1. Yu v. Pacleb, G.R. 130316, 24 January 2007 (ART.

523 – DEFINITION)

Facts: Petitioners Yu instituted forcible entry to the Respondent Baltazar Pacleb.

Petitioners Yu alleged that they acquired the property from Javier. Javier on the other
hand, got the property from Rebecca Del Rosario who in turn got the property from
Respondent Baltazar Pacleb. Yu (All series of alleged sales were not registered) At the
time of turnover, a portion of the subject lot was being occupied by Ramon Pacleb,
son of Baltazar Pacleb, who were the tenants of Respondent Baltazar. Upon the return
of Baltazar from abroad, Baltazar entered the property by means of FISTS. Despite
repeated demands by Yu, Baltazar refused to vacate. Hence, the filing of forcible
entry. The lower courts ruled in favor of Yu. CA reversed and ruled in favor of
Baltazar. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether petitioner Yu acquired possession of the subject property.

Ruling: No. The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. To possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a
thing, with or without right. Possession always includes the idea of occupation and
it’s not necessary that the person in possession should himself be the occupant. The
occupancy can be held by another in his name. Two things: (1) there must be
occupancy, apprehension or taking; (2) the animus possidendi (intent to possess).

In an action for forcible entry, prior physical possession is required. Here, the
petitioners Yu failed to establish that they had prior physical possession. In fact, here,
it was held that the possession is held still by Baltazar Pacleb, his son as a caretaker
while he was in the US. The claim of turnover to petitioners Yu were only self-
serving. On the other hand, Respondent presented tax declarations and tax receipts,
and it is settled that payment of real estate taxes is one of the most persuasive and
positive indications of possession in the concept of owner. Hence, petitioners’
allegation failed.

Additional notes:-the title of the land in question remained in the name of

respondent Baltazar (As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession
of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership.)-Alleged document of
kasunduan (submitted by petitioners re: turnover): (1) petitioners acknowledged
Ramon as tenant of Baltazar; (2) as mere tenant, they had no authority to sign; (3) No
clear proof that Ramon was appointed as trustee therefore self-serving; (4) when doc
was executed, Ramon as caretaker was replaced by another son Oscar.

2. De Jesus v. CA (217 SCRA 307)

DOCTRINE: Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive period required for
acquisition of immovable property is ten years if the possession is in good faith, and
thirty years if in bad faith

FACTS:

The property in dispute is a parcel of residential land situated in Dampol 2nd,

Pulilan, Bulacan, bounded on the North by a Vereda: on the South, by the Provincial
Road; on the East, by Catalino Tayag (Tayao); on the West, by Macario de Leon,
containing an area of 2565 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration in the
name of Victoriano Felipe Private respondent executed a sworn statement declaring
herself the only heir of the deceased Victoriano Felipe and adjudicating to herself
the ownership of the land in question.

More than twelve years later, petitioners herein filed in the Court of First Instance,
an action for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of title to the
abovementioned piece of land covered by Tax Declaration, alleging among others:
"that their grandfather, Santiago de Jesus during his lifetime owned the residential
lot; that Santiago de Jesus died before the outbreak of World War II, leaving three
(3) sons, namely: Mariano, Exequiel, and Jose, all surnamed de Jesus; that Mariano
de Jesus died on September 3, 1956 leaving eight (8) surviving children, namely:
Edgardo, Remedios, Juanita, Juliano, Jose, Flordeliza, Reynaldo, and Ernesto, all
surnamed de Jesus and all of them plaintiffs; that Exequiel de Jesus died on April 3,
1948, survived by two (2) children — Priscilo and Corazon, both surnamed de Jesus,
also plaintiffs in this case; while Jose de Jesus died before the outbreak of World
War II without any issue.

CFI found for the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial
court in a decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has the right to the ownership and possession of the
residential lot.

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner has the right to the ownership and possession of the residential
lot. Private respondent's pretensions to acquisitive prescription may not succeed
even under Act No. 190, the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 41 thereof,
good faith and just title are not required for purposes of acquisitive prescription;
adverse possession in either character ripens into ownership after the lapse of ten
years. The just title required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo
verdadero y valido" — such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership
without the necessity of letting the prescriptive period elapse, but only "titulo
colorado" — or such title where, although there was a mode of transferring
ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner, and
incidentally, it may perhaps be mentioned that prescription running even after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, continued to be governed by
Section 41 of the Old Civil Code. Under the present Civil Code, the prescriptive
period required for acquisition of immovable property is ten years if the possession
is in good faith, and thirty years if in bad faith. Such open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious occupation of the disputed property for thirty years must be
conclusively established. Reckoned from the time she executed the affidavit of
adjudication in 1961, eleven years after the New Civil Code had taken effect, private
respondent's possession of the contested lot is far too short of the prescriptive
period of thirty years considering that her possession is in bad faith.

The filing of the petition for recovery of ownership and possession and quieting of
title by petitioners on April 27, 1973 was well below the acquisitive prescriptive
period for private respondent, which is thirty years under Article 1141 of the
present Civil Code. In this case, the statutory period of prescription is deemed to
have commenced when petitioners were made aware of a claim adverse to them,
that is, when the affidavit of adjudication was duly registered with the Registry of
Deeds which, at the earliest may be considered to be in 1974, when private
respondent was able to secure a tax declaration in her name.

ISSUE:
Who has the right to the ownership and possession of the residential lot subject
matter of the case, petitioners by virtue of hereditary succession, or private
respondent who claims ownership through purchase of the property by her
parents?

3. SMPSM v. BCDA

Petitioner: SAMAHAN NG MASANG PILIPINO SA MAKATI, INC. (SMPMI)

Respondent: BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (BCDA)

Short Facts: RA 7227 created the BCDA. Pursuant to this Act, portions of Metro
Manila military camps are to be utilized to generate capital for the BCDA. Among
these military camps is Fort Bonifacio. The members of SMPMI, are residents of Fort
Bonifacio. Petitioner maintains that its members have been occupying peacefully
and continuously these lots in Fort Bonifacio. It alleges that Fort Bonifacio is covered
by the TCT in the name of the United States of America, hence the Philippine
Government. It further alleges that BCDA, sent 30-day notices of eviction to its
members. It asserts the illegality of the imminent eviction, as the land which
petitioner's members are occupying is still owned by the USA and not by the
Philippine Government.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner SMPMI and BCDA has the right of possession over
the particular parcels of land which are subject of this petition.

HELD: BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. It is clear from the
records that BCDA has been granted a clear mandate by RA 7227, to take over and
administer Fort Bonifacio for its development and disposition to raise funds for
BCDA projects, among others, the conversion of Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions to alternative productive uses. It is basic that
ownership or dominion includes the right of possession. In traditional Roman law,
jus possidendi or the right to possess is fundamentally not only an attribute of
ownership but also a direct consequence of ownership. Thus, from BCDA's
ownership of the subject lots originates the rights of possession, use, and
disposition.

4.HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA and SPOUSES ABALOS

A person may be declared the owner of a property but he may not be entitled to possession.The
exercise of the rights of ownership is subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. Although
declared to be the lawful owner, such owner cannot automatically evict the physical possessor of
the land unless it has been determined that no rights of the possessor will be violated by such
eviction.

FACTS:

A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land
was originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years
to the Spouses David and Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner,
acting as caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of
Adriano the lot he owned was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited
was sold to the Spouses ABALOS, here. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos
although not completely (only ¾ of the lot). The lots in question were subsequently registered in
the name of the Spouses Abalos. The courts later declared them to be the undisputed owners
thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so filed cases against the spouses.
Currently Soriano is still in possession of the land claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a
tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof?

RULING

No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with
or without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary
incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include
possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is occupying the land
allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court says “allegedly” due to the fact that
there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication
Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final
judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects
the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The exercise
of the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the
rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from
dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by
the court to be unlawful.

5. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE V. CA

254 SCRA 368
FACTS:
Spouses Canuto and Solid Homes entered into a contract to sell. Solid Homes, Inc.
then mortgaged the property in favor of petitioner and upon his failure to pay the
loan, the property was foreclosed. Here now comes the spouses who filed a
complaint with the HLURB for failure of Solid to execute an absolute deed of sale.

ISSUE:
Whether spouses Oreta's unregistered rights are superior over State's registered
mortgage over the property

HELD:
State's registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that of respondents'
unregistered right. The unrecorded sale is preferred for the reason that if the
original owner (Solid Homes, Inc) had parted with the ownership of the thing sold,
he would no longer have the free disposal of it and would not be able to mortgage
it. Registration of the mortgage is not important since it is understood to be without
prejudice to the rights of third persons. An unregistered mortgage is of no moment
since it is understood to be without prejudice to the better right of third parties.

6. DBP V. CA (316 SCRA 650)

FACTS:
Spouses Piñedas are registered owners of a parcel of land in Capiz, which they
mortgaged to DBP to secure the loan of P20,000. Piñedas eventually defaulted,
prompting DBP to extra-judicially foreclose and take possession of such property.
The Ministry of Justice, then, opined through its Opinion No. 92 (’78) that lands to
which the subject property was included, may not be the object of foreclosure
proceedings. The Piñedas sought to redeem such property but was denied as the
land was allegedly tenanted. They then sought the cancellation of the title and
specific performance, stating that DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of
the property and caused the consolidation of its title in spite of the fact that the 5-
year redemption period expressly stated in the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale had not
yet lapsed and that their offer to redeem was within the redemption period.

ISSUE:
Whether the DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of the property

HELD:
NO. DBP’s act of consolidating its title and taking possession of the property after
the expiration of the redemption period was in accordance with Sec. 6 of Act No.
3135, which states that if no redemption of a foreclosed property is made within one
year, DBP is entitled as a matter of right to consolidate and to possess the property.
It was in consonance with Sec. 4 of the mortgage contract between DBP and the
Piñedas where they agreed the appointment of DBP as receiver to take charge and
to hold possession of the mortgaged property in case of foreclosure. In fact, without
DBP’s act of consolidating its title, the Piñedas would not be able to assert their right
to repurchase the property within 5 years, which would begin to run after the
expiration of the one-year period. Thus, its acts cannot be tainted with bad faith.
(nor did it impair Piñedas’ right to repurchase.)

It may also be argued that P.D. No. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed
the property. However, the legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was
questioned only after Opinion No. 92 (’78) was issued, which happened almost 2
months after DBP consolidated its title to the property. By law and jurisprudence, a
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may properly be the basis of
good faith.

Art. 526 of NCC states that “a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it.”
Moreover, Art. 527 of NCC provides “good faith is always presumed, and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof.” Thus, it
is incumbent on the Piñedas to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title, but
this they failed to do.
7. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. CA
185 SCRA 727
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San Miguel
Corporation who purchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals denying its application for registration of the said
land in view of its failure to show entitlement thereto.
The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that the
land in question is part of public domain and that petitioner being a private
corporation is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain. In
this case, petitioner claims that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of the land in question based on documentary evidence of
tax declarations and receipts, and testimonial evidence of vendor Silverio Perez.

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a

ruling that petitioner and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over
Lot 684.

HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land but
mere indicia of a claim of ownership. They only become strong evidence of
ownership of land acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession. Also, the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez as proof of actual
possession is weak and was not corroborated by other witnesses.

8. Equatorial Realty Dev’t, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc.

FACTS:
Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. leased its parcel of land with two-storey building to
Mayfair Theater, Inc. Carmelo informed Mayfair that they intend to sell the entire
property. Mayfair replied that they were interested to buy the entire property if the
price is reasonable. However, Carmelo sold the entire property to Equatorial.
Mayfair filed an action for specific performance and annulment of the sale because it
violated their exclusive option to purchase the property for 30 days as stipulated in
the lease contract. Carmelo contended that it informed Mayfair their desire to sell
the property and the option to purchase by Mayfair is null and void for lack of
consideration.

ISSUES:
Whether Equatorial is entitled to back rentals

RULING:
No. Equatorial is not entitled to back rentals.

The Supreme Court held that no right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo
to Equatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer. Rent is
a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of
accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the
perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should
belong to the owner of the property during that period. Ownership of the thing sold
is a real right which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him. And
there is said to be delivery if and when the thing sold “is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee. In the present case, it is clear that petitioner never took
actual control and possession of the property sold.

Also, it is to be emphasized that the fact that Mayfair paid rentals to Equatorial
during the litigation should not be interpreted to mean either actual delivery or ipso
facto recognition of Equatorial’s title. They were made merely to avoid imminent
eviction since there were already two ejectment suits against Mayfair.

Even assuming arguendo that there was valid delivery, Equatorial still is not
entitled to any benefits from the “rescinded” Deed of Absolute Sale because of its
bad faith. The contract of sale between Equatorial and Carmelo was knowingly
entered into in violation of the rights of and to the prejudice of Mayfair. Equatorial
even admitted that its lawyers had studied the contract of lease prior to the sale.
Equatorial’s knowledge of the stipulations therein should have cautioned it to look
further into the agreement to determine if it involved stipulations that would
prejudice its own interests.

9. MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging that
they are the owners of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639 which
was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis,
Bartolome Maglucot, Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas
and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to subdivide the lot into six
portions and was granted. Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d
paying rentals therefore. They likewise built houses on their corresponding leased
lots. However, in 1992, they stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the
subject lot. Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and that the
respondents are stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of
their agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.

HELD:
YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who
took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the
title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the
lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action
was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of
the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance
with the sketch plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents'
possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner thereof. One who
possess as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he
believes to be ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the subject lot in
the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was
commenced. Petition was granted.

10.Gabrito v. CA( 167 SCRA 771)

FACTS:
The spouses Respondent Roberto Tan and Benita Ching-Tan filed a complaint in the
Municipal Trial Court against defendants Maximo Gabrito, et al., alleging that they
are the possessors and legal owners of the property situated at No. 107 Gordon
Ave., New Kalalake, Olongapo City as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 4-2046.
The defendants are leasing portions of this parcel of land, each paying the
corresponding monthly rentals due thereon. The Tans found it fit for them to make
said lot a residential house for them instead. They furnished requests to Gabrito and
others stating their reasons and three months later they (Gabrito, et al.) were still
being stubborn in keeping with the operations of their commercial spaces. On
November 22, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the complainants.

Gabrito, et al., found the findings contrary and elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals, leading up to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. W/N an action for unlawful detainer is the proper action to oust petitioners from
their occupation of the land in dispute?
2. Who has a better right to possess the land which definitely falls under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court? Respondents Roberto Tan and Benita
Ching-Tan

HELD:
(1)In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
In such a case, prior physical possession is not required. Possession can also be
acquired, not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject
to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. Possession of land can be acquired upon the execution of the
deed of sale thereof by its vendor. Actual or physical occupation is not always
necessary. Although, there is still a dispute between the Bureau of Lands and the
courts, unlawful detainer is still applicable and is indeed the correct action.

(2)Defendants admitted that they entered the premises as lessees and had been
paying rentals for the use of the land to the private respondents' predecessor-in-
interest. When requested to vacate the premises, petitioners asked for an extension
of time which request was granted. However, petitioners failed to vacate the
premises and also stopped paying rentals. In view of said admissions, petitioners
had unquestionably recognized private respondents' prior right of possession over
the questioned property.

11. VDA DE BORROMEO V. POGOY

FACTS:
The intestate estate of Borromeo is the owner of a building, which was being rented
out to petitioner. On a relevant date, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner for
the payment of overdue rentals as well as to vacate the premises thereafter. The
petitioner failed to pay. With less than a year from the demand letter, private
respondent instituted action against petitioner for unlawful detainer. Private
respondent moves for the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction as she asserts
that conciliation proceedings should have first been instituted with the Lupon
Barangay.

ISSUES:
1. WON there was prescription -- NO
2. WON there was a need to go to the Lupon Barangay -- NO

HELD:
The Civil Code states that the period for filing actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the
premises. In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the
complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. There is at least
eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period.

Referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals" or a single human being as contrasted with a social group
or institution. It applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any
of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation
sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. Thus, the petition should still be dismissed.

Atty. Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo. The real party in interest is the intestate estate under
administration and thus, it does not fall within the “individual” description.

12.WILMON AUTO SUPPLY V. CA

208 SCRA 108

FACTS:
Wilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a
registered land owned in common by the Lacsons, Solinap, and Jarantilla. The leases
were embodied in deeds wherein one of the clauses provided for a reservation of
rights—the seller has the right to encumber or sell the property provided that the
transferee would respect the lease of Wilmon. On a relevant date, after the
expiration of the lease period, the premises were sold to Star Group Resources and
Development. The latter instituted an action for unlawful detainer against Wilmon.
Wilmon impugned Star’s right to eject them. It alleges that its right of preemption
has been violated, as well as their leasehold rights, and that it was denied the option
to extend the lease. These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed with
the RTC.

In the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should
proceed against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and
the RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case in the RTC didn't warrant
suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.

ISSUE:
Whether an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee grounded
on the expiration of the latter’s lease should be suspended by an action filed in the
RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled to a right of preemption
of the premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced?

RULING:
NO. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC based on
tenant’s claim that his right of preemption was violated. The underlying reasons for
the this were that the actions in the RTC did not involve physical or de facto
possession, and on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy
to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the
former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there
resolved.

It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases wherein ownership
(possession de jure) is the issue does not a bar or suspend ejectment cases (which
tackles possession de facto.)
The Court however stressed that when in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
“the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.”

13.SEMIRA V. CA
230 SCRA 577

FACTS:
Gutierrez was the owner of a parcel of land. This parcel was sold to Buenaventura.
He entered the premises based on the boundaries stated in the deed of sale. He then
bought two additional parcels of land. On a relevant date, he sold the first parcel to
his nephew who also entered the premises based on the boundaries stated in the
deed. The deed also stated the same boundaries and area of the lot, which was
larger in actuality. This nephew then sold the land to petitioner. The deed this time
reflected a different area, the actual area of the land. The land was found to be larger
than what was stated in the previous documents. Semira entered then the premises
based on the boundaries and began construction of a rice mill. Buenaventura then
filed an action for forcible entry against Semira, alleging that latter illegally
encroached on the other parcel of land previously bought by the former and that the
land that was supposed to be occupied by the latter was smaller than the land he
was actually occupying.

ISSUE:
Whether the issue of ownership can be decided for the sole purpose of resolving
priority of possession.

HELD:
YES. In the case at bar, the issue of possession cannot be decided independently of
the question of ownership. Private respondent claimed constructive possession of
the parcel of land he alleged to be encroached by Semira. Likewise, Semira based his
occupancy of the land by virtue of the Ramirez’s sale of the land to him. The
question of prior possession may only be resolved in answering the question of who
is the real owner of the disputed portion. Where land is sold for a lump sum and not
so much per unit of measure, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract
determines the effects and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. The vendor is thus
obligated to deliver the land included within the boundaries regardless of whether
the land is greater or lesser than the area stipulated in the sale.

14.JAVIER V. VERIDIANO
237 SCRA 565

FACTS:
Javier filed a miscellaneous sales application over a parcel of land. Thereafter, she
instituted an action for forcible entry against Ben Babol, alleging that she was
forcibly dispossessed of the parcel of land. Her complaint was dismissed, followed
the finding of the Bureau of Lands that the disputed portion of land is outside the
lot owned by Javier. Later, the sales application has been granted. Babol had already
sold the land to somebody else. Petitioner demanded the return of the land to her
and after 4 years since the dismissal of her earlier complaint, she files an action for
quieting of title and recovery of possession against Babol and Rosete. The latter
moved for the dismissal of the case based on res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether the action of the Petitioner is barred by res judicata

HELD:
For res judicata to arise, four requisites must concur: Final judgment, Court with
competent jurisdiction, judgment based on merits, identity of parties and cause of
action. The Court said that in the two cases, there were identities of parties because
Respondent, having acquired the contested land by sale and tradition, is a successor
in interest.

A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than

possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has right or title of
ownership.

15.LIM KICH TONG V. CA

195 SCRA 398

FACTS:
Lim and his family originally occupied a room for residential purposes. After they
transferred residence, they utilized the room for the storage of some important
belongings. The building had a common main door through which the occupants of
the various rooms therein can get in and out therefrom. Each occupant was given a
duplicate key to such doorlock. On a relevant date, when Lim needed to get his law
books, his key couldn't open the door. He then needed to incur expenses in buying
new law books because of the incident. When he was able to contact the officer-
incharge, the latter refused to issue to him a new key.

ISSUE:
Whether the action is one for specific performance or forcible entry and detainer.

HELD:
The suit is actually one for forcible entry and detainer. Respondent remained in
possession of the property but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by
depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the door of the building
and the room. Any person deprived of possession of any land or building may file
an action for forcible entry and detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or
withholding possession from him. This relief is not only available to landlord, lessor
but to lessee and tenant as well within one year from such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession.

16.PENAS V. CA
233 SCRA 744

FACTS:
Penas leased the disputed property in favor of Calaycay. An extrajudicial settlement
was executed by the heirs of Penas after his death. As time went on, the lease
continued with increased rentals. On a relevant date, a letter was sent to Calaycay
from petitioner Penas, relaying the intent to terminate the lease contract and the
offer of drafting a new lease contract with a higher rental fee. Calaycay failed to
abide with the demands. He continued though to occupy the premises and
deposited rentals to the bank in trust of petitioner Penas. Another letter was sent but
to no avail. This prompted the petitioner to file an action for unlawful detainer. The
complaint was dismissed in the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unlawful detainer case was proper. -- YES

HELD:
Yes, the unlawful detainer case was proper. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
petitioners and ordered respondent to vacate the leased premises and pay back
rentals at the increased rate. The settled rule is that when a lessee is given an option
to vacate the premises or sign a new lease contract with increased rental, his choice
to continuously stay means a new contract is made and he should pay the increased
rental. In this case, respondent deposited an amount based on the old rental. Thus
he defaulted in the payment. The demand to vacate sent in August 1992 was proper
since there was a breach of the contract on the part of the lessee. The case was filed
in September 1992, and so it was properly filed within one year from the last letter
of demand.

A complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should it be counted from the last
demand letter to vacate; the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his
right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises.

17.FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION V. CA

252 SCRA 127

FACTS:
Petitioner executed a contract to sell in favor of Sycip. It was stipulated that in case
of failure to pay 2 or more installment payments, the whole obligation shall be due
and demandable and the seller has the right to rescind the contract. The buyer
would also have to vacate the premises without need of any court action. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a case for unlawful detainer for the alleged failure of Sycip to pay
monthly amortizations. Demand letters of petitioner against Sycip were to no avail
as the latter refused to vacate. Sycip alleged that it had to stop paying monthly
amortizations or rentals as the petitioner failed to develop the subdivision project,
part of their stipulation. The complaint was ultimately dismissed, the court then
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction to award the damages after it has decided that it
has no jurisdiction of the case

RULING:
No, MTC does have jurisdiction to award damages. Petitioner’s complaint is for
unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment
requires a consideration of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real
property. Indeed private respondent claims that he has a right under P.D. No. 957,
to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or
developer of his decision to do so because of petitioner’s alleged failure to develop
the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and
within the time for complying with the same. The case thus involves a
determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under
P.D. No. 957. Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for
unsound real estate business practice with the HLURB.This is, therefore, not a
simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the
rents, comply with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the premises after
the expiration of the lease. Since the determinative question is exclusively
cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the right of petitioner must be
determined by the agency.

Where a complaint for unlawful detainer arises from the failure of the buyer on
installment basis of real property to pay based on a right to stop paying monthly
amortizations based on PD957, the determinative question is exclusively cognizable
by the HLURB

18.AZARCON V. EUSEBIO
105 PHIL 569

FACTS:

Eusebio filed for a lease application over a parcel of land, Azarcon occupied a
portion thereof under a homestead application. This caused a dispute between the
two. While their dispute was pending, Eusebio filed a case against Eusebio alleging
that he acquired the parcel of land by lease from the Director of Lands and that
Azarcon had been occupying a portion thereof. He prayed for Azarcon to vacate the
premises. Azarcon on the other hand, alleged that he had been occupying the land
by virtue of a homestead application prior to the lease application of Eusebio, with
interruptions during the war and until the time of filing of the action. The trial court
ruled in favor of Eusebio and while pending appeal, a writ of execution was issued
ordering Azarcon to leave the premises without expressly ordering Azarcon to
desist from gathering pending fruits. Azarcon moved for the setting aside of the
order and posted bond as he was required by the court. The court eventually set
aside the order but reinstated it under the wrong premise that Azarcon failed to
post the required bond. Despite the reinstatement of the order, Azarcon continued
to gather the pending fruits on the land.

ISSUE:
Whether Aznar acted in bad faith when he entered the land to gather palay despite
receipt of the notice of the writ of execution. -- NO

HELD:

Evidence showed that despite the writ of execution ordering Azarcon to remove
from the premises and let Eusebio to have restitution of the same, Azarcon
continued to enter the premises and gather the palay, which was then pending
harvest. It is found out that the palay had been planted and cultivated by Azarcon
who had been in possession of the land. The court didn't prohibit Azarcon in its
order from gathering the crops then existing thereon. Under the law, a person who
is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products
thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest. As the order
didn't expressly prohibited Azarcon to gather pending fruits, there has been no
violation of the court’s order. This is even bolstered by the fact that the writ of
execution has been set aside and Azarcon posted the required bond as required by
the court. If the order was then reinstated it was because of the wrong premise that
the bond wasn't posted by Azarcon as required.

19.CALAGAN V. CFI OF DAVAO

95 SCRA 498

FACTS:

Calagan and his wife Takura was granted a homestead application over a parcel of
land. Takura died and was survived by her husband and their children. On a
relevant date, Calagan sold a portion of the homestead to Sandoval. She was given
the title so that the sale could be annotated. Thereafter, Calagan offered to
repurchase the land but Sandoval didn't agreed. She continuously refused and was
only willing to comply if Calagan would reimburse the value of the house
constructed on the parcel of land. This prompted petitioners to file an action for
reconveyance, on which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that they pay for
the value of the house built on good faith by Sandoval.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be ordered to reimburse the value of the house built in
good faith on the land they seek to repurchase. -- NO

HELD: (ART 457)

Since petitioners didn't exercise the option to refund the amount of the expenses
incurred by private respondent for the house that the latter has built, and not to pay
the increase in value acquired by the land by reason of such expenses. Sandoval
may remove her house since this can be done without damage. Petitioners should
not be made to refund the value of the house since this would thwart the policy laid
down.

20.121 CRUZ V. PAHATI

98 PHIL 788

FACTS:

The car in dispute was originally owned by Northern Motors and was subsequently
purchased by a Chinaman. This Chinaman then sold it to Belizo, who in turn sold
the same to Cruz. Belizo was a second-hand car dealer. He offered to Cruz that he
would sell the car to a prospective buyer and since the car registration was missing,
Cruz issued an authorization letter to Belizo to obtain another certificate, at the
insinuation of the latter. The car was also turned over to Belizo. The letter was then
falsified by Belizo and converted into an absolute deed of sale. Because of this, he
was able to secure a car registration in his name and was later able to sell the car to
Balahan who then sold the car to Pahati. This prompted Cruz tofile an action for
replevin.
ISSUE:
Who has, therefore, a better right of the two over the car?-- CRUZ

HELD: 559
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the
same from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale in which case the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. This is
supplemented by the provision stating that where goods are sold by a person who is
not the owner thereof, and who doesn't sell them under authority or with the
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller’s authority to sell.

Cruz has a better right to the car in question than Bulahan or Pahati. He has the
right to recover the car as he was unlawfully deprived of it due to the ingenious
scheme employed by Belizo. This is the case even if Bulahan or Pahati acted in good
faith.

21.AZNAR V.YAPDIANGCO
13 SCRA 486

FACTS:
Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500.
After the advertisement, a certain de Dios, claiming to be the nephew of Marella,
went to the residence of Santos and expressing his uncle’s intent to purchase the car.
Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo who talked with de Dios. On being
informed, Santos advised his son to see Marella, which the son did. Marella
expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed of sale was prepared and Irineo
was instructed by his father not to part with the deed and the car without receiving
the purchase price from Marella. When irineo and de Dios arrived at the residence
of Marella, the latter averred that his money was short and had to borrow from his
sister. He then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the supposed house of the sister
to obtain the money with an unidentified person. He also asked Irineo to leave the
deed to have his lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella, Irineo did as
requested. Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to be sister, de Dios
and the unidentified person then disappeared together with the car. This prompted
Santos to report the incident to the authorities. Thereafter, Marella was able to sell
the land to Aznar. And while in possession of the car, police authorities confiscated
the same. This prompted Aznar to file an action for replevin.

ISSUE: Between Teodoro Santos and Jose Aznar, who has a better right to the
possession of the car?

Held: Teodoro Santos. Aznar accepts that the car in question originally belonged to
and was owned by Santos, and that the latter was unlawfully deprived of the same
by Vicente Marella. However, he contends that upon the facts of the case, the
applicable provision was Art. 1506, and not Art. 559. The SC held that this was
unmeritorious, since it is required that in 1506, the seller should have a voidable at
least – in this case, the seller had no title at all. The car in question was never
delivered to the vendee by the vendor as to complete or consummate the transfer of
ownership by virtue of contract. Marella obtained the car through theft. Common
law principle also states that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a
fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, does not apply in a
case where it is covered by an express provision of the NCC. Between common law
principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail.

22.DE GARCIA V. CA
37 SCRA 160

FACTS:
Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring with white gold mounting,
solitaire 2-karat diamond as well as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a
relevant date, while she was talking to Garcia, an owner of a restaurant, she
recognized the ring on the latter’s finger and asked how she acquired the same.
Garcia averred that she bought it from her comadre. Guevarra made Garcia know
that the ring was stolen from her place days before. It was ascertained the ring was
indeed Guevarra’s but despite written demands, Garcia refused to return the ring.

ISSUES:
Whether Guevarra has been unlawfully deprived of her ring and is entitled to the
remedy provided for by Art. 559

RULING
Yes. Art. 559: "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its
return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was
entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in
possession of the same. The only exception the law allows is when there is
acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price. The common law principle
that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the
another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced confidence,
has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered
by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a
common law principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this
jurisdiction."

23.DIZON V. SUNTAY
47 SCRA 160

FACTS:
Suntay was the owner of a diamond ring. On a relevant date, she and Sison entered
into a transaction wherein Sison would sell the diamond ring on a commission
basis. Both parties knew each other for a long time and that there was already a
prior transaction between the two wherein Sison sold on commission another piece
of jewelry owned by Suntay. As days passed with no return of Sison, Suntay made
demands. The ring could not be returned since it was pledged to Dizon’s pawnshop,
without the consent of Suntay. Suntay insisted on the return of her ring and Sison
then gave her the pawnshop ticket. Upon knowledge of the pledge, she filed a case
of estafa against Sison as well as sent a written demand to Dizon for the return of
the ring. Dizon refused to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Suntay had the right to the possession of the ring. -- YES

HELD: 559
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the
same from the person in possession of the same and the only defense the latter may
have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public sale in which case the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. Suntay who
was unlawfully deprived of the ring was entitled to recover it from Dizon who was
found in possession of the same. In the present case, not only has the ownership and
the origin of the ring misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that
Sison has fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of and pledged them contrary to
agreement, with no ownership, and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was thereby
illegally deprived of said jewels. The owner has the right to recover. He is not
estopped when his property has been unlawfully pledged by another.

24.EDCA PUBLISHING AND DISTRIBUTING CORP. V. SANTOS

184 SCRA 614

FACTS:
On a relevant date, one person who identified himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed
an order through telephone with Edca Publishing. He ordered 400+ books and
issued a personal check as payment. Then he sold some of the books to Santos who,
after verifying the seller’s ownership from the invoice shown, paid Cruz.
Meanwhile, Edca being suspicious over the second order placed by Cruz verified
with De La Salle College where he had claimed to be dean and was informed that no
such person was under its employ. It was also found out that there was no account
with the bank against which he had drawn his check. It was later found out that his
real name was Tomas de la Pena. Edca reported this to the police and through an
entrapment, de la Pena was captured. On the same date, Edca sought the assistance
of the police in recovery of the books bought from it. They forced their way inside
Santos’ store and seized the books without any warrant.

Issue:
Whether respondents were unlawfully deprived of their property
Ruling:
NO, there was no unlawful deprivation. EDCA was negligent in issuing the invoice
to the impostor without first verifying his identity and without first waiting for the
check to be cleared.

First, the contention of petitioner that Santos has not established ownership over the
disputed books because they have not even shown the receipt evidencing the
purchase is without merit. The possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to title.

Second, Santos acquired the books in good faith as found by the lower courts. She
first ascertained the ownership and relied on the invoice shown to her by de la Pena.
Santos was in the business of buying and selling books and often deals with hard-up
sellers who urgently have to part with their books at reduced prices.

Third, and on the real issue, on whether Edca had been unlawfully deprived of the
books, Edca argued that the impostor acquired no title to the books because of the
lack of funds in the check issued and want of consideration. This is without merit.
Nonpayment of purchase price only gives rise to the right to demand payment or
rescission of the contract.

Actual delivery was made to the impostor and thus, ownership was acquired by
him. Non-payment was a matter privy to him and Edca and doesn't involve Santos
who later acquired the books.
25.LEDESMA V. CA
213 SCRA 195

FACTS:

Two motor vehicles—Honda Gemini and Holden Premiere Model—were purchased

from Citiwide Motors by a person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. He
bought the vehicles purportedly for his father. Upon delivery to him of the vehicles,
he paid a manager’s check drawn against PCIB. The check though was dishonored
by the bank on the ground that the check’s value has been materially altered. This
was reported to the police authorities and it was found out that the person
misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez who had a long line of criminal cases
against him for his modus operandi. The Holden car was recovered after being
abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was
discovered to be sold to Ledesma. Ledesma averred he purchased the vehicle in
good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced by his certificate of registration. Citiwide
Motors was able to recover.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondent (the company) was unlawfully deprived of
the vehicle in the first place so as to make Article 559 apply. -- NO

HELD:
There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide Motors and
Suarez. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of
consideration which doesn't render a contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the sale. This being
the case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of the property. It is thus not
entitled to the return of the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good
faith and for consideration.

26.CHUA KAI V. KAPUNAN

104 PHIL 110

FACTS:
Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware 700 galvanized iron sheets and round
iron bars. He issued as payment a check drawn against Security Bank. Soto then
sold the sheets, some of them to Chua Hai. Meanwhile, the check issued for
payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. This prompted the
hardware store to file a case of estafa against Soto and prayed for the return of the
sheets. This was opposed by Chua on the part of the sheets he purchased.
Notwithstanding this opposition, the court ordered for its return.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner Chua has better right of the possession --YES

HELD:

To deprive Chua, who was in good faith, of the possession of the sheets, may it be
temporarily or permanently, is in violation of the rule laid down in Article 559.
Possession of chattels in good faith is equivalent to title, until ordered by the proper
court to restore the thing to the owner who was illegally deprived thereof. Until
such decree is issued, the possessor as presumptive owner is entitled to the
enjoyment and holding of the thing. Further, the hardware store or Ong was not
unlawfully deprived of the sheets. There was a perfected contract of sale between it
and Soto. There was delivery, by virtue of which, Soto was able to acquire title over
the sheets and bars. The failure of the buyer to pay the purchase price doesn't
automatically revest ownership to the seller until the contract of sale has been first
rescinded or resolved. Hence, until the contract between Soto and Ong has been set
aside by the competent court, the validity of Chua’s possession cannot be disputed
and his right to possession thereof should be respected.