G.R. No.

149440, January 28, 2003

444 Phil. 587

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003

HACIENDA FATIMA AND/OR PATRICIO VILLEGAS,

ALFONSO VILLEGAS AND CRISTINE SEGURA,
PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Although the employers have shown that respondents performed work that
was seasonal in nature, they failed to prove that the latter worked only for
the duration of one particular season. In fact, petitioners do not deny that
these workers have served them for several years already. Hence, they are
regular -- not seasonal -- employees.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the February 20, 2001 Decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 51033. The dispositive part of the
Decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil

action for certiorari is hereby DENIED.” [2]

On the other hand, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

Decision,[3] upheld by the CA, disposed in this wise:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor

Arbiter is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED and a new one
entered declaring complainants to have been illegally dismissed.
Respondents are hereby ORDERED to reinstate complainants
except Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and
Boboy Silva to their previous position and to pay full backwages
from September 1991 until reinstated. Respondents being guilty
of unfair labor practice are further ordered to pay complainant
union the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages.”[4]

The Facts

The facts are summarized in the NLRC Decision as follows:

“Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants

[herein respondents] refused to work and/or were choosy in the
kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the records is replete with
complainants’ persistence and dogged determination in going
back to work.

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“Indeed, it would appear that respondents did not look with favor
workers’ having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when
complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining
representative in the certification elections, respondents under the
pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the
union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein
were not given work for more than one month. In protest,
complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the
signing of a Memorandum of Agreement which stipulated among
others that:

‘a) The parties will initially meet for CBA negotiations

on the 11th day of January 1991 and will endeavor to
conclude the same within thirty (30) days.

‘b) The management will give priority to the women

workers who are members of the union in case work
relative x x x or amount[ing] to gahit and [dipol] arises.

‘c) Ariston Eruela Jr. will be given back his normal

work load which is six (6) days in a week.

‘d) The management will provide fifteen (15) wagons for

the workers and that existing workforce prior to the
actual strike will be given priority. However, in case the
said workforce would not be enough, the management
can hire additional workers to supplement them.

‘e) The management will not anymore allow the scabs,

numbering about eighteen (18) workers[,] to work in the
hacienda; and

‘f) The union will immediately lift the picket upon

signing of this agreement.’

“However, alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen

wagons, respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and
bargain collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means
including the use of private armed guards to prevent the
organizers from entering the premises.

“Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any

more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the
union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992. But due to the
conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of
Agreement was signed by the complainants and respondents
which provides:

‘Whereas the union staged a strike against management

on January 2, 1992 grounded on the dismissal of the
union officials and members;

‘Whereas parties to the present dispute agree to settle

the case amicably once and for all;

‘Now therefore, in the interest of both labor and

management, parties herein agree as follows:

‘1. That the list of the names of affected union members

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G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003

hereto attached and made part of this agreement shall

be referred to the Hacienda payroll of 1990 and
determine whether or not this concerned Union
members are hacienda workers;

‘2. That in addition to the payroll of 1990 as reference,

herein parties will use as guide the subjects of a
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and
between the parties last January 4, 1990;

‘3. That herein parties can use other employment

references in support of their respective claims whether
or not any or all of the listed 36 union members are
employees or hacienda workers or not as the case may
be;

‘4. That in case conflict or disagreement arises in the

determination of the status of the particular hacienda
workers subject of this agreement herein parties further
agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;

‘5. To effect the above, a Committee to be chaired by

Rose Mengaling is hereby created to be composed of
three representatives each and is given five working
days starting Jan. 23, 1992 to resolve the status of the
subject 36 hacienda workers. (Union representatives:
Bernardo Torres, Martin Alas-as, Ariston Arulea Jr.)”

“Pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and the Minutes

of the Conciliation Meeting showed as follows:

‘The meeting started at 10:00 A.M. A list of employees

was submitted by Atty. Tayko based on who received
their 13th month pay. The following are deemed not
considered employees:

1. Luisa Rombo
2. Ramona Rombo
3. Bobong Abrega
4. Boboy Silva

‘The name Orencio Rombo shall be verified in the 1990

payroll.

‘The following employees shall be reinstated

immediately upon availability of work:

1. Jose Dagle 7. Alejandro Tejares

2. Rico Dagle 8. Gaudioso Rombo
3. Ricardo Dagle 9. Martin Alas-as Jr.
4. Jesus Silva 10. Cresensio Abrega
5. Fernando Silva 11. Ariston Eruela Sr.
6. Ernesto Tejares 12. Ariston Eruela Jr.’

“When respondents again reneged on its commitment,

complainants filed the present complaint.

“But for all their persistence, the risk they had to undergo in
conducting a strike in the face of overwhelming odds,

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G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003

complainants in an ironic twist of fate now find themselves being

accused of ‘refusing to work and being choosy in the kind of work
they have to perform’.”[5] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature,
they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and were
therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed
security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right was deemed by the CA
to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.

The appellate court found neither “rhyme nor reason in petitioner’s

argument that it was the workers themselves who refused to or were choosy
in their work.” As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is “replete
with complainants’ persistence and dogged determination in going back to
work.”[6]

The CA likewise concurred with the NLRC’s finding that petitioners were
guilty of unfair labor practice.

Hence this Petition.[7]

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

“A. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that

respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, were regular
employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of
the Labor Code, which categorically state that seasonal
employees are not covered by the definition of regular
employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under
paragraph 2 which refers exclusively to casual employees
who have served for at least one year.

“B. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the

ruling in Mercado, xxx, and relying instead on rulings
which are not directly applicable to the case at bench, viz,
Philippine Tobacco, Bacolod-Murcia, and Gaco, xxx.

“C. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave

abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC’s conclusion
that private respondents were illegally dismissed, that
petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice, and that
the union be awarded moral and exemplary damages.”[8]

Consistent with the discussion in petitioners’ Memorandum, we shall take

up Items A and B as the first issue and Item C as the second.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Regular Employment

At the outset, we must stress that only errors of law are generally reviewed

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by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari of CA decisions.[9]

Questions of fact are not entertained.[10] The Court is not a trier of facts and,
in labor cases, this doctrine applies with greater force.[11] Factual questions
are for labor tribunals to resolve.[12] In the present case, these have already
been threshed out by the NLRC. Its findings were affirmed by the appellate
court.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the CA did not err when it held that
respondents were regular employees.

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:

“Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of

written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment
is for the duration of the season.

“An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered

by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exist.” (Italics
supplied)

For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it

is not enough that they perform work or services that are seasonal in
nature. They must have also been employed only for the duration of one
season. The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second,
condition. The fact that respondents -- with the exception of Luisa Rombo,
Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva -- repeatedly worked as
sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not denied by the
latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one
season. Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.

In Abasolo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[13] the Court issued this

clarification:

“[T]he test of whether or not an employee is a regular employee

has been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held:

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining

regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of
the employer. The test is whether the former is usually
necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of
the employer. The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade
in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing

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the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not

continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,
the employment is considered regular, but only with
respect to such activity and while such activity exists.

xxxxxxxxx

“x x x [T]he fact that [respondents] do not work continuously for

one whole year but only for the duration of the x x x season does
not detract from considering them in regular employment since in
a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal
workers who are called to work from time to time and are
temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from
service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-
employed.”[14]

The CA did not err when it ruled that Mercado v. NLRC[15] was not
applicable to the case at bar. In the earlier case, the workers were required
to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after
which their services would be available to any other farm owner. They were
not hired regularly and repeatedly for the same phase/s of agricultural work,
but on and off for any single phase thereof. On the other hand, herein
respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season
for several years, are considered the latter’s regular employees for their
respective tasks. Petitioners’ eventual refusal to use their services -- even if
they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever
these were available -- and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks
originally assigned to respondents amounted to illegal dismissal of the
latter.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA’s dismissal of what petitioners
claim was their valid exercise of a management prerogative. The sudden
changes in work assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were
implemented immediately after respondents had organized themselves into
a union and started demanding collective bargaining. Those who were union
members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners’ move actually
amounted to unjustified dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor
Code.

“Where there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal
dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination
was for a valid and authorized cause.”[16] In the case at bar, petitioners
failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents who, as
discussed above, are regular employees.

Second Issue:
Unfair Labor Practice

The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It
ruled as follows:

“Indeed, from respondents’ refusal to bargain, to their acts of

economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who
withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the

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organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and

members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want
a union in their hacienda—a clear interference in the right of the
workers to self-organization.”[17]

We uphold the CA’s affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual

findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in
matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only
respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court.
[18]
Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal,
especially when supported by substantial evidence.[19] Consequently, the
Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings,
in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any
rational basis.[20]

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the
sanction of moral and exemplary damages.[21]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J., (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,

concur.

[1]
Eighth Division, composed of Justices Ramon A. Barcelona (chairman
and ponente), Rodrigo V. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos (members).
[2]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 36.
[3]
Fourth Division, composed of Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan
(ponente), Presiding Commissioner Irenea E. Ceniza and Commissioner
Amorito V. Canete.
[4]
NLRC Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 63-64; records, pp. 28-29.
[5]
NLRC Decision, pp. 5-9; rollo, pp. 59-63; records, pp. 24-28. Italics
provided.
[6]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 35.
[7]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on April 30, 2002, upon
receipt by the Court of petitioners’ Memorandum, which was signed by
Atty. Teodoro V. Cortes. Respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Attys.
Francisco D. Yap and Whelma F. Siton-Yap, was received by the Court on
March 7, 2002.
[8]
Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 275.
[9]
Viloria v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 529, June 30, 1999.

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G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003

[10]
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc., 306
SCRA 762, May 5, 1999; Villarico v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 193, June
28, 1999; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 118, March 22, 1999;
Baguio v. Republic, 301 SCRA 450, January 21, 1999.
[11]
Ropali Trading Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 296
SCRA 309, September 25, 1998.
[12]
Chua v. National Labor Relations Commission, 267 SCRA 196, January
30, 1997.
[13]
346 SCRA 293, November 29, 2000.
[14]
Id., pp. 304-305, per De Leon Jr., J.
[15]
201 SCRA 332, September 5, 1991.
[16]
Valiant Machinery and Metal Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 252 SCRA 369, January 25, 1996, per Mendoza, J.
[17]
NLRC Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 63; records, p. 28.
[18]
C. Planas Commercial v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303
SCRA 49, February 11, 1999.
[19]
Barros v. National Labor Relations Commission, 315 SCRA 23, September
22, 1999.
[20]
Tan v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.
[21]
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 323 SCRA 86, January 24, 2000.