VOL.

388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 445

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

*
G.R. No. 143360.September 5, 2002.

EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO
and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents.

Civil Law; Negligence; Quasi-delict; Requisites to sustain a

claim for quasi delict.—To sustain a claim based on quasi delict,
the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Offended party cannot “recover damages
twice for the same act or omission” or under both causes.—These
two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed
of, subject to the ca-

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

446

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

veat that the offended party cannot “recover damages twice for
the same act or omission” or under both causes. Since these two
civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the
failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in
the other.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Motor Vehicle Law; Petitioner
held liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because
it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident
on July 17, 1994; Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the
registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and
third persons are concerned; In contemplation of law, the owner I
operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator
and employer being considered as merely its agent.—We hold
petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of,
because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of
the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consistently ruled
that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered
owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third
persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer
of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered
as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the
registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Santos, Pilapil & Associates for petitioner.
          Mercado, Lim & Associates Law Offices for private
respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a

motor vehicle is solidarity liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of
the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject
of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person.
Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the
sale—while valid and binding between the parties—does
not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents
involving the said transport equipment. Thus, in the

447

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 447

 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is

liable for the acts of the driver employed by its former
lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue
of an unregistered Deed of Sale.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 1 of the

Rules of Court, assailing
2
the May 12, 2000 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55474. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision, dated May 5,
1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil
Case No. 95-73522, is hereby AFFIRMED with3 MODIFICATION
that the award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.”

On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 14) had
earlier disposed in this wise:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendant Equitable Leasing
Corporation ordering said defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the
following:

A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO

1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Kernel Tamayo;

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents,
and funeral expenses.

B. TO FELIX OLEDAN

1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan;

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 21-31.

2 Third Division. Written by Justice B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and
concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. (Division chairman)
and Renato C. Dacudao (member).
3 Assailed Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 31.

448

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses.

C. TO MARISSA ENANO

1. P7,000.00 as actual damages

D. TO LUCITA SUYOM

1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two

sons.
4
     The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.”

The Facts

On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul

Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo
located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the
house was destroyed. Pinned to death under the engine of
the tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayo’s son, Reniel
Tamayo, and Respondent Felix Oledan’s daughter,
Felmarie Oledan. Injured were Respondent Oledan himself,
Respondent Marissa Enano, and two sons of Respondent
Lucita Suyom.
Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 5 296094-SA,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office,
respondents
6
were furnished a copy of Official Receipt No.7
62204139 and Certificate of Registration No. 08262797,
showing that the registered owner of the tractor was
“Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim.” On
April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor,
Ecatine Corporation (“Ecatine”) and Equitable

_______________

4 RTC Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 57; penned by Judge Inocencio D.

Maliaman.
5 See Annex “E”; Rollo, p. 38.
6 See Annex “C”; id., p. 35.
7 See Annex “C-1”; ibid.

449

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 449

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

8
Leasing Corporation (“Equitable”) a Complaint for
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522 in the RTC
of Manila, Branch 14.
The trial court, upon motion of plaintiffs’ counsel, issued
an Order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim
from the Complaint, because9
they could not be located and
served with summonses.
10
On the other hand, in its Answer
with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that the vehicle had
already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no
longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of
Equitable, but of Ecatine.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision
ordering petitioner to pay actual and moral damages and
attorney’s fees to respondents. It held that since the Deed
of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been
registered with the Land Transportation
11
Office (LTO), the
legal owner was still 12
Equitable. Thus, petitioner was
liable to respondents.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to

be legally deemed the owner/operator of the tractor, even if
that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor
of Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the CA
was that the Certificate of Registration on file with the
13
 13
LTO still remained in petitioner’s name. In order that a
transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle can 14
bind third
persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO.
The CA likewise upheld respondents’ claim for moral
damages against petitioner because the appellate court
considered Tutor,

_______________

8 Annex “F”; Rollo, p. 38.

9 Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 117.
10 Annex “G”; Rollo, p. 45; penned by Judge Lydia Querubin Layosa.
11 RTC Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 54.
12 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 11.
13 CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 27.
14 Id., pp. 9 & 29.

450

450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

the driver of the15 tractor, to be an agent of the registered

owner/ operator. 16
Hence, this Petition.

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues

for the Court’s consideration:

“Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely
erred when they decided and held that petitioner [was] liable for
damages suffered by private respondents in an action based on
quasi delict for the negligent acts of a driver who [was], not the
employee of the petitioner.

II

“Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court

gravely erred when they awarded moral damages to private
respondents despite their failure to prove that the17 injuries they
suffered were brought by petitioner’s wrongful act.”

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Liability for
Wrongful Acts

Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the

damages sustained by respondents and that arose from the
negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it
had already sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not
having employed Raul

_______________

15 Id., pp. 10 & 30.

16 The case was deemed submitted for decision on December 13, 2001,
upon the Court’s receipt of respondents’ Memorandum, which was signed
by Atty. Yolando F. Lira of Mercado Lira and Associates. Petitioner’s
Memorandum, filed on October 24, 2001, was signed by Atty. Sergio M.
Ceniza of Santos Pilapil and Associates.
17 Page 7; Rollo, p. 101. Original in upper case.

451

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 451

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

Tutor, the driver of18 the vehicle, it could not have controlled
or supervised him.
We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the
aggrieved 19 party may sue the negligent party under (1)
Article 100 of the Revised Penal20 Code, for civil liability ex
delicto; or (2) under Article
21
2176 of the Civil Code, for civil
liability ex quasi delicto.
Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies
committed by22 their employees in the discharge of the
latter’s duties. This liability attaches when the employees
who are convicted of crimes committed in the performance
of their work are found to be insolvent 23
and are thus unable
to satisfy the civil liability adjudged.
On the other
24
hand, under Article 2176 in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an action predicated on
quasi delict may

_______________

18 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 103.

19 This article provides:

“ART. 100. Civil Liability of a person guilty of felony.—Every person criminally

liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”

20 This article provides:

“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.”

21 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 329 SCRA 600, April 3,

2000; Casupanan and Capitulo v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26,
2002, 388 SCRA 28.
22 Ibid.
23 Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 333, October 5,
1989.
24 This article provides:

“ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x x x     x x x     x x x
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their as-

452

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

be instituted against the employer for an employee’s act or

omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the
defense of due25diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against
the employer for an action based on Article 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent, since the liability of
the former is solidary—the 26
latter being statutorily
considered a joint tortfeasor. To sustain a claim based on
quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence 27of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff.
These two causes of action (ex delicto 28or ex quasi delicto)
may be availed of, subject to the caveat that the offended
party cannot “recover damages twice 29
for the same act or
omission” or under both causes. Since these two civil
liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the
failure to recover in30 one will not necessarily preclude
recovery in the other.

_______________

signed tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
x x x     x x x     x x x”
25 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, supra.
26 Article 2194 Civil Code provides, “Art. 2194. The responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.”
27 FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 718,
March 23, 1998, citing Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191
SCRA 195, November 6, 1990.
28 This caveat is found in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code which states:

“ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.”

29 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, March 31, 1984; Mendoza
v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, June 29, 1979; Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607,
July 8, 1942.
30 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corpration v. People, supra.

453

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 453

 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

In the instant case, respondents—having failed to recover

anything in the criminal case—elected to file a separate
civil action for damages, 31 based on quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. The evidence is clear that the
deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents and their
kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso 32
tractor.
Dated June 4, 1991, the Lease Agreement between
petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that “it is the
intention of the 33parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE
AGREEMENT.” Under such scheme, ownership of the
subject tractor was to be registered in the name of
petitioner, until34the value of the vehicle has been fully35 paid
by Edwin Lim. Further, in the “Lease Schedule,” the
monthly rental for the tractor was stipulated, and the term
of the Lease was scheduled to expire on December 4, 1992.
After a few months, Lim completed
36
the payments to cover
the full price37 of the tractor. Thus, on December 9, 1992, a
Deed of Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in
favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the
Deed was not registered with the LTO.
We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries
complained of, because it was the registered owner of 38
the
tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The
Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made
of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily 39
responsible for the consequences of its operation. In
contempla-

_______________

31 Ibid.
32 Annex “B”; Rollo, p. 32.
33 Annex “B-1”; Rollo, p. 34.
34 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 8.
35 Annex “B-1”; Rollo, p. 34.
36 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 8.
37 Annex “D”; Rollo, p. 36.
38 Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705, June 29,
2001, 360 SCRA 395.
 39 MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10,
September 7, 1984, citing Vargas v. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174, September 29,
1962; Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506, July 11, 1956; Timbol v.

454

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

tion of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of

the driver, the actual operator 40
and employer being
considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies
even if the registered
41
owner of any vehicle does not use it
for public service.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the
tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths
42
and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the
one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has already been
superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third
persons. The rationale for 43
this rule has been aptly
explained in Erezo v. Jepte, which we quote hereunder:

“x x x. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify

the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running
on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to
forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the
public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained,
in the interest of the determination of persons 44
responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.”

Further, petitioner’s insistence 45on FGU Insurance Corp. v.

Court of Appeals is misplaced. First, in FGU Insurance,
the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent-
a-car business, rented out the car. In this case, the
registered owner of the truck, which is

_______________
 Osias, 96 Phil. 989, April 30, 1955; Montoya v. Ignacio, 94 Phil. 182,
December 29, 1953; Tamayo v. Aquino, et al., 105 Phil. 949, May 29, 1959.
40 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
209 SCRA 660, June 9, 1992.
41 BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, No-
vember 13, 1992.
42 Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, supra.
43 102 Phil. 103, September 30, 1957, per Labrador, J.
44 Id., p. 108, per Labrador, J.
45 Maloles II v. Philips, 324 SCRA 172, January 31, 2000.

455

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 455

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle

acquisitions, has actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which
in turn employed Tutor. Second, in FGU Insurance, the
registered owner of the vehicle was not held responsible for
the negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars,
because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable.
We held that no vinculum juris as employer46 and employee
existed between the owner and the driver. In this case,
the registered owner of the tractor is considered under the
law to be the employer of the driver, 47
while the actual
operator is deemed to be its agent. Thus, Equitable, the
registered owner of the tractor, is—for purposes of the law
on quasi delict—the employer of Raul Tutor, the driver of
the tractor. Ecatine, Tutor’s actual
48
employer, is deemed as
merely an agent of Equitable.
True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated
“5/31/91,” qualifies the name of the registered owner as
“EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION/Leased to
Edwin Lim.” But the lease agreement between Equitable
and Lim has been overtaken by the Deed of Sale on
December 9, 1992, between petitioner and Ecatine. While
this Deed does not affect respondents in this quasi delict
suit, it definitely binds petitioner because, unlike them, it
is a party to it.
We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or
Ecatine to register the sale with the LTO should not
prejudice respondents, who have the legal right to rely on
the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner is
liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the
driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its allegation that
Tutor was the employee of Ecatine. This will effectively
prevent respondents from recovering their losses on the
basis of the inaction or fault of petitioner in failing to
register the sale. The non-registration is the fault of
petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences
thereof.

_______________

46 Id., p. 722.
47 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
209 SCRA 660, June 9, 1992.
48 Ibid.

456

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

Second Issue:
Moral Damages

Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral

damages, because respondents failed to establish or show
the causal connection or relation between the factual basis
49
of their claim and their wrongful act or omission, if any.
Moral damages are 50not punitive in nature, but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation,
51
and similar injury unjustly caused a
person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages must nevertheless be somehow
proportional
52
to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. This is so because moral damages are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury
53
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
 Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case 54
falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2),
which provides for
55
the payment of moral damages in cases
of quasi delict. Having established the liability of 56
petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicle,
respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the

_______________

49 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 15; Rollo, p. 109.

50 Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713,
November 25, 1986.
51 Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 141, June
25, 1999.
52 Philtranco Services Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA
562, June 17, 1997.
53 Radio Communication v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899 February 28,
1990; San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 21 SCRA 292, September 29, 1967.
54 “Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

x x x      x x x      x x x.”

55 Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 426, July 26, 1996.
56 BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra.

457

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 457

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

57
factual basis for the award and its causal connection to
the acts 58of Raul Tutor, who is deemed as petitioner’s
employee. Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by
respondents were the 59 proximate result of petitioner’s
tortious act or omission.
Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount 60
of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence gives no ground for doubt that such discretion 61
was properly and judiciously exercised by the trial court.
The award is in fact consistent with the rule that moral
damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but
to alleviate the moral suffering undergone 62
by that party by
reason of the defendant’s culpable action.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Puno (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,

concur.
     Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

_______________

57 “ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.”
58 Philippine Veterans Bank v. NLRC, 317 SCRA 510, October 26, 1999.
59 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292, September 29,
1967; Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp v. Reyes, supra.
60 “ART. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be
adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is
left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each
case.”
61 Salao v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493, January 22, 1998.
62 Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, supra.

458

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Hugo vs. Court of Appeals

Note.—The basis, for holding an employer solidarity

responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals,
321 SCRA 584 [1999])

——o0o——
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