The Supreme Court ruled that an attorney, Sergio Amonoy, was prohibited from purchasing land that was part of an estate he represented in a partition case. While the partition was approved in 1965, the estate was not closed until 1969, so the attorney-client relationship still existed when Amonoy had the heirs mortgage the land to him as payment for legal fees. The court found this violated the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which prevents attorneys from acquiring properties involved in cases where they represent clients. The rationale is that the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client could allow undue pressure or influence. The court set aside the lower court orders and directed the return of the land to the petitioners.
The Supreme Court ruled that an attorney, Sergio Amonoy, was prohibited from purchasing land that was part of an estate he represented in a partition case. While the partition was approved in 1965, the estate was not closed until 1969, so the attorney-client relationship still existed when Amonoy had the heirs mortgage the land to him as payment for legal fees. The court found this violated the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which prevents attorneys from acquiring properties involved in cases where they represent clients. The rationale is that the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client could allow undue pressure or influence. The court set aside the lower court orders and directed the return of the land to the petitioners.
The Supreme Court ruled that an attorney, Sergio Amonoy, was prohibited from purchasing land that was part of an estate he represented in a partition case. While the partition was approved in 1965, the estate was not closed until 1969, so the attorney-client relationship still existed when Amonoy had the heirs mortgage the land to him as payment for legal fees. The court found this violated the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which prevents attorneys from acquiring properties involved in cases where they represent clients. The rationale is that the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client could allow undue pressure or influence. The court set aside the lower court orders and directed the return of the land to the petitioners.
The Supreme Court ruled that an attorney, Sergio Amonoy, was prohibited from purchasing land that was part of an estate he represented in a partition case. While the partition was approved in 1965, the estate was not closed until 1969, so the attorney-client relationship still existed when Amonoy had the heirs mortgage the land to him as payment for legal fees. The court found this violated the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which prevents attorneys from acquiring properties involved in cases where they represent clients. The rationale is that the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client could allow undue pressure or influence. The court set aside the lower court orders and directed the return of the land to the petitioners.
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Fornilda vs. Br.
164, RTC IVth Judicial Region, Pasig
No. L-72306. October 5, 1988 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Facts: A Project of Partition was filed for the 6 parcels of land owned by the estate of Julio Catolos by his heirs which were adjudicated to Alfonso Fornilda and Asuncion Pasamba represented by Atty Segio Amonoy, respondent. The court approved the Project on 12 January 1965 but it was only on 6 August 1969 that the estate was declared closed and terminated after the inheritance taxes had been paid. Alfonso and Asuncion executed a Contract of Mortgage wherein they mortgaged the parcels of land as a security of the payment of his attorney’s fees in the amount of P27,600.00. However, they both died and the petitioners are some of the heirs of Alfonso. Since the mortgage indebtedness was not paid, respondent instituted foreclosure which the trial court ordered petitioners to pay respondent and failure of which the parcels would be sold at public auction. An auction was held where respondent was the highest bidder. A year later, an action for annulment of judgment questioning the validity of the auction sale to respondent as Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits attorneys from purchasing, even at a public or judicial auction, properties and rights in litigation. The trial court dismissed the case which the CA affirmed. Thus, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the Controverted Parcels in favor of Respondent Amonoy comes within the scope of the prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code? Rule of law: Article 1491 Application: Telling, therefore, is the fact that the transaction involved falls squarely within the prohibition against any acquisition by a lawyer of properties belonging to parties they represent which are still in suit. For, while the Project of Partition was approved on 12 January 1965, it was not until 6 August 1969 that the estate was declared closed and terminated (Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 3103, p. 44). At the time the mortgage was executed, therefore, the relationship of lawyer and client still existed, the very relation of trust and confidence sought to be protected by the prohibition, when a lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate terms to an harassed client. What is more, the mortgage was executed only eight (8) days after approval of the Project of Partition thereby evincing a clear intention on Respondent Amonoy’s part to protect his own interests and ride roughshod over that of his clients. From the time of the execution of the mortgage in his favor, Respondent Amonoy had already asserted a title adverse to his clients’ interests at a time when the relationship of lawyer and client had not yet been severed. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons (Paras, Civil Code, Vol. V, 1973 ed., p. 70). Conclusion: WHEREFORE, Certiorari is granted; the Order of respondent Trial Court, dated 25 July 1985, granting a Writ of Possession, as well as its Orders, dated 25 April 1986 and 16 May 1986, directing and authorizing respondent Sheriff to demolish the houses of petitioners Angela and Leocadia Foruilda are hereby set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued, is made permanent. The six (6) parcels of land herein controverted are hereby ordered returned to petitioners unless some of them have been conveyed to innocent third persons.