DISINHERITANCE

Art. 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of disinheritance, be deprived of his

legitime, for causes expressly stated by law.

‘Disinheritance’ Defined - Disinheritance is the process or act, thru a testamentary

disposition of depriving in a will any compulsory heir of his legitime for true and lawful
causes.

Purpose of Disinheritance
(a) “The purpose of disinheritance is not vengeance BUT RETRIBUTION inasmuch as there
can possibly be no feelings of vengeance between parents and children or between
husband and wife at the supreme hour of death.”
(b) The object of disinheritance is to punish the ungrateful, the culpable, the cruel, the
unnatural heir, or an unfaithful spouse. Otherwise stated, its object is to maintain good
order and discipline within the family.

Implications from the Definition of Disinheritance

(a) Since disinheritance must be made in a WILL, there is no disinheritance in legal
succession. (b) Only compulsory heirs can be disinherited, for they alone are entitled to the
legitime. (So, brothers and sisters for example, cannot be the object of any disinheritance.
As to them, and strangers, the testator may institute them or not. The testator may indeed
set aside or revoke any legacies or devises, with or without any reason).
(c) Since compulsory heirs may be disinherited only for lawful causes, it is clear that the
courts may properly inquire into the validity of a disinheritance.
(d) A disinheritance excludes the heir not only from the legitime but also from the free
portion; in other words, he is completely excluded from the inheritance.
Reason: If by disinheritance an heir is excluded from the legitime (which should have been
his as a matter of right) with greater reason should the testator’s attitude or dislike toward
him, exclude him from the free portion (which is not his as a matter of right).
Other Ways of Depriving the Heirs of their Legitime
Aside from disinheritance, there are other conceivable ways in which a compulsory heir is
deprived, in effect, of what should have been his legitime, namely:
(a) In case of PREDECEASE, INCAPACITY, REPUDIATION (of course, in case of predecease or
incapacity, his own heirs may inherit by representing him).
(b) In case the liabilities of the estate EQUAL or EXCEED its assets, there would be no
hereditary estate, and consequently, no legitime.

Articles 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause
therefor shall be specified.

Requisites of Disinheritance. — In order that a compulsory heir may be deprived of his

legitime through disinheritance, the following requisites must concur:
(1) The disinheritance must be for a cause expressly stated by law;
(2) The disinheritance must be effected only through a valid will;
(3) The legal cause for the disinheritance must be specified in the will itself;
(4) The cause for the disinheritance must be certain and true;
(5) The disinheritance must be total; and
(6) The disinheritance must be unconditional.

The most indispensable requisite of a valid disinheritance is that it must be for a cause
expressly stated by law. The cause may actually be a just one, or the testator may actually
believe that he has a very strong ground for depriving a compulsory heir of any
participation in the inheritance, but if such cause is not one of those expressly recognized
by law, he cannot disinherit such heir. It is, therefore, essential that the cause must be one
of those designated by law; otherwise, the disinheritance is null and void.

The second requisite is that the disinheritance must be effected only through a valid will.
Because the act of disinheritance involves the exercise of an exceptional power by virtue of
which a compulsory heir is deprived of his legitime, the same requisites and formalities
necessary for the disposition of properties mortis causa are also necessary for such act.
Consequently, if the will is invalid because it has not been executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law, the disinheritance is also invalid; if the will is valid, but
subsequently it is revoked in accordance with law, the disinheritance is also revoked.

The third requisite is that the cause for the disinheritance must be specified in the will itself.
From this it is evident that there can be no implied or tacit disinheritance. It must be noted,
however, that the last will of the testator may be embodied in several documents. Taken
together, they constitute his last will and testament. Therefore, if a compulsory heir is
disinherited in one will without a specification of the cause, the defect may be cured if the
cause thereof is specified in another will. It must also be noted that while the law requires
that the cause must be express, there is no legal precept which requires that the
specification must be couched in the exact language of the law or that details and other
circumstances surrounding it must be given.

The fourth requisite is that the cause specified in the will must be certain and true. This can
be implied from the provision of Art. 917, which declares that the burden of proving the
truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator if the
disinherited heir should deny it. Consequently, the cause must not be a mer fi gment of the
mind or an insane delusion. Neither must it be based on mere suspicion or on the biased
opinion of others. As Manresa states it, the testator must not only have a knowledge of the
cause, but it must also be in the process of being committed, or at least, it has already been
committed at the time of the disinheritance. Hence, he cannot, with efficacy, state in his will:
“If my wife should ever commit adultery, she shall not be entitled to any of my properties.”
Such an act of disinheritance will violate two requisites which are clearly deducible from the
law — that the cause must be certain and true and that it must be unconditional.

Articles 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause for disinheritance shall rest upon
the other heirs of the testator, if the disinherited heir should deny it.

Burden of proof: The person who wants to give effect to the disinheritance has the burden
of proving the existence of the ground for disinheritance by showing clear, substantial and
convincing evidence to show that the ground existed at the time the will was executed. The
other compulsory heirs are therefore given the burden since it will be to their benefit if the
disinheritance is given effect.
Article 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of
which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code,
shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but
the devices and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as
will not impair the legitime.

Ineffective disinheritance:
Article 918 sets forth the instances when disinheritance becomes ineffective.
1. Without a cause: (e.g. “I disinherit X”)
2. Cause is not proven: (For instance, X was disinherited on the ground of false accusation
and there was no proof given by any other heir)
3. Cause stated is not one of those provided by law: (e.g. “I disinherit X since he sold my
house without my knowledge.”)

Effects of Ineffective Disinheritance

(a) The institution of heirs is annulled but only insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited, that is, insofar as the legitime of said heir is impaired.
(b) The devises, legacies, and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as
will not impair the legitime.

Example of the 1st Effect

A disinherited B, and instituted C and D as his (A’s) heirs. B, C, and D are A’s legitimate
children. The disinheritance of B was however invalid because it was for a cause not
provided for by the law. The hereditary estate is P900,000. How much will each of the
children receive?

ANS.: B’s legitime is P150,000 (and he gets this)

C gets .................. P375,000
D gets .................. P375,000
P900,000

In other words, the institution of heirs remains valid, but the shares of the instituted heirs
will be decreased to give B his legitime.

[NOTE: The rule here is different from that in preterition (Art. 854), because in such a case,
the whole institution of heirs is annulled. Had there been preterition here, each of the
children would receive P300,000 each.].

Example of the 2nd Effect

Estate is P1 million. A legacy of P700,000 was given to X, a friend. Y, a legitimate child of
the testator, was ineffectively disinherited. How much should X and Y get?
ANS.: X gets only P500,000. (The legacy to him is reduced by P200,000 so as not to impair
Y’s legitime. Y gets P500,000 [his legitime].).

[NOTE: The rule regarding this 2nd effect is the same as in preterition. (Art. 854).].

[NOTE: If the free portion has not been disposed of, the ineffectively disinherited heir gets
not only his legitime, but also his intestate share of the free portion. This is because he is an
intestate heir also.

What is the effect of disinheritance?

The effect of disinheritance is not just deprivation is not just deprivation of the legitime but
the total exclusion of the disinherited heir, from the inheritance. Thus, the disinherited heir
forfeits:
a. His legitime;
b. His intestate portion; and
c. Any other testamentary disposition made in a prior will of the disinheriting testator

Distinguished from preterition.

The two may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
(1) In imperfect disinheritance, the person disinherited may be any compulsory heir, while in
preterition, the person omitted must be a compulsory heir in the direct line.
(2) In the first, the attempt to deprive the heir of his legitime is always express, while in the
second, the attempt is always implied.
(3) In the first, the attempt to deprive the heir of his legitime is always intentional, while in
the second, the attempt may be intentional or unintentional.
(4) In the first, the effect is a partial annulment of the institution of heirs, while in the
second, the effect is a total annulment.

Distinction Between Preterition and Imperfect or Ineffective Disinheritance

In preterition, the institution of heirs is completely annulled while in Imperfect
Disinheritance, the institution remains valid, but must be reduced insofar as the legitime has
been impaired.

If there is ineffective or imperfect disinheritance, will the heir in question get any part
of the free portion other than his legitime?
The heir in question gets his legitime, but as to whether he will also get any part if the
intestate portion or not, depends on whether the testator gave away the free portion
through testamentary dispositions. If he did, these dispositions are valid and the compulsory
heir improperly disinherited gets his legitime. If the testator did not, the compulsory heir will
be entitled to his corresponding share of the free portion as well.

Similarities Between Preterition and Imperfect or Ineffective Disinheritance

(a) In both cases, the omitted heir and the imperfectly disinherited heir get at least their
legitime.
(b) In both cases, the legacies and devises remain valid insofar as the legitime has not been
impaired.
(c) Both refer to compulsory heirs.

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendants has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without a justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life; (8) Conviction of a
crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.

NOTE: Enumeration is exclusive. The list is an exclusive list and not illustrative.

What does the term children and descendants include in Article 919? The children or
descendants referred to in the Article include the legitimate and illegitimate (recognized)
children and include grandchildren, great-grandchildren and so on. They are compulsory
heirs.

Can an intestate heir who is not a compulsory heir be the subject of disinheritance?
Intestate heirs who are not compulsory heirs (not entitled to legitime) cannot be the subject
of disinheritance. The right to disinherit must be exercised through a will where the specific
cause for disinheritance must be specifically stated.

Grounds for Disinheritance of Descendants. — Art. 919 enumerates eight different

grounds for the disinheritance of children or descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
They are:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants or ascendants. Evidently, this ground refers to either
attempted or frustrated parricide as defined and punished in the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, the first requisite is that the child or descendant must have committed either
attempted or frustrated parricide. Furthermore, the law requires that there must have been a
previous criminal conviction. Therefore, the second requisite is that the child or descendant
must have been convicted for the criminal offense of attempted or frustrated parricide. It is,
however, possible that even if there is no previous criminal conviction, the attempt, if it is
made against the life of the testator, will constitute a valid ground for disinheritance,
provided that it falls within the scope or purview of “maltreatment of the testator by word
or deed” within the meaning of No. 6 of the article under discussion. Final conviction is
required.

(2) When the child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless.
This ground requires the following requisites: first, the heir must have accused the
testator of a crime; second, the penalty prescribed by law for such crime must be six years
imprisonment or more, and third, the accusation must have been found to be groundless.
Since the law does not make any qualification whatsoever, it is clear that “accusation”
includes not only the act of the disinherited heir of instituting the criminal action in the
capacity of a complainant, but also any act of intervention such as being a witness for the
prosecution, by which he accuses the testator of having committed the crime charged.
Similarly, as regards the third requisite, it will not make any material difference whether the
accusation was found groundless during the preliminary investigation, or during the trial, or
on appeal.

(3) When the child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator. As in the case of the first ground, a final judgment of conviction is
an essential requisite. Mere adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator is not,
therefore, a ground for the disinheritance of a child or descendant. It is, however, possible
that even without a previous criminal conviction, adultery or concubinage with the spouse of
the testator may be a ground for disinheriting the child or descendant, provided that it falls
within the scope or purview of “living a disgraceful or dishonorable life” within the meaning
of No. 7 of the article under discussion.

(4) When the child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made. It must be noted that the fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence may have been employed either for the purpose
of causing the testator to execute a will or for the purpose of causing the testator to
change or will which has already been made. Consequently, what had been stated in a
previous section with regard to fraud, violence, intimidation, and undue influence may also
be applied here.

(5) When the child or descendant refuses without justifiable cause to support the testator. It
must be noted that the refusal of the heir to give support must be without justifiable cause.
Hence, if there was a justifiable cause for such refusal, the disinheritance would be
ineffectual or imperfect. Examples of this would be those cases where the resources of the
child or descendant have been reduced to the point where he cannot give the support
without neglecting his own needs and those of his family, or when the testator has
improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his
subsistence.
(6) When the child or descendant maltreats the testator by word or deed. It is clear that this
ground includes all acts of violence against the person of the testator. It also includes any
maltreatment of the testator by words, whether such words are defamatory or not. A final
judgment of conviction is not required. It is, however, necessary that the maltreatment must
have been intentional or voluntary. Otherwise, if it was due to insanity, lack of discernment
or tender years of the child or descendant, the maltreatment cannot be considered as a
sufficient cause for disinheritance. Thus, where the testator’s granddaughter was only 14
years old at the time when she insulted and slapped him, and prior to that occasion, she
had been suffering from fits of insanity, it was held that there is no sufficient ground for the
testator in disinheriting her, since it is clear that she had acted without discernment.

(7) When the child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life. The scope of this
ground under the old law was much more limited than its scope under the present law.
Thus, according to No. 3, Art. 853 of the Spanish Civil Code, a daughter or granddaughter
may be disinherited by the parents or ascendants if she becomes a prostitute. The old law,
therefore, referred only to a limited extent to the immoral life of a daughter or
granddaughter, but did not have any provision regarding the immoral conduct of a son or
grandson. The Code Commission, believing that this ground for disinheritance should be
broad enough to include both male and female descendants, has changed the old provision
so that under our present law, it is now possible for parents or ascendants to disinherit any
child or descendant who leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life. Hence, any dishonorable or
disgraceful conduct, such as engaging in a life of crime or immorality, provided that it
characterizes the mode of living of the child or descendant disinherited, is a sufficient cause
for disinheritance.

(8) When the child or descendant is convicted of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction. This is self-explanatory, but it should be noted that there must be a final
judgment of conviction here. Moreover, under Arts. 40 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code,
civil interdiction is given as an accessory penalty to: (1) death (if commuted) (2) reclusion
perpetua (3) reclusion temporal

Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of parents or
ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to live a
corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendants has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code;
(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a
reconciliation between them.

Grounds for Disinheritance of Ascendants.

(1) When the parents have abandoned their children, or induced their daughters to live a
corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against her virtue. Actually, this ground may be
subdivided into three — first, when the parents have abandoned their children; second,
when the parents have induced their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life; and third,
when the parents have attempted against the virtue of their daughters. “Abandonment”
within the meaning of the law refers to the failure of the parents to give to their children
due care, instruction and support. This definition is of course in consonance with the
provision of what is now Art. 316 of the present Code to the effect that the father and
mother have, with respect to their unemancipated children, the duty to support them, to
have them in their company, educate and instruct them in keeping with their means, and to
represent them in all actions which may redound to their benefit. Hence, failure to comply
with these duties shall justify a child in disinheriting a parent. “Inducing their daughters to
live a corrupt and immoral life” comprehends the act of the parents in inducing their
daughters or granddaughters, by advice, force, intimidation, or any other positive act, to live
a life of corruption and immorality. The law speaks of daughters only, but this must be
taken to mean any daughter or granddaughter of the erring parent or parents. “Attempting
against their virtue” includes any act of the parents either as principals, coprincipals, or
accomplices, which can properly be classified as an attempt against the virtue of their
daughters or granddaughters. This would include all criminal acts against the chastity of the
latter.

(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants or ascendants. This ground is a common ground for
the disinheritance of any compulsory heir. Consequently, what had been stated under Art.
919 with regard to this ground are also applicable here.

(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless.
This is the second common ground for the disinheritance of any compulsory heir.
Consequently, what had been stated under Art. 919 with regard to this ground are also
applicable here.

(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator. This is also a ground for the disinheritance of children or
descendants. Consequently, what had been stated under Art. 919 with regard to this ground
are also applicable here.
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes
the testator to make a will or to change one already made. This is the third common
ground for the disinheritance of any compulsory heir. Consequently, what had been stated
under Art. 919 with regard to this ground are also applicable here.

(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specifi ]ed in the Civil Code. It is evident that
there must be an actual loss of parental authority; otherwise, the testator cannot disinherit
the parent or ascendant. This is so, even granting that such parent or ascendant has
committed an act or offense which constitutes a ground for loss of parental authority by
judicial decree. The difficulty, however, is with regard to the proper interpretation which
must be given to the phrase “for causes specified in this Code.” We know that the causes
specified in the Code and which can be used as grounds for disinheritance are the
following: (1) emancipation; (2) adoption; (3) appointment of a general guardian; (4)
subsequent marriage of the widowed mother; (5) deprivation by final judgment in a criminal
case; (6) deprivation by final judgment in legal separation proceedings; and (7) deprivation
by final judgment on the ground of excessive harshness, or of corrupting orders, counsels or
examples, or of making them beg, or of abandonment.

(7) When the parent or ascendant refuses without justifiable cause to support the testator.
This is the fourth common ground for the disinheritance of any compulsory heir.
Consequently, what had been stated under Art. 919 with regard to this ground are also
applicable here.

(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other, unless there has been a
reconciliation between them. It will be observed that unlike the grounds stated is Nos. 2 and
4 of the article under discussion, under this ground, a final judgment of conviction is not an
essential requisite.

Article 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or
her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator
to make a will or to change one already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse.

Grounds for Disinheritance of Spouse. — Those stated in Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6 are, however,
common grounds for the disinheritance of any compulsory heir. Consequently, what had
been stated under Art. 919 with regard to these grounds are also applicable here. These six
grounds for the disinheritance of the spouse are:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator; his or
her descendants, or ascendants.
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, and the accusation has been found to be groundless.

(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator
to make a will or to change one already made.

(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation. Under the original project of the
Civil Code as drafted by the Code Commission, this ground for disinheritance was not
included. It was only when the project was being discussed by Congress that it was inserted.
As it now stands, it is clear that by virtue of this provision, if the wife has committed
adultery, or if the husband has committed concubinage, or if either of the spouses has
made an attempt against the life of the other, the innocent spouse would be justified in
disinheriting the offending spouse. Thus, it has been held that criminal conviction is not a
condition sine qua non in order that the wife can disinherit an unfaithful husband. The same
principle can also be applied to an attempt made by one spouse against the life of the
other. There is, therefore, a partial conflict between this provision and that of No. 1 of the
article under discussion. Under this provision, the mere attempt by one of the spouses
against the life of the other without a previous final judgment of conviction is a sufficient
cause for disinheritance, while under No. 1, a previous final judgment of conviction is an
essential requisite. The effect of this conflict is that, unwittingly, the provision of No. 1 with
regard to the conviction of the spouse of an attempt against the life of the testator has
become practically useless. However, if the attempt is made against a descendant or an
ascendant of the testator, conviction would still be essential.

(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental authority. It must be
observed that under this ground, the mere fact that there is a ground for the loss of
parental authority is a sufficient cause for disinheritance, whereas under No. 6 of Art. 920, in
order that a child or descendant can disinherit a parent or ascendant, it is essential that
there must be an actual loss of parental authority.

(6) When the spouse refuses without justifiable cause to support the children or the other
spouse.

Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that
may have been made.

‘Reconciliation’ Defined - Reconciliation is the mutual restoration of feelings to the status

quo. It is indeed the resumption of friendly relations.

Characteristics of Reconciliation
(a) Reconciliation needs no special form; therefore it may be express or implied. (Ultimately,
this is a judicial question of fact). There is implied or presumed reconciliation if the parties
live again in the same house.
(b) There is no reconciliation in the following instances:
1) A general pardon usually given at the hour of death to all who may have, in some way or
another, offended the testator, unless there really be a removal of hurt feelings.
2) A pardon not accepted by the disinherited heir.
3) A pardon which does not specify the heir concerned nor the act which had been
committed. 4) A pardon given by testator in the very same will wherein he provides for the
disinheritance. Here, there cannot be said to be a reconciliation, and restoration to the
status quo; there only is a sort of moral force or spiritual influence which forgives in the
name of morality

Effects of Reconciliation
(a) If no disinheritance has been made yet, no disinheritance can now be done.
(b) Disinheritance already made is rendered INEFFECTUAL; in other words, it is as if there
had been no disinheritance at all.

During that period between the execution of the will and the death of the testator, it is
always possible that the testator may pardon the offender. Such pardon, however, cannot
have any possible effect either upon the testator’s right to disinherit or upon the
disinheritance if it has already been made. Under the law, before it can have any effect, it is
essential that it must have been accepted by the offender thus resulting in a reconciliation
between the two. It is, therefore, clear that what the law requires is a bilateral act and not a
mere unilateral act. Once there is a reconciliation between the offender and the offended
person, such reconciliation shall have the effect of depriving the latter of the right to
disinherit the former or of rendering ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been
made.

Rules In Case the Cause of the Disinheritance is ALSO a Cause of Unworthiness:

(a) BASIS — There are grounds for disinheritance which are also causes of incapacity to
succeed by reason of unworthiness. Among them are the abandonment of children, and the
attempt to take the life of the testator, etc.
(b) If the cause of unworthiness was made a ground for disinheritance and there is a
reconciliation, Art. 922 will govern, and NOT Art. 1033. In other words, the mere fact of
reconciliation extinguishes the unworthiness and NO written document is needed for a
condonation.
Reason: A person is rendered unworthy to succeed only because the law presumes this to
be the will of the testator. This presumed intent certainly cannot prevail over the express will
of a person shown by his act of reconciliation.

How Disinheritance is Revoked

Disinheritance is revoked by:
(a) subsequent reconciliation;
(b) the making of a new will making the disinherited heir an instituted heir.

The fact that a void will containing a disinheritance is denied probate cannot be said to
revoke a disinheritance, for the simple reason that in such a case, there never was a valid
disinheritance. Hence, there is really nothing to revoke.

What are the other ways of lifting or revoking disinheritance?

1. Nullification of the will of the testator.
2. The subsequent institution of the disinherited heir in a subsequent will.

What is the effect of setting aside the disinheritance?

a. The disinherited heir is restored to his legitime;
b. If the disinheriting will did not dispose of the disposable portion, the disinherited heir is
entitled to his proportionate share (in intestacy), if any, of the disposable portion.
c. If the disinheriting will disposed of disposable portion in favor of testamentary heirs, such
dispositions remain valid.

Note: There is no required form of reconciliation. It may be express or implied. In fact, the
mere act of living together in the same house is sufficient.

Article 923. The children and descendants of the person disinherited shall take his or her
place and shall preserve the rights of compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the
disinherited parent shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which
constitutes the legitime.

Effects of Disinheritance. — The most important effect of disinheritance is of course the

deprivation of the compulsory heir who is disinherited of any participation in the inheritance
including this legitime. However, if the compulsory heir has children or descendants of his
own, such children or descendants, according to Art. 923, shall take his or her place and
shall preserve his or her right with respect to the legitime, although the disinherited parents
shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes the legitime.
According to Manresa, since disinheritance is a penalty which the testator may impose upon
a compulsory heir who is guilty of any of the causes prescribed by law, its imposition upon
the latter is undoubtedly in conformity with the requirements of strict justice. But to impose
it in the same manner upon the innocent children or descendants of the offender would be
unjust. Hence, under the law, after the death of the testator, the children and descendants
of the disinherited heir shall represent the latter with respect to the legitime.

It must be noted, however, that Art. 923 cannot be applied to all cases in which the
compulsory heir who is disinherited has children or descendants of his own. Although it
appears to be of general application, yet it is undeniable that it is applicable only if the
compulsory heir who is disinherited happens also to be a child or descendant of the
testator. This is so, because, in reality, this article establishes or recognizes a right on the
part of the children or descendants of the disinherited heir to represent the latter with
regard to the legitime to which he would have been entitled had he not been disinherited,
and it is a well-known principle of testamentary succession that the right of representation
can take place only in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending

Representation of the Disinherited Heir

(a) The heirs of the disinherited heir can represent the latter, but only insofar as the legitime
of said disinherited heir is concerned.
Example: A dies leaving P1 million and 2 legitimate children, B and C. B was however
disinherited validly in A’s will and C was given P1 million. B has a legitimate child D. D
represents B in getting B’s legitime which is P250,000. Therefore C, the instituted heir, gets
only P750,000.

(b) In the example above given, B does not have the usufruct or administration of said
P250,000. This is, therefore, the exception to the general rule that a parent has the
administration and usufruct of the property of a child who is under parental authority. The
reason for this exception is obvious when we consider the incapacity of the disinherited heir
brought about by his own unworthiness or act of ingratitude.

(c) The children and descendants are allowed to inherit by representation, the legitime of
the disinherited heir because the fault of the heir is not the fault of the representative —
and it would be unjust to punish them.

(d) The law says “the children and descendants of the person disinherited.” (Art. 923). Who is
this “person disinherited” who can be represented? Does it refer to a disinherited parent,
disinherited wife or disinherited child or descendant?
ANS.: The phrase refers only to a disinherited child or disinherited descendant. Thus, neither
a disinherited spouse nor a disinherited parent may be represented.

(e) In this Art. 923, the right of representation extends only to the legitime. If the
disinherited person had been given any legacy, devise, or part of the free disposal, same will
go to the substitutes, if any (note that the disinherited heir should not even receive any part
of the free disposal); if none, to the other heirs, legatees, or devisees by accretion if proper;
if accretion is not proper, same should go to the legal heirs by intestacy.

Right of representation in disinheritance: This article allows the children and descendants
of “the person disinherited” to take his place and retain the rights of compulsory heirs in
respect to the legitime. It provides for representation, but under the law, specifically Article
972, representation is allowed only in the direct descending line, and never in the
ascending line. As such, the “person disinherited” in this article only refers to children and
descendants of the testator. The effect of disinheritance is to deprive the compulsory heir of
all participation in the estate of the testator. But the causes of disinheritance are personal to
the disinherited heir, therefore his children and descendants should not be penalized for the
guilt or fault is not imputable to them.
What is the extent of representation?
The representative takes the place of the disinherited heir not only with respect to the
legtime but also to any intestate portion that the disinherited heir would have inherited, if
the free portion was not disposed in favor of testamentary heirs. Representation, therefore,
occurs in compulsory and intestate succession.