1) PANGANDAMAN VS.

CASAR

G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, MAGAMBAAN PANGANDAMAN, MACARIAN

NARVASA, J.:

The petitioners ask this Court:

1) to annul the warrant for their arrest issued by respondent Judge Dimaporo T. Casar of the
Municipal Circuit Court of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, in Criminal Case No. 1748 entitled People vs. Hadji
Ibrahim Solay Pangandaman et al.;

2) to prohibit the Judge from taking further cognizance of said Criminal Case No. 1748; and

3) to compel the Judge to forward the entire record of Criminal Case No. 1748 to the Provincial
Fiscal of Lanao del Sur for proper disposition. 1

Their plea is essentially grounded on the claim that the warrant for their arrest was issued by the
respondent Judge without a proper preliminary investigation.   The Solicitor General agrees and
2

recommends that their petition be granted and the warrant of arrest voided.  3

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least
five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one
version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders
suffering casualties.   Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place,
4

Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed. 5

On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the
victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast
preliminary investigation" of the incident.  The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons
6

being implicated by the parties involved on both sides — none of whom was, however, identified —
and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal
addressed a "1st indorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and
requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon
of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases." 7

No case relative to the incident was, however, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday,
August 10, 1985, when a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt.
Jose L. Laruan, which was docketed as Case No. 1748.   On that same day, the respondent Judge
8

"examined personally all (three) witnesses (brought by the sergeant) under oath thru .. (his) closed
and direct supervision," reducing to writing the questions to the witnesses and the latter's
answers.   Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of
9

arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John
Does." 10

An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar (joined by
Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough
investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly
haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded.   The respondent Judge denied
11

the motion for "lack of basis;"  hence the present petition.

While they concede the authority of the respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary investigation of
the offenses involved, which are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, the petitioners and the
Solicitor General argue that the Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court ;   and that
13

that failure constituted a denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading
to the issuance of the warrant for the petitioners' arrest.   It is further contended that August 10,
14

1985 was a Saturday during which "Municipal Trial Courts are open from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. only,
..." and "... it would hardly have been possible for respondent Judge to determine the existence of
probable cause against sixty- four (64) persons whose participations were of varying nature and
degree in a matter of hours and issue the warrant of arrest in the same day;"   and that there was
15

undue haste and an omission to ask searching questions by the Judge who relied "mainly on the
supporting affidavits which were obviously prepared already when presented to him by an enlisted
PC personnel as investigator."  16

The petitioners further assert that the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of
the charges "... in total disregard of the Provincial Fiscal ..." who, as said respondent well knew, had
already taken cognizance of the matter twelve (12) days earlier and was poised to conduct his own
investigation of the same;   and that issuance of a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) "John Does"
17

transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe
the persons or things to be seized. 18

There can be no debate about the proposition that in conducting a pre investigation of any crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts, a judge of an inferior court (other than in Metro-Manila or
the chartered cities, where no authority to conduct preliminary investigation is vested in such
officials) must observe the procedure prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. And although not specifically so declared, the procedure mandated by the Rule actually
consists of two phases or stages.

The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits
and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge
either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the
complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the
provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to
continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase.

This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the
complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents.
At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses
questions on matters that, in his view, need to be clarified. The second phase concludes with the
Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for
trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate
action.
The procedure above described must be followed before the complaint or information is filed in the
Regional Trial Court. Failure to do so will result in a denial of due process. 
19

Here, no information has as yet been filed with the Regional Trial Court. There is no pretense that
the preliminary investigation has been completed, insofar as the respondent Judge is concerned,
and that he does not intend to undertake the second phase. In this situation, it cannot be said that he
has failed to observe the prescribed procedure. What has happened is simply that after receiving the
complaint and examining the complainant's witnesses, and having come to believe, on the basis
thereof, that the offenses charged had been committed, the respondent Judge issued the warrant
now complained of against the fourteen (14) respondents (now petitioners) named and Identified by
the witnesses as the perpetrators of the killings and injuries, as well as against 50 "John Does."

The real question, therefore, is whether or not the respondent Judge had the power to issue the
warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation.
Stated otherwise, is completion of the procedure laid down in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine
qua non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for preliminary investigation must be completed
before a warrant of arrest may be issued. What the Rule   provides is that no complaint or
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information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing
that procedure. But nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be completed before a warrant of
arrest may issue. Indeed, it is the contrary that is true. The present Section 6 of the same Rule 112
clearly authorizes the municipal trial court to order the respondent's arrest even before opening the
second phase of the investigation if said court is satisfied that a probable cause exists and there is a
necessity to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a
probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shag issue a
warrant of arrest. 
21

This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly
denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary
investigation proper. Thus, the former Section 6 of Rule 112 provided:

SEC. 6. Warrant of arrest, when issued. — If the judge be satisfied from the
preliminary e petition conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

In Mayuga vs. Maravilla,   this Court found occasion to dwell in some detail on the process of
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preliminary investigation and, incidentally, to affirm the power of a justice of the peace or municipal
judge conducting a preliminary investigation to order the arrest of the accused after the first stage
(preliminary examination), saying:
 Appellant should bear in mind that a preliminary investigation such as was conducted
by the Justice of the Peace has for its purpose only the determination of whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the
accused guilty thereof, and if so, the issuance of a warrant of arrest. And it should
not be forgotten that a preliminary investigation has two stages: First, a preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused;
and, second, the reading to the accused after his arrest of the complaint or
information filed against him, and his being informed of the substance of the
evidence against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor, if he
so desires. Probable cause, in regard to the first stage of preliminary investigation,
depends on the discretion of the judge or magistrate empowered to issue the warrant
of arrest. It suffices that facts are presented to him to convince him, not that a person
has committed the crime, but that there is probable cause to believe that such person
committed the crime charged. The proceeding is generally ex parte unless the
defendant desires to be present and while under the old Rules the Justice of the
Peace or investigating officer must take the testimony of the complainant and the
latter's witnesses under oath, only the testimony of the complainant shall be in writing
and only an abstract of the testimony of the other is required. Regarding preliminary
investigation, it has thus been ruled that 'the occasion is not for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence
only as may engender well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. ... 
23

The rule on arrest after preliminary examination has, of course, been modified somewhat since the
occurrence of the facts upon which Mayuga was decided, but not to abrogate the authority of the
investigating judge to order such arrest, and only to prescribe the requirement that before he may do
so, he must examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination to be under oath and reduced
to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. This modification was introduced by
Republic Act 3838, approved June 22, 1963, amending Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
the "searching questions and answers" requirement is incorporated in the present Section 6 of Rule
112 already quoted.

The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary
investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that
such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire
procedure of preliminary investigation .

Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there was scarcely time to
determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within
a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00
p.m. That argument founders upon the respondent Judge's positive affirmations that he had
personally and closely examined under oath the three witnesses to the complaint   and that he had
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issued the warrant of arrest "believing that the offense thus filed had been committed."   Nothing in
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the record before this Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.   The contention that the
26

witnesses to the complaint had merely sworn before the respondent Judge to statements prepared
beforehand and submitted by a military investigator   must, in view of the foregoing considerations
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and for lack of any support in the record, be dismissed as mere speculation.

The same argument also unwarrantedly assumes that the respondent Judge limited the proceedings
on preliminary examination to the usual Saturday office hours of 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., in addition to
not making any persuasive showing that such proceedings could not have been completed within
that time-frame. For all that appears, said respondent could have put off the 1:00 p.m. adjournment
until he had finished interrogating the witnesses to his satisfaction. And there is really nothing
unusual in completing within a three-hour period the questioning of three witnesses in a preliminary
examination to determine the existence of probable cause.

The record which, lacking proof to the contrary, must be accepted as an accurate chronicle of the
questioned proceedings, shows prima facie that the respondent Judge had personally examined the
witnesses to the complaint, and a consideration of the latter's sworn answers to his questions
satisfies this Court that the finding of probable cause against the petitioners was neither arbitrary nor
unfounded.

The three witnesses to the complaint, Misandoning Monasprang, a student, Lawandato Ripors, an
engineering graduate, and Sanny Monib a farmer gave mutually corroborative accounts of the
incident. Under separate questioning, they declared that they were members of a party that was
passing by Pantao on its way to Lalabuan from Talaguian, all in Masiu, Lanao del Sur, at about
10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1985, when they were ambushed and fired upon by an armed group which
included the petitioners and about fifty other unidentified persons; that five of the party had been
killed and two (the witnesses Lawandato Ripors and Sanny Monib) wounded; that even after they
had killed their victims, the ambushers had continued to fire at the dead bodies; that the witnesses
managed to escape their attackers and return to Talaguian, where they informed their relatives
about what had happened, and thence went to the municipal hall in Masiu to report to the authorities;
that the dead victims were recovered only late in the afternoon of that day because the authorities
could not "penetrate" the area and the ambushers refused to release the bodies; and that the
ambush was an offshoot of a grudge between the families of the ambushers and those of the
victims. 
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The witnesses named and Identified the dead victims as Cadar Monasprang, Macacrao Guiling
Macrang Hadji Alawi, Alicman Ripors and Malabato Diator. All of them also Identified by name each
of the fourteen petitioners as members of the ambush group. The respondent Judge can hardly be
faulted for finding enough cause to hold the petitioners named in the statements of three
eyewitnesses to killings perpetrated in broad daylight.

In Luna vs. Plaza,   this Court ruled that the term "searching questions and answers" means —
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...only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is
to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest
may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to
show the commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof. What would be
searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the
nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible
motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and
social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes,
opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities,
financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the
subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore must to a
great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. ...

Upon this authority, and considering what has already been stated above, this Court is not prepared
to question the propriety of the respondent Judge's finding of probable cause or substitute its
judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put to the witnesses during the preliminary
examination.

Upon the facts and the law, therefore, the warrant of arrest in question validly issued against the
petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after proceedings, to which no irregularity has been
shown to attach, in which the respondent Judge found sufficient cause to commit the petitioners to
answer for the crime complained of.

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a
class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of
the liberty of the subject."   Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest
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should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,  the warrant must, as regards its
31

unidentified subjects, be voided.

The fact that the Provincial Fiscal may have announced his intention of investigating the incident
himself did not, in the view of the Court, legally inhibit the respondent Judge from conducting his own
inquiry into the matter if, as is made to appear here, it was regularly brought before him and no
formal complaint was filed before the Fiscal. Courtesy may have dictated that in those circumstances
he leave the investigation to the Fiscal and simply endorse to the latter the complaint filed with him;
duty did not, and if he nonetheless chose to conduct his own investigation, nothing in the rules states
or implies that he could not do so.

Be that as it may, since the action and final resolution of the respondent Judge after completing the
second stage of the preliminary investigation are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal, practical
considerations of expediency and the avoidance of duplication of work dictate that the latter official
be permitted to take over the investigation even in its present stage.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest
of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) "John Does."
The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of
the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his court for further
appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.