CHAPTER 4

THE FRANKFURT YEARS

4:1 On The Border Between Philosophy And Theology

4:1:1 Tillich’s Understanding of Theology

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main

(Tillich 1936:40) (1929-1933). Tillich (ibid:38) writes: ‗Anyone standing on the

border of philosophy and theology will find it necessary to get a clear conception

of the scientific relation of both‘. Tillich (ibid:39) continues: ‗By the appearance

of the so-called ―Existential Philosophy‖ in Germany, I was led to a new

understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology‘. Tillich (ibid:40)

begins to show the relationship between philosophy and theology by recalling his

intellectual development and career. Tillich (ibid:40) writes: ‗To these ideas, which

are characterized as standing between philosophy and theology, corresponded my

professional career. Doctor of Philosophy in Breslau, Licentiate of Theology in

Halle and Berlin; Professor of the Science of Religion in Dresden and the same time

Professor Honorarius of Theology in Leipzig; Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in

Frankfurt-on-the-Main‘. Tillich‘s (1948:83-84) view of the relationship between

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philosophy and theology helps us to better understand the Frankfurt years. Tillich

(ibid:83-84) writes:

The term ―philosophical theology‖ points to a theology that has a philosophical

character….As long as theological thought has existed, there have been two
types, of theology, a philosophical one and-let me call it- a ―kerygmatic‖ one.
Kerygmatic is derived from the New Testament word kerygma, ―message.‖
It is a theology that tries to reproduce the content of the Christian message in
an ordered and systematic way, without referring to philosophy. In contrast to
it, philosophical theology, although based on the same kerygma, tries to
explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy.
The tension and mutual fertilization between these two types is a main event
and a fortunate one in all history of Christian thought. The fight of the
traditionalists of the early church against the rising logos-Christology, the
struggle between the mystics and dialecticians in the early Middle Ages,
between Biblicism and scholasticism in the later Middle Ages, between the
Reformers and the Aristotelian scholastics, the attack of the Ritschlians on
speculative theology, and of the Barthians on a philosophy of religion-all
this and much more was the consequence of the existence of a philosophical
and a kerygmatic theology. The duality is natural. It is implied in the very
word ―theology,‖ the syllable ―theo‖ pointing to the kerygma, in which God
is revealed, and the syllable ―logy‖ pointing to the endeavor of human reason
to receive the message. This implies further that kerygmatic theology and
philosophical theology demand each other and are wrong in the moment in
which they become exclusive. No kerygmatic theology ever existed which
did not use philosophical terms and methods. And no philosophical theology
ever existed-deserving the name ―theology‖-which did not try to explain the
content of the message.

Tillich (ibid:84) continues as to the ‗theological ideal‘: ‗Therefore, the theological

ideal is the complete unity of both types, an ideal which is reached only by the

greatest theologians and ever by them only appropriately. The fact that every human

creativity has its typological limitations makes it desirable that theological faculties

should include a representative of kerygmatic and one of philosophical theology,

whether the latter is called apologetics, speculative theology, Christian philosophy of

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religion, or philosophical theology‘. Tillich (ibid:86) elaborates further: ‗But

philosophy, before attempting a description of the world in unity with all kinds of

scientific and nonscientific experience, tries to understand being itself and the

categories and structures which are common to all kinds of beings. This makes the

division between philosophy and theology impossible, for, whatever the relation of

God, world, and man may be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation

of the meaning and structure of being as being; unavoidably has consequences

for the interpretation of God, man, and the world in their interrelations‘. Paul

Tillich (ibid:87) concludes: ‗In which philosophy shows kerygmatic and therefore

a theological character, for this is the task of theology: to ask for being as far as it

gives us ultimate concern. Theology deals with what concerns us inescapably,

ultimately, unconditionally‘. Tillich (ibid:87) adds: ‗Philosophy asks the questions theology

supplies the answers‘. Carey (2002:37) asked Protestant and Roman Catholic scholars at

Tubingen, Germany concerning ‗contemporary German theological scene‘, and the

exploration of Tillich‘s work. The answer is rather surprising but pertains to Tillich‘s

ontological theology: ‗An embarrassed silence followed, and then one theologian noted that

there was little interest in Germany in Tillich‘s ontological approach to theology, and

that in fact there was considerable sentiment in Germany that after Tillich came to

America and began to develop his systematic theology he removed himself from the

matrix and methodologies of Continental theology‘. Tillich‘s (1948:83) Frankfurt

years carry with them the Tillichean understanding of ‗the relationship between
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philosophy and theology‘. Tillich‘s theology was built on the ontological model.

Horton (1952:45) visited Frankfurt shortly after Tillich had left in 1933. Horton

(ibid:45) writes: ‗His teaching at Frankfurt was so much concerned with art,

science, economics, politics, and general culture that hostile critics frequently

charged him with deserting his job as a philosopher of religion‘. The bias of the

critics must be admitted and allowed for since they would be in all likelihood,

National Socialists loyal to Adolf Hitler. The Frankfurt years are understood even

better when Tillich‘s boundary and border line concept are understood. Tillich (1966:

13) writes:

In the introduction to my Religiose Verwirklichung (Religious Realization),

I wrote: ―The boundary is the best place for acquiring knowledge.‖ When
I was asked to give an account of the way my ideas have developed from my
life, I thought that the concept of the boundary might be the fitting symbol for
the whole of my personal and intellectual development. At almost every point,
I have had to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to be
completely at home in neither and to take no definitive stand against either.
Since thinking presupposes receptiveness to new possibilities, this position
is fruitful for thought; but it is difficult and dangerous in life, which again
and again demands decisions and the exclusion of alternatives. This
disposition and its tension have determined both my destiny and my work.

Ratschow (1980:22) clarifies this further for us:

Paul Tillich wrote two autobiographical sketches-the first one in his fiftieth
year, the second in the year 1952. In the first sketch from 1936, Tillich
describes his destiny as an existence ―on the boundary.‖ Of course, every
life can be understood as always lived on ―boundaries,‖ for life is transition.
But Tillich‘s sense of his existence as running on boundaries had a particular
intensity, directness, and totality. For him, moreover, these boundaries are
not only transitions but also battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions,
and ever new endurance tests.

In scrutiny, the Frankfurt years give us a better understanding of how Tillich

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understood the relationship between philosophy and theology. Philosophic theology

and kerygmatic theology are both necessary aspects of theology. They should not

be separated from each other.

4:2 The Union of Philosophy And Theology

4:2:1 Tillich’s Theological Experience At Frankfurt

Tillich sought to show the union of philosophy and theology. This

became possible through the explanation of Schelling‘s Christian philosophy of

existence. Tillich (1936:35) writes: ‗I thought that, fundamentally, I had found

the union of theology and philosophy in the philosophical explanation of the

Christian doctrine through the older Schelling, in his founding of a Christian

philosophy of existence in contrast to Hegel‘s humanistic philosophy of essence

and in his interpretation of history as the History of Salvation. I must confess that

even today I find more ―theonomous philosophy‖ in Schelling than in any of the

other idealists‘. Tillich (1936:35) preferred Schelling‘s metaphysical thought to that

of Hegel‘s ‗philosophy of essence, and his interpretation of history as history of

salvation‘. The problem was that Schelling‘s metaphysical religious thought failed

to achieve ‗a unity of theology and philosophy‘ (ibid:35). The First World War

proved to be a catastrophe for the survival of German idealism. Schelling‘s thought

aimed at the union of philosophy and theology. It failed because it did not include

Tillich‘s concept of the abyss (ibid:35). The result of all of this was the birth of Tillich‘s

philosophy of religion. The union of theology and philosophy is the result of Tillich‘s
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philosophy of religion. His philosophy of religion abides on the border between

theology and philosophy (ibid:36). Neither academic discipline of theology nor

philosophy are lost. Tillich‘s philosophy of religion expressed in philosophical terms

the concept of the abyss and ‗the idea of justification a limitation of philosophy‘ (ibid:36).

Tillich (ibid:36) claimed his philosophy of religion was determined by both the

‗religious reality‘ and the philosophical concept of the abyss (ibid:36).

In his effort to show the union of theology and philosophy at Frankfurt,

Tillich gave a critical analysis. He rejected Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of values,

and also phenomenology. Neo-Kantianism didn‘t include the experience of the abyss.

Tillich (ibid:36) rejected the philosophy of values since it comprehended religion as a

sphere of values. All this was assumed in the experience of the abyss. Tillich (1959:74)

defines the abyss: ‗That which is expressed is the ―dimension of depth‖ in the

encountered reality, the ground and abyss in which every thing is rooted‘.

Phenomenology lacked the dynamic element of the abyss (ibid:36-37). Instead,

Tillich was attracted to a philosophy of life as described by Nietzsche (ibid:36-37).

Nietzsche expressed the concept of the abyss, more clearly than the thought of the

others. Tillich came to depend on Schelling‘s philosophy of life. It was Schelling‘s

philosophy that made it possible for Tillich to be able to approach and interpret

Nietzsche. The philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich in the years after

the First World War. The philosophy of life was a reaction against the ‗years of

death and hunger‘. The German Revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich‘s

thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically

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oriented (ibid:37). However, the philosophy of history had originated not with

Tillich but with Ernst Troeltsch. Tillich adapted it making it his own. Tillich

heard Troeltsch on this subject in Berlin. Troeltsch (1958:168-169) wrote:

There is just one thing which the original Protestantism so long as it held strictly
to its fundamental idea, did not and could not do-and the omissions is of the
highest significance for the whole understanding of its relation to the modern
world: it never elevated artistic feeling into the principle of a philosophy of life,
of metaphysics or ethics. It could not do that, because its asceticism and its
absolute metaphysical dualism made it impossible. It could not reconcile
itself to the admission of art as an end in itself, as a particular way of knowing
God and the world which is necessarily in some way or other bound up with his
principle, and the not less closely connected transfiguration of the sensuous,
and the sense of the world as harmony.

Troeltsch was speaking on the philosophy of history which had not been treated since

Hegel‘s death (Tillich 1936:37). Troeltsch failed due to his adherence to German

idealism. He was unable to succeed because of the barrier of historical relativism.

Tillich repudiated Troeltsch‘s idealism. Tillich justified his decision to discard

historical relativism because of the damaging effect of World War I on Germany.

Tillich espoused a new philosophy of history the ‗the philosophy of history of religious

Socialism‘ (ibid:38). Adams (Tillich 1924:352-353 in Adams 1965:150) clarifies:

Tillich believes Troeltsch was never able to resolve the tensions in the way in
which he hoped to, for in the struggle over the contradiction between the
absolute and ―the preponderance lay on the side of the relative.‖ ―It was not
for external reasons alone that he abandoned theology.‖ Not that his passage
from theology to philosophy was simply a passage from the absolute to the
relative. ―The opposite would be more correct.‖ His actual intention was to
move from the false absolute to the genuine. But in his striving for standards
Troeltsch attached himself to that wing of Kantianism which moved in the
scientific methodology in accord with Windelband and Rickert.

In inspection, one of Tillich‘s goals at Frankfurt was to bring about the union
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of philosophy and theology. Tillich developed his own Christian philosophy of religion.

Nietzsche‘s philosophy of life became attractive to Tillich. He was able to interpret

Nietzsche because of Schelling‘s work. Tillich developed a new philosophy of history

that was sociologically and politically oriented.

4:3 Another Dimension Between Philosophy And Theology-Religion And Culture

4:3:1 The Relationship of Religion To Culture

Tillich sought to show another aspect of the union of theology and philosophy.

This was the dimension between theology and philosophy of religion and culture.

Tillich (1959:40) began by defining religion: ‗Being ultimately concerned about that

which is and should be our ultimate concern. This means that faith is the state of being

grasped by an ultimate concern, and the belief in the existence of a highest being God,

and the theoretical and practical consequences of such a belief‘. Religion defined by

Tillich was absolute and universal. His proof for this claim is the absolute and universal

nature of religion as evidenced in the idea of God. Religion is not a sub category of

culture. Neither is religion to be placed as being an entirely separate realm from culture

(Tillich 1936:50). Culture has a claim upon philosophy. Culture decides the forms and

context that expresses the ‗Absolute‘. Culture‘s substance is religion. Religion‘s form

is culture. Tillich (ibid:50) explains the one difference: ‗In religion the substance which

is the unconditioned source and abyss of meaning is designated, and the cultural forms

serve as symbols for it‘ whereas in culture the form, which is the conditioned meaning
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becomes perceptible only indirectly, throughout the autonomous form‘. Culture seeks to

understand man‘s finiteness and search for the infinite. Religion by way of contrast must

include ‗the autonomous form‘ the ‗Logos‘ (ibid:50). Tillich concludes by saying that

these ideas were the foundation for both a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of

culture (ibid:50). Tillich was then able to treat cultural movements from the perspective

of religion (ibid:50-51).

Tillich wanted to show the relation of religion to culture. Culture that included

politics, art, depth psychology and also sociology (Tillich 1966:7). Tillich (1967:43)

writes: ‗Frankfurt was the most modern and liberal university in Germany, but it had

no theological faculty. So it was quite natural that my lectures moved on the boundary

line between philosophy and theology and tried to make philosophy existential for the

numerous students obliged to take philosophical classes‘.

German culture had experienced culture shocks at all levels due to the

devastation of World War I. Germany was experiencing two digit inflation. The

German people were open to these new ideas. Tillich formed an apologetical

theology. This became part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt.

Dresden had been a center of the visual arts including painting, architecture, dance,

and opera. Tillich (1966-9-10) writes: ‗The cultural situation was not much different

when, in 1929, I received and accepted a call as professor of philosophy at Frankfurt‘.

Tillich brought the culture of Berlin, Dresden and Frankfurt to bear in his lectures in

Frankfurt. This element became an important part of Tillich‘s efforts to show the
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union of theology and philosophy. Ratschow (1980:24) writes:

In 1929 Tillich was called to the chair that Scheler had held in Frankfurt as
ordinarius for philosophy and sociology; he remained there until 1933. The
lectures from this time indicate no specifically theological themes, with the
exception of a course Dogmatics I, in Marburg. The themes are all on religion
and culture, on the social situation, or on ―religious experience,‖ the ―religious
interpretation of being,‖ and the ―essence of religion.‖ In the themes of these
lectures and in the way that Tillich moved from university to university is
reflected the tendency of Tillich‘s working. At the peak of this tendency is
the theme of his life: the theology of culture..

Ratschow gives us further insight into Tillich‘s theology of culture. Ratschow

(ibid:24) writes: ‗In this problem his historical elan, his religio-philosophical

system, his poltical theory, and his religious passion were brought together‘.

In analysis, Tillich tried to demonstrate another dimension of the union

between philosophy and theology. This was the union of religion and culture. Culture‘s

substance is religion. Religion‘s form is culture. Tillich related religion to politics, art,

depth psychology, and sociology.

The German people were open to new ideas as a result of the culture shocks from

World War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became

part of his curriculum while he was teaching at Frankfurt.

4:4 Tillich’s Role At Frankfurt

4:4:1 Tillich A Sacred Theologian In A Secular Setting

Tillich accepted the position in Frankfurt with the title Professor of Philosophy
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and Sociology (Pauck and Pauck 1976:112-113). Fritz Medicus wrote a public

endorsement of Tillich in a ‗leading Swiss newspaper‘. The Paucks (ibid:113) write:

‗Tillich‘s former teacher and friend Fritz Medicus, who had observed Tillich‘s popularity

at a seminar in Davos during the summer of 1928, wrote a tremendously enthusiastic

piece for the Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the leading Swiss newspaper, proclaiming

that the appointment of Tillich to Scheler‘s chair was the beginning of a new

philosophical era. His experience in Davos convinced him that his former pupil,

whom he described as a genius, had rescued the Schellingian philosophy from the

dusty theory in which it was held captive and transformed it into meaning for a

responsible way of life‘. The Paucks (ibid:113) add: ‗Tillich‘s formal task at the

University of Frankfort [Frankfurt] was in fact to teach social education, and in his

lectures and seminars between the years 1929 and 1933 he thus emphasized the

aspects of social ethics, historical action, and political direction rather than the

speculative or metaphysical interest of the thinkers with whom he dealt in the

classroom. More than ever he felt obliged to make philosophical questions existential

for the numerous students for whom philosophical courses were mandatory‘. The

Paucks (ibid:113) continue: ‗He gave courses on Kant, Hegel, and Schelling, on

Locke and Thomas Aquinas‘. Tillich lectured: ‗on ―Being and Action,‖ ―The Masses and

The Spirit,‖ Philosophy of Religion,‖ and ―The History of Philosophy.‖ He offered a

course on questions of systematic theology only during the last semester in Frankfort and

then only in an informal colloquial way‘ (ibid:113-114). Ratschow (1980:24) argues

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for Tillich‘s ‗systematic science of culture‘ during the German university years.

Ratschow (ibid:24) continues: ‗Its dialectic is rooted in the fact that every science

must use universal concepts to set forth a concrete normative science of its own does

does not wish to remain without fruit in a merely general validity‘. Ratschow

(ibid:24) argues: ‗This is also true for theology. As a normative science—that is,

as part of the concretizing that is turned toward life—it is a part of the science of

religion‘. Ratschow (ibid:24) reveals Tillich‘s conception of theology. Ratschow

(ibid:25) writes: ‗Since Tillich conceives of theology as the normative part of a

science of religion, the problem of cultural theology can be discussed only in the

large horizon of religion and culture. At this time, moreover, religion for Tillich

is the experience of unconditional (Schlechthinning) nothingness‘. Ratschow

(ibid:25) concludes:

Where this experience leads to the ―absolute radical No,‖ it ―changes…into a

radical Yes.‖ In the complexes of No and Yes, that which is ―above being‖
(das Uberseiende) announces itself as the reality of meaning. The definition
of religion shows the unambiguous structure of Schelling‘s triangular model:
being and nonbeing transcend toward Suprabeing (Ubersein). Even here,
however, this scheme is directed to what will later be shown to be structure
of justification.

The Paucks (1976:114) commenting on Tillich‘s time at Frankfurt write:

‗The period at Frankfort [Frankfurt] turned out to be the richest and most successful

of Tillich‘s German career‘. The Paucks (ibid:114) add:

From the beginning, as Medicus had predicted, he attracted a large and

enthusiastic group of students, which steadily increased. In these years, which
he and his illustrious colleagues (to whom he referred as ―glorious‖) described
later in ever more glowing and romantic reminiscences as the ―golden age‖ of
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German university life, Tillich deepened and refined his teaching skills.

The Paucks (ibid:114) speak well of Tillich:

He sought the truth, as of old, in his non authoritarian way. That was
unusual for a theologian. His colleagues soon learned that he had
somehow freed himself from the stuffy moralism of his Protestant
background. Moreover, he did not merely teach his students; he lived
with them and mobilized their intellectual forces. The largeness of his
nature, the broadmindedness that gave others confidence to speak their
own words, became more and more evident.

Tillich made his students feel worthwhile and intelligent by his responses to

their questions and input (ibid:114). Moreover, Tillich had the great ability

to be a very good listener. Tillich was a very open person. He was able to

employ the Socratic method of teaching whereby he obtained answers to his

questions (ibid:114). He had two assistants while he was at the University of

Frankfurt. The first was Harald Polechau ‗whom Tillich brought from Berlin‘.

Polechau was writing his dissertation at this time. Tillich had a second

assistant by the name of Theodor Wiesengrund. He was known by Teddy

or Adorno (ibid:114-115).

Tillich became well known throughout Germany as the result of his

position at the University of Frankfurt (ibid:120). The Paucks (ibid:122) add:

‗The menace of National Socialist power, at first mere parody and a shadow,

suddenly became a grotesque and brutal reality‘. At Frankfurt, Tillich had a

wide circle of friends that met to discuss academic questions (ibid:119). Tillich

described this group as ‗religious, philosophical, prophetic‘ (ibid:119). The

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Paucks (ibid:118) write: ‗Horkheimer, Lowe, Mannheim, Mennicke, Pollock

and Reizler, who came as ‗thought-provoker‖ ex officio, were all members‘.

Dorrien (2003:487) writes of Tillich‘s activities at Frankfurt:

Shortly after Tillich arrived at Frankfurt, he helped engineer a faculty

position for Max Horkheimer, who became director of the neo-Marxist
Institut fur Sozialforschung, later named as the Frankfurt School. The
Frankfurt School critical theorists were more inclined to theory than
practical political engagement, and theoretically most of them were
socialists positioned between the compromised revisionism of the
German Social Democratic Party and the compromised revisionism of
and the antidemocratic collectivism of the Communists.

Donnelly (2003:2) writes: ‗This bringing together and fusing of religious and

Marxist thought in the early Tillich has been the subject of special study for

a number of scholars, most notably Guy Hammond, Terry O‘Keeffe, Richard

Quinney, Ronald Stone, and John Stumme‘. Donnelly (ibid:2) argues that

Tillich was ‗widely perceived as a Marxist, and not without good reason‘.

Donnelly points to Tillich‘s commitment to Marxism. Tillich (1936:63

in Donnelly 2003:27) admits his debt to Marx: ‗ I owe to Marx, first of all,

the insight into the ideological character not only idealism but of all systems

of thought, religious as well as profane which as the servants of power hinder,

even though unconsciously, the more righteous form of social reality‘. Further,

Donnelly (2003:2-3) lists a number of journals which support Tillich‘s commitment

to this important ideology. Donnelly (ibid:2-3) lists: ‗ ―Review of Metaphysics‖

(Cohen 1950:4:13-24), the ―Journal of Religion‖ (Kucheman 1972:52:268-286), the

―American Journal of Theology and Philosophy‖ (1984:5:1:13-24), the ―Journal of

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Social Research‖ (1948:3:472-499), ‗Ideology and the Protestant Principle‘ in the

―Journal of Religion‖ (1983:283-305), the ―Union Seminary Quarterly Review‖ (1979:

34:4:203-214), the ―Union Seminary Quarterly Review‖ (1979:32:1:3-9), and the

―Laval Theologique et Philosophie‖ (1989:October:393ff)‘.

Thomas (1963:14) argues that Tillich‘s public speaking brought him into

conflict with the growing Nazi movement in Germany. His argument is built on

Tillich biographical details (1963:14). Tillich was convinced of the need for religious

socialism for Germany (Thomas 2000:43). Thomas (ibid:43) argues based on Tillich‘s

book The Socialist Decision. It contained Tillich‘s ‗developed political theology‘ (ibid:43).

This book showed Tillich‘s commitment to ‗socialist politics‘, and it was ‗a deliberate

attack on the growing attraction of Nazism‘ (ibid:43).

The critical analysis of this section shows that Tillich was Professor of Philosophy

at Frankfurt. Tillich was replacing Scheler. Scheler was to replace Cornelius. Scheler died

before his appointment was to begin. Tillich emphasized the social, historical action, and

political direction. Tillich made his philosophical questions existential while he was at

Frankfurt. Tillich attracted a large number of students at Frankfurt. This was his most

successful teaching period. Tillich became involved with the Institute for Social Research

at Frankfurt. The early Tillich had fused together religious and Marxist thought into

religious socialism.
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4:5 The Political And Economic Background

4:5:1 The Rise of Hitler And The Great Depression

Paul Tillich‘s years at Frankfurt were lived out against the background

of political turmoil and turbulence in Germany. Thomas (ibid:19) writes: ‗As the 1920s

wore on, the National Socialist Movement grew in strength and influence. Thomas (ibid:43)

continues : ‗By the end of the decade, the threat it posed was sufficient‘. The Great Depression

which had its origin in the Wall Street Crash that occurred on October 29, 1929 in the United

States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. By mid 1930‘s the economic

pressures of the Great Depression were causing the German democratic government to come

apart (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-649). January 30, 1933, saw Hitler named as

Chancellor of Germany by Hindenburg‘s concession (ibid:687). In March, 1933, Hitler

became dictator of all of Germany (ibid:687). Tillich‘s years in Frankfurt were

overshadowed by the rise of Adolf Hitler. Tillich (1977:xxxiii) writes:

‗The political events of recent years have been decisive in providing the impulse to

begin and complete the book: the decline of the political influence of the Social

Democrats, the apparently final split in the proletarian working class, the triumphal

advance of National Socialism, the consolidation of the late-capitalistic powers on a

on a military basis, the increasingly perilous situation in foreign affairs‘.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles had laid heavy war ‗reparations for all the

damage to which the Allied governments and their people were subject as a result

of the war‘ on Germany (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:644). Barnett (1998:19)

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writes:

In 1919, however, most Germans longed not for democracy but for stability and
order. The Weimar Republic, its birth accompanied by right-wing soldiers‘
uprisings and Communist attempts at revolution, was an uncertain government
in a volatile environment. It was burdened by the social and economic costs of
the war and the additional obligations of paying war reparations, which the
victorious European powers had set at 132 billion gold marks.

The Dawes Plan of 1924 was drawn up by an international commission. It gave

Germany a loan of two hundred million. Reparations were reduced and made

dependent upon Germany‘s ability to pay (Duiker and Spielvogel 2007:646-647).

The Americans made heavy investments in Europe which created European prosperity

during the years 1924 to 1929. In 1928, American investors called in these loans

made to Germany. This was so as to be able to invest in the New York stock market.

The October 1929 stock market crash led American investors to have to withdraw

even more loaned money to Germany (ibid:647). Duiker and Spielvogel (ibid:649)

write:

Germany experienced runaway inflation in 1922 and 1923; widows, orphans,

the retired elderly, army officers, teachers, civil servants, and others who lived
on fixed incomes all watched their monthly stipends become worthless and their
lifetime savings evaporate. Their economic losses increasingly pushed the middle
class to the rightest parties that were hostile to the republic. To make matters
worse, after a period of prosperity from 1924 to 1929, Germany faced the Great
Depression. Unemployment increased to 3 million in March 1930 and 4.4 million
by December of the same year. The depression paved the way for the rise of
extremist parties.

In inquiry, Tillich‘s Frankfurt years were lived out against the background of

political turmoil and economic instability. The treaty of Versailles had laid heavy

war reparation payments on Germany. The booming New York stock market of 1928

caused American investors to withdraw loans made to Germany. This was in order that
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they could invest in the New York stock market. The crash of the New York stock

market in 1929 sent financial shockwaves around the globe. American investors called

in more loans made to Germany. The Hindenberg democratic government was coming

apart. Hindenberg made a concession to Adolf Hitler on January 30, 1933. Hitler was

named Chancellor of Germany. Later, in March, 1933, Hitler became dictator of all of

Germany.

4:6 Tillich’s Closing Days At Frankfurt

4:6:1 Tillich’s Appeal To The German People

Tillich produced his book The Socialist Decision during his German years.

Stumme (1977:xxiii) writes: ‗Tillich wrote the bulk of The Socialist Decision during

the summer of 1932 in the mountains of Sils Maria, Switzerland‘,….But it was too

late. Historical events foreclosed any genuine decision; on 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler

took power, and the barbaric future began‘. Stumme (ibid:xxiii-xxiv) continues: ‗The

Socialist Decision was suppressed and all the socialist literature of Alfred Protte,

Tillich‘s publisher, was confiscated. Later, the remaining copies of the work were

destroyed when the Protte warehouse in Potsdam was leveled by Allied bombs‘.

Stumme (ibid:xxiv) concludes: ‗The book‘s public existence was extremely short-lived,

and no reviews of it were printed. Like other anti-Nazi material, The Socialist Decision

was consumed by the fires of repression‘. Carey (2002:4) writes: ‗Tillich was dismissed
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by the Nazis from his position at the University of Frankfurt on April 13, 1933, and in

December of the same year he and his family came to America‘.

In examination, Tillich‘s book The Socialist Decision did not come out soon enough.

It was published in 1933 by Alfred Protte. Hitler took power on January 30, 1933. All

socialist literature was confiscated. Allied bombs leveled the Protte warehouse. Tillich

was dismissed from his teaching position at Frankfurt by the Nazis on April 13, 1933.

It was in December of 1933 that Tillich and his family came to America.

4:7 Summary

Tillich was Professor Ordinarius of Philosophy in Frankfurt-on-the-Main.

He sought to get a clear conception of the scientific relationship of philosophy to

theology. This helps us in our understanding of the Frankfurt years. Tillich distinguished

between two kinds of theology. Philosophic theology is philosophical in character. The

second kind of theology is kerygmatic theology. Kerygmatic is derived from the New

Testament word for message. It tries to reproduce the Christian message in a systematic

way without referring to philosophy. Philosophical theology is also based on the kerygma.

It tries to explain the contents of the kerygma in close interrelation with philosophy.

Kerygmatic theology and philosophical theology are interdependent on each other.

Kerygmatic theology has always used philosophical terms and methods. Philosophical

theology has always tried to explain the content of the message. The theological ideal is

the unity of both types of theology. Philosophical theology is also called apologetics,

speculative theology, and also Christian philosophy of religion.

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Philosophy attempts a description of the world in unity with all kinds of scientific

and nonscientific experience. However, it must first try to understand being itself, the

categories, and the structures common to all kinds of beings. This makes the division

between philosophy and theology impossible because of the relation of God, world, and

man. Whatever the relation is it lies within the frame of being. Philosophy asks the questions.

Theology supplies the answers. The Frankfurt years (1929-1933) show the Tillichean

understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Tillich‘s theology

is built on the ontological model.

The Frankfurt years help us in our understanding of Tillich‘s boundary and border

line concept. This is a metaphysical concept pointing to Tillich‘s destiny as existence on

the boundary. The boundaries had particular intensity, directness, and totality for Tillich.

These boundaries are transitions, battlegrounds, controversies, difficult tensions, and

endurance tests.

Tillich tried to show the union between philosophy and theology at Frankfurt.

This became possible because of the explanation that Schelling‘s Christian philosophy

of existence provided. However, Schelling‘s Christian philosophy didn‘t the unity of

theology and philosophy. It failed to do so because it didn‘t include Tillich‘s concept

of the abyss. The result was the birth of Tillich‘s Christian philosophy of religion. The

union of theology and philosophy was achieved because of Tillich‘s Christian philosophy

of religion. His Christian philosophy of religion abides on the border between theology

and philosophy. The abyss is that which is expressed in dimension of depth. The ground
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and abyss is that in which everything is rooted.

Tillich was attracted to the philosophy of life. He could interpret Nietzsche

because of Schelling. The German revolution of 1918 gave new direction to Tillich‘s

thinking. His Christian philosophy of history became sociologically and politically

oriented. Tillich redefined his Christian philosophy of history as a result of Troeltsch‘s

philosophy of history. Tillich‘s new Christian philosophy of history became the Christian

philosophy of religious socialism.

A second dimension of the union between philosophy and theology was that of

religion and culture. Tillich defined religion as ultimate concern concerning that which

should be our ultimate concern. Faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern.

Faith is also the belief in the highest being‘s existence God, the theoretical, and the

practical consequences of such belief. Culture decides the forms and the context that

expresses the Absolute. Culture‘s substance is religion. Religion‘s form is is culture.

Tillich showed the relationship of religion to culture. Culture included politics, art,

Philosophy, depth psychology, and sociology.

Frankfurt didn‘t have a theological faculty. It was natural for Tillich‘s lectures

to move on the boundary between philosophy and theology. Tillich tried to make

philosophy existential for his numerous students.

The German people were open to new ideas due to the culture shocks of World

War I and two digit inflation. Tillich formed an apologetical theology. This became

part of his curriculum when he was teaching at Frankfurt. Tillich lectured on the themes
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of religion and culture, the social situation, religious experience, the religious interpretation

of being, and the essence of religion. Tillich‘s theology of culture was the theological

problem that joined together his historical elan, his religio-philosophical system, his

political theory, and his religious passion.

Tillich accepted his position in Frankfurt as Professor of Philosophy and Sociology.

Fritz Medicus, a former teacher wrote an article about Tillich in a leading Swiss newspaper.

The article pointed out that Tillich‘s appointment as a successor of Scheler was the

beginning of a new philosophical era. Tillich became well known throughout Germany

as a result of his position at the University of Frankfurt. Tillich had a wide circle of

friends at Frankfurt. They met to discuss academic questions in the Frankfurt School

(Institute for Social Research). The early Tillich fused together religious and Marxist

thought. Tillich was perceived as a Marxist.

Tillich‘s Frankfurt years (1929-1933) were characterized by political turmoil

and economic instability. The Wall Street Crash on October 29, 1929 in the United

States sent financial shockwaves around the globe. The German democratic government

collapsed. On January 30, 1933, Hitler was named Chancellor of Gernany by the concession

of Hindenburg. March 1933 saw Hitler becoming dictator of all of Germany.

Tillich‘s closing days at Frankfurt saw the completion of his book The Socialist

Decision. This book was published in 1933. Hitler‘s barbaric reign began on January

30, 1933. The Socialist Decision and all socialist literature was suppressed and

confiscated. The remaining copies of The Socialist Decision were destroyed when the
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Alfred Protte warehouse was levelled by Allied bombs. Tillich was dismissed by the

Nazis on April 13, 1933. He and his family came to America in December of 1933.

The procession of our thesis is to consider the influences on Tillich during the

years 1886 to 1933.

 CHAPTER 5

INFLUENCES

5:1 Academic

Influences (Dictionary 2008:1) is defined as ‗the capacity or power of

persons or things to be a compelling force on or produce effects on the actions,

behavior, opinions, etc., of others‘.

Paul Tillich‘s life had many influences on it during the German years.

Bernard Martin (1963:2) argues that Tillich‘s biographical data ‗sets forth the major

facts of Tillich‘s life‘. Martin (ibid:7) seeks to explain what ‗incidents‘ and ‗experiences

of his personal historical destiny have been of basic importance in molding his thought‘.

In addition, Martin (ibid:7) argues for the ‗crucial intellectual influences upon‘ Tillich‘s

life. Tillich had studied philosophy on his own. He had a working knowledge of the history

of philosophy and familiarity with Fichte and Kant. At the University, he had studied

Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling. His concentration was focused on Schelling‘s

Christian philosophy of religion (ibid:17). Tillich had studied theology at the University

of Berlin, Tubingen, and also Halle. He took his first theological exam in 1909. His

second theological exam was written in 1911. He received the Doctor of Philosophy degree

from the University of Breslau in 1911. In 1912, Tillich received the Licentiate of Theology
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from the University of Halle (ibid:17). Paul Tillich was interested in the ideological character

not only of ‗idealism‘ but as well ‗all systems of thought both religious and profane‘. He

had learned earlier from Kierkegaard that truth is always to be found in the context of the

knower (ibid:21). It was during the German years that Tillich became interested in the

social movements of his day. He had a profound interest in Marx who had a new and a

different emphasis of economic materialism (ibid:21). The thought of Kierkegaard held

that every human being exists in a situation of despair (ibid:21). The German masses were

involved in a class struggle during and after World War I. Marx thought every system of

harmony was untrue (ibid:21). Tillich was now able to connect truth to a particular

psychological or social situation. Further, Marx‘s doctrine of economic materialism

confirmed Kierkegaard‘s doctrine of self-alienation (Tillich 1936:65). Martin (1963:21)

argues that Marx was one of the definite influences on Tillich. Martin (ibid:21) writes of

Marx‘s influence on Tillich: ‗his debt to him for many…insights‘.

Martin follows the biographical details of Paul Tillich‘s life to establish his

argument. In 1900, the Tillich family moved to Berlin, Germany. Tillich‘s father,

Johannes had accepted a church position as pastor. Martin (Tillich 1936:6 in Martin

1963:16) quotes Tillich: ‗I was saved from romantic enmity against technical

civilizations and was taught to appreciate the importance of the big city for the critical

side of intellectual and artistic life. Later there was added to this a vital and thoughtful

understanding of the world of Bohemianism, possible only in the large cities; and also an

aesthetic appreciation of the internal and external immensity of the metropolis‘. Tillich
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(ibid:6 in ibid:16) gained ‗personal experience‘ of both the political and the social movements

in Berlin. Tillich (1952:9) graduated from the Gymnasium in 1904. He developed a love for

both the Greek language, culture, and as well Greek philosophy (ibid:9). Tillich (ibid:10)

confirms that he (ibid:10) had studied philosophy on his own prior to beginning his theological

studies at the university. Tillich (ibid:10) had a knowledge of both Fichte and Kant when he

entered the university. Tillich (ibid:10) studied Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling

during his university days. Tillich studied theology at the Universities of Berlin,

Tubingen, and Halle (Martin 1963:17). In 1909, he took his first theological exam. In

1911, his second theological exam (ibid:17). In 1911, Tillich received the Doctor of

Philosophy degree from the University of Breslau. In 1912, he received the Licentiate of

Theology at Halle (ibid:17). His doctoral dissertation and his Licentiate of Theology were

both written on the work of Friedrich Schelling (Tillich 1952:10 in ibid:17). Schelling‘s

work made an impact on Tillich‘s life. Martin doesn‘t draw this conclusion from Tillich‘s

biographical data. His purpose comes out in that his argument is to support only the theme

of his book The Existential Theology of Paul Tillich (ibid:26). Martin (ibid:26) argues:

‗Kierkegaard and Heidegger remain his philosophic heroes and the existentialist doctrine

of man continues to be for him the most valuable and enlightening account that has been

given of the human predicament in modern times‘.

Tillich (1936:31-33) recalls his theological training and reading:

During the writing of these works, [his two dissertations on Schelling] I was a
student of Protestant theology, and at the conclusion of my studies became
assistant pastor at various parishes of the Old Prussian United Church. At that time,
Martin Kahler and Wilhelm Lutgert from Halle were my most important teachers.
 156

The former was a personality of overwhelming ethical and religious power and
intellectual concentration; as teacher and writer difficult to understand;
profoundest and in many respects the most modern representative of the theology
of mediation of the nineteenth century; an opponent of Albert Ritschl, herald of the
theological doctrine of justification, and critic of idealism and humanism, out of
which he himself evolved. I am indebted to him primarily for the insight he gave
me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification….
At this point, I parted soon from the teachings of the theologians in Halle and
became less and less in accord with the new supranaturalism, which has grown up
within Barth‘s theology, and wishes to repeat the dogmatic doctrines of the
Reformation, by discarding the scientific work of two hundred years. At first it
was the interpretation of the Old Testament by Wellhausen and Gunkel, the
so-called religions-geschichtliche Methode, which fascinated me and revealed to me
the Old Testament in its fundamental meaning for Christianity and humanity. My
preference for the Old Testament and the spirit of prophetic criticism and expectation
has stayed with me and through the bearing of this upon my political attitude, it has
become decisive for the shaping of my life and thought….My historical insights into
the New Testament I owe principally to Albert Schweitzer‘s ―The Quest of the
Historical Jesus‖ and Bultmans Synoptische Tradition. Ernst Troeltsch caused my
transfer of interest from all mediating-theological and apologetic remains in Church
History and in the problem of historical criticism.

Martin‘s view of Tillich as merely an existential theologian does not do justice to

Tillich. Tillich (1936:31-33) argues for Schelling‘s Christian philosophy of religion

and the Old Testament prophetic criticism for his political attitude.

In partition, Tillich was indebted to both Kierkegaard and Marx. Kierkegaard

gave Tillich insight on man‘s existence in a situation of despair or self-alienation. Marx‘s

interpretation of history as a class struggle gave Tillich insight into the situation of the

German masses during and after World War I. Schelling‘s views became Tillich‘s

views. Tillich wrote both his doctoral dissertation and his dissertation for Licentiate of

Theology on Schelling. Tillich had insight from Martin Kahler into the Pauline-Lutheran

idea of justification. Wellhausen and Gunkel gave Tillich insight into the Old Testament.
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Tillich‘s political attitude was influenced by the spirit of prophetic criticism from

the Old Testament.

5:2 Life Experiences

5:2:1 Tillich’s Religious Situation

Martin does draw a conclusion from the biographical data of Tillich‘s church

service and duty as a chaplain in World War I. Tillich served as a chaplain in the

German army from September 1914 to September 1918. Martin (1963:20) points out

Tillich saw World War I as a disaster for Europe. The unity of the German nation was

a myth. Germany was divided into conflicting classes. Further, the proletariat viewed

the church as the ally of the ruling classes. The conflict between the masses and the ruling

class led to the revolution of 1918. The result was Imperial Germany collapsed. Martin

(1963:20) argues: ‗Tillich in deep sympathy with social aspects of the short-lived

revolution. He became one of the founders of German religious socialism; and as one

of the major theoreticians of the movement, developed some of its key concepts‘. Niebuhr

(1956:10) interprets Tillich‘s The Religious Situation as a revolt ‗against the spirit of

capitalist society‘. Niebuhr (ibid:10) writes:

Capitalist society, however, is not a scheme of economic organization only; it is also

a culture with a definitely religious character. Its civilization is based…the
establishment of human control over the world of nature and mind. Natural science,
technique and capitalist economy…control the civilization.

Tillich became involved in the social movements (Martin 1963:20). Tillich incorporated
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Marx‘s thought into his life and teaching. Tillich (1956:122-125) writes:

Among the ideas which betray the true character of capitalist society is its conception
of the state. In the pre-capitalist period of the state as the law giving and law-enforcing
community possessed the unction and sanctity which naturally belongs to it when the
whole community regards it as the fundamental structure of the social life, determining
all aspects of the social culture….[T]he capitalist conception of the state may be
characterized as its complete secularization….[T]he vital force which supported the
capitalistic state was nationalism….[I]n…socialism….[I]ts…contradiction.

He developed the concept of the kairos which was espoused during the regular meetings

of religious socialism (Tillich 1936:57-58 in Martin 1963:20).

Ludwig Feuerbach who lived from 1804-1872 thought the ‗true sense of

Theology is Anthropology (Feuerbach 1989:xvii in Crockett 2001:108). Tillich‘s

(1977:13-15) The Socialist Decision demonstrates the inclusion of anthropology. This

was an appeal to the German people to accept Socialism rather than Nazism. Tillich

sought justice in the realms of economics and politics. Tillich wanted a meaningful

society that would make the question of Marxism to Christianity an open question

(Stumme 1977:xxvi).

In evaluating, Tillich‘s experience as a chaplain in the Germany army from

1914 to 1918 deeply affected Tillich‘s views. He saw the unity of the German nation

as a myth. Germany was experiencing class warfare. The proletariat distrusted the

church and the ruling classes. It was conflict between the masses and the ruling classes

that led to the revolution of 1918. Tillich became a religious socialist. He was one of

the founders and theoreticians of the religious socialist movement. His books The

Religious Situation and The Socialist Decision demonstrate Tillich‘s commitment to

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religious socialism. The Religious Situation was written against the spirit of the

capitalist society. His book The Socialist Decision was an appeal to the German people to

accept religious socialism rather than Nazism.

5:3 Marx

5:3:1 Marx’s Influence On Tillich

John Carey (2002:23) tells of Marx‘s influence on Tillich. Carey (2002:23)

writes:

That Paul Tillich was interested in the thought of Karl Marx is widely known among
Tillich scholars. Tillich‘s early German writings on socialism, his sympathy for
the social critiques of religion, and his efforts to promulgate a religious-socialist
movement in Germany are all evidences of his debt to Karl Marx. Tillich was
deeply influenced by Marx‘s critique of capitalism, and he used that critique
in his numerous early assessments of capitalism as the basic source of economic
injustice in the modern world.

Carey (Tillich 1948:907 in ibid:29) continues:

Tillich consistently refused to join the ranks of those who dismiss Marx as a
diabolical thinker who unleased the wave of communist terror upon the earth.
Quite the contrary, he saw many key insights in Marx‘s thought as having
relevance for the twentieth century because Marx interpreted history ―in a
way which makes even his erroneous prophecies significant.

Tillich (1977:109) writes of Marx:

For Marx, too, being must move in the direction of that which is demanded,
so that the demand does not remain abstract and impotent. In his analysis of
capitalist society these basic presuppositions receive concrete application and
are elaborated by means of scientific methods. The structure of capitalism
itself drives towards its transmutation into socialism, towards the classless society.

Tillich (1977:160) took seriously Marx‘s words on ‗another possibility: chaos‘. Tillich

(ibid:160-161) writes:
 160

If, in the encounter between the bourgeoisie and political romanticism, the bourgeois
principle should once again gain a complete victory, the increasingly severe crises
would make chaos virtually invevitable. If on the other hand political romanticism
and, with it, militant nationalism proves victorious, a self-annihilating struggle of
the European peoples is inevitable. The salvation of European society from a
return to barbarism lies in the hands of socialism.

Tillich (1936:66 in ibid:29) argues for the need to appropriate, criticize, and

continue the dialogue with Marx. Carey (2002:29-30) argues:

Tillich felt that there are far-reaching analogies between Marx‘s interpretation
of history and the perspective of the Old Testament prophets. Both saw history
in dynamic terms, as a struggle between good and evil powers. Humanity is
called to identify itself with the historical group that carries on the fight for good.
Redemption is the conquest and extermination of evil in history. In this sense
Marx, like the prophets, set himself against the ―nonhistorical‖ interpretations
of history which attempt to understand history through categories of nature or
space.

Carey (ibid:30) concludes: ‗Tillich recognized, of course, that Marx had shifted the

prophetic concept of transcendence to the material realm of immanence, but he

insisted nevertheless that Marx shows a greater affinity to the prophets than do most

of the comfortable churches of our day‘.

Carey (2002:30) points out: ‗Tillich gives priority to Marx‘s view of justice‘.

Carey argues that economics as the basis for historical change is an oversimplification

(ibid:30). Yet Carey (ibid:30-31) admits the ‗significance of the economic factor in life,

and in being aware of the physical needs of persons‘. Tillich saw in Marx the prophetic

voice ‗for justice in the social order‘ (ibid:31).

Tillich saw in Marx the importance of an approach to the interpretation of history

that allows for ‗decision and involvement‘ (ibid:31). Carey (2002:32) argues:

Related to this understanding of truth is Marx‘s trenchant criticism of the ideologies

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developed by all societies to justify the status quo. Marx developed this point as a
part of his attack on Idealism; as opposed to appeals to a transcendent order, he
wanted to stress the primacy of humanity‘s actual situation. Ideologies that are
presented as eternal truths, independent of humanity‘s concrete situation, distort the
actual human situation, and keep us from taking the necessary steps to improve our
conditions. This, too, Tillich saw as a valid insight, and he appropriated this into
his own understanding of history.

Carey (Tillich 1936:63 in ibid:32) quotes Tillich: ‗I owe to Marx, first of all, the insight

into the ideological character, not only of idealism but of all systems of thought, religious

as well as profane, which as the servants of power hinder, even though unconsciously,

the more righteous form of social reality‘. Tillich (1938:116-117 in ibid:32) admitted

the accuracy of Marx‘s thought that religion was a ideology of the privileged classes.

Carey (Tillich 1936:192-194 in ibid:34) makes an interesting point on the need for a

revolution by the proletariat. Carey writes:

It is interesting that Tillich nowhere criticized Marx‘s doctrine of the necessity of

a revolution by the proletariat, although his own identification with the German
Social Democratic party suggests his preference for working for social change
within the context of existing political structures. The reason for Tillich‘s silence
may lie in his concept of power. He recognized that when a ruling group no
longer expresses the will of the majority of citizens, a revolutionary situation is
created, and justice in such instances is often on the side of the revolutionary forces.
Tillich admits that there are ambiguities involved in determining when the time is
ripe for a political revolution, but he was not willing to say that revolutions ipso
facto are always wrong.

Further, Carey makes another interesting point on Tillich which is beyond the scope of this

thesis on the German years. Carey (ibid:23) writes: ‗What is less well known, even

among Tillich scholars, is that Tillich had a lifelong interest in Marx and Marxism‘.

Tillich‘s statement of Marxian thought has always been contingent on the dialectical

which combines a yes and a no. The positive element on Marx‘s thought in Tillich‘s life
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was ‗on prophetic, humanistic, and realistic elements‘ (Martin 1963:22). The no or the

negative element of Marxian thought in Tillich‘s life was ‗in Marx‘s analysis, polemics,

and propaganda‘ (ibid:22). Carey‘s conclusion on Marx‘s influence is important for our

thesis. Carey (ibid:35) writes: ‗There is no doubt that Karl Marx exerted a greater influence

on Tillich than anyone else concerning political consciousness and the interpretation

of history‘. Carey‘s critique of Tillich‘s criticism of Marx is largely based on documents

from the American years 1933-1965 which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Carey

(ibid:34) argues that Tillich felt Marx was mistaken in his thinking on the proletariat.

Marx made the rise of the proletariat ‗the focal point of history‘. Carey (2002:29-35)

agrees that Tillich‘s thinking on Karl Marx was always dialectical. This was a combination

of both positive and negative elements. The positive would be that Tillich saw in Marx the

voice of the Old Testament prophets (ibid:29). Tillich admired Marx‘s view of justice

with the call for the need for a just society (ibid:30). Tillich admired Marx‘s historical

approach with the need for decision and involvement (ibid:31). Tillich agreed with Marx

on Marx‘s criticism of ideologies that were oppressive to the human situation (ibid:32).

The negative for Tillich would be Marx‘s failure to distinguish the divine from human

ecclesiastical expressions. Marx‘s interpretation of history did not allow for the kairos, his

interpretation of history was too utopian, a wrong emphasis on the proletariat, and some of

Marx‘s thought was not relevant for the twentieth century (ibid:33-34). Carey (ibid:34)

lists Marx‘s irrelevant thought as follows: ‗Marx‘s theories of work and value, accumulation

and concentration of wealth, the scientific study of history, and so forth‘.

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In breakdown, Tillich was deeply influenced by Karl Marx. It was

Marx‘s critique of capitalism that Tillich used in his early writings. Tillich pointed

out that capitalism was the cause of economic injustice in the world. Tillich saw in

Marx the spirit of the Old Testament prophets. Tillich argued for the need to continue

the dialogue with Marx. Tillich admitted his debt to Marx. Karl Marx had a greater

influence on Tillich than anyone else in both Tillich‘s political view and his interpretation

of history.

5:4 Art

5:4:1 Tillich’s Theology Of Art

Tillich became interested in painting during his time as a chaplain in World War I.

Palmer (Pauck and Pauck 1976:51 in Palmer 1984:3) writes:: ‗For Tillich‘s

appreciation of painting began in the trenches, during the First World War and thus

belongs to the most shattering and formative period of his life. During his four years

of military service as an army chaplain, Tillich survived the offensives at Verdun,

Amiens and Aisne-Marne, received the Iron Cross, sustained two nervous breakdowns,

and emerged with a consciousness of suffering and death from which, so his

biographers record, he never fully recovered‘. Palmer (ibid:3) continues: ‗Throughout

this time painting provided him with his principal means of relaxation and escape, an

inevitable reaction‘. Tillich (1966:27-28 in ibid:3) tells that this was due ‗to the horror,

ugliness and destructiveness of war. My delight even in the poor reproductions obtainable

at the military bookstores developed into a systematic study of the history of art. And out
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of this study came the experience of art‘. Palmer (ibid:3) relates another experience

that made a great impact on Tillich during Tillich‘s last furlough of World War I.

Palmer (ibid:3) writes:

During his last furlough of the war, Tillich visited the Kaiser Friedrich Museum
in Berlin. There he saw Botticelli‘s ‗Madonna with Singing Angels‘, the
picture hanging alone on a wall opposite the entrance. The setting itself
was dramatic and the painting‘s impact on him enormous: ever afterwards
Tillich was to speak of it as a moment of ‗revelation‘, as an experience in
which he had been grasped not only by the beauty and power of visual art
but by the reality of the absolute.

Tillich (1952:13) became a Privatdozent of theology at the University of

Berlin from 1919 to 1924. He tried to relate religion to other subjects of which art

was one. Tillich (ibid:13) continues: ‗Revolutionary art came into the foreground,

supported by the Republic, attacked by the majority of the people‘. Tillich‘s

theology of culture was also a theology of art. Art had a great influence on Tillich

during his years in as a chaplain in the German army in World War I.

In dissection, Tillich‘s experience as a chaplain in World War I led to his

interest in art. Tillich longed for beauty amidst the horrors of World War I. He sought

relief and escape in the paintings of the military bookshops. Tillich‘s interest in art and

his systematic study of art resulted in a theology of art.

5:5 Freud

5:5:1 The Common Bond

During the German years, Tillich thought the ‗new depth psychology of Freud‘
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‗a little short of revelatory‘ (Martin 1963:23). Freud was another intellectual influence

upon Tillich. Tillich had been introduced to Freud‘s work by Eckart Von Sydow

(Pauck & Pauck 1976:75). The Paucks (ibid:223) tell us that Tillich‘s interest in

Freud grew ‗which he had nourished since 1919‘. Tillich lectured ‗on subjects which

included the relation of religion to politics, art, philosophy, depth psychology, and

sociology‘ (Tillich 1967:41). This was when Tillich was at the University of Berlin as

a Privatdozent of theology from 1919 to 1924 (ibid:41). Tillich (ibid:41) continues:

‗I presented in my lectures on the philosophy of religion, its history and its structure.

The situation during those years in Berlin was very favorable for such an enterprise….

Psychoanalytic ideas spread and produced a consciousness of realities which had been

carefully repressed in previous generations‘. Cooper (2006:15) explains: ‗Freud used

psychological terminology and Luther used theological concepts, both pointed toward

the fundamental human dilemma—the darker regions of the psyche have a multitude of

maneuvers for keeping themselves unknown‘. Cooper (ibid:21) continues: ‗It is Tillich‘s

understanding of the demonic which draws deeply from both Freud and Marx. Freud reinstated

the psychological bondage of the will, which seems to reflect a kind of demonic activity‘.

Cooper (ibid:21) concludes: ‗Marx, on the other hand, describes the undercurrents of class

conflict and economic injustice which represent social demons‘. Tillich (1966:69 in Cooper

2006:21) tells of his concept of the demonic:

The only sufficient term I found was in the New Testament use of the ―demonic,‖
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which is in stories about Jesus: similar to being possessed. That means a force,
under a force, which is stronger than the individual good will. And so I used that
term. Of course I emphasized very much I don‘t mean in a mythological sense-as
little demons or a personal Satan running around the world-but I mean it as structures
which are ambiguous, both to a certain extent creative, but ultimately destructive.
I had to find a term which covers the transpersonal power which takes hold of men
and society.

Further, both Tillich‘s existentialism and Freud‘s psychoanalysis shared ‗a common

revolt‘ (Cooper 2006:66). This was against the philosophy of consciousness which reached its

peak with Hegel. Cooper (ibid:66) continues:

The ―philosophy of consciousness‖ takes human thought at face value. Existentialism

and psychoanalysis, on the other hand, view consciousness as governed by the
impulses and irrational urges beneath it….Tillich believes this conflict has gone on for
centuries: Aquinas vs. Duns Scotus, Erasmus vs. Luther, Descartes vs. Pascal, Hegel
vs. Kierkegaard, and so on. The philosophy of consciousness reached its zenith in
Hegel, who provoked a rebellion in such masters of suspicion as Nietzsche, Marx, and
Freud. Tillich, as we might suspect, highlights Schelling as a very important player in
this revolt against the finality of finite reason.

In addition, both ‗existentialism and psychoanalysis are concerned with estrangement

(ibid:66). Tillich (1964:116) adds: ‗now through Freud‘ came ‗ methodological scientific

words‘. Cooper (2006:66) expands and clarifies Tillich‘s words: ‗Freud is especially

important because he offered empirical, methodological procedures for demonstrating the

power of the irrational unconsciousness. While previous thinkers had offered insightful

intuition, Freud attempted to provide these intuitions with a scientific foundation‘.

Armbruster (1967:15) concludes: ‗Two other intellectual movements played an important

role in Tillich‘s formation: existentialism and psychoanalysis‘.

In brief, Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his existentialism. Freud‘s thought
 167

was taken up with the human psyche. Tillich tried to relate religion to depth psychology when

he was a Privatdozent at the University of Berlin from 1919 to 1924. Freud‘s psychoanalysis

was a revolt against Hegel‘s philosophy of consciousness. Tillich‘s existentialism shared

the same revolt against Hegel. Both existentialism and psychoanalysis were concerned with

man‘s estrangement. Tillich‘s understanding of the demonic was drawn from Freud.

5:6 Heidegger

5:6:1 A New Understanding

Heidegger was another intellectual influence on Tillich‘s life. Tillich came

to the University of Marburg in 1924. Heidegger was lecturing on existentialism.

Martin (1963:18) argues: ‗Heidegger himself has contributed very importantly to

Tillich‘s intellectual development‘. Tillich (1936:40 in Martin 1963:19) calls the

intellectual influence of Heidegger ‗upon his thinking: ‗of a prime order of magnitude‘.

Achtemeier (1969:27) writes: ‗the fundamental question with which Heidegger sets

out to deal with is the question of ―Being‖ ‘. Godbieba (1995:1) adds: ‗Any attempt on a

discussion about the religious status of God in postmodern philosophy of religion must

reckon with Martin Heidegger‘s critique of ontotheology and its effect of questioning

all contemporary conceptions of God to the point of instability. Heidegger‘s critique

of the identification of God with Being, an identification ―goes without saying‖ for

centuries is the crucial step in the attempt to overcome metaphysics, and also influences

continental philosophy‘s critique of foundations‘.

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Tillich (1936:39) experienced the lectures of Martin Heidegger: ‗by the

appearance of the so-called ―Existential Philosophy‖ in Germany, I was led to a new

understanding of the relation between philosophy and theology. The lectures of Martin

Heidegger given at Marburg, the impression of which on my Marburg students and upon

some of my colleagues I experienced; then his writing Sein Und Zeit (Being and Time)‘.

However, Tillich subjects Heidegger‘s thought on existentialism in part to Soren

Kierkegaard. Bove (1995:19) recognizes this academic maneuver by Paul Tillich.

Hamilton (1963:38) traces the evolution of Tillich‘s thinking on the subject of

existentialism. This intellectual influence reaches to both the nineteenth and the

twentieth centuries: ‗Tillich regards the existentialist way of thought, reaching

through Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century to Heidegger

and Sartre in the twentieth, as one of the great formative influences in the evolution

of his own thinking‘. Baron (2003:1) admits these intellectual influences: ‗Tillich‘s

thought was guided by ontological/existential categories‘. The proof of this came out

in Robinson‘s Honest to God (1963). Le Mahieu (2001:7) argues that Robinson

presented God as the ‗Ground of Our Being‘. His argument is that Robinson borrowed

this concept from Tillich and others. Le Mahieu (ibid:7) continues: ‗Robinson adopted

the existential language of Paul Tillich‘.

In analysis, Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between

philosophy and theology.

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5:7 Husserl

5:7:1 Tillich’s Clear Philosophical Theological Thinking

Another intellectual influence on Tillich‘s thinking was that of Edward Husserl.

Martin (1963:19) acknowledges this intellectual source: ‗Aside from Heidegger, the

modern German philosopher to whom Tillich is most indebted is probably Edmund

Husserl. Husserl‘s ―Logische Untersuchungen‖ appeared to Tillich the most forceful

refutation of positivism and particularly of that form of it, psychologism, which is of

most significance for the philosophy of religion‘. Martin (ibid:19) continues: ‗For Tillich,

Husserl‘s doctrine was the most satisfying confirmation of what he claims to have learned

from Kant and Fichte, and to Husserl‘s phenomenology he owes, as we shall observe, much

of this conception of the general nature of philosophical reflection‘.

In reasoning, Husserl aided Tillich‘s understanding of the nature of philosophical

reflection. Husserl‘s phenomenology confirmed for Tillich what he had previously

studied from Fichte and Kant.

5:8 Nature and Schelling

5:8:1 Schelling The Basis For Tillich’s Theology

Tillich had a romantic relation to nature. Tillich (1952:3-4) admits his early

years in Schonfliess-Neumark, and in Konigsberg-Neumark ‗may partly account for

what has been challenged as the romantic trend in my feeling and thinking‘. Tillich

(ibid:4) continues: ‗It is expressed in a predominantly aesthetic-meditative attitude

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toward nature as distinguished from a scientific-analytical or technical-controlling

relation. It is the reason for the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling‘s philosophy

of nature made upon me- although I was well aware that this philosophy was

scientifically impossible. It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the

of the participation of nature in the process of fall and salvation‘. Tillich (ibid:4)

points to three possible causes that account for his romanticism to nature. Tillich (ibid:4)

writes: ‗First, I find the actual communication with nature daily in my early years, in my

later years for several months of every year‘. Tillich (ibid:5) adds: ‗A second cause of the

romantic relation to nature is the impact of poetry. The German poetic literature, even aside

from the romantic school, is full of expressions of nature mysticism. There are verses of

Goethe, Holderlin, Novalis, Eichendorff, Nietzsche, George, and Rilke which never have

ceased to move me as deeply as they did when I first heard them‘. Tillich (ibid:5)

continues:

A third cause of this attitude toward nature came out of my Lutheran background.
Theologians, know that one of the points of disagreement between the two wings of
the Continental Reformation, the Lutheran and the Reformed, was the so called
―Extra Calvinisticum,‖ the doctrine that the finite is not capable of the infinite. (non
capax infiniti), and that consequently in Christ the two natures, the divine and the
human, remain outside each other. Against this doctrine the Lutherans asserted the
―Infra Lutheranum‖; namely, the view that the finite is capable of the infinite, and
consequently that in Christ there is a mutual indwelling of the two natures. The
difference means that on Lutheran ground the vision of the presence of the infinite
in everything finite was theologically affirmed, that nature mysticism was possible
and real, whereas on Calvinistic ground such an attitude is suspect of pantheism and
the divine transcendence is understood in a way which for a Lutheran is suspect of
deism.
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Tillich (ibid:5) concludes: ‗Romanticism means not only a special relation to nature; it

means also a special relation to history. To grow up in towns in which every stone is witness

of a period many centuries past produces a feeling of history, not as a matter of knowledge,

but as a living reality in which the past participates in the present‘.

Tillich (ibid:4) admits the tremendous emotional impact that Schelling‘s Christian

philosophy of nature made upon him. Tillich‘s (1936:7) own autobiography bears out the

truth of this point: ‗Schelling‘s Philosophy of Nature, which I read in a state of intoxication,

as it were, surrounded by the beauties of nature became for me the direct expression of this

feeling for nature‘. Schelling was the subject of Tillich‘s doctoral dissertation and his

Licentiate in Theology. Tillich (1966:47) writes: ‗I read through his collected works several

times, and eventually made his work the subject of my dissertations for the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy and Licentiate of Theology‘. Walter Leibrecht (1972:25) writes: ‗But follows

…Schelling where he visualizes both otherness and being dynamically united in ultimate

reality. It is the awareness of this problem which has led Tillich to vernture a new synthesis,

witnessed to the final identity in the ultimate ground‘. Hutchinson (1953:138) draws our

attention to the intellectual influence of Schelling on Tillich. He claimed Schelling advocated

the ‗Existentialist protest‘ long before Kierkegaard. Tillich denotes the importance of

Schelling‘s work in his work, On The Boundary. Tillich (1966:56) highlights Schelling‘s

Christian philosophy of existence as one of the factors that caused him to accept the

existential position. Schelling‘s philosophy of existence was derived from Jacob Bohme.
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Tillich (1936:54-55) writes of Bohme‘s influence: ‗With him as mediator, Lutheran

Mysticism had an influence on Schelling and German Idealism, and through Schelling,

again on Irrationalism and the philosophy of life of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries‘.

The Paucks (1976:175) add that Tillich was a Christian thinker who held the religious views

of Schelling. Tillich (1936:31) admitted that Schelling had become the basis for this thought

and development. Falk (1961:1-28) argues that Tillich relied heavily on Schelling‘s The Ages

of the World. Falk (ibid:26-27) is referring to Tillich‘s second dissertation for the degree of

Licentiate in Theology. Russell Re Manning (2005:77-83) affirms Schelling‘s Christian

metaphysical theology to be Tillich‘s position. Tillich (1936:35) admits that Schelling had

become the basis for his theonomous philosophy. Tillich (ibid:37) was able to interpret

Nietzsche‘s philosophy of life because of Schelling. Tillich (ibid:37) writes: ‗The historical

dependence of the philosophy of life on Schelling made it easy for me to approach it‘.

Wheat (1970:102) acknowledges Tillich‘s reliance on Schelling: ‗Tillich read Schelling‘s

collected works through several times as a student and wrote two dissertations (1911 and 1912)

dealing with Schelling‘s thought‘. Wheat (ibid:214) argues that Tillich outlined Schelling‘s

thought ‗in mysticism and theism‘. God is man who was mediated to Tillich by Schelling

(ibid:188). Wheat concludes by arguing that Tillich copied Schelling (ibid:262).

Scharlemann (2006:225) reviewed Tillich‘s two dissertations on Schelling. He

argues that Schelling was as much a contributor to theology as he was to philosophy.

Tillich (ibid:225) was ‗centrally occupied with the principle of identity‘ based on

Schelling‘s thought. Carey (2002:14) argues:

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The concept of God was likewise a rich area for Tillich (see, for example, his
Systematic Theology, volume 1) and is obviously an area in which he made a
major contribution to twentieth-century theology. Tillich, however, drew on
a wide variety of sources as he tried to understand the problem of God. He was
indebted to the German idealistic philosopher Friedrich Schelling.

Carey misses the essence of Schelling‘s Christian thought. He does argue for Tillich‘s

debt to Schelling which is important for our chapter on the influences on Tillich during

the German years (1886 to 1933). Carey (ibid:21) adds: ‗Scholars have tended

therefore to probe his relationship to Schelling‘. Tillich made Schelling‘s Christian

philosophy his own thought.

In judgment, Tillich‘s romanticism to nature determined the romantic trend in

his thinking. Romanticism is defined as an ‗aesthetic-meditative attitude to nature‘.

Tillich‘s daily communication with nature, German poetry, and his Lutheran background

account for his romanticism to nature. Romanticism meant as well a interest in history.

Tillich attributes this to the medieval towns in which he grew up. Schelling‘s Christian

philosophy of nature expressed Tillich‘s romanticism to nature. Schelling became the

subject of both Tillich‘s doctoral dissertation, and his Licentitate of Theology. Schelling‘s

views made it possible for Tillich to accept the existential position. Tillich‘s own

admission is that Schelling had become the basis for his thought and development.

Schelling‘s Christian metaphysical theology became Tillich‘s religious views. The

Paucks, Falk, Re Manning, Wheat, Scharlemann, and Carey argue for Tillich‘s reliance

on Schelling‘s thought.
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5:9 Bohme

5:9:1 The Father of German Lutheran Mysticism

Another intellectual influence on Paul Tillich was Jacob Bohme. Tillich (1966:75)

calls him the ‗philosophical spokesman for German mysticism‘. Bohme‘s thought was an

elaboration of mystical Lutheranism (ibid:75). It was through Bohme that Lutheran mysticism

influenced both Schelling, German Idealism, and in turn Tillich. Schelling‘s work was

derived from Bohme. Tillich‘s work was derived from Schelling‘s Christian philosophy

(ibid:75). Adams (1965:32) writes: ‗The concepts ―ground‖ and ―abyss‖ stem from Jacob

Boehme.. As we shall observe again and again, Boehme is a major source for certain

crucial elements in Tillich‘s outlook‘. Carey (2002:14) writes: ‗He was indebted…,

to the German mystic Jakob Bohme‘.

In analysis, Jacob Bohme advocated Lutheran mysticism. Bohme‘s German

Christian mysticism influenced the thinking of Schelling, German Idealism, and Tillich.

Tillich derived his concepts of ground and abyss from Bohme. Bohme was another

major source for Tillich‘s views.

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5:10 Barth

5:10:1 Barth’s Supernaturalism Rejected By Tillich

Tillich stood with Barth in the dialectical movement (Horton 1952:26). Horton

(ibid:26-27) writes:

As an associate of Karl Barth in the ―dialectical theology‖ movement, and later as a

critic of Barth, he left a mark upon Continental theology which years of absence have
not obliterated….The term ―neo-orthodox‖ is becoming canonical to designate the
position of Karl Barth and other contemporary theologians who undertake to correct
modern theology by going back to the Protestant Reformers. Since Tillich owes much
to Luther, and since he undoubtedly considered himself an associate of Barth in the
early days of ―dialectical theology,‖ this would seem to entitle us to pin the label
―neo-orthodox‖ on him, too.

Horton (ibid:27) states: ‗His article in Kant-Studien, XXVII (1922), where he speaks (p.447)

of his ―spiritual comradeship‖ with Barth and Gogarten in a theology of ―paradox‖ to which

they and he had independently been led. Barth, Tillich, and Otto Piper belonged to the group

of theologians called progressives after World War I‘. Horton (ibid:28) clarifies for us:

It is far more appropriate to consider Tillich as a ―progressive‖ than as an ―orthodox‖

of any kind. His autobiographical introduction to ―The Interpretation of History‖
points out that ―precisely in the protest against the Protestant orthodoxy (even in its
moderate form of the nineteenth century) I had won my way through to autonomy.‖…
This fear of a new orthodoxy was one of the causes of his eventual break with Barth.
[T]illich makes it very clear that he has never completely repudiated liberalism
either in the economic-political sense or in the theological sense.

Tillich rejected any intellectual influence that would have been derived from either Karl

Barth or Emmanuel Hirsch. It was both Hirsch and Barth who opposed socialism (Tillich

1966:76). Adams (1965:19) argues that Tillich ‗radically criticized Barthianism‘. Tillich

thought Barth deficient because of his reliance on the thinking of Immanuel Kant. Kant‘s

‗categorical imperative‘ for Tillich was too abstract. It gave no importance to facing ‗the
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present concretely‘ (ibid:20). Cremer points to an article that Tillich wrote in 1923, in

which he uses both Marx and Nietzsche to refute Barth. Cremer (1995:295) writes:

In an article entitled ―Critical and Positive Paradox,‖ written in 1923, Tillich

attacked the unending and unresolved nature of the Barthian dialectic. He claimed
that there must be some point of reference, an absoluteness that is not purely
transcendent but reachable in part by human consciousness, despite the fact that
Barth ‗s dialectic theology forbade such a conception of the ineffable. The dialectic
itself, Tillich claimed was not absolute, and therefore there must be an unconditioned
starting point.

In examination, any religious sentimentalism with Karl Barth was short lived.

Tillich rejected Barth‘s supernaturalism. Further, Barth opposed the religious socialism

which Tillich advocated. Tillich became a radical opponent of Karl Barth and his

neo-orthodox theology.

5:11 Hegel

5:11:1 Hegel Rejected By Tillich

Tillich uses both Feuerbach and Marx to refute Hegelianism‘s lack of social

concern (Adams 1965:22). Tillich‘s (1966:56) ontology is not derived from the Hegelian

categories. Leibrecht (1972:25) argues that Tillich did follow Hegel‘s thinking. This was

‗in terms of eternal separation of spirit from itself and its eternal return to itself within the

divine ‗ (ibid:25). Leibrecht (ibid:25) develops his argument by saying: ‗His thought comes

to Hegel again in his deeper insights penetrating to an essential metaphysics in describing the

essential structures of being‘. Tillich‘s use of such terminology such as ‗synthesis‘ demonstrates
 177

the intellectual influence of Hegel upon his life and thought (ibid:25). Wheat (1970:102)

argues for many of Tillich‘s concepts to be derived from Hegel. The concept of

self-transcendence that Tillich uses is also used by Hegel (ibid:102). Tillich‘s thought

emphasizes the concept of the dialectic. Tillich spoke of Hegel‘s concept of the ‗great

synthesis‘. It was Hegel who put forward the idea of thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis (ibid:105).

John Powell Clayton (1980:132-133) recognized Tillich‘s use of Hegel‘s thought. Clayton

(ibid:135) adds: ‗Even though Tillich‘s theory of culture is not simply Hegelian, he was

nonetheless much influenced by the tradition in which culture was principally Geistesleben‘.

Tillich ‗even before entering the University…became acquainted with…Hegel‘ (Thomas

1963:11). Clayton (1980:135) speaking of Tillich‘s relationship to Hegel ‗even when he

criticized the idealist tradition, Tillich remained tangled to some extent in its web‘.

Hegelian ideas remained popular in Germany after 1860 (Bentley 1999:86). Rowse

(1948:120) characterized Hegel‘s thought as transcendental, ‗absolute in character‘, and the

primal ‗Idea‘. Hegel analyzed art, and aesthetics. He taught earlier at the University of

Frankfurt where Tillich was a professor from 1929 to 1933 (Harris 1996:34). Stumme

(1977:xviii) argues that it was Tillich‘s ‗intention to return to the Hegelian sources of the

Marxist dialectic and to reconstruct socialist theory on this basis‘. Tillich rejected Hegel‘s

political views. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He (ibid:80) writes:

‗Hegel‘s effort to establish a philosophical foundation for positive Christianity, especially

his ambiguous Christology, was the most important alliance of bourgeosie and feudalism‘.

Tillich (1952:11) does confirm a ‗decisive break‘ from Hegel:

Another prelude to the things to come occurred in the period between my student
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years and the beginning of the First World War. It was the encounter with Schelling‘s
second period, especially with his so-called ―positive philosophy.‖ Here lies the
philosophically decisive break with Hegel, and the beginning of that movement
which is today Existentialism. I was ready for it when it appeared in full strength after
the First World War, and I saw it in the light of the general revolt against Hegel‘s system
of reconciliation which occurred in the decades after Hegel‘s death, and which through
Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche has become decisive for the destiny of the twentieth
century.

Niebuhr (1952:217) argues for the difference between Tillich and Hegel based on Tillich‘s

Systematic Theology, vol. 1. He (ibid:217) writes:

Paul Tillich‘s magnum opus, his Systematic Theology, of which unfortunately only the
first volume is available at the time this analysis of his work is attempted, will become a
landmark in history of modern theology for two reasons. First, his ontological speculations
are more rigorous and include all of the disciplines of culture more imaginatively than
anything which has been done in the realm of philosophy of religion or natural theology
in our day or in many decades. Secondly, it distinguishes itself from the natural theology
inspired by Hegel and Kant in the past two centuries by a fuller appreciation of the limits
of reason in penetrating to the ultimate mystery or in comprehending the mystery of human
existence.

Tillich (1964:84) writes: ‗Schelling calls the claim of Hegel‘s rational system to embrace not

only the real, the What, but also its reality, the That, a ―deception.‖ No ‗merely logical

process is also a process of real becoming‘. John Carey (2002:14) claims Tillich ‗was indebted

…to Georg Hegel as he combined the categories of biblical faith with issues raised by Western

philosophy. Tillich felt that one could grasp the mystery of the Divine through the Judeo-

Christian tradition and also through various philosophical systems‘.

In evaluation, Tillich and Hegel may have used similar terminology. Tillich had

studied Hegel‘s thought. Tillich viewed Hegel as an agent of the German state. He

perceived Hegel as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism.
 179

Tillich maintained that Schelling‘s thought made it possible to relinquish Hegel between

his student years and the beginning of World War I. Those who promote Hegel‘s

influence on Tillich do so from a rationalistic perspective.

5:12 Nietzsche

5:12:1 Nietzsche Accepted Because Of Schelling

Another intellectual influence on Tillich‘s thinking was Nietzsche. Nietzsche‘s

thought contained revolutionary romanticism (Tillich 1977:38-39). Tillich (1966:56) was

very enthusiastic about Nietzsche‘s ‗philosophy of life‘. Hutchinson (1953:141) confirms

Tillich‘s words:

It was in the name of life that Nietzsche fought against the ―nihilism‖ of the
technical culture. Many followed him in all spheres of spiritual creativity.
He and the movement of which he is the most conspicuous symbol saw more
clearly than Kierkegaard and Marx the deepest roots of the dehumanizing and
depersonalizing implications of modern society.

Tillich‘s doctrine of ‗will to power‘ is Nietzsche‘s thought of ‗the self-affirmation of

life‘. This is the ability of one to affirm one‘s own existence in life (ibid:142). Nuovo

(1987:21) acknowledges Tillich‘s fascination with ‗Nietzsche‘s concept of the creative‘.

Tillich (1966:54) writes:

The ecstatic influence of existence so prevalent after the war as a reaction against the
wartime years of death and hunger made Nietzsche‘s affirmation of life very attractive.
Because it is, at least partly, historically rooted in Schelling‘s thought, I could readily
accept it. I might well have developed my philosophy along these lines, incorporating
pagan elements instead of Jewish and Catholic motifs; but the experience of the German
revolution of 1918 decisively redirected my concerns toward a sociologically based and
politically oriented philosophy of history.
 180

Nietzsche‘s thought was acceptable to Tillich because it was ‗partly, historically rooted

in Schelling‘s thought‘ (ibid:54). Carey (2002:55) adds: ‗In this typology Tillich clearly

sides with the philosophers of life…Nietzsche‘.

Logically, Tillich found Nietzsche‘s thought very attractive. Nietzsche‘s

revolutionary romanticism, his philosophy of life, the concepts of the self-affirmation of

life, and the creative were acceptable to Tillich because of its historical roots in Schelling.

Nietzsche‘s thought was evaluated based on Schelling. Tillich sided with the philosophers

of life.

5:13 Buber

5:13:1 Tillich And Buber A Common Background

Diamond (1967:244) argues Buber and Tillich had ‗much in common in the way

of background and perspective‘. Novak (1992:159) emphasises: ‗As a model for Jewish-

Christian dialogue, this role that Buber played for Tillich‘s own thought is not to be

underestimated‘. Novak refers to an incident that took place back in the 1920‘s in Germany

at ‗a conference of religious socialists‘. Tillich had wanted to change the name God and find

a word to replace it. Buber replied: ‗Aber Gott ist ein Urwort! (God is a primordial word!)‘

(ibid:159). Tillich (1936:46-47) writes:

Wherever the question of the language of the Christian gospel is taken seriously,
for example in the Neuwerk-Kreis, and in the magazine of the same name, edited by
my old friend and fellow-combatant, Herman Schafft, great difficulties arise. It
 181

is certain that the original religious terminology, as it is used in the Bible and in the
liturgies of the Ancient church, cannot be supplanted. There are religious original
or archetypal words (Urworte) of mankind, as Martin Buber remarked to me some
time ago. But these original or archetypal words have been robbed of their original
power by our objective thinking, and the scientific conception of the world, and thus,
have become subject to dissolution. In face of what the archetypal word ―God‖ means,
rational criticism is powerless. In face of an objectively existing God, atheism is right.
A situation is hopeless and meaningless in which the speaker means the original word,
and the listener hears the objective word. Thus, we may understand the proposal which
is meant symbolically rather than literally, that the church impose a thirty-year silence
upon all of its archetypal words. But if it should do this, as it did in a few instances,
it would be necessary to develop a new terminology.

In interacting, Buber and Tillich shared a German background, religious socialism,

and the question of the language of the Christian gospel. Buber stimulated Tillich‘s thinking

on the language of the Christian gospel.

5:14 Troeltsch

5:14:1 Troeltsch Influences Tillich’s Christian History of Philosophy

Tillich‘s thought was intellectually influenced by Troeltsch. Tillich used Troeltsch‘s

thought as the basis for the furtherance and development of his own thinking. Tillich

(1966:54-55) writes:

My study of Troeltsch had paved the way for this change of direction. I clearly remember
the statement he made during his first Berlin lecture on the philosophy of history,
claiming that his was the first philosophical treatment of this subject at the University of
Berlin since Hegel‘s death. Although we were to a great extent agreed about the problems
involved, I repudiated his idealistic point of departure. Troeltsch;s idealism made it
impossible for him to overcome what he called historicism, against which he fought.
Historicism could be overcome only by a generation that had been forced to make
fundamental historical decisions. In light of the necessity of facing history squarely
-a demand that is both grounded in and limited by the Christian paradox-I sought to
develop a philosophy of history that could become also a philosophy of religious
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socialism.

Tillich rejected Troeltsch‘s idealism. Tillich developed a philosophy of history which lent

itself to a Christian philosophy of religious socialism (ibid:54-55). Siegfried (1952:68-69)

draws a further clarification between Troeltsch and Tillich. Siegfried (ibid:68-69) writes:

The medieval theologians in their all-embracing ―Summae,‖ fulfilled the want in a

classical way. The Reformers gave it a new impetus through their doctrine of the
―two realms,‖ which liberated the secular realm from ecclesiastical control and related
it directly to God as an expression of his creative power. This is the basis of the idea of
a ―theonomous culture‖ which plays such a role in Tillich‘s thought. German classical
philosophy elaborated this idea, and liberal theology (from Schleiermacher to Harnack
and Troeltsch) followed its lead. The difference between Tillich on the one hand, and
idealism and liberal theology, on the other, was from the very beginning his emphasis
on a radical criticism of culture as such, and not only of particular manifestations of man‘s
cultural life. The Yes and No of the Unconditional over against everything human was
understood in its full depth, according to the interpretation of the Unconditional not only
as the ground, but also as the abyss of everything finite. In this point Tillich is only
partly at odds with the liberal theology, for liberals like Wobbermin and Harnack have
seriously warned of the optimism of the late nineteenth century, and have pointed to the
critical function of Protestantism in a world of unavoidable fragments and distortions.
…Tillich has always tried to relate theology and ontology; furthermore, he has
elaborated an ontology of his own in order to show how all realms of reality are translucent
to the divine ground of being and meaning.

Siegfried (ibid:71) continues:

The spiritual shock produced by the catastrophes of the First World War drove members of
the older as well as the younger generation in Germany to look for a radical reorientation in
all realms of life. This is true of the liberal theologians who much earlier had created the
Evangelical Social Congress, and who, at this critical moment, tried to transform it into a
tool for a democratic and social renewal. Men like Rade, the editor of Die Christliche
Welt (the German counterpart of The Christian Century), Adolph Harnack, Ernst Troeltsch,
and Rudolf Otto belonged to their group. But the younger generation, of whom Tillich
was one of the leaders, reached beyond the limited goal of a political and social reform. The
reality and power of the socialist movement grasped their imagination. They joined
the attacks on the bourgeois world and did so just at the moment in which the socialist
movement, after having been excluded in imperial Germany from any participation in
political responsibility, was obliged to take over the full responsibility in the most tragic
 183

moment of German history.

Tillich represented something more magnificent the splendor of religious socialism explained

‗ in religious terms‘ (ibid:71).

In assaying, Troeltsch‘s influence is seen in helping Tillich define his Christian

philosophy of history. Tillich‘s Christian philosophy was a Christian philosophy of

the history the Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism.

5:15 Luther

5:15:1 Similarities Between Tillich And Luther’s Theology

Horton (1952:27) argues that Tillich ‗owes much to Luther‘. The similarities

between Luther and Tillich are those that fit within Tillich‘s religious socialism. Tillich and

Luther thought human nature to be ‗finite freedom‘ (Siegfried 1952:81). A further comparision

between Tillich and Luther would be ‗Luther‘s intuition of the relativity of all social orders‘

(ibid:81). Tillich and Luther spoke on the subject of ethics. Tillich‘s comments compared

to Luther are ‗in broad and general terms‘ (Thomas 1952:92). Luther‘s ‗justification by faith‘

and the authority of the Bible‘ though relative, for Tillich was ‗the ‗New Being‘ in Jesus as the

Christ‘ (ibid:94). Carey (2002:9) points out four areas of ‗affinities between Luther and

Tillich‘. Carey (ibid:9-20) lists the theological method, concept of God, the human condition,

and the concept of justification. Carey (ibid:9,12) writes:

The issue of theological method needs to be discussed primarily because of the study by
Wayne G. Johnson, Theological Method in Luther and Tillich. This book was Johnson‘s
doctoral dissertation at the University of Iowa and argues the thesis that there is a general
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similarity between Luther‘s theological method and that of Tillich. It is an open question
in Luther scholarship whether Luther in fact had a clearly defined theological method.
Johnson argues, however, that the key for Luther as a theologian was his understanding of
law and gospel….[W]hat evidence…Tillich‘s method of correlation is in fact similar to
(or derives from) Luther‘s working hypothesis of law and gospel?...I do not think Johnson
establishes this case in his book, and in his…Systematic Theology Tillich never refers
to law-and-gospel scheme.

Carey (ibid:10) argues that the Law was God‘s commands in the Decalogue and at other

places in the Pentateuch. Luther felt as well it was ‗that natural law of God…broadly written

on the minds of all persons everywhere‘. The Law had two uses one was civil and the other

useage was theological (ibid:10). Carey (ibid:11) elaborates on Tillich‘s theological method:

Tillich took the problem of theological method more seriously than did Luther because
he struggled with some ambiguities Luther did not feel. Tillich was also more interested
than Luther ever was in the philosophical issues related to the nature of theological language
and religious knowledge. In a formal sense, I would argue that Tillich is actually closer to
Thomas Aquinas than to Luther in theological method.

Tillich and Luther are similar in their theological method because: ‗Both thinkers, for example,

are persuaded that theology is tied to the human experience and that in our experience we can

know the saving reality of God‘ (ibid:12). Further, both Tillich and Luther believed that

theology is existential dealing with the ‗profound issues of life‘ (ibid:12). Carey (ibid:12)

points to the concept of God. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God that

God was ‗sheer will‘(ibid:13). Luther believed the theme of the sovereignty of God, God‘s

presence through creation, God‘s absolute power, God‘s attributes both hidden and revealed.

Luther spoke against idols. Luther‘s problems dealt with the Medieval church and Rome‘s

authority (ibid:13-14). The concept of God was ‗a rich area for Tillich‘ (ibid:14). Carey

(ibid:14) adds: ‗In his approach to ―God language,‖ Tillich was clearly concerned to move
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beyond the inadequate theistic understandings of God (that is, God as a person or as a being)

and to press for a larger and more comprehensive understandings of God. Tillich

understood that the biblical concept of transcendence needed to be replaced with more adequate

metaphors that can do justice to a scientific understanding of the universe‘. The concept of

the demonic was involved in Tillich‘s concept of God. Carey (ibid:14) writes: ‗Tillich insisted

that the Divine contained within itself the element of nonbeing as well as being‘. Carey

(ibid:14) continues: ‗This is a relative type of nonbeing as opposed to an absolute type of

nonbeing, but is an insight through which Tillich thought one could understand the elements

of mystery and depth in the Deity. There is an irrational dimension in the Divine‘. Carey

(ibid:15) concludes: ‗Tillich felt a clear affinity with Luther concerning the irrational, hidden,

mysterious dimension of God‘. Luther‘s theme ‗God alone is God‘ is seen in Tillich‘s concept

the ‗Protestant Principle‘ (ibid:15). A third similarity between Tillich and Luther is ‗in their

understanding of the human situation‘ (ibid:16). Luther believed in the total ‗fallenness‘

of man (ibid:16). Luther thought man was ‗enslaved by demonic forces‘ (ibid:16). Man‘s

will was not able ‗to cooperate with God‘ (ibid:16). Tillich described the human situation

by the terms ‗estrangement‘ and ‗alienation‘ (ibid:17). The fourth area of similarity between

Luther and Tillich is in the area of justification (ibid:18). Carey (ibid18) writes: ‗Briefly put,

Luther—drawing heavily on the apostle Paul—felt that our deliverance from sin is a free act

of God‘. Carey (ibid:19) writes of Tillich‘s thought on justification: ‗Tillich stands very close

to Luther on the matter of justification, but again uses a different vocabulary‘.

In evaluating, similarities of thought do exist between Luther and Tillich. These fit
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Tillich‘s religious socialism. These similarities are human nature as finite freedom, Luther‘s

intuition of relativity of social orders, Luther‘s justification by faith is Tillich‘s New Being

in Jesus and the Protestant principle, theological method, the concept of God, and the human

condition. Tillich and Luther thought theology tied to human experience. Theology is

existential. Luther argued against the rationalistic concept of God. Luther and Tillich‘s

affinity can be seen as well in their concept of the irrational, the hidden, and the mysterious.

They had a similar belief concerning man‘s situation. Luther believed in

man‘s fallenness. Tillich used the terms estrangement and alienation to describe the same.

5:16 The Man Tillich

5:16:1 Tillich’s Exceptional Interpersonal Skills

Ratschow argues that ‗Tillich was able to transcend the problems of his time‘ (Carey

2002:135). It was Tillich‘s ability to assess and make value judgments which were based on his

historical context of Germany in the 1920‘s and 1930‘s (ibid:39). Carey‘s (ibid:39) point is

well taken: ‗It is important, however, to note how Tillich appraised the strengths and

weaknesses of the theological left and right, and how he assessed both in the light of the

Christian claim‘. Carr (1961:76) adds that moral judgments occur within ‗a conceptual

framework which is itself the creation of history‘. Tillich (1952:13-14) argues in terms

of environment and social forces rather than personality or his ability to make value judgments.

Ratschow (1980:8) argues:

He appropriated the problems of his generation in an extremely personal way.

He worked them out as his destiny. One can also say that Tillich identified
himself completely with the problems of his generation even though they
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affected others more strongly and more deeply than him.

Ratschow (ibid:8) continues: ‗Tillich identified himself with everything he met….It was

these identifications which led to the consequence that everyone who met him believed

himself to be quite specifically and quite exclusively the one about whom Tillich was

concerned and that never had he been so well understood by another human being as here

by Tillich‘. Ratschow (ibid:8) elaborates further: ‗In such identifications one thing was

quite decisive. Personal meetings with Tillich always ran their course completely without

any aggression on Tillich‘s side‘. Ratschow (ibid:8) adds: ‗That is also a striking feature in his

works—they contain no polemics or surreptitious defensiveness‘. Ratschow adds an interesting

point on how Tillich handled objections. He (ibid:9) writes:

He sought to understand questioners and to grasp critical objections correctly while

himself learning in the process. Because Tillich devoted himself completely to those
whom he met and opened himself without mental reservations, such an identification
could take place. One can also put it thus: Tillich entered fully and completely into
the situation of the one with whom he was in contact. The magic of his person lay
in the seriousness of this devotion.

Ratschow (ibid:34) concludes:

On this point, one must indeed say that Tillich wrote his apologetic theology strictly
for his time. But in doing this, he transcended the questions of the time toward their
solution. In them, he arrived at concepts of so great human depth that they can be
intelligible to every time, even though what is involved is a humanity and a human
spirituality which as such can prove to be time bound

In analyzing the material, the problems of Tillich‘s time influenced him. Tillich

was able to analyze the problems of his generation. He provided a working solution for

these problems. This became for Tillich his destiny. Tillich was very personable in his

identifications with others. Tillich was focused and devoted to those he met. Tillich wrote
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an apologetic theology which Ratschow thought good only for Tillich‘s German generations.

5:17 Summary

The views of Kierkegaard and Marx influenced Tillich‘s existential and political

theology. Tillich‘s political theology was formed as well from the Old Testament prophets.

It was their spirit of prophetic criticism that Tillich saw in Marx. Schelling‘s Christian

philosophy became the basis for Tillich‘s Christian theology. Tillich‘s books The Religious

Situation and The Socialist Decision are evidences of Tillich‘s commitment to

religious socialism.

Tillich‘s experience as a chaplain in the German army in World War I led

Tillich to accept the views of Karl Marx. His army experience was the beginning of

his theology of art. He longed for beauty and an escape amidst the horrors and suffering

of the First World War.

Tillich found in Freud confirmation for his theology of existentialism, and a

shared revolt against Hegel‘s philosophy of consciousness. Existentialism and

psychoanalysis were concerned with man‘s estrangement. Tillich‘s doctrine of the

demonic was drawn from Freud‘s thinking.

Heidegger gave Tillich a new understanding of the relationship between

philosophy and theology. Husserl‘s thought confirmed Tillich‘s previous study

of Fichte and Kant. Husserl aided Tillich‘s understanding of the nature of philosophical

reflection. Tillich‘s greatest influence was his romanticism to nature, and the Christian

philosophy of Schelling. Bohme‘s Lutheran mysticism completed Tillich‘s Christian

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metaphysical theology. Tillich rejected Barthianism. Tillich became a radical opponent

of Karl Barth. Hegel and Tillich may have used similar terminology. Hegel was viewed

by Tillich as a promoter of the alliance between the bourgeoisie and feudalism. Tillich

was able to discard Hegel because of Schelling‘s thought. Nietzsche‘s thought was

accepted by Tillich because it had historical roots in Schelling. Tillich sided with the

philosophers of life. Buber was a stimulus to Tillich‘s thinking on the language of the

Christian gospel. Troeltsch helped Tillich define what his philosophy of history should

be a Christian philosophy of the history of religious socialism. Luther‘s influence on

Tillich can only be seen in terms of similarities. These similarities are those which fit

within Tillich‘s religious socialism, political, and existential theology.

Tillich analyzed the problems of his time. He developed a working solution

which became his destiny. Tillich had great interpersonal skills.

Schelling and Bohme had the greatest influence on Tillich in determining his Christian

theological views. Tillich maintained that Schelling had discovered existentialism long before

Kierkegaard. Marx had the greatest influence on Tillich in terms of determining Tillich‘s

political theology. The sequence of our thesis moves now to consider the Tillich legacy from

from the German years.