2014 Journal for Juridical Science 39(2):53-66

JJ Henning

Some manifestations of the statutory

recognition of a partnership as an entity

Summary
The general rule in South African law is that a partnership has no existence in itself
distinct from the partners of which it is composed. A brief analysis of South African
legislation, however, reveals a significant number of instances departing from the
general rule to some extent. This leads to a conclusion that, notwithstanding the
general rule, whether or not a partnership can be treated as a mere aggregate of
individuals or a “juristic person”, “entity”, “person”, “private body” or the like for
purposes of a particular statutory provision is a matter of careful interpretation.

Etlike verskyningsvorms van die statutêre erkenning

van ’n vennootskap as ’n entiteit
Die algemene reël in die Suid‑Afrikaanse reg is dat ’n vennootskap geen afsonderlike
bestaan het van die vennote nie. ’n Bondige ontleding van Suid‑Afrikaanse
wetgewing toon egter ’n beduidende getal gevalle waar van die algemene reël,
in die een of ander opsig, afgewyk word. Dít kan ’n gevolgtrekking regverdig dat,
ondanks die algemene reël, dit telkens ’n sorgvuldige uitleg vereis om vas te stel
of ’n vennootskap vir die doeleindes van ’n sekere statutêre bepaling as ’n blote
versameling individue of eerder as ’n “regspersoon”, “entiteit”, “persoon”, “privaat
liggaam” of iets soortgelyks beskou moet word.

JJ Henning, Senior Professor in the Faculty of Law, University of the

Free State.

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Journal for Juridical Science 2014:39(2)

1. Introduction
Internationally and historically, considerable debate has been devoted
to the respective merits of the entity and aggregate theories of the legal
status of partnership and, consequently, the extent to which courts and
legislators have treated or should regard the partnership as an entity
distinct from the partners or merely as a collection of individuals. Some
controversy still remains.1
From early on, South African jurisprudence has in the main2 regarded
a partnership as a mere aggregate or collection of individuals, having no
separate identity or existence apart from its members.3
Thus, the basic principle or general rule in South African law is that a
partnership is not a legal entity or persona separate from its members; it has
no existence of its own, distinct from the partners of which it is composed,
although some exceptions or quasi‑exceptions are acknowledged.4 The
rights and duties of the partnership are the rights and duties of the partners,
and its property is owned by the partners jointly in undivided shares.5
If two or more individuals, in their capacity as partners, enter into an
agreement with another person, the identity of the partners is synonymous
with the identity of the individuals entering into the agreement. Evidence
that they entered into the agreement as partners is merely evidence as

1 See Henning 2014:139‑140.

2 For exceptions in post‑Union jurisprudence, see, e.g., Silbert v Evans 1912
TPD 425:434, 441; Potchefstroom Dairies v Standard Fresh Milk Supply 1913
TPD 506:512; Estate Brown v Brown 1923 EDL 291:295; Rees v Feldman 1927
TPD 884:888; Liquidators of the Durban Roodepoort Mynpacht Syndicate
v Blankfield 1922 TPD 173:176; Ex parte Buttner Bros 1930 CPD 138:140;
Mahomed v Karp Bros 1938 TPD 112:113; Michalow v Premier Milling 1960 2
SA 59 W; Standard Bank v Lombard 1977 2 SA 808 W:813G.
3 For jurisprudence during the past 60 years, see, e.g., Commissioner for Inland
Revenue v Epstein 1954 3 SA 689 A:699; Goldberg v Di Meo 1960 3 SA 136 N:142;
Michalow v Premier Milling:61; Muller v Pienaar 1968 3 SA 195 A:202‑203; Abro
v Softex Mattress 1973 2 SA 346 D:351; Ex parte Cohen 1974 4 SA 674 W:675;
Standard Bank v Lombard:813; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente:209; Spie
Batignolles Société Anonyme v Van Niekerk: in re Van Niekerk v SA Yster & Staal
Industriële Korporasie 1980 2 SA 441 NC:446; Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993
3 SA 799 C:6; Da Silva v Pillay 1997 2 All SA 217 D:221; Metlika Trading v
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2005 3 SA 1 SCA:13; Gardee v
Dhanmanta Holdings 1978 1 SA 1066 N:1067‑1068; Ferela v Craigie 1980 3 SA
167 W:169A; DF Scott (EP) v Golden Valley Supermarket 2002 6 SA 297 SCA.
4 Muller v Pienaar:202‑203; Ex parte Cohen:675; Strydom v Protea
Eiendomsagente:209; Standard Bank v Lombard:813; Lombard v Standard
Bank 1977 2 SA 806 T:807D; DF Scott (EP) v Golden Valley Supermarket;
Spaeth v Schneider 1960 2 SA 629 SWA:631; Michalow v Premier Milling:63.
See in particular also Henning 2014:139‑167; De Wet & Van Wyk 1978:391, 408,
525‑526; Hahlo & Kahn 1960:702; Jorna 1993:22; Snyman 1995.
5 Sacks v CIR 1946 AD 31:40; Muller v Pienaar; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente.

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to the relationship between the two or more individuals – a relationship

established by contract.6
An analysis of Roman‑Dutch law sources7 reveals that there was some
appreciation of the entity view of partnerships, and that a number of
statutory provisions treated a partnership as a separate entity for certain
purposes.8 Although our jurisprudence has not as yet taken full cognisance
of these sources, they do give rise to the question as to whether a similar
recognition appreciation of the entity view of partnership is to be found in
South African legislation.
Therefore, this contribution aims to explore whether, in view of the
general rule that a partnership is not a separate entity at common law,9
South African law also contains statutory provisions that do not treat a
partnership as a mere aggregate of individuals, as the general rule maintains.
Put differently, when interpreting a particular statutory provision, can it be
summarily accepted that the status of the partnership under that legislation
will conform to the general common‑law rule, or is there sufficient reason
to believe that a more considered approach has to be followed in order to
determine a partnership’s status, necessitating a careful analysis of, for
instance, the definitions section of the particular statute?
To answer this question, a search of traditional hard‑copy legal
sources was conducted, supplemented with an electronic search of the
Jutastat e‑publication Juta’s Statutes of South Africa10 using the keyword
“partnership”. The results obtained are summarised below.

2. Statutory provisions11

2.1 Acquisition of legal personality

In so far as a partnership qualifies as an association of persons formed
after 31 December 1939 for the purpose of carrying on a business aimed
at the acquisition of gain by its individual members, it is prohibited by the
Companies Act 71 of 2008 to be a body corporate, unless it is registered
as a company under the Companies Act.12 The effect is that it is not

6 Muller v Pienaar:203; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente:211; DF Scott (EP) v

Golden Valley Supermarket.
7 For example, Kohler 1907:293.
8 For instance, the Rechte ende Costumen van Antwerpen of 1582, which
carried considerable weight in Holland and especially in Amsterdam, and
a Brabant statute of 1609. See Van der Keessel 1967:3.21.7 (Thesis 703);
Voet 1689:14.4.8; Hansmann et al. 2006:1375.
9 Chipkin (Natal) v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2005 5 SA 566
SCA:570.
10 Expiry date 30 April 2015.
11 See also Henning 2014:166‑169.
12 Or is formed pursuant to some other law, or was formed in pursuant
to Letters Patent or Royal Charter before 31 May 1962 – Companies

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Journal for Juridical Science 2014:39(2)

possible for such an association of persons to acquire legal personality

by conduct.13
It should be noted that the entity theory of the status of partnership
does not entail that a partnership is clothed with all the attributes of legal
personality in the same way as a common‑law universitas personarum or an
14
incorporated company or close corporation. Generally, it negates neither
the ultimate personal liability ex contractu or ex delicto of the partners
singuli in solidum for partnership debts and obligations, nor dissolution
by disassociation by virtue of selectus personae. Thus, even in Scotland,
where the separate entity of the firm is explicit, it is acknowledged that the
partnership entity’s legal consequences differ from those of the juristic
15
persona of an incorporated association. It may, therefore, be argued that
the precursors of this provision in the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 were aimed specifically at associations with
large, fluctuating memberships, such as building societies, instead of
ordinary partnerships.16

2.2 Juristic person or separate entity

2.2.1 Consumer protection, national credit, constitutional

democracy, organised crime and land claims
The definition of “juristic person” in the Consumer Protection Act17 and
the National Credit Act18 includes a partnership. The definition of “juristic
person” in the Firearms Control Act19 originally included a partnership, but
was substituted by the Firearms Control Amendment Act20 with effect from
1 July 2003 and presently only includes a trust. However, the definition of
“juristic entity” in the Customs Control Act21 includes a partnership.

Act 71/2008:section 8(3). See Companies Act 46/1926:section 4b; Companies

Act 61/1973:section 31; Helpmekaar (Thusano) Taxi Diens v Nasionale
Vervoerkommissie 1978 1 SA 250 O:255; Mitchell’s Plain Town Centre
Merchants Association v McLeod 1996 4 SA 159 A; De Villiers 1976:144;
Cilliers & Benade 1982:6‑7; Cilliers et al. 2000:4‑5.
13 Cilliers et al. 2000:7‑8.
14 For these attributes, see Cilliers et al. 2000:7.
15 See Miller 1994:16.
16 See Morrison v Standard Building Society 1932 AD 229:238‑239;
Delport & Vorster 2011:50‑51.
17 Consumer Protection Act 68/2008:section 1. “‘[J]uristic person’ includes – (a)
a body corporate; (b) a partnership or association; or (c) a trust as defined in
the Trust Property Control Act, 1988 (Act 57 of 1988); …”
18 National Credit Act 34/2005:section 1.
19 Firearms Control Act 60/2000:section 1.
20 Firearms Control Amendment Act 28/2006.
21 Customs Control Act 31/2014:sectio 1.

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The definition of “entity” in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy

against Terrorist and Related Activities Act,22 the Prevention of Organised
Crime Act23 as well as the Land Claims Court Rules24 includes a partnership.

2.2.2 Insolvency
The definition of “debtor” in section 1 of the Insolvency Act,25 in connection
with the sequestration of the debtor’s estate, includes a partnership or the
estate of a partnership, which is a debtor in the usual sense of the word.
The Insolvency Act treats the partnership as having a separate estate and
as being in the same position as any other debtor.26 It not only retains the
partnership estate as a separate estate from the estates of the individual
partners, but also precludes partnership creditors from preferring their
claims against the individual estates.27 At least initially, partnership
creditors have to look for payment to the partnership estate only.28 The
trustee of the partnership estate is only entitled to the residue, if any, of a
partner’s estate after all the claims of the private creditors of the partner
have been paid in full, if that residue is required to pay the partnership’s
debts.29 Similarly, the trustee of a partner’s estate is entitled to the residue,
if any, in the partnership estate after the claims of partnership creditors
have been paid in full, to the extent that such partner would have been
entitled to it, if his estate had not been sequestrated.30 In accordance
with this arrangement, separate accounts must be framed in the estate
of the partnership as well as that of each individual partner.31 This leads
to the hypothesis that third parties dealing with, and granting credit to a
partnership do so in reliance only on the assets of the partnership, and
that, throughout their dealings with the partnership, they regard it as a
separate entity.32

22 Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities

Act 33/2004:section 1.
23 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121/1998:section 1.
24 Land Claims Court Rules:Rule 1(a).
25 Insolvency Act 24/1936.
26 Insolvency Act 24/1936:section 2 (definition of “debtor”), 3(2), 13, 49, 92(5),
128; Michalow v Premier Milling:63; Cassim v The Master 1962 4 SA 601 D:606;
Ex parte Fernandez 1965 3 SA 726 O:728; Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery v
Pretorius; Ex parte Cohen:677; Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings 1978 1 SA 1066
N:1067‑1068; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente:209; Ferela v Craigie 1980 3
SA 167 W:169A.
27 Michalow v Premier Milling; Ex parte Cohen; Jorna 1993:23.
28 Insolvency Act 24/1936:section 49; Michalow v Premier Milling; Ex parte
Cohen; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente.
29 Insolvency Act 24/1936:section 49; Michalow v Premier Milling; Ex parte
Cohen; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente.
30 Insolvency Act 24/1936:section 49; Michalow v Premier Milling; Ex parte
Cohen; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente.
31 Insolvency Act 24/1936:section 92(5).
32 Michalow v Premier Milling:62; Ex parte Cohen; Cassim v The Master:606;
Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings:1071; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente:209;

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From the moment a partnership is sequestrated, the partnership

creditors are primarily confined to the partnership assets and automatically
deprived of recourse against the partners individually. For purposes
of insolvency law, the partnership estate is treated as a separate entity
as soon and as long as its liabilities exceed the value of its assets.33
Otherwise, partnership creditors would be deprived of the safeguards
against preferences extended to all other types of creditors.34
In an application for the sequestration of a partnership and of the
partners, the “debtor” envisaged by section 10(c) of the Insolvency Act
24 of 1936 is the partnership, and the partnership alone: What must be
considered under this provision is confined to the question as to whether,
prima facie, there is reason to believe that the sequestration of the
partnership estate would be to the benefit of the partnership’s creditors.
All that counts is the effect of sequestration on the partnership’s own
creditors; not the effect of the ancillary sequestration of the partners’
estates on the partners’ creditors.35
In Commissioner for SARS v Hawker Air Services: In re Commissioner
for SARS v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership,36 the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that the estate of a partnership can be sequestrated even
where the estate(s) of one or more or even all of the partners cannot be
sequestrated by virtue of a reason not provided for in section 13 of the
Insolvency Act.37
As far as the rehabilitation of an insolvent partner is concerned, the
relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 193638 refer only to the
claims against a partner’s private estate that need to be considered, and
do not include the claims against the estate of a partnership of which
he has been a member.39 The court may, however, take into account the
partner’s conduct in respect of partnership matters.40

Ex parte Fernandez:728.
33 Michalow v Premier Milling:63; Cassim v The Master:606; Ex parte
Fernandez:728; Ex parte Cohen:677; Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente:209;
Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings:1071; Ferela v Craigie:169.
34 Michalow v Premier Milling:63.
35 Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings.
36 Commissioner for SARS v Hawker Air Services: In re Commissioner for
SARS v Hawker Aviation Services Partnership 2006 2 All SA 565 SCA:575;
Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services;
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation Partnership
2006 4 SA 292 SCA.
37 A body corporate falls outside the ambit of the definition of a debtor in
section 2 of the Insolvency Act, and its estate cannot be sequestrated under
the Insolvency Act, but can be liquidated pursuant to the provisions of the
Companies Act 71/2008.
38 Insolvency Act 24/1936:sections 124(3)(b), 124(5).
39 Ex parte Fernandez; Ex parte Cohen; Noordkaap Lewendehawe Koöperasie v Raath
1977 2 SA 815 (NC):818.
40 Ex parte Cohen.

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2.2.3 Rules of court

A partnership may sue or be sued in its own name.41 A partnership
that was dissolved after the accrual of the cause of action, but before
the issue of summons, may nevertheless be sued in its name at the
date of the accrual of the cause of action.42 If so sued and judgement
is taken against a partnership without the name of any of the partners
being disclosed, execution may follow only against the property of the
partnership. The assets of a partner who has not been served, who has not
appeared, who has not been adjudged to be a partner, and whose name
has not been disclosed as partner under the court rules43 cannot without
further proceedings be attached in execution of a judgement against the
partnership.44 These rules deal with procedure and not with substantive
law. It does not turn a partnership or firm into a different entity or a juristic
person existing separately from its members or owners.45
The court has also refused to exercise its discretion to order payments
by instalments in terms of Uniform Rules of Court rule 45(12)(j) in respect
of a partnership debt against a partner in circumstances where both the
partnership and the partner prima facie appeared to be insolvent, because,
apart from other considerations, such an order would probably not be in
line with the trends concerning partnerships in insolvency.46 Although this
approach was taken under review less than a decade after the decision,47
it may still appear that, for purposes of civil proceedings, a partnership is
to some extent treated as an entity.48

41 Supreme Court Rules:rule 14; Magistrates’ Court Rules:rule 54.

42 Kirsh Industries v Vosloo & Lindeque 1982 3 SA 479 W; Spie Batignolles
Société Anonyme v Van Niekerk: in re Van Niekerk v SA Yster & Staal Industriële
Korporasie.
43 Kirsh Industries v Vosloo & Lindeque; Spie Batignolles Société Anonyme v Van
Niekerk: in re Van Niekerk v SA Yster & Staal Industriële Korporasie.
44 Rees v Feldman:889. See also Engelbrecht v Visentin In re Visentin v Clensatron
SA 1997 1 All SA 48 W.
45 See DF Scott (EP) v Golden Valley Supermarket:301; Ahmed v Belmont
Supermarket 1991 3 SA 809 N; Simpson’s Motors v Flamingo Motors
1989 4 SA 797 W:791; Standard Bank v Lombard:813; Strydom v Protea
Eiendomsagente:209; Standard Bank v Pearson 1961 3 SA 721 E.
46 Noordkaap Lewendehawe Koöperasie v Raath: 818G.
47 P de V Reklame v Gesamentlike Onderneming van SA Numismatiese Buro
& Vitaware.
48 Standard Bank v Pearson:723C; Greef v Janet 1986 1 SA 647 T.

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2.3 Person

2.3.1 Value‑added tax (VAT)49

The definition of “person” in the Value‑Added Tax Act 89 of 199150
includes a partnership. If a partnership carries on an enterprise, it is, for
VAT purposes in terms of the Act,51 deemed to carry on such enterprise
as a person separate from its members. It is obliged to apply for its own
VAT registration number. Registration of the partnership must occur
separately from any registration of any of its members for any other
enterprise. Liability for tax for supplies made by the partnership must
be determined and calculated independently of any other enterprise
carried on by its members. The statutory duties and obligations imposed
upon a member must be performed by the partnership separately from
the duties and obligations imposed on any of its members.52 In effect,
therefore, a partnership is distinct from its members for VAT purposes.
The practical significance is that a supply by a member to the partnership,
or to a fellow member constitutes a taxable supply.53 Since a partnership is
constituted intuitu personae, which means that the delectus personarum
is regarded as one of the main considerations on which an agreement
of partnership is based, any change in membership destroys the identity
of the firm. If a partner retires or dies, or a new partner is admitted, this
brings about the dissolution of the existing partnership at common law. If
the remaining partners agree to continue the business of the partnership,
a new partnership is created. Since a new partner can be admitted only
by agreement between him and all the existing partners, the existing
partnership is dissolved and a new partnership created upon such new
admission. Therefore, the reconstituted firm is, in each event, a new
partnership and, although precisely the same business may be carried on
under the style of the old firm, the business must be transferred to the
new partnership.54 In principle, therefore, each time a change in partners
occurs, the partnership should, in the absence of specific statutory

49 De Koker & Kruger 2002.

50 Value‑Added Tax Act 89/1991:section 1. “‘[P]erson’ includes any public
authority, any municipality, any company, any body of persons (corporate or
unincorporate), the estate of any deceased or insolvent person, any trust fund
and any foreign donor funded project; …”
51 Value‑Added Tax Act 89/1991.
52 Value‑Added Tax Act 89/1991:section 51(1).
53 De Koker & Kruger 2002; Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v
Hawker Aviation Services Partnership 2005 5 SA 283 T.
54 Executors of Paterson v Webster, Steel 1881 1 SC 350:355: “There can be no
doubt that, as a general principle, the Court can only recognise the members of
which the firm consists, and that any change among them destroys the identity
of the firm”; Standard Bank v Wentzel & Lombard 1904 TS 828:833‑834; Wagstaff
& Elston v Carter & Talbot 1909 TS 121; Whitelock v Rolfes, Nebel 1911 WLD
35:37‑38; Divine Gates v African Clothing Factory 1930 CPD 238:240; Goldberg
v Di Meo 1960 30 SA 36 N:142; Kirsh Industries v Vosloo & Lindeque:483.

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provisions to the contrary, be required to re‑register as the “person”, since

the old partnership ceases to exist.
In terms of the Value‑Added Tax Act,55 however, if a partnership
is dissolved, because one of its partners withdraws or a new partner is
admitted, but the new partnership continues to carry on the enterprise as
a going concern, the new and the dissolved partnership are deemed to be
one and the same partnership. The new partnership, in effect, steps into
the shoes of the dissolved partnership, and no new registration is required.

2.3.2 Jurisdiction: Magistrates’ courts

Under the Magistrates’ Courts Act,56 jurisdiction in relation to a “person”
includes a partnership that has business premises situated, or any member
thereof residing within the district of that court.

2.3.3. Jurisdiction: Small claims courts

The Small Claims Courts Act57 provides that its jurisdiction in respect of a
“person” as defendant includes a partnership that has business premises
situated, or any member thereof residing within the area of jurisdiction of
the court. However, only a natural person may institute an action in the
court, and a juristic person may become a party to an action in a court
only as defendant.58 In Da Silva v Pillaty, in response to the submission
that, although a partnership as such is not a natural person or juristic
person, the individuals who constitute the partnership are natural persons,
and may sue in a small claims court jointly as individuals,59 it was held
that in a case where all the partners are natural persons, this submission
may be sound.60 However, if the partners are juristic persons, or only
one of them is a juristic person, none of them could institute action in a
small claims court to enforce a right of the partnership. If all partners are
juristic persons, this would be because none of them are natural persons;
if only one partner is a juristic person, it would be because proceedings
by the remaining partners who are natural persons would be prejudicial
for non‑joinder of the remaining partner, who, not being a natural person,
could not institute action in a small claims court. Thus, if the submission
is correct, the legislature has created an anomalous situation, namely
that the individual partners of a partnership may institute action in a small
claims court, provided that each of them is a natural person, but that a
partnership in which all or some of the partners are juristic persons, or one

55 Value‑Added Tax Act 89/1991:section 51(2).

56 Magistrates’ Courts Act 32/1944:section 28.
57 Small Claims Courts Act 61/1984:section 14. See also Da Silva v Pillay.
58 Small Claims Court Act 61/1984:section 7(1).
59 Da Silva v Pillaty 1997 3 SA 760 D:765.
60 Da Silva v Pillaty:766. Also see Raman v Barlow Motor Investments t/a Natal
Motor Industries, Prospection 1999 4 SA 606 D.

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of the partners is a juristic person, may not do so. There appears to be no

prima facie reason why the legislature would wish to discriminate against
a partnership of the latter kind. Indeed, this then suggests that, by its
reference to “a natural person” in section 7(1) of the Act, the legislature did
not intend to refer to partners in a partnership, even if they all happened to
be natural persons.61

2.3.4 Jurisdiction: High court

In view of the entity approach apparent from the Insolvency Act as well as
rule 14, especially rule 14(5)(h), of the Uniform Rules of Court, it was held
in Metlika Trading v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service62 that
the high court, in whose area of jurisdiction the principal place of business
of a partnership is situated, is the most convenient forum as far as the
partnership is concerned, and is, in general, the court whose judgements
against the partnership could most effectively be enforced. Therefore, as
in the case of companies, the location of the principal place of business of
a partnership within the area of jurisdiction of a court is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on that court in respect of the partnership.

2.3.5. Other provisions

Partnership is included in the definition of “person” in the Banks Act,63
the Co‑Operative Banks Act,64 the Mutual Banks Act,65 the Financial
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act,66 the Securities Services Act,67 the
Law Society (Cape of Good Hope) Private Act,68 the Customs and Excise
Act,69 the Private Security Industry Regulation Act,70 the Export Credit and
Foreign Investments Insurance Act,71 the Credit Rating Services Act,72 the
Financial Markets Act,73 the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services
Act,74 the Gambling Act,75 the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act,76

61 Da Silva v Pillaty:766.
62 Uniform Rules of Court, it was held in Metlika Trading v Commissioner, South
African Revenue Service 2005 3 SA 1 SCA:13 per Streicher JA.
63 Banks Act 94/1990:section 1.
64 Co‑Operative Banks Act 40/2007:section 1.
65 Mutual Banks Act 124/1993:section 1.
66 Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28/2001:section 1.
67 Securities Services Act 36/2004:section 72, repealed and replaced by the
Financial Markets Act 19/2012.
68 Law Society (Cape of Good Hope) Private Act 20/1916:section 17(b).
69 Customs and Excise Act 91/1964:section 103.
70 Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56/2001:section 1.
71 Export Credit and Foreign Investments Insurance Act 78/1957:section 1.
72 Credit Rating Services Act 24/2012:section 1.
73 Financial Markets Act 19/2012:section 1.
74 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 73/2002:section 1.
75 Gambling Act 7/2004:section 1.
76 Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9/2011:section 1.

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and the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act,77 while

the definition of “person” in the Interpretation Act includes any body of
persons unincorporate.78

2.4 Unregistered person and institution

The definitions of “associated institution” and “unregistered person” in the
Inspection of Financial Institutions Act79 and the definitions of “institution”
and “unregistered person” in the Financial Institutions (Protection of
Funds) Act80 include a partnership.

2.5 Private body

Under the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication‑Related Information Act,81 the Electronic Communications
and Transactions Act,82 the Promotion of Access to Information Act83 and
the Protection of Personal Information Act,84 a “private body” includes a
partnership that carries on any trade, business or profession.

2.6 Business, enterprise and firm

The definition of “business” in the Statistics Act85 includes a partnership
carrying on a commercial activity, while the definition of “enterprise” in the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act86 and the Prevention and Combating of
Corrupt Activities Act87 includes a partnership.
In terms of the National Environmental Management Act,88 “firm”
includes a body incorporated by, or in terms of any law, as well as a
partnership. The definition of “firm” in the Auditing Profession Act89
includes a company and a partnership, while the definition of “firm” in the
Competition Act90 includes a partnership and a trust.

77 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act 7/2013:section 1.

78 Interpretation Act 33/1957:section 1.
79 Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 80/1998:section 1.
80 Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28/2001:section 1.
81 Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of
Communication‑Related Information Act 70/2002:section 1.
82 Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25/2002:section 1.
83 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2/2000:section 1.
84 Protection of Personal Information Act 4/2013:section 1.
85 Statistics Act 6/1999:section 1.
86 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121/1998:section 1.
87 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12/2004:section 28(7).
88 National Environmental Management Act 107/1998:section 34(9).
89 Auditing Profession Act 26/2005:section 1.
90 Competition Act 89/1998:section 1.

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Journal for Juridical Science 2014:39(2)

2.7 Agent
Under the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962,91 “agent” includes a partnership
acting as an agent.

2.8 Other examples

2.8.1 Single rather than multiple

Section 19 of the Agricultural Produce Agents Act92 requires each fresh
produce agent to open and keep a trust account at a deposit‑taking
institution, but stipulates that only one trust account has to be kept by a
fresh produce agent which is a partnership.

2.8.2 Appointment and continuation of appointment at

dissolution
In terms of the Pension Funds Act93 and the Mutual Banks Act,94 the
appointment of a partnership as auditor does not lapse by reason of a
change in the composition of the partnership, as long as not less than
half of the partners in the reconstituted partnership are persons who were
partners as at the date when the appointment of the partnership was last
approved. The Companies Act95 stipulates that, if a company appoints a
firm as its auditor, any change in the composition of the members of that
firm does not by itself create a vacancy in the office of auditor for that year,
provided that, if by comparison with the membership of a firm at the time
of its latest appointment, more than one half of the members remain after
the change.
The Companies Act96 provides also for the appointment of a partnership
as a company secretary. A change in the membership of a partnership that
holds office as company secretary does not constitute a casual vacancy
in the office of company secretary, if the remaining or new partners satisfy
the prescribed requirements.97

3. In closing
The legislation referred to is by no means intended as a numerus clausus.
There may well be other instances where, for certain purposes, the

91 Income Tax Act 58/1962:section 1.

92 Agricultural Produce Agents Act 12/1992.
93 Pension Funds Act 24/1956:section 9.
94 Mutual Banks Act 124/193:section 45.
95 Companies Act 781/2008:section 91(4) & (5).
96 Companies Act 71/2008:section 87.
97 Companies Act 71/2008:section 84(5).

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 Henning/Manifestations of the statutory recognition of a partnership as an entity

mercantile view of the status of partnership prevails and the partnership is

statutorily recognised or treated as a separate entity for certain purposes.98
Although the general rule that a partnership is not a person at common
law99 serves as point of departure in the interpretation of legislation, it
is clear that whether or not a partnership can be considered a “juristic
person”, “entity”, “person”, “private body” or the like for purposes of a
particular statutory provision warrants careful consideration.100 In the
final analysis, if the legislature expressly alters the common law, the
presumption that legislation does not intend to change existing law101 does
not apply, and the changes must be effected.102

98 See Nedbank v Van Zyl; Michalow v Premier Milling; Ex parte Cohen;

Noordkaap Lewendehawe Koöperasie v Raath:818; Strydom v Protea
Eiendomsagente:209‑211; Metlika Trading v Commissioner, South African
Revenue Service:13.
99 Chipkin (Natal) v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service:570.
100 Herman v Faclier 1949 4 SA 377 C; Helpmekaar (Thusano) Taxi Diens v Nasionale
Vervoerkommissie 1978 1 SA 250 O:255.
101 Glen Anil Finance v Joint Liquidators, Glen Anil Dev Corp (in liquidation)
1981 1 SA 171 A.
102 Gordon v Standard Merchant Bank 1983 3 SA 68 A.

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