PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57

 
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” carrying Four
(4) wrapped packages. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she
could examine and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.
 
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and
reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination. The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
 
The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and seized objects contained
in the four (4) parcels.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
 
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

SIMON JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Facts:

 A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor,
was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate
the questioned premises of North EDSA to give way to the construction of the"People's Park".
 On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to
stop the demolition of the private respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. CHR
issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
 Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist. Respondents consequently asked that petitioner’s be
cited in contempt.
 Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They alleged that the Commission
has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents’ privilege to engage in business, not their civil and
political rights.
 In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of
them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it
was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines "
 Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon Jr. et al filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin
the CHR from hearing private respondents’ complaint.

Issue/s:

WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by respondents.
WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents’ complaint.

Held:

No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.

No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.

Rationale:
 Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa observed that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have

CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.

 The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country,
or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.
Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment
or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general,
the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
 Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
 In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances
obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary

 
Cariño vs Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681 case brief summary
December 2, 1991

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assembly. Secretary of Education issued a return to work in
24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum directing the DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply. After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were
administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private respondents moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually
decided ordering the dismissal of Esber and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed.
Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied.
Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human Rights alleging they were denied due process
and dismissed without due notice. The Commission issued an order to Cariño to appear and enlighten the commission so
that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter.
Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to try
and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.

Issue: Does the Commission on have jurisdiction to adjudicate, try and hear the issue?

Ruling: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power. The most that may be conceded to
the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The Constitution clearly
and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights.  It does not however grant it the power to resolve issues. The Commission on Human Rights, having
merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" of the matters involved. These are
matters within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education and within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and lastly, the Supreme Court.
The petition is granted and respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are
prohibited "to hear and resolve the case on the merits."

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189220, December 07, 2016

ALBERT WILSON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,

SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALBERTO ROMULO, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL
GONZALES, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, BOARD OF CLAIMS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOLICITOR GENERAL AGNES DEVANADERA, AND BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Mandamus1 filed by Albert Wilson (Wilson) to enforce the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (the Committee) Communication No. 868/19992 (View) against the
Republic of the Philippines (RP). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Antecedent Facts

The present case has its roots in the incarceration and subsequent acquittal of Wilson for the crime of
rape which was the subject of the Court's ruling in GR. No. 135915 entitled People of the Philippines
v. Wilson.3

Proceedings in G.R. No. 135915

On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged with the crime of
consummated rape4 by a 12-year-old girl, the daughter of his Filipina live-in partner. The girl was
assisted by her biological father in filing the criminal complaint. Immediately thereafter, Wilson was
taken into custody.

After trial, Wilson was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, in its Decision dated September 30, 1998
and was imposed the death penalty pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 76595 and
ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.6 The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court for automatic review.

Pending appeal, or on June 15, 1999, Wilson filed with the Committee, pursuant to Article 5,
paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, a case7against the RP for violations of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifically: Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3;8 Articles
6;9 7;10 9;11 10, paragraphs 1 and 2;12 and Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and 6.13

In the Decision14 dated December 21, 1999, the Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. It found that
there were serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements particularly in the testimony given by
the victim. It concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by Wilson. The Court, thus, acquitted Wilson stating:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The accused is hereby
acquitted of the charge of consummated rape. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
effect his immediate release from custody unless he is being held in custody for some other legal
cause.

SO ORDERED.15 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Present Case

Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal. He immediately left the Philippines
for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon his return in the UK, Wilson sought compensation from the Board
of Claims (BOC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to R.A. No. 730916 through counsel as
one who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released by virtue of an acquittal.

On January 1, 2001, the BoC-DOJ awarded to Wilson P14,000.00 as compensation. On February 21,
2001, Wilson was informed of the BoC-DOJ award and that he had to claim the compensation in
person in the Philippines. Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that under R.A. No. 7309, he was
entitled to P40,000.00.17

On April 23, 2001, the BoC-DOJ informed Wilson that a memorandum was issued directing the BOC
to raise the award to the maximum amount that may be paid to those unjustly imprisoned or
detained subject to the availability of funds.18

Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa to travel to the Philippines due to his presence in the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) watch list.19 According to the BI, Wilson's presence in the watch list could
be attributed to his overstaying and his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.20

The BoC-DOJ, thereafter, issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated August 24, 2001 granting Wilson an
additional award of P26,000.00 in addition to the initial amount of P14,000.00 bringing the total
award to P40,000.00.21

In September 2001, the DOJ issued a check amounting to P26,000.00 representing the additional
award. The check was made out to Wilson, care of the Ambassador of UK at the request of the
former.22

On November 11, 2003, the Committee issued the View. It found that the allegations falling under
Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the ICCPR were inadmissible.23 The Committee stated:
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9. In accordance with article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of the [ICCPR], the State party is under an
obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. In respect of the violations of article
9 the State party should compensate the author. As to the violations of articles 7 and
10 suffered while in detention, including subsequent to sentence of death, the Committee
observes that the compensation provided by the State party under its domestic law was not
directed at these violations, and that compensation due to the author should take due
account both of the seriousness of the violations and the damage to the author caused. In
this context, the Committee recalls the duty upon the State party to undertake a
comprehensive and impartial investigation of the issues raised in the course of the
author's detention, and to draw the appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences for
the individuals found responsible. As to the imposition of immigration fees and visa exclusion,
the Committee takes the view that in order to remedy the violations of the Covenant the State party
should refund to the author the moneys claimed from him. All monetary compensation thus due to
the author by the State party should be made available for payment to the author at the venue of his
choice, be it within the State party's territory or abroad. The State party is also under an obligation
to avoid similar violations in the future.24 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In a letter25  dated June 19, 2008, Wilson, through his counsel, asked the Executive Secretary [ES]:
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cralawred

As with internationally wrongful acts, a breach of a State obligation gives rise first to a duty of
reparation. The Committee found that the breach of Covenant obligations required that the
Philippines provide compensation or redress. In accordance with the decision of the Committee, we
thus pray that this Honorable Office:

1. take steps to effect payment of compensation to Mr. Wilson, taking into consideration
the seriousness of the breach of his human rights;chanrobleslaw

2. direct the [BOC] to release the sums awarded to Mr. Wilson to his authorized
representatives, the undersigned counsel Roque and Butuyan Law Office.
3. direct the [BI] to refund the amount unjustly imposed upon Mr. Wilson for overstaying
his tourist visa, such be indirectly attributable to the wrongful decision of the trial
court.26

In his letter27 dated October 20, 2008, Wilson reiterated his June 19, 2008 letter and asked that the
payment of compensation be effected, a comprehensive and impartial investigation be conducted,
and the monies paid by Wilson with respect to immigration fees and visa exclusion be refunded.28

On October 29, 2008, the letter was referred by the ES to the DOJ Secretary for appropriate action.29

On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus.30 He insists his entitlement
to the writ of mandamus owing to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol. He argues that by virtue of
the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach of an international obligation since any View
issued by the Committee constitutes part of international law and that the RP is obligated to enforce
the same. He prays that:
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1. Respondents take steps to ensure that Albert Wilson is paid and given reparation in the
amount sufficient to compensate him for the torture and abuse he suffered under the
penal system of the Philippines, in compliance with Philippine treaty obligations in the
ICCPR as embodied in the Communication of the Human Rights Committee in Case no.
868/1999 in keeping with international law on reparations.

2. Respondents undertake continual efforts and steps to ensure that no torture and
inhuman and degrading treatment are suffered by prisoners in the National Penitentiary
and other places of detention and imprisonment in the Philippines, in the manner laid
down in the Manila Bay case.31

The RP, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opines that the petition is without merit. It
argues that Wilson was not able to prove that there is any national law giving life to the ICCPR and
Optional Protocol in order for it to have force and effect in our jurisdiction as required under Article
2(2) of the ICCPR.32 It further avers that the findings of the Committee are merely recommendatory
and does not give rise to an obligation to enforce and implement the View. Thus, being
recommendatory, the View cannot be used to compel the Philippine Government to compensate
Wilson.33 In any event, Wilson's documents show that BoC-DOJ had already awarded in his favor
P40,000.00 pursuant to R.A. No. 7309 and it was of Wilson's own volition that the amount remains
unclaimed.34 It disagrees that the case of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, et al.35 is applicable because unlike the Manila Bay case, the
petitioner, in this case, seeks to enforce international law and not domestic law.36 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Issue

Simply, the issue before this Court ts whether mandamus lies to compel the enforcement of the
View. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

The petition is without merit.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a writ issued to compel a tribunal to
perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, to wit:
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Section 3. Petition for mandamus. - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the
court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis ours) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy, etc., et al.,37 and several times reiterated thereafter, the Court held
that a purely ministerial duty must exist and a clear legal right must be established by the petitioner
for mandamus to lie, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Two pertinent principles arc well settled in this jurisdiction: (a) one is that mandamus would lie only
to compel a tribunal, board or officer to comply with a purely ministerial duty, or to allow a party to
exercise a right or to occupy and enjoy the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; (b)
the others is that for the writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a clear legal right to
the relief sought, and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in relation thereto.38 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It behooves the Court to examine whether the View dated November 11, 2003 relied upon by Wilson
confers upon him any legal right which the respondents are ministerially required to perform but
have unlawfully neglected.

No Ministerial Duty

It is well-settled that a ministerial duty must be clear and specific as to leave no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance.39 As stated in Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Hon. Speaker
Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., Secretary General Marilyn B. Barua-Yap and Regina Ongsiako Reyes:40
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.41 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

R.A. No. 7309 was passed on March 30, 1992 creating a BoC-DOJ to evaluate and investigate claims
for compensation for persons who were: (1) unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but released
by virtue of an acquittal; (2) unjustly detained and released without being charged; (3) a victim of
arbitrary or illegal detention and released without being charged; and (4) victim of a violent
crime.42 Under R.A. No. 7309, compensation for victims of unjust imprisonment or detention will be
based on the number of months of imprisonment. Compensation for each month of imprisonment
shall not exceed P1,000.00.43

It is clear, however, that Wilson has been granted compensation under R.A. No. 7309. In fact, the
BoC-DOJ granted to Wilson the maximum allowed compensation under that law. It was Wilson's
decision not to collect the money granted to him.

Other than the R.A. No. 7309, under which Wilson had already been granted compensation, there is
no other law or regulation that forms the basis of such ministerial right that the government is
impelled to grant. Wilson does not present any law by which his ministerial right arises from with
respect to additional compensation. It is not within this Court's discretion to adjust any monetary
grant arbitrarily.

There is No Clear and Complete Legal Right

On December 19, 1966, the RP became party to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol.44 The ICCPR
recognized the "inherent dignity of the human person" and its concomitant rights. At the same time,
the Philippines made a declaration that:
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The Philippine Government, in accordance with article 41 of the said Covenant, recognizes the
competence of the Human Rights Committee set up in the aforesaid Covenant, to receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.45 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Pursuant to Article 41 of the ICCPR, the Committee was organized. Signatories recognized the
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State
Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR.46 In addition,
under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, the State parties agreed to recognize the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals who claim to be victims of a
violation by that State Party of any rights set forth in the ICCPR. The Philippine Congress ratified the
ICCPR on October 23, 1986 and the Optional Protocol on August 22, 1989.

As the OSG points out, the Court in the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Health Sec. Duque III47 stated that a treaty is transformed into domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism. The Court explained:
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Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section
21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of. all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.48 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours) ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In sum, there must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty applicable in our jurisdiction. To
be sure, what was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, nowhere in the instrument does
it say that the View of the Committee forms part of the treaty. Even the Committee in its General
Comment No. 33 stated that:
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11. While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual communications is
not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional Protocol
exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision. xxx.49 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Any View issued by the Committee only displays "important characteristics of a judicial decision" and
are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views, therefore, are mere
recommendations to guide the State it is issued against.

Once again, the Court would like to stress that it is beyond its purview to act on such
recommendations as these are matters which are best taken up by the Legislative and the Executive
branches of government as can be seen by the formation of the Presidential Human Rights
Committee.50 To recall, the Court derives its powers under its basic mandate under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution:
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Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such l9wer courts as may
be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court finds that there is no ministerial duty and clear legal right which would justify the issuance
of a writ of mandamus.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to:

           1.       Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

           2.       Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they
have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

           1.       Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

           2.       The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme
Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to
a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.