CURRICULUM VITAE

Shaun Nichols

Department of Philosophy Phone: 503-804-5248

Sage School of Philosophy [email protected]
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14850

Professional Positions:
Professor, Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, 2019-
Sherwin Scott Chair of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2016-2019
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 2006-2016
Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, 2004-6
Harry Lightsey Associate Professor in Humanities, College of Charleston, 2000-2004
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, 1998-2004
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston, Charleston, South
Carolina, 1992-1998.

Education:
Ph.D., Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, 1992
B.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 1986

Publications:

BOOKS:

Nichols, S. (2021). Rational Rules: Towards a Theory of Moral Learning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2015). Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretense, Self-awareness and
Understanding Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

EDITED VOLUMES:

Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., and Nichols, S. (2020). Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol. 3.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., and Nichols, S. (2018). Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol. 2.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., and Nichols, S. (2015). Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2013). Experimental Philosophy, vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press.
Alhoff, F., Mallon, R., & Nichols, S. (2012). Philosophy: Traditional and Experimental Readings. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Cova, F., Dutant, J., Machery, E. Knobe, J., Nichols, S., Nahmias, E. (2012). La Philosophie
Experimentale. Paris: Vuibert.
Nadelhoffer, T., Nahmias, E. & Nichols, S. (2010). Moral psychology: Historical and Contemporary
Readings. Wiley-Blackwell.
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2008). Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2006). The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretense, Possibility, and
Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ARTICLES:

Anderson, R., Kamtekar, R., Nichols, S., & Pizarro, P. (forthcoming). "False positive" emotions,
responsibility, and moral character. Cognition.
Chadha, M. & Nichols, S. (forthcoming). Eliminating selves, reducing persons. In C. Coseru (ed.)
Reasons And Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality; Essays in Honor of Mark
Siderits. Springer.
Nichols, S. (forthcoming). The case for moral empiricism. Analysis.
Nichols, S. (forthcoming). Free will and reference. In J. Campbell (ed.) Blackwell Companion to Free
Will.
Nichols, S. (forthcoming). Moral learning and moral representations. In J. Doris & M. Vargas (eds.) The
Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. & Shoemaker, D. (forthcoming). The embattled ‘self’: elimination or preservation? In P.
Robbins & B. Malle (eds.) Cambridge Handbook of Moral Psychology. Cambridge University
Press.
Sytsma, J., Muldoon, R., & Nichols, S. (forthcoming). The meta-wisdom of crowds. Synthese.
Handfield, T., Thrasher, J., Corcoran, A. & Nichols, S. (2021). Asymmetry and symmetry of acts and
omissions in punishment, norms, and judged causality. Judgment and Decision Making, 16, 796-
822.
Rose, D., Sievers, E., & Nichols, S. (2021). Cause and burn. Cognition.
Chadha, M., & Nichols, S. (2020). Experiential Unity without a Self: The Case of Synchronic Synthesis.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1-17.
Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2020). Teleological Essentialism: Generalized. Cognitive science, 44(3), e12818.
Ayars, A., & Nichols, S. (2020). Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence
from consensus. Mind & Language, 35, 67-89.
Nadelhoffer, T., Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Nichols, S. (2020). Natural compatibilism, indeterminism,
and intrusive metaphysics. Cognitive science, 44(8), e12873.
Chadha, M., & Nichols, S. (2019). Self-conscious emotions without a self. Philosophers Imprint, 19(38).
Fiala, B., & Nichols, S. (2019). Generating Explanatory Gaps. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(9-
10), 71-82.
Kamtekar, R., & Nichols, S. (2019). Agent‐Regret and Accidental Agency. Midwest Studies In
Philosophy, 43(1), 181-202.
Millhouse, T., Ayars, A., & Nichols, S. (2019). Learnability and moral nativism: Exploring Wilde rules.
In J. Suikkanen and A. Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge, 73-89.
Nichols, S. (2019). Debunking and vindicating in moral psychology. In A. Goldman & B. McLaughlin
(eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2019). Experimental philosophy and statistical learning. In Eugen Fischer and Mark Curtis
(eds.). Methodological Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury, 13-42.
Nichols, S. (2019). Moral learning. In A. Zimmerman, K. Jones, and M. Timmons (eds.) Routledge
Handbook of Moral Epistemology, 124-138.
Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2019). From punishment to universalism. Mind & Language, 34(1), 59-72.
Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2019). Teleological essentialism. Cognitive science, 43(4), e12725.
Blanchard, T., Lombrozo, T., & Nichols, S. (2018). Bayesian Occam's razor is a razor of the
people. Cognitive science, 42(4), 1345-1359.
Garfield, J., Nichols, S., & Strohminger, N. (2018). Episodic memory and oneness. In PJ Ivanhoe, O.
Flanagan, V. Harrison, H. Sarkissian, & E. Schwitzgebel (eds.), The Oneness Hypothesis in
Philosophy, Religion, and Psychology. Columbia University Press.
Nichols, S. (2018). The wrong and the bad. In K. Gray & J. Graham (eds.) Atlas of Moral Psychology.
 Guilford Press, 40-48.
Nichols, S., & Gaus, J. (2018). Unspoken Rules: Resolving Underdetermination With Closure Principles.
Cognitive science, 42(8), 2735-2756.
Nichols, S., & Pinillos, N. Á. (2018). Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”. Mind &
Language, 33(4), 397-414.
Nichols, S., Strohminger, N., Rai, A., & Garfield, J. (2018). Death and the self. Cognitive science, 42,
314-332.
Ayars, A., & Nichols, S. (2017). Moral empiricism and the bias for act-based rules. Cognition, 167, 11-
24.
Gaus, G., & Nichols, S. (2017). Moral learning in the open society: the theory and practice of natural
liberty. Social Philosophy and Policy, 34(1), 79-101.
Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2017). Experimental Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nichols, S. (2017). The essence of mentalistic agents. Synthese, 194(3), 809-825.
Nichols, S. (2017). Memory and personal identity. In S. Bernecker & M. Kourken (eds.), Routledge
Handbook of Philosophy of Memory,169-179.
Nichols, S. (2017). The rationality of psychological essentialism. In D. Rose (ed.) Experimental
Metaphysics. Bloomsbury, 117-134.
Nichols, S. (2017). Replies to Kane, McCormick, and Vargas. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2511-2523.
Nichols, S. & Samuels, R. (2017). Bayesian psychology and human rationality. In T. Hung and T. Lane
(eds.). Rationality: Constraints and Contexts, Elsevier.
Prinz, J. & Nichols, S. (2017). Diachronic identity and the moral self. In J. Kiverstein (ed.) Routledge
Handbook of Social Mind, 449-464.
Chan, H., Deutsch, M., & Nichols, S. (2016). Free Will and Experimental Philosophy. In J. Sytsma & W.
Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley Blackwell, 158-172.
Horgan, T. & Nichols, S. (2016). The Zero Point and I. In S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. Morando (eds.)
Pre-reflective Consciousness. Routledge.
Nichols, S., Kumar, S., Lopez, T., Ayars, A., & Chan, H. Y. (2016). Rational learners and moral
rules. Mind & Language, 31(5), 530-554.
Nichols, S., Pinillos, N. A., & Mallon, R. (2016). Ambiguous reference. Mind, 125(497), 145-175.
Garfield, J. L., Nichols, S., Rai, A. K., & Strohminger, N. (2015). Ego, egoism and the impact of religion
on ethical experience: What a paradoxical consequence of buddhist culture tells us about moral
psychology. The Journal of Ethics, 19(3-4), 293-304.
Rose, D., Buckwalter, W., & Nichols, S. (2017). Neuroscientific prediction and the intrusion of intuitive
metaphysics. Cognitive science, 41(2), 482-502.
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2015). Neurodegeneration and identity. Psychological Science, 26(9),
1469-1479.
White, C., Kelly, B., & Nichols, S. (2015). Remembering past lives: intuitions about memory and
personal identity in reincarnation. In H. Cruz & R. Nichols (eds.) The Cognitive Science of
Religion and its Philosophical Implications. Continuum Press.
Fiala, B., Arico, A. and Nichols, S. (2014). You, Robot. In E. Machery & E. O’Neill (eds.), Current
Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge, 31-47.
Nichols, S. (2014). The Episodic Sense Of Self. In J. D’Arms and D. Jacobson (eds.) Moral Psychology
and Human Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2014). Process debunking and ethics. Ethics, 124(4), 727-749.
Nichols, S., Timmons, M., and Lopez, T. (2014). Ethical Conservatism And The Psychology Of Moral
Luck. In M. Christen, J. Fischer, M. Huppenbauer, C. Tanner, & C. van Schaik (eds.) Empirically
Informed Ethics. Springer, 159-176.
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131(1), 159-171.
Tierney, H., Howard, C., Kumar, V., Kvaran, T. & Nichols, S. (2014). How many of us are there? In J.
Sytsma (ed.) Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Continuum Press, 181-202.
Bartels, D. M., Kvaran, T., & Nichols, S. (2013). Selfless giving. Cognition, 129(2), 392-403.
Deery, O., Bedke, M. and Nichols, S. (2013). Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism And The
Experience Of Agency. In D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 126-
150.
Kvaran, T., Nichols, S., & Sanfey, A. (2013). The effect of analytic and experiential modes of thought on
moral judgment. Progress in brain research, 202: 187-196.
Nadelhoffer, T., Heshmati, S., Kaplan, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). Folk retributivism and the
communication confound. Economics & Philosophy, 29(2), 235-261.
Nichols, S. (2013). Brute retributivism. In T. Nadelhoffer (ed.) The Future of Punishment. New York:
Oxford University Press, 25-47.
Nichols, S. (2013). Free will and error. In G. Caruso, ed. Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral
Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 203-218.
Nichols, S. and Timmons, M. (2013). Experimental ethics. In H. LaFollette, ed., The International
Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell, 1838–1850.
Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The lesson of bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4(4),
599-619.
Fiala, B., Arico, A., and Nichols, S. (2012). On the psychological origins of dualism: dual-process
cognition and the explanatory gap. In E. Slingerland & M. Collard (eds.) Creating Consilience:
Issues and Case Studies in the Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. Oxford University
Press, 88-109.
Klein, S. and Nichols, S. (2012). Memory and the Sense of Personal Identity. Mind, 121 (483): 677-702.
Knobe, J., Buckwalter, W., Nichols, S., Robbins, P., Sarkissian, H., and Sommers, T. (2012).
Experimental philosophy, Annual Review of Psychology, 63: 81-99.
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2013). If folk intuitions vary, then what?. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 86(3), 618-635.
Nichols, S. (2012). The indeterminist intuition: Source and status. The Monist, 95(2), 290-307.
Phelan, M., Arico, A., & Nichols, S. (2013). Thinking things and feeling things: On an alleged
discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 12(4),
703-725.
Arico, A., Fiala, B., Goldberg, R. F., & Nichols, S. (2011). The folk psychology of consciousness. Mind
& Language, 26(3), 327-352.
Doris, J. and Nichols, S. (2011). Broadminded: sociality and the cognitive science of morality. In E.
Margolis, R. Samuels, and S. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive
Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 425-453.
Freiman, C., & Nichols, S. (2011). Is desert in the details?. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 82(1), 121-133.
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2011). Free will and the bounds of the self. In R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford
Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 530-554.
Kozuch, B., & Nichols, S. (2011). Awareness of Unawareness Folk Psychology and Introspective
Transparency. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(11-12), 135-160.
Mallon, R., & Nichols, S. (2011). Dual processes and moral rules. Emotion Review, 3(3), 284-285.
Nichols, S. (2011). Experimental philosophy and the problem of free will. Science, 331(6023), 1401-
1403.
Nichols, S. (2011). Is Free Will an Illusion?. Scientific American Mind, 22(5), 18-19.
Cohen, J., & Nichols, S. (2010). Colours, colour relationalism and the deliverances of
introspection. Analysis, 70(2), 218-228.
Machery, E., Deutsch, M., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., Sytsma, J., & Stich, S. P. (2010). Semantic intuitions:
reply to Lam.
Mallon, R. and Nichols, S. (2010). Experimental philosophy. In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Mallon, R. and Nichols, S. (2010). Rules. In J. Doris (ed.) Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 297-320.
Nichols, S. (2010). Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness. politics, philosophy &
 economics, 9(3), 275-296.
Nichols, S., & Bruno, M. (2010). Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study. Philosophical
Psychology, 23(3), 293-312.
Prinz, J. and Nichols, S. (2010). Moral emotions. In J. Doris (ed.) Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 111-148.
Sarkissian, H., Chatterjee, A., De Brigard, F., Knobe, J., Nichols, S., & Sirker, S. (2010). Is belief in free
will a cultural universal?. Mind & Language, 25(3), 346-358.
Schroeder, T., Roskies, A., and Nichols, S. (2010). Moral motivation. In J. Doris (ed.) Moral Psychology
Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 72-110.
Young, L., Nichols, S., & Saxe, R. (2010). Investigating the neural and cognitive basis of moral luck: It’s
not what you do but what you know. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(3), 333-349.
Fiala, B., & Nichols, S. (2009). Confabulation, confidence, and introspection. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 32(2), 144-145.
Lopez, T., Zamzow, J., Gill, M., & Nichols, S. (2009). Side constraints and the structure of commonsense
ethics. Philosophical Perspectives, 23(1), 305-319.
Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2009). Against arguments from reference. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 79(2), 332-356.
Nichols, S. (2009). The propositional imagination. In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion
to the Philosophy of Psychology, 360-369.
Zamzow, J. L., & Nichols, S. (2009). Variations in ethical intuitions. Philosophical Issues, 19(1), 368-
388.
Gill, M. B., & Nichols, S. (2008). Sentimentalist pluralism: Moral psychology and philosophical
ethics. Philosophical Issues, 18(1), 143-163.
Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2008). An experimental philosophy manifesto. In Knobe and Nichols (eds.)
Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reprinted in translation [Un Manifeste pour la Philosophie Expérimentale] in Klesis Revue
philosophique (2013), 27.
Nichols, S. (2008). How can psychology contribute to the free will debate? In J. Baer, J. Kaufman, & R.
Baumeister (eds.) Are We Free? Oxford University Press, 10-31.
Nichols, S. (2008). Imagination and the I. Mind & Language, 23(5), 518-535.
Nichols, S. (2008). Moral rationalism and empirical immunity. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral
Psychology, vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 395-407.
Nichols, S. (2008). Sentiment, intention, and disagreement: replies to Blair & D’Arms. In W. Sinnott-
Armstrong (ed.) The Psychology and Biology of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nichols, S. (2008). Sentimentalism naturalized. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) The Psychology and
Biology of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Roskies, A. L., & Nichols, S. (2008). Bringing moral responsibility down to earth. The Journal of
philosophy, 105(7), 371-388.
Vargas, M., & Nichols, S. (2007). Psychopaths and moral knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, &
Psychology, 14(2), 157-162.
Nichols, S. (2007). After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes. Philosophical
Perspectives, 21, 405-428.
Nichols, S. (2007). Imagination and immortality: thinking of me. Synthese, 159(2), 215-233.
Nichols, S. (2007). On The Psychological Diversity Of Moral Insensitivity. In O. Vilarroya and L.
Valencia (eds.), Biology of Conflicts and Cooperation. Barcelona: Littera Ediciones.
Nichols, S. (2007). The rise of compatibilism: A case study in the quantitative history of
philosophy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 260.
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007). Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk
intuitions. Nous, 41(4), 663-685.
Reprinted in J. Knobe & S. Nichols (eds.) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University
Press.
Reprinted in The Philosopher’s Annual, 2008.
Reprinted in translation [Responsabilite morale et determinisme] in F. Cova et al. (eds.) (2012)
La Philosophie Experimentale. Paris: Vuibert.
Reprinted in in G. Sher (ed.) (2012) Ethics: Essential Readings. New York: Routledge, 685-702.
Nichols, S., & Ulatowski, J. (2007). Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect
revisited. Mind & Language, 22(4), 346-365.
Nichols, S., & Vargas, M. (2007). How to be fair to psychopaths. Philosophy, Psychiatry, &
Psychology, 14(2), 153-155.
Nichols, S. (2006). Do children think of the self as the soul?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(5), 481-
482.
Nichols, S. (2006). Folk intuitions on free will. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6(1-2), 57-86.
Nichols, S. (2006). Free will and the folk: Responses to commentators. Journal of Cognition and
Culture, 6(1/2), 305-20.
Nichols, S. (2006). Imaginative blocks and impossibility: an essay in modal psychology. In S. Nichols
(ed.) The Architecture of the Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 237-255.
Nichols, S. (2006). Introduction. In S. Nichols (ed.) The Architecture of the Imagination. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1-16.
Nichols, S. (2006). Just the imagination: Why imagining doesn’t behave like believing. Mind &
Language, 21(4), 459-474.
Nichols, S., & Mallon, R. (2006). Moral dilemmas and moral rules. Cognition, 100(3), 530-542.
Reprinted in translation [Dilemmes moraux et regles morales] in F. Cova et al. (eds.) (2012) La
Philosophie Experimentale. Paris: Vuibert.
Nichols, S. (2005). Innateness and moral psychology. In The Innate Mind: Structure and Content, eds. P.
Carruthers, S. Laurence, and S. Stich. New York: Oxford University Press, 353-369.
Machery, E., Mallon, R., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. P. (2004). Semantics, cross-cultural
style. Cognition, 92(3), B1-B12.
Reprinted in J. Knobe & S. Nichols (eds.) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University
Press.
Nichols, S. (2004). After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment. Philosophical
Psychology, 17(1), 3-26.
Nichols, S. (2004). Folk concepts and intuitions: From philosophy to cognitive science. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 8(11), 514-518.
Nichols, S. (2004). The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts. Mind & Language, 19(5), 473-502.
Nichols, S. (2004). Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code. The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, 62(2), 129-139.
Nichols, S. (2004). Is religion what we want? Motivation and the cultural transmission of religious
representations. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 4(2), 347-371.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2004). Reading one’s own mind: self-awareness and developmental
psychology. In New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, a supplemental volume of the
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, eds. M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger, 297-339.
German, T. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal
chains. Developmental Science, 6(5), 514-523.
Nichols, S. (2003). Imagination and the puzzles of iteration. Analysis, 63(3), 182-187.
Nichols, S., & Folds-Bennett, T. (2003). Are children moral objectivists? Children's judgments about
moral and response-dependent properties. Cognition, 90(2), B23-B32.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2003). How to read your own mind: a cognitive theory of self-consciousness.
In Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, eds. Q. Smith and A. Jokic. Oxford University
Press, 157-200.
Nichols, S., Stich, S., and Weinberg, J. (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethno-epistemology. In
The Skeptics, ed. S. Luper. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 227-247.
Stich, S. and Nichols, S. (2003). Folk psychology. In The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, eds.
T. Warfield and S. Stich. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 235-255.
Faucher, L., Mallon, R., Nazer, D., Nichols, S., Ruby, A., Stich, S. and Weinberg, J. (2002). The baby in
the lab-coat: why child development is an inadequate model for understanding the development of
science. In The Cognitive Basis of Science, eds. P. Carruthers, M. Siegal, and S. Stich. Cambridge
University Press.
Nichols, S. (2002). Folk psychology. In Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. London: Nature Publishing
Group, 134-140.
Nichols, S. (2002). How psychopaths threaten moral rationalism: Is it irrational to be amoral?. The
monist, 85(2), 285-303.
Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral
judgment. Cognition, 84(2), 221-236.
Nichols, S. (2002). On the genealogy of norms: A case for the role of emotion in cultural
evolution. Philosophy of Science, 69(2), 234-255.
Reprinted in translation [Un fragment de la généalogie des normes] in Terrain: Revue
d’Ethnologie de l’Europe, 48, (2007) 73-88.
Nichols, S. (2001). Mindreading and the cognitive architecture underlying altruistic motivation. Mind &
language, 16(4), 425-455.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2001). Leggere la propria mente. Sistemi Intelligenti, XIII(1), 143-170.
Weinberg, J. M., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2001). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. Philosophical
topics, 29(1/2), 429-460.
Reprinted in R. Viale, D. Andler, and L. Hirschfeld (2006). Biological and Cultural Bases of
Human Inference, LEA, 191-222.
E. Sosa (ed.) (2007). Epistemology: An Anthology. Blackwell.
J. Knobe & S. Nichols (eds.) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Nichols, S. (2000). The mind’s “I” and the Theory of Mind’s “I”: Introspection and two concepts of
self. Philosophical Topics, 28(2), 171-199.
Nichols, S., & Grantham, T. (2000). Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness. Philosophy of
science, 67(4), 648-670.
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2000). A cognitive theory of pretense. Cognition, 74(2), 115-147.
Nichols, S., & Uller, C. (1999). Explicit factuality and comparative evidence. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 22(5), 776-777.
Grantham, T. and Nichols, S. (1999). Evolutionary psychology: ultimate explanations and panglossian
predictions. In Where Biology Meets Psychology : Philosophical Essays, ed. V. Hardcastle.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 47-66.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (1999). Pretense in prediction: simulation and understanding other minds. In
Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, ed. D. Fisette.
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 291-310.
Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (1998). Rethinking co-cognition. Mind & Language, 13, 499-512.
Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1997). Cognitive penetrability, rationality and restricted simulation. Mind &
Language, 12(3‐4), 297-326.
Nichols, S., Stich, S., Leslie, A., and Klein, D. (1996). Varieties of off-line simulation. In Theories of
Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 39-
74.
Stich, S. and Nichols, S. (1996). How do minds understand minds? Mental simulation vs. tacit theory. In
Deconstructing the Mind, Stephen Stich. New York: Oxford University Press, 136-167.
Nichols, S., Stich, S., & Leslie, A. (1995). Choice Effects and the Ineffectiveness of Simulation:
Response to Kühberger et al. Mind & language, 10(4), 437-445.
Stich, S. and Nichols, S. (1995). Second thoughts on simulation. In Mental Simulation: Evaluations and
Applications, eds. M. Davies and A. Stone. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 87-108.
Nichols, S. (1993). Developmental evidence and introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(1), 64-
65.
Stich, S., & Nichols, S. (1992). Folk psychology: Simulation or tacit theory?. Mind & Language, 7(1‐2),
35-71.
Reprinted in Science and Knowledge, ed. E. Villanueva. Ridgeview, 1993.
Reprinted in Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, eds. M. Davies and A. Stone.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995, 123-158.

Book reviews:

Nichols, S. (2004). Review of G. Currie and I. Ravenscroft’s Recreative Minds: Imagination in

Philosophy and Psychology. Mind, 113, 329-334.
Nichols, S. (1999). Review of D. Bolton & J. Hill’s Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder. Philosophical
Review, 108, 559-562.
Stich, S. and Nichols, S. (1998). Theory Theory to the Max: A Critical Notice of Gopnik & Meltzoff’s
Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Mind & Language, 13, 421-449.
Nichols, S. (1997). Review of W. Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality. Review of Metaphysics, 50, 672-
673.
Nichols, S. (1993). Review of New Enquiries into Truth and Interpretation (eds. Neil Cooper and Pascal
Engel). Mind & Language, 8, no. 1, 157-161.
Nichols, S. (1991). Review of J. C. Maloney’s The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language.
Mind & Language, 6, no. 4, 386-389.

ADDRESSES:
“The Wrong and the Bad”
Understanding Value, Sheffield University Conference, December, 2020
“Rational learning, parochial norms and tribalism”
Inaugural lecture for Center for Experimental-Philosophical Studies of Discrimination
(CEPDISC), University of Aarhus, Denmark, November, 2020
Conference for the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, December, 2020
“Corpora and the Evidence Available to Learners”
Corpus Fortnight, May, 2020
“Essentialism and the Self”
Thinking Morally about Genetics and Agency: Empirical and Philosophical Approaches,
Columbia University, December 2019
Book workshop for Rational Rules
Duke University, September 2019
“Agent regret and accidental agency”
Beijing Analytic Philosophy Conference, May 2019
Fudan University, June 2019
Zhejiang University, June 2019
Yale University, March 2019
Lectures on Bound
Renmin University, Beijing, May 2019
“Lexical Semantics and the Self”
Peking University, China, May 2019
Monash University, Australia, August 2018
“Right and Good: On the Doxastic and Ecological Rationality of Deontic Rules”
Evolution and Ethics Conference, Boston University, April 2019
“Rationalist metaethics”
Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philosophy Conference, Northeastern University,
April 2019
University of Pennsylvania, October 2018
Experimental Philosophy Conference, Buffalo, September 2018
“Unspoken Rules”
University Pennsylvania, October 2018
“Death and the Self”
Monash University, Australia, August 2018
NEH Summer Institute on Self-Knowledge in Eastern and Western philosophies, Charleston SC,
May 2018
JNU, Delhi, January 2018
Weber State, Utah, October 2017
Oneness in Philosophy and Psychology, City University of Hong Kong, May 2016
Colorado College, Colorado City, February 2016
Union College, Schenectady, NY, February 2016
Seminar for Comparative Philosophy, Columbia University, Sept 2015
The Immortality Project, Capstone Conference, University of California, Riverside, May 2015
International Conference of Cognitive Science, Tehran, Iran April 2015
Wellcome & Loebel Lecture in Neuroethics, Oxford University, March 2015
Experimental Philosophy of the Self, NYU December 2014
New Directions in Moral Psychology, Tulane University, November 2014
Immortality Project, Templeton Foundation, University of California, Riverside, June 2014
“Outcome-based Rules, Punishment, and Fairness”
Chapman University, Los Angeles, November 2018
“Self-conscious emotions without a self”
NEH Summer Institute on Self-Knowledge in Eastern and Western philosophies, Charleston SC,
May 2018
“Referential ambiguity and discretion”
Concept Lab, University of Oslo, January 2018
“Skepticism and the Acquisition of ‘Knowledge’”
Southern Society for philosophy and psychology, March 2018
Experimental Philosophy Group, Osnabruck, Germany, November 2017
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, August 2017
Alternative Methods in Experimental Philosophy, University of East Anglia, UK, July 2017.
School of Philosophy, IPM, Tehran, Iran, April 2015
Yale-National University of Singapore, Singapore, January 2014
“The Wrong and the Bad”
CUNY, New York, April 2018
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Presidential Address, Baltimore, MD, July 2017
“Resolving underdetermination in norm systems”
Experimental Methods in Social and Political Philosophy, Australian National University, March
2017
“Moral Rationalism: A Limited Defense”
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, July 2016
Central APA, Kansas City, March 2016
“Blame under Uncertainty”
Gothenburg Biennial Responsibility Conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, August 2016
“Moral Empiricism: A Rational Learning Approach to Moral Judgment”
 International Conference on Thinking, Providence, RI, August 2016
“How Humean is Moral Learning”
The Hume Society, Sydney, Australia, July 2016
“Emotions as Rational Learning?”
Summer Institute: Moral Psychology & Education: Putting the Humanities to Work. Grand
Rapids, MI June 2016
“Statistical Learning and Social Norms”
Summer Institute: Moral Psychology & Education: Putting the Humanities to Work. Grand
Rapids, MI June 2016
“The Reference of ‘Meaning’ and the Meaning of Life”
The Meaning of Meaning: An Exploration of the Psychology of Purpose, Barcelona, April 2016
“Moral responsibility, change and the self”
Department of Bioethics, NIH March 2016
“Rational Learners and Metaethics”
GRIN, University of Quebec at Montreal, January 2016
“Rational Learners and Moral Rules”
Society for Personal and Social Psychology Pre-conference on Justice and Morality, San Diego,
January 2016
Moral Learning Workshop, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, May 2015
Cambridge University, March 2015
Jesus College, Oxford, March 2015
Princeton University, February 2015
“Senses of Self”
Morality in the Marketplace, Tulane University, October 2014
University of Stuttgart, June 2014
City University of New York, March 2014
Social Psychology Brownbag, Washington University, November 2013
9th Triennial Choice Symposium, Netherlands, June 2013
Intuitions, Experiments, and Philosophy, Nottingham, UK, September 2012
NEH Institute on Buddhism and Consciousness, Charleston, SC, May 2012
King’s College London, May 2012
M.E.R.G. Workshop, NY, March 2012
“Bayesian Learning and Moral Cognition”
ONR Cognitive Science & Human Robot Interaction Program Review, Arlington, VA, August
2014
“Can Bayesian Psychology Vindicate Human Rationality?”
IEAS Conference on Reason and Rationality, Taipei, Taiwan, August 2014
“Affect, conformity, and the persistence of moral norms”
Moral Revolutions, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, July 2014
“Learning and Mental Concepts”
The Future of Social Cognition, Bochum, Germany, June 2014
“Rational Learners and Non-Utilitarian Rules”
Jean Nicod, Paris, June 2014
City University of New York, March 2014
University of California, Irvine, October 2013
International Association for Computing and Philosophy, College Park, MD, July 2013
International Summer School for Affective Sciences, Geneva, Switzerland, July 2013
International Neuroethics Conference, Padua, Italy, May 2013
Workshop on Science and Ethics, Ann Arbor, MI, June 2012
Conference of the Brazilian Society for Analytic Philosophy, Fortaleza, Brazil, June 2012
Workshop on Moral Dilemmas, Royal Institute of Philosophy, London, May 2012
 “You, Robot”
Phenomenal Mindreading, Bochum Germany November 2013
“Free Will and Error”
Free Will, Reference, and Conceptual Change, University of San Francisco, August 2013
“Intuitions of Objectivity”
Workshop on Science and Ethics, Ann Arbor, MI, June 2013
“Folk Psychology of Consciousness”
Mindreading, Understanding, and Emotion, Chapel Hill, NC January 2013
NEH Institute on Buddhism and Consciousness, Charleston, SC, May 2012
Theory of Mind Workshop, Venice, Italy December 2008
Integrating Science and the Humanities, UBC, Vancouver, CA September 2008
Experimental Philosophy Workshop, Pre-SPP, University of Pennsylvania, June 2008
“The Belief in Free Will: Source and Status”
University of California, Berkeley, October 2011
College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, August 2011
“Experimental philosophy and economic thought: Two case studies”
XIV Urrutia Elejalde Summer School on Economics and Philosophy: Experiments in Economics,
Experiments in Philosophy, July 2011
“The Self in Self Interest”
Making People Moral conference, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, May 2011
“Debunking and Ethics”
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, October 2011
Society for Empirical Ethics, Pacific APA, April 2011
Experiment and Intuition, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., April 2011
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, February 2011
Murphy Institute Seminar, New Orleans, December 2010
Workshop on Metaethics and Empirical Methods, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, September
2010
“On the Psychological Origins of Dualism”
M.E.R.G. Workshop on Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness, NY, March 2011
Ohio State University, March 2011
George Washington University, Washington D.C., February 2011
University of Maryland, February 2011
Kline workshop on experimental philosophy, University of Missouri, April 2010
University of Minnesota, April 2010
Werkmeister conference on Experimental Philosophy, Florida State University, January 2010
California State University, Los Angeles, November 2009
Northwest Philosophy Conference, Pacific University, October 2009, keynote address
“On Biology and Culture in the Evolution of Morality”
University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, February 2011
“The State of Nature and the Epidemiology of Norms”
Series on the Science of Culture, University of British Columbia, October 2010
“Brute Retributivism”
Society for Applied Philosophy, Oxford, July 2010
St. Louis University, March 2010
“Modal Concepts in Preschoolers”
Methods workshop, Arche, St. Andrews, Scotland, May 2010
“Ethics and the psychology of moral luck”
Experimental Ethics workshop, Zurich, Switzerland, March 2010
Behavioral Ethics Conference, University of Central Florida, February 2010
Symposium on morality and evolution, German Analytic Philosophy conference, Bremen,
 Germany, September, 2009
Symposium on experimental ethics, Pacific APA, Vancouver, April 2009
University of Pennsylvania, March, 2009
“The Epidemiology of Promissory Norms”
Mellon Seminar on Promises and Agreements, Rice University, January 2010
“Children’s Judgments about Possibility”
Johns Hopkins University, December 2009
“The Epistemology of moral luck”
Experimental Epistemology Workshop, University at Buffalo, SUNY, Buffalo, NY, October,
2009
“Emotions, norms, and the genealogy of fairness”
Symposium on empirical approaches to ethics, Central APA, Chicago, February 2009
Workshop on moral psychology and free will, Palma de Mallorca December 2008
March Foundation/UNED, Madrid, Spain, December 2008
Conference on Moral Psychology, Princeton, November 2008
Social Psychology group, University of British Columbia, Vancouver CA September 2008
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, September 2008
“The Belief in Free Will: Why We Have It and What if We Lose It”
Workshop on moral psychology and free will, Palma de Mallorca December 2008
Lewis & Clark College, Portland OR, October 2008
“Introspection, Confabulation, and Transparency”
Confidence workshop, Jean Nicod, Paris, France December 2008
“After Incompatibilism”
University of California at San Diego, May 2008.
Agency and Responsibility, Indiana University, September 2007.
University of North Carolina, Moral Psychology Seminar, May 2007.
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston, SC, April 2006.
University of San Francisco, November 2005.
“Sentimentalist Pluralism”
Graduate Student Symposium, University of California at San Diego, May 2008, keynote address.
First Annual Graduate Conference, Western Michigan University, December 2007, keynote
address.
Mind, Agency, and Emotion, University of San Francisco, November 2007.
32nd Annual Midwest Philosophy Colloquium Frontiers of Moral Psychology, University of
Minnesota, Morris, October 2007.
“Moral Standing across Cultures”
Culture and the Mind workshop, Sheffield, England March 2008.
“Intuitions about Agency”
Free Will and Science, Florida State University, January 2008.
“Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited”
Max Planck Institute for Economics, Jena, Germany, January 2008.
University of Wisconsin, March 2007
Georgia State University, September 2006.
University of Arizona, September 2006.
Society for Exact Philosophy, San Diego, May 2006, keynote address.
College of Charleston, April 2006.
Pacific APA, session for the Society for Empirical Ethics, Portland, OR, March 2006.
University of Alberta, February 2006.
Harvard University (Social Cognitive Development Group), December 2005
“Imagination and the I”
The Imagination, Philosophy, and Psychology, Temple University, March 2008
 Pretense and Imagination, Birkbeck College, London, June 2007
Mimesis, Metaphysics, and Make-Believe: A Conferene in Honor of Kendall Walton, Leeds, June
2007
California State University, Fullerton, November 2006.
Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, October 2006.
“Experimental Philosophy Greets Behavioral Economics”
Economic Science Association, Tucson, AZ October 2007.
“Morality, Emotions, and Culture”
Culture, Mind, Brain, and Development workshop (NSF/FPR), Rensselaerville Institute, NY,
June 2007
“Rise of Compatibilism: A Case Study in the Quantitative History of Philosophy”
On-line Philosophy Conference, May 2007
“The Importance of Moral Rules” (with Ron Mallon)
Central APA, April 2007
“Attributions of Agency: Experimental Approaches”
Central APA: Society for Empirical Metaphysics, April 2007
“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: Investigating Folk Intuitions”
Neuroethics and Empirical Moral Psychology, University of Oslo, Norway, March 2007
“Mindreading and the Problem of Other Minds”
Mirror Neurons and Cognition, Cal State Long Beach, February 2007
“The Role of Affect and Motivation in Cultural Evolution”
Northwestern University, January 2007.
Institute of Cognition and Culture, Belfast, January 2007.
“Attributions of Freedom and Consciousness”
Culture and the Mind workshop, Lisbon, January 2007.
“Moral Dilemmas and Moral Rules” (with Ron Mallon)
Philosophy of Science Association, Vancouver, November 2006.
University of Alberta, March 2006.
Moral Psychology Research Group, October 2004.
“Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions” (with Joshua Knobe)
Cognitive Science Series, University of Arizona, October 2006.
Action, Ethics and Responsibility (INPC), Pullman, WA, March 2006.
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Wake Forest, June 2005.
“Imaginative Resistance and Immortality Beliefs”
Auburn University, March 2006.
Weber State University, February 2006.
Eastern APA, Group session on the imagination, Boston, December 2004.
“Moral Motivation” (with Adina Roskies and Tim Schroeder)
MPRG workshop, Washington University, April 2006.
“Compatibilism and Hot Cognition”
Emory University, February 2006.
University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, September 2005.
Pacific APA, session for the Society for Empirical Ethics, San Francisco, March 2005.
UNC/Duke workshop on Naturalized Ethics, Chapel Hill, NC, February 2005.
“Cultural Evolution: A Plea for History”
Workshop on cultural evolution, Washington University, January 2006.
“Embedded Fictions and the Psychology of the Imagination”
American Society for Aesthetics, Providence, RI, October 2005.
“Moral Emotions: Guilt and Anger” (with Jesse Prinz)
MPRG workshop, Dartmouth, October 2005.
“Moral Rules” (with Ron Mallon)
 MPRG workshop, Dartmouth, October 2005.
“Moral Psychology Psychologized”
The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Wake Forest, June 2005.
“Naturalized Meta-aesthetics” (with Jesse Prinz)
Aesthetics Anarchy, Indiana University, May 2005
“Folk Intuitions and Incompatibilism”
University of Arizona, May 2005
Yale University, April 2005
“Moral Rules and the Genealogy of Norms”
California Institute of Technology, November 2004.
“How Emotions Shape Moral Judgment”
World Forum of Cultures, Barcelona, July 2004.
“What Children Think about Objectivity”
Dartmouth conference, “The Psychology and Biology of Moral Beliefs and Attitudes,” May
2004.
“Introspection and the Attribution of Agency”
Pacific APA, invited symposium on introspection, Pasadena, March 2004.
“Cross-cultural Semantics and the Methodology of Metaphysics” (with Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon,
and Stephen Stich)
Folk Concepts: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, Florida State University, January
2004.
“Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn’t Behave Like Believing”
American Society for Aesthetics session on Imagination and Simulation, San Francisco, October
2003.
University of California, Santa Cruz, October 2003.
“Judgments about Moral Objectivity: Experimental Assays”
Pacific APA group session of the Society for Empirical Ethics, San Franciso, March 2003.
“Imagining and Believing: The Promise of a Single Code”
NEH Institute, Art, Mind, and Cognitive Science, July 2002.
“On the Genealogy of Norms: A Case for the Role of Emotion in Cultural Evolution”
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Nashville, April 2002.
“Norms with Feeling: The Role of Affect in Moral Judgment”
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Cincinnati, June 2001.
“A Cognitive Account of Moral Judgment”
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New York, June 2000.
“Reading One’s Own Mind: A Cognitive Theory of Self-Awareness” (with Stephen Stich)
International Conference on the Nature of Consciousness, Santa Barbara, November 1998.
Institute for the Study of Child Development, Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, March
1999.
“Counterfactuals and Pretense: Possible Worlds in Cognitive Science”
European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Lisbon, September 1998.
“Psychological Attribution by Analogy”
Comment on John Greenwood’s “Theoretical Modeling and the Child’s Theory of Mind”.
Eastern APA, Philadelphia, December, 1997.
“Evolutionary Psychology: Ultimate Explanations and Panglossian Predictions” (with Todd Grantham)
ISHPSSB, Seattle, WA, July 1997.
“Theory-Theory Theory”
Comment on Brad Cohen’s “Simulation and Theory: Redirecting the Debate”. Eastern APA,
New York, December, 1995.
“Simulation and the Ascription of Intentional States” (with Stephen Stich)
Conscience et Intentionnalité: modèles et modalités d’attribution, University of Quebec at
 Montreal, June, 1995.
“Varieties of Off-Line Simulation” (with Stephen Stich)
Theories of Theories of Mind, Sheffield University, England, July, 1994.
“Do Content Sentences Need Content?”
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, April, 1993.
“Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory” (with Stephen Stich)
Perspectives on Mind, Washington University, St. Louis, December, 1991.
Comment on Daniel Kolak’s “Art and Intentionality”
New Jersey Regional Philosophical Society, January, 1990.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

Refereeing
Journals: Cognition, Mind & Language, Cognitive Science, American Philosophical Quarterly,
Animal Cognition, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, Child
Development, European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, European Journal of Philosophy,
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Mind & Society, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, Nous,
Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Explorations, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical
Studies, Philosophical Review, Philosophy of Science, PLOS ONE, Psychological Science,
Synthese, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Social Psychological and Personality Science

Presses: Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, MIT Press, Psychology Press

Organizations: The Society for Philosophy and Psychology, National Endowment for the
Humanities, National Science Foundation, American Society for Aesthetics, American
Philosophical Association, Cognitive Science Society

Society service:
Award committee for Glushko Dissertation Prize in Cognitive Science, Cognitive Science
Society, 2015-2018
Program co-chair (with Brian Scholl) for 2006 meeting of the Society for Philosophy and
Psychology.
Program committee for the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 2004-2006.
Program committee for the American Society for Aesthetics, 2004.

Editorial:
Editorial board, Cognition, 2008-
Editorial board, Philosophy Compass: Naturalistic Philosophy, Blackwell, 2008-
Editorial board, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Philosophy of Cognitive Science, 2007-
Associate editor, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science: Philosophy, 2007-2016
Editor, Philosophy Compass: Naturalistic Philosophy, Blackwell, 2005-2008

ACADEMIC HONORS AND GRANTS:

“The Psychological Foundations of the Cosmological Argument” Experimental Philosophy of Religion,
PI (with David Pizarro and Tamar Kushnir), 2022-2024, $250,000
Engaged Faculty Fellow, Cornell University, 2020-2021
Engage Curriculum Grant, Cornell University (with John Doris, Laura Niemi, Rachana Kamtekar), 2020-
2021
“Religion, normativity, and self-regulation" Developing Belief Network, Templeton foundation, co-I (with
Tamar Kushnir, Alice Zhau, Yue Yu), 2020-2023
Laurance Rockefeller Visiting Fellow, Princeton University Center for Human Values, 2017-2018
President, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2016-17
“Investigating the moral self” Self, Motivation, Virtue, Templeton Foundation (2015-2017), co-PI (with
Javier Gomez-Lavin, Jesse Prinz, and Nina Strohminger), $189,266
“Complementary Benefits of First- and Third-Person Perspectives for Self-Control” The Philosophy and
Science of Self Control, Templeton Foundation (2015-2017), co-PI (with E. J. Masicampo and
Kathleen Vohs), $200,000
“Bayesian Learning and Moral Cognition” Office of Naval Research (2014-2017), PI, $300,000
“Death and the Self” The Immortality Project, Templeton Foundation #4209890 (2013-2015), co-PI (with
Jay Garfield), $250,000
NEH Summer Institute on “Experimental Philosophy”, co-director (with Ron Mallon), 2012
Big Questions in Free Will grant for Bootcamp on experimental philosophy of free will, PI, 2011
NEH Summer Institute on “Experimental Philosophy”, co-director (with Ron Mallon), 2009
Stanton Award, Society for Philosophy & Psychology, 2005
Harry Lightsey Chair in Humanities, 2000-2004
NIH National Research Service Award Postdoctoral Fellowship, 1999-2000
Visiting Fellow Grant, Research Group on Evolution and Higher Cognition, Center for Cognitive
Science, Rutgers University, Au/gust 1998-July 1999
Research Grant, Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, August 1998
Distinguished Teaching Award Nominee, College of Charleston, 1998
Rutgers University Excellence Fellowship, 1987-90, 1991-92
Robert M. Golden Award for Honors Thesis in Philosophy, Stanford University, 1986