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Chapter 9 - The Concept of Knowledge in Islam

The document discusses the concepts of knowledge ('ilm) and gnosis (ma'rifah) in Islam. It defines 'ilm as empirical, quantifiable knowledge obtained through the senses, while ma'rifah refers to knowledge of a more abstract, subjective nature attained through the heart. The Quran uses both terms to describe knowledge, urging Muslims to ponder over creation as a means to understand God. It also discusses humans as microcosms that should reflect on themselves and the greater universe to gain knowledge of God as the Creator.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
279 views30 pages

Chapter 9 - The Concept of Knowledge in Islam

The document discusses the concepts of knowledge ('ilm) and gnosis (ma'rifah) in Islam. It defines 'ilm as empirical, quantifiable knowledge obtained through the senses, while ma'rifah refers to knowledge of a more abstract, subjective nature attained through the heart. The Quran uses both terms to describe knowledge, urging Muslims to ponder over creation as a means to understand God. It also discusses humans as microcosms that should reflect on themselves and the greater universe to gain knowledge of God as the Creator.

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Watasiwa Henry
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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1

The Concept of Knowledge

THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM

1. Introduction:

The words Ñilm and maÑrifah in Arabic are generally used to denote knowledge or
science. Some of Muslim scholars are even more specific about the terms and used Ñilm as a
collective noun to imply science, and maÑrifah to signify knowledge in general. Based on this
definition, one might have a general conception about knowledge in Islam, in which Ñilm can
be interpreted to imply a body of knowledge that is quantitatively and qualitatively objective
or empirical in nature, like mathematics and natural/applied sciences, whereas maÑrifah can
be interpreted in reference to a body of knowledge that is subjective in nature and not subject
to empirical methods of study, such as philosophy, metaphysics, theology.

The author of Mufradāt, al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī (d.502AH) writes that Ñilm is an


understanding, cognizance, comprehension, discernment, or cognitive perception of or over
something in corresponding with its true nature of reality (idrāk al-shay’i bi-ḥaqīqatihi).
Knowledge (Ñilm) according to this definition is of two categories; firstly, Ñilm in reference to
cognitive understanding and discernment of the true nature of something as they are (idrāk
dhāt al-shay’i), and secondly, Ñilm in reference to the affirmation or judgment that one has on
something as a clear evidence to demonstrate and verify the existence of something else (al-
ḥukm Ñala al-shay’i bi-wujūd shay’i), whether it is in affirmative (true) or negative (false).1

Semantically, from the same root word Ñilm, one may derive other relevant terms,
such as Ñālim (lit. he who possessed knowledge or the learned), Ñalīm (the most
knowledgeable), and Ñalam (sign, evidence, symptom or symbol from or by which one may
attain the knowledge about something). Hence, the world is called Ñālam in Arabic because it
was created to serve as a manifest sign, piece of evidence (dalīl) or instrument (ālat) that
those who possessed knowledge (ālim), such as the scientists, can explore, examine and
verify to demonstrate the existence of its Creator (ṣāniÑ), Allāh.2 Due to this reason, writes al-
Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī, Allāh has urged Muslims to study every single “world” (Ñālam), such as
the world of human beings (Ñālam al-insān), the fiery world (Ñālam al-nār), the watery world
(Ñālam al-mā’), the world of angels (Ñālam al-malā’ikah) and others that constitute our

1
Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn bin Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-
Qur’ān, Beirut: Dār al-MaÑrifah, n.d, p. 343.
2
Ibid, p. 344.
2
The Concept of Knowledge

greater universe in order to attain the knowledge about the absolute oneness (waḥdānīyyah)
of its Creator, Allāh.

‫َجلُ ُه ْم‬ ِ ٍ ِ ِ ‫السماو‬


ِ ‫ات َواأل َْر‬ ِ ِ
َ‫بأ‬َ ‫ض َوَما َخلَ َق اللّوُ من َش ْيء َوأَ ْن َع َسى أَن يَ ُكو َن قَد اقْ تَ َر‬ َ َ َّ ‫أ ََوََلْ يَنظُُرواْ ِف َملَ ُكوت‬
‫ي لَوُ َويَ َذ ُرُى ْم ِِف طُ ْغيَاِنِِ ْم يَ ْع َم ُهو َن‬ ِ ِ ‫ من ي‬.‫يث ب عده ي ؤِمنو َن‬
َ ‫ضل ِل اللّوُ فَالَ َىاد‬
ِ ِّ ‫فَبِأ‬
ْ ُ َ ُ ْ ُ ُ َ ْ َ ٍ ‫َي َحد‬
“Have they not pondered over the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and whatever that
Allāh has created, and that may be their hour of death has come? In what message after this
would they then believe? None can guide those whom Allāh lets go astray and leaves them
blundering about in their rebellious transgression”. 3

In this verse, Allāh has condemned the unbelievers for having ignored the signs of
Allāh (āyātullāh) that He has made it plainly clear for them to reflect upon. Due to this
reason, they failed to acknowledge the truth about the absolute Oneness of Allāh as
proclaimed by the Prophet  to them. If they, according to this verse, took just a little bit
initiative to ponder over the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and all that exists in the
universe, with sincerity and knowledge, and to thereby draw lessons from this reflection
(yaÑtabirū bihi), they would not fail to acknowledge the truth proclaimed by the Prophet
about the absolute Oneness of Allāh, and surely they would not waste no time to dedicate
their worship and obedience to Him alone, and would never associate Him with other gods or
deities as partners in their worship and obedience. This verse speaks of the greater universe
(Ñālam al-kabīr) as a subject matter of the fact-finding science. As rational beings, men are
urged to examine and study whatever that Allāh has created throughout the universe in order
not only to demonstrate the existence of its Creator, but also to comprehend the knowledge
about His absolute nature and attributes.4

Closely connected to the concept of greater universe stated above, Muslim


theologians have referred every single human being as a microcosmic world (Ñālam al-
ṣaghīr) vis-à-vis the greater universe (Ñālam al-kabīr). According to them, man is but a mirror
image, a reflection, of the greater universe, because Allāh has created him (makhlūq) in
accordance with the form or image of the greater universe, and He has caused to exist in him
of everything that exists in the greater universe.5 Thus, from the perspective of Islamic
ontology, man has formed a single cosmos (Ñālam) in itself, and is also an instrument (ālat) or

3
The Qur‟ān, al-AÑraf 7: 185-186.
4
See, Abū JaÑfar Muḥmmad bin Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d.310AH), JāmiÑ al-Bayān fī Ta’wīl Āyy al-
Qur’ān, Cairo: Dār Hijr, 2001/1422, Vol. 10, p. 606.

5
Al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-Qur’ān, p. 345.
3
The Concept of Knowledge

subject matter of scientific study from which people of science may obtain the knowledge
(Ñilm) about the true nature of the greater universe around them as well as the knowledge
about its Creator, Allāh. To the men of wisdom (al-ḥukamā’), according to al-Qurṭūbī
(d.671AH), Muslim are obliged by the Qur‟ān not only to ponder over the greater universe
(the heavens and the earth and all that Allāh has created), but also to reflect upon their
selves,6 because reflecting upon the self is the beginning of knowing the Creator.7

2. MaÑrifah and ÑIlm in the Qur‟ān

It must be mentioned from the outset that knowledge is indefinable. Due to this
reason, there is no categorical definition of knowledge that one can put forward to describe
what knowledge is according to Islamic intellectual tradition. The absence of clear-cut
definition of knowledge does not mean that Islam is against knowledge and science. In fact,
Islam has made it religiously obligatory (farḍ) for its followers to seek out knowledge and
this obligation is applied to both men and women. It abhors ignorance, illiteracy and blind
following (taqlīd) of opinions, ideas, thoughts or practices about which one does not have
clear knowledge. However, there are attempts by Muslim scholars to describe what is
knowledge, but the definitions they have provided are not comprehensive or all-inclusive
(ghayr māniÑ ). They are mostly relative to the scholars‟ own ideological and theological
leanings and are heavily embedded with certain ideologies and perceptions that characterize
particular theological school of thoughts (madhāhib).

Although knowledge is one of the many things that cannot be exactly defined, one can
describe its nature and characteristics. The Qur‟ān has used two terms, Ñilm and ma‘rifah to
describe what knowledge is. Although the two terms are synonymous, but it is generally
understood that the former (Ñilm) means knowledge by inference of what is sensible to the
five senses, thus empirical in nature, while the latter (maÑrifah) referring to knowledge that is
intelligible to the heart, which is the seat of knowledge. If Ñilm is a kind of knowledge
attainable through empirical and rational methods of investigation, such as by frequent
observation, conducting scientific testing and experiments, logical explanation based on
concrete data and facts, maÑrifah, on the other hand, is a kind of knowledge about something
much more abstract whose nature is known not by empirical methods, but through conviction
on the information or news (khabr) disclosed by authoritative sources or by experience.

6
The Qur‟ān, al-Dhāriyāt 51:21.
7
Abū ÑAbdillāh Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Abī Bakr al-Qurṭūbī, al-JāmiÑ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān,
Beirut: Mu‟assasah al-Risālah, 2006/1427, Vol. 9, p. 403
4
The Concept of Knowledge

Muslim scholars usually describe their maÑrifah (gnosis) about Allāh  as experiential in
nature rather than experimental.

There is no such word maÑrifah found in the Qur‟ān, but as a concept it is expressive
in different ways of its usage as a verb (past tense, present tense, present continuous tense).
Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī has defined maÑrifah as an in-depth understanding or cognizant of
something by means of rational thinking (taÑaqqul), intuitive reflection (tafakkur), logical
reflection (naẓar) and perceptive discernment (tadabbur) of its implications or phenomena
(āthārih). Therefore, maÑrifah implies a state of being cognizant or understanding of
something that one inferred with certainty after reflecting upon its implications and
phenomena. Thus, the conception of maÑrifah in this meaning is clearly reflected in the
attitude shown by some Muslims whose state of knowledge is described by the Qur‟ān saying
that, “Others among them have recognized or have rather been cognizant (i‘tarafū) of their
sins for having mixed up their good deeds and that which are evil”. 8 Hence, the word
maÑrifah according to the Qur‟ānic expression as stated above signifies understanding,
recognition or a state of being cognizant of something that corresponds to truth and actual
facts.

The opposite of maÑrifah is “inkār”, which means deliberate defiance, denial and
rejection of what is proven to be truth, whereas an act contradictory to truth is considered
“munkar” (an evil act). The Qur‟ān also uses maÑrifah to denote what is generally
acknowledged by the majority as an act of righteousness and kindness (Ñuruf and maÑrūf),
confirmed either by reason or revelation (custom or religion). Thus, Muslim men are advised
to divorce their wives with kindness (maÑrūf) in a manner that is appropriate according to the
ethical codes of conduct approved by the universal norms and religion. This fair and just
treatment is extended even after the divorce takes place, thus under the dictates of Sharī„ah
law, Muslim men are urged to treat their ex-wives with justice and to provide them with
necessary assistance and protection before they could be able to manage their normal life on
their own.9

Another Arabic word for knowledge and science is Ñilm, defined by al-Rāghib al-
Iṣfaḥānī as an understanding or a state of being cognizant of something according to the true

8
The Qur‟ān, sūrah al-Tawbah 9: 102
‫يم‬ ِ ‫اِلاً وآخر سيِّئاً عسى اللّو أَن ي توب علَي ِهم إِ َّن اللّو َغ ُف‬ ِ ً‫وآخرو َن اعت رفُواْ بِ ُذنُوِبِِم خلَطُواْ عمال‬
ٌ ‫ور َّرح‬
ٌ َ ْ ْ َ َ َُ ُ َ َ َ َ َ َ ‫ص‬ َ ََ َ ْ َ َْ ُ َ َ
ِ ِ ِ ِ
The Qur‟ān, sūrah al-Baqarah 2: 241 (‫ي‬ َ ‫اع بِالْ َم ْعُروف َح ّقاً َعلَى الْ ُمتَّق‬
ٌ َ‫) َولْل ُمطَلَّ َقات َمت‬
9
5
The Concept of Knowledge

nature of its reality (ḥaqīqah) and essence (dhāt al-syai’). Based on this general conception of
knowledge, one may infer a conclusion that someone is said of having acquired Ñilm if he
mastered the knowledge about something in its exactitude and objective sense, while
maÑrifah is subjective and abstract in nature. Since Ñilm is an understanding of something in
corresponding to its true nature of reality (ḥaqīqah) and essence (dhāt), it is therefore argued
that one can possibly arrive at this knowledge after conducting vigorous process of empirical
study upon the subject under investigation. It must require a rigorous and coherent method of
knowing whose nature of exactness of its findings is equivalent to the many discoveries made
by science. Due to this reason, Muslims have never claimed of having attained the knowledge
about Allāh in the sense of Ñilm as above, for this is impossible because Allāh being a subject
of knowledge could never be objectively known in the sense of a scientist attaining an
objective knowledge about the physical world he had studied. It is truly inconceivable to
suggest that one has knowledge about Allāh and other metaphysical realities in the true
meaning of the word Ñilm discussed above. Only Allāh, the All-Knowing has the knowledge
of everything in this sense, for “He is the Knower of both the invisible and the visible
realities”.10 Therefore, the Ṣūfī jargon of maÑrifatullāh (the knowledge about Allāh) is used to
denote man‟s inferior knowledge about the nature, attributes and quality of Allāh‟s Absolute
Being. What is meant by inferior knowledge here is that man will never attain a perfect,
complete or comprehensive understanding of Allāh in the true sense of a scientist having
attained a factual understanding of the subject matters under his investigation.

From semantic point of view, the term Ñilm is generally used to denote “knowledge by
inference”. And this semantic signification of Ñilm is commonly used either by the Arabs
during the pre-Islamic period or by the Qur‟ān itself. Both the jāhilīyyah Arabs and the
Qur‟ān have used the word Ñilm as the opposite of ẓann, a sheer conjecture and unfounded
piece of knowledge. The only distinction between the jāhilīyyah conception of Ñilm and that
of the Qur‟ān is that the valid source upon which a particular knowledge is founded. To the
jāhilīyyah conception, the source of Ñilm was found in the tribal tradition resulted of an
accumulated personal experiences that had been accepted/recognized as an immaterial asset
to the tribe. This asset or tradition was passed down through the ages from generation to
generation and preserved in the form of proverbs known as “amthāl”. Anything contrary to

The Qur‟ān, sūrah al-Jum‘ah 62: 4 (‫كم ِِبَا ُكنتُ ْم تَ ْع َملُون‬ ِ‫ب والشَّهادة‬ ِ ‫) ُُثَّ تُرُّدو َن إِ ََل َع‬
ُ ُ‫فَيُ نَبِّئ‬ َ َ َ ِ ‫اَل الْغَْي‬
10
َ
6
The Concept of Knowledge

the tradition was denounced as ẓann, that is, a conjectural or speculative knowledge that had
no scientific values because it was not grounded on a recognized tribal tradition.11

The Qur‟ānic conception of Ñilm has introduced completely a new epistemological


basis for knowledge. Although it maintains the semantic signification of the word Ñilm as
commonly understood by the Arabs during jāhilīyyah as something that opposed to ẓann,
such as conjecture, speculation or assumption, it does not however accept anything but
Divine Revelation (waḥy) as the only valid source of knowledge. Consequently, Ñilm in the
Qur‟ān means a piece of knowledge derived from Divine Revelation. Such knowledge has an
objective validity because it is grounded on the Truth (al-Ḥaqq), the Divine Ḥaqq which is
the only reality in the full sense of the word. Since the revelation, namely the Qur‟ān, serves
as absolutely the reliable source of Ñilm, all other sources including that which was found in
the tribal tradition or personal experience must be essentially or naturally unreliable. It means
that the jāhilīyyah conception of Ñilm grounded primarily on personal experiences and tribal
traditions should be downgraded to a mere ẓann, i.e., fancies and conjectures, thus not a
reliable knowledge.12 For instance, the Qur‟ān has denounced the jāhilīyyah atheistic
philosophy of life for having denied the existence of life after death as baseless for it was not
grounded on true knowledge, but on sheer conjecture.

‫ك ِم ْن ِع ْل ٍم إِ ْن ُى ْم إََِّّل يَظُنُّو َن‬ ِ ِ ِ


َ ‫َّىُر َوَما ََلُم بِ َذل‬
ْ ‫وت َوََْنيَا َوَما يُ ْهل ُكنَا إََِّّل الد‬
ُ ُ‫َوقَالُوا َما ى َي إََِّّل َحيَاتُنَا الدُّنْيَا ََن‬
And they say: What is there but our life in this world? We shall die and we live, and nothing
but Time can destroy us. But of that they have no knowledge: they are merely making
conjecture. 13

The above Qur‟ānic verse was revealed in response to certain group of the jāhilī
Arabs who adhered to the existentialist philosophy of life, an agnostic philosophy which has
rejected the idea of life after death (al-Ākhirah). When Muhammad  preached to them about
the Day of Judgment, in which man shall be held accountable of what they have done
throughout their worldly lives, they resisted by arguing that there was no other tangible life
except one that of this world in which they supposed to live and die. In addition to that, they
also claimed that the matter of life and death was nothing but a natural cause of nature. The
Qur‟ān, on the contrary, has denounced this existentialist view of reality as baseless, and
contrasted that what the jāhilī Arabs all along held as truth had no connection whatsoever

11
Toshihiko Izutsu, God and Man in the Qur’an, p. 56
12
Izutsu, God and Man in the Qur’an, p.57
13
The Qur‟ān, al-Jāthiyah 45: 24
7
The Concept of Knowledge

with Ñilm, that is, the knowledge grounded on valid and objective sources. In fact, the thing
they claimed to be knowledge was not knowledge, but a sheer ẓann – a conjecture and
speculation that has no objective ground.14

The Qur‟ān has repeatedly paraphrased conjectural and speculative knowledge (ẓann)
with the Arabic collocation, ittibāÑ al-ahwā’, which means – following the natural inclination
of the impulsive and perverse nature of human soul and desire. It has also criticized the
unbelievers and those who have shared their superstitious tradition as having accomplished
nothing as far as their religious and spiritual salvation is concerned, because over reliance on
uncorroborated ẓann as a ground for truth would have certainly made themselves succumbing
to their own pervasive caprices and fancies (ahwā’).15 Conjectural and speculative knowledge
(ẓann), according to the Qur‟ān, is not a form of objective knowledge (Ñilm). Apart from
personal experience of the human caprices and desires (ahwā’), conjectural knowledge is also
grounded on one‟s personal opinions or views (ra’yy), which is arbitrary in nature. However
creative it may be, arbitrary opinions tend to create division and bring in distorted
interpretations of truth. In the early centuries Islam had witnessed a number of deviant groups
emerged as a result of their indiscriminate and independent reasoning to pronounce their
arbitrary opinions (ra’yy) in their attempt at interpreting the Qur‟ān. The historians of deviant
religious sects in Islam have classified these groups as ahl al-ahwā’ – the people who
succumbed to their own caprices, thus drawing from it a conjectural knowledge (ẓann)
mistakenly assumed as having significant amount of authority similar to the knowledge
grounded on Divine Revelation.

Knowledge according to Muslim scholars

According to al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār, one of the leading theoreticians of Mu„tazilī


school of thought, knowledge is “the meaning (al-maÑnā) that makes the soul of the learned
feeling contented after having acquired it. It is not knowledge if the learned does not feel
contented with it, even though he believed in it with certainty. Due to this reason, the
meaning (i.e. knowledge as such) cannot not be characterized with this rule (i.e. something
that makes the learned feels contented in the soul), if it constitutes a matter of conviction

14
Izutsu, God and Man in the Qur’ān., p.58
15
The Qur‟ān, al-Rūm 30: 29
ِ ِ ِ ِ َّ
‫ين‬ َ ‫اءىم بِغَ ِْْي عْل ٍم فَ َمن يَ ْهدي َم ْن أ‬
َ ‫َض َّل اللَّوُ َوَما ََلُم ِّمن نَّاص ِر‬ َ ‫بَ ِل اتَّبَ َع الذ‬
ُ ‫ين ظَلَ ُموا أ َْى َو‬
8
The Concept of Knowledge

(iÑtiqād) of which the learned is convinced that what is known is essentially real (wāqiÑ )”.16 It
appears that according to Al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār, knowledge is none but the meaning of
something that the learned has discovered, and he feels contented in the soul that the
discovered meaning is right and real. However, this conception of knowledge contradicts the
definition delineated by other leading MuÑtazilī theoreticians, al-Jubbā‟ī Abū ÑAlī and al-
Jubbā‟ī Abū Hāshim, who have conceived of knowledge as a conviction (iÑtiqād) of
something that the learned believed to be real, and corresponds with reality. To them,
knowledge is “a conviction (iÑtiqād) of something that corresponds to what it is”. 17 Al-Qāḍī
ÑAbd al-Jabbār has refuted this definition, saying that it is far from truth, because as he stated,
“a faithful follower (al-muqallid) might have convinced upon something as real or in
correspondent to what it is, but this state of conviction has never made him knowledgeable
(Ñālim). Due to this reason, his state of conviction is essentially analogous to a state of
conjecture (ẓān) and doubt (shākk). It has been confirmed by the Arabic philologists that an
Ñālim (the learned) is one who has attained certainty in what is known, and the nature of his
knowledge is free from doubt and conjecture”.18

The main point of al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār‟s criticism against his fellow MuÑtazilīte
colleagues for defining knowledge as a conviction (iÑtiqād) of something lies in the latter‟s
failure to distinguish the nature of knowledge attained by the real Ñālim (the learned) and one
that is attained by a muqallid (a faithful follower who has blindly adopted and assumed the
teachings of his teacher as right and correspondent to truth). He has further emphasized that
something, which is nothing to do with knowledge, cannot be easily assumed as part of
knowledge simply because of its being a matter of dogmatic conviction (iÑtiqād). Being
himself a MuÑtazilī by school of thought, al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār did not hesitate to criticize
the mistake committed by his fellow colleagues who have equated knowledge (Ñilm) with
something that many people, namely the faithful followers (muqallidūn) who have blindly
adopted and assumed the teachings of their revered teachers as right and truth, have taken it
for granted as a matter of conviction (iÑtiqād). For him, such a conviction is not knowledge

16
Al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-ÑAdl, (see chapter on al-Naẓr wa
al-MaÑārif), edited by Ibrāhīm Madkūr and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Cairo: al-Mu‟assasah al-Miṣrīyyah al-
ÑĀmmah li al-Nasr, 1962, Vol. 12, p. 13.
17
Ibid, Vol. 12, p. 13.
18
Ibid, Vol. 12, pp. 17-18.
9
The Concept of Knowledge

but dogmatic beliefs very much akin to one‟s conviction resulted of blind following or a
sheer lucky guess (iÑtiqād al-taqlīd wa tabkhīt).19

Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that among MuÑtazilī scholars, at
least there are two definitions of knowledge; first, knowledge in reference to the meaning of
something by which the learned is satisfactory and contented in the soul, and second,
knowledge in reference to one‟s conviction or belief of something in correspondent to what it
is.

The Sunnī scholars disagreed with the above definitions because of certain reasons;
the former is reductionist because it has confined knowledge to “something” that possesses
real existence (wujūd) only, whereas knowledge about non-existent (al-maÑdūm) cannot be
called knowledge for reason being that the “thing” that has been the subject of knowledge
does not possess real existence. The second definition is false because of its assumption to
equate knowledge with conviction or belief (iÑtiqād). If knowledge is conviction, certainly
everyone who has attained knowledge of something (Ñālim) must be a believer (muÑtaqid).
This rule is not necessarily applicable to all, for Allāh certainly is Ñālim (the Knower), and is
thus all knowing (Ñalīm) of everything that exists, but He cannot be called a believer
(muÑtaqid). Such is evident that to define knowledge as a matter of conviction or belief is
false, because it is not comprehensive (ghayr jāmiÑ). Another problem of this definition
pointed out by the Sunnī scholars is related to the nature of conviction itself. For them,
conviction or belief is always susceptible to differences and preconceived ideas and, as such,
it should never be considered as part of knowledge. To identify conviction or belief (iÑtiqād)
as knowledge simply because of the assumption that it corresponds with reality (wāqiÑ ) is
inconceivable for reason being that one‟s conviction or belief may not be a matter of
conviction or belief to others.20

It must be noted that Muslim philosophers do not differentiate between Ñilm


(knowledge by inference), maÑrifah (knowledge by experience) and idrāk (knowledge by
rational understanding), and have used all these terms to denote knowledge. Al-Jurjānī, for
instance, defined knowledge as “attaining the description of something in the mind” (ḥuṣūl
ṣūrah al-shay’ fī al-Ñaql).21 It appears that al-Jurjānī‟s definition of knowledge as stated above

19
Al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, ed. ÑAbd al-Karīm ÑUthmān, Cairo:
Maktabab Wahbah, 1384/1965, p. 46.
20
Rājiḥ ÑAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kurdī, Naẓarīyyah al-MaÑrifah bayn al-Qur’ān wa al-Falsafah,
Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1412/1992, p. 35.
21
Al-Jurjānī, al-TaÑrīfāt, p. 135.
10
The Concept of Knowledge

is in conformity with the rationalist vision of reality, which has strongly emphasized on the
human mind or reason (Ñaql), not the heart (qalb), to be the seat of knowledge and the best
judge of what is right and wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice. This meaning of
knowledge is furthermore supported by Ibn Sīnā who speaks of knowledge as “the
understanding or discernment of something (idrāk al-shay’), which is actually the reality
reflecting or representing itself in the intelligent (al-mudrik) which has been constantly
observing what it is. In principle, the reality itself is actually external from the intelligent”. 22
As regards to the process of attaining the knowledge among the learned (Ñārifūn), Ibn Sīnā
has identified it as resulting of mutual discourse, argument, discussion (nuqāsh) between the
irrational soul (al-nafs al-insānīyyah) and the rational soul (al-Ñālam al-Ñaqlī) and this process
is dependent on the nature of one‟s innate dispositions and the given challenges that one is
facing.23

It appears that in the above definition, Ibn Sīnā acknowledged the spirit of curiosity
and the vibrant interaction between the irrational soul (nafs) and the rational soul (Ñaql) in
every human being with constant challenges he is facing in everyday life as very crucial in
one‟s discovery of knowledge about something. Having deeply fascinated by the scientific
tradition of the Greek philosophy, Ibn Sīnā, like other Muslim philosophers, has once again
reaffirmed the central role of reason as the best judge in the attainment of knowledge about
reality in its objective sense.

A well-known theologian, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwainī (d. 478H),24 has a peculiar


scheme to identify what does constitute knowledge. He said, “The way to comprehend the
meaning of knowledge and its distinction from non-knowledge according to our view is as
follows; by necessity (bi al-ḍarūrah), we should have two prepositions pertaining to our
certainty of something. Therefore, we can say that our conviction of something is either
absolutely certain or definitive (jāziman), or quite the opposite. Absolute certainty does not
necessarily correspond with the true nature of reality; it could be on the contrary remote from
reality. If it corresponds with the true nature of reality and becomes religiously binding (for
all Muslims to believe in), such an absolute certainty is called knowledge regardless whether

22
Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt, ed. Sulaimān Dunyā, Cairo: Dār al-MaÑārif, n.d, Vol.2, pp.
359-366.
23
Ibn Sīnā, ibid., Vol. 4, p. 124.
24
His real name is ÑAbd al-Malik bin ÑAbdullāh, known as Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwainī. In
theology, he subscribed to the AshÑarīte theological school of thought and in jurisprudence to the
ShāfiÑīte school of thought. He is a prolific scholar, who wrote many books and treatises mostly
in kalām and fundamentals of religion (uṣūl al-dīn).
11
The Concept of Knowledge

it is objective or subjective. Nevertheless, if it is binding without having been affirmative


about its being objective or subjective, it is simply called a dogmatic conviction of the
laymen (iÑtiqād al-muqallid). It must be mentioned that a definitive certainty not corresponds
with the true nature of reality is no more than a sheer ignorance (jahl), whereas a conviction
which is not definitive is called doubt or uncertainty (shakk), and even the doubt also could
be moreover divided into two; speculative conjecture (ẓann) if it is plausible, and erroneous
impression or delusion (wahm) if it is not plausible”.25

It is found that al-Juwaynī‟s conception of knowledge above is not about the


definition of knowledge as such, but more relevant to the nature and levels of conviction that
one has pertaining to certain things. For him, the highest level of certainty that one has in
terms of one‟s conviction of something is called knowledge providing it must conform to or
correspond with the true nature of reality, disregarding whether the subject matter of this
conviction is objective or subjective. A conviction that fails to achieve the definitive level of
certainty and does not correspond with the true nature of reality is classified into different
categories. The highest in ranking is the dogmatic conviction of the ordinary people who
have adopted the views and teachings of the learned blindly. Al-Juwaynī, like a MuÑtazilī
scholar al-Qāḍī ÑAbd al-Jabbār, has called it iÑtiqād al-muqallid in reference to a rigid form of
conviction belongs to followers of certain schools of thought, who have blindly complied
with what their teachers had taught and said rather than examining thoroughly the subject
matters of their conviction. The weakest forms of conviction after iÑtiqād al-muqallid are
called speculative conjecture (ẓann) and delusion (wahm) respectively, mainly because of
their distinguishing elements of doubt (shakk). Nevertheless, al-Juwaynī have shared one
thing in common with other Muslim scholars, disregarding their schools of thought, in the
view that anything does not conform to the true nature of reality is none but a sheer form of
ignorance (jahl).

Perhaps one of the most systematic expositions of the theory of knowledge in the
history of Islamic intellectual tradition is one that was theoretically outlined by al-Ghazālī,
who has defined knowledge in relation to three interrelated concepts; the innate faculty of
understanding (al-baṣīrah al-bāṭinah), the true nature of reality (ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’), and the
attainment of the true image or description of that reality (nafs al-ḥaqā’iq) in the heart, which
he identified not only as the recipient but also the seat of knowledge. According to him,

25
Imām al-Rāzī, Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb or al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Cairo: MaṭbaÑah al-Khayrīyyah, 1307H,
Vol. 1, p. 280.
12
The Concept of Knowledge

knowledge is “ḥuṣūl al-mithāl fī al-qalb”,26 that is, the attainment of actual description or
representation in the heart. What he meant by “the actual description or representation” here
refers to the actual description or representation that pertains to the true nature of reality or
the truth of things (ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’), and this actual description pertaining to the true nature
of reality must be reflected in the mirror of the heart, which is in fact the seat of knowledge.
Al-Rāzī has refuted al-Ghazālī‟s notion of knowledge being a description of the true nature of
reality reflected in the heart as not quite right, for what is reflected does not necessarily
conform to the truth (data) of things as they are (ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’ bi-dhātihā). Similarly,
reflection of things in a mirror has never described the true nature of things as what they truly
are, for the meaning of “reflection” is none but the mirror image of a reality but not the
reality itself.27

In some other places, al-Ghazālī has distinguished between knowledge by inference


on objective physical evidences (Ñilm) and knowledge by inference on textual evidences
(maÑrifah); the former refers to “the actual description about the truth or the true nature of
something attained by the well-balance, perceptive and integrated rational soul (al-nafs al-
nāṭiqah al-muṭma’innah), which is able to perceive the truth of something independent of its
subject matters in terms of its nature (aÑyān), qualitative values (kayfīyāt), quantitative values
(kammīyāt) and substances (jawāhir), and identities (zawātihā) if it is an independent subject
by itself”.28 We are told by this definition that the means to attain the knowledge about the
truth of something (ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’) is man‟s perceptive and sound rational soul (al-nafs
al-nāṭiqah), which is attributed by al-Ghazālī in his other works with other significations,
such as the faculty of reason (al-‘aql) and the faculty of intellect (al-qalb) respectively. We
are also informed that the objective of this knowledge by inference (Ñilm) is to comprehend,
with certainty, the true nature of things, which are themselves subject matters under
investigation. Al-Ghazālī did not specifically describe the kind of knowledge he has
delineated in the above definition. However, the scientific terminologies he employed in the
definition are strongly evident to indicate that the given knowledge must be empirical
knowledge, that is, the knowledge that one inferred from investigating objective physical
evidences (Ñilm).

26
Imām al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā’ ÑUlūm al-Dīn, Cairo: ṬabāÑah ÑIsā al-Ḥalabī, 1957, Vo. 3, p.12
27
Al-Kurdī, Naẓarīyyah al-MaÑrifah, p. 40
28
Imām al-Ghazālī, al-Risālah al-Ladunīyyah, in (MajmūÑah al-Quṣūr al-ÑAwālī), Cairo:
Maktabah al-Jundī, 1920, Vol.1, p. 98
13
The Concept of Knowledge

Not categorically distinct from above, al-Ghazālī has defined knowledge inferred
from religious textual evidences (maÑrifah) as “knowledge that accepts no doubt (shakk),
especially when it deals with the Absolute Being of Allāh (zātulLāh) and His Sublime
Attributes (ṣifātihī) as its subject matters”.29 It appears that, like al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī has
linked maÑrifah (knowledge inferred from textual evidences (nuṣūṣ al-sharÑīyyah) with
i‘tiqād (conviction or faith) pertaining to realities or things whose being, true nature and
essences are not comprehensible to the senses nor are they subjected to empirical methods of
investigation. Although some have disputed al-Ghazālī‟s conception of knowledge, it is
nevertheless sufficient and most comprehensive to describe what knowledge is, because
knowledge is only attainable with the existence of three factors; first, the existence of sound
reason (Ñaql), intellect (qalb) or the intelligent self (al-dhāt al-maÑrifah) found in man that
makes him capable of understanding, and differentiates him from the rest of animals; second,
the true nature of things (ḥaqā’iq al-ashyā’) which is known to man after having verified it
following sound scientific methods; and third, which is the most important one, the sound and
appropriate method by which the intelligent soul can apply in order to attain the knowledge
pertaining to the truth of things.30

Based on the above discussion, one may conclude that accusations labeled against al-
Ghazālī for being incomprehensive in his definition of knowledge are unfounded, because
sound knowledge pertaining to reality or existence (wujūd) is nothing but a highly complex
collection or combination (majmūÑah) of human conceptions, thoughts or ideas (afkār) that
men of science could possibly achieve concerning various forms of existent (mawjūdāt)
whose existence is essentially interrelated towards each other. In view of this nature, no
human being is ever able to grasp the knowledge, in its comprehensive sense, of everything
that exists in the universe of existence. Due to this reason, his knowledge is not but only a
partial description of the whole character of truth pertaining to certain aspects of the entire
existence that his intellectual soul is capable of grasping. Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī recognized
the fact that only human being is unique and superior in comparison with other creatures due
to the ability of his rational and intellectual soul to acquire knowledge of both the visible
(Ñālam al-shahādah) and the unseen (Ñālam al-gayb) universe.31

29
Imām al-Ghazālī, Mīzān al-ÑAmal, Cairo: Maktabah al-Jundī, n.d., p. 175
30
Al-Kurdī, Naẓarīyyah al-MaÑrifah bayn al-Qur’ān wa al-Falsafah, p. 41.
31
Al-Kurdī, ibid, p. 41.
14
The Concept of Knowledge

Al-Ghazālī‟s definition of knowledge as “something that accepts no doubt” should not


be taken as an all-encompassing conceptualization without any qualification. In fact, the
definition is qualified with specific and well-defined subject matters, especially those which
deal specifically with the essence or being of Allāh (zātullāh) and His attributes (ṣifāt), and
other subjects of knowledge (al-maÑlūm) of similar nature. This definition has indicated to us
that to al-Ghazālī, maÑrifah is more particular and specific than Ñilm, because to him maÑrifah
is not but knowledge that has reached the highest level of certainty (Ñilm al-yaqīn), and
definitely such knowledge accepts no doubt. It must be noted also that this knowledge will
assume the position of īmān (belief and faith) when looked from the perspective of religious
conviction, but it will assume the position of maÑrifah (knowledge with certainty) if that
conviction is founded on clear evidence (dalīl).32 However, in other place of his book, Iljām
al-ÑAwām, al-Ghazālī has made a distinction between knowledge to imply maÑrifah and
knowledge to denote īmān (religious conviction or faith), but he has also acknowledged that
both are identifiable by determining the different stages (marāḥil) of conviction that one has
attained vis-à-vis the given subject matters. Consequently, at one stage, a servant‟s conviction
is called maÑrifah (knowledge with certainty), because it is firmly grounded on clear textual
and rational evidences. At another stage, such a conviction is simply identified as imān
(faith), because it is purely a form of conviction with its highest level of certainty (al-taṣdīq
al-jāzim), although it was not substantiated with any rational evidence (adillah Ñaqlīyyah).
Obviously, a servant according to al-Ghazālī might have been able to achieve such a
conviction in the form of imān on the basis of sheer theological speculative evidence (adillat
al-wahmīyyah al-kalāmīyyah) which is grounded on theological premises or known
presuppositions already received approval by renowned scholars.33

To al-Ghazālī, maÑrifah (knowledge about something that tolerates no doubt and


skepticism) is actually referred to the advanced stage of one‟s state of conviction which has
reached the highest level of certainty (al-taṣdīq al-jāzim). Having conceived of the specific
meaning of maÑrifah in reference to “knowledge about something that tolerates no slightest
dot of doubt and skepticism”, particularly about the Being, Essence and Attributes of Allāh,
al-Ghazālī has helped outlining a specific theoretical methodology in Islamic epistemology
concerning what method is appropriate and best to understand subject matters belong to the
unseen universe. He has consistently emphasized that knowledge with certainty (maÑrifah)

32
Ibid, p. 42.
33
Ibid, p. 42.
15
The Concept of Knowledge

pertaining to the unseen universe can only be attained through conviction (īmān) in khabr
(information or news) provided by Divine Revelation; the Qur‟ān and authentic ḥadīth of the
Prophet . In doing so, al-Ghazālī‟s conception of maÑrifah had succeeded in defusing the
ongoing theological disputes and controversies during his times pertaining to the nature of
God and other similar metaphysical or unseen subject matters, such as the nature of the spirit,
the angelic world, the Hereafter or the like, which accept no room for speculation or
conjecture, nor should they become subject of empirical and purely rational methods of
examinations as he found them widely practiced in falāsifah (philosophy).

xxxxxxxxxxx

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that there is no definitive


conception of knowledge. During the early days of Islam, knowledge is always conceived of
being synonymous with one‟s understanding (fiqh) of the eternal truths and rulings of the
SharīÑah derived or inferred from the inspired source, i.e., the divine revelations. For Muslim
scholars, the true knowledge in its objective sense can be found only in the divine revelations,
namely the Qur‟ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet . According to al-Attās, all knowledge
whether it be revealed or empirical is originally from Allāh  and makes known to man
through either Divine Revelation (waḥy) or symbolic signs manifested in the natural world of
creation (al-kawnīyyah) or signs that are made hidden in the human self (anfusīyyah).

‫ك أَنَّوُ َعلَى ُك ِّل َش ْي ٍء َش ِهي ٌد‬ ِ ‫اِل ُّق أَوََل يك‬


َ ِّ‫ْف بَِرب‬
ِ ِ ِ
َ َّ َ‫َسنُ ِري ِه ْم آيَاتنَا ِِف ْاْلفَاق َوِِف أَن ُفس ِه ْم َح ََّّت يَتَب‬
َ ْ َ َْ ُ‫ي ََلُ ْم أَنَّو‬
Soon will We show them Our Signs in the (furthest) regions (of the earth),
and in their own souls, until it becomes manifest to them that this is the
Truth. Is it not enough that your Lord does witness all things? 34
The main interpreter of this knowledge derived from the three sources above is the
human soul through its spiritual (the faculty of reason and intellect) and physical faculties
(the sensual faculties – sight, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling). Since knowledge
originates from God, it is necessary for Muslims to understand the method of its arrival to the
human soul. Al-Attās divided knowledge into two based on the manner of its attainment: 35

 Ḥuṣūl – The arrival of the right meaning and descriptions of a thing into the
soul. This can be construed to denote the acquired knowledge, the knowledge

34
The Qur‟ān, Fuṣṣilāt 41:53
35
Al-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1999, pp.16-17.
16
The Concept of Knowledge

which is attained through observation of the subject of knowledge and through


other relevant empirical methods.

 Wuṣūl – The arrival of the soul at the right meaning and descriptions of a thing
that is in fact the subject of knowledge. This can be interpreted to signify the
Revealed Knowledge that has been made available to men through tawātur
(trustworthy) process of narration, dissemination and transmission, and handed
down from generation to another by authorities that are trusted in terms of their
intellectual and moral integrity

3. Classification of Knowledge and the Duty of Its Acquisition

Al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī has classified Ñilm into naẓarī (theoretical) and Ñamalī
(practical). The division is made depending on the nature of the objective for Muslims to
study it. The former is considered theoretical because, after obtaining it, Muslims are not
obliged to put it into practice, such as the knowledge about the multifarious forms of
existence in the universe. In contrast, the latter is considered practical knowledge because
after obtaining it, Muslims are obliged to put it into practice, such as the knowledge about
religious duties pertaining to worship (Ñibādāt).36 How did Muslim scholars classify
knowledge, and what criteria they have applied in this regard shall be furthermore discussed
later.

Based on the understanding of the concept of knowledge above, Muslim scholars


have classified knowledge and sciences into two main categories in view of the nature and
mode of its arrival, and the order of its necessity (ahammīyyah) and obligation (wujūb) for
Muslims to study:

 Al-‘Ulūm al-Naqlīyyah aw al-Shar‘īyyah: translated as the Transmitted,


Religious, Revealed or SharīÑah Knowledge which is originated and developed
from the revealed and inspired sources, namely the Qur‟ān and Sunnah of the
Prophet. It is called “Transmitted Knowledge”, because it is made available to
man through valid sources and trusted authorities. The sciences included under
this category are mainly related to the study of Islam as a religion and complete
way of life for humanity, thus it pertains to first, „Aqīdah which covers the
fundamentals of belief in Islam, such as theology (‛ilm al-kalām), the science of
Tawḥīd (‘ilm al-tawḥīd), philosophy (falāsifah), metaphysics (‘ilm mā warā’ al-
17
The Concept of Knowledge

ṭabī‘ah), the principles of religion (uṣūluddīn), theology (ilāhīyyah), Sufism


(tasawwuf) and Islamic worldview (taṣawwur); second, SharīÑah which covers
the study of the command of Allāh (SharīÑah) pertaining to every aspects of the
Muslim life and activities, such as Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), Principles of
Islamic Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh), Sciences of the Qur‟ān (‘Ulūm al-Qur’ān),
Sciences of Ḥadīth (‘Ulūm al-Ḥadīth), the History of the Prophet (Sīrah al-
Nabawīyyah), International Relations (Siyār), War and Peace (Maghāzī),
Governance and Administration (al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭānīyyah), and the Arabic
language (Naḥw, Bayān, Manṭiq, Balāghah); third, Akhlāq which covers the
study of the principles of ethics and morality in Islam (‘Ilm al-Ahklāq). It would
include also the study of the nature of human actions, the meaning of good and
evil, right and wrong, and the ethical instructions for Muslims to emulate the
morally good (maḥmūdah) and avoid the morally evil (madhmūmah), and to
constantly strive (mujāhadah) to achieve the highest possible ranking of spiritual
excellence (iḥsān), piety (taqwā), sincerity in good deeds (ikhlāṣ), certain faith
(īmān), and others.

 Al-‘Ulūm al-‘Aqlīyyah; translated as the Rational or Intellectual sciences. In this


category, other disciplines of knowledge and science are thought to Muslim
students. These include for instance logics, mathematics, the sciences of nature
(al-‛Ulūm al-Ṭabī‛īyyah), such as cosmology, biology, chemistry and physics,
the applied sciences (al-‛Ulūm al-Riyāḍīyyah) such as engineering, architecture
and arts, medical sciences, farming, and philosophy (Falāsifah). It is called the
Intellectual or Rational (‛aqlī) sciences because of two reasons; first, the
knowledge established by these disciplines of science could be arrived at by
human reason and intelligence, and are not transmitted (naqlī) in the same way
as the religious, linguistic and historical sciences.37

The distinction between the two categories of knowledge has been elaborated in detail
by al-Attās. The first kind of knowledge is given to men by Allāh through revelation; and this
refers to the Qur‟ān. The Qur‟ān is the complete and final Revelation, so that it suffices for
man‟s guidance and salvation, for there is no other knowledge except one that is based upon
it and conforming to it that can guide and save man. The Qur‟ān is therefore the knowledge

36
Al-Rāghib al-Aṣfahānī, al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-Qur’ān, p. 343.
37
Seyyed Hossien Nasr, Traditional Islam, p.126.
18
The Concept of Knowledge

par excellence. The Prophet  who received the revelation had brought the Qur‟ān, that is,
the knowledge to man. His life as embodied in his Sunnah is the most excellent and perfect
interpretation of the Qur‟ān in daily life and practice. The Sunnah is in itself the knowledge
through which the Muslims can comprehend the knowledge embodied throughout the
passages of the Qur‟ān.38

It must be mentioned, however, that Allāh has never ceased to communicate with
man. Apart from direct revelation to human Messengers, Allāh according al-Attās “may
bestow the favor of specific spiritual knowledge (‘ilm al-ladunnī) and wisdom (ḥikmah) upon
the elect among His servants, referred to in the Qur‟ān as “the friends of Allah”
(awliyā’ulLāh), in proportion to their degree of sincerity (ihklāṣ) and goodness (iḥsān)”.39 In
the Qur‟ān, the Prophet Mūsā  is mentioned to have met with one of Allāh‟s servant who
had been bestowed with “the knowledge directly from Allāh‟s presence”.40 The servant of
Allāh that Mūsā had met is known as Khiḍr according the Prophet‟s authentic traditions.41
Allāh had bestowed Khiḍr with specific spiritual knowledge and wisdom, including the
ability to interpret the inner meaning and mystery of events,42 which had sparked a sharp
disagreement between him and Prophet Mūsā . As regard to ‘ilm al-ladunnī and ḥikmah,
al-Attās observes that man can receive this as a result of his true faith (īmān) in God, sincere
act of worship and devotion (Ñibādah) to God, constant performance of righteous deeds
(a‘māl ṣāliḥah) and upright moral integrity that reaches the level of iḥsān. He receives this
special knowledge from Allāh‟s presence by direct insight (dhawq) of the true nature of
reality or by unveiling (kashf) it to his spiritual vision.43 Based on the above discussion, one
may conclude that the Qur‟ān, the Sunnah of the Prophet , the special spiritual knowledge
(‛ilm al-ladunnī) and wisdom (ḥikmah), and the Divine Sharī„ah are the essential elements of
the Transmitted Knowledge.

The classification of knowledge into two categories as above has its significant
meaning to the seekers of knowledge in Islam, especially when one speaks of the order of
necessity and the obligation pertaining to its acquisition. It is undoubtedly evident, as found

38
Al-Attas, Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, p. 30
39
Ibid, p. 30
The Qur‟ān, al-Kahf 18: 65 (ً‫ِعْلما‬ ِ ‫) فَوجدا عبداً ِّمن ِعب ِادنَا آتَي ناه ر ْْحةً ِمن ِع‬
‫ندنَا َو َعلَّ ْمنَاهُ ِمن لَّ ُدنَّا‬ ْ َ َ ُ َْ َ ْ َْ َ َ َ
40

41
For further study of the story of Mūsā and Khiḍr, see Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Aẓīm, Vol.
3., pp.103-107.
42
„Abdullāh Yūsuf „Ali, The Meaning of the Holy Qur’ān, p. 727
43
Al-Attas, Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, pp. 30-31
19
The Concept of Knowledge

also in the writings of Imām al-Ghazālī and other Muslim scholars that Muslims are obliged
to study and master first and foremost the Transmitted Knowledge primarily before they
decided to specialize in any disciplines of the Rational Knowledge. It becomes a consensus of
the Muslim scholars that the first kind of knowledge is obligatory to all Muslims (farḍ ‘ayn) –
a religious duty that is imposed upon every Muslim men and women, whereas the second
category of knowledge is obligatory to some Muslims only (farḍ kifāyah). Nevertheless,
Muslims are told that the obligation to acquire and master the Rational or Scientific
Knowledge might be changed to the level of farḍ ‘ayn – a duty that is imposed on those who
are qualified in certain disciplines of science considered indispensable for the welfare and
general interests (maṣlaḥah al-‘āmmah) of the Ummah and its survival.44

It is worth noted that as far as the objective of knowledge is concerned, both the
categories of knowledge stated above are important for Muslims as an individual and society.
The first is necessary in order to define their vertical and personal relationship with the
Creator as His servants (‘abdulLāh), while the latter is indispensable in order to realize their
cosmic roles and responsibility as vicegerents of God (khalīfatulLāh) on earth. If looked at
from this perspective, we may argue that the classification of knowledge in terms of the
nature of obligation to acquire it into farḍ ‘ayn and farḍ kifāyah is completely irrelevant.
When the Prophet  imposed the obligation for Muslims to acquire knowledge, he did not
virtually differentiate between the knowledge that is considered farḍ ‘ayn for its acquisition
and the knowledge that is farḍ kifāyah. What is important is that, it is a moral and religious
duty for every Muslims to acquire knowledge, either the Transmitted or the Rational ones. 45

When Islam makes it necessary that Muslims should master the Transmitted
Knowledge first before they decided to specialize other sciences of the Rational Knowledge,
it does so in the spirit of preserving the adāb (ethical conduct) of attaining knowledge.
Muslims are warned about the danger of having mastered any disciplines of the Rational
Knowledge alone without having deeply grounded on the Transmitted sciences, for this
would only import confusion into the Muslim minds and the disintegration of one‟s
personality.46 To master the Transmitted Knowledge would serve as a guiding principle in
determining the aim and objectives of the scientific learning and research activities involving
Muslim scientists and students. During the golden era of Islamic civilization, the study of

44
Ibid, p. 32
45
Imām al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, p. 35
46
Al-Attas, Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education, p. 32
20
The Concept of Knowledge

natural sciences had never been detached or separated from the study of religion and ethics.
In fact, students were not allowed to master any disciplines of Rational sciences provided
they were first of all well-versed in the Sharī„ah sciences, especially those sciences which
enable the students to enhance their understanding of the fundamentals of religion and ethics
from the revealed sources or texts (nuṣūṣ), namely the Qur‟ān and Sunnah. By comparison,
the progress and development of modern science today is completely separated from religion
and tradition, thus created into the Muslim minds a confused conception of reality, who many
of them were suffering of compartmentalized personality. They might have been very good in
their profession as a scientist but unfortunately, their actions and behaviors as a servant of
Allāh and a member of society are totally bereft of religious and ethical directions, and such
directions are only found in the Sharī‛ah sciences whose origin is traceable in the absolute
command of Allāh, not in the temperamental dictates of human reason and interests.

Although the duty to study the Rational Knowledge is a farḍ kifāyah (collective duty
imposed on qualified individual), it may become farḍ ‘ayn (personal duty) to Muslims,
especially when the number of Muslim experts or scientists in certain areas of the Rational
sciences is inadequate to serve the general interests of the Ummah. It must also remember
that although the Rational Knowledge is complementary to the Sharī„ah sciences, Muslims
are strongly encouraged by the Qur‟ān to study and learn it as an indispensable component of
their scientific tradition. The objective of this study and learning is not merely to enhance
man‟s mastery of nature (istiskhār) by unveiling the laws governing its existence, so that it
can be utilized for his material, physical and economic prosperity, but more importantly to
comprehend the embedded meaning of the Divine creativity, power, knowledge and wisdom
of Allāh  that are inherent in nature, for the world of creation according to the Qur‟ān is
none but ayātulLāh (the signs of God).

In the light of these objectives, the Qur‟ān has laid greater emphasis on the
importance for Muslims to enhance their scientific knowledge of nature by conducting
scientific experiments or empirical researches, and by making constant observation upon its
phenomena - a tradition that has been unfortunately forgotten by the Muslims since many
centuries ago. As mentioned earlier, the exploration of nature in the Islamic scientific
tradition is analogous to the study of the revealed texts (nuṣūṣ) of the Qur‟ān, for both the
creation and revelation in Islam are none but the āyātulLāh, the signs of Allāh, upon which
Muslims are strongly urged to reflect, contemplate and explore. The following are some
21
The Concept of Knowledge

Qur‟ānic āyāt quoted to demonstrate that Islam is not anti-science, but on the contrary, is
supporting of science and scientific exploration.

The origin of life forms and their evolution

‫ك لَ ُم ْحيِي الْ َم ْوتَى َوُى َو َعلَى ُك ِّل َش ْي ٍء‬ ِ ِ


َ ‫ض بَ ْع َد َم ْوِتَا إِ َّن ذَل‬
َ ‫ف ُُْييِي ْاأل َْر‬
ِ ِ
َ ‫فَانظُْر إِ ََل آثَا ِر َر ْْحَت اللَّو َكْي‬
‫قَ ِد ٌير‬
“Then contemplate (O man!) the memorials of God‟s Mercy! How He gives
life to the earth after its death: verily the same will give life to the men who
are dead: for He has power over all things” 47

Destruction of the environment and human civilization

‫ض الَّ ِذي َع ِملُوا لَ َعلَّ ُه ْم يَْرِج ُعو َن \ قُ ْل‬ ِ ِ ِ ‫ظَهر الْ َفساد ِِف الْب ِّر والْبح ِر ِِبا َكسبت أَي ِدي الن‬
َ ‫َّاس ليُذي َق ُهم بَ ْع‬ ْ ْ ََ َ ْ َ َ َ ُ َ َ َ
‫ي‬ ِِ ِ ِ َّ ِ ِ ‫ِس ُْيوا ِِف ْاأل َْر‬
َ ‫ين من قَ ْب ُل َكا َن أَ ْكثَ ُرُىم ُّم ْشرك‬
َ ‫ف َكا َن َعاقبَةُ الذ‬
َ ‫ض فَانظُُروا َكْي‬
“Mischief has appeared on land and sea because of (the deeds) that the
hands of men have earned, that (God) may give them a taste of some of their
Deeds: in order that they may turn back (from Evil). Say: Travel through the
earth and see what was the end of those before (you): Most of them
worshipped others besides God”.48
ِ َ ‫ض فَينظُروا َكيف َكا َن عاقِبةُ الَّ ِذين ِمن قَبلِ ِهم وَكانُوا أ‬ ِ
ُ‫َش َّد مْن ُه ْم قُ َّوةً َوَما َكا َن اللَّو‬ َ ْ ْ َ َ َ َ ْ ُ َ ِ ‫أ ََوََلْ يَس ُْيوا ِِف ْاأل َْر‬
ً‫ض إِنَّوُ َكا َن َعلِيماً قَ ِديرا‬ ِ ‫السماو‬
ِ ‫ات َوََّل ِِف ْاأل َْر‬ ٍِ ِ ِ ِ
َ َ َّ ‫ليُ ْعجَزهُ من َش ْيء ِف‬
“Do they not travel throughout the earth, and see what was the end of those
before them, though they were superior to them in strength? Nor is God to
be frustrated by anything whatever in the heavens or on earth: for He is All
Knowing, All Powerful” .49

Natural phenomena and its evolution and reproduction


ِ ِ ِِ ِ ‫يع ِِف ْاأل َْر‬ِ ِ َّ ‫أَ ََل ت ر أ ََّن اللَّو أَنزَل ِمن‬
ُ ‫ض ُُثَّ ِيُْر ُِج بو َزْرعاً ُُّّمْتَلفاً أَلْ َوانُوُ ُُثَّ يَه‬
ُ‫يج فََت َراه‬ َ ‫الس َماء َماءً فَ َسلَ َكوُ يَنَاب‬ َ َ َ ََ ْ
ِ‫ك لَ ِذ ْكرى ِألُوِل ْاألَلْباب‬ ِ‫مص َفراً ُُثَّ ََيعلُو حطَاماً إِ َّن ِِف ذَل‬
َ ْ َ َ ُ ُ َْ ّ ْ ُ
“See you not that God sends down rain from the sky, and leads it through
springs in the earth? Then He causes to grow, therewith, produce of various
colors: then it withers; you will see it grow yellow; then He makes it dry up
and crumble away. Truly, in this, is a Message of remembrance to men of
understanding”.50

The Qur‟ānic āyāt quoted above suffice to demonstrate that as far as the duty and
obligation to seek out knowledge is concerned, Islam has never differentiated between the

47
The Qur‟ān, al-Rūm 30: 50
48
The Qur‟ān, al-Rūm 30: 41-42
49
The Qur‟ān, Fāṭir 35: 44
50
The Qur‟ān, al-Zumar 39:21
22
The Concept of Knowledge

SharīÑah sciences and the Rational sciences. Muslims are obliged to acquire both kinds of
knowledge in proportionate to their intellectual and cognitive ability. In fact, seeking out
knowledge is the natural right of every human being regardless of his religious and ethnic
affiliations. The Qur‟ān has emphasized this obligation upon Muslims in different ways.
Secular ideologies tend to differentiate people because of material and physical
considerations, such as yearly income and color of skin, but Islam differentiate them because
of knowledge. According to the Qur‟ān, a believer who has knowledge is better than those
who have no knowledge in sight of Allāh.51 The knowledgeable among the believers are thus
entitled of the divine favor of Allāh in its both material and spiritual senses. It is in fact
evident that those, who are knowledgeable either in the Transmitted or in the Rational
sciences, have enjoyed relatively certain degree of respect and allegiance by the people
around them because of their authority in terms of knowledge and leadership.52 In view of the
importance of knowledge as means to ascertain truth and reality, the Qur‟ān has prohibited
the Muslim masses from taking for granted assumptions or theories of which they have no
certain knowledge,53 and this is imperative in order to safeguard them from being corrupted
by falsehood (bāṭil) and misguidance (ḍalāl). At the same time, Muslims are also requested
to get the assistance of their learned men by consulting them for their expertise and advices
on matters that they are not qualified, including non-Muslim learned men who were well
versed with the Divine Scriptures before Muḥammad.54

4. Salient Features of Islamic Concept of Knowledge

The classification of knowledge into two distinctive categories, the SharīÑah sciences
and the Rational sciences, as elaborated earlier seems to imply that the Muslim concept of
knowledge in its both theoretical (theory of knowledge) and practical (acquisition of

51
The Qur‟ān, al-Zumar 39: 9
ِ ‫ْاألَلْب‬ ‫ين ََّل يَ ْعلَ ُمو َن إََِّنَا يَتَ َذ َّكُر أ ُْولُوا‬ ِ َّ ِ َّ
(‫اب‬َ َ ‫)قُ ْل َى ْل يَ ْستَ ِوي الذ‬
َ ‫ين يَ ْعلَ ُمو َن َوالذ‬
52
The Qur‟ān, al-Nisā’ 4: 59
(‫َوأ ُْوِل األ َْم ِر‬ ‫ول‬
َ ‫الر ُس‬ ِ ‫َطيعواْ اللّو وأ‬
َّ ْ‫َط ُيعوا‬ ِ ِ َّ
َ َ ُ ‫ين َآمنُواْ أ‬
َ ‫)يَا أَيُّ َها الذ‬
al-Mujādalah 58: 11
(ٌ‫خبِْي‬ ِ ٍ ‫)ي رفَ ِع اللَّو الَّ ِذين آمنُوا ِمن ُكم والَّ ِذين أُوتُوا الْعِْلم درج‬
َ ‫َواللَّوُ ِبَا تَ ْع َملُو َن‬ ‫ات‬ َ ََ َ َ َْ َ َ ُ َْ
53
The Qur‟ān, al-Isrā’ 17: 36
(ً‫س ُؤوَّل‬ ِ َّ ‫ك بِِو ِعْل ٌم إِ َّن‬
ْ ‫َعْنوُ َم‬ ‫ك َكا َن‬
َ ‫صَر َوالْ ُف َؤ َاد ُك ُّل أُول ئ‬
َ َ‫الس ْم َع َوالْب‬ َ َ‫س ل‬
َ ‫ف َما لَْي‬
ُ ‫) َوَّلَ تَ ْق‬
54
The Qur‟ān, al-Naḥl 16: 43
(‫الذ ْك ِر إِن ُكنتُ ْم َّلَ تَ ْعلَ ُمو َن‬ ِ ِ ِ
ِّ ْ َ‫ك إَِّلَّ ِر َجاَّلً نُّوحي إِلَْي ِه ْم ف‬
‫اسأَلُواْ أ َْى َل‬ َ ‫) َوَما أ َْر َسْلنَا من قَْبل‬
23
The Concept of Knowledge

knowledge and education) levels, was equally suffering of dualism as its secular counterparts.
Such a suggestion is not correct because of certain reasons. Important among them is that
because the theory of knowledge and the system of education in Muslim civilization since
from the early centuries of its development had been always premised on the worldview of
Tawḥīd. According to this worldview, Allāh  is not merely the Creator of the entire
universe, but also the Only God deserves of worship, obedience and devotion. To Muslims,
the command of Allāh is Absolute, Overriding and Predominant over everything He has
created. It is the absolute source of authority by which man determines what is right and
wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice. The idea of Tawḥīd dictates upon Muslims to
ensure that every aspect of their lives must be made in conformity with the absolute
command of Allāh as embodied in the revealed law of the Sharī‛ah and enshrined in the
Qur‟ān and Sunnah of the Prophet . The essence of Tawḥīd here is the transformation of a
mode of life in which every aspect of human affairs, the religious as well as the mundane,
including the Muslim theory of knowledge and practice, is governed in accordance with the
command of Allāh. More importantly is that, the manifestation of this tawḥīdic
welstanchauung is evident particularly when we speak about the source of knowledge, the
integration of the Revealed and the Rational Knowledge and the integration of revelation and
reason, in the Muslim intellectual tradition.

(4.1) Integration of the sources of knowledge

Muslim scholars are all in agreement that knowledge originally comes from God,
including what is today called as the knowledge of the natural and human sciences by virtue
of the fact that all the discoveries of these sciences are actually achieved as a result of
studying the natural world of creation, including man. According to the Islamic worldview,
the natural world of creation is not an independent reality that has come into being (wujūd)
and existence (mawjūd) through accidental process of nature. On the contrary, it has come
into existence as a consequence of God‟s absolute will and design. The Qur‟ān tells the
Muslims that the creation of the world and all its contents was not a futile exercise bereft of
transcendent objectives.55 Thus, one of the objectives of the creation of nature is to serve as
āyātulLāh (the signs of God) through which man, by means of reflection, observation and
research, may accomplish the true ma‘rifah (knowledge) about God – His creative power,
sovereignty and wisdom – as manifested in nature. In addition to this, the Qur‟ān has also

55
The Qur‟ān, Āli ‘Imrān 3: 191; Ṣād 38: 27
24
The Concept of Knowledge

encouraged men of reason to be witnesses upon the truth (al-Ḥaqq) through reflecting upon
themselves (anfus),56 particularly of that which is related to their origin, physiological and
psychological dispositions, human nature, the purpose of their creation, the meaning of their
existence in relation to God and the universe, their history and civilization, etcs. Based on
this, we can summarize the sources of knowledge in Islam are as follows:

 The Divine Revelation – consisting of the Qur‟ān and the Prophet‟s


Sunnah.

 The natural world of creation – described in the Qur‟ān as āyātulLāh


indicating to the existence of God; His creative power, sovereignty,
knowledge and wisdom.

(4.2) Integration of the Revealed and the Rational Knowledge

The Muslim intellectual tradition has never approved the secular assumption of the
separation or dichotomy between the Revealed and the Rational Sciences. The latter has
never been viewed in contrast to, but a complementary to and extension of the former.
Muslims are obliged to master both the disciplines of knowledge. They are constantly
reminded that specialization of the Rational alone with total neglect of the Revealed would
definitely bring about confusion into the Muslim minds and disintegration of their
personalities. It is a matter of principle in the Muslim tradition that no one is allowed to study
and become specialized in any disciplines of the Rational sciences, unless he or she must
have achieved satisfied mastery in the Sharī‛ah Sciences, including memorization of the
Qur‟ān and mastery of the Arabic language at a very young age. According to this principle,
the Revealed Knowledge should serve as a guidance and foundation for the evolution and
expansion of other disciplines of the scientific knowledge. Due to its tawhīdic worldview, the
Islamic epistemology has never recognized two separate systems of education in which
Muslim students are given the option to study Sharī‛ah Sciences at traditional religious
schools or to pursue their study of Rational Sciences at non-religious schools. On the
contrary, students are taught with both disciplines of sciences under one system of education
under the instructions of able and qualified teachers. Under this system, students are not
allowed to specialize in any subject matter of Rational Sciences unless they have first
mastered the Sharī‛ah Sciences.

56
The Qur‟ān, Fuṣṣilāt 41: 53
25
The Concept of Knowledge

As a result, scientific discoveries or theories made by Muslim scholars have never


been secular or anthropomorphic in nature, as compared to the secular conception of
knowledge, even ethics that has been an important subject matter of philosophy in
determining what is good and bad, right and wrong, justice and injustice, virtue and vice, is
being reduced to a sheer business of human temperament, and what we considered right and
wrong is a matter of negotiation between members of society,

“Ethics is generally defined as that branch of the study of value and quality
in philosophy that deals with the nature of morality. Thus, it has to do with
defining what is right and wrong. There is no universally applicable and
objectively determinable „right‟ and „wrong‟. What is deemed right and
wrong in a society is „negotiated‟ over time by the members of that society.
Culture thus plays an important role. Not all members have equal power to
influence these „negotiations‟ of what is to be considered right and wrong,
but in most societies there is an attempt to balance the interests of the
„stakeholders‟ in an issue.57

In another instance, the Islamic science has never acknowledged the assumption that
the universe had come into existence by accident or by chance, which was widely held by
existentialist scientists and philosophers (al-dahrīyyīn). The Islamic science has agreed with
existentialism, which had portrayed the universe as an ordered system. However, contrary to
the latter, the Islamic science does not see the state of orderliness which is the inherent nature
of the universe is possible by itself. It is thus but determined and governed by the universal
laws (sunnatulLāh) that its Creator has primordially dictated upon it. The universe is
therefore not a self-subsisting reality or system of order independent of the will of God. It has
attained and sustained its natural state of orderliness or equilibrium (tawāzun) by the absolute
command of Allāh who has created it and all that exists in it. On this the Qur‟ān says,

‫استَ َوى َعلَى الْ َعْر ِش يُ َدبُِّر األ َْمَر َما ِمن‬ ِِ ِ َّ ‫إِ َّن ربَّ ُكم اللّو الَّ ِذي خلَق‬
ْ َّ‫ض ِِف ستَّة أَيَّ ٍام ُُث‬ َ ‫الس َم َاوات َواأل َْر‬ َ َ ُ ُ َ
َِ ‫ إِلَي ِو مرِجع ُكم‬.‫اعب ُدوه أَفَالَ تَ َذ َّكرو َن‬
‫َجيعاً َو ْع َد اللّ ِو َح ّقاً إِن َُّو‬ ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ
ْ ُ َْ ْ ُ ُ ُ ْ َ ْ ُ َُّ ُ ّ ُ ُ َ ْ ْ َ ‫َشفي ٍع إَِّلَّ من‬
‫ف‬ ‫م‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ب‬
‫ر‬ ‫و‬‫ل‬‫ال‬ ‫م‬ ‫ك‬ ‫ل‬ ‫ذ‬ ‫و‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ذ‬ِ
‫إ‬ ‫د‬ ‫ع‬ ‫ب‬
‫ْحي ٍم‬ َِ ‫ات بِالْ ِقس ِط والَّ ِذين َك َفرواْ ََلم َشراب ِّمن‬ ِ ‫اِل‬ ِ َّ ْ‫اْلْلق ُُثَّ يعِيده لِيج ِزي الَّ ِذين آمنواْ وع ِملُوا‬
ْ ٌ َ ُْ ُ َ َ ْ َ ‫الص‬ َ َ ُ َ َ َ ْ َ ُ ُ ُ َ َْ ُ‫يَْب َدأ‬
‫َّرهُ َمنَا ِزَل لَِت ْعلَ ُمواْ َع َد َد‬ ِ ‫ ىو الَّ ِذي جعل الشَّم‬.‫وع َذاب أَلِيم ِِبَا َكانُواْ ي ْك ُفرو َن‬
َ ‫س ضيَاء َوالْ َق َمَر نُوراً َوقَد‬ َ ْ َ ََ َُ ُ َ ٌ ٌ ََ
ٍ ِ ِ
.‫ص ُل اْليَات ل َق ْوم يَ ْعلَ ُمو َن‬ ِ ِ
ْ ‫ك إَّلَّ ب‬
ِّ ‫اِلَ ِّق يُ َف‬ ِ ِْ ‫السنِي و‬
َ ‫اب َما َخلَ َق اللّوُ ذَل‬
َ ‫اِل َس‬ َ َ ِّ
Lo! Your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the earth in six days,
and then He established Himself upon the Throne, directing all things. There
is no intercessor (with Him) save after His permission. That is Allah, your
Lord, so worship Him. Oh, will ye not remind? Unto Him is the return of all
of you; it is a promise of Allah in truth. Lo! He produces creation, then
reproduces it, that He may reward those who believe and do good works
with equity; while, as for those who disbelieve, theirs will be a boiling drink
and painful doom because they disbelieved. He it is who appointed the sun a

57
Joelien Pretorius, Joanne Sprakett & Mark Bowmaker, “Future Ethical Challenges in Biology”,
in ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006
26
The Concept of Knowledge

splendor and the moon a light, and measured for her stages, that ye might
know the number of the years, and the reckoning. Allah created not (all) that
save in truth. He details the revelations for people who have knowledge”. 58

Muslim scientists who were trained under the integrated system of Islamic education
would never been fascinated with the Darwinist or materialist theory of existence. For them,
the above quoted Qur‟ānic verses are clearly evident that the universe and all that exists does
not come into being by itself or by accidence. These verses and other similar verses in the
Qur‟ān have helped substantiate their view of everything in the universe is created and the
creation continues to produce and reproduce not by itself but according to the natural law
dictated by the determining will of its Maker (al-Khāliq), Allāh . Not only that, everything
in the universe moves about and evolves in a harmonious and coordinated way in proportion
to its due place and function as determined by the absolute command of its Maker. Allāh is
described here in the verses not only as the Maker of the universe, but also its Sustainer Who
constantly manages and executes the affairs of everything that exists in it with the right
measurement (taqdīr).59

To Muslim scientists, reliance on natural science alone does not reveal the whole
characters of truth about reality. They therefore realized that having well-versed in natural
science (Rational Sciences) alone without having deeply grounded on the traditional sciences
of religion (Sharī„ah Sciences) will make them completely lost sight of the metaphysical
dimension of truth about reality whose knowledge is only attainable through the guidance of
Divine Revelation. The problem confronting the Western conception of knowledge lies in its
antagonism against religious or metaphysical view of nature, thus restricted the boundary of
science to merely an empirical inquiry aiming at understanding the physical or rather the
peripheral or exterior (ẓāhir) dimension of reality with the exclusion of its interior (bāṭin)
facts, which in fact constitute an integral part of that reality. Having deeply grounded on
Sharī„ah Sciences, traditional Muslim scientists did not suffer the reductionist inclination in
their exploration of nature. On the contrary, Divine Revelation they referred to as a source of
knowledge had expanded their vision of reality beyond the limited boundary of what the
human senses could possibly achieved. Being faithful to Divine Revelation had never in any
way jeopardized their quest for scientific objectivity. In fact, it had not only enhanced the
spirit of objectivity, but also salvaged them from both superstitious obscurantism (of revering

58
The Qur‟ān, Yūnus 10: 3-5.
59
Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr al-Qur’īn al-‘Aẓīm, Vol. 2, pp. 446-447
27
The Concept of Knowledge

objects in nature as gods) and materialist ideologies (of negating the existence of the Creator
of nature).

It must be mentioned that the main vehicle for this beautiful integration of the
Revealed or Sharī„ah Sciences and the Rational Sciences is traceable in the Qur‟ān itself.
Such integration has found its concrete model in the personality of true meaning of „Ulamā‟
stated in the Qur‟ān, whose duty is not only to interpret the command of Allāh enshrined in
Divine Revelation and to disseminate its universal message and teachings to humanity, but
also to investigate the secrets of nature in order to correct the people‟s understanding of the
universe in conformity with the ultimate truth (al-Ḥaqq) manifested in Divine Revelation. In
contrast to the general perception that is commonly understood today, the term „Ulamā‟
(learned men) in the Qur‟ān refers to those who are well-versed in Rational Sciences, namely
the science of nature, as complementary to their mastery of Revealed Sciences. The Qur‟ān
says,

ِ ِْ ‫ات ُُّّمْتلِفاً أَلْوانُها وِمن‬ ٍ ِِ ِ َّ ‫َن اللَّو أَنزَل ِمن‬


‫ف أَلَْوانُ َها‬ ٌ ‫يض َوْحٌُْر ُُّّمْتَل‬ٌ ِ‫اْلبَ ِال ُج َد ٌد ب‬ َ َ َ َ َ ‫َخَر ْجنَا بو َثَََر‬ ْ ‫الس َماء َماءً فَأ‬ َ َ َ َّ ‫أَ ََلْ تَ َر أ‬
ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ِ ‫ َوِم َن الن‬.‫ود‬
‫ك إََِّنَا َِْي َشى اللَّ َو م ْن عبَاده الْ ُعلَ َماء إِ َّن اللَّوَ َع ِز ٌيز‬ ٌ ‫اب َو ْاألَنْ َع ِام ُّمُْتَل‬
َ ‫ف أَلْ َوانُوُ َك َذل‬ ِّ ‫َّو‬
َ ‫َّاس َوالد‬ ٌ ‫يب ُس‬ِ
ُ ‫َو َغ َراب‬
‫ور‬
ٌ ‫َغ ُف‬
“Have not you seen that Allah sends down rain from the sky? With it, We bring out
fruits (products) of various colors. Moreover, in the mountains are tracts white and
red of various shades of color and black intense in hue. Therefore, among men and
crawling creatures and cattle are created in various colors. Those who truly fear
Allah among His servants are those who have knowledge (al-ÑUlamā’). For Allah
is exalted in might and oft-forgiving”.60

The above Qur‟ānic verses set themselves as a catalyst for scientific observation and
research about the mysteries of the outer world created by God, and consequently bring about
the discovery of new scientific facts and theories pertaining to nature. Nevertheless, this
scientific exploration of nature should not end with mere appreciation and reverence of the
outer meaning of the natural and physical world, for science in the tawḥīdic worldview is not
an end in itself. The image of science as an end in itself is true if we speak of the character of
modern science, but certainly not of the Islamic science. Therefore, the real „Ulamā‟ in the
true Qur‟ānic sense refers to learned men and scholars whose mastery of nature is deeply
grounded on strong faith and loyalty to the religion of Islam, and this is manifested in their
commitment “to rehearse the Book of Allāh, establish regular prayer, and spend in charity out
of what Allāh has bestowed upon them, secretly and openly, with the hope for a trading that

60
The Qur‟ān, Fāṭir 35: 27-28
28
The Concept of Knowledge

will never fail”.61 Nevertheless, that is not sufficient. They are also expected to master
scientific knowledge of the physical world, whose scientific discoveries and theories conform
to the vision of truth and reality projected by the Divine Revelation. Only the disciplines of
science developed within and from the mold of tawḥīdic worldview like this would
fundamentally enhance the integration of Muslims‟ religious belief and scientific
comprehension of truth and reality, which ultimately stimulates a regeneration of intellectual
personalities who deemed to be called „Ulamā‟ (learned men or scholars) in the true Qur‟ānic
sense elaborated above.

(4.3) Integration of Revelation and Reason

Another important characteristic of the Islamic concept of knowledge is its


commitment to seek the integration of revelation and reason as infused by the tawḥīdic
worldview of truth and reality. In the secular worldviews, reason is venerated above anything
else, including revelation, as the only authority and criterion to ascertain truth and reality.
Modern scientists and philosophers who have been influenced by secularism in one way or
another are reluctant to accept the authority of Divine Revelation. Some of them do recognize
the importance of Revelation, but its function according to their assumption is completely
marginal and applicable only to a very limited domain of theological and religious discourse
only. As far as scientific and philosophical issues are concerned, Divine Revelation is often
relegated to an insignificant position inferior to human reason. In many occasions, Revelation
is only superficially invoked to sanction certain scientific findings or theories rather than used
as an authoritative source of knowledge. Other group of secular scientists and philosophers
are even more extreme in their opposition against revelation. For them, revelation should not
be a source of knowledge or criterion to ascertain truth and reality, because it was a bygone
product of primitive mentality which was inferior to the forces of nature. Revelation
according to them has no scientific and intellectual values and contradictory to science.

Allegations and accusations labeled against the validity of revelation, as a source of


knowledge is probably relevant to the Biblical concept of revelation, especially within the
historical context of Christianity in Europe before the age of Renaissance. However, this
cannot be applied to the Islamic revelation. The hostility against science and its founders by
Christian authorities and institutions during Medieval Christianity was used as a pretext for
modern scientists and philosophers to undermine and reject the authority of revelation as a

61
The Qur‟ān, Fāṭir 35: 29
29
The Concept of Knowledge

whole. Islam did not experience this kind of hostility, for from the very beginning of its
revelation, the Qur‟ān has constantly appealed to men to use their common sense and
intelligence as a means to judge, verify and ascertain truth. It has encouraged through its
verses men of learning to exercise ijtihād, taddabur, tafakkur, munāẓarah, and discouraged
them to hold ideas and belief system based on mere assumptions and conjectures (ẓann),
blind imitation to ancestral traditions without legitimate basis (taqlīd), and superstitions
(khurafāt), etcs. At the same time, the Qur‟ān has repudiated those who misused or rather
virtually failed to apply their intellectual and rational faculties as legitimate tools in
differentiating between truth and falsehood, right and evil, justice and injustice, as even
worse than animal.62

In the Muslim intellectual tradition, the position and role of reason are properly
defined. Reason is considered the highest and best faculty bequeathed by Allāh to man.
Muslim philosophers looked at man‟s rational faculty as the king, thus occupies a position of
authority within one‟s self. The scholars of Islamic jurisprudence have regarded a state of
being rational (‘āqil) as a prerequisite for a Muslim being eligible to bear duties imposed by
the Sharī‛ah. The Prophet  was once reported to have said, that “There is no religion for
someone who has no common sense”, which implies that religion and the performance of its
obligations is only applicable upon those who have common sense. All this explains the
important position of reason in Islam.

Nevertheless, the Qur‟ān has reminded men of knowledge of the danger for over-
dependence on reason as the overriding authority superior over everything else. Thus, reason
should not be revered as an object of worship in derogation of God.63 Islam recognizes the
ability of human reason to acquire knowledge, but it has its limits – including its ability of
knowing what is only sensible and intelligible to it. Reason certainly cannot ascertain and
comprehend the true nature of reality, especially of that which we have called metaphysical
realities (‘ilm mā warā’ al-ṭabī‘ah), independent of Divine Revelation. In view of this
limitation, the tradition of the Prophet  has reminded the Muslims about the dangerous
repercussions of overly indulgence into rational discussion and endless deliberation on God‟s

62
The Qur‟ān, al-A‘rāf 7: 179
ِ ِ ِ ِ ‫نس ََلم قُلُوب َّلَّ ي ْف َقهو َن ِِبا وََلم أَعي َّلَّ ي ب‬ ِْ ‫ولََق ْد َذرأْنَا ِْلهنَّم َكثِْياً ِّمن‬
َ ‫صُرو َن ِبَا َوََلُ ْم آ َذا ٌن َّلَّ يَ ْس َم ُعو َن ِبَا أ ُْولَئ‬
‫ك‬ ُْ ٌ ُ ْ ْ ُ َ َ ُ َ ٌ ْ ُ ِ ‫اْل ِّن َوا ِإل‬ َ َ ََ َ َ
ِ
‫ك ُى ُم الْغَافلُو َن‬ ِ
‫ئ‬ ‫ل‬
َ‫ُو‬
‫أ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫َض‬ ‫أ‬ ‫م‬‫ى‬ ‫ل‬‫ب‬ ِ
‫ام‬ ‫ع‬ ‫َن‬
ْ ‫أل‬ ‫ا‬‫ك‬َ
َ ْ ُّ َ ْ ُ ْ َ َ
63
The Qur‟ān, al-Furqān 25: 43
(ً‫َعلَْي ِو َوكِيال‬ َ ‫ت َم ِن َّاَّتَ َذ إِ ََلَوُ َى َواهُ أَفَأ‬
‫َنت تَ ُكو ُن‬ َ ْ‫) أ ََرأَي‬
30
The Concept of Knowledge

Being and Essence (zātulLāh) of which human reason is incapable of comprehending them.
Instead of investigating the nature of God‟s Being, the Prophet  has encouraged his
followers to explore and reflect upon the natural world of creation as the best channel
towards understanding the Creator.

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