DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The Structure of Judiciary
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

B. Jurisdiction of Courts
BP129
CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS

Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo

warranto,and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and

3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and
the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph
4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any
and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within
three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902.)

CHAPTER II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (200,000.00);

NOTE:

After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec.
19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall
be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). five (5) years thereafter, such
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act
of Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
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(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);

After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3),
(4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act of Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand
pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3),
(4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act of Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under
the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.

Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional
Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

the

Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court has
committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to
be reviewed.

Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the
Regional Trial Courts to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases,
urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration
of justice.

CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
criminal cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their
respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where
there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

After five(5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3),
(4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act of Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when,
in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
the where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)

Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or
city, any Metropolitan Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may hear and decide
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the
absent Regional Trial Judges sit.

Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with
at least two branches, the Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof to try exclusively forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the
rental law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition as the Supreme Court may determine. The
Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures
may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for
filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.

Original vs Appellate
Original vs Concurrent
C. Nature of the Right to Appeal
1. Villanueva v CA
TOPIC: Nature of the Right to Appeal (The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party
who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
lost.)

It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be filed both with the Court of Appeals and with the
board, commission or agency (sec. 5 Rule 43) that made or rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment
appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the Insurance
Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. The said failure of petitioner to comply with
the requirements of law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its present remedial attempt. It renders the decision of
the Insurance Commission final and executory and the same can no longer be a subject of review. The perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure
to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.
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FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that in consideration of the annual payment of P7,535.00, private respondent (PR)
executed a policy of sickness and accident insurance. On August 12, 1989, petitioner was admitted to a
hospital where she was diagnosed and operated on for cholecystitis. Petitioner paid bills in the aggregate
sum of P48,934.05. However, PR wrongfully refused to pay petitioner which is entitled to recover under the
policy, reasoning that under the insurance policy, among the exclusions or non-compensable sickness are
those which have pre-existed before the effective date of the insurance of which the insured was aware or
should reasonably be aware of; and cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition, hence non-compensable.

The Insurance Commission concluded that petitioner’s illness was not a pre-existing disease and therefore,
fully compensable. Hence, it ordered PR to pay tha amount with legal interest from date of filing of
complaint until fully satisfied plus P5,000 attorney’s fees.

According to the Court of Appeals (para dali ra masabtan kay mga dates raba ni, take note lang sa mga gi-
bold)
1. September 27, 1990 - the copy of said decision was received by private respondent
2. October 15, 1990 – [more than fifteen (15) days allowed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 5434]
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which petitioner opposed
3. December 13, 1990, the Insurance Commission denied said motion for reconsideration
4. December 17, 1990, private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission
5. March 15, 1991 – CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time and that
private respondent did not duly file a copy of its notice of appeal with respondent court as mandated by
RA 5434

Respondent court noted that under the aforesaid Section 2 of Republic Act No. 5434, private respondent
had ten (10) days to file an appeal from receipt of order denying its motion for reconsideration (mao ni ang
Dec 13 order but received the order the day after so Dec 14)

On its May 8, 1991 resolution after Motion for Reconsideration was filed by PR, respondent court
subsequently agreed that PR filed its notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission within the said 10-day
period, but no such notice was filed with the CA itself as required by Section 3, RA 5343. Nevertheless, the
Special Third Division of respondent court resolved to reconsider its original resolution and ordered the
reinstatement of the appeal “in keeping with the ends of substantial justice.”

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the respondent court committed an error in reinstating the appeal when it has no
jurisdiction to do so, there being no notice of appeal having been filed with it.

RULING:
The CA erred in reconsidering its previous resolution. The dismissal of said appeal is proper and fully
justified by private respondent's failure to file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals as required by
Republic Act No. 5434 for the perfection of its appeal from the decision of the Insurance Commission.

The Court of Appeals has been vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. During the period
relevant to and involved in the appeal from the Insurance Commission to respondent court, subject of the
present review, the appeal to the Court of Appeals from said quasi-judicial body was governed by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same are not inconsistent with the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129:

"In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section
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22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals
and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment; or in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within said period, then within ten days from
notice of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 5434). No
extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is needed, much less allowed."

It is, therefore, indubitable that to perfect an appeal, notice must be filed both with the Court of Appeals
and with the board, commission or agency that made or rendered the ruling, award, order, decision or
judgment appealed from. In the instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was seasonably filed
with the Insurance Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. The said
failure of petitioner to comply with the requirements of law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its
present remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance Commission final and executory and the
same can no longer be a subject of review. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate
court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to
avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is
lost.

It is true that in some cases the filing of an appeal was allowed where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when it would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
the court's equity jurisdiction. In the case at bar, however, the interests of justice would not be served by a
policy of liberality, nor has the private respondent advanced any compelling reason to warrant the same.
Moreover, relaxation of the rules is not called for since the issues raised are mainly factual. For a party to
seek exception for its failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal,
strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof
must be shown, in order to warrant the Court's suspension of the rules.

2. Teope v People
An accused who escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court which includes remedy of appeal.
“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court
to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)
days from notice.”

FACTS:
(overview lang ning mga dates aron han-ay but TN sa mga naka-bold)
6. January 19, 1994 – Petitioner was charged with 2 counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC of
Dumaguete City.
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7. December 9, 1995 – After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to the
Evidence
8. January 9, 1995 – The RTC denied said demurrer
9. January 21, 1999 – Notice of Appeal from the denial was filed by petitioner
10. February 5, 1999 – The RTC denied due course to the Notice of Appeal
11. March 16, 1999 – RTC denied motion for reconsideration, which petitioner timely filed
12. May 24, 1999 – Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals
13. On October 19, 2000 and August 6, 2001, respectively – CA promulgated the assailed Decision and
Resolution dismissing the petition and denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Upon verification from the records of the case, it appears that a lot has transpired between the bold dates
above. (LABAD JUD KAAYO NI NA PART, basta kaning blue kay what transpired between those dates. Not
that important but basa lang gamay aron masabtan)
The RTC ordered that hearings for the reception of petitioner's evidence be set. Petitioner's counsel himself
suggested that the hearings be held on April 17, 19, 21, 24, 25 and 26, 1995.
 April 17, 1995 – however, petitioner filed a "Motion entreating Hon. Enrique C. Garrovillo to consider
whether to continue presiding over the cases and to inhibit Fiscal Diosdado D. Hermosa from appearing
as public prosecutor in the cases."
 April 21, 1995 – motion to inhibit was denied by the RTC and petitioner was ordered to present her
evidence on April 24 and 26, 1995 and on May 9 and 12, 1995.
 April 24, 1995 – petitioner failed to appear at the hearing thus, RTC declared her bail bonds forfeited
and ordered the bondsman to produce petitioner within 30 days and show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against her for the amount of the bonds
 April 27, 1995 – RTC received an urgent motion for postponement from petitioner's counsel, asking for
the resetting of the May 9 and 12, 1995 hearings. Reasons kay sa May 9, counsel was scheduled to
attend to some urgent family engagement while on May 12, counsel already had prior engagements
with other courts. The RTC acceded to the motion and reset the hearings to June 6, 7, 8, 9 and 13, 1995,
but declared these hearings to be "intransferable considering the fact that the termination of these
cases has been much delayed by the frequent absence and/or postponements made by the Accused.
 June 2, 1995 – petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 21, 1995 order (motion to
inhibit).
 July 5, 1995 – RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
 July 6, 1995 – RTC rendered judgment against the bonds for failure of the bondsman to produce
petitioner and submit an explanation for the latter's failure to appear at the April 24, 1995 hearing.
 January 30, 1996 – as prayed for by petitioner's counsel, the RTC issued an order again resetting the
hearing to April 7, 1997.
 February 4, 1997, the RTC issued another order declaring petitioner as a fugitive from justice and a
warrant of arrest was issued against her

Petitioner's counsel then filed an Omnibus Motion on May 19, 1997 asserting that petitioner cannot be tried
in absentia because she was not notified of the subsequent trials after the forfeiture of her bail bonds.
Consequently, petitioner's counsel prayed that the two criminal cases against her be archived and that an
alias warrant of arrest be issued. The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit on October 30,
1998. In the same order, the criminal cases were deemed submitted for decision and an alias warrant of
arrest was issued. It was only on January 18, 1999 that RTC rendered a Joint Judgment finding petitioner
guilty on both counts of violation of BP 22.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to which the RTC denied due course on the ground that, being a fugitive
from justice, petitioner has lost her right to appeal. Unable to convince the RTC to give due course to her
appeal, petitioner's counsel sought redress with the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for mandamus.
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ISSUE/S: Whether or not CA committed error for dismissing the case for mandamus

RULING:
NO. There was no error on the part of CA. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
clearly provides that:
“If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may
surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for
his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause,
he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.”

There is no question as it is very obvious that petitioner escaped after her arraignment. Subsequently, the
trial was ordered to continue but after the accused failed to appear, the RTC terminated the trial and,
thereafter, promulgated the Joint Judgment of conviction. During that time petitioner was at large. She
remains at large even while her counsel continues to file various pleadings on her behalf before the RTC, the
Court of Appeals and this Court.

Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred from availing of the remedies allowed by the rules against the
judgment of the RTC, one of which is the right to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The reason for
this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court,
he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Thus, having no right to appeal the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, the petition for mandamus cannot
prosper. Mandamus will only lie to compel the performance of a ministerial duty and the petitioner must
show a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

D. Appeal as distinguished from other remedies

1. Appeal from Certiorari
3. Madrigal Transport Inc v Lapanday Holdings
GR: The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are not
alternative or successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
SEE RULING for detailed discussion regarding special action for certiorari vs ordinary appeal

Instance when certiorari may prosper despite availability of appeal.

EXC: Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate — either
in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result — a writ
of certiorari may still be issued. (See also next case, more detailed)

Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41, petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal. Section 1(a)
of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration, because the
remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner could have done. (NOTE: sec 1 of Sec 41 was amended in 2007) –
NOTE IT IS JUST A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE, YOU DON’T APPEAL THE ORDER DENYING MR BUT YOU MAY APPEAL THE
ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS. IN THE END, YOU CAN APPEAL, YOU JUST NEED TO APPEAL THE CORRECT
ORDER.
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Reason why order of MR cannot be appealed – A  motion for reconsideration  is not putting forward a new issue, or
presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or
final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive;
or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to
law. (quoted from next case)
FACTS:
Petitioner Madrigal filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court RTC.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against Respondents
Lapanday, Macondray, and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC.

In the latter action, Madrigal alleged (1) that it had entered into a joint venture agreement with Lapanday
for the primary purpose of operating vessels to service the shipping requirements of Del Monte Philippines,
Inc.; (2) that it had done so on the strength of the representations of Lorenzo, in his capacity either as
chairman of the board or as president of Del Monte, Lapanday and Macondray; (3) that Macondray had
thereafter been appointed — allegedly upon the insistence of Lapanday — as broker, for the purpose of
securing charter hire contracts from Del Monte; (4) that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Madrigal
had purchased a vessel by obtaining a P10,000,000 bank loan; and (5) that contrary to their representations
and guarantees and despite demands, Lapanday and Lorenzo had allegedly been unable to deliver those Del
Monte charter hire contracts.

On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court declared petitioner insolvent. On March 30, 1998 and April 6,
1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed their respective Motions to Dismiss the case for
damages pending before the RTC.
 
The RTC granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action. Applying Sections 32
and 33 of the Insolvency Law, the trial court opined that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the
exclusive right to prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee. 

On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was later denied on July 26, 1999.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the
December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999 Orders of the trial court. 

the appellate court ruled that since the main issue in the instant case was purely legal, the Petition could
be treated as one for review as an exception to the general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal
was available.

ISSUE:
A. WON the proper remedy is Petition for Certiorari
B. WON the Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of appeal.

RULING:
 No. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an
appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

Petitioner was ascribing errors of judgment, not jurisdiction, in its Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court
of Appeals. The issue raised there was the trial court's alleged error in dismissing the Complaint for lack of
cause of action. Petitioner argues that it could still institute the Complaint, even if it had filed a Petition for
Insolvency earlier. As petitioner was challenging the trial court's interpretation of the law — posing a
question of law — the issue involved an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment
committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not necessarily equivalent to "grave
abuse of discretion."

Citing Sections 1(a) and 1(h), Rule 41, petitioner further claims that it was prohibited from filing an appeal.
Section 1(a) of the said Rule prohibits the filing of an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration, because the remedy is to appeal the main decision as petitioner could have done. In fact,
under Section 9, Rule 37, the remedy against an order denying a motion for reconsideration is to appeal the
judgment or final order. Section 1(h) does not apply in this case, because the trial court's Order did not
dismiss the action without prejudice. (NOTE: sec 1 of Sec 41 was amended in 2007)

HEAVY DISCUSSION:
Appeal
Under Rule 41, Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of Court to be
appealable. 

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more
can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the
lower court. Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves
something to be done as regards the merits of the latter. 

Petition for Certiorari

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as
its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. 
FOR CERTIORARI TO PROSPER, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. 
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of
jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse
of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

judgment. 
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the
purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of
the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings
of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari.  Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a
mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy. 
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of
review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal
are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the
prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are
appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. 
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from.  Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final
order.  A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an
appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. 
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed,
the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior
to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the
alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the
law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order. 

 Yes, BUT exception to the rule was not established by petitioner.

We are not unaware of instances when this Court has granted certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
Where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not prove adequate —
either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a total failure of justice could result —
a writ of certiorari may still be issued. Petitioner cites some of these exceptions to justify the remedy it has
undertaken with the appellate court, but these are not applicable to the present factual milieu.
These alleged errors of judgment, however, do not constitute a despotic, capricious, or whimsical exercise
of power. On the contrary, petitioner availed of certiorari because the 15-day period within which to file an
appeal had already lapsed. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of
appeal.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

4. But see: Hrs. of Sps Reterta v Sps. Mores

Petitioner commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance where they allege that their late father had been
granted a land by virtue of occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years and that they discovered an affidavit that
their father purportedly had executed waiving his right therein and by virtue of such affidavit, respondent was able to
allegedly had purchased it. Respondent filed motion to dismiss arguing that RTC has no jurisdiction because the action
involves friar land, it must be the Director of Lands who has exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands,
which RTC granted the motion. (Note: It is the truly the RTC/MTC has the jurisdiction as the jurisdiction of Director of
Lands is limited only to administration and disposition, which does not include reconveyance) Petitioner assailed the
dismissal via petition for certiorari but CA denied as there is available remedy – ordinary appeal. SC: petition for
certiorari is incorrect remedy BUT given the circumstances, this qualify for the exception to the general rule – because
the dismissal of the case, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to protect their substantial
rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable damage.

GR: Certiorari not available if Appeal is available

EXC: Certiorari may prosper even if appeal is available if:

(a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari  be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust
result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; or
(b) the order of the RTC granting the  motion to dismiss  on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Also, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: 
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; 
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
(c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; 
(d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; 
(e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; 
(f) where public interest is involved; and 
(g) in case of urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that THE AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL AS A REMEDY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PREVENT OR PRECLUDE A PARTY FROM MAKING USE OF CERTIORARI  IF APPEAL IS NOT
AN ADEQUATE REMEDY, OR AN EQUALLY BENEFICIAL, OR SPEEDY REMEDY. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a
litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and
set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the  Rules of Court. 

Q: It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule
41,  supra, by deleting an order denying a  motion for new trial  or motion for reconsideration  from the enumeration of
non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. – SO, KARUN PWEDE
NA I APPEAL AND ORDER OF MR? Dean Largo: Still prohibited.

FACTS:
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

the RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983), averring that they were the true and real owners
of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708
square meters, having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late
father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father
and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of
the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that
their father had purportedly executed whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in
the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of
respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.
On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a  motion to dismiss, insisting that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and
that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the  motion to dismiss. The RTC considering that the land
subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No. 1120 is the
law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive administration and
disposition of Friar Lands. (NOTE: It is the RTC/MTC has the jurisdiction, thus RTC is incorrect in arguing
that Director of Lands has jurisdiction)
On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal  via  petition for certiorari,
but the CA dismissed the petition on April 25, 2003, holding:
Thus, the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to lie is that
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

ISSUE:
1. WON the proper remedy is Petition for Certiorari
2. WON the Court may grant certiorari despite the availability of appeal.
3. Who has jurisdiction over the case

RULING:
 No. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of
only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners posit that a special civil action for  certiorari  was their proper remedy to assail the
order of dismissal in light of certain rules of procedure, specifically pointing out that the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court ("An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final
order") prohibited an appeal of a denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court("No appeal may be taken from: . . . An order
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration") expressly declared that an order denying a motion
for reconsideration  was not appealable. They remind that the third paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly provided that in the instances "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65."
The petitioners' position has no basis. cCHITA
For one, the order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order
granting the respondents'  motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The
fact that the order granting the  motion to dismiss  was a final order for thereby completely disposing of
the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates
that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners'  motion for reconsiderationwas an appeal
from the final order dismissing the action upon the respondents'  motion to dismiss. The said rule
explicitly states thusly:
Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. — An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a  motion for reconsideration  independently of a
judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A  motion for reconsideration  is not putting forward a
new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence
either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for
reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse
or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy
from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were  not appealable  made in the 1997 version of Section 1,
Rule 41 of the  Rules of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed
decision on May 15, 2002 — included an order denying a  motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable. IEHSDA
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007, has since
amended Section 1, Rule 41,  supra, by deleting an order denying a  motion for new trial  or motion for
reconsideration  from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a revision of a
procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis would not be
right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in force at the time
when it issued its assailed final order.

 Yes. The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of
any remedy to protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer
grave injustice and irreparable damage. In that situation, the RTC's dismissal should be annulled
through certiorari, for the task of the remedy was to do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.
THE SETTLED RULE PRECLUDING  CERTIORARI  AS A REMEDY AGAINST THE FINAL ORDER
WHEN APPEAL IS AVAILABLE NOTWITHSTANDING, the Court rules that the CA should have given due
course to and GRANTED THE PETITION FOR  CERTIORARI  FOR TWO EXCEPTIONAL REASONS,
namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari  be given due course to avoid the
undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the
RTC granting the  motion to dismiss  on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered  certiorari  as the proper remedy despite the availability
of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In  Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously
and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where
an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of
law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that THE AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL AS A REMEDY DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE SUFFICIENT GROUND TO PREVENT OR PRECLUDE A PARTY FROM MAKING USE
OF CERTIORARI  IF APPEAL IS NOT AN ADEQUATE REMEDY, OR AN EQUALLY BENEFICIAL, OR SPEEDY
REMEDY. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need
not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and
set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the  Rules of Court. 

[Reason for the wide breadth and range of discretion]

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite  certiorari  not being available as a proper remedy
against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural requirements and to
overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order that a void order of a lower
court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice. Verily, the instances in
which  certiorari  will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and
usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the court are such that
authority is not wanting to show that  certiorari  is more discretionary than either prohibition or  mandamus,
and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be
granted  whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice. 

[BACKGROUND OF THE CASE]

The petitioners' complaint — self-styled as being for the  "quieting of title and reconveyance,
declaration of nullity of affidavit & Sales Certificate, reconveyance and damages" — would challenge the
efficacy of the respondents' certificate of title under the theory that there had been no valid transfer or
assignment from the petitioners' predecessor in interest to the respondents of the rights or interests in
the land due to the affidavit assigning such rights and interests being a forgery and procured by fraud.
The petitioners' cause of action for reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing upon the
manner by which to establish a right in a piece of friar land.
where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon, such transfer
must conform to certain requirements of the law. UnderDirector of Lands v. Rizal, 18 the purchaser in the
sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law as the actual owner of the lot
purchased  even before the payment of the full payment price and before the execution of the final deed of
conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the
Government becoming that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee. 
Thus, pursuant to Section 16 of Act No. 1120, 20 had grantee Teofilo Reterta perfected his title, the
petitioners as his heirs would have succeeded him and taken title from him upon his death. By law,
therefore, should the execution of the deed in favor of the respondents be held invalid, the interests of
Teofilo Reterta should descend to the petitioners and the deed should issue in their favor. Adding
significance to the petitioners' claim was their allegation in the complaint that they were in possession of
the land. Moreover, as alleged in the petitioners'  opposition  to the  motion to dismiss  of the respondents,
Teofilo Reterta had partially paid the price of the land. 
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

Given the foregoing, the petitioners' complaint made out a good case for reconveyance or reversion, and its
allegations, if duly established, might well warrant the reconveyance of the land from the respondents to
the petitioners. It did not matter that the respondents already held a certificate of title in their names. In
essence, an action for reconveyance respects the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks
the transfer of the property to its rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or
mistakenly registered in another person's name. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance,
for it is enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the
registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. 

[RTC HAS JURISDICTION]

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 23 as amended
by Republic Act No. 7691, 24 which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;
xxx xxx xxx
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title
involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction
over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00
(in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction).
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought. 

[RTC ACTED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION]

The respondents' reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the
Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis.
The authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar
lands, did not include the petitioners' action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the
friar land is disposed of in favor of a private person and title duly issues in the latter's name. By ignoring
the petitioners' showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the
allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically and capriciously.

2. Appeal from petition for relief

5. Madarang v Morales
Petitioner filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the house of defendant. The house was mortgaged for the loan the
defendant obtained from petitioner wherein they failed to pay on due date. The defendants filed a MR but was denied,
they then filed an appeal but was also denied as it was filed beyond the 15 day reglementary period. Defendants now
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)
filed a petition for relief from judgment blaiming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within
the reglementary period.

SC: Failure of petitioners' former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period is not excusable
negligence. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional circumstances. If
the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that their counsel's
negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence. The mere allegation that there is
excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an
unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as the bigotry that supports it.

In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at .... SEE FULL TEXT

Facts: The Spouses Morales (petitioner) alleged that Spouses Nicanor and Spouses Bartolome (both
defendants) loaned P500,000.00 from them which was secured by the Bago Bantay property. The period to
pay lapsed without the Spouses Bartolome having paid their loan.

Spouses Morales, therefore, filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot.
RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Morales, ruling that defendants pay them the amount of the loan with 7%
interest.

Defendants filed for a Motion for Recon but was denied. They thereafter filed an appeal but was also denied
for it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

Defendants now file a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who failed to file
the notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They argued that Atty. Tugonon's failure to appeal
within the reglementary period was a mistake and an excusable negligence due to their former lawyer's old
age.

Issues:
1) WON the failure to file notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period by an 80-year old lawyer
would constitute excusable negligence.
2) WON the petition for relief from judgment was properly denied

Ruling:
1) No. Failure of petitioners' former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period is
not excusable negligence.

Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be
filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. —
When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable relief granted only under exceptional circumstances.
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must show that
their counsel's negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and prudence. The mere
allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial slur to
senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as
the bigotry that supports it.

There is also no showing that the negligence could not have been prevented through ordinary diligence and
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel's negligence.

2) Yes. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order.
The decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.

Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for relief
from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied
the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
“Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.”

3. Appeal from annulment of judgment

6. Pinausukan Seafood House v FEBTC
Petitioner’s case for annulment of real estate mortgage was dismissed for failure of its counsel to prosecute. Petitioner
then seeks to nullify the order dismissing its case on the ground that his counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable
negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments
on the case.

SC: The case for Annulment of Judgment is defective as to substance and form.

FORM: Pinausukan's failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment for only by the
affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can the
petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment. This is because
extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts
constitutive of it.

SUBSTANCE: Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must emanate from an act of the adverse
party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not
extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.

Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the developments in the case was Pinausukan's own responsibility. As a
litigant, it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the continuing duty to keep itself
abreast of the developments if only to protect its own interest in the litigation. It could have discharged its duty by
keeping in regular touch with its counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it has only itself to blame.

EXTRINSIC FRAUD - when you are deprived of your day in court.

INTRINSIC FRAUD - goes into the merits of the case; and by diligence, you can found it.

Facts: Bonier, the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan), executed four real estate mortgages in
favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company (the Bank). When the unpaid obligation secured by the mortgages
had ballooned to P15,129,303.67, the Bank commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgages.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the mortgages, Pinausukan,
brought an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages, averring that Bonier had obtained the loans
only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without
Pinausukan's consent through a board resolution.

The RTC dismissed the case (by Pinausukan) for failure to prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality.
Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and learned that Atty. Villaflor,
its counsel of record, had not informed it about the order of dismissal.

Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the order of October
31, 2002 dismissing its case. It stated that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in
failing to keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the developments
on the case.

Issues: WON the annulment of judgment was proper

Ruling:
Annulment of Judgment; When to file
The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort
to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no
fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as "a last remedy," 32 is not an
alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction.
The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must
be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must
be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity
the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. (affidavits)

Pinausukan's petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally defective

The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukan's disregard of the fourth requirement mentioned earlier
consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action.
Pinausukan's failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for annulment for only by
the affidavits of the witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud
can the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for annulment.
This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the pleading but needs to be
particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.

The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track of the case, and to his
failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which the CA did not accept as constituting
extrinsic fraud, because such neglect of counsel, even if it was true, did not amount to extrinsic fraud
because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party, and did not occur outside the trial
of the case. (Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must emanate from an act of the
adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court.
The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.)

Moreover, the failure to be fully aware of the developments in the case was Pinausukan's own
responsibility. As a litigant, it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the
continuing duty to keep itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its own interest in the litigation.
It could have discharged its duty by keeping in regular touch with its counsel, but it did not. Consequently, it
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

has only itself to blame.

E. Issues on Appeal
1. Final Judment/ Order (distinguished from interlocutory orders)
Final Judgment Rule:
7. Aranas v Mercado
RTC issued an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included. RTC denied their MR. The CA partly granted the petition, reversing the inclusion of a certain parcel of land
which was already sold. WON Petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in the denial of MR. SC: No. Denial of MR is an
interlocutory order RTC issued an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included. RTC denied their MR. The CA partly granted the petition, reversing the inclusion of a
certain parcel of land which was already sold.

The  final judgment rule stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may
be the subject of an appeal in due course.

A final order disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but an interlocutory order does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon.

An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory
or final is:  does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case?  If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

FACTS: Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. When he died, Teresita was
appointed as administrator of the estate of Emigdio. RTC granted petition. As the administrator, Teresita
indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only
personal properties”.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma (one of
the heirs) moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The
RTC granted Thelma's motion to which the parties agreed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory.
RTC issued an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties
that should be included. RTC denied their MR. The CA partly granted the petition, reversing the inclusion of
a certain parcel of land which was already sold.
ISSUE: WON certiorari was the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC

HELD: No.
Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari  to assail the orders of the RTC by
Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper. Thelma's contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for  certiorari  as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In  Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, the Court distinguished
between final  and  interlocutory  orders as follows:
A final order disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution
what the court has determined, but an interlocutory order does not completely dispose
of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.
An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to
be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is:  does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?  If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The assailed order denying Teresita's motion for the approval of the inventory and the order denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties in the
inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and
the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at any time during the course of the administration proceedings.
In  Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect
that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory
and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that
the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and
for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots."
In the case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, the Court pointed out: All that the said court could do as regards
the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator.  If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the
opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita,   et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The  final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41,  Rules of
Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders
(and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same
rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109
of the  Rules of Court (open codals in case ipa enumerate)  enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings and clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being
interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.

8. Jose v Javellana
CHECK FULL TEXT, DECISION DENYING MR, UN APPEALLABLE MAN KAHA, BASIS - SEC 1 RULE 41. Also, ana si dean nga
even if na tang tang na ang “(a) – an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration” on Dec 1, 2007, still dili
japun pwede.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition
against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

FACTS:
Margarita sold to respondent Javellana two parcels of land and agreed title to will be passed only upon full
payment.

After Margarita died, Priscilla (the heir) did not cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens
System despite payment from Javellana.

Javellana filed an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against Priscilla in RTC.

Priscilla in turn, filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and
that the complaint did not state a cause of action. RTC initially denied Priscillas motion to dismiss but was
reversed upon Priscillas’ MR.

Javellana moved for reconsideration but was likewise denied. As such, Javellana filed a notice of appeal
from the order denying the MR, which Priscilla countered that order was not appealable.

ISSUES: Whether or not Javellana’s appeal from the order denying his MR (MR from the decision of RTC
granting motion to dismiss) was proper

RULING: Yes.
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and appealable

Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000 was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that
Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration.

Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.

First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration is a final order, not an interlocutory one, for it
left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy
or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;[23]
but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.

Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration of a final
order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified
that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a
denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA

Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that he received a copy of
the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after
the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the order of June 21,
2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000,
his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the
reglementary period.
Dom: 3 days nalang daw kay 15 days, provided by law, minus 12 days, the period after which he filed his
MR from receipt of the July 9, 1999 order.
The Court adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved party desirous
of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration.
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.

Partial Summary Judgment:

9. Phil. Business Bank v Chua
Partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated
separately from the main case. Hence not an appealable judgment.

A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not put an end to an
action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.  The
Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the
trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.

The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant,
respondent Chua, based on the latter’s admission that he signed promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB.

Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas
Tans complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretary’s certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out
loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the
resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.. Being a
partial summary judgment, appeal is unavailing as it is not a final order.

FACTS
Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc., filed a derivative suit for the
Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate,
Injunction, Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against PBB, respondent Felipe Chua and others before the Makati City RTC.
 
In Tans amended complaint , alleged that before he went abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to
respondent Felipe Chua, a director and the President of CST, the original copies of two titles to lands owned
by, and registered in the name of, CST. Felipe Chua informed him that CSTs properties had been
fraudulently used as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority
from CST stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.
 
From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a Secretarys
certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted CST board
meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with PBB. This
Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these
loans. Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total amount of
P91,100,000.00) and used CST properties as collateral.

Respondent Felipe Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the
representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence parts
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

of this loan.
 
When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties after CST defaulted, Tan filed the
present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out in CSTs
name are unenforceable against it, since they were entered into by persons who were unauthorized to
bind the company.
 
In its Amended Answer, PBB claimed that the loans and mortgage were all valid and binding since it were
supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate, which authorized him to obtain credit facilities in
behalf of CST. In addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as
collaterals. Also included a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the promissory
notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua.
 
In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim denied all allegations except to the fact that he admitted
that he signed, as co-maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with
PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been
consummated, in a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and
retrieve from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.
 
PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the execution of the
promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to P75,000,000.00, insofar as its cross-claim against him was
concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued
that although respondent Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John
Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law.

THE RTC’S PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RTC found Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to P75,000,000.00. The RTC
reasoned that by signing as a co-maker, he obligated himself to pay the amount indicated in the promissory
notes, even if he received no consideration in return. Thus, the RTC ordered him to pay PBB the amount
of P75,000,000.00, plus interests and costs.
 
Upon Chua’s Notice of Appeal, RTC ruled that Chua could not file a notice of appeal. (questioned in present
petition) Instead, he should have filed a special civil action for certiorari. However, since the period for filing
a certiorari petition had already lapsed without respondent filing any petition, the partial summary
judgment had become final and executory. Thus, it ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of the partial summary judgment in favor of PBB. Sheriff then issued a Notice of Levy
and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties, addressed to respondent Chua.
 

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA alleging that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in disallowing his appeal of the partial summary judgment, and in issuing a writ of
execution. Significantly, respondent Chua did not question the propriety of the partial summary judgment.
CA partly affirmed the RTC order  on the matter of the disallowance of respondent Chuas appeal. The CA
held that respondent Chua could not appeal the partial summary judgment while the main case remained
pending, in keeping with Section 1(g), Rule 41 of the Rules. However, the CA held that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua. As found by the CA,
the RTC grievously erred when it held that the partial judgment had become final and executory when
respondent Chua failed to avail of the proper remedy of certiorari within the 60 day reglementary period
under Rule 65. Since a partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of the action, it is merely an
interlocutory, not a final, order. Thus, it could not attain finality.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

  
ISSUE
Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that Chua could not appeal
the partial summary judgment

THE RULING
 DENIED the petition for being unmeritorious.
 
A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it does not put an
end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the
remedy he sues for. The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial
process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those
facts which are not in dispute.

After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which
specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. It follows that a partial summary
judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated separately
from the main case. Hence not an appealable judgment.
 
PBB asserted that Guevarra case is inapplicable, which Court disagreed. It was held in said case that the
summary judgment rendered by the lower court was in truth a partial summary judgment because it failed
to resolve the other causes of action in the complaint, as well as the counterclaim and the third party
complaint raised by the defendants. Contrary to PBBs assertions, the same could be said for the case. The
partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant,
respondent Chua, based on the latter’s admission that he signed promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of
PBB.

 Clearly, this partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in
plaintiff Tomas Tans complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretarys certificate which authorized John
Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of
CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed for and on
behalf of CST, remained unresolved.. Being a partial summary judgment, appeal is unavailing as it is
not a final order.

(Topic only up to this portion, it is your discretion to proceed further)

Certiorari not the proper remedy

PBB also maintains that the partial summary judgment attained finality when respondent Chua failed to file
a certiorari petition. Contrary to PBBs contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for
respondent Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct
review, not a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower courts judgment. It is well-settled
that certiorari is a limited form of review; restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in
the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a
petition for review.
 
Court affirmed the CAs ruling that the partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order which could not
become a final and executory judgment, notwithstanding respondent Chuas failure to file
a  certiorari  petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the RTC grievously erred when it issued the
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

writ of execution against respondent Chua.

 
As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the issue of the propriety of the
partial summary judgment issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never raised this issue in his
petition for certiorari before the CA. It is well settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it
has been raised in the proceedings below.Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this
rule.
 
WHEREFORE, Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.

4. Question of law distinguished from question of fact

10. First Bancorp v CA

There are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction –

(1) by WRIT OF ERROR under Section 2(a), RULE 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact and law
are raised or involved;

(2) APPEAL BY CERTIORARI under Section 2(c), RULE 41, IN RELATION TO RULE 45, where only questions of law are
raised or involved:

The TEST OF WHETHER A QUESTION IS ONE OF LAW OR OF FACT is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Applying the test to the
instant case, it is clear that Lightner raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule
41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Jane Lightner seek to recover 50pct of the properties of his deceased husband. She alleged that the property is owned
by his husband however was named to another to hide it from her. Respondent filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
failure to state cause of action. RTC granted the MTD. Jane filed notice of appeal to CA. Respondent opposed arguing
that it is a wrong appeal as it involves pure question of law thus, must appeal via rule 45 and not 41. SC: respondent is
correct.

FACTS

Jane Thomas Lightner, an American citizen who resided in California, U.S.A., filed a Complaint against First
Bancorp, Inc. with RTC alleging that properties (parcel of land and house and other improvements with
address at 144 San Juanico Street, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila) registered under
Bancorp actually belongs to the estate of her deceased husband (Donald Lightner) as the property were
acquired with conjugal or community funds and therefore is a conjugal or community asset.

In an attempt to divest and defraud her out of her 50% undivided interest in the Property (or in the
conjugal/community funds used to acquire the Property) as well as her compulsory inheritance from his
estate’s 50% undivided interest therein, Donald C. Lightner, Jr. caused the title to the Property to be
registered in the name of bank in which property was used exclusively as the primary residence her
husband and his mistress Aida Villaluz until his death.

Since bank is only a holding corporation owned by nominees, all of its stockholders, directors and officers
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

are lawyers and an accounting staff having total capitalization of P100,000 as of 23 September 1997,
proving that it could not have purchased the Property. She further claimed that as widow of Donald and
considering no valid decree of divorce, legal separation, separation of properties, or dissolution of the
conjugal partnership was obtained, she was entitled a 50% undivided interest in the property from bank, as
trustee and in trust for the benefit of plaintiff.

Bancorp filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint (on ground that complaint on the ground that it failed to
state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant therein), and for prematurity, as the conjugal
partnership between her and her deceased husband had not yet been liquidated prior to its filing) which
was opposed by Lightner. RTC granted the motion of Bancop and ordered the complaint be dismissed.

Lightner filed a notice of appeal to CA, arguing that the questioned order is contrary to the relevant facts
and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Bancorp in turn filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that court lack jurisdiction as appeal involved pure questions of law. Lightner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, claiming that her appeal involved both questions of law and questions of facts. CA denied
the Motion to Dismiss Appeal filed by Bancorp. MR likewise denied as well as the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Bancorp. (on the ground that only legal issues had been raised in the appellant’s
brief, hence, the appeal should be dismissed). Hence, present petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not CA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it assumed jurisdiction and took
cognizance of the appeal of Lightner

RULING The petition is meritorious.

The order of the trial court dismissing the complaint of Bancorp on the ground that it is premature and
states no cause of action is final because it terminated the proceedings so that nothing more can be done in
the trial court. The order ended the litigation. There are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial
court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction –

(1) by writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of fact or questions of fact
and law are raised or involved; (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45,
where only questions of law are raised or involved:

In the present case, Lightner appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant therein), and for prematurity, as
the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband had not yet been liquidated prior to its
filing.

On other hand, Bancorp maintains that the trial court acted in accord with law when it dismissed the
complaint. While it admits that when it filed its motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint of
respondent states no cause of action, it theoretically admitted the truth of the factual and material
allegations in the complaint and not mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions
of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.

It likewise agrees that the court may not inquire into the truth of the allegations and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the
complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as basis for said motion. 

Court affirmed Bancorp’s contention that a question of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)

against defendant or that the action is premature is one of law. The determination thereof is one of law
and not of facts. It follows that a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of
action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact.

The TEST OF WHETHER A QUESTION IS ONE OF LAW OR OF FACT is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact. Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that Lightner raises pure questions of law
which are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

It must be stressed that an order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order which is subject to appeal,
not the proper subject of certiorari. Where appeal is available as a remedy, certiorari will not lie. In the
instant case then, if the petitioner had chosen to appeal from the dismissal order of the trial court solely on
questions of law, then he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. If he wanted
to raise in his appeal both questions of law and of fact, then he should have pursued the remedy of an
ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals and not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court of
Appeals did not then commit any reversible error when it dismissed the petition for review of the
petitioner. Thus, the appeal of respondent to the CA by writ of error is a wrong mode of appeal;
consequently, the appeal should have been dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

5. Judgments and orders that are not appealable

Rule 41, Sec 1 ROC
SECTION 1. Subject of Appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.  cIDHSC

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (deleted in
2007)
(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief
from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress,
or any other ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom; and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
civil action as provided in Rule 65.
DANIEL AND DOMINIC ONG ALP CASES 2018 (OUTLINE OF DEAN LARGO)
 (Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
|||

[December 4, 2007])

F. Modes of Appeal
Rule 41, Sec 2 ROC
SECTION 2. Modes of Appeal. —
(a) Ordinary Appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. (n)