasha, similar to other prominent members of the CUP,
justified the initial phase of deportations on grounds that there were Armenian
rebellions and an ongoing civil war between Armenian guerillas and the Ottoman army
in Anatolia.614 Dyer interprets the deportation decisions of the CUP leaders as follows:
“Talat, Enver and their associates … as desperate, frightened and unsophisticated men
struggling to keep their nation afloat in a crisis far graver than they had anticipated
when they first entered the war (the Armenian decisions were taken at the height of the
crisis of the Dardanelles), reacting to events rather than creating them… ”615
612
Balakian, Armenian Golgotha, p. 33-34.
613
614
Alpay Kabacalı (ed.), Talat Paşa’nın Anıları, (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), p. 70.
193
Talat Pasha, argues that these rebellions caused a great anxiety in Istanbul. In
this respect, the CUP government considered the presence of the heads of Armenian
committees in Istanbul was inappropriate because all military operations of the
Ottoman Empire was planned and directed in the capital. Therefore, for the security of
the Straits, the general headquarters decided to give an order to the Istanbul Police
Directorate to arrest all the people in Istanbul who had any relationship with the
Armenian committees.616 Although Talat Pasha stated that there was increasing
awareness and thus widespread uneasiness in Istanbul among the members of the
Tashnak and Hınchak Parties, the memoirs of the Armenian intellectuals and
politicians who had experienced deportation from Istanbul show that the Armenians in
Istanbul were unaware of the seriousness of the situation in Anatolia at that time.
Balakian wrote down the following sentences in his memoirs: “…so widespread were
the excitement and demagogy that no one worried about tomorrow. Besides me, just a
few national representatives were trying, in vain, to point out the imminent danger to
the Armenians in Turkey.”617
On March 18, 1915, the Ottoman Empire earned a victory in the Dardanelles
stopping the naval operations of the Allied Powers through the straits. This success
increased the morale of the Ottoman government. In the meanwhile Armenian
rebellions increased in the eastern Anatolia in the beginning of April. The operation of
April 24, which had been planned before, was implemented within this context.618 The
615
Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘deceivers’: historiography and the Armenian
massacres”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, (1976), p. 107.
616
Kabacalı (ed.), Talat Paşa’nın Anıları, pp. 70-71. Mimaroğlu, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim’den...,
pp. 55-56. According to Yusuf Sarınay, the arrest of prominent Armenian figures related to the
Armenian revolutionary committees was the last resort for the government to control the increasing
political and revolutionary activities of Armenians. He argues that before the arrests the government
tried to prevent the activities of the Armenian committees through some other measures such as the
disarmament of Armenian privates; dismissal of disloyal and unreliable Armenian policemen and
officials; and their deportation to other provinces. Yusuf Sarınay, “What Happened on April 24, 1915?:
The Circular of April 24, 1915, and the Arrest of Armenian Committee Members in Istanbul”,
International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1&2, (2008), pp. 76-77.
617
Balakian, Armenian Golgotha, p. 33.
194
Ottoman government arguing that the rebellions in eastern Anatolia were directed from
the headquarters present in Istanbul, decided to put an end to the activities of these
organizations by closing them down. Thus, a code sent from the General Directorate of
Security to fourteen provinces and ten sanjaks ordered the closure of all Armenian
political and revolutionary organizations including the Tashnak and Hınchak Parties;
seizure of all documents belonging to these organizations; arrest of the leaders of the
organizations and other suspected Armenians and deportation of the Armenians whose
presence in wherever they were was perceived as dangerous. 619 In the evening of the
day when this code was sent to the provinces, the Istanbul Police Directorate began an
operation to arrest more than two hundred Armenian politicians, intellectuals and
notables in Istanbul. 620
A commission was formed to carry out the operation in Istanbul. The
commission members were as the following: İsmail Canbulat, the Director of the
general Directorate of Security; Bedri Bey, the Director of the Istanbul Police
Directorate; Mustafa Reşat [Mimaroğlu] Bey, the chief of the 2nd Branch (2. Şube) and
Political Section (Kısm-i Siyasi) of the General Directorate of Security; Aziz and Esat
Beys, the chiefs of Administrative and Criminal Sections (Kısm-i İdari and Kısm-i
Adli) of the General Directorate of Security.621 The list of the Armenians to be
deported from Istanbul had been prepared through a long process of investigation since
618
619
This code was sent to the provinces of Edirne, Erzurum, Adana, Ankara, Aydın, Bitlis, Halep,
Hüdavendigar, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Trabzon, Konya, Mamuretülaziz, Van and to the sanjaks of Urfa,
İzmit, Bolu, Canik, Karesi, Kayseri, Niğde, Eskişehir, Karahisar-ı Sahib and Maraş.
BOA.DH.ŞFR.52/96, 97, 98, 11 Nisan 1331 (April 24, 1915), T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel
Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermenilerin Sevk ve İskanı (1878-1920), (Ankara: Sistem Ofset,
2007), pp. 125-126.
620
İzrail gives a full list of two hundred and fifty Armenians who were arrested in the operations of
April 24 and afterwards. These people were deported to Çankırı or Ayaş. The list provides the names
and occupations of these Armenian notables as well as the place of their deportation, and whether they
died or survived throughout the process. İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 227-233. Actually, this book is one
of the most helpful studies about the issue. The author used a variety of sources in his research.
Ottoman archival documents, the memoirs of the Ottoman officials and Armenian witnesses reinforced
his analysis.
621
195
the beginning of the Great War. Armenian undercover police officers had also worked
for the preparation of the list.622 Istanbul was divided into twelve regions and twelve
lists were prepared for each region. Police officers went to these regions in advance
and made investigations in accordance with the lists. In the evening of April 24,
Saturday, police officers simultaneously went to the houses of the Armenians having
names on the lists. The operation was a secret one and the police officers were ordered
to be extremely careful. Therefore, although this was actually intended as a raid,
conducted as a simple judiciary process. In order not to attract attention, police officers
in groups of two or three went to each house and requested the persons to be arrested
to accompany them to the police station for a trivial inquiry.623
After the process in police stations, the detainees were taken to the Central
Prison (Hapishane-i Umumi) at Sultanahmet Square. In fact, the detainees were not
informed about their crime. Most of them, especially those who were close to the CUP
or those who had no relation with Armenian political organizations, thought that they
were innocent and hoped to be released after a short interrogation. As Istanbul police
arrested persons with so different profiles, it was hard to make generalizations about
them. In this respect, had it been an operation against the political leaders who had
been organizing rebellions against the government, there would not have been among
the detainees in Central Prison persons very close to the CUP.624 Therefore, reason and
622
Ali Rıza Öge, a chief-police officer in the political section of the General Directorate of Security,
gave detailed information about two Armenian undercover police officers named as Corci and Artin.
According to him, while Corci tried to protect his nationals, Artin as an ex-member of Hınchak Party,
helped a lot for identification of a large number of “suspect” Armenians, particulary being members of
Tashnak Party. Ali Rıza Öge, Meşrutiyetten Cumhuriyete Bir Polis Şefinin Gerçek Anıları, (Bursa:
Günlük Ticaret Gazetesi Tesisleri, 1957), pp. 226-229. According to the memoirs, the Armenians who
were assigned to collect information and intelligence about Armenian notables were ignorant people.
They were not close to the Armenian community and political activities. Therefore, as a result of
misinformation provided by these agents, Istanbul Police arrested a lot of innocent people. İzrail, 24
Nisan 1915, p. 85. For instance, there were two people carrying the same name, Hayg Tiryakyan. One
was a prominent member of the Tashnak Party and Armenian National Assembly. The other was a very
old grocer who had no relation with politics. Both were arrested on April 24, 1915 and the politician
was sent to Çankırı whereas the grocer was deported to Ayaş with other members of the Tashnak Party.
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, p. 397. This is only one example among many others.
623
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 51-53.
196
content of this operation was discussed among the detainees over the Saturday night
and on Sunday.
The Central Prison, where there were a number of non-political criminals, had
been emptied for the Armenians. Thus, all prisoners in Central prison on April 25,
1915 were Armenians. In the evening, the detainees were called to the prison yard by
reading their names one by one. One hundred twenty six of the detainees would be sent
to Çankırı, and remaining seventy-one would be deported to Ayaş, a small town in the
Ankara province. The Tashnak leaders and members who were identified as
“dangerous” would be sent to Ayaş. The persons who would be sent to Çankırı were
“less dangerous” figures according to the CUP leaders. The detainees under the control
of police officers and İbrahim Bey, the director of the Central Prison, departed from
Istanbul at about nine o’clock on April 25.625 During the week following the departure
of the first group, twenty-nine Armenians, whose names had been on the previous list
of Istanbul Police but had evaded the initial arrests due to their absence in their
addresses on April 24, were detained in Istanbul. This group departed from Istanbul on
May 3. Thirteen of the detainees were deported to Ayaş while sixteen was sent to
Çankırı.626 Therefore, in a week, two hundred and twenty-six Armenians in total were
detained in Istanbul and deported to Anatolia. There were two questions waiting reply
following the deportation of the intellectuals and political leaders: first, what would
624
For instance, Agnuni (Haçadur Malumyan), a prominent executive of the Tashnak Party, was famous
for his moderate thoughts about the CUP. Furthermore, he had close relations with Talat Pasha. Dikran
Allahverdi, doctor and director of the Pangaltı branch of the Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti (National
Defense Committee), was a supporter of the CUP. These were two of the detainees who were arrested
on April 24, 1915. İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, p. 57, 69.
625
For detailed information about the journey of the Armenian notables see Odian, Accursed Years, pp.
35-155; Balakian, Armenian Golgotha, pp. 61-251; Mikayel Shamtanchian, The Fatal Night: An
Eyewithness Account of the Extermination of Armenian Intellectuals in 1915, (California: H. and K.
Manjikian Publications, 2007), pp. 13-44; İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 91-103.
626
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 107-108. According to Sarınay, the number of the detainees being 180 on
April 24, 1915 reached 235 between April 24, 1915 and May 24, 1915. By August 1915, 290 Armenians
from Istanbul had been arrested and prosecuted. Sarınay, “What Happened on April 24, 1915?”, p. 82.
Actually, the list prepared by General Directorate of Security included the names of 610 Armenians to
be arrested living in Istanbul. Most of these people could not be found in their addresses. For full list of
610 Armenians, see Yusuf Sarınay, 24 Nisan 1915’te Ne Oldu? Ermeni Sevk ve İskanının Perde Arkası,
(Istanbul: İdeal Kültür & Yayıncılık, 2012), pp. 263-322.
197
happen to these prominent figures of Armenian community?627 Next, would there be a
mass Armenian deportation from Istanbul? The answer to both questions was yet
unclear.
Morgenthau, the Ambassador of United States in Istanbul, was in continuous
attempt to communicate with the Grand Vizier, Minister of Interior and Minister of
War in order to stop the Armenian deportations in Anatolia that had officially began
following the arrests and deportations April 24, 1915. In his report the ambassador
commented that “[his] arguments unavailing except as to Constantinople.”628 Although
the Ottoman government guaranteed him that there would not be any mass deportation
from Istanbul, there was continuous fear and doubt about a probable deportation. In the
meanwhile, Talat Pasha implicitly told Morgenthau that the Ottoman government was
ready to apply strict measures against all Armenians in Istanbul in case any slightest
offense would be committed against the government. 629
It is probable that, the remaining Armenian notables, the Patriarch and the
ordinary Armenians in Istanbul were aware of the possibility Talat Pasha implied.
After April 24 1915, close surveillance, routine and random identity controls, tracking
and detentions became a part of daily life for the Armenians in Istanbul.630 Despite the
627
Most of the deportees in Çankırı and Ayaş were re-deported to Der Zor. Only some of the deportees
had the chance to go back to Istanbul without being deported to Zor. İzrail provides detailed information
about the story of the deportees after their arrival to Ayaş and Çankırı. According to the numbers given
by İzrail, seventy-five of ninety-two deportees in Ayaş and ninety-nine of the one hundred and fifty-
eight deportees in Çakırı died. Therefore, out of two hundreds and fifty deportees only seventy
survived. İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 227-233. Yusuf Sarınay gives information about CUP
government’s reply to the petitions written by the deported Armenians and their families. As a result of
the evaluation of these petitions some of the deportees were allowed to return to Istanbul. Some others
were released on the condition that they would not travel to Istanbul and would settle elsewhere in
Ottoman Empire. Sarınay, 24 Nisan 1915’te Ne Oldu?, pp. 169-171.
628
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/74, RG 59, July 10, 1915.
629
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/75, RG 59, August 11, 1915. Even in October 1915, the fear
of deportation was still alive in Istanbul. In his report to Washington, Morgenthau stated that: ‘…Delay
[deportation of the Armenians in Istanbul] is being secured but entire escape of Constantinople
Armenians is doubtful if present general political conditions here remain unchanged…’ NARA,
Department of State, 867.4016/159, RG 59, October 10, 1915.
630
Harry, Stuermer, Two War Years in Constantinople; Sketches of German and Young Turkish Ethics
and Politics, (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917), pp. 53-54. Also Morgenthau wrote to
198
increasing oppression over the Armenian inhabitants in Istanbul, everybody continued
their daily lives as usual or pretending that everything was normal. The small number
of remaining Armenian political leaders in Istanbul could not dare to engage in any
political activity. Even the Patriarch feared to take any step either for the release of
detained Istanbulite intellectuals and politicians or for the Armenians in Anatolia.631
Morgenthau summarized the prevailing situation in Istanbul as one of mutual
distrust and fear: “Fear on the part of the Armenians who recall the past massacres and
fear on the part of the government at alleged or dreaded conspiracies.”632 As the fear
on the part of the government increased, stricter measures were put into practice and
these stricter measures in turn caused a climax of fear on the side of Armenians. In
early June 1915, two prominent Armenian deputies, Krikor Zohrab and Vartkes
Serengülyan, were arrested and sent to Diyarbakır for trial. Two weeks later, on June
15, 1915, twenty members of the Hınchak Party were hanged in the Beyazıt Square.633
Apart from these measures, the government tried to control the travels of Armenians to
and from Istanbul.
Despite all, the capital city still had some advantages for the Armenians in
Anatolia. The presence of a noteworthy foreign population as well as the
representatives of neutral states in the city made the decision of deportation quite
difficult for Istanbul. Therefore, the Armenians in Anatolia searched for ways to go to
Istanbul during the War years. The government had a two-sided policy for controlling
the Armenian population in Istanbul: on the one hand, the Armenians who were from
Washington that the Ottoman government ill treated to inoffensive Armenian population in Istanbul.
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/67, RG 59, May 28, 1915.
631
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, pp. 133-134.
632
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/71, RG 59, May 25, 1915.
633
İzrail, 24 Nisan 1915, p. 141. An archival document about these incidents exists in NARA. However,
according to this document three deputies, Zjrabvart, Brandie and Cherajian, were arrested.
Furthermore, the twenty Armenians were hanged due to alleged separatist conspiracy. This document
argues that further executions were expected. The government tried to justify these measures on the
ground of military necessity. NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/70, RG 59, June 18, 1915.
199
other Anatolian provinces were expelled from Istanbul, while on the other hand, the
government tried to prevent the travel of Anatolian Armenians to Istanbul.
As mentioned earlier, Istanbul had been an attractive city for immigrants
coming from Anatolia since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The same was
true for Anatolian Armenians. Following April 24, 1915, such recently immigrated
Armenian countrymen in Istanbul became a target for the Ministry of Interior.634
Among these, the number of İzmit Armenians was the highest. In August 1915, a code
sent by the Ministry of Interior stated that the Armenian from İzmit and its vicinity
would be sent back to their localities and would be deported with the Armenian
population there.635 Probably, most of the Armenians in İzmit had already been
deported from İzmit before the code of the Ministry of Interior was sent. Therefore,
only a week after the first code, the Ministry of Interior sent another code to Eskişehir
about sending there the İzmit Armenians in Istanbul.636 There were obviously
Armenians from other provinces apart from İzmit. The deportation process of the
Armenians countrymen continued during the summer of 1915. Harry Stuermer, a
reporter of the German newspaper Kölnische Zeitung, told the situation as the
following:
634
Mustafa Reşat [Mimaroğlu], the director of the political section of Istanbul Police Directorate,
explicitly stated in his memoirs that according to the official point of view all of the migrated Armenian
countrymen living in Istanbul, whether being married or single, were members of Armenian
revolutionary committees. Therefore, the scrutiny of these Armenians and their expulsion from Istanbul
was one of the main issues of the police during the Great War. Mimaroğlu, Gördüklerim ve
Geçirdiklerim’den..., p. 34, 56.
635
“İzmit ve mülhakatı ahalisinden olup Istanbul’da bulunan ve mahal-i mezkura gitmek isteyen
Ermenilerin buraya avdet edebilmek ve zaten ora ahalisinden olmaları itibariyle diğerleriyle beraber
ihraç edilmek üzere Dersaadet’ten gitmelerine müsaade olunması muvafık olacağı polis müdüriyet-i
umumiyyesine bildirilmiş ve keyfiyet nezaretçe tensib edilmiştir. Ona gore muamele ifası.”
BOA.DH.ŞFR.54A/343, 28 Ramazan 1333 (August 10, 1915)
636
BOA.DH.ŞFR.55/72, 4 Ağustos 1331 (August 17, 1915). The order to deport Armenians from the
Sancak of Izmit and its 42 localities was signed by the Minister of Interior on 5/18 July 1915. The
deportation process of İzmit was almost totally completed in August 1915. Raymond Kévorkian, The
Armenian Genocide: A Complete History, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), pp. 551-556.
200
Everyday towards evening, when these unfortunate creatures had been
collected in the police-stations, the women and children were packed into
electric-trams while the men and boys were compelled to go off on foot to
Galata with a couple of blankets and only the barest necessities for their terrible
journey packed in a small bag. Of course, they were not all poor people by any
means…I know cases where men of high education belonging to aristocratic
families –engineers, doctors, lawyers – were banished from Pera in this
disgusting way under cover of darkness to spend the night on the platforms of
the Haidar-Pasha Station and then be packed off in the morning on the
Anatolian Railway – of course they paid for their tickets and all travelling
expenses!637
Lewis Einstein, an American diplomat and historian, noted in his diary that the
deportation in Istanbul had begun on August 8, 1915. He stated that the police had
detained sixty Armenians that day.638 This was probably the first time a mass
Armenian arrest took place publicly, after 24 April.
It is quiet difficult to present numbers for the Armenians deported from
Istanbul during the war years. In the Ottoman Archives there is no such document with
exact numbers. From the memoirs and other archival documents, it is understood that
the deportation of Armenians countrymen in Istanbul was made step by step. Wolff-
Metternich, the ambassador of Germany in Istanbul, sent a report about these
Armenians to Bethmann Hollweg, the prime minister of Germany.639 According to his
report, 4.000 Armenians were deported from Istanbul to Anatolia during the summer
of 1915. Wolff-Metternich also stated that this number recorded in the police
directorate was provided to him by a reliable source.640 The same number also appears
in a report prepared by Viscount Bryce, a member of House of Lords and sent to
637
Stuermer, Two War Years in Constantinople, pp. 55-56.
638
Lewis Einstein, Inside Constantinople : a Diplomatist’s Diary during the Dardanelles Expedition,
April-September, 1915, (London : J. Murray, 1917), p. 222.
639
Wolfgang Gust (ed.), Alman Belgeleri: Ermeni Soykırımı 1915-1916, Alman Dışişleri Bakanlığı
Siyasi Arşiv Belgeleri, (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2012), p. 590-593.
640
In his report, Wolff-Metternich also requested this information to be kept secret. Gust (ed.), Alman
Belgeleri, p. 591.
201
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 641 According to
this document “the [Ottoman] Government compiled a register of Armenian
inhabitants, singling out those who were immigrants from the provinces from those
actually born in the city and a considerable number of prominent people on the former
class had been deported by the middle of August.”642 According to Mustafa Reşat, the
director of political section under Istanbul Police Directorate, the number of deported
Armenian countrymen from Istanbul was around 2,000.643 Similar to Mustafa Reşat,
Uras argues that the number of deported Armenian countrymen from Istanbul was
2,345.644
To sum up, although there was not a mass Armenian deportation in Istanbul
during the Great War, a remarkable number of Armenian countrymen were expelled
from the capital, especially during the summer of 1915. The government probably
aimed to keep only the Istanbulite Armenians in the capital. Hence, the government
also aimed at preventing the travel of Armenians from Anatolia to Istanbul. On August
3, 1915, a code was sent to several provinces and sanjaks stating that it was absolutely
forbidden to issue travel documents for Armenians intending to travel to Dersaadet.645
There were different groups of Armenians who were trying to go to Istanbul.
For example, the Catholic Armenians were struggling to go to Istanbul since the
beginning of the War. Nevertheless, the government only accepted the travel request of
Catholic Armenians who were from Istanbul. For instance, six Istanbulite Armenians
641
Miscellaneous No. 31 (1916), The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916,
Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs By Viscount
Bryce, (London: 1916), p. 392. Actually, it is explicitly stated in the document that some information
was based on rumors. For instance, the document includes the following information: “...According to
another rumour, the Armenians of Scutaria [Üsküdar] and Ortakeui have already been deported.” p.
391. Actually, there is no information about this argument in the Ottoman and American archives or in
any personal memoirs.
642
Miscellaneous No. 31 (1916), The Treatment of Armenians, p. 389.
643
Mimaroğlu, Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim’den, p. 56.
644
645
The code was sent to the provinces of Ankara, Konya and Hüdavendigar and the sanjaks of İzmit,
Karesi and Kayseri. BOA.DH.ŞFR.54A/255, 22 Ramazan 1333 (August 4, 1915).
202
had gone to Ankara an“d had been deported to Konya with a group of Armenians from
Ankara. These Armenians requested their return to Istanbul and the Ministry of
Interior accepted this request on the grounds that they were from Istanbul. 646 However,
in general terms, the Ministry of Interior tried to keep away from Istanbul the
Armenians of other provinces whether they were Protestant, Gregorian or Catholic.647
In short, although Catholic Armenians to great extent excluded from the deportation
process in later phases, they would still have no privilege of travelling to Istanbul.
Another group of Armenians who intended to reach Istanbul were the
Armenian soldiers who had been discharged from the army. The Ministry of Interior
sent several codes to provinces to make sure that local authorities would not allow the
travel of those who had the intention to go to Istanbul.648 Probably, until the end of
1916, the Armenians who were working at railways as civil servants or workers had
been enjoying the privilege of travelling without travel documents. However, this
caught the attention of the Ministry of Interior as a “security gap”. Thus, a code was
sent to fifteen provinces and seventeen sanjaks to prohibit the travel of Armenians in
that category.649 Accordingly, no Armenian railway employee whether converted to
Islam or not would have the right to travel to Istanbul without the special permission of
the Ministry of Interior.
646
BOA.DH.ŞFR.56/115, 9 Eylül 1331 (September 22, 1915).
647
For instance, the Ministry of Interior sent a code to the Hüdavendigar Province warning the local
government for not allowing departure of the Protestant and Catholic Armenians to Istanbul.
BOA.DH.ŞFR.55-A/126, 25 Ağustos 1331 (September 7, 1915)
648
On December 30, 1915, the Ministry of Interior sent a code to the Konya province stating that there
had recently been a number of discharged Armenian soldiers who coming from the region had arrived in
Istanbul. The Ministry demanded information regarding the departure of these Armenians from Konya,
specifically inquiring about the office granting them permission as well as the documents granted.
BOA.DH.ŞFR.59/154 ,17 Kanunuevvel 1331 (December 30, 1915). A following code made clear that
some of these soldiers were discharged from the Niğde Battalion before coming to Konya. The Ministry
of Interior notified the local authorities about the issue once again. According to the code, the arrival of
these Armenian soldiers to Dersaadet was not permissible. BOA.DH.ŞFR.60/94, 10 Kanunusani 1331
(January 23, 1916). For similar correspondences see p. 44.
649
BOA.DH.ŞFR.69/62, 23 Zilhicce 1334 (October 22, 1916)
203
Following the Armenian Deportation the number of Armenians converted to
Islam evidently increased in the Ottoman Empire, as this was considered as a way to
survive. Furthermore, being Muslim converts, traveling to Istanbul and other regions
was easier for Armenians. However, the Ministry of Interior sent a code to Cemal
Pasha, the Commander of the Forth Army located in Syria, stating that, whether
converted to Islam or not, travel of all Armenians from the region was forbidden,
except those who had special permission of the Ministry of Interior. 650 Apart from
Catholic Armenians and those discharged from the army, The Ministry of Interior also
warned the officials in Syria not to send Armenian orphans to Istanbul.651 Therefore,
during the Great War, entry to Istanbul was closed to Armenians coming from
Anatolia and Syria. Nevertheless, Armenians were eager to reach Istanbul because the
capital was much more secure than the other parts of the Empire. 652 Furthermore,
Istanbul was the place of departure for migration to foreign countries. Especially,
Armenians migrating to the United States had to leave the country from Istanbul.653
The restrictions on travel of Armenians to Istanbul began to slacken after
October 1918.654 Accordingly a number of codes were sent to several provinces to
650
In 1917, deportation was almost completed. The Armenians, who could have survived, reached Der
Zor. Therefore, this code was sent only to Syria. BOA.DH.ŞFR.74/301, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1335 (March
28, 1917). There was an exception at this point. The converted wives of the officers were not allowed to
travel to any regions in the Ottoman Empire except Istanbul. However, in order to travel to Istanbul,
they had to have a document that was signed by the Commandery of the Corps (Kolordu Komutanlığı)
conforming their situation as being a wife of an officer. BOA.DH.ŞFR.81/151, 14 Teşrinisani 1333
(November 14, 1917)
651
BOA.DH.ŞFR.81/273, 13 Safer 1336 (November 29, 1917)
652
As this was the case, some officials began providing fake travel documents to Armenians in
exchange for money and this turned to be a way of earning money for such officials. For instance,
lieutenant Tahsin Efendi was one of these working as a transfer officer (sevk memuru) in Konya Station.
When his abuse was detected, the Ministry of Interior commenced an inquiry about him.
BOA.DH.ŞFR.66/167, 26 Temmuz 1332, (August 8, 1916).
653
NARA, Department of State, 867.4016/162, RG 59, October 9, 1915.
654
On October 20, 1918, a decree was sent to all the provinces specifying the conditions for Armenians’
return. For detailed information about the Return Decree (Geri Dönüş Kararnamesi), Adem Günaydın,
Return and Resettlement of the Relocated Armenians (1918-1920), Unpublished M.A. Thesis, (Ankara:
Middle East Technical University, 2007), pp. 19-20.
204
inform that Armenians would be allowed to travel to Istanbul including Armenian civil
servants655, Armenians being Russian subjects656 and Armenians traveling to Istanbul
for trade or journey.657 If Armenians who had been deported from Istanbul or its
vicinity wanted to return to Istanbul, it was principally Istanbul provincial
government’s duty to carry out necessary proceedings and make preparations for their
settlement before their return.658
As a result, the number of returnee Armenians in Istanbul increased rapidly in a
short period of time. The Ministry of Interior sent a code to fifteen provinces and
sixteen sanjaks about the issue.659 According to the code, most of the Armenians and
Greeks had travelled to Istanbul without travel documents. Local governments were
warned about being careful to fulfill the procedures of travel. Especially, following the
occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers, the number of Armenians in Istanbul
continued to increase. For example, more than 2.000 Armenians travelled to Istanbul
from Beirut by ship at one time in 1919.660 Yet, there are no precise numbers regarding
Armenians returning to Istanbul after the Armistice. Despite the fact, it can definitely
be argued that Armenians continued to perceive Istanbul as a secure place, following
the war years.
As a matter of fact, the measures implemented on Armenians and Greeks in the
name of the maintenance of public order and crime-prevention could be regarded as
the part of a broader government policy to punish “undesirable elements” in the
society. Therefore, all policies of controlling, repressing and policing related to
655
BOA.DH.ŞFR.92/52, 29 Zilhicce 1336 (October 6, 1918).
656
BOA.DH.ŞFR.92/167, 13 Muharrem 1337 (October 20, 1918) Through another order, the Armenians
who were Russian subjects were allowed to go to Russia. BOA.DH.EUM.AYŞ.56/49, 9 Teşrinisani
1334 (November 9, 1918).
657
BOA.DH.ŞFR.93/224, 20 Teşrinisani 1334 (November 20, 1918).
658
BOA.DH.ŞFR.93/224, 20 Teşrinisani 1334 (November 20, 1918).
659
BOA.DH.ŞFR.93/158, 10 Safer 1337 (November 15, 1918).
660
BOA.DH.EUM.MTK.80/67, 4 Teşrinisani 1335 (November 10, 1919).
205
“suspects” sould be regarded accordingly. It means that the government tried to
reshape the population structure in the capital city through a number of scrutinizing
policies in accordance with its political aims.
In doing this, the discourse of the prevention of crimes provided the
government and security forces the basis for legitimacy. In that sense, ‘preventive
policing’ understood in a proactive way was at least at a discursive level prominent
feature of the Ottoman understanding of public security during the Great War. As
mentioned in the second chapter, particularly the economic hardships of wartime years
inevitably led to the rise of crime rates in Istanbul. The CUP government’s response to
the newly emerging problems tells a lot about official priorities in criminal policy as
well as the state’s penetration capacity to the society.
In this respect, three types of crimes being offences directly related to the
economic dynamics namely theft, profiteering and bribery, will be analyzed in detail in
the next chapter. As mentioned in the first chapter, the protection of private property
became a major concern for modern states after the eighteenth century. Thus,
governmental policies against these crimes will be analyzed taking into consideration
the density of these crimes in Istanbul, the changing conditions as a result of the Great
War, and the legal procedures implemented or deliberately ‘not’ implemented to
offenders of these crimes.
206
CHAPTER 6
CONSTRUCTION OF CRIMINALITY AND DELINQUENCY: THEFT

VERSUS PROFITEERING AND BRIBERY
In the previous two chapters the CUP policies related to the maintenance of
public order in Istanbul were examined in detail. It is clear that, during the Great War,
the discourse on ‘the maintenance of public order’ provided the CUP government and
the security forces the capacity for implementation of harsher policies over the city
population. Alongside with ‘the maintenance of public order’, ‘prevention of crimes’
became another such discourse. In that regard, the “suspected” came to be “potential
criminals” in the eyes of the government. Thus, the CUP government, while aiming at
restructuring the society and penetrating to it in a far-reaching way through a number
of controlling policies, predominantly argued and advocated that these policies were
necessary for repressing “potential criminals” and preventing crimes.
In the Chapter 1, it was argued that political and economic context is highly
influential in specifying what is criminal or delinquent. In this sense, the Great War
had its own dynamics that featured priorities such as ‘survival of the state’ and
elimination of ‘enemy within’ and these have much relevance in evaluating the
criminal policy of the CUP during the war years.
The changes in the Penal Code, and the publication of various ordinances and
regulations during the war years provide us general information about the attitude of
the government towards crime and punishment. However, it is quite difficult to
determine the crime rates precisely during the war years due to several reasons. First,
unfortunately, we do not have on hand the Nizamiye Mahkemeleri (civil/criminal
207
courts)661 reports of the war years, which would normally provide plentiful information
about crimes, punishments and criminals.662 Furthermore, accessible archival
documents of courts-martial, the military courts primarily dealing with cases related to
the military issues, are limited.663 Also, the information about crimes that could be
inferred from the files of the General Directorate of Security is extremely dispersed.
Finally, although there are some crime statistics of the General Directorate of Security
providing detailed information about the crimes in Istanbul, the number of these
statistics is insufficient.664
661
The Vilayet Nizamnamesi (The Regulation of Province) of 1864 constituted the legal and
administrative basis for the foundation of new courts named as Nizamiye Mahkemeleri that would
proceed the cases of both the Muslims and non-Muslims. Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, “Tanzimat Devri
Osmanlı Mahkemeleri”, Yeni Türkiye, Vol. 31, (Ocak-Şubat 2000), p. 769. Actually, foundation of the
Nizamiye courts was a process that took fifteen years. From 1864 to 1879, several regulations were
made about the Nizamiye Court system and finally the reforms of 1879 adjust the division of labor
between various courts. According to the division of labor, the Nizamiye courts would deal with civil,
commercial, and criminal cases, while the Sharia Courts (religious courts) addressed matters of personal
status and vakıfs (endowments), Avi Rubin, “From Legal Representation to Advocacy: Attorneys and
Clients in the Ottoman Nizamiye Courts”, IJMES, Vol. 44, (2012), pp. 111-113. For detailed
information about foundation of Nizamiye Courts and their functions also see, Sedat Bingöl, Tanzimat
Devrinde Osmanlı’da Yargı Reformu: Nizamiye Mhkemelerinin Kuruluşu ve İşleyişi (1840-1876),
(Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 2004).
662
Avi Rubin, Ottoman Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),
p. 9.
663
Actually, courts-martial as military courts were mainly dealing with military criminal cases such as
internal and external security of the state; foundation of secret organizations; revealing military secrets;
crimes against conscription for instance providing fake health reports; opposition to decisions and
regulations of military government; and sex crimes against wives or female family members of soldiers
and officers. However, during the Great War, some other criminal cases came under the jurisdiction
subject of courts-martial such as assassination of state officials; violent theft; and profiteering.
Unfortunately, the accessible registers of these military courts are not sufficient enough to make
inferences as to what extent these courts dealt with non-military issues. For detailed information, see
Osman Köksal, Tarihsel Süreç İçinde bir Özel Yargı Organı Olarak Divan-ı Harb-I Örfiler (1877-
1922), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1996), pp. 84-101; 150-151.
664
The crime statistics of the General Directorate of Security provide detailed information about crimes
and criminals. The main topics in the statistics were as follows: number of the criminals; number of the
criminal cases whose offenders were known or unknown; the location of the crime in terms of in city
center or countryside; gender of the criminals, their martial status and whether they had children;
number of the one-time offenders and repetitive ones; occupation, nationality, citizenship, level of
education, residency in terms of being a city-dweller or countryman (şehirli, köylü) and age of
criminals. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917),
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 20, 1917). We have these two statistics
only for the crime rates in Istanbul in January and February 1917.
208
Nevertheless, crime tables of Istanbul published in the Police Journal are
helpful despite their deficiencies. The major deficiency of these crime tables was that
they only provide the numbers of crimes. Unlike the crime statistics of the General
Directorate of Security, there was no information about the criminals in terms of their
ages, nationalities, occupations and etc. in the crime tables of the Police Journal.
Furthermore, there was no information about the regions of Istanbul where crimes took
place.665 Moreover, the crime tables in the Police Journal included nineteen crimes at
most whereas from the crime statistics of the General Directorate of Security, it is
understood that there were seventy-two crimes that were specified by the Ottoman
government during the war years. Probably, nineteen crimes taking place in the crime
tables of the Police Journal were the crimes which the government preferred to
highlight. Additionally, these crimes had to be the most frequent crimes in Istanbul
during the Great War. Another deficiency of the crime tables was mistakes in
calculation.666 Therefore, the numbers given in the tables has to be evaluated carefully.
Despite these deficiencies, these crime tables provide important data about crime rates
in Istanbul during the Great War.
Until 1916, there were seven type of crimes in crime tables: theft (sirkat), pick-
pocketing (yankesicilik), fraud (dolandırıcılık), homicide (katl), battery and wounding
(darb ve cerh), indecent sexual behavior (fiil-i şeni), and fire (harik). These tables did
not focus on the crime rates of specific months or weeks of the year. They included
665
There were limited number of statistics indicating crime rates in Istanbul on the basis of region.
These statistics were as follows: “Tafsilat: 1330 senesi Kanunisani mahına aid cedvel”, Polis Mecmuası,
No. 40, 8 Rebiülahir 1333/1 Mart 1331 (14 Mart 1915), p. 15, “Tafsilat: 1330 senesi Şubat mahına aid
cedvel”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 41, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1333/15 Mart 1331 (28 Mart 1915), p. 48.
“Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi Mart’ının ibtidasından nihayetine değin bir ay zarfında Istanbul, Beyoğlu
ve Üsküdar polis müdüriyetleri dahilinde vuku bulan ceraim-i umumiyeyi mübeyyin cedveldir.”, Polis
Mecmuası, No. 68, 11 Receb 1334/1 Mayıs 1332 (May 14, 1916), p. 119, “Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi
Haziranının onaltıncı gününden nihayetine değin son iki haftası zarfında bilumum merakiz-i zabıta
dahilinde vuku bulan ceraim-i umumiyeyi gösterir cedveldir.”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 74, 15 Şevval
1334/ 1 Ağustos 1916 (14 Ağustos 1916), p. 263, “Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi Temmuzunun
ibtidasından nihayetine değin Dersaadet’te bilumum merakiz-i zabıta dahilinde vuku bulan ceraimi
gösterir cedveldir.”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 75, 29 Şevval 1334/15 Temmuz 1332 (28 Temmuz 1916), p.
288.
666
See Appendix C and D as examples of calculation mistakes, pp. 340-343.
209
data on a two-month basis. Until 1917, comparisons were made between the crime
rates of specific months of one year with that of the previous year.667
In 1916, the number of categories of crimes in the crime table increased to
nineteen. Furthermore, in 1917, the comparison began to be made between successive
months of the same year rather than the same months of the successive years. 668 This
situation could probably be a consequence of the fact that crime rates began to rise
rapidly especially in the last two years of the Great War. Therefore, comparison
between the same months of successive years was probably risky for the government
because in this way the rise of crime rates would be more apparent. Actually, one of
the main idea behind publishing crime rates regularly in the Police Journal should be
that the General Directorate of Security and the government tried to display their
“success” maintaining public order through decreasing the crime rates or through not
allowing dramatic increase in crime rates. Therefore, demonstration of data belonging
to two successive months would be a safer way for the government to give the
message that ‘there were no alarming changes in the crime rates’.
There were monthly or fortnightly-published crime tables in the Police Journal.
Certainly, these tables give us an idea about criminal cases in Istanbul during the Great
War. Nevertheless, numbers on their own are not enough to make a detailed analysis
about crime and punishment. Therefore, in the following parts an analysis of the
selected crimes –theft, profiteering and bribery– and their corresponding punishments
will refer to the documents of the General Directorate of Security, debate registers of
the Senate, prison registers, prison reports, the Penal Code and provisional laws as well
as crime tables.
As a matter of fact, official records about crime rates have to be examined
carefully. Most of the time, governments and security forces prepare that type of
667
See Appendix C for the crime table comparing crime rates in Istanbul for February of 1914 and 1915,
pp. 340-341.
668
For crime categories included in the crime tables and for new version of comparison based on
successive months of the same year rather than the same months of the successive years see Appendix
D, pp. 342-343.
210
records in accordance with the policies they implement. Although the registers in the
Police Journal provide plentiful and regular data about crime rates in Istanbul during
the Great War, the content of the tables indicate that they were prepared according to
some particular mind-set. For instance, it is possible to evaluate most of the crimes
included in the crime tables under the category of ‘crimes against property’. 669 The
reason behind that is the meaning of ‘private property’ for the modern state. During the
nineteenth century, the protection of private property assumed specific importance for
modern state. In this sense, the struggle against any kind of attack on capital and good
became an important component of policing.670 Therefore, it became an effective way
to make the crimes against property publicly visible in official records to be able to
justify the policies related to these crimes.
In 1916, the crime tables began including some other crimes such as battery
and insulting state officials during office; opposition to decisions and regulations of the
government; and bribery. Inclusion of the first two categories in crime tables, which
will be discussed in the following chapter, might be related to a rising level of concern
about the continuation of the CUP rule during the Great War. Bribery, on the other
hand, was included in the crime tables due to the increasing rate of this crime.
However, in the statistics, the numbers for this crime was extremely low. As will be
examined in detail, according to a number of memoirs of the time, bribery was
widespread. It is probable that the government published numbers of bribery lower
than actual to reinforce the impression that despite some individual cases of bribery in
Istanbul it never became a widespread crime among state officials.
Unlike theft and bribery, profiteering was a totally ignored crime during the
wartime, as it never became a part of crime tables. Furthermore, there was no article or
news about this crime in the Police Journal. It means that although profiteering was
669
Violent theft, petty theft, pick-pocketing, fraud, robbery, seizure and abuse of confidence were the
crimes against property included in crime tables.
670
Ergut, “Policing the Poor”, p. 153.
211
one of the most important causes of rising socio-economic problems in Istanbul, the
government almost totally preferred to ignore it until 1917.
All these indicate that, during the Great War, the CUP government had three
different attitudes towards crimes that were closely related to economic dynamics.
First, as in the case of theft, the CUP government deliberately made some crimes
publicly visible. It is clear that the government did not fight against the real causes of
theft such as rising poverty, emergence of black market and unequal distribution of
basic necessities. In this sense the question why the government made this crime
publicly visible will be answered in this chapter. Second, as in the case of profiteering,
the government preferred to overlook some crimes. In fact, the main reason of
ignorance was that the government benefited from the capital accumulation emerging
from profiteering. Third was the attitude of the CUP government towards crimes
related to wartime economic dynamics that could be inferred from the policy towards
bribery. Although this crime was made publicly visible through crime tables, this was
rather used to conceal the actual frequency and importance of the crime.
In fact, during the Great War, the rate of theft and bribery increased
remarkably. At the same time, profiteering as another type of economic crime became
a phenomenon of the war years which had its roots in economic realities. This chapter
aims to examine these crimes in a detailed manner in order to shed light on the CUP
policies towards crimes related to wartime economic conditions. This in turn will also
allow us to comment on how the CUP government made use of crime and punishment
policies with respect to its political and administrative aims.
6.1 Petty Theft (Adi Sirkat) and Violent Theft (Cinayet Nevinden Sirkat)
The existing data indicates that theft, especially adi sirkat (petty theft), was the
most widespread crime in Istanbul during the Great War. Although most cases of theft
were evaluated as cünha or kabahat according to the Penal Code of 1858, it was
probably the most important crime-related problem influencing daily life of city-
212
dwellers. The economic circumstances during the war were the main stimulant in the
rise of theft cases. On the one hand, due to increasing prices, problems of provisioning,
black-market and unemployment, persons could not even provided for their daily
needs. This situation had a great impact on the increase in the number of petty theft
cases especially during the last two years of the Great War. On the other hand, city-
dwellers already faced difficulties in meeting their basic necessities felt themselves
under a continuous threat of theft.
Although petty theft was mentioned in all crime statistics and tables, there was
no exact definition for this kind of theft in official documents. Nevertheless, from the
Penal Code, it could be understood that petty theft was a general name for ordinary
thefts except violent theft (cinayet nevinden hırsızlık). Therefore, petty theft could be
categorized as cünha requiring punishment of imprisonment from one month to three
years. The Article 222 of the Penal Code explicitly stated that if a person committed
theft that accompanied one of the followings, she/he would be imprisoned from one
year to three years:
First […], [theft] being night time and two or more persons being found
together; or there existing only one of these two circumstances but of its being
in an inhabited place or in places of worship; second, […] being armed
clandestinely or openly even though the affair of theft takes place by day, or on
the part of a single person and the place of theft be not an inhabited place;
third, […] committing the theft being a laborer or an artisan’s apprentice and
committing theft in the house, shop or store of his master or […] committing a
theft where he continuously works; forth, is that of innkeepers, hotel-keepers,
coachmen, boatmen or similar tradesmen or their agents stealing the whole or
part of the goods entrusted to them.671
671
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 175. The punishments related to theft
were regulated in the Second Chapter of the Penal Code. The seventh part, named as ‘Sirkat
Hakkındadır’ (Relates to Theft), was composed of fifteen articles (Articles 216-230). “Ceza
Kanunname-i Hümayunu”, Düstur, I/1, pp. 584-588; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman
Penal Code, pp. 171-183. For changes in 1911, “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı
mevadını muaddel kanun”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 457-459.
213
In the following articles, other circumstances for petty theft were described. For
instance, stealing transported beverages or edible food by the boatmen, cart-drivers or
672
muleteers and/or replacement of these with injurious or harmless substances;
stealing horse, other beast of burden, cattle, agricultural tools, firewood that had been
cut and prepared for sale, fish grown in fishponds;673 and crops and other profitable
produce of soil 674 were some of other circumstances of petty theft.
In the original text of the Penal Code of 1858, punishments for petty thefts
were lighter. The CUP government lengthened durations for imprisonment with the
amendments of 1911. For instance, the imprisonment from twenty-four hours to three
months in the Penal Code of 1858 was prolonged to one month to one year by the
changes of 1911.675 The main mentality behind lengthening incarceration periods for
petty thefts should be related to the rising importance of private property and its
meaning for the State in the early twentieth century. On the one hand, as mentioned
earlier, the CUP government tried to minimize the power of Islamic Law in criminal
issues by making detailed changes in related articles of the Penal Code; on the other
hand, by lengthening sentences, the CUP government tried to increase deterrent effect
of the punishments for crimes against property. In other words, the State was to
become the first and main protector of the private property.
The second type of theft was cinayet nevinden sirkat (violent theft) considered
as organized crime having more serious consequences. According to the Penal Code of
672
Punishments for this crime was imprisonment for from one month to three years and a cash fine from
half a mecidiyye (gold lira issued in Abdülmecid Reign) to half mecidiyye gold pieces, Article 123, Ibid,
pp. 176-177; Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 869.
673
The punishment for stealing animals was imprisonment from one year to three years; and the
punishment for stealing agricultural tools and firewood and fish was imprisonment from one month to
one year. Article 224, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 177-178.
674
The punishment for this crime was imprisonment for one month to one year. In the case if the theft
happened at night and was committed by a group of people also making use of carts or animals,
imprisonment period would increase to six months to two years. Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
675
Article 225, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code. Other articles substituted by
new articles through which incarceration periods were changed in 1911 were as follows: Articles 224
and 226.
214
1858, the punishment of violent theft was kürek in perpetuity or temporarily for not
less than fifteen years.676 Article 217 stated that if a case of theft corresponded to the
specifies in the following five circumstances, the punishment would be kürek in
perpetuity:
The first of these circumstances is that of being night time; the second is that
of two or more persons being found together; the third is that of these [people]
or even one from among them being armed clandestinely or openly; the forth
is that of entering […] any kind of place wherein men resides by demolishing
the wall thereof or by going up over the wall thereof by ladder or by breaking
the door thereof or by opening the lock thereof by an instrument or by taking
the guise and appearance of a State official or by producing a fictitious order
from officers; the fifth is that of intimidating by violent treatment or the
display of arms.677
The following four articles of the Penal Code included some other
circumstances of violent theft requiring punishment of kürek. For instance, according
to the Article 218, if a theft was committed at night and by more than two people as
well as with the exercise of compulsion and violent treatment, then offenders would be
punished to kürek temporarily. If marks of wounding occurred due to violence, the
offenders would be placed in kürek in perpetuity.678 Furthermore, committing theft on
a public road at night was also categorized as violent theft requiring kürek in perpetuity
or temporarily for not less than five years.679 According to Article 220, committing
theft in places –whether inhabited by someone or not– through entering inside by
making a hole on the wall or by going up over a ladder or by breaking or opening the
doors or windows was also categorized as violent crime.680 In 1911, this article was
676
See Article 217, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 172-173.
677
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 172.
678
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p.173.
679
Article 219, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 173-174.
680
215
substituted by a new one. The new version of Article 220 preserved the circumstances
mentioned above as they were and added the following sentences:
Those who commit theft by way of breaking or of opening with special

instruments the doors of the rooms or safer or locked boxes or cupboards in a
house or in the appurtenances thereof, even though not entered into by making
a hole through a wall or by setting up a ladder or by opening with a special
instrument, are also placed in kürek temporarily.681
Therefore, by this change, crimes against private property and corresponding

punishments were detailed and significantly standardized by the government.
Furthermore, this addendum would constitute the legal basis for kasa hırsızlığı (theft
of lockbox) being one of the most widespread types of violent theft during the war
years.
After this brief introduction to petty theft and violent theft, rates of these
crimes in Istanbul during the Great War will be analyzed. According to the numbers
compiled from several crime tables and statistics, petty theft rates in Istanbul during
the Great War were as follows:
Table 7: Rate of Petty Theft in Istanbul during the Great War
Adi Sirkat (Petty Theft)

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 147 135 - 85 84 83 67 33682 66 132 156 141
1916 83683 - 169 169 174 189 218 110684 163 188 236 198
1917 533 263 - - 370 315 355 - - 337 497 462
1918 633 - - 735 613 333 473 549 529 514 396685 405
681
682
Data for the first two weeks of August 1331 (August 1915), Polis Mecmuası, No. 76.
683
Data for the first two weeks of Kanunusani 1331(January 1916). Title mistakenly written as ‘data
belonging to last two weeks of Kanunievvel 1331 (December 1915)’. Polis Mecmuası, No. 86.
684
Data for the first two weeks of August 1332 (August 1916), Polis Mecmuası, No. 76.
216
Source: “Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli”, Polis Mecmuası, Nos. 40, 41, 68, 69, 70,73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81,
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917); BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335
(March 26 1917).686
685
Petty theft in November 1918 was indicated as 396 in Polis Mecmuası, No. 108 whereas it was
indicated as 388 in Polis Mecmuası, No. 109.
686
This table is compiled from the crime tables that were published in twenty-nine issues of the Police
Journal and two crime statistics published by the General Directorate of Security. In fact, the original
tables and statistics were prepared by using Rumi Calendar (Julian Calendar). This calendar had
thirteen-days difference from the solar calendar that is currently in use. For instance, the title ‘crime
table of first two weeks (1-16) of Kanunisani (January) 1331’ means that the table compiled the crimes
that took place between January 14, 1916 and January 29, 1916. The table above consciously ignored
thirteen-days difference, because otherwise there would be too much confusion. For instance, the crime
table of March 1331, in fact, shows the crimes that took place March 13, 1916-April 13, 1916. If the
Rumi Calendar was converted to solar calendar, we had to calculate how many crimes took place in
March and how many of those in April. Therefore, the statistics provided, which had their own
shortcomings as mentioned earlier, would become much problematic. Thus, being aware of its
deficiencies, we ignore thirteen-days difference in this table and in the following tables. It means that
for instance, the numbers of the table titled ‘Crime Table of March 1331’ is accepted as crime rates for
March 1915. Thirteen days difference was officially neglected in March 1333 (1917). Therefore, there
is no problem for the numbers belonging to the dates between March 1917-December 1918. The crime
statistics were dated as January and February 1917. Since in the Police Journal there was no exact
information for these months, data given by crime statistics will be used for January and February 1917.
The symbol ‘-’ was used for the months when there was no information about crimes. For the data used
in this table and in the following tables about the crimes of pick-pocketing, fraud, robbery and seizure
by violence; homicide, battery and wounding; abuse of confidence; indecent sexual behavior, adultery,
sodomy and seducing a virgin; battery and insulting an official during the office; bribery; opposition to
regulations and decisions; drunkenness; fire and arson; and various crimes, see, “Ceraim Mukayese
Cedveli”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 40, 8 Rebiülahir 1333 (March 14, 1915), p. 15; No.41, 12
Cemaziyelevvel 1333 (March 28, 1915), p. 48; No. 68, 11 Receb 1334 (May 14, 1916), p. 119; No. 69,
25 Receb 1334 (May 28, 1916), p. 144; No. 70, 13 Şaban 1334 (June 14, 1916), p. 168; No. 73, 28
Ramazan 1334 (July 28, 1916), pp. 239-240; No. 74, 15 Şevval 1334 (August 14 , 1916), pp. 276-279;
No. 75, 29 Şevval 1334 (July28, 1916), p. 287; No. 76, 17 Zilkade 1334 (September 14, 1916), p. 312;
No. 80, 17 Muharrem 1335 (November 14, 1916), pp. 406-408; No. 81, 2 Safer 1335 (November 28,
1916), p. 432; No. 82, 18 Safer 1335 (December 14, 1916), p. 456; No. 83, 2 Rebiülevvel 1335
(December 28, 1916), p. 480; No. 84, 20 Rebiülevvel 1335 (January 14, 1917), p. 504; No. 85, 4
Rebiülahir 1335 (January 28, 1917), p. 528; No. 86, 21 Rebiülahir 1335 (February 14, 1917), p. 552;
No. 92, 12 Şevval 1335 (July 1, 1917), p. 144; No. 93, 13 Zilkade 1335 (September 1, 1917), p. 168;
No. 97, 17 Rebiülevvel 1336 (January 1, 1918), p. 264; No. 98, 19 Rebiülahir 1336 (February 1, 1918),
p. 286; No. 99, 17 Cemaziyelevvel 1336 (March 1, 1918), p. 24; No. 103, 22 Ramazan 1336 (July 1,
1918), p. 121; No. 104, 23 Şevval 1336 (August 1, 1918), p. 122; No. 105, 25 Zilkade 1336 (September
1, 1918), p. 138; No. 106, 25 Zilhicce 1336 (Oct. 1, 1918), p. 154; No. 107, 27 Muharrem 1336 (Nov. 1,
1918), p. 170; No. 108, 28 Safer 1337 (Dec. 1, 1918), p. 186; No. 109, 28 Rebiülevvel 1337 (Jan. 1,
1919), p. 202, , No. 110, 28 Rebiülevvel 1337 (Jan. 1, 1919), p. 218. For data given for January and
February 1917, see, BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917),
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 26, 1917).
217
This table demonstrates the rising trend of petty theft during the war years. In the first
year of the war, petty theft rates were extremely low compared to the following years.
Especially, in the last two years of the war, cases of petty theft increased rapidly. For
instance, the numbers given for April in the table are remarkable. There were eighty-
five cases of petty theft in April 1915; this number doubled in 1916 and rose to 735 in
1918. The number relating to April 1918 was the peak point of petty theft cases
according to the crime tables. As a matter of fact, in April 1918, the crime rates in
general reached a peak point among the other crime rates belonging war years.
According to the crime tables, there is a record of 1238 crimes in Istanbul during April
1918.687 In this regard, petty theft cases corresponded to approximately 60% of total
crimes in Istanbul in April 1918. When the numbers of April 1915 were examined, the
dramatic change in crime rates became clearer. In April 1915 total crime number in
Istanbul was 735.688 Petty theft number that was 85 constituted approximately 11% of
the total crime number for that month. Therefore, it is clear that the rate of petty theft
among total crime increased year by year during the war.
The distribution of petty theft cases with respect to the districts of Istanbul
could be specified from the cases that were reported by the Police Directorates and
police centers.689 During the war years, there were fifteen police centers directly
attached to the General Police Directorate of Istanbul (Istanbul Polis Müdüriyet-i
Umumiyyesi). Apart from these police centers, there were two Police Directorates,
Beyoğlu and Üsküdar, that were attached to the General Police Directorate of Istanbul.
687
“Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 103, 22 Ramazan 1336 (July 1, 1918), p. 121.
688
“Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 69, 25 Receb 1334 (May 28, 1916), p. 144.
689
Unfortunately, there are only four tables providing information about the distribution of crimes in
accordance with the districts during the War years. One of these tables belonged to January 1915,
whereas others gave information about the following dates: March 1916, last two weeks of June 1916,
July 1916. See, “Tafsiat: 330 senesi Kanunisani Mahına aid olan”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 40, 8 Rebiülahir
1333 (March 14, 1915), p. 15; “Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi Mart’ının…”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 68, p.
119; “Ceraim Cedveli: 332 Senesi Haziranı’nın 16. gününden nihayetine değin son iki haftası zarfında
bilumum merakiz-i zabıta dahilinde vuku bulan ceraim-i umumiyeyi gösterir cedveldir”, Polis
Mecmuası, No. 74, p. 263; “Ceraim Cedveli: 332 Senesi Temmuzu’nun ibtidasından nihayetine değin
Dersaadet’e bilumum merakiz-i zabıta dahilinde vuku bulan ceraimi gösterir cedveldir”, Polis
Mecmuası, No. 75, p. 288.
218
The police centers (called as Istanbul Directorate hereafter)690 that were directly
attached to the Genaral Police Directorate of Istanbul were as follows: Adalar,
Aksaray, Ayasofya, Eyüb, Eminönü, Bayezid, Deniz, Şehremini, Samatya, Fatih,
Fener, Kapandakik (Unkapanı), Kumkapı, Karagümrük and Makriköy (Bakırköy).691
Beyoğlu Police Directorate was composed of Hasköy, Pangaltı, Arnavudköy,
Büyükdere, Dolapdere, Kasımpaşa, Galata, Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş and Taksim police
centers.692 Çinili, Kadıköy, Paşakapısı, Çengelköy, İskele and Kızıltoprak were the
police centers under Üsküdar Police Directorate.693
Petty theft rates were generally higher in the districts under the Istanbul and
Beyoğlu Police Directorates than they were in the districts under the Üsküdar Police
Directorate during the war years. Ayasofya was the district where petty theft rates were
the highest, while Adalar and Makriköy were the districts having low rate of petty
theft. For instance, in March 1916, there were seventy-four petty theft cases reported
by the Istanbul Police Directorate. In Ayasofya and Şehremini, there were eleven petty
theft cases each, whereas there was one case of petty theft in Adalar and two cases in
Makriköy.694 Although there are not numerous tables showing the distribution of
crimes with respect to districts, it could be argued from existing data that Istanbul and
Beyoğlu Police Directorates reported most of the petty theft cases during the war
years.
Having evaluated the petty theft rates in Istanbul, the committers of these
crimes will now be examined. The crime statistics of the General Directorate of
Security presented information about the occupation, gender, martial status, ethnicity,
690
In the crime tables, the fifteen police centers that were directly attached to the General Police
Directorate of Istanbul were briefly called as Istanbul Directorate. Being aware of the fact that there was
no separate police directorate called Istanbul Directorate during the War years, hereafter, the Istanbul
Directorate will be used for defining the fifteen police centers in this dissertation.
691
“Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi Mart’ının”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 68, p. 119.
692
Alyot, Türkiyede Zabıta, p. 495.
693
Alyot, Türkiyede Zabıta, p. 495.
694
“Ceraim Cedveli: 1332 senesi Mart’ının”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 68, p. 119.
219
religion and age of the criminals. In Istanbul, out of 543 committers of petty theft in
January 1917, 488 were male and fifty-five of them were female. According to the
statistics, the majority of male offenders were single, whereas most of the female
committers were married and had children.695 Probably, the women who had children
had to struggle against heavy living conditions, and so, committing petty theft had
become a way of providing money for food or food itself. For instance, on November
28, 1917, the police discovered a band of thieves completely comprised of women in
Istanbul. All these women ‘belonged to really destitute families, and seemed to have
restored such a life out of despair’.696 The members of this theft band worked together
and whatever they took became common property. About this band Yalman stated the
following sentences:
By a complicated system of cooperation, they managed to steal about seven

hundred various articles, of a total value of $80.000. Some of the members of
the band sold the stolen good in distant towns, bought food supplies with the
proceeds, and sold such food to advantage in the streets of Constantinople.697
This band and individual female thieves whose number increased during the war years
indicated changing socio-economic conditions. As a matter of fact, before the war,
males were the typically breadwinners of the families in the Ottoman Empire.
However, a great number of males had been conscripted or died during the Great War.
Therefore, women who had no experience of earning money became the new
breadwinners of their families during the War years. Nevertheless, since most of the
women did not have any profession, they had to find other ways for survival. High
695
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917). In Istanbul, a great number
of petty theft offenders (191 persons) were young persons that were between the ages of 20-30. The
distribution of offenders in terms of age groups was as follows: 139 persons were between the ages 14-
20; 94 were between 30-40; 49 were under 14; 35 were between 40-50; 25 were between 50-60; 9 were
60-70; and there is one person who was over 70.
696
697
Yalman, Turkey in the World War, pp. 246-247.
220
percentage of women with children among female committers of petty theft should be
evaluated within these socio-economic conditions.
In Istanbul, there were two main categories of stolen items in petty theft cases:
goods stolen from residences such as houses or rooms, and goods stolen from shops.698
Food, including sugar, grape, tea, nut, and flour; money; and jewelry were the most
frequently stolen goods from shops and houses. Animals such as sheep, lamb, chicken,
cow and fish were also important items of theft. They were perhaps stolen, not for
trading, but for consumption as food. Clothes and shoes were other items frequently
stolen from shops and houses. Apart from these items, less frequently stolen goods
were as follows: watch, copper, tire, umbrella, pen, pencil, firewood, horse, tobacco,
blanket, gas oil, sewing machine and fabric.699 These items were probably stolen for
sale and making money.
According to the crime statistics, majority of offenders were Ottoman subjects.
In January 1917, the number of Ottoman petty theft offenders in Istanbul in terms of
their ethno-religious identity was as follows: 343 Muslims, 134 Greeks, 26 Armenians,
12 Jews and 5 other Ottoman communities. The rest of the offenders, whose number
was thirteen, were foreigners.700 These numbers indicated that most of the offenders
were Ottoman Muslims. In the previous chapter, it has been argued that public security
measures of the CUP government was targeted to control specific groups that were
evaluated as “threat” to the public security of Istanbul. From the government’s point of
view, these people including foreigners, countrymen, vagrants, refugees and minorities
698
In the files of the General Directorate of Security, there were no detailed reports about petty theft
cases during the war years. There were only numbers about such cases; however, there was no
information about the items that were stolen. After the War, the General Directorate of Security,
especially 2nd Branch (2. Şube) began to prepare much more detailed reports about criminal cases. For
instance, there was a report showing criminal cases taking place in Istanbul in December 1918.
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.45/1, 7 Rebiülahir 1337 (January 10, 1919). This report gave information about
criminal cases taking place in Istanbul just after the Great War therefore content of petty theft cases
should be similar with petty theft cases during the War years. Upon this assumption, this document will
be used in analyzing petty theft cases in terms of their content.
699
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.45/1, 7 Rebiülahir 1337 (January 10, 1919).
700
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917). The number of foreign
offenders was given as 23 rather than 13.
221
were “potential criminals”. Nevertheless, the crime statistics of General Directorate of
Security demonstrate that foreigners and minorities did not constitute the largest group
of offenders. Although Ottoman Greeks were the second largest group of committers
of petty theft, this was not the case for foreigners and Armenians.701 In this regard, as
argued in the previous chapter, government’s policy of preventive policing should not
be evaluated only with regard to criminal issues. On the contrary, as will be examined
in following parts, for the government, criminal issues, especially crimes such as petty
theft were always of secondary importance.
The occupations of petty theft offenders were also indicated in the crime
statistics. Most of the offenders were concentrated on three main categories of
occupation: unemployed (işsiz), worker (amele) and craftsmen (ehl-i sanat). In January
1917, 196 out of 543 petty theft offenders in Istanbul were unemployed. There were
121 craftsmen and 114 workers who committed petty theft. Among other occupations
of petty theft committers were: domestic workers (49); civil servants (19); tradesmen
and moneychangers (15); boatmen (11); farmers (7); fishers (6); merchants (4); and
scientists and professionals as teachers, doctors and etc. (1). 702 Regarding this data,
there are three important points. First, although economic conditions of civil servants
worsened during the war, majority of them did not get involved in petty theft. It can be
argued that in order to make up for their economic hardships in the face of increasing
inflation rate, civil servants resorted to committing bribery, making use of their official
status. Next, the percentage of craftsmen among the petty theft offenders was very
high. This situation was probably related to war conditions causing unemployment.
Finally, most of the petty theft offenders came from lower classes.
701
This situation was also the case in February 1917. According to the crime statistics, 263 petty theft
cases occurred in Istanbul in February 1917. The ethno-religious identity of the offenders was as
follows: 171 Muslims, 70 Greeks, 11 Jews, 10 Armenians, and one Iranian as a foreigner.
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 26, 1917).
702
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917). Similar to January 1917, in
February 1917, the unemployed, craftsmen and workers were also the first three groups who committed
petty theft in Istanbul. Out of 263 petty theft offenders, 86 were unemployed, 63 were craftsmen and 51
were workers. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 26, 1917).
222
Actually, even in the peacetime, most of petty theft offenders were probably
from lower classes; and by depending on this kind of statistical data, governments
could easily discipline and oppress lower class people in the name of maintaining
“public security”. As a matter of fact, workers who were not satisfied with their
conditions as well as the unemployed were always seen as a “threat” to the existing
system.703 Therefore, as discussed in detail in the first chapter, the main aim of the
political elites was to ensure continuation of the existing economic system and
property relations while repressing the lower classes. Nevertheless, “the maintenance
of public order” and “the prevention of crime” became ostensible causes of oppression
and control.
Certainly, in this respect the Great War provided more appropriate conditions
for the government to control more extensively the lower classes in Istanbul. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, during the war years, the CUP government
implemented strict controls on newcomers, banished vagrants from the city, and made
several regulations about immigrants and countrymen. The government legitimized all
of these policies by stating that lower classes tended to commit crime. In fact, the
statistics verified this assumption and probably the rise of statistical studies especially
during the CUP period was related to such a cause-effect relationship: these crime
statistics and crime tables published in the Police Journal strengthened the
government’s hand in implementation of increasingly oppressive mechanisms on
lower classes. Actually, during the war years, there were more serious crimes, about
which the government did not take any measure, such as profiteering resulting in the
rise of price and emergence of black-market and, eventually, starvation on a massive
scale in the city. In this regard, it is possible to say that during the war, the CUP
government preferred to struggle against “potential criminals” rather than the actual
ones.
703
The CUP policies regarding vagrants and workers directly related with concerns to protect existing
political and economic system. For detailed information see Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, pp. 243-
245, 256-263, 265-273.
223
As a matter of fact, although their frequency was much lower than petty theft
cases, there were several violent theft cases that are recorded in the documents of the
General Directorate of Security and the Police Journal. Before examining specific
cases, the violent theft rates will be analyzed in terms of their frequency. According to
the numbers compiled from several crime tables and statistics, violent theft rates in
Istanbul during the Great War were as follows:
Table 8: Rates for Violent Theft during the Great War
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 - - - 27 17 20 20 25704 29 39 11 12
1916 10705 - 0 10 4 4 8 1706 5 6 22 100
1917 18 13 - - 1 2 0 - - 1 0 1
1918 1 - - - 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
(March 26 1917).707
According to the table, in the first year of the war, average violent theft rate
was higher than it was in the other three years. There were more than ten violent theft
cases in each month about which there is data. In December 1916, violent theft rate
reached its highest point with 100 cases. This number was really surprising when
violent theft rates were taken into consideration as a whole. Kasa hırsızlığı (theft of
lockbox) was the most frequent violent theft during the war years. In some tables,
‘theft of lockbox’ was indicated instead of violent theft. Probably, the number for
December 1916 mostly included theft of lockbox. Nevertheless, on July 28, 1916 there
704
Data for the first two weeks of August 1331 (1915), Polis Mecmuası, No. 76.
705
belonged to last two weeks of Kanunievvel 1331 (December 1915)’. Polis Mecmuası, No. 86.
706
Data for first two weeks of August 1332 (August 1916), Polis Mecmuası, No. 76.
707
See Chapter 6, footnote 686, p.217.
224
was news about theft of lockbox in the Police Journal stating that after a long period of
time, a theft of lockbox case had taken place in Beyoğlu. 708 As mentioned earlier,
Beyoğlu was one of the regions with high crime rates. Therefore, if the news of the
Police Journal is to be assumed correct, the rate of violent crime was low until July
1916. In this regard, there are two possibilities: first, the number could have been
written wrong thus being 10 rather than 100; second, the number 100 was the correct
rate of the violent crimes while most of the cases had happened some time between
July and December 1916. Unfortunately, there is no concrete evidence proving the
possibility of any of these alternatives.
In last two years of the war, it seems that violent theft rate decreased
dramatically. Especially, from May 1917 to the end of 1918, there were totally eight
cases of violent theft in Istanbul. Although crime tables and crime statistics
demonstrate low violent theft rates, some other documents indicate that there were
several cases of violent theft especially in 1917. For instance, in March 1917, a violent
theft attempt resulting in homicide took place in Üsküdar.709 Since this incident had
many dimensions, it will be examined in detail. Here, Selim, at the age of 65-70, was a
salesman at a candy store in Üsküdar. He was a countryman who had come to Istanbul
many years ago. Every night, he was going to night prayer (yatsı namazı) without
locking the door of the store. At the incident night, four people, who knew that he went
to mosque without locking the door, entered the store to steal money from the lockbox.
According to the news of the Police Journal, since the offenders were not experienced
thieves, they could not open the lockbox. Moreover, while they were trying to do it,
Selim came back to the store and caught the thieves on hand. They ordered him to
hand them over the keys of the lockbox. However, Selim said that he did not have the
keys because they were kept by the owner of the store. Hereupon, they killed him.710
708
“Vakayi-yi Zabıta: Kasa ve Mücevherat Hısızlarının Derdesti”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 73, 28 Ramazan
1334/15 Temmuz 1332 (July 28, 1916), p. 236.
709
“Vukuat-ı Zabıta: Üsküdar Cinayeti”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, 9 Receb 1335/1 Mayıs 1333 (May 1,
1917), pp. 62-65.
225
Up to here, this case was an ordinary case of violent theft: it was night; there
was more than one person involved; the offenders tried to open a lockbox; and they
resorted to violence. Nevertheless, the narrative in the Journal told more than that.
Initially, the author of the news claimed that ordinary people attempting violent theft
were much more dangerous than experienced thieves, because experienced thieves
typically refrained from committing homicide. In this case as well as others, it can be
inferred from the existing data that most of the violent theft attempts during the war
years resulted in homicide. In this regard, most of the violent theft cases in the war
years were committed by ordinary people rather than experienced thieves. Another
important point in the narrative of the case was about the description of “suspect”. The
news stated that although the offenders were unknown immediately after the incident,
there were some “suspects”. According to the news, the first name appearing was
Konyalı Rıza, described in the following words: Rıza was known as a miserable and
dissolute person who did not engage in any job and who spent all his time with
prostitutes.711 This description embodied the official approach to the persons who had
a “vagrant” way of life. Thus, if there was a crime, the first and foremost suspected
persons coming to mind would be such individuals. This approach illustrated the
legitimization of the policies of the government regarding vagrants, which is in line
with the discussion in the forth chapter of this thesis.
As a matter of fact, there was no detailed data for the percentages of violent
theft offenders with respect to their occupations. There is information about the
offenders of limited number of violent theft case. For instance, in January 1917, out of
eighteen violent theft cases, an offender of one case was categorized as unemployed.712
In February 1917, the occupations of the offenders of violent theft cases were as
710
“Vukuat-ı Zabıta”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, pp. 62-65.
711
“[…]Üsküdar muhitinde sefih [eğlenceye düşkün] ve sefil bir şahıs olarak tanınan ve hiç bir işle
iştigal etmeyerek daima fahişe kadınlar arasında bir hayat-ı sefihane şeçirdiği malum bulunan, Mevlevi
Hacı Ahmed dedenin mahdumu [Konyalı] Rıza evvel emirde hatıra gelen bir şahıs olmuştur.”, “Vukuat-
ı Zabıta:”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, pp. 62-65.
712
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
226
follows: one domestic worker, four unemployed and one from the occupational group
named as ‘scientists and professionals as teachers, doctors and etc’.713 Therefore, due
to lack of information, it is quite difficult to argue that violent theft offenders were
from lower classes.
Although violent theft was generally identified with theft of lockbox, banditry
activities could also be regarded as an important part of violent theft cases during the
war years. Actually, these activities did not exist in crime tables as a separate category
of crime. Nevertheless, there were occasionally documents and news about them. Most
of the banditry acts were a combination of battery, wounding and robbery. Generally,
bandits invaded villages that were close to Istanbul and took money, food or valuable
items by forceful means. In summer of 1917, a band named ‘Matlı Mehmed Çetesi’
comprised of eight-nine Albanians committed several brigandage activities in Beykoz
and its environs.714 Another brigandage activity took place in the Sarıkavak village,
close to Şile.715 A band named as Kiryako (?) Band (Kiryako Çetesi) composed of
twenty or thirty persons invaded the village twice in ten days. Although the report did
not mention anything about the members of the band, it was composed of Greeks. The
bandits pillaged several goods from the villagers of Sarıkavak.
It is evident from existing documents that brigandage activities increased in
1917. Although there definitely were brigandage activities in 1915 and 1916, the
frequency and impact of these activities increased in 1917. According to the
documents, banditry activities including pillaging continued in 1918. For example, in
February 1918, the deputy governor of Istanbul sent a correspondence to the Ministry
713
There were thirteen cases of violent theft in February 1917. The crime statistics provide information
about the occupations of only six offenders. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335
(March 26, 1917).
714
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.37/56, 14 Safer 1336 (November 29, 1917). According to the document, this
band was supported by a number of Albanians working as gardener, guard or watchman at ranches in
Beykoz. Unfortunately, this document did not give detailed information about the activities of the band
but in general terms, it stated that the band had several brigandage activities in the region.
715
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.21/13, 27 Zilkade 1335 (September 15, 1917).
227
of Interior about banditry activities in Yeniköy.716 According to this correspondence,
Istanbul Regimental Commandery of Gendarme sent an additional battalion to the
region due to increasing banditry activities in Yeniköy.
There was another report about a raid on Erikli village by a band composed of
ten Georgians.717 The bandits seized gun, money, gold, watches, clothes and food
from various houses. One bandit was caught while others escaped. From the prison
reports, it can be argued that the security forces were not “successful” enough in
preventing banditry acts during the war period. In the prison registers presenting
detailed information about 583 prisoners718, there were only nine persons who were
convicted for a crime related to brigandage.719 These cases indicate that most of the
banditry activities took place in the vicinity of Istanbul. This situation had to be related
to lower level of security measures and convenient conditions for sheltering in the
countryside.
It was deserters who principally constituted bands and committed several
banditry activities during the war. Although the reports about brigandage incidents
mentioned above did not make it clear whether the members of the bands were
716
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.31/51, 10 Cemaziyelevvel 1336 (February 22, 1918).
717
Erikli village was close to Gebze. BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.42/4A, 22 Şevval 1336 (July 31, 1918).
718
In fact, the total number of prisoners in the prison registers of 1917 was 660 because it also included
77 child prisoners. Out of 77 child prisoners, 72 were offenders of theft. The others committed crimes
such as seizure, indecent sexual behavior, arson, injury and homicide. It must be noted that children
were punished different from adults. For instance, adults committing petty theft were generally punished
with imprisonment for three years, whereas the children committing the same crime were generally
punished with incarceration for less than a year. Furthermore, a child who wounded and killed someone
was punished with sixteen months imprisonment; whereas an adult perpetrating the same crime was
punished with fifteen years imprisonment. Due to such differences in punishment, in the following parts
of this thesis, only the information for adult prisoners will be taken into consideration. Furthermore, out
of 583 adult prisoners, 22 ran away and 37 were released because they fulfilled their duration of
punishment. This information will only be used in the last part of the next chapter that is about
amnesties. In other sections about the actual practice of punishments in accordance with the Penal Code,
the total number of prisoners will be examined without taking into consideration those who ran away or
were released. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1333 (August 4, 1917).
719
Among these prisoners six were convicted directly for ‘brigandage (şekavet)’ and sentenced to life
imprisonment; two were arrested for joining a band and imprisoned for three to eight years; and one
prisoner was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for aiding banditry acts. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35,
15 Şevval 1333 (August 4, 1917).
228
deserters, some of the members were at least noted to be deserters. It is a fact that,
during the Great War, for the government and military authorities, one of the greatest
problems related to desertion was brigandage.720 Especially, after mid 1916, deserters
and their brigandage activities became a serious problem for the government. Due to
brigandage activities of deserters, their presence close to the capital and other city
centers came to be considered as threatening public order. For instance, in May 1916,
it was reported that there were 265 deserters in Beykoz. Apart from Istanbul, there
were also increasing number of deserters trying to take shelter close to the city centers
of Mosul and Kars721
Growing number of deserters began to undermine the war-making ability of the
Ottoman army. Furthermore, their engagement in brigandage facilities caused security
problems for the government especially in regions close to the capital city. Due to
these reasons, in late July 1916, a number of new battalions composed of gendarmes
were recruited in the regions of army corps. The main duty of these new battalions was
to follow and catch deserters.722 When the deserters were caught, they were re-
recruited in the army despite their earlier engagement in brigandage activities.
According to the report prepared by the General Commander of Gendarme, the
procedure of re-recruitment of deserters without any deterrent punishments let them
repeatedly to desert the army and resulted in their reengagement in brigandage.723
Between the dates July 1916 and April 1917, regional battalions caught 2.375 deserters
720
Mehmet Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between
Voluntarism and Resistance, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 268.
721
Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization., p. 271.
722
According to the report prepared by General Commander of Gendarme (Gendarme Umum
Kumandanı), there were several problems of these newly found battalions. Initially, although gendarme
was not only responsible the maintenance of public order but also provisioning and agricultural issues
during the War years, the number of gendarmes was insufficient to fulfill of all these obligations. For
instance, only forty-seven gendarmes were assigned for catching deserters in Istanbul. Another problem
was that wages paid to the gendarmes was low, while the provisioning of them was inadequate with
respect to their effort. BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.15/61, 29 Receb 1335 (May 21, 1917).
723
229
from Istanbul Regiment.724 However, there is no exact information about how many of
these deserters had engaged in brigandage activities. Nevertheless, it is clear that
military forces and government argued that a great number of the deserters were
dealing with banditry activities.
Deserters were not only acting as bands, but they also committed a number of
violent theft and murder crimes in Istanbul in smaller groups composed of two or three
persons. For instance, on January 19, 1917, two deserters and their friends decided to
725
burglarize a house in one of the refugee neighborhoods at Göztepe. According to
the news in the Police Journal, the deserters had heard about a woman who had some
money. Although they did not have any idea about how much it was, they entered the
house at night. Before taking the money, they strangled the woman and her baby.
Another case took place in Beyoğlu in February 1917.726 Three persons, being ex-
convicts, went to the milk pudding shop (muhallebici) of Erzurumlu Recep Hüseyin
Aga with the aim of committing theft. Although only one of the offenders was a
deserter, someone had supplied military uniforms to all of them so that they went to
the shop with official dress. These persons confessed that they killed Recep Aga in
order to take his money.
There was another violent theft case in Bahçeköy. On March 9, 1917, a non-
Muslim deserter named as Kocu killed a child at the age of ten when he was pasturing
cows and sheep.727 According to a witness, on the day of the incident, the deserter and
his wife went to collect brushwood as they usually did. However, different from other
days, they returned with muddy meat that was cut irregularly. Upon this declaration,
the security forces caught Kocu at the house of another deserter. According to news,
Kocu confessed that he had killed the boy and taken the sheep. All these incidents
724
BOA.DH.EUM.6.Şb.15/61, 29 Receb 1335 (May 21, 1917).. The number of deserters in Istanbul
caught during March 1917 was 313. BOA.DH.6.Şb.16/30, 12 Şaban 1335 (June 3, 1917).
725
“Vukuat-ı Zabıta: Istanbul Polis Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesinden”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 88, 9
Cemaziyelahir 1335/1 Nisan 1933 (April 1, 1917), pp. 42-45.
726
“Vukuat-ı Zabıta: Istanbul Polis”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 88, pp. 42-45.
727
“Vukuat-ı Zabıta: Istanbul Polis”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 88, pp. 42-45.
230
were violent theft cases resulting in murder. As mentioned before, according to
Ottoman security forces, inexperienced thieves were more inclined to kill their victims.
This evaluation was probably correct because the offenders of the violent theft
incidents mentioned above were not experienced and “professional” thieves but
ordinary persons looking for money or food. Difficulties in accessing basic nutrition
goods during the war years certainly had a role in these violent theft cases.
To sum up, theft was the most frequently committed crime in Istanbul during
the Great War. The number of theft cases increased dramatically especially in 1917
and continued to rise in 1918. In the meantime, the government did not make any
changes about punishments. The part entitled as ‘Theft’ had been one of the parts that
many changes had taken place in 1911. With the changes in 1911, imprisonment
durations were lengthened and these remained in effect during the war years.
Nevertheless, as it will be analyzed in the final section of this chapter, longer
imprisonment durations were not effective during the war because several amnesties
were declared and a great number of petty theft offenders were released while they had
completed only half of their sentences. Certainly, for the government, one of the most
important reasons to repeatedly proclaim amnesty was to find soldiers to recruit in the
army. However, a great number of the criminals became deserters and committed
additional crimes once they were released. In late 1916, the Police Journal felt the need
of publishing photos of repetitive (mükerrer) criminals in Istanbul.728 Out of twenty-
four repetitive criminals whose photos were published, twenty-two were repetitive
criminals of theft.
Actually, in 1917, the length of imprisonment for theft was shortened.
According to the prison register of Istanbul Central Prison (Dersaadet Hapishane-i
Umumi) showing the names, titles, ages of the prisoners; cause of imprisonment;
duration of imprisonment; and state of health, 660 prisoners were jailed in Istanbul
728
“Sevabık-ı Mükerrere Eshabı”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 79, 30 Zilhicce 1334/15 Teşrinievvel 1332
(October 28, 1916); “Sevabık-ı Mükerrere Eshabı”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 80, 17 Muharrem 1335/1
Teşrinisani 1332 (November 14, 1916); “Sevabık-ı Mükerrere Eshabı”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 84, 20
Rebiülevvel 1335/1 Kanunusani 1332 (January 14, 1917). See Appendix F, p. 345.
231
Central Prison between the years 1911 and 1917.729 Actually, the number of the
prisoners who were imprisoned in 1916 and 1917 was the highest. The prisoners jailed
before 1916 and being still at the prison in 1917 were generally the criminals that had
committed felonies required more than fifteen-year imprisonment.730
Seventy-seven of the prisoners were children under the age eighteen. Out of
seventy-seven child prisoners, seventy-two were imprisoned due to theft. The
punishment these children faced was imprisonment for more than one month and less
than one year. Apart from child prisoners, there were 583 adult prisoners.731 274 of the
adult prisoners were convicted because of petty theft.732 The average punishment
duration was one year to three years for the thieves that were put in prison in 1916.
However, most of the thieves jailed in 1917 were punished for one month to six
months.733 There are two probable explanations for the shortened imprisonment
duration for petty theft offenders. First, it may be argued that since petty theft rates
increased, it resulted in overpopulation in the Central Prison of Istanbul. Therefore,
possibly to open up place in prisons, the imprisonment duration for petty theft was
lowered. Nevertheless, as will be examined in the next chapter, the population of
Istanbul Central Prison in 1917 was extremely low compared to the previous years. In
this sense, the second explanation arguing that shortened imprisonment duration might
be related to increasing need of manpower for the army seems more plausible. This
issue will be discussed in the following chapter.
729
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1335 (August 4, 1917).
730
The low number of the prisoners who had been jailed before 1916 is an indicator that most of the
petty crime offenders had been released as a result of amnesties. Also see footnote 133, p. 38.
731
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1335 (August 4, 1917). There were thirty woman-prisoners in
the Istanbul Central prison in June 1917. Twenty-two of the woman-prisoners were imprisoned because
of theft. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/17, 10 Ramazan 1335 (June 30, 1917).
732
The number of prisoners imprisoned for violent theft was four. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15
Şevval 1335 (August 4, 1917).
733
232
Especially, during the last two years of the war when living conditions
worsened, the rate of petty theft increased remarkably. As argued earlier, crimes
against private property was a foremost concern for modern states since the nineteenth
century. The same was the case for the Ottoman State. It was also indicated earlier that
the part concerning ‘crimes against property’ was one of the most comprehensive parts
of the Penal Code of 1858. Furthermore, in 1911, the CUP government made a
significant number of changes in this part. In that respect, theft came to be an
inseparable element of crime statistics during the Constitutional Regime. This situation
did not change in war years.
In fact, the government and security forces deliberately made this crime
publicly visible in statistics. The main idea was that repressive policies towards lower
classes could be more easily justified by making use of the rising rate of theft. In other
words, theft as a criminal issue did not have priority in the policing agenda of the CUP
government during the Great War. If this had been the case, there would at least be an
attempt to provide remedy for the main causes of this crime. The main cause of rising
theft rates at that time was economic conditions including the scarcity of basic goods,
increasing price levels, emergence of black market, and unequal opportunities of
access to the supply of basic necessities. As examined in the second chapter, although
the CUP government opted for taking some measures after 1916 to prevent inflation,
these attempts were far from providing permanent and effective solutions to the
economic problems. The government did not have the capacity to make radical policy
chances because it actually benefited from wartime economic relations for the aim of
achieving certain economic policies. For instance, profiteering was systematically
ignored by the CUP government despite its being a topmost problematic economic
phenomenon. Therefore, examining this “ignored crime” allow us to gain insight into
the crime policies of the CUP during the Great War.
233
6. 2 Profiteering (İhtikar)
It was argued in the first chapter that provision was a critical issue for the
governments of belligerent states during the Great War. Profiteering as a direct
consequence of abuses related to provision became an important problem in Istanbul
beginning with the early war years. On the other hand, profiteering never appeared in
the statistics as a crime category. Therefore, if only the official crime records was to be
taken into consideration, it would be possible to argue that there was no profiteering in
Istanbul during the war years. However, historical sources such as memoirs and
parliamentary debates point to the contrary, demonstrating that profiteering emerged in
the early war years to become an inseparable part of socio-economic life in Istanbul
thereafter.
The CUP government tried to regulate the provisioning the city through a
number of methods.734 In fact, provisioning was vital for the maintenance of war-
making. As Mahmut Paşa, a member of Meclis-i Ayan (Ottoman Senate), stated in the
parliament “success in provisioning directly determine the success in war; therefore
failures in provisioning would inevitably mean fatal results.”735 Although the
government was aware of this fact, official policies were not effective enough to
achieve proper provisioning in the capital city. There were several reasons for this.
First of all, the government had not taken necessary measures to organize for
provisioning in a better way before the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War. For
example, when the decision of mobilization was declared in August 1914, Cemil Paşa,
the mayor (Şehremini) of Istanbul, suggested buying 300.000 sacks of flour from
Romania, considering the fact that commercial routes were still open at that time.
However, this recommendation was rejected on the basis that time was not right to pay
734
For detailed information about provisioning policies of the CUP in terms of organizational structure
see Chapter 2, pp. 48-55.
735
MAZC, 3/3, 21, 2 Kanunusani 1332 (January 15, 1917), p. 277.
234
money abroad.736 Yet, consequently commercial routes were closed down making this
option not viable anymore. As a result, after 1915, even access to bread became a big
problem in the city. As early as 1916, some inhabitants began substituting bread with
corncob and grass.737
According to the debates in Senate, disorder and lack of coherent provisioning
policies continued in the following war years. For example, in 1916, there was an
excess of bulgur (cracked wheat) in Konya whereas there was scarcity for the same
item in Istanbul. This was a time when fifteen railroad cars were carrying soldiers from
Istanbul to Konya everyday while these cars returned to Istanbul empty. Ahmed Rıza
inquired in the parliament why at least three or four of these cars were not used to
carry bulgur from Konya to Istanbul providing a partial solution to the need for grain
in Istanbul as well as keeping the price of grain low.738
The distribution of necessities was also a relevant problem. The CUP
government argued that basic necessities were distributed to all neighborhoods in
Istanbul. However, there were Senate members claiming that some items such as olive
oil, barley and bean were never delivered to some neighborhoods.739 Furthermore,
even in neighborhoods receiving these items, it had become a common practice for
grocers to covertly sell these items for higher prices to speculators who would then sell
the same items with even higher prices in the black market. This meant that there were
grave problems in access to basic necessities.740
As a matter of fact, rising prices began disturbing the daily lives of the
inhabitants of Istanbul as early as late 1915. Although there was no mass street protest
against the rapid increase in prices, according to Ahmed Rıza, it was becoming more
736
MAZC, 3/2, 23, 14 Kanunusani 1331 (January 27, 1916), pp. 395.
737
738
739
MAZC, 3/3, 28, 28 Kanunusani 1332 (February 10, 1917), p. 395.
740
235
and more intolerable every day.741 Since, morale at the home front was a foremost
important asset for war-making, Ahmed Rıza frequently urged the government to take
necessary measures about provisioning. Profiteering was a direct consequence of
improper provisioning policies. It was also the main cause of rapid price increases.
Therefore, provisioning policies had to incorporate measures for struggle against
profiteering. With this idea in mind, in 1915, Ahmed Rıza sent an official dispatch to
Meclis-i Mebusan (Chamber of Deputies) about the prevention of profiteering.
However, this did not receive any reply.742 This was probably because the government
did not want to acknowledge profiteering as a problem at that time.
After a while, the government officially accepted the presence of profiteering
in Istanbul and promised to take necessary measures. Nevertheless, the way of action
pursued by the government was not criminal investigation about profiteers. Talat Paşa,
Minister of Interior, declared that mills in Istanbul would be administered by the
municipality and bread would be distributed to the city inhabitants for lower prices. He
argued that profiteering would hence be prevented.743 Of course this naïve policy was
not sufficient to solve either the problem of provisioning or profiteering.
Provisioning and profiteering was not only limited to bread. During 1916,
almost all basic goods became scarce in Istanbul. Most of the items even including
basic foodstuff became virtually only purchasable in the black market. Due to
widespread discontent, the government had to establish a new organization entitled
Central Provisioning Commission (Merkez İaşe Heyeti) on July 23, 1916.744 This
commission was formed according to the model of German Provisioning Organization
and was composed of undersecretaries of Ministries related to provisioning as well as
741
742
743
744
236
some “reliable” merchants such as Abud Efendi and İsmail Efendi. 745 Under this
commission, a number of sub-commissions were established to deal with the
distribution of basic goods to neighborhoods.746 To what extent these commissions
functioned properly is questionable. In the early 1917, provisioning problems, price
increases and profiteering were still the most important dynamics of the socio-
economic life of Istanbul.
For one, there was a huge price difference between the same type of items sold
in Istanbul and nearby provinces. For example, in February 1917, one okka (a weight
measure used in the Ottoman Empire that equals to 1283 grams) of butter was 50
piastres in Bursa whereas it was 90-100 piastres in Istanbul.747 It was also a fact that
biggest profits were made from food items and this prompted most of merchants
actually dealing with the trade of other items to begin selling food items during the
War. Thus, drapers from Beyoğlu to Galata began selling sugar.748 As a matter fact,
merchants could make incredible profits even in sale of rationed food.
In 1917, sugar and bread were the only items sold through rationing in Istanbul.
Although access to these items was easier for inhabitants, there was still abuse in the
distribution of these items. For example, sugar was sold by the government for 9
piastres whereas merchants sold the same item for 60 piastres in the black market.749
Similar to sugar, bread was sold in black market for higher prices. In 1917, the price
determined for white bread was 3 piastres in Istanbul. Nevertheless, influential people
having strong networks and knowing the bakeries in person, bought bread in larger
quantities at one time without having to wait in a line for a single piece of bread like
ordinary people. The bread obtained in such large quantities for 3 piastres each was in
745
MAZC, 3/3, 31, 6 Şubat 1332 (February 19, 1917), p. 493.
746
MAZC, 3/3, 31, 6 Şubat 1332 (February 19, 1917), p. 493. For detailed information about Central
Provisioning Commission also see Chapter 2, pp. 53-54.
747
748
MAZC, 3/3, 53, 30 Mart 1333 (March 30, 1917), p. 483.
749
237
turn sold for 8,10, 12 piastres in the black market.750 Thus, there were two main
reasons for black market and unpreventable price increases in Istanbul. First, the
government could not develop efficient policies about provisioning, and second, there
were almost no punitive sanctions for profiteers. These reasons need closer
examination for a better understanding of provisioning problems in the city.
Ahmed Rıza described the insufficiency of provisioning policies as below:
[…]Even the laws made by the Parliament were not implemented. On the
contrary, due to a number of provisional laws and orders violating one another
people and merchants were totally left in confusion. Several privileged and
irresponsible commissions emerged. In this way, while trade was left to the
monopoly of some profiteers who were not actual merchants, public interest
was violated and furthermore sacrificed for illegitimate personal interests…751
According to Ahmed Rıza, the institutional structure present at that time did
not allow for a proper provisioning. In fact, he was making these criticisms at a time
when the newly-established Central Provisioning Commission and its sub-
commissions were in operation. From above comments it is understood that these
commissions were protecting individual interests rather than public interest, and
therefore their operation was not reliable. At this point, Ahmed Rıza recommended the
foundation of a separate Ministry for provisioning. He justified his idea as follows:
“…Separate ministries were founded to deal with provisioning even in the countries
where there were already well-functioning municipalities. In Istanbul, neither the
municipality nor other institutions were properly functioning. Therefore provisioning
as a vital issue during the war should not be left to such a commission…”752
750
MAZC, 3/3, 52, 29 Mart 1333 (March 29, 1917), p. 466.
751
“Meclis-i Umumiden geçen kanunlar bile tatbik edilmedi. Bilakis, yek diğerini nakzeden muvakkat
kanunlar, talimatlar karşısında ahali, esnaf şaşırdı. Birtakım mümtaz ve gayr-i mesul heyetler,
cemiyetler teşekkül etti. Menafi-i umumiyye bu suretle ihlal ve gayr-i meşru hususi menfaatlere feda
edilerek ticaret esasen tacir olmayan birkaç kişinin yed-i inhisar ve ihtikarına bırakıldı.” MAZC, 3/3,
24, 12 Kanunusani 1332 (January 25, 1917), p. 315.
752
238
The CUP government denied the proposal of Ahmed Rıza by claiming that in
the given circumstances the foundation or continuation of a ministry of provisioning
was impossible. Furthermore, according to the government, the Central Provisioning
Commission properly carried out its duties related to provisioning.753 However, there
was a widespread opinion at that time about the improper functioning of the Central
Provisioning Commission as the price of basic goods would not rapidly rise otherwise
and profiteering would more effectively be prevented. In order to ensure the proper
functioning of this commission, Damat Ferid Paşa recommended the foundation of an
investigation board composed of fifteen members of the Chamber of Deputies and
fifteen members of the Senate. This board would closely follow distribution processes.
In case any abuse was noticed, the Central Provisioning Commission would be
immediately informed and profiteers would promptly be punished. Talat Paşa rejected
this proposal by stating that control power belonged to the Chamber of Deputies and
the government, therefore leaving no need to establish such a board.754 It is clear that
although there were recurring problems about provisioning, the government was not
open to new ideas to deal with the situation.
In the absence of sufficient punitive sanctions was also an issue of criticism.
According to some members of the Senate, preventing price increases would be
impossible as long as the government did not directly struggle against profiteering.
Mahmut Paşa, a member of the Senate, stated that in Germany, a profiteer who sold
any item for twice the price he paid for it would be punished with a cash penalty of
thousands of francs. According to him, if there were similar strict penalties in the
Ottoman Empire, profiteering and price increases could effectively be prevented.755
Ahmed Rıza offered an even more radical punishment for profiteers. He claimed that if
a number of profiteers were publicly executed by hanging at the bridge (probably
753
754
755
239
mentioning Galata Bridge), persons would feel thankful to the government for
punishing these people.756
Reşit Akif Paşa, another member of the Senate, also criticized the government
for the attitude towards profiteering. According to him, although some profiteers were
punished, the penalties were far from being deterrent. Muhtars (headmen of
neighborhoods), imams (muslim religious leaders in mosques) and civil servants were
frequently abusing their position and engaging in profiteering particularly in the
distribution processes of food. As a result, discontent among the people was increasing
day by day.757 When Reşit Akif Paşa made these criticisms, Talat Paşa was at the
Senate to join the discussion about law proposal of Ahmed Rıza relating to foundation
of a Ministry of Provisioning.758 Upon Reşid Akif Paşa’s criticisms, Talat Paşa stated
that the government was aware of the fact that there was a rising rate of profiteering in
Istanbul. He also claimed that the government was determined in the struggle against
profiteering.759 Nevertheless, the way of struggle Talat Paşa spoke off was not
implementing strict punishments. He claimed that if reliable people were assigned to
the distribution positions, profiteering would be prevented. There were 800 such points
of distribution in Istanbul. Therefore, according to Talat Paşa, 800 civil servants
appointed to these positions would solve the problem of profiteering.760
However, Midhat Şükrü Bey, the deputy of Burdur, stated that during the war
years, those undertaking the responsibility of distribution were mainly ordinary
“reliable” persons selected by Kara Kemal.761 In this sense, rather than state officials,
756
MAZC, 3/3, 28, 28 Kanunusani 1332 (February 10, 1917), pp. 392-393.
757
758
Interestingly enough, the discussion about law proposal of Ahmed Rıza relating to foundation of a
Ministry of Provisioning was made on a day when he was not in the Senate. MAZC, 3/3, 31, 3 Şubat
1332 (February 19, 1917).
759
760
761
Dadrian and Akçam, ‘Tehcir ve Taktil’, pp. 410-411.
240
some non-official people close to Kara Kemal fulfilled this highly profitable duty.
Kara Kemal, the leader of the local CUP organization in Istanbul, was assigned by the
CUP government to deal with almost all issues related to the economic life in the city.
Therefore, the government must most probably be informed that nonofficial people
were charged for the distribution of food, meaning that the government deliberately
overlooked the problems in distribution and profiteering. This is why even in 1917,
when living conditions gradually worsened as a result of uncontrollable price
increases, the government was still reluctant to recognize profiteering as a crime to be
punished.
The statement of Cavid Bey, Minister of Finance, related to profiteering was
also in support of that case:
Besides, what should we understand from profiteering? Ordinary profiteering

(ihtikar-ı adi) or legal profiteering (ihtikar-ı kanuni)? The legal meaning of
profiteering is storing some amount of an item and later selling it in higher
price. However, during the war there was no item whose price did not increase;
therefore, I am not sure whether blaming people who sell some items for higher
prices and punishing them for that is right or not… I would prefer buying an
item for twice its price rather than not ever finding it.762
Cavit Bey made this controversial statement while he was talking about the draft law
of Tax for War Profits (Harb Kazançları Vergisi).763 It is clear that according to Cavid
Bey, since profiteering could not be categorized as a crime, the best solution was the
implementation of a tax on war profits. This idea resulted in further high-tension
discussions in the Senate. Damat Ferit Paşa stated that the government did not focus on
the actual causes of existing problems. He gave an example from his neighborhood at
762
“Bir de ihtikardan ne anlayacağız? İhtikar-ı adi mi ihtikar-ı kanuni mi? İhtikarın mana-yı kanunisi,
her hangi bir malın miktar-ı mevcudunu iddihar ile o malı bilahare yüksek fiyata satmak demektir.
Fakat muharebe esnasında fiyatı yükselmeyen hiçbir şey yoktur ve yüksek fiyatla eşya satanları tevbih
ve muahaze etmek doğru olup olmadığını bilmiyorum…Bu eşyayı hiç bulamamaktan yüzde elli
nisbetinde pahalı olarak bulmayı tercih ederim.”, MAZC, 3/3, 47, 22 Mart 1333 (March 22, 1917), p.
313.
763
MAZC, 3/3, 47, 22 Mart 1333 (March 22, 1917), p. 313.
241
the countryside. There he had seen that some families were collecting grass and
cooking it as a meal without even adding salt and oil. This was the reality of Istanbul.
Therefore, according to Damat Ferit Paşa, earning profits from other people’s meal had
to be categorized as a kind of theft. He expressed his idea through the following
sentence: ‘Profiteering is a kind of theft and tax should not be implemented upon
theft.’764 As a matter of fact, the tax for war profits was not approved by the parliament
during the whole phase of war.765
To sum up, in the third year of the war either profiteering or price increases
were still not effectively prevented in Istanbul. On the contrary, according to Salih
Paşa, in 1917, inhabitants of Istanbul were living even in worse conditions compared
to the year before. The economic gap between ordinary people and profiteers reached
an unsustainable level. A small number of families could eat five times in a day
whereas the majority of Istanbul population was starving. Certainly, the city poor and
the civil servants receiving minimum or average salary were the people affected the
most from the economic hardships.766 As a matter of fact, after early 1917, the rise of
prices, high inflation rates, increasing costs of living and profiteering led to a high
tension among the people. The CUP government had to recognize that more concrete
decisions had to be taken to solve existing economic problems.
On April 6, 1917, a law was enacted in order to prevent profiteering and the
rise of prices.767 The main aim of this law was to determine price ceiling for basic food
items and essential consumption goods. Thus, in the market, these items would not be
764
MAZC, 3/3, 47, 22 Mart 1333 (March 22, 1917), p. 314.
765
Tax for war profits were already levied in Germany, Austria-Hungary and France at the time when
the CUP government decided to prepare a draft for a similar tax. Nevertheless, Tax for War Profits
remained as a draft until the end of the War. It would be put into effect through a decree on December
13, 1919. Toprak, İttihad Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 177. For full the text of the Law of Tax for War
see “Harb kazançları vergisi hakkında kararname, 14 Kanunuevvel 1335 (December 13, 1919)”, Düstur,
II/11, pp. 495-512.
766
767
“Mevadd-ı gıdaiyye ve havaic-i sairenin suret-i füruhtu ve tevzi hakkında kanun, 13 Cemaziyelahir
1335, 6 Nisan 1333 (April 6, 1333)”, Düstur, II/9, pp. 632-635.
242
allowed to be sold for higher prices than the ceiling specified. In Istanbul, Şehremaneti
(municipality) could buy these items from the market for these preset prices and sell
them to the people for lower prices. In this way, the government aimed at preventing
inflation and profiteering.
During the discussions of this law in the Senate, it was inquired that why the
government preferred to put a ceiling price rather than narh (fixed price). Topçu Feriki
Rıza Paşa stated that the only item sold in Istanbul for a fixed price was gas, despite
the fact that there was no gas in Istanbul for a long time. Therefore the government
had put a fixed price for an item that did not even exist. However at that time, the
prices of other basic goods had reached unaffordable levels, and this demonstrated
according to him that the government had to put fixed prices for basic goods.768 Haşim
Bey, the Director of Central Provisioning Commission, stated that the reason of not
setting fixed price on basic items was that fixed prices set on specific item immediately
led to the disappearance of that item from the market, soon after reappearing with
769
much higher prices in the black market. Therefore, according to the government,
setting fixed prices backfired and caused the rise of profiteering.
This law also included punitive sanctions for profiteers. According to third
article of the law, merchants selling determined items for higher prices than the ceiling
prices and hiding basic goods in their warehouses or shops would be punished with
imprisonment from one week to one year or cash fine from five Ottoman gold to 200
Ottoman gold.770 There is no exact information about to the extent this law was
implemented. Nevertheless, we could see from Ahmed Rıza’s comments that he was
hopeless about the capacity of this law in solving the existing economic problems.
Because, according to him, the same issues –profiteering and provisioning- had been
discussed for three years with no conclusive results. Although the government had
frequently promised for taking necessary measures, neither profiteering had been
768
MAZC, 3/3, 52, 29 Mart 1333 (March 29, 1917), p. 464.
769
MAZC, 3/3, 52, 29 Mart 1333 (March 29, 1917), p. 464.
770
“Mevadd-ı gıdaiyye ve havaic-i”, Düstur, II/9, p. 633.
243
prevented nor provisioning had been properly regulated. Therefore, he claimed that he
had lost all hope.771
Probably, Ahmed Rıza was right in his doubts because in May 1917, economic
problems in Istanbul were continuing as ever, even deteriorating further. Commodities
passed from the hands of one merchant to another for a number of times thereby
inflating the price of items to an unreasonably high point when consumers actually
accessed these items. This process, named as ‘enchainment method’ (zincirleme
usulu), had almost totally gone out of control. On the one hand, merchants dealing
with profiteering gained huge amounts of money without any effort; on the other hand,
ordinary people were suffering from lack of many basic goods.772 According to
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, this situation rather expectedly nourished a feeling of uprising
in the society.773 With the aim of decreasing widespread discontent, for the first time a
raid was conducted by the police to a commercial building. In May 1917, Istanbul
General Directorate of Security carried out the operation to Abud Efendi Hanı (a
commercial building at Çakmakçılar, Eminönü) and arrested over 200 merchants on
the basis that they were dealing with speculative enterprise. These merchants were
tried in compliance with Penal Code, Article 239.774 Following this raid, on May 24,
1917, a committee, named as Men'-i İhtikar Heyeti (Committee of Prohibition of
Profiteering) was founded under the Ministry of Interior.775
771
MAZC, 3/3, 52, 29 Mart 1333 (March 29, 1917), p. 465.
772
773
774
Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 169. According to the Article 239, merchants dealing with
speculative enterprise would be punished with imprisonment from one week to one year and cash fine
from five Ottoman gold liras to a hundred Ottoman gold liras. If the items merchandized were essential
consumption goods, then the punishment stated above would be affected as in two-folds (imprisonment
from two weeks to two years and cash fine from ten gold liras to two hundred gold liras). See,
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 872; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman
Penal Code, p. 188.
775
244
Talat Paşa being the Minister of Interior was the leader of this Committee;
nevertheless, since Talat Paşa had excessive responsibilities, the vice-president of the
Committee, Hüseyin Cahit [Yalçın] would be the actual head. The other members of
the Committee were Osman Bey, legal adviser of Ministry of Interior, Doktor Nazım
and Resuhi Bey, members of the head commission of the CUP.776 When it was
founded, the main aim of the Committee had been to make sale of dry goods
particularly imported from abroad at most two-fold of its price before the War. It
means that the Committee’s scope of authority had been limited to dry goods whereas
food items being the main objects of profiteering activities were left out.777 Although
Central Provisioning Commission was dealing with food items, in June 1917, the
scope of authority of these organizations re-structured. According to the new
arrangement, the Central Provisioning Commission would be responsible with the
regulation of sale of sugar, gas, soap and food items while Committee of Prohibition of
Profiteering would deal with dry goods, tea and coffee.778
Yalçın, describing the Committee of Prohibition of Profiteering, stated that
there was neither an actual organization nor its required instruments. The only aim was
to keep prices somehow low by frightening merchants.779 The scope of authority of
the Committee was limited to Istanbul. Therefore, when the Committee took restrictive
measures about sale of goods in Istanbul, the merchants found a number of ways to
take them out of Istanbul and to sell in Anatolia for higher prices. According to
Hüseyin Cahit, there was no way to prevent this situation because if the Committee
prohibited sale of goods out of Istanbul, it would then cause scarcity of many goods in
Anatolia.780 Despite these realities, the Committee tried to struggle against profiteering
as much as possible.
776
Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar, p. 320, 335; Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 169.
777
Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar, pp. 320-321.
778
779
245
Until August 1917, the Committee tried to abolish the ‘enchainment method’,
but they were not successful in that because the majority of merchants did not comply
with the rules and regulations set by the Committee. Moreover, a great number of
merchants found a way for escaping from scrutiny. Only a small number of non-
Muslim merchants were punished for dealing with speculative enterprise. 781 Then, the
Committee decided to set fixed prices for the goods under its scope of authority.
Initially, fixed price was determined for matches to be followed by fez and coffee. In a
short period of time the Committee set fixed prices for a variety of items from
medicine to shoes.782 Therefore, the government, which had earlier in March 1917
been opposing the practice of fixed prices had to agree for it in August 1917.
Although the Committee of Prohibition of Profiteering was highly committed
to struggle against profiteering, there were still a lot of structural problems. First of all,
most food items being materials of profiteering were not under the Committee’s
control. Therefore, profiteering over food items continued. Furthermore, the
Committee was composed of only few people participating as volunteers. Apart from
the members of the Committee, Hüseyin Cahit, Osman Bey, Doktor Nazım and Resuhi
Bey, the Istanbul Police Directorate assigned a police officer to the service of the
Committee.783 These five people were dealing with all issues about profiteering.
Moreover, the Committee was not skillful in terms of the methods of punishments it
devised. In fact, the Committee members consciously did not want to establish a
bureaucratic organization because they intended to take decisions urgently and punish
profiteers promptly.784
780
781
782
783
784
246
A typical investigation and punishment procedure of the Committee would start
with the application to the Committee of a consumer thinking that he was deceived and
a verbal complaint about a particular merchant. The police officer would then go to the
shop of the merchant and take him to the Committee’s office. If the case that he
charged unfair extra price from the consumer, then he would be compelled to refund
this amount also being immediately punished with respect to the severity of the act of
profiteering. Merchants repeatedly engaging in profiteering activities would be
arrested and sent to the prison.785 According to Yalçın, the Committee was indifferent
to even the most prestigious and powerful merchants, so they had the capacity to
prevent profiteering totally.786 As a matter of fact, in the beginning, the establishment
of the Committee of Prohibition of Profiteering and its facilities caused unease and
fear among profiteers. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to argue that this Committee
achieved absolute success in its struggle against profiteering because its scope of
authority was limited to dry goods and only a small number of food items. Therefore,
profiteering over food items continued throughout the final year of war.
The following sentences of Ahmed Rıza are explanatory for the situation in
Istanbul at that time:
[F]or four years, laws and measures about provisioning totally remained
fruitless… Abuse, theft, overt bribery and small or large scale speculation
increased day by day…Laws and regulations served only to provide personal
interests. Last year, people had difficulties in supplying provisions but this year
they are totally confused about what to do. They do not know at all what to eat;
who to apply for complaints; what law to take into consideration; whether to
comply with the practices of the government or unofficial commissions and
companies…[This inequality] is also seen in the implementation of laws. The
person selling sugar, the ceiling price for which is 14 piastres, for 250 piastres
is protected, whereas another person is sent to the court martial because of
785
Yalçın, Siyasi Anılar, p. 336. According to the prison registers, in August 1917, there were no
prisoners incarcerated due to profiteering in the Istanbul Central Prison. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15
Şevval 1333 (August 4, 1917). It means that, in general, profiteers were not punished with
imprisonment.
786
247
selling matches for 30 liras instead of 20 liras. There is a saying: ‘Biri yer biri
bakar, kıyamet ondan kopar (All conflicts can be traced back to a quarrel
between the haves and have nots)’. While, one conspicuously wastes what he
earns through favoritism in a primrose path, the other sleeps hungry in a dark
and cold room.787
It is clear that despite the government’s efforts, especially since after mid-1917, there
still were no concrete results in terms of either the maintenance of proper provisioning
or the prohibition of profiteering. Furthermore, laws, rules and regulations were not
applied to everyone equally. It means that although the government and commissions
began implementing legal measures against profiteering after mid-1917, it never
turned to become a wholesale struggle against profiteering until the end of the Great
War.
There were two basic reasons for that. First, many people including merchants
close to the CUP, the bureaucrats and officers were inside such economic relations.
Therefore, an overall struggle against profiteering would bear the risk of damaging
“the feeling of unity and solidarity” for the CUP government.788 Second and more
important, the attempts for avoiding speculative enterprise and profiteering were not
realistic when the main economic policies of the CUP are taken into consideration
during the war years. Kara Kemal played a key role in the establishment of national
enterprises in Istanbul through his strong network among merchants. As examined in
detail in the second chapter, the provisioning policies implemented in Istanbul
787
“[D]ört seneden beri iaşeye mütealik yapılan kanunlar, ittihaz edilen tedbirler de hep akim
kaldı…Suiistimal, hırsızlık, aleni irtikab, küçük büyük spekülasyon gittikçe arttı. O derece ki kanunlar,
kararlar menafi-i şahsiyeye temine hizmet etmekten başka bir şeye yaramadı. Ahali geçen sene erzak
tedarikinde müşkilat çekerdi, bu sene ne yapacağını büsbütün şaşırdı. Ne yiyeceğini, kime müracaat ve
şikayet, hangi kanuna tevfikan hareket, hangi memurun sözüne, Hükümetin mi gayr-i resmi şirketlerin,
cemiyetlerin mi, kimin ermine itaat edeceğini bilemiyor…Bu müsavatsızlık kanunların tatbikatında da
görülüyor. 14 kuruştan yukarı mubayaa edilmediği resmen bildirilen şekeri 250 kuruşa kadar satan,
mazhar-ı himaye oluyor, 20 paralık kibriti 30 paraya satan satan, Divan-ı Harbe sevkediliyor. Biri yer
biri bakar, kıyamet ondan kopar derler. Biri mazhar-ı muavenet ve iltimas olarak kazandığını zevk ve
safahat aleminde bol bol israf ediyor, diğeri geceleri karanlık ve soğuk bir odada aç uyuyor.” MAZC,
3/4, 7, 26 Teşrinisani 1333 (November 26, 1917), p. 81.
788
248
provided the capital for the establishment of national enterprises.789 In this regard,
merchants/profiteers making huge amounts of money through speculation constituted
the burgeoning class of Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the CUP tried
to establish a national bourgeois class and the necessary capital achieve that was
closely related to war profits, while on the other hand, it decided to struggle with the
same class. Due to this contradiction, the main target of relevant CUP policies
remained as the lowest segment of profiteers: the shopkeepers and small business
owners. Furthermore, non-Muslim merchants were tightly controlled. They were tried
and sentenced to imprisonment and fine. However, most of the powerful profiteers
who were close to the CUP continued to make profits within the war conditions.790
To sum up, due to these two causes, the CUP government did not even
recognize profiteering as a crime during the first two war years. However, especially
after 1917, the discontent of the inhabitants of Istanbul compelled the government to
take some concrete measures against profiteering. After mid-1917, several
commissions “to struggle against profiteering” were founded, and a number of laws
and regulations were declared. In fact, profiteering became so visible and disturbing
that it became impossible to deny it. However, it never came to be regarded as the
most serious crime by the government and official crime records never included
profiteering. Therefore, profiteering remained as an “ignored crime” until the end of
the Great War.
Similar to profiteering, bribery increased in Istanbul as the war extended. The
government’s attitude towards this crime will be examined in the next section.
5.2.3.2 Bribery (Rüşvet)
In the second chapter dealing with the socio-economic situation of Istanbul

during the War years, it was indicated that civil servants earning fixed income were
789
For detailed analysis see Chapter 2, pp. 50-53.
790
Toprak, İttihat Terakki ve Cihan Harbi, p. 174-175.
249
one of the main groups affected from the War. As the inflation rate and prices
escalated during the War, the purchasing power of civil servants dramatically
decreased.791 Civil servants tried to cope with worsening economic conditions in
several ways. To preserve their dignity many of those sold their valuables and
household goods,792 while many others had to find secondary jobs.793
However, as the war extended, economic difficulties compelled civil servants
into committing illegal acts. Especially, those carrying out judicial duties were left to
struggle against deteriorating conditions, thereby being occasionally led to abuse their
authority in cases strictly requiring their impartiality.794 As a matter of fact, in time,
corruption became widespread among civil servants performing different duties.
Although, according to the memoirs, and the existing conditions during the war
strengthened the possibility of rising number of bribery cases in Istanbul, the numbers
in crime tables and crime statistics were surprisingly far from supporting this
argument. In fact, the government and police did not try to conceal bribery. On the
contrary, this crime was included in the crime tables in 1916. Nevertheless, the rates
demonstrated therein were extremely low. Therefore, in publishing the rates for
bribery, the government might have had secondary aims rather than making this crime
publicly visible. According to Police Journal and crime statistics of the General
Directorate of Security, bribery rates in Istanbul during the war years as in follows:
791
For details of this issue see pp. 57-59.
792
MAZC, 3/4, 7, 26 Teşrinisani 1333 (November 26, 1917), p. 81.
793
794
250
Table 9: Rates of Bribery in Istanbul during the Great War
Jan795 Feb796 Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug797 Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1916 - - 0 2 1 5 6 0 2 6 2 0
1917 10798 5 - - 1 3 1 - - 0 3 5
1918 4 - - 5 4 5 3 7 8 1 0 1
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
(March 26 1917).799
The table indicates that in 1915 there was no bribery case in Istanbul; however, this
seems questionable. There are individual bribery cases after 1916 but they never
reached a high level during the war years according to the existing data. In fact, it is
quite difficult to determine to what extent these numbers represent the actual case. For
example, according to the crime tables published in the Police Journal, there was no
bribery case in Istanbul in 1915. Nevertheless, according to another data, in 1915, even
just from the Istanbul Police Directorate, three police officers and one deputy police
commissioner were dismissed due to bribery.800 The number of police officers and
deputy police commissioners dismissed from the Istanbul Police Directorate due to
795
The data of January 1916 indicating the first two weeks of the month. Polis Mecmuası, No. 86. For
the data of January 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
796
For the data of February 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 20,
1917).
797
The data of August 1915 and 1916 demonstrating the first two weeks of the month. Polis Mecmuası,
No. 76.
798
In the Crime Statistics of January 1917, there were two different categories for bribery. One was
called as rüşvet (bribe), the other was named as sirkat-i emval-i emiriyye, irtikab (theft of state property,
take a bribe). In Table XVII, the sum of these two categories was indicated. It was the case for the
numbers given for February 1917.
799
800
“Polis Divanının [331 ve] 332 Seneleri Zarfında Terkin-i Kaydına Karar Verdiği Memurinin
Mukayesesini Gösterir Cedveldir”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, 9 Receb 1335/1 Mayıs 1333 (May 1, 1917),
p. 69.
251
involvement in bribery increased to ten in 1916.801 Only these examples suffice to
indicate that there were several cases of bribery in Istanbul and the number of these
cases was certainly higher than indicated in the statistics.
The following data also verifies this argument. There was an widely-known
reality about widespread corruption in transportation of basic goods by railway cars as
well as in package trade (koli ticareti).802 Since the majority of railway cars were used
for military transportation, there was scarcity of railway cars for use in trade. In theory,
merchants could use railway cars and packages by submitting exportation certificate
(ihracat vesikası). However, in practice, a great number of people not having anything
to export and not being actual merchants, could obtain exportation certificate by
bribing state officials. Then these people sold their certificates to merchants for higher
prices.803 There were a large number of state officials involved in such corruption of
railway cars and packages. For instance, between September 1917 and October 1918
almost two hundred civil servants were dismissed from their posts in the Ministry of
Postal and Telegraph Services (Posta ve Telgraf Nezareti).804 However, compared to
this number, for the same dates, only forty-five bribery cases were demonstrated in
crime tables of the Police Journal (Table IX). Therefore, the government probably did
not prefer to publish actual numbers of bribery because it was not successful in taking
necessary measures to prevent such illegal activities of state officials which actually
stemmed from the economic circumstances during the war years.
As an option, the CUP government could increase the salaries of the state
officials in order to support their purchasing power in response to the continuously
rising costs of living. Nevertheless, this was impossible given the economic dynamics
of the war. On the contrary, as stated in the second chapter, at the beginning of the
801
Out of ten, seven were police officers and three were deputy police commissioners. “Polis Divanının
[331 ve] 332 Seneleri Zarfında…”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, p. 69.
802
Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-Terakki’nin Sorgulanması, p. 202.
803
Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-Terakki’nin Sorgulanması, pp. 406-407.
804
252
war, the government actually decreased the salaries of state officials in order to
decrease public expenses. However, in the following years, the worsening economic
situation of state officials resulted in problems such as insufficient public service and
corruption. This issue was discussed in the parliament in November 1917. As a result
of parliamentary discussions, the decision was that it was impossible to increase
salaries of the state officials.805 As a matter of fact, even in case that salaries were
actually increased, it would still not be a solution because merchants would
immediately raise the prices at the same rate. Therefore, while the purchasing power of
state officials would remain indifferent, economic conditions would become even
heavier for ordinary people. As a remedy to improve economic conditions of the state
officials, the parliament decided to exempt them from paying taxes.806
However, there is no exact data as to the effectiveness of this decision to
improve the economic situation of civil servants and prevent them from committing
bribery. According to the prison registers of 1917, in the Central Prison of Istanbul, out
of 583 prisoners, there was just one prisoner incarcerated due to committing bribery.
He was punished with imprisonment of three years.807 Unfortunately, we have only
this extremely specific data about implementation of punishments to committers of
bribery in Istanbul. Therefore, due to lack of data, rather than their actual
implementation, we had to look at the Penal Code in order to evaluate punishments
related to bribery.
Bribery was one of the most important problems of the Ottoman Empire when
the Constitutional Regime was founded in 1908. Therefore, the CUP changed some of
the articles related to bribery in 1911.808 In the original version of the Penal Code,
805
806
807
808
In the Penal Code of 1858, bribery was the subject of the third part of the first chapter. The Articles
67-81 were related to bribery. In 1911, four articles were repealed and substituted by new articles.
Furthermore, the CUP government repealed the Articles 70-75 completely and did not substitute them
by new ones. Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 60-69.
253
Article 67 provided the definition for bribery. Although bribery was generally regarded
as a crime committed by state officials, in this article there was no direct and explicit
emphasis on state officials. In the original version of Article 67, bribe was described as
follows:
Whatever is received or given, under whatsoever designation [name] it may be,

for the purpose of furthering a design is a bribe. Also if any movable or
immovable property is by way of bribery purchased or sold for a price which is
less or more by an excessive difference than its value regard being taken of
time and place the difference between the price at which that immovable or
movable property has been sold in this manner and true value of it is actually a
bribe…809
The CUP changed this article making a clear emphasis on the relationship between
bribery and state officials. The new article was as follows:
In the same way as money received, or goods taken under the designation of
present or other advantages secured by judges or generally by officials or by
elected or appointed members of official Councils [mecalis-i resmiyye] who
undertake official duties or functions or by persons who being private
individuals are charged with an official duty as an arbitrator or expert or by
advocates in order to do or not to do the thing which they are by law or
regulation bound to do or to do or not to do the thing which they are bound not
to do, is bribe, so also the excessive difference between the actual value and the
price named of emval and emlak purchased or sold by them with this object at a
low or increased price is bribe.810
809
810
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 62. Turkish text of Article 67 was as
follows: ‘Hükkamın ve aliyyel-ıtlak vezaif ve hidmat-ı resmiyyeyi der-uhde eyleyen bil-cümle memurin
ve müntehab ve mensub-ı bilcümle mecalis-i resmiyye azasının ve efrad-ı nasdan olub da hükm-i ve ehl-i
hayra gibi bir vazife-i resmiyye ile mükellef bulunan eşhasın ve dava vekillerinin kanunen ve nizamen
yapmaya mecbur olduğu şeyi yapmak veya yapmamak veya yapmamaya mecbur olduğu şeyi yapmak
veya yapmamak için ahz eyledikleri akçe ve hediye namıyla aldıkları eşya veya temin eyledikleri sair
menafi rüşvet olduğu gibi bu maksada mebni dun veya ziyade bahaya iştira ve bey ettikleri emval ve
emlakın kıymet-i hakikiyesiyle semen-i müsemma beynindeki fark-ı fahiş dahi rüşvettir .’, “28 Zilhicce
1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, p. 443.
254
Through this amendment, the CUP regime clarified the description of bribery. In
accordance with the new article, bribery was determined as a crime committed by all
kinds of state officials and also any other people somehow having a relationship with
official duties. Although this article made it clear bribery was a crime committed by
state officials, the crime statistics of January and February 1917 demonstrates that out
of twenty-five perpetrators of bribery in Istanbul, there were just three civil servants.811
The majority of the committers of bribery were craftsmen (8) and boatmen (8)
according to this data. This conclusion is surprising, because although persons who
resorted to giving a bribe (raşi) were also regarded as guilty according to the Penal
Code, the main actor in bribery accepting to take the bribe (mürteşi) was to be a state
official. In other words, there were legally two sides of this crime. In this case, it can
be argued that the majority of those put on the records might be people who committed
unsuccessful bribery attempts. Since these people were caught when they offered
bribe, the other side of the bribery –state officials– were not reflected in the crime
statistics.
The CUP government amended the articles about punishments for bribery in
1911. According to the original version of Article 68, any person accepting a bribe was
to be punished with temporary confinement in a fortress (muvakkaten kalabendlik) as
well as paying twofold of the bribe as a cash penalty. Furthermore, the person would
be dismissed from the office for six years.812 In the new version of the article,
punishments of temporary confinement in a fortress and cash penalty remained as it
earlier was. Furthermore, the duration for confinement in fortress was determined as
five years or more if the act of bribery was resulted in violation of right.813 Actually,
the penalties for the person giving or offering bribe were similar to the punishments
811
Furthermore, there was no civil servant among the perpetrators of bribery in January 1917 in
Istanbul. Therefore, these three civil servants accepted a bribe in February 1917. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.
30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917), BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335
(March 26, 1917).
812
For the details of Article 68 see Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 845.
813
“28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 443-444.
255
mentioned above. Between March 1916 and April 1917, eleven people were banished
from Istanbul because of committing bribery.814 These people were sent to Çorum for
temporary confinement in a fortress for three to five years.815
With the amendment of 1911 the dismissal penalty for persons giving or
offering a bribe was removed from the text of Article 69.816 It may be argued that the
CUP government found it more appropriate to leave the decision about termination of
office in case of bribery to the state institutions themselves. Probably, the internal
regulations of each state institution indicated the relevant specifications. For instance,
bribery was one of the causes of dismissal from office within the institution of Police
Organization during the war years.817
In the same way, bribery was considered as requiring the dismissal of officers
and field-grade officers from the army. A provisional law related to this issue was
enacted on March 10, 1915. The provisional law stated that due to the constraints of
war conditions, the dismissal of officers and field-grade officers from the army was to
be left to after the end of the war.818 This was a good example of how punishments for
some crimes committed by state officials were determined by the conditions of the
war. Since, for the government, officers were the most “important” state officials
during war, even when they committed bribery, officers and high-ranking officers
were not all at once expelled from the army as long as the war continued. The
existence of such a provisional law and the low number of state officials among the
814
815
Only one of the perpetrators of bribery was sent to Kayseri. BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem
1336 (November 4, 1917).
816
For details of Article 69, see “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3,
p. 444.
817
“Polis Divanının [331 ve] 332 Seneleri”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 89, p. 69.
818
“Seferberlikte tard cezasını müstelzim ceraim-i irtikab eden ümera ve zabitanın kabl’e-l-muhakeme
nisbet-i askeriyenin suret-i kati hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat, 23 Rebiülahir 1333, 25 Şubat 1330 (March
10, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 446.
256
perpetrators of bribery in the crime statistics point to the fact that the legal sanctions in
that respect over state officials were at a minimum level during the war years.
In fact, this might also be evaluated as a deliberate governmental policy to
relieve to some extent the burden upon state officials whose living conditions had
continuously deteriorated. In other words, since the government could not produce any
policies to improve the economic conditions of state officials, it opted for somehow
ignoring bribery, or postponing consistent measures against it. Accordingly, it is
possible that the rates of bribery in the crime tables were intentionally indicated lower
than actual. There can be another possibility as well. Maybe these numbers were
correct but since the government and security forces were reluctant to pursue in a
determined way the committers of this crime due to the causes mentioned above, the
numbers officially published became lower than actual. In this respect, on the one
hand, the government pretended to be strict about this crime by including it to the
crime tables, while on the other hand, referring to the low rates of bribery allowed for a
message to the public that cases of bribery was not high. Thus, the overall policy of
the CUP government towards bribery was an important indicator of how crimes and
punishments were used as an instrument of official policy-making during periods of
crisis such as war.
In this chapter, two main arguments about crimes are discussed through an
analysis of three crimes –theft, profiteering and bribery – related to wartime economic
dynamics. First, as argued in the first chapter, specifying what is criminal and
delinquent is highly influenced by the political context. Second, the government and
lawmakers has a great discretionary power in determining what is criminal.
The Great War actually provided an appropriate political context that allowed
the government free rein in specifying what was criminal and how to punish. For
instance, although profiteering was an obvious problem influencing the daily lives of
persons, the government was able to ignore this crime until mid-1917. Furthermore,
since government did not effectively develop any policies to prevent bribery, it
deliberately distorted the statistics regarding this crime. However, contrary to
257
profiteering and bribery, theft always remained as an important element of crime
records. The government made this crime publicly visible not with the aim of
struggling against it, but to repress the lower classes.
Wartime economic realities were the real reason behind the rise of theft,
profiteering and bribery. Therefore, without making structural economic reforms, it
was impossible to struggle against any of these crimes. The first and foremost
requirement was to devise a program for a committed struggle against inflation and
speculative enterprises. If that had been the case, then the rates of theft and bribery
would definitely be kept somewhat lower, while profiteering would also be prevented.
However, it is a fact that such an attitude would radically contradict with the economic
policy of the CUP government, which aimed at creating a Turkish-Muslim bourgeois
class. The necessary capital for the establishment of national bourgeoisie and national
enterprises was mostly provided from war profits.819 It means that a wholesale struggle
against speculative enterprise was impossible for the CUP. As a result, starting with
the early years of war, inflation, black market, and unequal access to basic necessities
became inevitable in economic life, which in turn led to booming rates of theft and
bribery.
It would be right to say that there was a vicious circle of economic
inefficiencies and defective economic policies during the war. The government
pretended to develop a “criminal policy” without making any structural changes. The
components of this criminal policy were making theft publicly visible; ignoring
profiteering; and overlooking bribery. Such an official attitude makes it clear that
actual criminal dimension of these issues never had the priority for the government.
The policies against these crimes were rather used as instruments for political and
economic aims.
The survival of the state and the continuation of the CUP regime were the main
concerns during the Great War. In the next chapter, two crimes - battery or insulting
remarks against state officials during office; and opposition to the decisions and
819
Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-1985, (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1988), p. 18.
258
regulations of the government – will be analyzed in this context. The regulations
concerning firearms and official documents will also be examined in a similar fashion.
Finally, amnesties will also be taken into consideration as an important element of
criminal policy implemented during the war.
259
CHAPTER 7
SURVIVAL OF THE STATE, AMNESTIES AND A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF

CRIMINALITY
During the Great War years, it became the foremost concern for all belligerent
countries to ensure the survival of the state. Similar was the case for the Ottoman
Empire while the same mentality was inevitably blended with the continuity of the
CUP regime and thus conditioned the workings of internal security policies. On the
one hand, the government instituted stricter mechanisms of control and surveillance, as
examined in the forth chapter. On the other hand, priorities of the government in
shaping criminal policy changed remarkably.
It is not possible to demonstrate with specific examples to what extent the
government assigned importance to the continuation of its power because in fact it
became apparent as a totalistic set of thinking in each and every policy of the
government at that time. However, in order to show some of its particular workings,
we will focus on two categories of crimes included in the crime tables in 1916, namely
battery and insult against state officials during office, and disobedience to official rules
and regulations.
Battery and insult against state officials, as a crime category, had already been
an important issue for the CUP government before the Great War. A great number of
the articles in the Penal Code related to this crime were changed in 1911. Through
these changes relevant punishments were clarified and made stricter, while the
inclusion of crimes against state officials became in itself a direct sign of the
government’s heightened sensitivity about this issue. During the war years, the
effectiveness of security forces in the maintenance of order in Istanbul gained further
importance for the CUP regime. Therefore, this crime was included in crime tables as a
crime category in 1916.
260
Disobedience to official rules and regulations was also included in crime tables
and this had two reasons. On the one hand, for the state elites, the implementation of
rules and regulations was a prerequisite for maintaining public order. On the other
hand, referring to increasing rates of this crime the government enhanced its capacity
to exercise more repressive policies. Therefore, analyzing this crime category will
definitely give us an idea about the extent to which the government was successful in
effectively implementing rules and regulations in Istanbul.
As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Great War, although theft,
profiteering and bribery caused foremost socio-economic problems in the society, the
CUP government did not undertake any wholesale program to eliminate them. For
example, although petty theft rates continuously increased during the Great War and,
as a result, the rates of this crime were deliberately made visible in the statistics, this
did not prompt the government to make any changes in the Penal Code or institute
mechanisms to prevent this crime.
However, there were other criminal issues about which the government made
regulations. In this sense, there were addenda to the Penal Code and a number of
regulations about the possession of firearms and the issuance of official documents,
both of which directly related to the power of the state. For instance, the set of
regulations on firearms must be evaluated as attempts to enforce the state's monopoly
on the legitimate use of force. The Great War provided the conditions for legitimizing
collection of firearms from ordinary persons as well as for implementing harsher
punishments to persons opposing relevant rules and regulations. The same was true for
the issuance of official documents as their forgery for the purpose of travelling freely
constituted another important concern for the CUP government. It is clear that such
fraud was regarded as a threat to the state's exclusive authority.
Finally, in this chapter, amnesties will also be analyzed. During the war years,
the CUP government declared a number of amnesties in order to remedy the problem
of overcrowd in prisons as well as to create an extra source for military mobilization.
However, as a result of continuing amnesties, a vicious circle of criminality emerged
261
in Istanbul. Therefore as an important part of the wartime criminal policy, the actual
content of a series of amnesties alongside with their consequences for the criminality
in Istanbul will be discussed next.
7.1 Battery and Insult on Duty (Esna-yı Vazifede Hakaret ve Darb)
According to the Ottoman political system, officials holding an office of

authority in government directly represented the authority of the Ottoman State. In this
respect, officials and the attitude of persons towards them had specific importance for
the government as an indicator of power and authority. In the Penal Code, the seventh
part of the first chapter was devoted to this issue.820 During the Constitutional Regime,
out of five articles (Articles 112-116), only the first article regulating punishments of
persons for their acts of insulting, intimidation and vituperation against state officials
remained as it was in 1858.821 Articles 113-116 were repealed and substituted by new
ones in 1911.
Article 113 delineating punishments for crimes against security forces were
repealed in 1911. The new version of the article aggravated punishments. For example,
in the old version of the Article, the punishment for insulting, intimidation and
vituperation to lower rank soldiers, police officers or other civil servants carrying out
their duties was cash penalty.822 Alongside that, the new version of the Article brought
in imprisonment penalty of one week to three months for the same crime. According to
the Penal Code, if the same type of crimes were committed against higher ranks of
820
The seventh part entitled ‘Punishment of Persons Opposing, Disobeying or Insulting the Officials of
the Imperial Ottoman Government’ (Memurin-i Devlet-i Aliyyeye Muhalefet ve Adem-i İtaat ve Hakaret
Edenlerin Cezası) included five articles (Articles 112-116). Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı
Hukuku, pp. 852-853; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 86.
821
Punishment of these acts was imprisonment for one week to six months. See Article 112, Akgündüz,
Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 852; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal
Code, p. 86.
822
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 852.
262
military and civilian security forces, there would be heavier punishments such as
imprisonment for fifteen days to six months.823 In the case of battery or use of
violence against security forces or officials being on duty would be punished from six
weeks to two years.824 In the old version of Article 115, the punishment for wounding
and causing injury of government officials on duty was unclear.825 In 1911, the CUP
made an amendment in this article to specify punishment. According to the new
version of the article, the punishment of wounding an official would be imprisonment
for six months to three years.826 Thereby the ambiguity was clarified.
Article 116, the last article about crimes against state officials was also
repealed and substituted by a new one in 1911. In fact, this article was originally about
cash penalties for persons being officially invited to the Courts and Councils and
failing to do so without any acceptable excuse.827 The new version of the Article
comprehended elaborate punishments for the crimes against state officials especially
those charged with the fulfillment of official decisions such as the wrist of summons or
arrest. The text of the new Article was as follows:
Article 116: Those who dare to exercise compulsive or violent treatment or to

do any other effective act in order to attack or to impede the legal acts of
823
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 88. In the old version of the Article, the
punishment of the same crime was imprisonment for one week to one month. Akgündüz, Mukayeseli
İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 852-853.
824
In the English translation of this Article there is a mistake. The duration of imprisonment was written
as six months to one year. Nevertheless, in the original text of Düstur, imprisonment duration was
indicated as ‘six months to two years’. The original text of the new version of Article 114 was as
follows: ‘Memurinden birini veya asakir-i nizamiyeden veya jandarma ve polis sınıfından bir neferi,
memuriyetlerini icrada iken yahud icra ettikleri hükm-i memuriyetten dolayı darba veya muamele-i cebr
ve şiddete cüret eden olur ise her halde altı aydan iki seneye kadar hapis olunur. ’ “28 Zilhicce 1274
Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, p. 446.
825
In the original version of Article 115, it was stated that ‘He [the person who wounded an official] is
punished with double the punishment provided by law according to the degree of his offense’, Bucknill
and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 90.
826
“28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, p. 446.
827
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 91; Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve
Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 853.
263
executive officers, or of an armed force, or of [revenue] collectors or of
mubashirs or policemen bearing writs of summons or arrest, or of officers
delegated by the courts or of officers of the administrative or judicial police
while they are serving or putting into execution the laws or regulations of the
State or the orders of the Government or the decisions or judgments of the
Courts or the provisions of writs of summons or arrest or the writs of invitation
or citation or other judicial documents are punished as follows: Firstly, if these
acts are committed by more than twenty persons and all of them are or one
from amongst them is armed openly punishment of imprisonment for from
three months to three years is awarded; and in the case of there being no armed
person among them punishment of for from one month to two years is inflicted
on such persons…828
The rest of the Article regulates the punishments for the same crime in the case that it
was committed by three to twenty persons, and less than three persons. In each case,
the punishment was specified as imprisonment. In this sense, the CUP aggravated the
cash penalty that had been main punishment for similar crimes since 1858. Another
important dimension of this amendment was the specification of the type of officials
whose prevention from carrying out their duties would be regarded as a “crime”. In
this way, the civilian and military security forces as well as all the officials that acted
in accordance with decisions taken by administrative and judicial institutions were
secured through law. These amendments were important indicators of the CUP’s
administrative understanding. Especially, the intention to protect military and civilian
security forces show that the “maintenance of public security” had became a major
issue for the CUP government.
During the war years there were not any amendments in the articles related to
crimes against state officials; therefore, the articles mentioned above were in effect
until the end of the Empire. Nevertheless, the implementation of punishments on
828
Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 91. A part of Turkish text of this Article
is as follows: ‘116 ıncı madde-i kaime: İcra memurları ve kuvve-i müsellaha ve tahsildarlar ile ihzar ve
tevkif mezkurelerini hamil bulunan memurlar ve zabıta-i mülkiye ve adliye memurları kavanin ve
nizamat-ı devleti ve evamir-i hükümeti ve mukarrerat ve ilamat-ı mahakimi ve ihzar ve tevkif
mezkureleri ahkamını ve davetiyye ve celb mezkurelerini vesair evrak-ı adliyeyi tebliğ ve tenfiz ettikleri
sırada bunlara tecavüzle icraat-ı kanuniyelerine mümanaat için muamele-i cebr ve şiddete veya diğer
bir fiil-i müessire cüret edenler ber-vech-i ati mücazat olunur.’ “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı
Cezanın bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, p. 446.
264
perpetrators of crimes against state officials became harsher during the war. For
example, out of 583 prisoners in the Central Prison of Istanbul in 1917, only four were
sentenced to death penalty. Three of these prisoners were convicted by homicide while
one of them was sentenced to death penalty because he had brandished weapon to a
police officer.829 However, according to the Penal Code, the punishment of this crime
was actually imprisonment for six months to two years.830 Therefore, this harshness in
punishment could only be explained with regard to the extraordinary conditions of
war. The decision of death penalty for this crime indicates two things about war
conditions. First, since the importance of ‘public order’ increased to a higher level
during the war years, the CUP government began to take heavier measures in order to
give out the message that in the case of slightest threat to the security forces, the
perpetrators would be punished in the harshest ways. Second, even without making
any legal amendments in the Penal Code, heavier punishments were directly exercised
to the extent that the state perceived the war conditions as necessitating so.831
The government and security forces were probably much more sensitive to the
crimes against state officials in Istanbul because it was the administrative and political
829
In the prison registers, his crime was written as ‘zabıta memuruna teşhir-i silah’ (brandishing
weapon to a police officer). See, BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1333 (August 4, 1917). Also see
footnote 133, p. 38.
830
‘113üncü Madde-i Kaime: Asakir-i nizamiyenin ve hükümet tarafından alel-ıtlak zabıtaya ve idareye
memuriyetlerini icrada iken yahud icra ettikleri hükm-i memuriyetten dolayı kadr ve namuslarına
nakisa verecek suretle haklarında muamele-i hakarete ve itale-i lisana ve ihafeye cüret edenler olur ise
bir haftadan üç haftaya kadar hapis….ve bu misillü hakaret ve ihafenin icrasında teşhir-i silah eden
olur ise her halde altı aydan iki senye kadar hapis olunur’, “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın
bazı mevadını”, Düstur, II/3, p. 446. For the English translation of this Article see, Bucknill and
Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 88.
831
Probably, this was a decision of court-martial. During the war years, since courts-martial took
decisions more rapidly than civilian courts, not only military issues but also civilian criminal cases
became subject of these military courts. According to Yalman, “penalties [given by courts-martial] were
not always fixed by law.” Yalman, Turkey in the World War, p. 246. Therefore, levying such a heavy
penalty for an offence of brandishing weapon to a police might have its roots in being a decision given
by court-martial. Assassination of state officials was also one of the offences within the jurisdiction of
courts-martial during the war years. The main argument behind this situation was that assassination of
state officials was regarded as an offense against internal and/or external security of the state. Köksal,
Tarihsel Süreç İçinde, pp. 95-96. It can be argued that brandishing weapon to a police officer was
perceived as an assassination attempt, thereby making it a case eligible to be determined on court-
martial. Hence, such perpetrators would be punished with the heaviest penalty.
265
center of the Empire. Therefore, it is essential to examine the rate of crimes against the
state officials during the Great War in Istanbul. Relevant existing data is as follows:
Table 10: Rates of Battery and Insult on Duty in Istanbul during the Great War
Jan832 Feb833 Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug834 Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1916 0 - 8 8 11 4 4 1 18 12 17 4
1917 11 10 - - 7 15 7 - - 2 5 9
1918 6 - - 4 9 6 3 8 10 10 5 15
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
(March 26 1917).835
This table illustrates that during the first year of the war, there were almost no cases of
crimes against state officials in Istanbul. Compared to the first year, there was a
significant increase in the rates of these crimes since 1916. Although the number of
crimes against state officials never reached a high level, it still was never as low as it
was in 1915 either. The slight rise in crimes against state officials during the war years
indicates that the government encountered a kind of social resistance while
implementing its policies, laws and regulations. In this sense, at this time, penetration
to the society by using instruments of infrastructural power became much more
problematic for the CUP government in these years. It must be kept in mind that these
numbers represent the situation in Istanbul where the state authority was stronger than
anywhere else in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the
832
the data of January 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
833
For the data of February 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 20,
1917).
834
No. 76.
835
266
existence of crimes against state officials even in Istanbul was an indicator of
weakening penetration power of the state into society during the Great War. As the
trend continued to be so, repressive and radical measures came to scene. The exercise
of punishment of death penalty for simple crimes such as brandishing weapon to a
police officer can thus be regarded as an example of increasingly authoritative
administrative policies of the CUP. Furthermore, intending to make crimes against
state officials publicly-known by including them into the crime tables in 1916 had a
practical advantage for the CUP. In this way, the government gained upper hand in its
attempts at widening the scope of jurisdiction, and the power and authority of security
forces.
According to the existing data, during January and February 1917, out of the
twenty-two offenders of crimes against state officials in Istanbul, twelve were
craftsmen. There were six unemployed persons, three civil servants and one domestic
worker who committed several crimes such as battery, insulting and opposition against
state officials on duty.836 Although this data is not enough to make generalizations, the
number of craftsmen among the offenders of crimes against state officials was
remarkable. In fact, although there is no detailed account of these crimes to support
deeper analysis, it can be argued that craftsmen constituted one of the major groups
opposing state officials during the war. It is certain that the living standards of
craftsmen in Istanbul remarkably deteriorated during the war years as a result of
aggravating economic conditions. Contrary to the merchants making enormous profits
making advantage of the war conditions, the craftsmen were probably deprived of their
means of earning money. Their increasing tendency to commit crimes should be
considered within the socio-economic context of Istanbul during the Great War.
As a matter of fact, the state officials who were opposed by persons in several
ways such as battery or insulting were representatives of state authority. They aimed to
implement laws, rules and regulations. In this sense, opposition to decisions and
836
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917); BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43,
26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 20, 1917).
267
regulations is another important crime category which could provide us hints about
crime policy of the CUP government during the war years.
7.2 Opposition to Decisions and Regulations (Mukarrerat ve Nizamata Muhalefet)
This category of crime was included in the crime tables published in the Police
Journal after March 1916 alongside with the crimes against state officials and bribery.
As a matter of fact, opposition to decisions and regulations is an important conceptual
category in terms of evaluating the infrastructural power of the CUP government vis-à-
vis the society. In other words, the rate of this crime directly provides hints as to the
extent the CUP government was successful in the implementation of its rules,
regulations and laws during the war years. Furthermore, the rate of this crime also
gives an idea about resistance and/or consent of the societal elements to rules,
regulations and laws.
In 1918, the category of crime entitled ‘Opposition to Decisions and
Regulations’ was changed to be ‘Opposition to the Decisions of the Government’
(Mukarrerat-ı Hükümete Muhalefet). Although this may seem as a slight change, it
corresponded to somewhat more than the addition of a single word. In fact, from the
beginning of the War, the Constitutional Regime became increasingly a single party
regime rather than being a parliamentary one. In other words, the CUP government
maintained all the state power during the war, as it provided appropriate conditions for
that. Therefore, all the decisions, rules and regulations during the Great War were
implementations of the CUP government. In this sense, opposition to official
decisions, rules and regulations were directly perceived as opposition to the CUP
government. Hence, the change in the name of the crime category as mentioned above
should actually be considered as a reflection of this mentality. The relevant statistics
during the Great War was as follows:
268
Table 11: Rates of Opposition to Decisions and Regulations in Istanbul during
the Great War
Jan837 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug838 Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1916 0 - 9 5 5 6 9 3 4 2 1 60
1917 46 - - - 80 51 39 - - 29 19 43
1918 27 - - 167 46 55 17 13 23 4 3 5
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
(March 26 1917).839
The table indicates that during the last two years of the war, the number of crimes
related to opposition to decisions and regulations remarkably increased in Istanbul.
Especially, in April 1918, opposition to decisions of the government reached its
highest point with 167 cases. In fact, as mentioned earlier, in 1917 and 1918, living
conditions continuously deteriorated in Istanbul. Furthermore, as the war continued to
extend, people in home front began to lose their hope and belief in victory. Therefore,
not only the mobilization of the home front but also the implementation of decisions,
rules and regulations became much more problematic for the CUP government
especially in the last two years of the war. In other words, in the eyes of society, the
CUP government probably began to lose legitimacy that was sine qua non for the
implementation of official policies. The rising number of opposition cases to decisions
and regulations could be a reflection of this situation.
837
The data of January 1916 and 1917 indicating the first two weeks of the month. Polis Mecmuası, No.
86.
838
No. 76.
839
269
Punishments related to this crime were regulated in the last chapter of the Penal
Code.840 Therefore, this crime could be categorized as kabahat requiring cash penalty
or imprisonment for twenty-four hours to one week. According to the prison registers
of 1917, there was no prisoner imprisoned because of opposition to decisions and
regulations in the Istanbul Central Prison. This was probably because the perpetrators
generally paid cash penalty. Another possibility was that the offenders were
imprisoned in police stations, smaller prisons or detention houses for a short period of
time. It is clear that although the punishments for opposition to decisions and
regulations of the government was not heavy, the rising number of this crime became
disturbing for the CUP government as the war continued.
Before 1916, crime tables included only the number of criminal cases such as
crimes against property and crimes against persons. After 1916, some other crimes
related to public order and administration such as opposition to decisions of the
government and crimes against state officials also became a part of crime tables of the
Police Journal. Therefore, it can be accepted as a sign for the heightened importance of
the ‘maintenance of public order’ and the continuation of the regime for the
government during the war.
Nevertheless, there were also some other crimes that, despite being left out of
crime tables, still corresponded to particular policy concerns of the government such as
the use of firearms and the issuance of official documents. As a matter of fact, these
crime topics became issues about which the government made a number of legal
regulations during the war, meaning they were considered as being among criminal
topics of foremost importance. In this sense, an evaluation about these topics will be
helpful in understanding the government’s priorities in its wartime criminal policy.
840
Articles 254-264, Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, pp. 875-876. In 1911, Article
265 was added to the Penal Code which was about drunkenness. “28 Zilhicce 1274 Tarihli Kanun-ı
Cezanın”, Düstur, II/3, pp. 459-460. For Articles 254-265, see, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 199-208.
270
7.3 Other Crimes and their Respective Punishments: “Invisible” in Crime Tables
but ‘Visible’ in Criminal Policy
Crimes against property, persons, state officials and general well-being of the
public were the main topics included in the crime tables and crime statistics. These
crimes might be considered as the crimes consciously made visible by the security
forces and government. In other words, the government deliberately published the
rates of these crimes in every volume of the Police Journal, while the aim behind that
was to set the basis for security policies intended to repress and keep under control the
city inhabitants.
In general terms, the first and primary duty of the security forces has always
been put forward as the prevention of criminal cases such as theft, homicide and etc.
Nevertheless, as examined in the previous sections, despite the rising number of theft
cases in Istanbul, for example, the government did not take any additional measures in
order to prevent or at least diminish this type of crime. However, the amendments in
and addenda to the Penal Code during the war years made it clear, the government had
different considerations about some other type of crimes not particularly appearing in
the crime tables published in the Police Journal. In this section, regulations about
firearms; and crime of forgery or altering official documents will be examined
alongside with their respective punishments. Although there is no exact numerical data
about these crimes, the amendments made in the Penal Code, and the publication of
some regulations indicate that the government had special concerns about these issues.
The overall analysis in this section will reveal the security priorities of the CUP
government during the Great War.
On February 9, 1916 an addendum was made to the part of the Penal Code
entitled ‘Theft of State Properties and Other Corrupt Acts’.841 This addendum was
about firearms and munitions belonging to police officers. According to the addendum,
841
“Kanun-ı Ceza’nın dördüncü faslına müzeyyel 14 Rebiülevvel 1319 tarihli fıkrayı muaddel kanun, 4
Rebiülahir 1334/26 Kanunusani 1331 (February 9, 1916)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 383.
271
in the case that a police officer sold or intentionally lost his firearms, munitions and
any other materials of state property, or gave them to someone else, he would be
imprisoned for one year and dismissed from office.842. This addendum had two
defining aspects. First, during the war period, the government tried to establish control
not only on ordinary people, but also on the security forces in terms of their exercise of
force in the name of the state. In fact, alongside military forces, police having the right
to use arms, munitions and other assets of violence constituted instruments of the state
apparatus in the maintenance of monopoly on force in the modern state. Therefore,
while governments always sought to construct a kind of control mechanism over the
security forces, this necessity became much more urgent and serious for the ruling
elites during periods of crisis such as the Great War. In the original version of the
Penal Code, the Articles related to theft of state properties, there was no specific
emphasis on firearms and munitions. Thus the addendum should be considered as a
consequence of the war conditions.
Second, this addendum should also be evaluated as a part of a more general
policy related to the seizure of arms as a prerequisite of the modern state and its
monopoly on legitimate use of force. In fact, the CUP concentrated efforts on this issue
in a way unprecedented throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire.843 Even before
the Great War, the CUP tried to establish several mechanisms for collecting arms from
citizens. Although there was no exact consensus on this issue in the Ottoman
Parliament, the CUP government had always been determined in the issue of seizure of
arms.844 In 1913, through the publication of the Police Statue, the CUP government
took one more step in collecting arms. With this Statue, even the use of weapons such
as daggers, wedges or big knifes, the use of which was not forbidden according to the
842
“Polis memurlarından her kim kendisine ait esliha ve cephane ve her nevi eşya-yı emiriyyeden bir
şey satar veya kasden telef ve ızaa eyler ve her ne sebeple olursa olsun ahere verirse bir sene hapis ve
polis mesleğinden tard olunur.’, “Kanun-ı Ceza’nın dördüncü faslına”, Düstur, II/8, p. 383.
843
844
Especially, non-Muslim deputees in the Parliament criticized the methods the CUP used for the
seizure of arms. Ergut, Modern Devlet ve Polis, p. 167.
272
Penal Code, was restricted.845 Actually, the Great War provided further opportunity to
the government to achieve aims in collecting arms.
During the war, use of arms, their seizure and corresponding punishments were
topics about which a series of decisions, provisional laws and regulations were made.
On December 12, 1914, through a provisional law, an amendment was made in Article
166 of the Penal Code regulating ‘prohibited guns’. 846 In the previous version of the
Article, ‘prohibited guns’ were described as ‘State and military weapons and revolvers
of which the barrels are more than fifteen centimeters’.847 With the amendment made
on December 12, 1914, a new condition about caliber was added to the ‘prohibited
guns’. According to this provisional law, guns with more than nine or ten millimeter
caliber were to be regarded as ‘prohibited guns’. Actually, the main intention behind
this provisional law was to prevent ordinary persons from carrying guns that had
features similar to the guns possessed by police officers. This provisional law
remained in effect until January 1917.
On January 25, 1917, transformation of this provisional law to an effectual one
was discussed in the Parliament. According to Abdullah Azmi Efendi, deputy of
Kütahya, this idea was meaningless because this provisional law treated persons
carrying guns as if they would necessarily use them against police officers or the
government. However, ordinary people mostly felt the necessity to carry guns to
protect themselves and their properties in rural areas where there were no security
forces. Furthermore, he claimed that every single person carrying guns would have to
be taken to police stations in order to measure his guns’ caliber if this provisional law
became an effectual one. In turn, he stated that this implementation would be against
the understanding of freedom according to the Constitutional Regime. After a long
discussion, the Parliament rejected transformation of this provisional law to an
845
Ergut, State and Social Control, p. 172.
846
“Kanun-ı Cezanın 166. Maddesinin 7 Cemaziyelahir 1329 tarihli zeylinin fıkra-ı ahiresini muaddel
kanun-ı muvakkat, 24 Muharrem 1333/30 Teşrinisani 1330 (December 12, 1914)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 132.
847
See Article 166, Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, p. 123.
273
effectual one. 848 Therefore, after 1917 the previous version of Article 166 continued to
be applied to determine ‘prohibited guns’.
As argued above, war conditions allow states to gain special advantages
regarding the use of force. Collecting arms and mobilizing all assets in war making
through state control are among the established policies of governments during war
periods. This was the case for the CUP government during the Great War. On April 26,
1915, a provisional law was enacted about collecting from people firearms and all
kinds of munitions.849 This provisional law was an indicator demonstrating the extent
to which the state capitalized on war conditions regarding the strengthening of its
power and monopoly on legitimate use of force. The provisional law stated that during
the war, the army and commanders, if they deemed it necessary, had the right to collect
all arms, munitions and other explosives from people. Furthermore, persons not
submitting their arms within the determined time period would be considered as acting
in a hostile way against the army, as well as being involved in treason and would be
sentenced to death penalty. Moreover, the law explicitly indicated that only the persons
who were called to duty by official commanders and military institutions to defense of
the country could have the right to carry arms. 850 With this provisional law, the seizure
of arms began to be determined totally in accordance with the necessities of war. In
this sense, it can be argued that, during the Great War, the state extended its power to
collect arms and consolidate its monopoly on use of force.
Actually, through this provisional law, carrying arms became totally prohibited
in regions where idare-i örfiyye (martial law) was put into effect. Since, this was a war
period, not only Istanbul but also almost every province of the Empire was under
martial law. It means that the provisional law was valid for all of the provinces and
848
MMZC, 3/3, 29, 12 Kanunusani 1332 (January 25, 1917), pp. 17-19.
849
“Ahali nezdinde bulunan silah, cephane ve mevadd-ı müştailenin cihet-i askeriyeye teslimi hakkında
kanun-ı muvakkat, 11 Cemaziyelahir 1333/13 Nisan 1331 (April 26, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 588-589.
850
“Mühlet-i muayyene hitamında silahını teslim etmemiş olanlar her kim olursa olsun ordu aleyhinde
hareket-i hasmane ihzar ve hıyanet-i harbiyye ika etmiş ad olunarak idam olunur. Ancak kumandanlar
tarafından düşmana karşı müdafaa-i memlekete davet ve teşrik edilen efrad nezdinde silah
bulundurabilirler”, “Ahali nezdinde bulunan silah, cephane”, Düstur, II/7, p. 588.
274
localities in the Empire. Martial law was actually declared in Istanbul even before the
Great War in 1909. Following the Incident of 31 March, martial law was declared in
Istanbul and it continued till the end of the Empire.851 Therefore, the ‘state of
emergency’ that had begun in Istanbul before the Great War continued throughout the
Great War. In general practices, the duties and authorities of civilian administrations
are typically transferred to military ones during periods of martial law. In this sense,
the powers of military administrations became more encompassing. 852 Nevertheless, in
the Ottoman case, from the year 1909 to the end of the Great War, the CUP
government as a civilian administration referred to the practice of martial law to
extend its repressive policies. In that respect, provisional laws regarding the seizure of
arms were promulgated under martial law conditions.
Although the provisional law of May 9, 1915 stated the prohibition of carrying
arms by ordinary people in the areas where martial law was in effect, there is no exact
data regarding the extent to which this decision was implemented in Istanbul. In a
parliamentary discussion, Salih Paşa, a member of the Senate, stated that the
government was highly successful in collecting all kinds of weapons from firearms to
machetes.853 Moreover, according to the data existing at that time, there were only
seven cases of crime related to carrying guns in Istanbul in January and February
1917.854 Furthermore, in the Istanbul Central Prison, the number of prisoners
imprisoned due to that type of crime was extremely low. There were only three
prisoners jailed for brandishing weapons, and these were subject to the following
punishments: one was sentenced to death penalty since he brandished weapon to a
police officer; the other two were imprisoned for two and seven years respectively.855
851
Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, pp. 346-348.
852
Köksal, Ösmanlı Devletinde Sıkıyönetim”, pp. 162-163.
853
MAZC, 3/3, 52, 29 Mart 1333 (March 29, 1917), p. 470.
854
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917), BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/43,
26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 20, 1917).
855
275
Despite the low number of prisoners and cases in Istanbul, it is not possible to argue
that the government was totally successful in the seizure of arms. Especially, the
banditry activities analyzed in the former chapter pointed to recurring problems about
the implementation of the provisional law regarding the seizure of arms.
Before concluding the debate about the seizure of arms, it must be emphasized
here that one of the main aims of the regulations might have been the disarmament of
the Armenian population. As the government had anticipation about an Armenian
revolt since the beginning of the Great War, the disarmament of this population was an
important concern for the state elites. Furthermore, the incidents that took place in the
eastern and southern regions of Anatolia in the first war year made the CUP
government more alert about the disarmament of the Armenian population.856 April 26,
1915, the promulgation date of the provisional law about seizure of firearms and all
kinds of munitions from people also verifies this argument. This provisional law was
enacted just a few days after the deportation decision was put into implementation.
Furthermore, in April 1915, the Police Journal began to publish plenty of photos
belonging to the arms seized from Armenians. Such publication of photos continued
until mid-1916.857 Although the regulations regarding the seizure of arms was effective
for every citizen of the Ottoman Empire, the publication of the photos displaying
Armenian weaponry implies that the CUP government attributed a special meaning
that.
Having concluded the discussion on provisional laws, rules and regulations
about the seizure of arms, another important topic for the CUP government requiring
closer analysis will be the regulations about the forgery of official state documents,
and counterfeit of official seals or official documents such as stamps. Heavy
punishments were provisioned for these crimes in the fifteenth part entitled ‘Sets forth
856
For brief information about the Armenian incidents in the eastern and southern Anatolia see Chapter
5, pp. 190-191.
857
For photos of seized arms from the Armenians living in different regions of the Empire such as
Kayseri, Sivas, Merzifon, Diyarbakır, Adana, Dört Yol, İzmit, Amasya, Trabzon, Hüdavendigar and
Arapkir, see Polis Mecmuası, Vols. 45, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 69, and 70.
276
Forgery’ of the first chapter of the Penal Code.858 The CUP government made
amendments in Article 149 during the Great War.
According to Article 149, whoever imitated or altered any kind of seal
belonging to the State would be punished with imprisonment for temporary hard labor
or with confinement in a fortress up to ten years.859 During the war, there were two
addenda to this article. The first addendum was made on December 23, 1915.860 This
addendum broadened the scope of forgery. While the earlier version of the Article had
stated that the imitation or alteration of official seal was a crime, the addendum
indicated, in addition, that whoever altered or imitated any kind of officially sealed
state and/or municipality document, or sold this kind of altered or imitated document
having financial value, would be punished with imprisonment with hard labor or
confinement in a fortress up to ten years. In 1917, one more addendum was made to
Article 149 specifying the same punishments to the persons who counterfeited stamps
belonging to the state.861 Furthermore, the original version of the article and addenda
regulated cash penalty for the persons who made use of these kind of altered or
imitated state documents.862 Thus, addenda to Article 149 demonstrate that the CUP
government had specific concerns about forgery during the war years.
858
There were fifteen articles regulating punishments for forgery in the Penal Code of 1858. For
instance, Articles 156 and 157 were about fake travel documents and passports. According to Article
156, the persons who used or prepared travel documents or passports issued for faked names would be
imprisoned for six months to two years. The punishment for persons who issued and used fake travel
documents or passports would be imprisoned for one year to three years according to Article 157. For
detailed information about Articles 148-162 see Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku …,
pp. 858-860; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial Ottoman Penal Code, pp. 109-118.
859
Akgündüz, Mukayeseli İslam ve Osmanlı Hukuku, p. 858; Bucknill and Utidjian, The Imperial
860
“28 Zilhicce 1274 tarihli Kanun-ı Ceza’nın 149. Maddesine zeyl-i sani olmak üzere müzeyyel fıkarat
hakkında kanun, 15 Safer 1334/10 Kanunuevvel 1331 (December 23, 1915)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 243.
861
“28 Zilhicce 1273 tarihli Kanun-ı Cezanın 149. Maddesine müzeyyel fıkarat hakkında kanun, 7
Cemaziyelevvel 1335/1 Mart 1333 (1 Mart 1917)”, Düstur, II/9, p. 240.
862
The relevant cash penalty was determined as one to five Ottoman gold. This issue became a topic of
discussion in the Ottoman Parliament. Mehmet Şevket Bey, deputy of Beyazıt, offered that the persons
deliberately using altered or imitated stamps should be imprisoned for three months to three years
277
The registers of the Istanbul Central Prison in 1917 show that the number of
prisoners imprisoned due to forgery was not negligible. Out of 583 adult prisoners, 89
were imprisoned because of forgery.863 The majority of perpetrators of forgery were
imprisoned for using or issuing fake official documents. 40 % of the perpetrators of
this crime were imprisoned for three years. There were only eleven committers of
forgery who were sentenced to incarceration for ten years or more. Out of eleven, two
were sentenced to heavy punishment for issuing fake paper money, and three were
imprisoned due to issuing fake military identity cards. The remaining six were jailed
for using or issuing fake identity cards.864 Actually, the majority of committers of
forgery were sentenced to imprisonment for three years or more. Out of the total
convicts, only 16.8 percent were punished with imprisonment for two years or less.
Therefore, present data, despite not extensive, reveals that during the war years,
in Istanbul, there was a considerable number of the persons issuing and using fake
official documents that were punished with imprisonment. Although crimes related to
forgery did not appear in crime tables published in the Police Journal, official
maneuvers, such as making addenda to the Penal Code and punishing perpetrators with
imprisonment for three years or more, point to the fact that the government was
concerned about that type of crime during the war years. It is clear that alongside with
carrying guns, the state elites regarded forgery in official documents as threat to the
unrestrained authority of the CUP government.
Up to that point, the CUP government’s criminal policy in Istanbul during the
Great War is analyzed with specific focus on some crimes and regulations. In fact,
criminal policy was always shaped in accordance with the priorities of the government.
Alongside with the approach of the CUP government to several crimes related to
property, amnesties constituted an important element of criminal policy.
alongside paying cash penalty. His offer was eventually denied. MMZC, 3/3, 15, 8 Kanunuevvel 1332
(December 21, 1916).
863
864
278
7.4 Amnesties Declared during the Great War
As living conditions worsened, crime rates increased in Istanbul during the

Great War. As a result, the number of criminals in prisons also displayed a similarly
increasing trend. Thus began to constitute the number of prisoners a problem for the
CUP, because the prisons in Istanbul were already limited in their capacity before the
war.865 The Central Prison was the biggest penal institution in Istanbul in 1910’s.
Although there is no exact information about its capacity, it is estimated to have been
between 550-600 prisoners.866 Even in the first year of the Great War, when crime
rates had not reached a peak, the number of prisoners in Istanbul Central Prison had
already increased remarkably. For example, in January 1915, the number of prisoners
in the Central Prison had reached 956.867 When the capacity of the Central Prison
estimated as 550-600 prisoners is taken into consideration, this number was definitely
over the capacity.
There were two options for the government to diminish the number of prisoners
in Istanbul. The first was the transfer of the prisoners in Istanbul to prisons in other
provinces. Thus, with this aim in mind, not only a number of actual prisoners, but also
several ex-convicts were banished from the city. Between March 1916 and April 1917,
170 prisoners and ex-convicts had been banished from Istanbul to the other cities.868
865
The Dersaadet Hapishane-i Umumi (Istanbul Central Prison) was opened in 1871 as a landmark of
“modern” penalty institutions in the Ottoman Empire. Apart from this prison, there were three major
jails in Istanbul at the end of the nineteenth century: Bab-ı Zaptiye Tevkifhanesi, Beyoğlu Tevkifhanesi,
Üsküdar Tevkifhanesi. Although the Central Prison was the newest and biggest penal institution in
Istanbul in the late nineteenth century, it was still far from fulfilling the requirements. Yıldız,
Mapushane: Osmanlı Hapishanelerinin, pp. 275-280; 295-296; 315.
866
For example, in 1879, a short period of time after its foundation, there were 562 prisoners in the
Central Prison, Ibid, p. 310. In March 1921, the number of the prisoners in the prison reached 748 and
this number was evaluated as over capacity. Riggs, ‘Yetişkinlerde Suç’, p. 291. Therefore, the capacity
of the Central Prison should have been about 550-600 persons.
867
Out of 956 prisoners, there were 908 male and 48 female prisoners. Majority of the prisoners were
imprisoned due to kabahats. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…19/12, 07. Rebiülevvel. 1333 (January 23, 1915).
868
279
Out of this 170, 80 were prisoners and 90 were ex-convicts. Majority of the criminals
were transferred to the prisons in Konya, Ankara, Hüdavendigar (Bursa) and Çorum.869
Nevertheless, in conditions of war, this policy was not an efficient one for the
government. Alongside problems of transportation and insufficiency of the local
prisons in terms of capacity, implementation of banishment of ex-convicts had the
potential to harm public security in the cities where ex-convicts were sent. Therefore,
the CUP government opted for another policy: declaration of amnesties, and
conscription of criminals in the army.
Actually, the practice of amnesty was not totally new in the Ottoman Empire.
During the nineteenth century, there were a series of individual and wholesale
amnesties. Alongside these, there started a new kind of amnesty entitled sülusan afvı
(amnesty of two-thirds) with the aim to open room in the prisons, which were
otherwise physically insufficient for increasing number of prisoners. The amnesty of
two-thirds, covering the prisoners who fulfilled two thirds of their imprisonment,
became the most widespread kind of the amnesty in the Ottoman Empire during the
second half of the nineteenth century.870 It became a custom to grant the amnesty of
two-thirds every year on cülus (anniversaries of enthronement) or other special days as
a favor of the Sultan. Actually, this implementation was against the ‘rational and
formal’ understanding of law according to which release of a prisoner had to depend
on benevolent behavior such as perfect compliance with the rules of prison. For
example, as a result of the consolidation of modern law, amnesties similar to the
amnesty of two thirds in the Ottoman Empire had been relinquished in America and
Europe in the nineteenth century.871 However, although important steps were taken to
modernize the legal system and penal institutions in the Ottoman Empire after 1839,
the amnesty of two-thirds, which regarded ‘the forgiven’ as a slave and ‘the forgiver’
869
Other such cities and provinces were Kütahya, İzmit, Adapazarı, Karahisar, Karesi, Yozgat, Aydın,
Kastamonu, Malatya, Eskişehir, Ezine, Kayseri and Bartın. BOA.DH.EUM.1. Şb.8/15, 19 Muharrem
1336 (November 4, 1917).
870
Yıldız, Mapushane, pp. 298-300.
871
Yıldız, Mapushane, p. 302.
280
as a master, continued to be implemented.872 A legacy from the Tanzimat Era to the
CUP, the amnesty of two-thirds continued to be implemented alongside some special
amnesties during the Great War.
The first amnesty during the Great War was declared through a provisional law
following the proclamation of jihad (holy war) by Sultan Mehmed V on November 14,
1914. According to the provisional law, ‘half of the imprisonment duration of the
prisoners who were incarcerated due to crimes of cinayet and cünha except hetk-i ırz
(violation of honor, rape) and fiil-i şeni (indecent sexual behavior), was to be reduced
and forgiven’.873 Thus, this amnesty was different from the ‘traditional’ amnesty of
two-thirds since it covered the prisoners who had completed half of their sentence,
meaning that a larger number of prisoners would benefit from it. Another difference
was that this amnesty was not declared on the anniversary day of enthronement
(cülus). In this sense, the declaration of amnesty was on that occasion related to the
entrance of the Ottoman Empire to the Great War and the announcement of jihad.
A few months after that, another provisional law was declared on March 4,
1915. According to this law, prosecution and punishments of almost all criminals and
prisoners would be postponed in case they agreed to join the army during the war.
Similar to the previous amnesty, the offenders of sex crimes were excluded.874 The
provisional law also made it clear that special commissions would examine the
physical, psychological and moral capabilities of the criminals in terms of their
872
Yıldız, Mapushane, p. 302.
873
“Hetk-i ırz ve fiil-i şeniden maada cinayet ve cünha efalinden dolayı mahkum olanların müddet-i
mahkume-i cezaiyyelerinin nısfı tenzil ve afv olunmuştur”, See “Bazı ceraim eshabının nısf-ı müddet
mahkumelerinin tenzil ve afvı hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat, 30 Zilhicce 1332, 6 Teşrinisani 1330
(November 19, 1914)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 76.
874
“Madde 1: Sinn-i mükellefiyete dahil olup da bir sene veya daha ziyade hapis veya nefy-i muvakkat
cezasıyla veya mücazat-ı terhibiyye ile ve keza sinn-i mükellefiyyet haricinde bulunup da gerek cünha
gerek cinayyetten dolayı mahkum bulunanlardan ve sinn-i mükellefiyyet dahilinde olsun olmasın ale-l-
ıtlak cünha ve cinayet neviinden bir cürm ile maznun-ı ileyh olanlardan darülharbe sevk ve izamlarını
taleb ve istida edenler ahlaken ve cismen evsaf-ı lazımaya haiz oldukları halde kıtaat-ı askeriyeye sevk
ve haklarındaki takibat-ı kanuniyyenin icrası veya hükümlerin infazı zaman-ı avdetlerine kadar tecil
edilebilir ancak hetk-i ırz ve fiil-i şeniden dolayı hüküm ve maznun-ı ileyh olanlar bundan müstefid
olamazlar.”, See “Darülharbe gidecek eşhas hakkındaki takibat ve mücazatın teciline dair kanun-ı
muvakkat, 17 Rebiülahir 1333, 19 Şubat 1330 (March 4, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, pp. 406-407.
281
appropriateness to army.875 As a matter of fact, this provisional law caused several
discussions in the parliament. On December 20, 1914, Fuad Bey, the deputy of
Divaniye, opposed the provisional law claiming that the offenders of cinayet were
prohibited from carrying guns and joining the army according to the existing Penal
Code and Code of Conscription. He also asked the reason why criminals who had been
deprived of general rights (hukuk-i umumiyye) were allowed to fight for the country.876
Talat Bey, Minister of Interior, defended the law with the following sentences:
By the way, there is a need to increase the number of [the volunteer/irregular]

units; and criminals and prisoners in the prisons became volunteers to sacrifice
their lives. Today, it is necessary to benefit from all kinds of forces for the
army and the army did not regarded itself to be satisfied with this kind of
force… Yours truly, I am convinced that this [conscription of criminals] is a
great benefaction for our country because both most of those who actually went
[the criminals who had joined the army] made their sins forgiven by becoming
martyrs and never returning; and the country also benefitted from that.877
In fact, this explanation goes beyond merely legitimizing the provisional law. It also
provides clues about the official mentality behind the attitude towards criminals and
prisoners. They were explicitly evaluated as mere human force for war making which
could be gotten rid of after “being made use of”. At this point, it can be argued that, on
the one hand, “modern” practices such as the disciplining of prisoners through their
imprisonment and subsequent reintroduction to the society suffered ruptures to a
certain extent during the war period; on the other hand, it is also possible to argue that
875
In Istanbul, the commission would be composed of one representative each from Ministries of War,
Interior, Justice and Health. “Darülharbe gidecek eşhas”, Düstur, II/7, p. 406.
876
MMZC, 3/2, 10, 7 Kanunuevvel 1331 (December 20, 1915), p. 185.
877
“Bu meyanda bu kuvvetlerin [gayr-i muntazam kuvvetler] bir miktar tezyidine lüzum hasıl oldu ve
hapishanelerde bulunan mücrimin ve mahkuminden gönüllü olarak bu suretle gidip fedayı hayat etmek
isteyenler oldu. Şu zamanda Ordu için her kuvvetten istifade etmek lazımdır, bundan dolayı Ordu,
kendisini bu kuvvetten müstağni görmedi… Bendenizin, bunun binnetice memlekete büyük bir hayır
olduğuna kaaniim, çünkü bu gidenlerin [mücrimlerin] pek çokları hem günahlarını affettirmek suretiyle
şehid oldular yani geri gelmediler hem de bu suretle memleket istifade etti.”, MMZC, 3/2, 10, 7
Kanunuevvel 1331 (December 20, 1915), p. 185.
282
the official mentality about criminals regarding them as “idle” and “detrimental”
elements to be eliminated and/or isolated from social life had been always same and
that the war conditions provided appropriate ground for the implementation of
different policies in accordance with this aim. Therefore, the declaration of a number
of amnesties and provisional laws might be examined from this perspective.
As a matter of fact, another dimension of the amnesties was to decrease over-
crowdedness in prisons. In order to achieve this aim, several amnesties with different
features were granted in the following months of the war. On July 1, 1915, an amnesty
of two-thirds was put into effect.878 Similar to the first amnesty, this one also excluded
the criminals of sex crimes. Furthermore, the prisoners who were sentenced to death
penalty and perpetual kürek were also excluded.
On January 1, 1916, two amnesties were declared. According to one of these,
the prisoners who had fulfilled half of their sentence would be released; whereas the
other focused on the release of prisoners having concluded three fourths of their
sentence.879 The declaration of two different amnesties on the same day is actually
confusing.
In that respect, the discussion in the parliament about these laws help clarify
the reason for two separate amnesties. Falis El Huri Efendi, deputy of Damascus,
claimed that although the parliament had previously decided on an amnesty for the
prisoners fulfilling three-fourths of imprisonment, making another law of amnesty
covering the prisoners completing half of their imprisonment was a reflection of the
conflict between the government and the judicial commission.880 Tahir Bey, the
Director of Penal Affairs (Umur-ı Cezaiyye Müdürü), stated that the previous amnesty
was not sufficiently effective in decreasing the over-crowdedness in prisons.
878
“Müddet-i cezaiyyelerinin sülüsanını ikmal eden mahkuminin afvı hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat, 18
Şaban 1333, 18 Haziran 1331 (July 1, 1915)”, Düstur, II/7, p. 268.
879
“Bazı ceraim ashabının nısf-ı müddet-i mahkumelerinin tenzili ve afvı hakkında kanun, 24 Safer
1333/19 Kanunuevvel 1331 (January 1, 1916)”, Düstur, II/8, p. 268; “Müddet-i cezaiyyelerinin üç
rubunu ikmal Edenlerin afvı hakkında kanun, 24 Safer 1333/19 Kanunuevvel 1331 (January 1, 1916)”,
Düstur, II/8, p. 269.
880
MMZC, 3/1, 45, 24 Teşrinievvel 1331 (November 6, 1915), p. 672.
283
Therefore, the declaration of an additional amnesty did not in any sense reflect any
conflict between the government and the commission, but rather stemmed from a
necessity. He also added that prisons that were already overcrowded before the war
had become much more above capacity during the war. Thus, in order to diminish the
total number of the prisoners, the government had to declare more than a single
amnesty. There were several oppositions to that from the parliament because,
according to some deputies, these amnesties had led to a great number of criminals
were released just because the physical conditions in prisons had compelled the
government to that. Eventually, despite the opposition, these laws were accepted in the
parliament.
It seems that even these amnesties were not sufficient to decrease the over-
crowdedness in prisons. On February 5, 1916, another amnesty of two-thirds was
declared.881 Similar to previous amnesties, the offenders of sex crimes and the
prisoners sentenced to death penalty and perpetual kürek were exempted. After the
declaration of this amnesty, until mid 1918, there was not any other amnesty put into
effect. It is evident that the amnesties declared during the war had different
characteristics from the traditional amnesties of the Ottoman state. Above all,
alongside with the traditional amnesty of two-thirds, amnesties were declared covering
the release of prisoners having fulfilled half or three-fourths of their imprisonment.
Moreover, except an amnesty proclaimed in mid 1918882, none of these amnesties
coincided with special days of the Ottoman Empire such as the anniversary of
enthronement. Therefore, under the war conditions, declaration of amnesties should be
considered as urgent and pragmatic policies of the CUP government. As mentioned
before, diminishing the number of prisoners was one of the main purposes of the
amnesties.
881
“Müddet-i cezaiyyelerinin sülüsanını ikmal eden mahkuminin afvı hakkında kanun, 30 Rebiülevvel
1332/23 Kanunusani 1331 (January 5, 1916)”,
882
The amnesty declared on July 15, 1918 was for only the deserters. “Firar, davete adem-i icabet ve
tecavüz-i müddet-i ceraimine ika eden küçük zabitan ve onbaşı ve neferatının cülus-ı hümayun
münasebetiyle afvları hakkında kararname, 6 Şevval 1336, 15 Temmuz 1334 (July 15, 1918)”, Düstur,
II/10, p. 553.
284
Nevertheless, the government developed new strategies to benefit from the
manpower of criminals. In this regard, military conscription was the best strategy for
the government. Therefore, on January 11, 1917, the provisional law dated March 5,
1915 about the delay of the punishment and prosecution of criminals and prisoners in
case of their involvement in the army became an effectual law.883 Here, the strategy of
conscription of prisoners in the army requires further clarification. In fact, the majority
of prisoners were recruited in the bands of Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa)
rather than regular units of the Ottoman Army. 884 Therefore, the structure of the
Special Organization in terms of its foundation aims, constituting elements and
operations has to be examined briefly.
Actually the historical background of volunteer units as a component of the
Special Organization went back to the Tripoli War (1911). However, official
foundation of these units was realized through a regulation dated March 16, 1913.885
These bands were composed of volunteers from refugees, prisoners, members of some
religious orders and tribal groups. The principal mission of the Special Organization
was to assist the regular troops of the Ottoman army by frustrating the military
strategies of enemy forces.886 There were two main methods of fulfilling this mission.
First, the bands of Special Organization engaged in combat together with regular
troops against the enemy on the battlefields. Second method was “to instigate interest
883
“Darülharbe gidecek Eşhas hakkındaki takibat ve mücazatın teciline dair kanun, 17 Rebiülevvel
1335/ 29 Kanunuevvel 1332 (11 Ocak 1917)”, Düstur, II/9, p. 94.
884
Polat Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization-Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa: An Inquiry into Its Operational
and Administrative Characteristics, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, (Ankara: İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent
University, 2012), pp. 181-187; Mehmet Beşikçi, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Seferberliği,
(İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2015), pp. 176-190; Beşikçi, The Ottoman
Mobilization..., pp. 160-172; Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Vol. III, p. 286; Falih Rıfkı Atay,
Zeytindağı, (Istanbul: Pozitif, 2004), pp. 37-38; Ahmet Refik Altınay, İki Komite, İki Kıtal, Kafkas
Yollarında, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010), pp. 35-40.
885
Ahmet Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-ı Şarkiyye Dairesi) Tarihi, Vol 1: 1914-1916, (Istanbul:
Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), p. 4. Safi and Beşikçi argues that the intelligence functions
of the Special Organization went back to the time of Abdülhamid II, For detailed information see
Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization, p. 160; Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization, pp. 18-22.
886
Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization, p. 222.
285
groups of Turkish-Muslim stock or other beliefs and origins beyond the frontline
found in enemy-occupied zones.”887
As a matter of fact, what makes the Special Organization “special” was this
second method of warfare. Making propaganda, collecting intelligence and using a
number of counter-insurgency techniques were functions that could be classified under
that mode of operation. The foundation of such irregular volunteer units stemmed from
a number of reasons such as the necessity of mobilization of men being exempt from
conscriptions and thereby restoring the deficiencies of the conscription system.888
Along with these, a set of considerations as analyzed in the paragraphs below also
played a role:
The use of volunteers provided the state with a flexible manpower pool which
would be used to undertake “informal” military missions such as guerilla
attacks into enemy territory, actions of violent oppression towards “disloyal”
civilians on the home front, or operations aimed at achieving demographic
homogenization in Anatolia. Such actions were either difficult or illegal for
formal military units. The extra-legality of many of these actions helps explain
the state’s enthusiastic enlistment of prisoners in irregular units.889
As Beşikçi argues, the recruitment of prisoners in the bands of Special Organization

seems to be closely related to the fact that these paramilitary units were probably
serving to accomplish certain ambiguous duties not appropriate to be performed by
regular military troops.
When the official regulation about the recruitment of prisoners in volunteer
units was declared, a large number of prisoners applied to the Ministries of War and
Interior benefit from it. Due to that massive demand, there emerged some selection
criteria. For example, since most of volunteer units were used at the Caucasia front, the
prisoners with Caucasian origin had a priority due to their knowledge of the language,
887
888
Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization, p. 158.
889
Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization, pp. 158-159.
286
geography and people of the region.”890 In addition, official authorities specified the
characteristics of prisoners who would be a part of volunteer units as being “brave,
physically fit and trustworthy in carrying out duties assigned to them.”891 Political
prisoners were specifically excluded from recruitment in the Special Organization.
Here, being political prisoner, most probably referred to those being in opposition to
the CUP.892 They were certainly regarded as untrustworthy.
Bands of the Special Organization, which were not regular troops but
paramilitary forces of the Ottoman army, generally pursued guerilla war tactics during
the Great War. This situation provided them considerable room for abuses. Although
their role in the Armenian massacres of 1915 is still a debatable issue in the current
Ottoman-Turkish historiography, some memoirs, testimonies and recent historical
studies attest to such.893 For instance, Yalman stated that “the deported [Armenians]
were not only left unprotected from attacks which were sure to come from marauders,
but the ‘Special Organization’ created by the help of two influential members of the
Committee of Union and Progress was in some cases directly instrumental in bringing
about attacks and massacres.”894
890
891
892
893
Some scholarly works strongly deny the role of the Special Organization in Armenian massacres. For
detailed information see, Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, p. xi; Philip H. Stoddard, The Ottoman Government
and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Unpublished PhD
Dissertation, (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1963); Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in
Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005). Some
other sources argue that there was a close relationship between the Armenian massacres and the Special
Organization. For detailed information see, Yalman, Turkey in the World War, pp. 219-220; Altınay, İki
Komite, İki Kıtal, pp. 35-43; Taner Akçam, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur, pp. 168-180; Vahank
Dadrian, “The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War”,
Minorities in Wartime, National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during
Two World Wars, Panikos Panayi (ed.), (Oxford: Bloomsbery Academic, 1993), pp. 50-82; Oktay Özel,
“Tehcir ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, 1915: Siyaset, Tehcir, Soykırım, Fikret Adanır and Oktay Özel (eds.),
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2015), [forthcoming].
894
Yalman, Turkey in the World War, pp. 219-220.
287
In the memoirs of Ahmet Refik [Altınay], there is detailed information about
the relationship between the Special Organization and Armenian massacres. 895 The
case of Çerkez Ahmet, a well-known bandleader, was particularly striking. First of all,
Çerkez Ahmet was a criminal who had been imprisoned in Istanbul due to committing
homicide, and then, being released by the CUP government following the Raid on the
Sublime Porte in January 1913 (Bab-ı Ali Baskını), had become the leader of a band
under Special Organization.896 Second, the band leaded by him killed Vartkes
Serengülyan and Krikor Zöhrab, two Armenian members of the Ottoman Parliament
deported from Istanbul in June 1915, somewhere close to Urfa in July 1915.897 Hence,
in that case, the paths of a criminal released from prison in Istanbul and two Armenian
politicians deported from the city had crossed in a suspicious way somewhere
hundreds of kilometers away.
Prisoners recruited in volunteer units also committed some other crimes such as
theft, extortion and murder.898 Although some bandits committing such crimes were
tried in court martial, there were continuous discipline problems in volunteer units.
There were two main reasons for that. First, the human resource of these volunteer
units included a great number of prisoners, readily making them prone to problems of
misconduct. Second, the number of trained officers leading these units was also
inadequate.899
Due to increasing discipline problems, the band units of the Special
Organization were abolished on April 5, 1915 and its name was changed to the Office
of Eastern Affairs (Umur-ı Şarkiyye Dairesi).900 In addition, the units of the Special
895
Altınay, İki Komite, İki Kıtal, pp. 35-43.
896
Altınay, İki Komite, İki Kıtal, p. 39.
897
Cemal Pasha, who had tried to save Zöhrap and Vartkes, executed Çerkez Ahmet in Damascus
following his murder of two Armenian politicians. Altınay, İki Komite, İki Kıtal, pp. 42-43.
898
899
900
Oktay Özel argues that there was a close relationship between Armenian Deportation and dissolution
of bands of the Special Organization by renaming the organization as the Office of Eastern Affairs and
288
Organization were subjected to regular military structuring whereby the bands of the
Special Organization were organized as a regiment consisting of three battalions, one
independent battalion and a company. This way, the organization continued to exist as
a part of Third Army until mid-1916.901. However, despite the subjection of the Special
Organization to regular military organization, the prisoners continued to be recruited in
the local gendarme and police units until the end of the war.902 The provisional law
about the delay of punishments and prosecution of criminals and prisoners in case of
their conscription in the army became an effectual law in January 1917 and remained
in force until the end of the war.
Probably, this law, alongside with previous amnesties, had an effect in
decreasing the population in prisons. For instance, in January 1915, there were 956
prisoners in the Istanbul Central Prison..903 This number continuously diminished over
the years during the Great War although the crime rates increased. In December 1916,
the number of prisoners in Istanbul Central Prison had decreased to 701.904 In August
1917, the number of prisoners in Istanbul Central Prison was 600.905 In October and
subjecting it to Ministry of War. According to Özel, after April 5, 1915, there emerged two ‘Special
Organization’s. The Office of Eastern Affairs being the formal one under the Ministry of War dealt with
propaganda issues until the end of the war. In this way, the Ministry of War and accordingly the
Ottoman army were formally excluded from all kinds of acts and discussions regarding Armenian
deportation and massacres. On the other hand, the ‘traditional’ bands and human resource of the Special
Organization were subjected to the CUP and continued to take crucial roles in Armenian deportation and
massacres led by Bahaddin Şakir. In this respect, local gendarme and police units, which played an
important role in the Armenian massacres, included considerable number deserters, prisoners, and ex-
bandits of the Special Organization. See, Özel, “Tehcir ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, [forthcoming].
901
Safi, The Ottoman Special Organization, p. 253. Although the Special Organization was replaced by
the Office of Eastern Affairs in May 1915, the name ‘Special Organization’ continued to be used even
in official correspondences until 1917. Tetik, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, p. 17.
902
Özel, “Tehcir ve Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”, [forthcoming].
903
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…19/12, 07. Rebiülevvel. 1333 (January 23, 1915).
904
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…26.47, 28 Rebiülevvel 1335 (December 12, 1916).
905
According to prison registers of August 1917, there were 583 adult and 77 child prisoners in the
Istanbul Central Prison. Out of 583 adult prisoners 36 were released since they fulfill their punishment
and 22 ran away. One child prisoner also ran away from the prison. Therefore, in total, there remained
289
November 1917, the number of prisoners in Istanbul Central Prison was 301 and 319
respectively.906 Thus, compared to the crime rates in Istanbul pertaining to these
months, the number of prisoners was considerably low.907
When the number of prisoners with respect to their crimes is taken into
consideration, it can be seen that, as the years passed, the number of offenders of
cinayet increased in Istanbul Central Prison, whereas the number of committers of
kabahats and cünhas constituting the majority of prisoners in 1915 decreased
remarkably in 1917. In January 1915, out of 956 prisoners in the Istanbul Central
Prison, 48 were offenders of cinayet, 361 were committers of cünha and 547 were
perpetrator of kabahat.908 In November 1917, the numbers of prisoners in Istanbul
Central Prison who were convicted of cinayet, cünha and kabahat was 192, 127 and
zero respectively.909
These numbers indicate that the majority of offenders of cünha and kabahat,
such as the perpetrators of petty theft which was the most widespread crime during the
war years benefitted from amnesties. Although the offenders of cinayet, excluding the
perpetrators of sex crimes, also had the opportunity to benefit from amnesties, since
their duration of imprisonment punishments were longer, the number of these
600 prisoners in the Istanbul central prison. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1333 (August 4,
1917).
906
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…26.6, 11 Muharrem 1335 (November 8, 1916);
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…33.24, 28 Cemaziyelahir 1336 (April 10, 1918). There was a dating mistake in
the previous document. The document was dated as October 10, 1917 whereas the date of the file is
April 10, 1916. The date written on the document is accepted as correct.
907
In Istanbul, the number of registered crimes in October and November 1917 were as follows
respectively: 560 and 800. For each month, even the number of petty theft cases was higher than the
total number of prisoners in Central Prison. In October 1917, there were 337 petty theft cases whereas
the number of the same crime reached 497 cases in November 1917. See, “Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli:
333 Senesi Teşrinievvel ve Teşrinisani ayları zarfında Dersaadet’te vuku bulan ceraimin mukayesesini
gösterir cedvel”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 97, 17 Rebiülevvel 1336 (January 1, 1918), p. 264.
908
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…19/12, 07. Rebiülevvel. 1333 (January 23, 1915).
909
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…33.24, 28 Cemaziyelahir 1336 (April 10, 1918). The numbers were similar
for October 1917. BOA.DH.MB..HPS.M…26.6, 11 Muharrem 1335 (November 8, 1916). There is a
dating mistake in this document. The document was dated as October 10, 1917 whereas the date of the
file is April 10, 1916. The date written on the document is accepted as correct.
290
criminals increased in Istanbul Central Prison during the war years. One of the causes
of decrease in the number of perpetrators of cünha in Istanbul Central Prison might
have been that a large number of these benefitted from the law postponing
punishments in case of joining the army increased in 1917. Although there is no exact
data – such as the number of prisoners being released so as to be conscripted – directly
proving this argument, the decrease of the number of perpetrators of cünha in Istanbul
Central Prison despite the increasing number of criminal cases could be evaluated as
an evidence of this situation.
Although the main aim of the government was to mobilize the criminals to the
war, it is uncertain whether this aim has been achieved. However, it was quite possible
that a number of the criminals could have made use of the laws and amnesties as an
opportunity to escape from prison. As examined in previous chapter, there was an
increasing number of deserters from the army, a considerable part of which might have
been former convicts. Furthermore, the criminals returning to the city life as a result of
amnesties could have been influential in rising crime rates in Istanbul, especially in last
two years of the war. The following table demonstrates total crime rates in Istanbul
during the war:
291
Table 12: Total Crime Rates in Istanbul during the Great War
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug910 Sep Oct Nov Dec
1915 353911 307912 - 780 403 431 440 282 438 525 492 485
1916 389913 - 445 411 495 517 578 264 403 464 507 551
1917 1143 512 - - - 744 626 - - 560 800 807
1918 972 - - 1238 1031 732 866 961 1012 906 749 839
83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20,
(March 26 1917).914
According to the table, in 1918 the crime rates reached the level of more than twice as
high as they had been in 1915. It means that during the Great War, although the CUP
government gained additional political and repressive power, it was still far away from
effectively preventing crimes in Istanbul. On the contrary, alongside with the
worsening economic conditions, the implementation of laws and regulations for the
mobilization of criminals and the declaration of a series of amnesties seem to have had
remarkable impact on the rising crime rates in Istanbul in the following year of the
war.
910
The data of August 1915 and August 1916 demonstrating the first two weeks of the month. Polis
Mecmuası, No. 76.
911
The crime table of January 1915 including seven crime categories. Therefore, this number reflects
total of just seven crimes. Polis Mecmuası, No. 40, p. 15.
912
The crime table of February 1915 including seven crime categories. Therefore, this number reflects
total of just seven crimes. Polis Mecmuası, No. 41, p. 48.
913
belonging to last two weeks of Kanunievvel 1331 (December 1915)’. Polis Mecmuası, No. 86.
914
292
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
“I feel pity for the souls and precious bodies becoming victims of wrong internal and international
policies. Unfortunately, they could not be revived; other kinds of loses may more or less be recovered;
corrupted laws could certainly be corrected; bands of profiteering and black market be disunited and
punished; and a bank founded through money collected from a people forced to commit suicide at the
hands of starvation could not survive but it collapse. Lies, concealed incidents and plans would
nevertheless be revealed…”
Ahmet Rıza, July 15, 1915915
The Great War was the first and the foremost destructive war of the early
twentieth century. Belligerent states had to mobilize all of their material and non-
material sources for a duration of four years. Similar to other states, the Ottoman
Empire mobilized all its resources, human and material.916 In order to successfully
manage mobilization process, beginning with the early stages of the war, the
belligerent states paid particular attention to the maintenance of internal order. This
thesis aimed at examining policies on public order, crime and punishment
implemented in Istanbul during the Great War. By focusing on these policies, it is
argued that although the CUP government continued to penetrate into the society and
shape it in accordance with its demands and political priorities, specific conditions of
the Great War resulted in change in the content and as well as the implementation
strategies of these policies. In this sense, the CUP policies on public order, crime and
915
“Dış ve iç siyasetteki yanlışların kurbanı olan canlara, değerli vücutlara acıyorum. Bunlar ne yazık
ki geri gelmez; başka türlü kayıplar nasıl olsa az çok giderilir; bozulan yasalar elbet düzelir;
vurgunculuk, karaborsacılık çeteleri dağılır, cezalarını görür; açlıktan intihar eden bir kavimden yasal
olmayan yollarla toplanan paralarla kurulacak banka, ayakta kalamaz, yıkılır. Yalanlar, gizlenen
olaylar, planlar hep ortaya çıkar. ” Ahmed Rıza, Anılar, (Istanbul: Çağdaş Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık,
2001), p. 77.
916
Feroz Ahmad, “War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-1918,” The Modern Middle East: A
Reader, Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury and Mary C. Wilson (eds.), (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press,1993), p. 127.
293
punishment carried out during the war added new dimensions to the state-society
relations, becoming especially apparent in Istanbul. The CUP government became
much more authoritarian while enforcing its policies and this situation led to a
deterioration of its credibility during the last years of war, especially in the capital city.
When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, the formation of the
Ottoman modern state in terms of institutional and administrative structure had
reached a certain point. On the one hand, the CUP government, benefited from several
institutional and legal features of the modern state during the war. On the other hand,
the war contributed to further consolidation of the modern state in the Ottoman
Empire. Concerning the topic of this dissertation, policing structures and legal system,
focusing on penal code, were analyzed in detail. It is clear that after the mid nineteenth
century, important steps were taken in order to modernize, centralize and
professionalize internal security institutions and legal system. The CUP government
took the legacy of the modernized institutions during the Tanzimat period as well as
the reign of Abdülhamid II, and contributed to this process through the foundation of
new institutions such as the General Directorate of Security and General Police
Directorate of Istanbul. Furthermore, in 1911, the CUP government made elaborate
changes in the Penal Code of 1858, aiming at the transformation of this legal text to be
a product of the Constitutional Regime.
When the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War, similar to the situation of
other belligerent states, in a short period of time, the security forces degenerated in
terms of their personnel. Even in Istanbul, being the most important political and
administrative city of the Empire, the number of qualified personnel of the police and
gendarme diminished dramatically as a result of recruitments in the army.
Furthermore, although there was a division of labor between the gendarme and the
police in theory, their obligations and duties regarding the maintenance of public order
and security became almost the same in practice. From time to time, in Istanbul, this
situation corresponded to a power struggle between the gendarme and police. Finally,
war conditions compelled internal security forces to fulfill some duties such as taking a
294
role in the distribution of food which normally would not be one of their obligations
during peacetime.
Despite shortages in personnel and change in duties, in accordance with the
war needs, a new security unit named as the Inspectorship of Security under the
Ministry of Interior was founded in July 1915. The main aim of the foundation of this
unit was to provide better control of passports and travel documents at checkpoints.
Parallel to this, a new office named the Travel Office was established under the
General Directorate of Security in 1915. These developments indicate two important
points about travel and its meaning for the CUP government during the war. First,
since the war compounded and radicalized the perception of ‘internal and external
threat’ for the governments of all belligerent states, the CUP government established
new institutional structures and developed new policing strategies to maintain more
efficient control over the movement of persons – whether citizens or foreigners.
Second, from a broader perspective, these developments contributed to the
‘monopolization of legitimate means of movement’ – a fundamental aspect of modern
state. Therefore, not only the foundation of new institutional structures, but also
efficient use of travel documents, passports and regular reports of the Travel Office
about travelers must all be regarded as a part of ‘monopolization of legitimate means
of movement’ during the war years.
By using these travel documents and registers, the CUP government provided
detailed information about travelers coming to or/and departing from Istanbul. This
storage of information helped the CUP government to develop policies on surveillance
during the war years when the ‘security’ perception of the state elites reached a peak.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior and General Directorate of Security played an
active role in the regulation of the movement of population by issuing and scrutinizing
these documents. Especially entrance to and exit from Istanbul – the political,
administrative and socio-economic center of the Empire – was thus attempted to be
brought under strict control. Therefore, the great number and frequency of the
regulations regarding travel was no accident. This was a deliberate policy of the
295
government during the war years indicating its increasing sensitivity and motivation
about surveillance and control of the city population.
According to Torpey, there is parallelism between ‘monopolization of
legitimate means of movements’ and ‘monopolization of legitimate means of violence’
as two important requirements of modern states.917 Actually, the Great War provided
further convenient conditions to the CUP to monopolize legitimate means of violence.
Especially, within the war context, the government could take more concrete steps to
collect firearms and munitions from citizens. Although from the beginning of the
Constitutional Regime the CUP government had made a number of regulations to
collect arms, the justification of this policy became more “based on hard facts” during
the war: “the country is in a state of war therefore every citizen must do whatever he
could such as giving whatever weaponry he has to the state.” The registers of the
Senate indicate that the government was remarkably successful in collection of arms
and disarmament of civilians especially in Istanbul. In fact, this was probably a two-
sided policy for the CUP government. On the one hand, the committed campaigns for
collecting arms constituted a further step in the monopolization of legitimate means of
violence. On the other hand, the CUP tried to achieve the disarmament of Armenians
whose banditry activities had become a big concern for the government. Therefore, the
collection of arms should be regarded, not only as a modern state policy for
monopolization of the legitimate means of violence, but also as part of a state policy to
suppress and control Armenian revolutionary activities during the war years.
The policies and regulations including effective use of travel documents;
foundation of new policing institutions; and disarmament of civilians point the fact that
the infrastructural power of the state increased during the Great War because all of
these contributed to the government’s ability to penetrate in the society. Nevertheless,
at the same time, authoritarian elements of the CUP administration consolidated their
power during the war years. Mann describes the features of an authoritarian state as
follows: “… it is high on both dimensions, having high despotic power on civil society
917
Torpey, The Invention of the Passport, p. 4.
296
groups and being able to enforce this infrastructurally.”918 When policies implemented
by the CUP government are taken into consideration, it can be argued that the Ottoman
State became more authoritarian during the Great War.
On the one hand, the state had several administrative and economic
infrastructural channels to implement its rules and regulations. On the other hand its
policies particularly related to public order, crime and punishment became more
authoritarian. One of the indicators of such a trend was the fact that almost all laws
made during the war years were provisional. These laws were the products of a small
number of government members. Therefore, most of the time neither the Chamber of
Deputies nor the Senate were sufficiently informed even in the case of most important
laws. For example, an amnesty declared through a provisional law in November 1914
and immediately put into effect was later brought to the agenda of the Senate in
December 1915.919 This situation was criticized by a number of the Senate members.
Ahmet Rıza stated his opposition with the following sentences:
This [provisional law] was made in November 1914. As mentioned by Musa

Kazım Efendi, it is a fait accompli. [Therefore] more than a year passed since
the promulgation of this law. In that case, why is it now sent to us? If this law
was to be made by consulting the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, it must
have been proposed to us before the release of them [prisoners]…Had the
Senate rejected this law, would these prisoners have been collected and jailed
again? This means ridiculing with the Senate… 920
This was only an example of the situation how the CUP government began making
decisions about very important topics on its own and even implementing these
918
919
MAZC, 3/2, 11, 3 Kanunuevvel 1331 (December 16, 1915 ), pp. 147-149.
920
“Bu kanun, 1330 senesi Teşrinievvelinde yapılmış. Musa Kazım Efendinin buyurdukları gibi olmuş
bitmiş bir iştir. Aradan bir seneden fazla bir müddet de geçmiş. O halde bize niçin gönderiyorlar. Eğer
bu kanun Ayan ve Mebusan müsaadesi ile yapılacak ise, bunları salıvermeden evvel bize
sormalıydılar…Ayan bu kanunu Kabul etmediği takdirde mahkumini toplayıp hapishaneye koyacaklar
mı? Bu hareket, Heyet-i Ayan ile bir istihza gibi oluyor.” MAZC, 3/2, 11, 3 Kanunuevvel 1331
(December 16, 1915 ), p. 148.
297
decisions without further approval in the absence of any kind of scrutiny and control
mechanisms. Therefore, it is evident that during the war years, the CUP became at the
same time the ruling party, government and the state virtually rendering all three the
same entity. In the absence of any parliamentary opposition, and check and balance
system, the discretionary power of the government considerably increased. Parallel to
this, one of the arguments of this dissertation is that the General Directorate of
Security and Ministry of Interior gained almost unlimited discretionary power in
making policies regarding public order and security.
As a matter of fact, such an increase in discretionary power was also a direct
consequence of the martial law existing in Istanbul from 1909 on. The state of martial
law certainly radicalized the security policies. Here, it is a fact that the CUP
government used the state of martial law in order to consolidate its power. Therefore,
the CUP government, and under it the Ministry of Interior and General Directorate of
Security found appropriate basis for taking more radical measures compared to those
of peacetime about some groups living in Istanbul, in the name of the maintenance of
public order and prevention of crimes.
Under the war conditions, the perception of “enemy within” reached peak, and
therefore, not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in all belligerent states,
governments gained extraordinary power for specifying what constituted “enemy
within” as well as the policies for controlling and repressing these groups. In fact,
beginning with the nineteenth century, state elites and bourgeoisie regarded some
groups of people including city poor, vagrants, beggars and prostitutes as “dangerous
classes” because according to the upper classes these persons were “threatening” to the
existing economic system and status quo.921 In the Ottoman archival documents, these
people were called as “suspects”. What in the Ottoman documents called as “suspects”
was exactly the same thing with “dangerous classes.” Actually, during the Great War
the content of “dangerous classes” changed to a certain extent in Istanbul. Along with
vagrants, refugees and countrymen – as ‘traditional’ components of “dangerous
921
298
classes” – foreigners and minorities were also included in this “dangerous classes”.
These people were frequently called as “suspects” in the Ottoman documents. The
policies implemented on these groups to suppress and/or control them were always
justified through the rhetoric of the maintenance of public order and crime prevention.
It must be stated that this situation was not specific to the CUP government
during the war years. Since the nineteenth century, the vagrants and city poor were
already controlled or/and compelled to leave Istanbul. Furthermore, the Ottoman
Greeks and Armenians became other elements of close scrutiny and surveillance
especially after the second half of the nineteenth century. However, it is argued that
during the war years, as a result of the greater discretionary power of the governing
party and lack of necessary checks and balances system, policies of control and
surveillance regarding “suspected elements” became stricter than as was normal in
peacetime.
Foreigners living in Istanbul became one of the direct targets of policing which
was not the case before. Not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in other belligerent
states, foreigners, particularly those being citizens of enemy states, came to be seen as
a major threats to internal order. Parallel to this, the Ottoman government started to
develop a number of policing strategies and published a series of laws and regulations
in order to keep the foreign population living in Istanbul under control. As a result of
these policies, Istanbul, the Ottoman city populated by the most number of foreigners,
lost a substantial number of its foreign population.
Minorities including the Ottoman Greek and Armenians came to be more
closely scrutinized during the Great War years. In fact, already in the nineteenth
century Ottoman governments had started to regard these people as a “threat”.
Nevertheless, in the absence of any kind of opposition, the CUP government could
implement much stricter policies in a way not possible in peacetime. Furthermore, the
CUP government and security forces could easily justify their policies regarding
minorities by referring to “extraordinary need for public order and security”.
299
Deportations, banishments and strict controls on the travel to and from Istanbul
became regular policies of the CUP government concerning minorities.
Actually, foreigners and minorities were regarded as threats to the survival of
the state and government. Therefore, it is clear that, for the CUP government, both of
these groups were “potential political criminals” that had to be kept under control in
order to ensure the survival of the state. Refugees, countrymen and vagrants were other
groups of people similarly scrutinized by the security forces in Istanbul during the
Great War. The basic difference between these groups and the groups mentioned
above was their perception by the government. Although both of them were “potential
criminals”, vagrants, refugees and countrymen were not entirely regarded as “threats”
to the survival of the state and continuance of the CUP government. From an official
perspective, these groups had to be scrutinized in order to prevent mostly ordinary
non-political crimes such as theft and pick pocketing. In this sense, these people’s
tendency to the crimes against property was a biased conviction from an official
perspective preceding their actual involvement in any such crimes. Furthermore, since
they were not part of productive labor force in Istanbul, they were considered as a
burden in terms of the provisioning of Istanbul which had become a fundamental issue
for the government during the war.
The high number of official documents about “suspected elements” and the
frequency of rules and regulations put into effect to control these people indicate that
“potential criminals” – whether political or not – became an important part of the
CUP’s agenda during the war years. In that respect the rationale was stated as the
maintenance of public order and prevention of crimes. Nevertheless, when the density
and content of the policies are taken into consideration, it is clear that the CUP
government tried to restructure the population of Istanbul in accordance with certain
political aims. Therefore, the maintenance of public order was beyond the prevention
of disorder, part of a broader political policy targeting the population of the capital
city.
300
Although the CUP aimed to restructure Istanbul population through its public
order policies, the most important discursive justification of these policies was
prevention of crimes. At this point, criminal policy of the CUP government deserves a
detailed analysis. In that respect, first of all it must be noted here that this dissertation
handled ‘crime’ as a ‘politically defined’ and ‘contextually constructed’ socio-
economic phenomenon. Accordingly, governments and lawmakers specify what is
criminal and delinquent within a certain socio-economic context. In line with this
argument, the wartime policies of the CUP government towards three crimes – theft,
profiteering and bribery – are comprehensively examined in this dissertation as all of
these crimes were related to the war in different aspects.
Petty theft was historically one of the most widespread crimes in the Ottoman
Empire. The rate of this crime in Istanbul increased dramatically during the Great War
years as a result of the hardships of economic subsistence. The government and the
General Directorate of Security made this crime publicly visible through crime tables
and statistics. Although economic conditions accounted for the increasing rate of petty
theft cases in Istanbul, the attitude of the government towards this crime in making it
publicly visible without taking any preventive measures was particularly meaningful.
For example, despite the increasing rate of petty theft in Istanbul, the imprisonment
duration of the committers of this crime incrementally shortened over the war years:
the registers of Istanbul Central Prison indicate that it became six months in 1917
whereas, previous to that, it had been approximately three years. Furthermore, the
government did not make any changes in the Penal Code despite the obvious fact that
this crime began to influence daily lives of persons. At this point, state elites seem to
have deliberately made this crime publicly visible so as to be able to justify their
repressive policies towards the city poor. In fact, there might be another dimension of
making this crime publicly visible. Since the majority of the victims of petty theft
cases were also from lower classes, by making this crime publicly visible, the state
elites pretended to be sensitive to this crime. Therefore, by repetitively emphasizing
301
the “threat of theft”, the government could more easily gain the consent of even lower
classes for the implementation of repressive policies on the same classes.
As a matter of fact, one of the main reasons of worsening economic conditions
in Istanbul and being the main reason behind the increasing theft cases was the
problems in provisioning. Especially the distribution policies of the CUP government
resulted in a number of successive problems such as price rises, emergence of black
market, profiteering and unequal opportunities of access to the supply of basic goods.
Therefore, without making structural changes to solve these economic problems, it was
impossible to decrease theft rates in the capital. However, a detailed analysis on
profiteering as an ‘ignored crime’ during the war years reveals that the CUP
government benefited from the economic conditions of the war, thereby being
reluctant to take resolute action for making structural changes.
In fact, the huge money obtained from war profits constituted the main capital
for the foundation of a domestic Turkish-Muslim bourgeoisie. In other words the
merchants engaged in profiteering activities actually became the first generation of
national entrepreneurs in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a committed struggle against
profiteering would be in contradiction with the CUP’s main economic policy, which
aimed at developing a national economy. As a result, until late 1915, the CUP
government even denied the severity of profiteering in Istanbul as a problem. In 1916,
although the state elites had to accept that there was a profiteering problem, they never
explicitly categorized profiteering as a crime to be struggled against in a committed
manner. For example, it was never included in crime statistics and crime tables as a
separate category. In 1917, due to a rising discontent among ordinary people having
great problems in access to basic goods, the government had to make a number of new
regulations. Furthermore, an organization in the name of Committee of Prohibition of
Profiteering was founded in 1917. Nevertheless, this Committee only dealt with
profiteering activities related to dry goods meaning that food items as the real
commodities of profiteering were left outside of the Committee’s jurisdiction.
According to the debates in the Senate and a number of memoirs, it is evident that
302
“struggle” against profiteering remained limited to small-scale merchants and non-
Muslim enterprises. The CUP government continued to ignore the profiteering
activities of merchants close to the ruling party. Thus, until the end of the war, there
was not a wholesale struggle against profiteering.
During the Great War years, another crime that the CUP government preferred
not to recognize was bribery. People receiving fixed-income were the main losers of
the war. The civil servants constituted the largest group becoming poor because their
income had remained stable and thus became invaluable day by day in the face of high
inflation rates. Since, the government did not have enough infrastructural and
economic resources to solve this problem, it opted for ignoring bribery. Yet, while
doing that, the CUP government followed a different strategy, and as different from
profiteering, this crime was made publicly visible. Nevertheless the numbers given in
crime registers were extremely low, whereas, contrary to the low numbers
demonstrated in the crime tables, according to memoirs, bribery increased
considerably during the war years. Actually, the economic conditions of the civil
servants also verified increasing bribery rate. At this point, the governments’ strategy
was to pretend to be sensitive to this crime by including it in crime tables and in a way
announcing to the public that the rate of this crime was not high when checked in the
crime tables.
To sum up, theft, profiteering and bribery were crimes directly related to the
wartime economic dynamics. The increase of theft and bribery, and the emergence and
continuation of profiteering during the Great War years were inevitable consequences
of economic inefficiencies and defective economic polices. The CUP government tried
to develop a “criminal policy” regarding these crimes without making any structural
changes in the economic life. The components of this deficient “criminal policy” were
such as making theft publicly visible without any deterrent measures; ignoring
profiteering; and overlooking bribery. This official attitude implies that the criminal
dimension of these issues held no priority for the CUP government. On the contrary,
303
the policies related to these crimes were regarded as instruments for broader political
and economic aims.
As mentioned earlier, during the war, ‘survival of the state’ became the
foremost concern for all of the belligerent states. Internal security policies were shaped
accordingly. Parallel to the same tendency, the CUP government had a great
sensitivity for the survival of the state. As argued before, for the state elites, during the
Great War, the Ottoman State and the CUP government became almost the same
entity. Thus, ‘survival of the state’ also meant ‘continuation of the CUP government’.
In this sense, the CUP’s perception of crime and its policies for crime-prevention were
highly influenced by the idea of the continuation of existing political and economic
system. The analysis in this dissertation points out that the government was extremely
alert to the acts regarded as a “threat” to its own existence. Making some crimes such
as ‘battery and insult against state officials’ and ‘disobedience to official rules and
regulations’ publicly visible through inclusion of them in crime tables; and
implementation of very harsh punishments even to simple crimes against state officials
attest to the plausibility of this argument. In fact, surveillance and control policies
implemented on population, especially policies regarding foreigners and minorities
should be considered with relevance to the general “threat” perception of the CUP
government. The Great War in that sense provided “appropriate” conditions for the
implementation of harsher punishments and for the development of stricter
surveillance and scrutiny mechanisms. Furthermore, it is argued in this thesis that the
CUP government and, under it the Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of
Security gained further discretionary power to specify criminality and delinquency.
Finally, in this dissertation, amnesties were examined as an indispensible part
of the criminal policy. During the war years, a number of amnesties being different
from ‘traditional amnesties’ in the Ottoman Empire were declared. The main argument
of the government for declaring these amnesties was to remedy the overcrowd in
prisons. Nevertheless, when the provisional law enacted in March 1915 postponing
prosecution and punishment of almost all criminals in case they agreed to join the
304
army during the war is taken into consideration, it is clear that the government had also
different aims about the prisoners. In fact, the prisoners who became volunteers for
army were mostly recruited in the Special Organization constituting paramilitary
forces of the Ottoman Empire. They were not regular troops. These paramilitary
forces, which were composed of volunteers including refugees, prisoners, some
religious order and tribal groups, were acting as bands rather than military troops.922
The main duties of these irregular troops were as follows: making propaganda of jihad;
supporting the regular troops when necessary; engaging in guerilla war in order to
defeat the enemy from ‘within’; and intimidating the local non-Muslim population
regarded as disloyal to the Ottoman Empire.923 These counterinsurgency duties
allowed these forces a great space for illegal acts including attacks and massacres
towards non-Muslim groups, especially Armenians.924 Therefore, prisoners were
deliberately recruited in Special Organization bands in order to make use of their
criminal tendencies.
As a consequence of amnesties and the provisional law mentioned above, the
number of prisoners sharply diminished in the Central Prison of Istanbul, although the
crime rates increased in the capital during the war years.925 It is clear that the prisoners
benefiting from amnesties returned back to social life and probably continued
committing crimes. One of the main reasons of increasing crime rates in the capital
city might be closely related to the presence of growing number of criminals in city
life. In late 1916, the Police Journal published photos of several notorious criminals
some of whom had committed the same crimes for nine times in a repetitive way.926
922
Polat Safi, “Üç Tarz-ı Çete”, Kebikeç, Vol. 34 (2012), p. 99.
923
Beşikçi, The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower, pp. 160-161; Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler,
Vol. III, pp. 279-286.
924
925
As a matter of fact, petty theft was the most increasing crime during the war. For detailed
information about rates of other crimes in Istanbul during the Great War, see Appendices VII, VIII, IX,
X, pp. 315-318.
926
See Appendix F, p. 345.
305
Therefore, the criminal policy of the CUP was far from effectively preventing crimes.
On the contrary, as a result of criminal policies implemented during the war years, a
vicious circle of criminality emerged in the capital city. Furthermore, in a way the
CUP government itself became a part of this vicious circle by deliberately recruiting of
criminals in the Special Organization. At this point Gingeras makes the following
evaluation:
The outbreak of war in 1914, as well as the seemingly intractable problems of

poverty, mass displacement of refugees, and state bankruptcy, would prove
fatal to these reforms [reforms aimed at securing and policing the population].
The crisis posed by the ever-expanding power of criminal gangs reached such a
threshold during the last years of the Ottoman Empire that imperial officers and
officials often chose to incorporate thugs and lawbreakers into state service.
Such steps did not simply serve as a means of controlling or minimizing the
activities of criminal syndicates. As we shall see, the synthesis of forged
between criminal groups and the state elements of the Ottoman and early
republican regimes a violent and compromising instrument with which they
could impose their political authority.927
As a matter of fact, recruitment of criminals in the Special Organization was not the
only contact point between the criminals and the Ottoman government. It might be
argued that another such point of contact revealed itself in the official attitude towards
profiteering. As mentioned earlier, by ignoring profiteering and using the huge money
accumulating from these activities for the formation of national enterprises, the CUP
government in a way became involved in this crime. The war conditions certainly
facilitated this process. Therefore, by reference to Tilly,928 it can be argued that state
making and war making emerged as two interrelated processes of ‘organized crime’ in
the Ottoman case.
The CUP government implemented most of its public order and criminal
policies in an authoritarian manner. Although the power of the Ministry of Interior
927
Ryan Gingeras, Heroin, Organized Crime and the Making of Modern Turkey, (Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 20.
928
Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”.
306
and, under it security forces considerably increased in the absence of opposition and
scrutiny, their “success” either in the maintenance of public order or in the prevention
of crimes is questionable. İsmail Canbulat who had been in important administrative
posts during the Great War such as the director of the Genaral Directorate of Security,
the governor and the mayor of Istanbul claims that neither the civilian government nor
the military forces could provide public security in Istanbul due to
maladministration.929 He stated that hundreds of thousands of soldiers were strolling in
Istanbul without any discipline. He argues that eighty percent of crimes, particularly
theft, was committed by these soldiers. The police deliberately remained inactive
against such illegal acts of soldiers.
Probably, this situation, combined with the inefficient policies of the
government especially in provisioning, caused an increasing discontent among the
inhabitants of Istanbul. According to a number of memoirs, the legitimacy of the CUP
government was thus undermined especially in Istanbul. Sertel comments on the
atmosphere in Istanbul during the war years as follows:
First a famine started. This famine increased year by year. For years, only
bread with a black color like mud became our basic food. Large masses of
people could not find anything to eat…Besides, black market, corruption and
bribery became widespread. Privileged groups having relations with the CUP
made huge amounts of money. They spent this money for luxury as if
ridiculing the poverty of the people. They built apartment buildings. They had
fun at pubs by lighting cigarettes of artists with burning banknotes. They made
flawing rivers of wine and champagne. They made all of these in front of the
eyes of a starving people […] This period of profiteering, bribery, corruption
and theft made people totally fed up with it. On the one hand poverty, on the
other hand displays of wealth provoked the hatred of the people.930
929
930
“Önce bir kıtlık başladı. Bu kıtlık yıldan yıla arttı. Yıllarca çamur gibi kara ekmek başlıca gıdamız
oldu. Geniş halk kitleleri yiyecek şey bulamıyordu…Bunun yanında karaborsacılık, yolsuzluk ve rüşvet
aldı yürüdü. İttihatçılara bağlı olan imtiyazlılar, sonsuz servetler yaptılar. Bunlar aç kalmış halkın
sefaletiyle alay eder gibi işi sefahate vurdular. Apartmanlar kurdular. Barlarda ve eğlence yerlerinde
artislerin sigaralarını binlik banknotlarla yakıp eğlendiler. Şarap ve şampanyadan nehirler akıttılar.
Bunları aç halkın gözü önünde yapıyorlardı[…] Bu vurgun, bu rüşvet , bu yolsuzluk ve hırsızlık dönemi
307
These sentences indicate that people lost their belief and trust in the rulers as a result of
never ending problems such as profiteering, bribery and corruption. The legitimacy of
the government was hence undermined. Similar to Sertel, Ahmet Rıza describes the
state-society relations in the wartime Ottoman Empire as follows:
Famine and poverty prevail every corner of the country…Our moral

devastation is as great as the material one. As a result of provisional laws and
arbitrary acts, there emerged chaos and anarchy in administration. A secret
policy not recognizing nation’s right of supervision and a thought of violence
and atrocity against minorities damaged our union as well as the constitutional
regime. People lost their heart and their belief. They were deprived of security
and trust. The relations between the government and the people as well as
between the caliphate and Islam weakened. These are signs of bankruptcy and
collapse that are already there before the actual result of the war. This disaster
and massive losses are a direct consequence of entering the war untimely
without making due preparations and consultations in advance.931
Mustafa Kemal also prepared a report including his comments about similar
problems.932 According to this report submitted to Enver Pasha in 1917, the
government had lost its credibility to a great extent in the eyes of the people. Mustafa
Kemal argued that the relationship between the government and the people was almost
entirely severed. For the people, the government had turned to become an authority
that was pushing them towards hunger and death.
halkı bezdirdi. Bir tarafta açlık, bir tarafta görülmemiş bir servet akını halkın nefretini arttırdıkça
arttırdı.” Zekeriya Sertel, Hatırladıklarım, (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), pp. 59-60.
931
“Açlık ve yoksulluk ulusun hemen her tarafını istila etti…Maddi zararımızdan başka manevi zarar ve
ziyanımız da büyüktür. Geçici yasalar ve keyfi davranışlarla, işlerin yönetiminde karışıklık ve anarşi
ortaya çıktı. Ulusun hak denetimini [denetim hakkını] tanımayan gizli bir siyaset, azınlıklar aleyhindeki
zulüm ve şiddet düşüncesi, birlik ve meşrutiyete Zarar getirdi. Halkın yüreği manevi gücü kırıldı.
Güvenliği ve güveni yok edildi. Hükümetle ulus, hilafetle islam arasındaki bağlar zayıfladı. Bunlar
savaşın sonucunu beklemeyen iflas ve çöküntü belirtileridir. Bu felaket ve büyük yitimler, savaşa
kesinlikle zamansız, önlemler almadan katılmanın ve aslında danışarak iş görmemenin acıklı
sonuçlarıdır.” This passage is taken from a letter written by Ahmet Rıza to Şeyhülislam Hayri Bey in
the midst of 1916. Ahmet Rıza, Anılar, p. 72.
932
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim, p. 290. For translated version of this report’s related parts, see
Chapter 2, p. 76.
308
Therefore, after a four-year war, state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire
were marked by tension, conflict and chaos. Although the CUP government aimed on
every occasion to increase its infrastructural power through a number of public order
and security policies, their actual implementation was conducted in a highly
authoritarian and arbitrary manner. When criminal policy is taken into consideration,
the situation was much more dramatic. Profiteering as the main cause of a number of
economic problems leading to starvation and deaths was almost totally ignored by the
government until the final war years. Similarly, bribery was underestimated and no
concrete policies were put into practice against increasing theft cases. However, the
government benefiting from war conditions, implemented severe measures against the
crimes regarded as a threat for its continuation. In the meanwhile, amnesties became
an important part of criminal policy. As a result of these, first criminals were recruited
in the bands of the Special Organization, thus committing further crimes; and second, a
great number of criminals benefiting from amnesties returned to the social life of
Istanbul causing in turn an increase in crime rates. In short, the security policies overall
resulted in a vicious circle of criminality in the imperial capital. When all of these were
compounded by the reality of final defeat in the Great War, the CUP government
virtually lost its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of society.
309
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333
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: Wartime Istanbul: A Brief Chronology933
Jul 28, 1914 Prices of food began to rise in Istanbul due to the war
had begun between Austria and Serbia.
Aug 2, 1914 General mobilization was declared.
Aug 6, 1914 Great dearth for bread began in the city.
Sep 9, 1914 Turkey announced the termination of the Capitulations.

The British and other foreigners came under Turkish
law.
Sep 27, 1914 British Ambassador and many British left by train to
Dedeağaç.
Nov 14, 1914 Sultan Mehmed Reşad declared jihad against Russia,
Britain and France.
Public demonstrations took place in the streets. Several

locations owned and run by French, British and Russian
minorities were attacked. Hotel Tokatlıyan was one of
them. Also a group of protestors moved to San Stefano
(Ayestefanos, Yeşilköy) and damaged the Russian
monument there.934
933
This chronology is compiled mostly from the letters of Charles Vinicombe. These letters being in
diary format provide detailed information about wartime Istanbul. Vinicombe was a British national
living in Istanbul, therefore as a citizen of an enemy state, his observations might be one sided and
biased. Despite this possibility, his letters are still valuable because it is not easy to find such specific
information about wartime Istanbul day by day. Furthemore, there might be some mistakes in dating,
however, such mistakes were possibly limited. Since it is impossible to check dates for personal notes,
only widely known dates such as declaration of jihad could be checked. Vinicombe, Charles of Istanbul,
Letters Describing Wartime Life in Istanbul, 99/9/1, (Located in Imperial War Museums, London,
United Kingdom).
934
Kaya Mutlu, “The Russian Monument at Ayastefanos”, p. 79.
334
Nov 18, 1914 A division led by Cemal Pasha blew up The Russian
Monument.
Nov 1914 & Apr 1915 Masonic Lodge was seized by the government and
turned into hospital for prostitutes.
Bread was rationed but it was awful and whitish bread
rose to 10 times its prewar price.
Apr 25, 1915 The Russians bombarded the Black Sea Bosphorus forts.
Turkish wounded came in thousands from the
Dardanelles.
In May 1915 A British submarine got into the harbor [Haydarpaşa ?]

and fired a torpedo at her. From all quarters guns were
fired at the submarine but it disappeared. Excitement
was immense, all shops closed and people rushed of to
their homes in panic.
Jul 26, 1915 Fire of 2000 houses took place at Fındıklı [Beyoğlu].
In Aug 1915 Coal became unprocurable the Gas Works stopped and
city was in darkness.
Aug 1915 & Dec 1915 Bread was awfully scarce. Fights around the bakeries
became daily occurrence. The bread was awful stuff,
black with straw and stank abominably and uneatable, as
it produced stomach trouble and many people died.
Dec 20, 1915 An awful explosion took place in Golden Horn at

midday. Some tons of high explosive went off. This
would be used for loading the Ottoman submarine
mines. Destruction of life and property was very great.
Dec 1915 Many days when no ration bread was procurable.
Turks seized the British Library. The Turks must have

got about 4600 books.
The petroleum rose from 15 to 2700 pilasters.
British Hospital became a Christian Red Cross Hospital
335
but the Turks seized it and used it.
Mar 10, 1916 A British airplane came over the city at 10 pm. It was
fired at by the Turks and Germans. It took 25 minutes
with an incredible noise. The British did not drop bombs
on the city but only on military of naval objects. This
operation was experienced by the city dwellers for many
times and the people got quite used to it. A German
Zepplin air ship came over the city.
Mar 20, 1917 America broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey, the
British became Dutch protected subjects.
In Mar 1917 Plague of typhus began in the city and remained for five
months. 67 doctors and thousands of people died. The
lice whose bite resulted in typhus were everywhere even
on the seats of the tramway cars.
Sep 6, 1917 The Germans had collected at the Haydarpaşa terminus

of the Bagdad Railway. The material for a campaign to
retake Bagdad from the British. At 5.10 pm a heavy
explosion took place and then explosions followed one
another. All the ammunition exploited and burnt. This
lasted 12 hours Hundreds of railway vagons and many
locomotives were destroyed. The grain elevators burnt
and the big terminus railway station took fire the
upper part only being ruined. Of course many lives were
lost. The value of material destroyed was not less than 5
millions of dollars. Therefore, the German expedition
fell. Some said it was an accident but there was also a
possibility that it was the act of a British aero plane.
Oct 15, 1917 Wilhelm II [Kaiser/Billy of Hohenzollern] came along to

hearten the Turks. There was no cheering nor enthusiasm
manifested by the people. He stayed 3 days and then
took away with him a trainload of food stuffs from the
already hungry city.
May 30, 1918 Conflagration in Istanbul burnt 16 schools and 10.000

houses in 27 hours.
Jul 3, 1918 The Sultan Mehmed Resad V died and no one seemed to
336
trouble about it.
Jul 7, 1918 Five airplanes came over the city dropping bombs on
military objects. It took 20 minutes.
Jul 14, 1918 There were much firing of guns and many explosions on
the Asiatic side of Bosphorus. Furthermore, the air raids
were frequent, thousands of people took refuge in
cellars.
The Turkish gold lira went to 570 piastres.
Oct 18, 1918 At 11 am, eleven airplanes circled over the city dropping
proclamations on Oct 25, 1918, an air raid from 2.30 pm
to 3 pm took place, the bombardment was vicious.
Oct 28, 1918 The German Ambassador (Bernstoff) left the city and
the German army left en masse via the Black Sea. The
Turkish population was bitter against the Germans
Oct 30, 1918 Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottoman
Empire and the Entente Powers.
Oct 31, 1918 The prohibition being out later than 10.00 PM was
removed. The war prisoners were permitted to go about
the streets.
337
APPENDIX B: Photos and personal information of persons expelled from
Istanbul for their connection with white slave trafficking935
935
There are photos and (on the back of photos) personal information of more 186 persons expelled
from the Ottoman Empire for their connection with white slave trafficking. In this document, there are
photos and personal information of nine of the white slave traders. NARA Department of State,
867.1152/2, RG 59, April 6, 1915.
338
339
APPENDIX C: Crime Table indicating the comparison between the crime rates
in February 1329 (1914) and 1330 (1915)
Source: “Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli: 1329 ve 1330 seneleri Şubat’ı zarfında Dersaadet’te bilumum
merakiz-i zabıta dahilinde tahaddüs eden ceraimin mukayesesini natık cedveldir ”, Polis Mecmuası, No.
41, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1333/15 Mart 1331 (28 Mart 1915), p. 48.
340
Kind of Crime February 1329 February 1330 Difference
(1914) (1915)
Theft (Sirkat) 145 135 - 10
Pick-pocketing (Yankesicilik) 116 107 - 9
Fraud (Dolandırıcılık) 11 4 - 7
Homicide (Katl) 1 3 + 2
Battery and Wounding 236 141 - 95
(Darb ve cerh)
Indecent Sexual Behavior 9 6 - 3
(Fiil-i şeni )
Fire (Harik) 30 11 - 19
Total 448936 307937 - 141
936
There is a calculation mistake. Sum of crimes in February 1914 was 548.
937
There is a calculation mistake. Sum of crimes in February 1915 was 407.
341
APPENDIX D: Crime Table indicating the comparison between the crime rates
in June and July 1333 (1917)
Source: “Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli: 333 senesi Haziran ve Temmuz ayları zarfında Dersaadet’te vuku
bulan ceraimin mukayesesini göstrerir cedveldir”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 93, 13 Zilkade 1335/ 1 Eylül
1333 (September 1, 1917), p. 168.
342
Kind of Crime June July 333 Comparison
333 (1917)
(1917)
Violent Theft (Cinayet nev’inden Sirkat) 2 0 - 2
Petty Theft (Adi sirkat) 315 355 + 69938
Pick-pocketing (Yankesicilik) 49 33 - 16
Fraud (Dolandırıcılık) 9 12 + 3
Robbery (Karmanyolacılık) 0 0 =
Seizure (Ahz ü gasb) 2 1 - 1
Abuse of confidence (Emniyeti suistimal) 4 7 + 3
Homicide (Katl) 3 3 =
Battery and Wounding (Darb ve cerh) 81 141 + 60
Battery and Insulting during the office (Esna-yı 15 7 - 8
vazifede hakaret ve darb)
Indecent Sexual Behavior, Adultery and Sodomy (Fiil- 9 12 + 3
i şeni, zina ve livata)
Opposition to decisions and regulations (Mukarrerat 51 39 - 12
ve nizamata muhalefet)
Lack of attention and nonobedience to the laws (Adem- 23 18 - 15939
i dikkat ve kanuna riayetsizlik)
Vituperation (Itale- i lisan) 0 6 + 6
Drunkenness (Sarhoşluk) 7 24 + 17
Fire (Harik) 12 11 - 1
Bribery (Rüşvet) 3 1 - 2
Suicide (İntihar) 9 2 - 7
Various Crimes (Ceraim-i mütenevvie) 22 24 + 2
Total 627940 696 + 69941
938
There is a calculation mistake. It must be +40 rather than +69.
939
There is a calculation mistake. It must be -5 rather than -15.
940
There is a calculation mistake. The sum was instead 616 in June 1917.
941
In accordance with the numbers given in the table it is clear that sum of the crimes in June 1917 was
616 and the sum of the crimes in July 1917 was 696; therefore the number of crime cases increased 80
in July 1917 instead of 69 indicated in the table.
343
APPENDIX E: Crime Statistics of Istanbul in January 1917
Source: BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
344
APPENDIX F: Photos of Repetitive Criminals in Istanbul, November 1916
Source: “Sevabık-ı Mükerrere Eshabı”, Polis Mecmuası, No. 79, 30 Zilhicce 1334/15 Teşrinievvel 1332
(October 28, 1916).942
942
From right to left: Köstenceli Ahmed Bin Hüseyin (sentenced for nine times due to theft, vagrancy
and abuse of confidence); Ahmed Hilmi bin Osman (sentenced for five times due to theft); Ismail bin
Mustafa yahud Ibrahim (senteced for five times due to theft and wounding); Pickpocket Ali bin Hasan at
the age of 18 (sentenced for five times due to theft and battery.There were photos of such repetitive
criminals in the following volumes of the Police Journal.
345
APPENDIX G: Rates for Pick-pocketing, Fraud, Robbery and Seizure in Istanbul
during the Great War
Pick-pocketing (Yankesicilik)
943 944 Mar Apr May. Jun Jul 945 Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Aug
1915 5 7 - 11 12 26 10 3 11 15 15 16
1916 4 - 14 22 14 17 16 12 14 23 29 27
1917 92 45 - - 55 49 23 - - 20 32 69
1918 39 - - 35 47 35 47 45 55 34 47 30
Fraud (Dolandırıcılık)
1915 8 4 - 10 9 3 1 2 3 13 10 13
1916 9 - 11 17 10 10 6 11 6 5 9 13
1917 44 22 - - 28 9 12 - - 11 32 20
1918 25 - - 35 29 21 15 22 16 22 26 15
Seizure (Ahz ü Gasb)
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1916 0 - 5 10 2 4 3 4 4 5 6 10
1917 - - - - 5 2 1 - - 0 4 3
1918 9 - - 3 7 3 4 4 5 4 5 24
Robbery (Karmanyolacılık)
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1916 0 - 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0
1917 0 - - - 0 0 0 - - 0 1 2
1918 1 - - 0 0 0 - - - - 0 3
Source: “Ceraim Mukayese Cedveli”, Polis Mecmuası, Nos. 40, 41, 68, 69, 70,73, 74, 75, 76,
80, 81, 83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110.
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917); BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.
30/43, 26 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 26 1917).946
943
Data of January 1916 indicating the first two weeks of the month. Polis Mecmuası, No. 86. For the
data of January 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917). In the
Crime Statistics of January 1917, data for pick-pocketing and seizure were given together, not as two
different categories.
944
1917). In the Crime Statistics of February 1917, the data for pick-pocketing and seizure were given
together, not as two different categories.
945
Data of August 1915 and 1916 demonstrating the first two weeks of the month. Polis Mecmuası, No.
76.
946
See Chapter 6, footnote 686, p. 217.
346
APPENDIX H: Rates for Abuse of Confidence in Istanbul during the Great
War947
Abuse of Confidence (Emniyeti Suistimal )

948 949 Mar Apr May Jun Jul. 950 Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Aug
1915 - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1916 3 3 8 6 5 5 0 1 4 7 8
1917 26 12 - - 1 4 7 - - 10 10 23
1918 24 - - 14 20 12 12 7 8 7 8 11
80, 81, 83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110.
947
Abuse of confidence was a kind of crime in which somebody’s trust was misused to provide financial
or material gain. In the Penal Code of 1858, the ninth part of the second chapter was about the
conditions and required punishments for this crime.
948
data of January 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
949
1917).
950
76.
951
See Chapter 6, footnote 686, pp. 217.
347
APPENDIX I: Rates for Homicide & Battery and Wounding in Istanbul during
the Great War
Homicide (Katl)
952 Feb953 Mar Apr May Jun Jul. 954 Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Aug
1915 3 3 - 2 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 0
1916 1 - 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 5 4 2
1917 9 3 - - 1 3 3 - - 2 1 1
1918 3 - - 4 1 1 2 4 7 6 3 8
Battery and Wounding (Darb ve Cerh)
955 Feb956 Mar Apr May Jun Jul 957 Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Aug
1915 165 141 - 274 173 173 176 75 129 112 88 89
1916 43 - 77 75 106 136 146 53 76 97 91 82
1917 125 62 - - 85 81 141 - - 71 104 81
1918 90 - - 112 132 134 161 187 218 171 159 141
80, 81, 83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110.
952
953
1917).
954
76.
955
the data of January 1917, see BOA.DH.EUM.ADL. 30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (March 6, 1917).
956
1917).
957
No. 76.
958
348
APPENDIX J: Rates for Indecent Sexual Behavior (Fiil-i Şeni), Adultery (Zina),
Livata (Sodomy) and Seducing a Virgin (İzale-i Bikr) in Istanbul during the Great
War
Indecent Sexual Behavior (Fiil-i Şeni), Adultry (Zina), Sodomy (Livata)

959 960 Mar Apr May Jun Jul 961 Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Aug
1915 10 6 - 13 8 14 12 1 2 3 3 0
1916 2 - 1 2 6 2 2 2 1 14 12 3
1917 1 0 - - 10 9 12 - - 4 5 5
1918 4 - - 3 1 5 3 4 1 2 3 4
Seducing a Virgin (İzale-i Bikr)962
1915 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1916 - - - - - - - - - - - -
1917 2 3 - - - - - - - - - -
1918 - - - 3 6 6 2 2 8 3 3 1
80, 81, 83, 84,85, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110.
959
960
1917)..
961
76.
962
Seducing a virgin was included in the crime tables as a separate category in 1918.
963
349
APPENDIX K: CURRICULUM VITAE
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Surname, Name: Dölek Sever, Deniz
Date and Place of Birth: January 6, 1981, Sivas
Contact: Middle East Technical University, Department of

History Ankara – Turkey 06800
(312) 210 7683
[email protected]/[email protected]
EDUCATION
Sep 2012-Jun 2013 Visiting Researcher at Georgetown University, Washington DC,

USA (with Scholarship of TUBITAK) (Supervisor: Assoc. Prof.
Dr. Mustafa Aksakal)
2005-2007 MA/ Middle East Technical University, Graduate School of

Social Sciences, Department of History
Thesis: Change and Continuity in the Sivas Province, 1908-1918

(Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nesim Seker)
2002-2004 Minor Program/ Middle East Technical University, Faculty of

Arts and Sciences, Department of History.
2000-2004 BS / Middle East Technical University, Faculty of Economic and

Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and
Public Administration
350
WORK EXPERIENCE
November 2005-present Research Assistant at Middle East Technical University,

Graduate School of Social Sciences, Department of
History, Ankara/Turkey
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS
22-25 Nov 2014 “Public Order, Crime and Punishment in Istanbul, 1914-
1918”, 48th Annual Meeting of MESA, Washington DC,
USA.
16-20 May 2012 “Propaganda and Representation: Arab Revolt, June

1916”, Turkish Studies Project III: Ottoman Empire
and World War I, UTAH, Yildiz Teknik University,
University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
19-21 Sep 2008 “Yerelde İdeolojik Dönüşüm: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi

Sivas Vilayeti’nde Osmanlıcılık Pratiğinden Türk
Milliyetçiliğine Geçiş”, 2008’den 1908’e Bakmak,
Tarih Vakfı ve İzmir Ekonomi Üniversitesi, İzmir,
Turkey.
10 Nov 2007 “From Ottomanism to Turkish Nationalism:

Transformation of Ideology in the Sivas Province,
1910-1915”, 14th Annual Tri-University History
Conference, The Tri-University Graduate Program in
History, Waterloo-Toronto, Canada.
PUBLICATIONS
Özgür Balkılıç & Deniz Dölek , ‘Turkish Nationalism at its beginning: Analysis of
Türk Yurdu, 1913-1918’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and
Ethnicity, Vol. 41, Issue 2, (March 2013), pp. 316-333.
351
Dölek, Deniz, “Yerelde İdeolojik Dönüşüm: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Sivas Vilayeti’nde
Osmanlıcılık Pratiğinden Türk Milliyetçiliğine Geçiş”, II. Meşrutiyet’i Yeniden
Düşünmek, Ferdan Ergut (ed.), İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2010, pp. 117-129.
Dölek, Deniz, ‘Bir Sempozyumun Ardından, 2008’den 1908’e Bakmak’, Toplumsal

Tarih, Vol. 179, (Kasım 2008), pp. 12-13.
352
APPENDIX L: TURKISH SUMMARY
“…Dış ve iç siyasetteki yanlışların kurbanı olan canlara, değerli vücutlara acıyorum. Bunlar
ne yazık ki geri gelmez; başka türlü kayıplar nasıl olsa az çok giderilir; bozulan yasalar elbet düzelir;
vurgunculuk, karaborsacılık çeteleri dağılır, cezalarını görür; açlıktan intihar eden bir kavimden yasal
olmayan yollarla toplanan paralarla kurulacak banka, ayakta kalamaz, yıkılır. Yalanlar, gizlenen
olaylar, planlar hep ortaya çıkar… ”
Ahmet Rıza, 15 Temmuz 1915964
1914 yılının yaz aylarında Avrupa’da başlayan ve ilerleyen yıllarda bir dünya
savaşına dönüşen Büyük Savaş, devlet-toplum ilişkilerine olan etkileri açısından,
yirminci yüzyılın en önemli olaylarından birisidir. Savaşa katılan bütün devletler,
vatandaşlarının gündelik hayatına daha fazla müdahil olmak suretiyle topyekün
seferberliği daha etkin şekilde gerçekleştirmeyi hedeflemişti. Bu şekilde, hem savaş
meydanlarında daha başarılı bir performans göstermek, hem de uzun yıllar sürecek
olan bu yıkıcı savaşa halkın rızasını kazanmak, savaşa katılan devletlerin en önemli
amaçlarından biri haline gelmişti.
Bu çalışma, Büyük Savaş yıllarında, Osmanlı Devleti’nin başkenti olan
İstanbul’da uygulanan asayiş, suç ve ceza politikalarını inceleyerek, savaş dönemi
devlet-toplum ilişkilerinde meydana gelen dönüşümü değerlendirmeyi
hedeflemektedir. Bu değerlendirmeyi yapabilmek için temel olarak üç konu üzerine
yoğunlaşılmıştır: modern devlet aygıtlarının konsolidasyonu; İttihat ve Terakki
Cemiyeti (İTC) hükümetinin giderek otoriterleşen yönetim anlayışı ve hükümetin
topluma nüfuz edip/edememe becerisi.
Büyük Savaş yıllarında, savaşan tüm devletler için öncelikli hedef ‘devletin
bekasının sağlanması’, dolayısıyla mevcut siyasal ve ekonomik düzenin korunması
olmuştur. Bu nedenle, savaş hükümetleri iç güvenliğin sağlanmasına özel bir önem
964
Ahmed Rıza, Anılar, (Istanbul: Çağdaş Matbaacılık ve Yayıncılık, 2001), s. 77.
353
atfetmişlerdir.965 Özellikle “içerideki düşman (enemy within)” ve “dışarıdaki düşman
(enemy without)” anlayışıyla şekillenen tehdit algısının gittikçe artması ve
radikalleşmesi, toplum tarafından merkezi kontrolün arttırılması talebinin daha güçlü
bir şekilde gündeme gelmesini sağlamıştır.966 Diğer bir deyişle, tehdit algısının
artmasıyla birlikte, devlet, iç güvenliği sağlamak amacıyla merkezi kontrolü arttırmak
için toplumun rızasını, barış dönemlerine göre daha rahat ve daha fazla bir şekilde
kazanmıştır. Ancak savaş koşullarında, iç güvenliğin sağlanması hükümetler için çok
kolay değildi. Bir taraftan, savaşan bütün ülkelerde, iç güvenlik güçleri olarak
adlandırılan polis ve jandarma kuvvetlerinin büyük bir kısmı orduda istihdam edilmiş
ve dolayısıyla özellikle kalifiye personel açısından iç güvenlik güçleri önemli bir
bozulma yaşamıştı. Diğer taraftan, savaş kendi özgün bağlamında, toplumsal
düzensizlik ve çatışma için yeni dinamikler ortaya koymuştu.
Aslında, savaş hükümetlerinin özellikle iaşe meselesindeki başarı veya
başarısızlıkları, toplumsal düzenin ve asayişin sağlanması konusunda en önemli
belirleyici etkenlerden biri haline gelmişti. Özellikle, yoğun bir nüfusa sahip olan
başkentlerin beslenmesi kritik bir meseleydi. Bu nedenle, İstanbul’un iaşesinin
sağlanması önemli bir başlık olarak bu çalışmada ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelendi.
Savaşın ilk yılından 1918 Temmuz’una kadar, İstanbul’un ve diğer imparatorluk
kentlerinin iaşesinin sağlanması için çok sayıda ve değişik niteliklerde heyetlerin,
komisyonların ve sonunda bir İaşe Nezareti’nin kurulduğunu görüyoruz. Bütün bu
çabalar, aslında savaş boyunca iaşe meselesinin tam anlamıyla çözülemediğini ve bu
konuda tutarlı bir politikanın oluşturulamadığını göstermekteydi.
İstanbul tarihsel olarak neredeyse tüm gıda maddelerini Ukrayna, Rusya ve
Eflak-Boğdan’dan sağlamaktaydı. Avrupa’da Büyük Savaş başlayınca ticaret yolları
kapandı ve dolayısıyla savaşın ilk yılından itibaren imparatorluk başkentinde önemli
965
Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger, “Introduction”, Policing Western Europe: Politics,
Professionalism and Public Order, 1850-1940, Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (der.), (New
York, Westport, Connecticut, London: Greenwood Press, 1991), s. ix.
966
Emsley and Weinberger, “Introduction”, s. xi.
354
bir gıda sıkıntısı başgösterdi.967 Temel besin maddeleri başta olmak üzere zaruri
tüketim mallarında meydana gelen kıtlık nedeniyle İstanbul’da karaborsa, anormal
fiyat artışları ve vurgunculuk ortaya çıktı. Bu faktörlerle birlikte yoksulluğun ve geçim
sıkıntısının artması özellikle ekonomik dinamiklerle yakından ilgisi olan bir takım
suçlarda hızlı bir artışa neden oldu. Öte yandan mevcut sosyo-ekonomik koşullar
sebebiyle İstanbul halkında özellikle savaşın ilerleyen yıllarında derin bir huzursuzluk
meydana gelmeye başladı. İTC hükümetinin bu kriz durumunu nasıl idare ettiği;
asayiş, suç ve cezalandırmaya dair politikalarını hangi saiklerle ürettiği ve bunları ne
şekilde uygulamaya koyduğu bu tezin temel konusunu oluşturmakta. Bu meselelerin
incelenmesi için kullanılan ve bu çalışmanın izleğini oluşturan kavramsal çerçeveden
kısaca söz etmekte fayda var.
Büyük Savaş, modern devletler arasında yapılan ilk büyük savaş olması
nedeniyle dünya tarihi açısından önemli bir yere sahiptir. Şüphesiz ki savaşa katılan
devletlerin herbirinin kendine özgü bir takım tarihsel ve sosyo-ekonomik nitelikleri
vardı. Ancak bu devletlerin taşıdığı bazı ortak özellikler, bu savaşın niteliğini ve
boyutlarını anlamamız açısından son derece faydalı. Bu nedenle, farklılıkları olduğunu
kabul etmekle birlikte, Büyük Savaşa katılan devletlerin siyasal ve sosyo-ekonomik
yapılarını anlamamızı sağlayacak bir kavram olarak ‘modern devlet’e odaklanmak
gerekmektedir. Modern devlet, sahip olduğu vergi toplama, merkezi bir bürokratik
yönetim, askere alma, kanun yapma ve uygulama gibi nitelikleri sayesinde toplum
hayatının hemen her alanına nüfuz edebilen bir yapıya sahiptir.968 Bu nitelikler,
Mann’ın kullandığı terminolojiye göre altyapısal iktidarın (infrastructural power)
bileşenleridir. Dolayısıyla modern devlet sahip olduğu altyapısal iktidar sayesinde
topluma nüfuz edebilmektedir.
967
Ahmet Emin Yalman, Turkey in the World War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), s. 270.
968
Micheal Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”,
Eupopean Journal of Sociology, Vol. 25, No. 2, (November, 1984), s. 189.
355
Bilgi toplama ve depolama yöntemleri, modern devletin, topluma nüfuz
edebilmek için kullandığı araçlardan en önemlileri arasında sayılabilir. 969 İstatistikler,
nüfus sayımları ve suç cedvelleri modern devletin toplumu denetleyebilmek için
geliştirdiği bilgi toplama ve depolama araçlarıdır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında modern
devlet için nüfus bir araç değil amaç haline gelmiştir. Öyle ki devlet iyi yönetebilmek
için her hamlesinde nüfusu hesaba katmak zorundadır.970 Bu nedenle devletin, nüfusu
sürekli kontrol altında tutup yönlendirmesi gerekmektedir. Foucault’ya göre ‘disiplin’,
Giddens’a göre ‘iç/dahili pasifleştirme’ (internal pacification) tam da bu işe yarar.971
Yani modern devlet, toplumu bilgi toplayarak, denetimle ve modern polislik
yöntemleriyle disiplinize edip kendi politikaları doğrultusunda yönlendirebilir. Bunu
yaparken kullandığı en önemli söylemsel araçlardan biri asayişi sağlamak ve toplumun
huzurunu korumaktır.
Çok genel olarak iki asayiş anlayışı vardır. Birincisi Anglo-Sakson gelenekteki,
düzensizliğin karşıtı olarak algılanan asayiş anlayışıdır.972 Bu anlayışa göre suçların
henüz olmadan engellenmesi ve suçluların yakalanması asayişin sağlanması için
polislik işinin temel amacıdır. Fransız geleneği olarak tanımlanabilecek, Kıta
Avrupası’nda benimsenen ve Osmanlı’nın da benimsediği asayiş anlayışı ise daha
geniş bir anlama gelmektedir. Bu, iyi düzenin sağlanması için toplumun daha derinden
düzenlenmesini hedefleyen bir asayiş anlayışıdır.973 Bu tezde dördüncü ve beşinci
bölümler, asayişin sağlanması amacıyla, savaş döneminde uygulanan politikaları ve
nüfusun, özellikle “tehlikeli sınıflar” kategorisi altında görülebilecek yabancılar,
969
Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, Vol. Two A Contemporary Critique of Historical
Materialism, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), s. 2.
970
Micheal Foucault, “Governmentality”, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (der.), The Foucault Effect:
Studies in Governmentality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), s. 100.
971
Foucault, “Governmentality”, s. 102; Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, s. 187-190.
972
Ferdan Ergut, “Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire”, Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No.2,
(2002), s. 150. George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, “The Evolving Strategy of Policing”,
Perspectives on Policing, No. 4, (November 1988), s. 7.
973
F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public Administration in France, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1969), s. 160.
356
azınlıklar, taşralılar, serseriler ve göçmenler özelinde nasıl kontrol edildiğini analiz
etmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu kontrolün ve denetimin araçları olarak da seyahat varakaları,
pasaportlar, seyrüsefer kaleminin düzenli tuttuğu raporlar incelenmektedir.
Modern devletlerde egemen sınıf burjuvazi olduğundan asayişin neye göre
sağlanacağı da burjuvazinin ya da daha genel olarak üst sınıfların tehdit algısı
doğrultusunda şekillenir. Bu açıdan, alt sınıflar her zaman mülkiyete karşı bir tehdit
unsuru olarak görülmüştür. 19. Yüzyılda, serseriler, fahişeler, dilenciler ve diğer kent
yoksullarından oluşan bu insanlara “tehlikeli sınıflar” (dangerous classes) adı
verilmiştir.974 Bunlar devletin gözünde her zaman kontrol altında tutulması gereken
potansiyel suçlulardır. Bu kişilere karşı uygulanan politikalar da genel olarak asayişin
sağlanması için uygulanan politikalar olarak gerekçelendirilse de asıl korunmaya
çalışılan mevcut mülkiyet ilişkileri ve siyasal sistemdir.
Aslında “tehlikeli sınıflar”ın kimlerden oluştuğu içinde bulunulan bağlama
göre değişmektedir. Bu açıdan mesela bizim örneğimizde savaş döneminde
yabancıların ve azınlıkların da belirgin şekilde “tehlikeli sınıflar” içine yerleştikleri
görülmektedir. Bu kimseler üzerine uygulanan politikalar gerekçelendirilirken her
zaman suçun engellenmesi söylemi kullanılmıştır. Bu açıdan suçu nasıl algıladığımız
da önemli. Bu tezde, suç, siyasal iktidarlar tarafından mevcut ekonomik ve siyasal
koşullara göre tanımlanan davranışlar olarak ele alınmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, suç,
iktidar sahibi sınıflar tarafından siyasal olarak tanımlanır ve bağlamsal olarak
kurgulanır. Bu nedenle neyin suç olup neyin suç olarak kabul edilmediği, içinde
bulunulan tarihsel koşullara göre değişebilmektedir.
Buradan yola çıkarak ceza kanunlarını, egemen güçler tarafından kendi
politikalarını gerçekleştirmek için kullandıkları bir araç olarak değerlendirebileceğimiz
sonucuna varılabilir. Üst sınıfların, asayiş adına hükümet ve güvenlik güçlerinin yerine
getirmelerini istedikleri iki temel beklenti, 19. Yüzyıldan itibaren devletin ceza
politikalarını şekillendirmiştir. Bu beklentilerden ilki mevcut düzenin devam etmesi,
974
Allan Silver, “The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of
Urban Crime, Police nad Riot”, The Police: Six Sociological Essays, The Police: Six Sociological
Essays, David J. Bordua (der.), (New York, London, Sydney: John Wiley&Sons, Inc, 1967), s. 4.
357
ikincisi ise mülkiyetin korunmasıdır. Alt sınıflar mülkiyete karşı tehdit oldukları için
düzenin devamı açısından da tehdit olarak algılanırlar. Tam da bu nedenle 1858
Osmanlı Ceza Kanunu’nda da olduğu gibi mülkiyete karşı işlenen suçlar ve cezaları,
ceza kanunlarının en geniş ve detaylı bölümleri haline gelmiştir. Bu tezde altıncı
bölüm, mülkiyetle ilgili suçlardan savaş sırasında en çok artan hırsızlık ile savaş
koşullarında ortaya çıkmış olan vurgunculuk ve yine savaş sırasında belirgin bir artış
gösteren rüşvet hakkında hükümetin izlediği politikaları konu almakta.
Savaş sırasında, yöneticiler için en önemli meselelerden biri, devletin bekası ve
mevcut siyasal iktidarın devamlılığı olduğundan, buna yönelik suçların algılanışı ve
cezalandırma pratikleri de değişikliğe uğramıştır. Yedinci bölümde bu meselelerle
ilgili olarak devlet memuruna görev başındayken hakaret ve darb; kurallara ve
kanunlara muhalefet gibi suçların yanısıra silah taşımak ve resmi belgede sahteciliğe
yönelik uygulamalar da incelenmiştir. Altıncı ve yedinci bölümde ele alınan suçlar ve
bunlara yönelik uygulanan cezalandırma pratikleri, İTC hükümetinin savaş sırasında
izlediği ceza politikası hakkında son derece detaylı veri sunmaktadır. Büyük Savaş
döneminde uygulanan ceza politikasının bir diğer önemli bileşeni ise aflardır. Yedinci
bölümün son kısmında savaş döneminde birbiri ardına ilan edilen aflar ve af
niteliğinde olan geçici kanunlar analiz edilmiştir.
Bu çalışma temel olarak Birinci Dünya Savaşı gibi etkileri ve kayıpları son
derece büyük olan bir kriz döneminde Osmanlı hükümetinin asayiş, suç ve
cezalandırma meselelerine dair uyguladığı politikaların ana hedefleri baki kalmak
üzere, içeriğinin ve uygulama yöntemlerinin değiştiğini iddia etmektedir. Dolayısıyla
savaş döneminde asayiş, suç ve cezalandırmaya yönelik politikalar, devlet-toplum
ilişkisine yeni boyutlar kazandırmıştır. Bu argümanı ortaya koyan analiz
imparatorluğun başkenti üzerine yoğunlaşılarak yapılmıştır.
Analiz nesnesi olarak İstanbul’un seçilmesinin bir kaç nedeni var. Herşeyden
önce asayiş, suç ve cezalandırmaya yönelik politikalar, imparatorluğun farklı
coğrafyalarında farklı özellikler taşımaktadır yani mekansal olarak bu tür bir
daraltmaya gitmek gerekmiştir. İkincisi İmparatorluğun siyasi ve ekonomik
358
merkezinde savaş döneminde iç güvenliğin ve asayişin sağlanması, yönetici elitler için
hem savaş yapma pratiğinin devamlılığı hem de toplumu savaşa mobilize etmenin bir
gerekliliği olarak barış dönemlerine göre daha fazla önem kazanmıştır. Son olarak ise
şimdiye kadar savaş dönemi İstanbul’u üzerine bir kaç makale dışında kapsamlı bir
sosyal tarih incelemesi yapılmamış olması bu tür bir çalışmayı gerekli kılmaktadır.975
Oysa Avrupa başkentleri için çok geniş bir literature mevcut. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma
Osmanlı tarih yazımında sözü edilen akademik boşluğu bir nebze de olsa doldurmayı
hedeflemektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, savaş dönemi İstanbul’u ile ilgili daha sonra
yapılacak olan daha kapsamlı sosyal tarih çalışmaları için bir giriş niteliği taşımaktadır.
Osmanlı devleti Birinci Dünya Savaşı’na girdiğinde, modern devlet oluşumu
belli bir aşamayı katetmişti. İttihat ve Terakki, savaş boyunca bir taraftan modern
devletin kurumsal ve hukuki bir takım kazanımlarından yararlanırken diğer taraftan
savaş, özgün koşullarıyla modern devlet pratiklerinin konsolide olmasına yardımcı
oldu. Özellikle, bu çalışmanın konusu açısından ele alınacak olursa, devletin altyapısal
iktidarını güçlendirecek nitelikteki iki yeni kurumun savaş döneminde kurulması bu
argümanı desteklemektedir. Savaşın iç güvenlik güçlerine personel açısından verdiği
tüm zarara ve bozulmaya karşın, 1915 yılının Temmuz ayında, Dahiliye Nezareti’ne
bağlı Emniyet Müfettişliği adında yeni bir birim oluşturuldu. Bu birimin temel görevi
pasaportların ve seyahat varakalarının özellikle ülkeye giriş noktalarında kontrolünü
sağlamaktı. İstanbul, bu dönemde, imparatorluğa deniz yoluyla giriş yapılan
merkezlerden biri olduğu için, başkentte de İstanbul Emniyet Müfettişliği adıyla bir
birim kuruldu.
975
Mevcut literatürün en önemli çalışmalarından birisi derleme bir kitap olan Istanbul, 1914-1923’dür.
Bu derleme kitap Bririnci Dünya Savaşı ve mütareke dönemi İstanbul’u ile ilgili çeşitli makalelerden
oluşmaktadır. Stefanos Yerasimos (der.), Istanbul, 1914-1923, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997).
Büyük Savaş dönemi İstanbul’u ile ilgili bir diğer makale Lokman Erdemir’e ait. Erdemir “I. Dünya
Harbi’nin İstanbul’da Sosyal Hayata Etkisi” isimli makalesinde Istanbul’u iaşe, sosyal yardım ve sağlık
servisleri bağlamında değerlendirmektedir. Lokman Erdemir, “I. Dünya Harbi’nin İstanbul’da Sosyal
Hayata Etkisi”, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Devleti, Ali Arslan and Mustafa Selçuk (eds.),
(Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2015), pp. 305-327. Bunların dışında, Ahmet Emin Yalman’ın Turkey in the World
War isimli kitabı Büyük Savaş dönemi İstanbul’u ile ilgili oldukça önemli veri sağlamaktadır ancak
kitabın odağı imparatorluk başkenti değil tüm Osmanlı coğrafyasıdır
359
Buna parallel olarak, aynı yıl Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti’ne bağlı
Seyrüsefer isminde yeni bir kalem kuruldu. Aslında bu iki yeni kurumun kurulması iki
açıdan önemli. İlk olarak, savaş sırasında iç ve dış tehdit algısı o kadar artmıştı ki,
Ittihat ve Terakki, hem vatandaşlarının hem de yabancıların imparatorluk içindeki
hareketlerini kontrol altında tutmak için yeni güvenlik tedbirleri almak zorunluluğunu
hissetmişti ve bu kurumlar bu zorunluluğun yansımasıydı. Öte yandan, daha geniş bir
perspektiften bakılacak olursa, bu kurumlar, Osmanlı Devleti’nin topluma nüfuzu
açısından seyahat üzerindeki denetimini ve belirliyiciliğini arttırmasına yardımcı oldu.
Bu kurumlarla beraber, seyahat konusunda detaylı veri sağlayan seyahat varakalarının
ve pasaportların etkin şekilde kullanılması ve denetlenmesi; ayrıca Seyrüsefer Kalemi
tarafından günlük, haftalık ve aylık olarak detaylı raporların düzenlenmesi de
hükümetin savaş dönemi denetim ve iç güvenlik politikalarının bir parçası olarak
değerlendirilmelidir. Bu nedenle, savaş boyunca devam eden tüm bu uygulamalar ve
yeni oluşturulan kurumsal yapılar, devletin altyapısal iktidarının güçlenmesinde ve
modern devletin konsolide olmasında önemli rol oynamıştır.
İTC hükümeti, seyahat belgeleri ve Seyrüsefer Kalemi tarafından hazırlanan
raporlar sayesinde İstanbul’a gelen ve kentten ayrılan yolcularla ilgili çok detaylı
bilgiye ulaşmış oldu. Yönetici elitlerin ‘güvenlik’ hassasityetinin savaşla birlikte en üst
seviyeye ulaştığı bir süreçte, bu bilgi deposu, hükümete, güvenlik ve denetim
politikalarını oluşturmasında temel veri kaynağını sağladı. Dahası, Dahiliye Nezareti
ve Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti, seyahat belgelerini hazırlama ve denetleme
işlevleriyle, nüfusun hareketinin düzenlenmesi konusunda aktif rol oynadı. Özellikle,
imparatorluğun, siyasi, idari ve ticari merkezi olan İstanbul’a girişler, sıkı bir şekilde
kontrol altına alındı. Dolayısıyla, savaş boyunca, seyahatle ilgili çok sayıda
düzenlemenin yapılması tesadüf değildi. Aksine, bu durum, devletin kent nüfusunu
daha fazla ve etkin şekilde kontrol edebilmesini sağlamak üzere geliştirilen bilinçli bir
politikanın yansımasıydı. Bu uygulamalar ve düzenlemeler sayesinde, savaş yıllarında,
Osmanlı Devleti’nin seyahat üzerindeki tekelini daha da arttırdığını iddia edebiliriz.
360
Bu tez, seyahat üzerindeki tekelin yanısıra, modern devlet oluşumu ve alt
yapısal iktidarın güçlenmesi açısından, silah toplama pratiklerinin de önemli bir başlık
olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Savaşın başlamasıyla birlikte, silah toplama işlemi,
hükümet için çok daha kolay oldu ve bu konuda geliştirilen politikalar daha etkili
şekilde uygulamaya konuldu. Aslında, İkinci Meşrutiyet rejiminin başlangıcından
itibaren, İTC için silah toplama önemli bir başlıktı. Bu konuda savaş öncesinde de
önemli adımlar atılmıştı. Ancak, savaşın başlamasıyla birlikte, hükümetin bu konudaki
söylemi çok daha “gerçekçi temellere” oturmuş oldu. Şöyle ki, devletin bir savaş
halinde olması ve her bir vatandaşın bu savaşa tüm varlığıyla katkıda bulunması
gerektiği söylemi, silahların toplanması konusunda iktidara ekstra bir alan yarattı. Öte
yandan, savaş koşulları, silahlarını teslim etmeyenler için çok sert cezaların
uygulanması açısından da uygun ortamı hazırlamıştı. Öyle ki silahını belirlenen süre
içinde teslim etmeyenlerin vatana ihanet suçlamasıyla idam edilebilmesi için kanuni
bir düzenleme yapıldı. Bu şekilde, bir taraftan savaş gereklilikleri öne sürülerek silah
toplama politikası meşrulaştırılırken, öte yandan ağır cezalar uygulanarak zor yoluna
da baş vurulmuştur.
Kısacası seyahat varakası ve pasaport gibi seyahat belgelerinin etkin kullanımı
ve denetimi, yeni emniyet birimlerinin ve denetim kurumlarının kurulması ayrıca sivil
halkın büyük ölçüde silahsızlandırılmasıyla birlikte devletin şiddet tekeline daha fazla
sahip olması, savaş döneminde Ittihat ve Terakki hükümetinin alt yapısal iktidarının
arttığını göstermektedir. Bu şekilde, Osmanlı hükümeti, topluma nüfuz etme
kapasitesini belli bir oranda arttırmıştır. Ancak, asayiş politikalarının nasıl uygulandığı
incelendiğinde, İTC hükümetinin gittikçe otoriterleşen bir yapıya kavuştuğu
görülmektedir. Mann’a göre otoriter devlet, bir taraftan toplumsal gruplar üzerinde
otoriter bir güce sahipken, diğer taraftan, bu gücü altyapısal olarak uygulayabilecek
niteliğe sahiptir.976 Diğer bir deyişle, otoriter devlette hem despotik hem de altyapısal
976
Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State”, s. 191.
361
güç birarada bulunmaktadır. Buradan yola çıkarak, savaş yıllarında İTC hükümetinin
otoriter bir yapısı olduğu savunulabilir.
İTC yönetiminin otoriter yapısının bir göstergesi olarak kanunu muvakkat
denilen geçici kanunlar ele alınabilir. Asayiş, suç ve cezalandırmaya dair pek çok
konuda geçici kanunlarla işlem yapılmıştır. Bu kanunlar, hükümet içindeki bir grup
bakan tarafından, çoğu zaman Meclis-i Ayan ve Meclis-i Mebusanın onayı ve bilgisi
olmadan yapılmaktaydı. Buna bir örnek olarak 1914 Kasım’ında geçici bir kanun
olarak düzenlenen affın, ancak bir yıl sonra Meclis-i Ayan tarafından tartışılmaya
sunulması verilebilir. Bu durum, Ayan üyeleri tarafından şiddetle eleştirilmişti. Ahmet
Rıza’nın söz konusu affın tartışılması sırasında sarfettiği cümleler, durumu özetler
nitelikteydi:
Bu kanun, 1330 senesi Teşrinievvelinde yapılmış. Musa Kazım Efendinin

buyurdukları gibi olmuş bitmiş bir iştir. Aradan bir seneden fazla bir müddet de
geçmiş. O halde bize niçin gönderiyorlar. Eğer bu kanun Ayan ve Mebusan
müsaadesi ile yapılacak ise, bunları [mahkumları] salıvermeden evvel bize
sormalıydılar…Ayan bu kanunu kabul etmediği takdirde mahkumini toplayıp
hapishaneye koyacaklar mı? Bu hareket, Heyet-i Ayan ile bir istihza gibi
oluyor.977
Bu sözlerden de anlaşıldığı gibi İTC her hangi bir kontrol mekanizması

olmadan kendi başına kanunlar yapmakta ve uygulamaktaydı. Savaş yıllarında asayiş,
suç ve cezalandırmaya dair pek çok uygulama geçici kanunlar şeklinde düzenlendi ve
uygulandı. Kısacası, herhangi bir siyasi muhalefetin ve kontrol mekanizmasının
bulunmadığı koşullarda hükümetin, Dahiliye Nezareti’nin, Emniyet-i Umumiye
Müdüriyetinin ve ona bağlı iç güvenlik güçlerinin takdir yetkisi son derece arttı.
İTC hükümetinin otoriter yapısının ve takdir yetkisinin artmasının bir diğer
nedeni de sıkıyönetimin varlığıydı. İstanbul özelinde değerlendiricek olursak,
sıkıyönetim savaş dönemiyle başlamamıştı. 1909’da meydana gelen 31 Mart
Vakasından sonra İstanbul’da sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş ve 1912 yılının Temmuz ve
977
MAZC, 3/2, 11, 3 Kanunuevvel 1331 (16 Aralık 1915 ), s. 148.
362
Eylül aylarını kapsayan üç aylık bir ara dışında savaşın sonuna kadar devam etmişti.978
Sıkıyönetimin varlığı şüphesiz emniyet ve asayiş politikalarının radikalleşmesine
neden oldu. Dahiliye Nezaretine bağlı bulunan Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti ve iç
güvenlik güçleri barış döneminde uygulanması neredeyse imkansız olan bir takım
güvenlik politikalarını sıkıyönetimin ortaya çıkardığı olağanüstü koşullarda
uygulayabildi.
Bu şekilde İstanbul’da kimi grupların tehdit olarak algılandığını ve bu
kimselerin şehir dışına çıkarılarak ve/veya kent içerisinde çeşitli denetim
mekanizmalarına tabi tutularak kontrol edildiğini görüyoruz. Serseriler, göçmenler ve
taşralılar aslında 19. Yüzyıldan itibaren devlet tarafından “tehlikeli sınıflar” ya da
Osmanlı belgelerinde kullanılan terminoloji esas alınırsa “şüpheli” kategorisi
içerisinde değerlendirilmekteydi. Savaş döneminde bu kimselerin İstanbul’daki varlığı
özellikle iaşe üzerindeki yükü arttırmaları nedeniyle daha da büyük bir sorun haline
geldi. Bu nedenle, asayişi tehdit ettikleri gerekçesiyle bu kimselerin başkente
girmelerinin engellenmesi hususunda çok sayıda kanuni düzenleme yapıldı.
Halihazırda şehirde yaşayanların da bir şekilde memleketlerine ya da imparatorluğun
başka yerlerine gönderilmesi için iç güvenlik güçleri ve Dahiliye Nezareti yoğun çaba
harcadı.
Savaş yıllarında, geleneksel olarak “şüpheli” olarak adledilen ve başkentin
dışına çıkarılmaya çalışılan gruplara yenileri eklendi. İstanbul’da yaşayan ve savaş
öncesinde “olağan şüpheli” kategorisinde değerlendirilmeyen yabancılar buna bir
örnek olarak gösterilebilir. Savaş yılları boyunca, çeşitli düzenlemeler ve uygulamaya
konan denetim mekanizmaları sonucunda kentteki yabancı nüfus kayda değer biçimde
azaldı. İTC hükümetinin belirgin şekilde “şüpheli” kategorisinde değerlendirdiği diğer
bir grup ise gayri müslimlerdi. Özellikle Rum ve Ermeni nüfusun kontrol altında
tutulması ve zaman zaman “olağan üstü şartlarda asayişin sağlanması gerekliliği”
söylemi çerçevesinde kent dışına çıkarıldığı görüldü. Esasen, İstanbul’da yaşayan Rum
978
Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi, Cilt 1 (İstanbul: İletişim
Yayınları, 1998), s. 346-348.
363
ve Ermeni nüfus 19. Yüzyıldan itibaren tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlanmıştı. Ancak,
savaş yıllarında, bu unsurlara ugulanan asayiş politkalarının çok daha radikal ve
baskıcı olduğu görülmektedir.
Yabancılar ve gayri müslimler siyasi açıdan “potansiyel suçlu” olarak
değerlendiriliyordu. Hükümete göre bu gruplar hem devletin bekasını hem de mevcut
siyasal iktidarı tehdit eden unsurlardı. Öte yandan, serseriler, göçmenler ve taşralılar
adi suçlara meyilli “potansiyel suçlular” olarak değerlendirilmekteydi. Resmi bakış
açısına göre, bu kimseler siyasi olmayan, hırsızlık, yankesicilik gibi mülkiyete tehdit
oluşturan suçları işleyebilecek nitelikte oldukları için denetim altında olmalıydılar.
Ayrıca, bu kimslelerin büyük bir kısmının üretici emek gücünün içerisinde yer almıyor
olması, devlet tarafından başkentin iaşesi üzerinde bir yük oldukları algısına neden
olmuştu. Dolayısıyla, alt sınıfları oluşturan bu toplumsal grupların İstanbul’daki
varlığı, İTC hükümeri için yukarıda sayılan nedenlerden ötürü sorunluydu.
Kısacası, bütün bu toplumsal gruplar – yabancılar, gayrimüslimler, serseriler,
göçmenler ve taşralılar – savaş yıllarında kriminal ve/ya siyasi açıdan “potansiyel
suçlu” olarak görülmekte ve henüz işlemedikleri suçlar nedeniyle sürekli kontrol
altında tutulmaktaydılar. Her ne kadar hükümetin ve güvenlik güçlerinin uyguladığı
asayiş ve denetim politikaları, suçların engellenmesi ve asayişin sağlanması
çerçevesinde gerekçelendirilse de; bu politikaların yoğunluğu ve içeriği dikkate
alındığında, hükümetin asıl meselesinin, savaş koşullarında başkent nüfusunu kendi
siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik gereksinimlerine göre şekillendirmek olduğu
anlaşılmaktadır.
Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti’nin savaş yıllarına ait belgeleri
incelendiğinde, İstanbul’da uygulanan asayiş politikalarını meşrulaştırmak için
kullanılan en temel söylemin ‘suçların engellenmesi’ olduğu görülmektedir. Bu
nedenle, bu çalışmada, hükümetin başkentte uyguladığı suç politikası da detaylı bir
şekilde ele alınmıştır. Her şeyden önce belirtmek gerekir ki, bu tezde, suç, siyasi olarak
tanımlanan ve bağlamsal olarak şekillendirilen sosyo-ekonomik bir olgu olarak
görülmektedir. Yani siyasal iktidar ve yasa koyucular tarafından belirlenen suçun ve
364
cezalandırmanın içeriği ve niteliği üzerinde içerisinde bulunulan tarihsel bağlamın
büyük payı vardır. Bu argümandan yola çıkarak savaş dönemi İstanbulu’nda hırsızlık,
vurgunculuk ve rüşvet ve bunlara dair hükümet politikası detaylı bir şekilde
incelenmiştir. Bu suçların ortak özelliği savaş yıllarındaki ekonomik dinamiklerle
yakından ilişkili olmalarıdır.
Hırsızlık (bilhassa adi hırsızlık), kent yaşamında, tarihsel olarak en sık görülen
suç kategorisidir. Ancak savaşla birlikte gittikçe ağırlaşan ekonomik koşullar
nedeniyle, barış zamanında bile oldukça yaygın olan bu suç, savaş yıllarında –
özellikle savaşın son iki yılında – gözle görülür şekilde artış göstermiştir. Polis
Mecmuası’nda düzenli olarak yayınlanan suç cedvellerinin ve Emniyet-i Umumiye
Müdüriyeti tarafından yayınlanan suç istatistiklerinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olan
hırsızlık suçu, savaş dönemi Osmanlı hükümeti tarafından sürekli görünür kılındı. Bu
suçun hangi sebeplerle bu denli görünür kılındığı konusunda iki ihtimalden söz etmek
mümkün. Birincisi hükümetin ve ona bağlı iç güvenlik güçlerinin bilinçli bir şekilde
hırsızlığın üzerine gittiği ve bu suçu engellemeyi hedeflediği ihtimali. Ancak hırsızlık
suçuna dair uygulanan politikalar bir bütün olarak değerlendirildiğinde asıl hedefin bu
olmadığı açık. Herşeyden önce, savaş yıllarında, hırsızlıkla ilgili herhangi bir caydırıcı
hukuki düzenlemeye ratlamıyoruz. Oysa, İTC hükümetinin özellikle kendi iktidarına
ve devletin bekasına tehdit olarak gördüğü pek çok meselede çeşitli hukuki
düzenlemeler yaparak bu suçların cezalandırılması konusunda savaş yıllarında
radikalleştiği tespit edilmiştir. İstanbul halkının gündelik hayatını ciddi anlamda
olumsuz yönde etkileyen hırsızlık suçuna dair herhangi bir ek düzenleme yapılmamış
olması, hükümetin ve güvenlik güçlerinin bu suçu engellemek ya da azaltmak
amacıyla kararlı bir mücadeleye girşmediklerini göstermektedir. Bu argümanı
destekleyecek bir diğer veri ise hırsızlık suçundan dolayı hapis yatanların ceza
süreleridir.
İstanbul Hapishane-i Umumi verilerine göre, 1915 ve 1916 yıllarında bu
hapishanede adi hırsızlık suçundan dolayı hapis yatanların 2 ila 3 yıl arasında cezaya
çarptırılmakta olduğunu, ancak 1917’den itibaren adi hırsızlık için hapis süresinin altı
365
aya kadar indirildiğini görüyoruz.979 Yani İstanbul’da hırsızlık vakalarının sayısı
artarken verilen cezaların hafifletilmişti. Ayrıca savaş boyunca peş peşe gelen aflar
sayesinde hırsızların hemen hepsi hapse girdikten kısa sure sonra hapisten
çıkmışlardır. O zaman devletin neden bu suçu bu denli görünür kıldığına dair ikinci
ihtimale gelmek zorundayız. Bunun için de öncelikle hırsızların sosyo-ekonomik
sınıflarını analiz etmekte fayda var.
Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti’nin suç istatistiklerine göre, 1917 yılının Ocak
ayında İstanbul’da 543 hırsız yakalandı.980 Bu hırsızlardan 196’sı işsiz, 114’ü ise işçi
olarak kaydedi. 121’i ise zenaatkar olarak kayıtlara geçti. Bu kimselerin de savaş
koşullarında yeterince para kazanamayan ve yoksullaşan kimseler olduğu düşünülürse
543 hırsızdan 431’i alt sınıflardan insanlardı. Aslında yalnızca savaş dönemlerinde
değil barış zamanında da hükümetlerin alt sınıfları mevcut sosyo-ekonomik sisteme bir
tehdit olarak gördüğünü düşünürsek, devletin, bu tür istatistiksel verilere dayanarak alt
sınıflara uyguladığı baskıcı politikalarını meşrulaştırdığını söyleyebiliriz. Daha açık
ifade etmek gerekirse, İTC hükümeti, savaş döneminde kent yoksullarına uyguladığı
baskıcı politikaları ve denetim mekanizmalarını bu tür istatistiklere dayanarak
gerekçelendirmekteydi. Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti belgelerinden açıkça
anlaşıldığı gibi, savaş yıllarında çok sayıda serserinin İstanbul’dan sürülmesi, yine alt
sınıftan olan göçmenlerin ve taşralıların kente girişlerinin yasaklanması, kentte
bulunanların da sürekli kontrol altında tutulmaya çalışılması bu politikaların bir
yansımasıydı. Belgelerde bu tür uygulamaların gerekçesi neredeyse hep aynı şekilde
ifade edilmişti: bu kimselerin kentin asayişini ve güvenliğini tehdit etmekte olduğu.
İşte bu noktadan yola çıkarak, hükümetin ve güvenlik güçlerinin bu tür istatistiksel
verilere dayanarak alt sınıflara mensup kimselerin, kentte artan hırsızlık ve benzeri
suçları daha da arttırbileceği varsayımıyla politika ürettiği, yine görünür kılınan
verilere referansla adi hırsızlıkların mağduru olan alt sınıflardan aynı sınıfa
uygulayacakları baskıcı politikaları için rıza aldıkları görülmektedir.
979
BOA.DH.MB..HPS.159/35, 15 Şevval 1333 (4 Ağustos 1917).
980
BOA.DH.EUM.ADL.30/20, 12 Cemaziyelevvel 1335 (6 Mart 1917).
366
Burada bir parantez açarak belirtmek gerekir ki, bu çalışmada kullanılan sayısal
veriler, Dahiliye Nezareti’ne bağlı Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti tarafından
hazırlanan istatistiklerden ve aynı kurum tarafından süreli yayın olarak çıkarılan Polis
Mecmuası’nda periyodik aralıklarla yayınlanan suç cedvellerinden derlenmiştir.
Dolayısıyla bu veriler, devletin yayınladığı verilerdir ve bu nedenle bu rakamlara
ihtiyatla yaklaşmak gerekmektedir. Çünkü istatistiksel veriler yalnızca devlet
politikalarını oluştururken değil aynı zamanda bu politikaları meşrulaştırmak için de
kullanılır. Mesela yalnızca bu istatistiksel verilere bakarak bir analiz yapılacak
olunsaydı, savaş sırasında İstanbul’da vurgunculuğun olmadığı sonucuna varılırdı.
Öyle ki, savaş yıllarında İstanbul’da oldukça yaygın bir suç haline gelen vurgunculuk,
savaş boyunca hiçbir şekilde suç cedvellerinde yer almamıştı. Ayrıca, hırsızlıkla ilgili
çok sayıda haberin ve makalenin yayınlandığı Polis Mecmuası’nda vurgunculukla
ilgili herhangi bir habere ve/ya makaleye yer verilmemişti. Oysa Büyük Savaş boyunca
İstabulluların gündelik hayatını belki de en çok etkileyen suç kategorisi, kıtlığa, aşırı
fiyat artışlarına, hastalıklara ve hatta ölümlere yol açan vurgunculuktu.
İTC hükümetinin bu suça yaklaşımı, suç politikasına dair önemli ipuçları
vermektedir. İTC hükümeti, savaşın ilk yılında bir problem ve suç kategorisi olarak
vurgunculuğun başkentteki varlığını neredeyse tamamen reddetmekteydi. Ancak
İstanbul’da, vurgunculuğun ve buna bağlı problemlerin gittikçe artması üzerine, 1915
yılının sonlarına doğru bu suçun varlığı resmi olarak kabul edildi. Hükümet her ne
kadar vurguculukla mücadeleye girişeceğini her fırsatta yinelese de, 1917 yılının bahar
aylarına kadar bu konuda herhangi bir somut adımın atılmadığını özellikle Meclis-i
Ayan tartışmalarından öğrenmekteyiz. 1917 yılının ikinci yarısından itibaren alınan
önlemler ise genellikle küçük esnaf ve gayrimüslimleri hedef alan, günü kurtarmaya
yönelik ve caydırıcı nitelikte olmayan önlemlerdi. Asıl mesele, İTC hükümeti
tarafından, vurgunculuğun, tam anlamıyla bir suç kategorisi olarak
değerlendirmemesiydi. Bu argümanı destekleyecek bir konuşma 1917 yılının Mart
ayında Maliye Bakanı Cavid Bey tarafından Meclis-i Ayan’da yapılmıştır. Cavid Bey
şöyle der:
367
Bir de ihtikardan ne anlayacağız? İhtikar-ı adi mi ihtikar-ı kanuni mi? İhtikarın
mana-yı kanunisi, her hangi bir malın miktar-ı mevcudunu iddihar [saklamak]
ile o malı bilahare yüksek fiyata satmak demektir. Fakat muharebe esnasında
fiyatı yükselmeyen hiçbir şey yoktur ve yüksek fiyatla eşya satanları tevbih ve
muahaze etmek [suçlamak] doğru olup olmadığını bilmiyorum…Bu eşyayı hiç
bulamamaktan yüzde elli nisbetinde pahalı olarak bulmayı tercih ederim.981
Her ne kadar, Cavid Bey’in ve genel olarak hükümetin vurgunculuğa karşı

tavrı yukarıda aktarılan bakışaçısı etrafında şekillenmiş olsa da 1917 yılının Bahar
aylarında İstanbul’daki sosyo-ekonomik eşitsizlik göz ardı edilemeyecek boyutlara
varmıştı. Ayan üyesi Salih Paşa, İstanbulda çok az sayıdaki ailenin günde beş öğün
yemek yerken, geniş halk kitlelerinin beş günde bir yiyecek kuru ekmeği bile zorlukla
bulduğunu söylüyordu.982 Varolan ekonomik zorluklardan en çok etkilenenler şüphesiz
ki kent yoksulları ile sabit gelirli memurlardı. Bu iki grup aslında başkent nüfusunun
çoğunluğunu oluşturuyordu. Sıradan halk kitleleri savaşın getirdiği zorlukları en ağır
biçimde deneyimlerken, İTC’ne yakın olan esnaf, bürokrat ve savaştan kar sağlayan
küçük bir kesim lüks içinde yaşamaktaydı.983 Başkent halkının bu duruma karşı tepkisi
artmaya başladığında, İTC hükümeti daha somut adımlar atmak zorunda kaldı. 1917
Nisan ayında vurgunculuk ve fiyat artışının engellenmesi için bir kanun yapıldı. Ancak
bu kanunun ne derecede etkili olduğunu tahmin etmek oldukça güç. Çünkü, savaş
sonuna kadar fiyat artışları devam etti. 24 Mayıs 1917’de Dahiliye Nezaretine bağlı
Men’i İhtikar Heyeti adında vurgunculukla mücadele eden bir heyet kuruldu. Ancak bu
heyetini yetki alanı yurt dışından gelen yiyecek dışı tüketim maddelerini kapsıyordu.
Yani, vurgunculuğun asıl konusu olan temel gıda maddelerine dair herhangi bir
yaptırımı yoktu. Aslında savaş sonuna kadar alınan hiç bir önlem, İstanbul’da
vurgunculuğun engellenmesini ya da kontrol altına alınmasını sağlayacak türde
981
MAZC, 3/3, 47, 22 Mart 1333 (March 22, 1917), s. 313.
982
MAZC, 3/3, 31, 6 Şubat 1332 (February 19, 1917), s. 500.
983
François Georgeon, "Gülüşün ve Gözyaşlarının Kıyısında", Istanbul, 1914-1923, Stefanos Yerasimos
(ed), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), s. 82.
368
değildi. Ahmet Rıza’nın Meclis-i Ayan’da yaptığı bir konuşma mevcut durumu özetler
nitelikteydi:
Dört seneden beri iaşeye mütealik yapılan kanunlar, ittihaz edilen tedbirler de
hep akim (sonuçsuz) kaldı…Suiistimal, hırsızlık, aleni irtikab, küçük büyük
spekülasyon gittikçe arttı. O derece ki kanunlar, kararlar menafi-i şahsiyeye
(kişisel çıkar) temine hizmet etmekten başka bir şeye yaramadı. Ahali geçen
sene erzak tedarikinde müşkilat çekerdi, bu sene ne yapacağını büsbütün
şaşırdı. Ne yiyeceğini, kime müracaat ve şikayet, hangi kanuna tevfikan
hareket, hangi memurun sözüne, Hükümetin mi gayr-i resmi şirketlerin,
cemiyetlerin mi, kimin ermine itaat edeceğini bilemiyor…Bu müsavatsızlık
(eşitsizlik) kanunların tatbikatında da görülüyor. 14 kuruştan yukarı mubayaa
edilmediği (satılmadığı) resmen bildirilen şekeri 250 kuruşa kadar satan,
mazhar-ı himaye oluyor, 20 paralık kibriti 30 paraya satan, Divan-ı Harbe
sevkediliyor. Biri yer biri bakar, kıyamet ondan kopar derler. Biri mazhar-ı
muavenet ve iltimas olarak kazandığını zevk ve safahat aleminde bol bol israf
ediyor, diğeri geceleri karanlık ve soğuk bir odada aç uyuyor984
Bu alıntıda açıkça belirtildiği gibi, vurgunculuğun engellenememesi, kanunların

düzgün uygulanmaması ve savaş boyunca gittkçe yaygın hale gelen rüşvet, halkın
dayanma gücünü zorlayacak bir seviyeye ulaşmıştı.
Bu tezde ayrıntılı olarak incelenen bir diğer suç kategorisi rüşvettir. Hükümet
ve güvenlik güçleri bu suçun varlığını kabul etmekteydi. Suç cedvellerinde ve suç
istatistiklerinde bu suça dair sayısal veriler yer almaktaydı. Ancak devlet tarafından
yayınlanan verilerin, anılar ve diğer bazı kaynakların bu konuyla ilgili verdiği bilgiyle
uyumluluk göstermediği görülmektedir. Anılara ve döneme ait diğer kaynaklara göre,
İstanbul’da rüşvet savaş yıllarında gözle görülür biçimde artmıştı. Ancak Polis
Mecmuası’nda yayınlanan rakamlara göre rüşvet vakalarının sayısı oldukça düşüktü.
Aslında, savaş dönemi ekonomik parametreler – aşırı fiyat artışı, memur maaşlarına
enflasyonla orantılı zam yapılmaması, sabit gelirlilerin her geçen gün alım gücünün
azalması – gözönüne alındığında, rüşvetin artmış olduğu varsayımı rahatlıkla
yapılabilmektedir. O halde, resmi verilerde yeralan rakamlar tam anlamıyla gerçeği
yansıtmamaktaydı. Öyleyse rüşvet vakalarının sayısal verilerinin, bu suçun
984
MAZC, 3/4, 7, 26 Teşrinisani 1333 (26 Kasım 1917), s. 81.
369
olduğundan daha az gösterilerek görünür kılınması, hükümetin bilinçli bir stratejesi
olarak değerlendirilmelidir. Bu şekilde hükümet bir taraftan bu suça karşı duyarlılığını
gösterirken diğer taraftan düşük suç oranlarına referansla aslında o kadar da önemli bir
suç olmadığını vurgulamaktaydı.
Sonuç olarak hırsızlık, vurgunculuk ve rüşvet savaş yıllarının ekonomik
dinamikleriyle yakından ilişkili suç kategorileriydi. Hükümetin bu suçların azaltmak
ve/ya engellemek için nasıl bir politika izlediği ise daha genel ekonomi politikaları ile
yakından ilişkiliydi. Aslında bu suçların engellenmesi ya da azaltılması oldukça
kapsamlı yapısal değişikliklerle mümkündü. Örneğin vurgunculukla kararlı bir
mücadele sonucunda bu suçun kontrol altında tutulması mümkündü. Bu yapıldığı
taktirde fiyat artışları bir nebze de olsa engellenecek, daha düzgün dağıtım
mekanizmaları ile herkes en azından temel gıdalara ulaşabileceği için hırsızlık
azalacaktı. Diğer taraftan sabit gelirli memurların alım gücü ciddi şekilde
azalmayacağı için rüşvet de yaygınlaşmayacaktı. Ancak hükümet, vurgunculukla
mücadele etmemeyi, 1917 yılının ortalarına kadar ısrarlı bir şekilde tercih etti. Bunun
en önemli sebebi vurgunculuk ile elde edilen birikimin, savaş boyunca iaşe işlerinin
yönetimini üstlenmiş olan Kara Kemal ve onun emri altında bulunan esnaf cemiyetleri
tarafından, milli şirketlerin kurulmasında kullanılmasıydı. İTC, 1916 yılındaki
kongresinde bu ilişkiler zincirini doğrulayarak iaşe işlerinden sorumlu olan Heyet-i
Mahsusa-i Ticariyye’nin iaşe işlerinden elde ettiği gelirin, milli şirketlerin ve Milli
İktisat Bankasının kurulmasında kullanıldığını açıkça kabul etti. Bu açıdan
bakıldığında spekülatif ticaretle uğraşan esnaf aslında milli burjuvazinin kurucu
unsurlarını oluşturmaktaydı. Bu nedenle, İTC’nin vurgunculukla ciddi bir şekilde
mücadele etmesi, ekonomi politikasına ters düşmekteydi. Sonuç olarak kent
sakinlerinin gündelik hayatlarını en çok etkileyen suç kategorileri hakkında hükümet
neredeyse hiç bir somut adım atamamıştı. Hükümetin hem bu suçlara dair politikası
hem de dağıtım ve iaşe işlerindeki başarısızlığı derin bir öfkeye ve huzursuzluğa yol
açmıştı.
370
Öte yandan, İTC, savaş yıllarında, kendi yönetiminin devamlılığı ve devletin
bekası konusunda gittikçe hassaslaştı. Kendi varlığına tehdit oluşturan suçlara karşı
giderek daha radikal tedbirler aldı. Bu konularda çok sayıda düzenleme yaptı. Nüfus
üzerine uygulanan politikalar ve özellikle azınlıklar ve yabancılara yönelik
uygulamalar bunun bir kanıtıdır. Kısacası, savaş, İTC’ne hem takdir yetkisini
arttırması açısından hem de devletin kendine tehdit olarak algıladığı ufak tefek suçlar
hakkında bile radikal cezalar uygulayabilmesi açısından oldukça “elverişli” bir ortam
hazırladı.
Bu tezde, İTC hükümetinin suç ve cezalandırma politikasının son bileşini
olarak aflar ele alındı. Savaş boyunca geleneksel aflardan farklı nitelikte çok sayıda af
çıkarıldı. Hükümetin bu aflar konusundaki temel gerekçesi artan hapishane nüfusunun
azaltılmasıydı. Ancak 1915 yılının Mart ayında yayınlanan bir geçci kanun, afların
ardındaki tek gerekçenin hapishanelerdeki nüfusun azaltılması olmadığını
göstermekteydi. 1917’de kanunlaşacak olan bu geçici kanuna göre, orduda görev
almak isteyen tecavüz suçluları ve siyasi suçlular hariç tüm suçluların cezalarının
ertelenecekti. Yani devlet, suçluları orduda istihdam etme kararı vermişti.
Aslında burada bahsedilen düzenli ordu değil gönüllü birliklerden oluşan
Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa çeteleridiydi. Bu çeteler hem orduya cephe savaşında yardım
etmekteydi; hem de düşmanı içerden çökertme amacıyla istihbarat toplama, düşman
devletin sınırları içerisindeki müslümanları propaganda yöntemiyle örgütleme ve ülke
sınırları içerisinde bulunan ve devlet tarafından sadakatsiz olarak görülen azınlıkların
bastırılması ve yıldırılması gibi işlevlere sahipti. Bu işlevleri ve kullandıkları
yöntemler açısından, bu birliklerin ellerindeki gücü kötüye kullandıkları ve bir çok
açıdan suça dahil oldukları görülmektedir. Bir taraftan dönemin anılarından bir
kısmına ve son yıllarda yapılan çeşitli tarih çalışmalarına göre Ermeni katliamlarında
etkin rol oynamışlar, diğer taraftan hırsızlık, yağma ve cinayet gibi suçlara
karışmışlardı. Ayrıca hem aflarala hem de bu kanunla hapishanelerden çıkan çok
sayıda mahkum başkentin sosyal hayatına dahil olmuştu. İstanbul’da suç oranlarının
savaşın son iki yılında büyük bir artış göstermesi şüphesiz bu politikalarla yakından
371
ilişkiliydi. Kısacası savaş yıllarında imparatorluğun başkentinde suç açısından bir
sarmal olduğu ve İTC’nin suç ve cezalandırma politikasıyla bu sarmalın hem
oluşmasında etkili olduğu hem de bir şekilde onun bir parçası haline geldiğini
görülmektedir.
Sonuç olarak büyük savaş sonunda Osmanlı’da devlet-toplum ilişkileri büyük
ölçüde bozulmuştu. İTC, bir taraftan asayiş ve emniyet politikalarıyla altyapısal
iktidarını güçlendirmeye çalışırken diğer taraftan bu politikaları son derece otoriter
şekilde uyguladı. Ayrıca savaş boyunca uygulanan suç politikası sonucunda
İstanbul’da suç oranları arttı. Sıradan halk, hükümetin poltikalarından son derece
rahatsızdı. Mustafa Kemal’in 1917 yılının Eylül ayında Enver Paşa’ya sunduğu
muhtıradan durumu vahemeti anlaşılmaktadır. Bu muhtırada şöyle denmiştir:
Hükümetle halk arasındaki bağlar tamamen çözülmüştür. Halk dediğimiz şey

bugün kadınlardan, sakat erkeklerden ve çocuklardan ibarettir. Bunların
hepsinin gözünde hükümet, kendilerini açlığa ve ölüme sevkeden kuvvettir.
İdari mekanizma otoritesini kaybetmiştir. Umumi hayat anarşi içindedir.
Hükümetin attığı her adım, halkın kendisine karşı olan nefretini arttıracak
yolda tesirler yaratmaktadır. Bütün memurlar rüşvet kabul ediyor ve her türlü
yolsuzluğa alet olmaya hazır bulunuyor. Adalet mekanizması tamamen
durmuştur. Emniyet kuvveti işlemez haldedir. İktisadi hayat korkunç bir hızla
çöküntüye doğru gidiyor. Ne halkın ne de hükümet memurlarının yarına
güvenleri yoktur.985
Tüm bunlar, savaşın kaybedilmesiyle birleşince, İTC, İstanbul halkının gözünde

meşruiyetini neredeyse tümüyle yitirmiştir.
985
Yalman, Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim, s. 290.
372
APPENDIX M: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU
ENSTİTÜ
Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
Enformatik Enstitüsü
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü
YAZARIN
Soyadı : Dölek Sever

Adı : Deniz
Bölümü : Tarih
TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : War and Imperial Capital: Public Order, Crime and
Punishment in Istanbul, 1914-1918.
TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora
1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir

bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.
TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:
373

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WAR AND IMPERIAL CAPITAL:

PUBLIC ORDER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISTANBUL, 1914-1918

DENİZ DÖLEK SEVER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Recep Boztemur (METU,HIST)

Name, Last name: Deniz Dölek Sever

WAR AND IMPERIAL CAPITAL:

Dölek Sever, Deniz

March 2015, 373 pages

SAVAŞ VE İMPARATORLUK BAŞKENTİ:

Dölek Sever, Deniz

Mart 2015, 373 sayfa

Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun, 1911 yılından itibaren

APPENDIX H: Rates for Abuse of Confidence in Istanbul during the

BOA Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi

The Great War had a considerable impact on state-society relations in all

Conceptual Framework and Problematic

The primary formal characteristics of the modem state are as follows: It

Outline of the Study

This study is composed of eight chapters aimed at answering the research

ISTANBUL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Istanbul, as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, witnessed wide-encompassing

2. 1. 2 The Balkan Wars & The Great War

Wars and immigration were important causes of demographic change in

Armenians 22,575 5,734 596 22,18 13,296 47 3,209 325 72,962

Jews 13,441 364 79 31,08 6,836 21 13 292 52,126

Latins 139 8 2,669 89 2,905

Suryani 18 5 5 511 23 562

Chaldeans 476 476

Gypsies 280 280

Serbians 1,603 52 21 1,467 196 3,339

When this data is compared with Ottoman General Census of 1881/82-1893, it

Religoious Those born in Istanbul Those born outside Istanbul

Source: Karpat, “The Population and the Social”, p. 105.

2.2 Economic Life

2.2.2 Inflation, Black-Market and Speculation

Year Cost of living index

Source: Toprak, “Birici Dünya Savaşı’nda Istanbul”, p. 242.

* Kıyye is an Ottoman weight unit equivalent to 1.282 kilograms.

1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

2.3 Social Life

2.3.1 Nineteenth Century

Istanbul, as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, had a dynamic and

2.3.2 The Great War

As a matter of fact, prostitution became also widespread also among Muslim

STRUCTURES: THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL LAW

Modernization process of the Ottoman State began in the early nineteenth

3.1.1 Brief Historical Background: From Janissaries to Ministry of Police (Zabtiye

3.1.2 Security Forces of the Constitutional Regime

Following the Constitutional Revolution in 1908, the issue of internal security

3.1.3 Security Forces during the Great War

3.2 Legal Structure of Crime and Punishment: An Overview of Penal Code as a

The war as a ‘crisis situation’ provided the CUP government further

3.2.1 Legal Regulations on Crimes: Transition from Islamic Law to a Modern

The declaration of Tanzimat Fermanı (Gülhane Decree) on November 3, 1839