VOL.

438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 485

Villanueva vs. Domingo

*
G.R. No. 144274. September 20, 2004.

NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.

PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO and LEANDRO LUIS R.
DOMINGO, respondents.

Civil Law; Motor Vehicle Law; Damages; Negligence; The

registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible to the public and third persons while it is being
operated.—We have consistently ruled that the registered owner
of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the public
and third persons while it is being operated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether the driver is authorized or
not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of
the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the
operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.—Whether the
driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to
determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury
or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and
highways. To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by
the actual owner before the registered owner can be held
accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle
legislations are enacted in the first place.
Same; Same; Same; The main purpose of vehicle registration
is the easy identification of the owner who can be held responsible
for any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle.—The
main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of
the owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage
or injury caused by the vehicle. Easy identification prevents
inconvenience and prejudice to a third party injured by one who is
unknown or unidentified. To allow a registered owner to escape
liability by claiming that the driver was not authorized by the
new (actual) owner results in the public detriment the law seeks
to avoid.

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

486

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villanueva vs. Domingo

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Romero, Arreza & Magtanong Law Offices for
petitioner.
     De Jesus & Associates for respondents.

CORONA, J.:
1
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52203 affirming in turn the
decision of the trial court finding petitioner liable to
respondent for damages. The dispositive portion read:

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED

except the award of attorney’s fees including appearance fees
which is DELETED.2
“SO ORDERED.”

The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of

Appeals, are as follows:

[Respondent] Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner of a

silver Mitsubishi Lancer Car model 1980 bearing plate No. NDW
781 ’91 with [co-respondent] Leandro Luis R. Domingo as
authorized driver. [Petitioner] Nostradamus Villanueva was then
the registered “owner” of a green Mitsubishi Lancer bearing Plate
No. PHK 201 ’91.
On 22 October 1991 at about 9:45 in the evening, following a
green traffic light, [respondent] Priscilla Domingo’s silver Lancer
car with Plate No. NDW 781 ’91 then driven by [co-respondent]
Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middle lane of
South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south.
Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with plate No. PHK 201 ’91
driven by Renato Dela Cruz Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street
towards the South

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by

Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Eighth
Division.
2 Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, p. 30.

487

VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 487

Villanueva vs. Domingo

Superhighway directly into the path of NDW 781 ’91 thereby

hitting and bumping its left front portion. As a result of the
impact, NDW 781 ’91 hit two (2) parked vehicles at the roadside,
the second hitting another parked car in front of it.
Per Traffic Accident Report prepared by Traffic Investigator
Pfc. Patrocinio N. Acido, Renato dela Cruz Ocfemia was driving
with expired license and positive for alcoholic breath. Hence,
Manila Assistant City Prosecutor Oscar A. Pascua recommended
the filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting to (sic)
damage to property and physical injuries.
The original complaint was amended twice: first, impleading
Auto Palace Car Exchange as commercial agent and/or buyer-
seller and second, impleading Albert Jaucian as principal
defendant doing business under the name and style of Auto
Palace Car Exchange.
Except for Ocfemia, all the defendants filed separate answers
to the complaint. [Petitioner] Nostradamus Villanueva claimed
that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the
mishap because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert
Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. For her part, Linda Gonzales
declared that her presence at the scene of the accident was upon
the request of the actual owner of the Mitsubishi Lancer (PHK
201 ’91) [Albert Jaucian] for whom she had been working as
agent/seller. On the other hand, Auto Palace Car Exchange
represented by Albert Jaucian claimed that he was not the
registered owner of the car. Moreover, it could not be held
subsidiary liable as employer of Ocfemia because the latter was
off-duty as utility employee at the time of the incident. Neither
3
was Ocfemia performing a duty related to his employment.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner liable and

ordered him to pay respondent actual, moral and
exemplary damages plus appearance and attorney’s fees:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs,

ordering Nostradamus Villanueva to pay the amount of P99,580
as actual damages, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 plus appearance fees of P500.00 per hearing with legal
interest counted from the date of judgment. In conformity with
the law on equity and

_______________

3 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

488

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villanueva vs. Domingo

in accordance with the ruling in First Malayan Lending and

Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (supra), Albert Jaucian
is hereby ordered to indemnify Nostradamus Villanueva for
whatever amount the latter is hereby ordered to pay under the
judgment. 4
“SO ORDERED.”

The CA upheld the trial court’s decision but deleted the

award for appearance and attorney’s fees because the
justification for the grant was not stated in the body of the
decision. Thus, this petition for review which raises a
singular issue:

MAY THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE BE

HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM A
VEHICULAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIS MOTOR VEHICLE
WHILE BEING OPERATED BY THE EMPLOYEE OF ITS
BUYER WITHOUT
5
THE LATTER’S CONSENT AND
KNOWLEDGE?

Yes.
 We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of
any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to6 the
public and third persons while it is being operated. The
rationale behind such 7doctrine was explained way back in
1957 in Erezo vs. Jepte :

The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing

with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public
has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is
the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to
enforce the actions that they may have for injuries caused to them
by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public should be
required to prove who the actual owner is. How would the public
or third

_______________

4 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

5 Petition for Review, Rollo, p. 10.
6 St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos, 426 Phil. 878; 376 SCRA 473 (2002); BA
Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98275, 13 November 1992, 215
SCRA 715, 720, citing Erezo vs. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103 (1957).
7 102 Phil. 103 (1957).

489

VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 489

Villanueva vs. Domingo

persons know against whom to enforce their rights in case of

subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do not imply by his
doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover
whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third
persons from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned
or conveyed the vehicle.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for a public service, should primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.
The members of the Court are in agreement that the defendant-
appellant should be held liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries
occasioned to the latter because of the negligence of the driver, even
if the defendant-appellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle
at the time of the damage because he had previously sold it to
another. What is the legal basis for his (defendant-appellant’s)
liability?
There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is
the defendant-appellant as he is the registered owner in the
Motor Vehicles Office. Should he not be allowed to prove the
truth, that he had sold it to another and thus shift the
responsibility for the injury to the real and actual owner? The
defendant holds the affirmative of this proposition; the trial court
held the negative.
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended)
provides that no vehicle may be used or operated upon any public
highway unless the same is properly registered. It has been stated
that the system of licensing and the requirement that each
machine must carry a registration number, conspicuously
displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the danger of
injury to pedestrians and other travelers from the careless
management of automobiles. And to furnish a means of
ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and
ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines upon
the highways (2 R.C.L. 1176). Not only are vehicles to be
registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated
without being properly registered for the current year, but that
dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish thee Motor Vehicles Office
a report showing the name and address of each purchaser of
motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer’s
serial number and motor number. (Section 5[c], Act No. 3992, as
amended.)
Registration is required not to make said registration the
operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in
land

490

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villanueva vs. Domingo

registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of

registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of
sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39
Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon
any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so
that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or
with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that
the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages
or injuries caused on public highways:

One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is

identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and
another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always
available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of
the rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever purpose there
may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary
purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules
of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him. The
purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a
“share and delusion,” if courts would entertain such defenses as that put
forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation
could be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they
should be allowed to place a “middleman” between them and the public,
and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense servants.
(King vs. Brenham Automobile Co., Inc., 145 S.W. 278, 279.)

With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-

appellant poses is: should not the registered owner be allowed at
the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in
accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility by and
lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We hold
with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the
law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly
of the responsibility

491

VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 491

Villanueva vs. Domingo

that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or

consequence of registration. Were a registered owner allowed to
evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or
owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to
an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with
which to respond financially for the damage or injury done. A
victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without
means to discover or identify the person actually causing the
injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to
the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is
the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him
would become illusory were the registered owner given the
opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership. If the
policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the registered
owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice
of the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or
another has become the owner, so that he may thereby be relieved
of the responsibility to the injured person.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite
harsh and would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do
not think it is so. A registered owner who has already sold or
transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint,
in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage
or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.
The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him
of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to
comply with the registration that the law demands and requires.
In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-
appellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused
to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner of the amount that he may be required8 to pay as damage
for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant.

Petitioner insists that he is not liable for damages since the

driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident was not an
authorized driver of the new (actual) owner of the vehicle.
He claims that the ruling in First Malayan Leasing and
Finance

_______________

8 Ibid., at pp. 106-110.

492

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Villanueva vs. Domingo
9
 9
Corporation vs. CA implies that to hold the registered
owner liable for damages, the driver of the vehicle must
have been authorized, allowed and permitted by its actual
owner to operate and drive it. Thus, if the vehicle is driven
without the knowledge and consent of the actual owner,
then the registered owner cannot be held liable for
damages.
He further argues that10
this was the underlying theory
behind Duavit vs. CA wherein the court absolved the
registered owner from liability after finding that the
vehicle was virtually stolen from the owner’s garage by a
person who was neither authorized nor employed by the
owner. Petitioner concludes that the ruling in Duavit and
not the one in First Malayan should be applicable to him.
Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. Whether the driver is
authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to
determining the liability of the registered owner who the
law holds primarily and directly responsible for any
accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways. To require the driver
of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before
the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat
the very purpose why motor vehicle legislations are
enacted in the first place.
Furthermore, there is nothing in First Malayan which
even remotely suggests that the driver must be authorized
before the registered owner can be held accountable. In
First Malayan, the registered owner, First Malayan
Corporation, was held liable for damages arising from the
accident even if the vehicle involved was already owned by
another party:

This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the

actual owner is of a motor vehicle might be, the registered owner
is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third
persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the
consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator

_______________

9 G.R. No. 91378, 9 June 1992, 209 SCRA 660.

10 G.R. No. 82318, 18 May 1989, 173 SCRA 490.

493
 VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 493
Villanueva vs. Domingo

of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and

employer being considered merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-
Industrial Corporation vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10, citing
Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aquino, 105 Phil.
949).

‘We believe that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually
employed by the operator of record. It is even not necessary to prove who
the actual owner of the vehicle and the employer of the driver is.
Granting that, in this case, the father of the driver is the actual owner
and that he is the actual employer, following the well-settled principle
that the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in
contemplation of law, as regards the public and third person, and as such
is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, we must
hold and consider such owner-operator of record as the employer, in
contemplation of law, of the driver. And, to give effect to this policy of law
as enunciated in the above cited decisions of this Court, we must now
extend the same and consider the actual operator and employer as the
11

agent of the operator of record.’

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the First Malayan ruling

is applicable to him since the case involves the same set of
facts—the registered owner had previously sold the vehicle
to someone else and was being driven by an employee of
the new (actual) owner. Duavit is inapplicable since the
vehicle there was not transferred to another; the registered
and the actual owner was one and the same person.
Besides, in Duavit, the defense of the registered owner,
Gilberto Duavit, was that the vehicle was practically stolen
from his garage by Oscar Sabiano, as affirmed by the
latter:

Defendant Sabiano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that

he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the
consent and authority of the latter. He testified further that
Duavit even filed charges against him for the theft of the jeep but

_______________

11 Supra note 9 at p. 663.

494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Villanueva vs. Domingo

which Duavit did not push through 12

as his (Sabiano’s) parents
apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

As correctly pointed out by the CA, the Duavit ruling is not

applicable to petitioner’s case since the circumstance of
unauthorized use was not present. He in fact voluntarily
delivered his car to Albert Jaucian as part of the
downpayment for a vehicle he purchased from Jaucian.
Thus, he could not claim that the vehicle was stolen from
him since he voluntarily ceded possession thereof to
Jaucian. It was the latter, as the new (actual) owner, who
could have raised the defense of theft to prove that he was
not liable for the acts of his employee Ocfemia. Thus, there
is no reason to apply the Duavit ruling to this case.
The ruling in First Malayan13
has been reiterated in BA
Finance Corporation vs. CA and 14 more recently in Aguilar,
Sr. vs. Commercial Savings Bank. In BA Finance, we held
the registered owner liable even if, at the time of the
accident, the vehicle was leased by another party and was
driven by the lessee’s employee. In Aguilar, the registered
owner-bank answered for damages for the accident even if
the vehicle was being driven by the Vice-President of the
Bank in his private capacity and not as an officer of the
Bank, as claimed by the Bank. We find no reason to deviate
from these decisions.
The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy
identification of the owner who can be held responsible for
any accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. Easy
identification prevents inconvenience and prejudice to a
third party injured by one who is unknown or unidentified.
To allow a registered owner to escape liability by claiming
that the driver was not authorized by the new (actual)
owner results in the public detriment the law seeks to
avoid.

_______________

12 Supra note 10 at p. 493.

13 G.R. No. 98275, 13 November 1992, 215 SCRA 715.
14 412 Phil. 834; 360 SCRA 395 (2001).

495
 VOL. 438, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004 495
Quiambao vs. Desierto

Finally, the issue of whether or not the driver of the vehicle

during the accident was authorized is not at all relevant to
determining the liability of the registered owner. This must
be so if we are to comply with the rationale and principle
behind the registration requirement under the motor
vehicle law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
January 26, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

          Panganiban (Chairman) and Sandoval-Gutierrez,

JJ., concur.
     Carpio-Morales, J., On Leave.

Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.

Note.—Extraordinary diligence requires common

carriers to render service with the greatest skill and
foresight. (Tabacalera Insurance Co. vs. North Front
Shipping Services, Inc., 272 SCRA 527 [1997])

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