The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History (PDFDrive)

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T h e O xford H andbook of
386 T H E OX FOR D H A N DB O OK OF I R A N I A N H I S T ORY

40 percent of the voters stayed home. The second factor, directly contributing to low
voter turnout, was dissatisfaction with Rafsanjani, Ahmadinejad’s rival in the
second round of elections. Here, a popular belief that associated Rafsanjani with the
established order and all its shortcomings discouraged many potential voters from
going to the polls and persuaded others to vote for the relatively unknown
Ahmadinejad.
President Ahmadinejad’s tenure may be viewed in terms of his domestic and
foreign policy. Domestically, in attempting to keep his campaign slogan of combat-
ing nepotism and corruption he showed a degree of disregard for the expertise and
experience of state managers and even university faculty. Under him, many experi-
enced state managers were replaced with relatively inexperienced, but well-con-
nected, new managers. This type of neo-nepotism soon proved disastrous, as new
managers proved their inadequacy in dealing with, national problems. The net
result of this policy in the economic sphere was a sharp rise in unemployment and
inflation. His freespending policy soon sharply reduced the “oil dividend” (money
accumulated as a result of high oil prices) and added to the country’s economic
woes. The president’s purge of state officials was extended to universities, where
faculty and students deemed sympathetic to the reform movement were retired or
asked to leave. Repressive policies against independent associations., the press, and
civil society in general were also increased. With the reform movement in disarray
and reduced to a minority in the parliament, the new administration used less
restraint in implementing its socially conservative politics, especially when it came
to women and youth. In this area, the state began to use its power to implement
moral codes without much restraint either in the parliament or by the opposition.
In terms of foreign policy, while the office of the president in the Islamic republic
does not have the authority to make decisions on key strategic issues, it does repre-
sent the country in the international arena. President Khatami had used the limited
power of his office to establish better relations with the international community,
particularly the European Union. With no real strategic ally, Islamic Iran had
always felt the weight of its international isolation, a problem the Khatami presiden-
cy had tried to address. President Ahmadinejad took the opposite direction. His
denial of the Holocaust and other activities added to Iran’s isolation. A more isolated
Iran soon found it more difficult to deal with the United Nation’s Security Council
regarding its position on Iran’s civilian nuclear program. The country’s isolation also
created problems in trying to find allies in dealing with an aggressive, and at times
threatening, Bush administration. In short, President Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy
proved as problematic as his domestic policy, with very few achievements to point
at. Many experts believe that had it not been for the total failure of the Bush admin-
istration’s strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran would have been in mortal danger
of an American attack during this period.
As Iran approached the June 2009 presidential election, a sense of frustration
returned to the country, and a national debate commenced over which direction to
take. In an age identified with a new African American U.S. president who proposed
a new domestic and foreign policy direction, finding a new direction for Iran

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