11 - Laburada vs.

Land Registration Authority, 287 SCRA 333, March 11, 1998

G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998

SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL

SANTOS, JR., petitioners,
vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

The petitioners were applicants to a registration case involving a parcel of land in Mandaluyong city. The
land registration court had ruled in their favor and issued an order to the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused because they have found that the
parcel of land the petitioners were seeking to register was already part of the land registered in a previous
case for that purpose.

The petitioners then filed with the SC an action for mandamus to compel the LRA to issue the decree of
registration in light of the registration case ruled in their favor.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the LRA may be compelled through mandamus to issue a decree of registration. (NO)

HELD:

There are three reasons why mandamus is an improper remedy.

One, because the petitioners do not have a legal right to compel the LRA to issue a decree of registration
because the judgment has not yet become executory and incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law.
Unlike in ordinary civil actions, the judgment over a land registration proceeding may only be deemed
executory and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.
Therefore, if the decree has not yet been entered into the Land Registration Commission, then the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.

Two, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to issue an order for registration of a piece of
land that has already been registered in a previous land registration case. To do so would be contrary to the
principle behind original registration, which is to register a parcel of land only once. The LRA, in this case,
has found that there is a possibility that the land the petitioners are seeking to register already has a title
issued over it to another person. If proven to be true, then the court’s decision awarding the subject property
to petitioners will be rendered null and void.

Third, because the issuance of a decree is not a ministerial act but a judicial function or act in which the LRA
is required to exercise its discretion. The LRA is actually tasked with the duty to make sure that there are no
duplicated registries, and since the petitioners have no legal right anyway, mandamus will not issue.
 12 - Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro, 324 SCRA 591, February 03, 2000

G.R. No. 112905. February 3, 2000

THE HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ, EUGENIO LOPEZ DE LEON, PASCUAL LOPEZ DE LEON,
ANTONIO GUICO LOPEZ, FORTUNATO GUICO LOPEZ, MIGUEL GUICO LOPEZ, ERLINDA
LOCERO LOPEZ, TING LOPEZ DE LEON, RUFINA LAYAO LOPEZ, LUISITA LOPEZ DE LEON,
MACARIO LOPEZ DE LEON, FELISA LOPEZ DE LEON, PRINTIS L. DE LEON, FLOVIANA LOPEZ
VELASCO, LOURDES LOPEZ DE LEON, LAGRIMAS LOPEZ DE LEON, ROSARIO LOPEZ DE
LEON, RESURRECCION LOPEZ DE LEON and RICARDA LOPEZ DE LEON, petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO C. DE CASTRO, MARIA SOCORRO DE CASTRO married to ANTONIO PERIGRINA,
FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, FAUSTINO DE CASTRO, EPIFANIA C. VDA. DE CASTRO, and their
successors-in-interest, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

The same parcel of land located in Tagaytay City was the subject of two applications for registration that
were filed to different branches of the same CFI.

The petitioners’ application commenced on July 25, 1956, filed before the CFI of Cavite. Petitioners had
acquired judgment in their favor over the subject property on April 19, 1971, wherein it was ordered that
once the decision has become final, the corresponding decree of registration of title be issued to them.
However, the Municipality of Silang, which had opposed the application of the petitioners, due to the subject
property being a part of its “patrimonial property”, raised the issue to the CA and the SC, rendering the
judgement final and executory only on June 18, 1980.

However, in the investigation to issue the decree of registration, it was found that respondents in this case
had applied for registration of the same parcel of land, which was then decreed in their favor on March 26,
1968. The respondents then subsequently sold the land to a third party “in good faith”.

Petitioners then filed on June 28, 1988 a complaint for the execution of the judgement in their favor and for
the cancellation of the land titles in the name of the respondents. The RTC dismissed the case for being
“improper and premature”, stating that the judgement rendered in 1980 could not be enforced against the
respondents because they were not parties in the application filed by the respondents and they did not
implead the Register of Deeds of Tagaytay, rendering the court without jurisdiction over the said registry in
order to cancel the titles issued in favor of the respondents. Additionally, the court concluded that the
complaint was in the nature of a collateral attack on the validity of the certificate of title issued in favor of
the respondents since the caption and averments did not directly assail it.

The CA, upon elevation, agreed with the RTC that the title was indefeasible and may not be a subject of a
collateral proceeding. Likewise, it cited Article 1544 of the Civil Code, saying that it had “persuasive
influence” in saying the earlier date of registration should prevail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners may cancel the tile issued in favor of respondents. (NO)

RULING:

Compliance with the requirement of notice and publication had the effect of notifying all persons interested
in the proceedings, both parties should have exercised diligence in protecting their interests, but most
particularly the petitioners because a land registration case “is a race against time” pursuant to the principle
that those who are “first in time are first in right”.

The petition is denied mainly because of laches, according to the SC. The petitioners waited for almost 7
years to attack the validity of the title issued in favor of respondents, more than the one year prescription for
such action. Additionally, the SC accused the petitioners for not exercising due diligence in guarding their
right over the subject property.

In land registration cases, it is the date of issuance of title over a parcel of land and not the date of application
for registration that governs, so even if the petitioners were the first ones to file for registration, it is the
respondents who first acquired title over the parcel of land in contest. The respondents, therefore, are first in
time and first in right.
 13 - Vda. de. Arceo vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 489, May 18, 1990

G.R. No. 81401. May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO,
RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, LORENZO
ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six
were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan.

The Arceos had apparently executed two deeds of donation disposing the subject properties in favor of Jose,
after which the latter took possession thereof. They also signed another deed of donation mortis causa
revoking the first deed of donation to Jose and declaring the properties in favor of all their grandchildren.
The same was notarized only on 1944 after Escolastica died. Subsequently in 1972, Virginia, Jose’s widow,
filed with the cadastral court an application for registration in their names of the subject properties, which
Jose’s siblings opposed.

The cadastral court rejected all three documents (of donation) and distributed the properties according to the
law on intestate succession. The CA affirmed the decision upon elevation by petitioners. Thus this petition to
the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether the petitioners have a better right over the subject property. (YES)

RULING:

The four parcels of land disputed lawfully belongs to Virginia and her children by virtue of the deed of
donation that was executed in accordance with law. The subsequent deed of donation was rendered
insufficient in form and the one signed mortis causa had no valid ground to revoke a donation that had
become irrevocable once accepted.
 14 - SM Prime Holdings, Inc. vs. Madayag, 578 SCRA 552, February 12, 2009

G.R. No. 164687. February 12, 2009

SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
ANGELA V. MADAYAG, respondent.

NACHURA, J.

FACTS:

Angela V. Madayag filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan an application for
registration of a parcel of land located in Barangay Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Attached to the
application was a tracing cloth of Survey Plan Psu-01-008438, approved by the Land Management Services
(LMS) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 1, San Fernando City.

Later that same year, SM Prime Holdings, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Chief, Regional Survey Division,
DENR, Region I, demanding the cancellation of the respondent’s survey plan because it apparently
encroached on the properties it had recently purchased from several lot owners and was not notified of the
survey that Madayag submitted.

SM Prime then manifested its opposition to the Madayag’s application for registration. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and the heirs of Romulo Visperas also filed their
respective oppositions.

On the advice of DENR Assistant Regional Executive Director for Legal Services and Public Affairs, Allan
V. Barcena, SM Prime filed a petition for cancellation to the DENR. SM Prime likewise filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings to await the decision of the administrative agency, it being prejudicial to the land
registration case, which the RTC granted, the reason being a survey plan is a necessary requirement in the
registration proceedings.

Madayag filed an MR on the order of the RTC granting the motion to suspend proceedings, which the CA
reversed. Thus this petition by SM Prime to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC may still proceed with the land registration case. (YES)

RULING:

The power to stay (suspend) proceedings is an inherent power of the court to control the disposition of the
cases in its dockets, with economy of time and effort for the court, counsel and litigants, but it should
likewise be mindful of the right of every party to a speedy disposition of his case.

The RTC has the authority to determine whether the subject parcel of land is included in the petitioners’
lands which it claims is already titled without having to wait for the DENR to determine the validity of the
survey plan or even to decide on its invalidity at all.

“In view of the nature of a Torrens title, a land registration court has the duty to determine whether the
issuance of a new certificate of title will alter a valid and existing certificate of title. An application for
registration of an already titled land constitutes a collateral attack on the existing title, which is not allowed
by law. But the RTC need not wait for the decision of the DENR in the petition to cancel the survey
plan in order to determine whether the subject property is already titled or forms part of already titled
property. The court may now verify this allegation based on the respondent’s survey plan vis-à-vis the
certificates of title of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest. After all, a survey plan precisely serves
to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be overlapped by a
subsequent registration of any adjoining land.”
Thus, the RTC is directed to proceed with the land registration case.
 15 - Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, August 31, 1987

G.R. No. L-37995 August 31, 1987

BUREAU OF FORESTRY, BUREAU OF LANDS and PHILIPPINE FISHERIES COMMISSION,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FILOMENO GALLO, respondents.

PARAS, J.

FACTS:

Four (4) parcels of land situated in Buenavista, Iloilo were the subject of an application for registration by
Mercedes Diago. The Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry opposed the application [the former
because “neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have sufficient title over the lands applied for,
which could be registered under the Torrens systems, and that they have never been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lands for at least 30 years prior to the filing of the application”, and the latter
because “certain specific portions of the lands subject matter of the application are mangrove swamps and
are within Timberland Block "B " L.C. Project No. 38, L.C. Map No. 1971 of Buenavista, Iloilo”].

Respondent Filomeno Gallo, having purchased the subject parcels of land from Mercedes Diago, moved to
be substituted in place of the latter, attaching to his motion an Amended Application for Registration of Title
substantially reproducing the allegations in the application of Mercedes Diago. Petitioner Philippine
Fisheries Commission also moved to be substituted in place of petitioner Bureau of Forestry as oppositor
over a portion of the land sought to be registered, supervision and control of said portion having been
transferred from the Bureau of Forestry to the Philippine Fisheries Commission.

The trial court rendered its decision ordering the registration of the four (4) parcels of land in the name of
respondent Filomeno Gallo [after excluding a portion which is the site of the municipal hall of Buenavista
town, and subjecting other lots to the road-of-way of 15 meters width].

The petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the trial court, thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not lands classified as forestry or mineral may be the subject of registration proceedings. (NO)

RULING:

The decision assailed is set aside, the portion of the land which is coconut land and is a disposable portion of
the public domain is ordered to be registered in the name of private respondent, and the rest which are forest
lands or lands of the public domain of the Republic of the Philippines are declared inalienable.
 16 - Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 647, April 29, 1974

No. L-31271. April 29, 1974

ROMEO MARTINEZ and LEONOR SUAREZ, spouses, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY and UNDERSECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.

ESGUERRA, J.

FACTS:

The spouses Romeo Martinez and Leonor Suarez are the registered owners of two (2) parcels of land located
in Lubao, Pampanga, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 15856 of the Register of Deeds of the said
province. Both parcels of land are fishponds. The property involved in the instant case is the second parcel
mentioned in the above-named transfer certificate of title.

The disputed property was originally owned by one Paulino Montemayor, who secured a ‘titulo real’ over it
way back in 1883. After the death of Paulino Montemayor the said property passed to his successors-in-
interest, Maria Montemayor and Donata Montemayor, who in turn, sold it, as well as the first parcel, to a
certain Potenciano Garcia.

Potenciano Garcia was prevented by the municipal president of Lubao, Pedro Beltran, from restoring the
dikes constructed on the contested property. Upon filing with the courts in 1914, and the decision
promulgated being in favor of the latter, the former was prevented from doing so permanently.

However, in 1925, Potenciano Garcia applied for the registration of both parcels of land in his name, and the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, sitting as land registration court, granted the registration of the land to
the spouses Potenciano Garcia and Lorenza Sioson.

After numerous change of hands, the property came into the possession of Romeo Martinez and Leonor
Suarez. They had referred the matter over the parcels of land to the Committee on Rivers and Streams, which
rendered a decision that the property is under the ownership of herein petitioner spouses. The spouses
proceeded to construct the dikes in the disputed parcel of land.

Some four (4) years later, the Honorable Florencio Moreno, then Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, ordered another investigation of the said parcel of land, directing the removal of the dikes
they had constructed, on the strength of the authority vested in him by Republic Act No. 2056, approved on
June 13, 1958, entitled ‘An Act To Prohibit, Remove and/or Demolish the Construction of Dams, Dikes, Or
Any Other Walls In Public Navigable Waters, Or Waterways and In Communal Fishing Grounds, To
Regulate Works in Such Waters or Waterways And In Communal Fishing Grounds, And To Provide Penalties
For Its Violation, And For Other Purposes’. This included a threat for the demolition of the dikes should the
spouses fail to comply, thus the commencement of the action.

The CFI ruled in favor of the spouses, but the CA reversed the same. Thus this petition to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property belonging to the public domain and cannot be registered for this reason may be
acquired by its registration under the Torrens system and after the lapse of one year since the final decree of
registration. (NO)

RULING:

“A simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the
possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains title under the Torrens system
which includes by mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does
not by virtue of said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.”
“[T]he incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land
covered thereby is not capable of registration.”

Article 339 of the old Civil Code which reads as follows:

Property of public ownership is:

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character.” (Par. 1)

The above-mentioned properties are parts of the public domain intended for public use, are outside the
commerce of men and, therefore, not subject to private appropriation.
17 - Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199, November 25, 1998

G.R. No. 103882. November 25, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, respondents.
CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

G.R. No. 105276. November 25, 1998

PASAY CITY and REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.

FACTS:

R.A. No. 1899 was approved on June 22, 1957 which authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by
chartered cities and municipalities. In light of this, the Pasay City Council passed Ordinance No. 121, for the
reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor
to award and enter into reclamation contracts, and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said
Ordinance was amended on April 21, 1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate
Corporation (“RREC”) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.

On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for the reclamation of the foreshore
lands in Pasay City.

In 1961, the RP filed a complaint with the then CFI of Rizal questioning the aforementioned agreement
considering that the land it covers is outside the commerce of man. Pasay City and RREC contend, however,
that the “foreshore lands” as mentioned in R.A. No. 1899 has a broader meaning than what can be found in
the Words and Phrases and in the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.

The CFI had ruled against Pasay City and RREC and enjoined them from further reclaiming or committing
acts of dispossession. Still dissatisfied with the decision of the CFI, the Republic appealed the case to the
CA, but the latter dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the CFI with modifications. Thus this
petition to the SC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the lands being reclaimed by Pasay City are to be considered foreshore lands. (NO)

HELD:

The lands Pasay City actually has are not foreshore lands but are actually submerged and offshore areas that
are outside the commerce of man. It was erroneous of the lower court to stretch the meaning of the
“foreshore lands” beyond the contemplation of the law.

“Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.”

“It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No.
158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899,
and therefore ultra vires and null and void.”

“What is more, a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether
fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. (Halili vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 174; Cimafranca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
611.) Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of P.D. 1529, that a
certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law.
 18 - Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., 606 SCRA 444, December 03, 2009

G.R. No. 162243. December 3, 2009

HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G. GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioner, vs. PICOP RESOURCES, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 164516. December 3, 2009

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. HEHERSON ALVAREZ substituted by HON. ELISEA G.
GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, respondent.

G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009

THE HON. ANGELO T. REYES (formerly Hon. Elisea G. Gozun), in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner, vs. PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP.
OF THE PHILIPPINES (PICOP), respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application to have its
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA). In the middle of the processing of PICOP’s application, PICOP refused to attend further meetings
with the DENR and instead filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then
DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez seeking the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the
DENR Secretary to sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to it.

The RTC granted the petition for mandamus, and the DENR’s MR was denied. Upon elevation, the CA
affirmed the decision but deleted the grant of damages to PICOP. Both of them filed a petition for review to
the SC.

The first SC decision for this case reversed and set aside the issuance of mandamus and denied the petition of
PICOP to reinstate the deleted decision concerning damages awarded to PICOP. Thus this MR, which was
decided after the conduct of oral arguments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PICOP was correct in bringing an action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against
DENR to the trial court without exhausting administrative remedies. (NO)

RULING:

It has been extensively discussed in the case that a writ for mandamus in favor of PICOP does not lie,
because mandamus may only be issued in the performance of a ministerial duty and does not involve the
exercise of an administrative agency’s discretion. The language of the law which PICOP relies for its right to
an automatic conversion from a TLA to an IFMA simply provides that the automatic conversion but can
hardly be considered as mandatory.

Therefore, since mandamus does not lie, the proper remedy of PICOP in claiming that it has complied with
all statutory and administrative requirements for the issuance of the IFMA should have been with the Office
of the President.