Ethics: Basic Concepts, Theories and Cases
Ethics: Basic Concepts, Theories and Cases
2. Passions or Concupiscence
Understood as a strong or powerful feeling or emotion.
Refers to the bodily appetites or tendencies as experienced and expressed in such
feelings as fear, love, hatred, despair, horror, sadness, anger, grief and the like.
Also known as sentiments, affections, desires, etc
These are inclinations toward desirable objects or a tendency away from undesirable
or harmful things.
These include both positive and negative emotions
Passions are either classified as antecedent
or consequent.
Antecedent – are those that precede an
act.
• It may happen that a person is emotionally
aroused to perform an act.
• Antecedent passions predispose a person
to act
3. Fear
- The disturbance of the mind of a person who is
confronted by an impending danger or harm to himself or
loved ones (Agapay 1991).
- Considered a passion which arise as an impulsive
movement of avoidance of a threatening evil, ordinarily
accompanied by bodily disturbances (Panizo1964).
- It is treated as a special kind of passion since it is a kind of
a test of one’s mental character.
Principles Governing Fear
1. Acts done with fear are voluntary.
- This is so because the person acting with fear is acting in spite of his fear, and thus, still
very much in control of his conduct.
- Therefore the person concerned remains morally responsible of his action, whether
good or bad, right or wrong.
2.Acts done out or because of intense fear or panic are simply involuntary.
- A person when acting out of extreme fear is not morally accountable of his action or
conduct.
- An example is a cashier who hands the money to a robber who is poking a gun on her
head is acting out of intense fear and panic, and thus, doing something involuntarily
and without her consent. Such action exempts theperson from any moral or even legal
responsibility.
MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACT
4.Violence
- Refers to any physical force exerted on a person by
another free agent for the purpose of compelling the
said person to act against his will (Agapay 1991)
- Any act where great and brutal force is inflicted to a
person constitutes violence.
- This includes acts such as torture, mutilation and the
like.
Principles Governing Violence:
1. Any action resulting from violence is simply involuntary.
- If one is compelled to do something, one should not consent to it.
- An example is a woman whose body may be violated but remained defiant in the presence of
an unjust and brutal aggressor, whose superior strength overpowers that of the woman victim.
2. When a person experiences so much fear in the face of an unjust aggressor who is armed and
extremely dangerous, he or she is not held morally responsible of his or her action.
- Active resistance should always be offered to an unjust aggressor.
- But if resistance is impossible, or if there is a serious threat to one’s life, a person confronted
by violence can always offer intrinsic resistance by withholding consent; that is enough to save
one’s moral integrity (Panizo as cited in Agapay 1991).
5. Habit
Is a constant and easy way of doing
things acquired by the repetition of the
same act (Panizo 1964).
Is a lasting readiness and facility, born
of frequently repeated acts, for acting
in certain manner (Glenn 1965).
Principles Governing Habit:
1. Actions done by force of habit are voluntary in cause, unless a reasonable
effort is made to counteract the habitual inclination (Glenn 1965).
2. A deliberate admitted habit does not lessen voluntariness and actions
resulting therefrom are voluntary at least in their cause (Peschke 1985).
3. An opposed habit lessens voluntariness and sometimes precludes it
completely. The reason is that a habit weakens both the intellect and will
in the concrete situation in a similar way as passion does (Peschke ibid).
4. When a person decides to fight his habit, and for as long as the effort
towards this purpose continues, actions resulting from such habit may be
regarded as acts of man and not accountable. The reason is that the
cause of such habit is no longer expressly desired (Glenn as cited by
Agapay, ibid).