1. NAOAKI HIRAKAWA REPRESENTED BY ERICA M. SHIBAMURA VS.

LOPZCOM
REALTY CORPORATION AND ATTY. GARI M. TIONGCO
G.R. No. 213230 | December 05, 2019 | LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

Indeed, allegations in the body of the pleading or the complaint, and not its title or
nomenclature, determine the nature of an action, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted.

Furthermore, it shall be noted that Rules of Procedure are intended to promote and not defeat
substantial justice. Time and again, the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to
advance substantial justice to relieve a party of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of non-compliance with the process required. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure
the orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases.

FACTS:

Respondent Lopzcom Realty Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in realty

development while respondent Atty. Gari Tiongco is Lopzcom's President and Chairman.
Petitioner Naoaki Hirakawa is a Japanese National represented by his agent Erica Shibamura.

Hirakawa essentially alleged that Takezo Sakai, acting for and on behalf of the stockholders and
members of the Board of Directors of several corporations, sold to respondent Lopzcom
represented by Tiongco, for Php 100M a 92-hectare subdivision project known as Windfields
Subdivision, in Consolacion, Cebu City. As payment, Tiongco delivered to Sakai 9 Westmont
Bank postdated personal checks all payable to the latter. Sakai then assigned, transferred and
conveyed to Hirakawa, all his rights and interest on the 4 out of the 9 postdated checks. The
total amount of the postdated checks assigned to Hirakawa was Php 65M. It represented
Sakai's share in the sale proceeds of Windfields Subdivision.

Upon encashment of the first check, Hirakawa requested Lopzcom and Tiongco to replace the
remaining postdated checks with new ones reflecting his name as payee. The new checks were
all drawn against Tiongco's personal account in PDCP. When the same became due, Tiongco
requested Hirakawa not to deposit the same and asked for additional time within which to pay
the obligation. He also offered to pay Hirakawa 18% interest per annum for the overdue
account, which the latter accepted. However, these checks were dishonored because Tiongco's
account was already closed.

Respondents then proposed to assign to Hirakawa their shares of stock in a golf course project
which they will develop through a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation,
as full payment of their PHP 40M outstanding obligation. Hirakawa agreed, hence, Lopzcom
through Tiongco executed the Deed of Assignment in favor of Hirakawa.
After 3 years, Hirakawa discovered that the golf course was never developed and no certificates
of stock of the supposed golf course project were issued in his name. Hirakawa was, therefore,
compelled to demand that Tiongco pay their outstanding obligation. The latter instead issued 2
postdated checks. Again, Tiongco requested for an extension and when the one-year extension
period expired both checks still remained unfunded.

Hirakawa served respondents a final Notice of Demand for Payment of their outstanding
obligation amounting to PHP 114M, inclusive of interest. But despite Hirakawa's final demand,
respondents still failed to pay their obligation. Hirakawa then sued respondents for Breach of
Contract and Attachment before the Regional Trial Court.

The trial court issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary attachment against respondents' properties
subject to the posting and approval of bond. The respondents then filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash the writ of preliminary attachment. Respondents manifested their willingness to post
counter-bond without objection from Hirakawa. Under Order, the trial court discharged the Writ
of Preliminary Attachment upon posting of respondents' counter-bond.

Respondents then filed an undated Motion to Dismiss the complaint on grounds that not being a
party to subject contract, Hirakawa had no cause of action against them; and Hirakawa had no
legal capacity to file a suit. Hirakawa filed his comment/opposition to the motion.

RTC denied the same holding that the instant case is not only for breach of contract as the
complaint also alleges plaintiffs claim for damages arising from defendants' alleged fraud thru
misrepresentations and issuance of worthless checks and other deceits. Anent defendants'
claim that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant case, the same is also bereft of merit
as juridical capacity is inherent in every natural person. Undeniably, plaintiff is a natural person.

Respondents then went up to seek affirmative relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The CA then reversed the ruling of the RTC. It noted that Hirakawa
was not a party to the contract of sale and had no cause of action against respondents.

ISSUE:

WON the CA gravely erred in dismissing the complaint below due to Hirakawa's lack of
cause of action against respondents

RULING:

At the outset, the Court agrees with the CA that Hirakawa is not a party in the Deed of Sale.
Under the civil law principle of relativity of contracts, contracts can only bind the parties who
entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. For clarification, what Sakai assigned to
Hirakawa on September 20, 1996, were his rights and interests over the 4 PDCs which
respondents issued him (Sakai), and not his interest in the Deed of Sale dated November 28,
1995 involving Windfields Subdivision. Therefore, he cannot sue for breach of contract insofar
as such deed of sale is concern. This brings Us to the question: May the complaint be
dismissed outright on this ground alone?

As a rule, the body rather than the title of the complaint determines the nature of the action. In
this case, Hirakawa's complaint is denominated as breach of contract and attachment. As
stated, respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on ground of lack of cause of action. On
one hand, the trial court denied the motion because the complaint was in fact, not solely for
breach of contract but also for damages arising from respondents' alleged fraud, issuance of
worthless checks and other deceits. On the other hand, the CA reversed and dismissed the
complaint in its entirety.

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the cause or causes of action ultimately seeks
payment of respondents' indebtedness of P114,027,812.22, and the corresponding claim for
damages allegedly suffered by Hirakawa by reason of respondents' failure or refusal to settle
their obligation. Indeed, allegations in the body of the pleading or the complaint, and not its title
or nomenclature, determine the nature of an action, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted. Here, although the complaint was
erroneously denominated as breach of contract, the allegations and the relief sought are plainly
for collection of sum of money. What Hirakawa is simply asking for is the payment of the value
of the checks assigned to him, its accrued interests, and the damages he suffered by reason of
respondents' failure to fund the checks assigned to him. He does not ask for rescission of
contract or restoration of things or the parties' respective situation. It does not at all seek that
Windfields Subdivision which is the subject of the Deed of Sale dated December 28, 1995 be
delivered to him. The case is a simple collection suit.

Furthermore, it shall be noted that Rules of Procedure are intended to promote and not defeat
substantial justice. Time and again, the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to
advance substantial justice to relieve a party of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of non-compliance with the process required. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very
technical sense when it defeats the purpose for which it had been enacted, i.e., to ensure the
orderly, just and speedy dispensation of cases.

Indubitably, Hirakawa had waited 14 long years as of filing of the complaint in 2010, for
Lopzcom and Tiongco's full payment of their obligation. But such payment seems to be not
forthcoming. For while purporting to have assigned their shares of stock in the golf course
project to Hirakawa as settlement of the remaining PHP 40M indebtedness, respondents have
not, to this date, delivered these shares of stock to Hirakawa. Dismissing the complaint now
after more than a decade of waiting for full payment would certainly be unjust for Hirakawa. The
CA’s suggestion for Hirakawa to file a separate action for collection of sum of money, while in
fact is already incorporated in the complaint, adds insult to injury. It certainly will not alleviate
Hirakawa's situation here. To repeat, rules of procedure are intended to promote justice and
efficacy in the judicial system and not as road blocks. The case should, therefore, be remanded
to the trial court for determination of the merits of Hirakawa's claim for sum of money with
damages.
 2. EAST WEST BANKING CORPORATION VS. VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC
G.R. No. 225181 | December 05, 2019 | REYES, J. JR., J.

As a rule, dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities, especially when the appellant had
substantially complied with the jurisdictional requirements, is frowned upon.

FACTS:

Respondent VMC filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of Suspension of Payments; the
Approval of a Rehabilitation Plan; and the Appointment of a Management Committee. Acting
upon the said petition, SEC's Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD), issued
an Order suspending all actions or claims against VMC pending before any court, tribunal,
office, board, and/or the SEC.

To restructure VMC's outstanding loan obligation pursuant to the ARP, VMC and its creditors,
which include East West Bank, executed a Debt Restructuring Agreement (DRA) where it was
agreed that as a debt restructuring measure, VMC will issue long-term commercial papers or
debt securities in the form of Convertible Notes (CN) in favor of VMC's creditors. These CNs
may either be converted to common shares of VMC or paid/redeemed by VMC from the holders
thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the parties' agreement.
Accordingly, VMC issued a CN in favor of East West Bank whereby VMC unconditionally
promised to pay East West Bank in immediately available funds, the principal amount of Php
200M+.

Eventually, VMC was able to settle all its restructured loans. Hence, VMC started to pay/redeem
the CNs from the respective holders thereof pursuant to the ARP and DRA. All creditors
accepted VMC's payment/redemption except for East West Bank. The latter insisted on its right
to convert the CN to VMC common shares. Despite several demands, East West Bank still
refused to accept the offer of payment/redemption and returned all the checks to VMC.

In a letter dated October 14, 2015, East West Bank notified VMC that it was exercising its option
to convert 13% of its outstanding unconverted CN. In response, VMC informed East West Bank
that it has no outstanding CN in the records of VMC as the CN issued to it had already been
paid/redeemed. This prompted East West Bank to file with the SEC a Motion to Compel VMC to
convert 13% of its outstanding CN into VMC common shares.

The SEC Special Hearing Panel 1 (Panel) granted the said motion, holding that while it is
mandatory for VMC to pay/redeem the CNs under the DRA and the ARP, it is not equally
mandatory on the part of East West Bank to receive and accept the same. On appeal, the
SEC En Banc reversed and set aside the Panel's Order. The SEC En Banc examined the ARP,
DRA, and CN and found that, contrary to the Panel's ruling, there was nothing in the DRA and
CN that states that East West Bank is not obligated to accept the payment/redemption made by
VMC. In fact, according to the SEC En Banc, East West Bank agreed and was bound by the
provisions of the DRA on Mandatory Pre-Payment. Aggrieved, East West Bank filed a petition
for review before the CA, wherein the latter affirmed the SEC En Banc’s Decision. Hence, this
petition.

It shall be noted that a Motion to Dismiss dated February 3, 2017, was thereafter filed for that
purpose, arguing that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution had already became final and
executory by virtue of the entry of judgment issued by the CA therefor.

ISSUE:
WON the Motion to Dismiss should be granted

RULING:

No. The said Motion to Dismiss shall be denied.

As a rule, dismissal of appeals based solely on technicalities, especially when the appellant had
substantially complied with the jurisdictional requirements, is frowned upon . In this case, the
Court does not see any cogent reason not to apply such principle in this case.

Despite failure to furnish the CA with a copy of the instant petition, we cannot disregard the fact
that a timely appeal was filed before this Court. Also, records show that the CA was furnished
copies of the notices issued by this Court, as well as other pleadings pertaining to the instant
petition. The CA was, thus, notified of the existence of the instant petition, which could have
prompted it to be more circumspect in issuing the entry of judgment. For this reason, VMC's
Motion to Dismiss is denied.
 3. CONNIE L. SERVO VS. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 234401 | December 05, 2019 | LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

Section 9 of BP 129 vests concurrent jurisdiction in the RTCs, CA and the Supreme Court over
special civil actions and auxiliary writs and processes. The law does not distinguish whether
the issues involved are pure factual or legal issues or mixed issues of fact and law for the
purpose of determining which of the courts should take cognizance of the case.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a claim for deposit insurance with respondent PDIC. She essentially alleged that
in October 2011, she lent Teresita Gutierrez Php 500,000 for the repair of the latter’s bus units.
Petitioner met with Gutierrez at the Rural Bank of San Jose Del Monte to receive the latter’s
loan payment. For this purpose, petitioner opened a time deposit account with the bank. Per her
agreement with Gutierrez, the latter's name was used as the account holder since she was a
preferred bank client. Few years later, however, the bank was closed down. Consequently,
petitioner filed with PDIC her claim for deposit insurance, together with certain documents.
However, PDIC, through its Claims Deposit Department, denied petitioner's claim for deposit
insurance, citing as ground the absence of any bank records/ documents indicating that
petitioner, not Gutierrez, owned the account.

Petitioner then filed a Request for Reconsideration (RFR) but to no avail. Petitioner
consequently filed the action with the trial court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on PDIC for
denying her claim for deposit insurance, albeit she submitted the necessary documents in
support of her claim. The trial court sustained PDIC's argument and dismissed the case on
ground of lack of jurisdiction, holding that since PDIC is a quasi-judicial agency, the case should
have been brought up to the Court of Appeals. It cited the PDIC Charter, providing that actions
of PDIC shall be final and executory, and may only be set aside by the Court of Appeals through
a petition for certiorari.

In her subsequent special civil action for certiorari before the CA, the latter still dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the jurisdictional issue involved, being a pure legal
question, should have been filed with the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on ground of lack of jurisdiction

RULING:

Yes. The CA erred when it dismissed petitioner's special civil action for certiorari on the ground
that since the case involves a pure question of law, the same falls within this Court's exclusive
jurisdiction.
Section 9 of BP 129 vests concurrent jurisdiction in the RTCs, CA and the Supreme Court over
special civil actions and auxiliary writs and processes. The law does not distinguish whether the
issues involved are pure factual or legal issues or mixed issues of fact and law for the purpose
of determining which of the courts should take cognizance of the case.

The jurisdiction of the CA to issue extraordinary writs, such as a petition for certiorari vis-a- vis
the hierarchy of courts, was enunciated in Gios - Samar, Inc., etc. v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, et  al.,viz:

In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs became concurrent with the
CA, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. BP 129 repealed RA No. 296 and granted the CA with "[o]riginal   jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas   corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." x x x

Fourthly, the filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there is special,
[extraordinary] or compelling reasons that   justify the same.   The Court enforces the
observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to. it. There being no special, important or
compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of
courts, warranting the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. x x x

In this case, there is no compelling reason for the CA here not to adhere to and observe the
hierarchy of courts. In any event, although the CA erred in dismissing the case, the Court will no
longer remand the case to the CA to avert any further delay in its resolution.  The Court,
therefore, deems it prudent to resolve once and for all, here and now, the issue of jurisdiction
involving PDIC.

Clearly, a petition for certiorari, questioning the PDIC's denial of a deposit insurance claim

should be filed before the CA, not the RTC. This further finds support in Section 22 of the
PDIC's Charter, as amended, which states that no court, except the CA, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction  against
the Corporation for any action under this Act.
 4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENEDICTA MALLARI AND CHI WEI-NENG
G.R. No. 197164 | December 04, 2019 | HERNANDO, J.

Consequently, petitioner's failure to duly file on time a Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
First Division's December 14, 2009 Resolution resulted in losing its right to assail the CTA First
Division's judgment before this Court. This is in accordance with the basic rule that a party who
fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed
by law for the purpose loses the right to do so.

Consequently, the CTA First Division December 14, 2009 Resolution had already attained
finality because of petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period allowed under the CTA's revised internal rules. As a rule, judgments or
orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no
appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. The court need not
even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 2-2007, Regional Director Alfredo
V. Misajon of the BIR Manila filed a criminal complaint against respondents Benedicta Mallari
and Chi Wei-Neng, President and General Manager, respectively, of Topsun Int'l., Inc. for
violation of Sec. 255 in relation to Secs. 253 and 256 of the 1997 NIRC before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila. The complaint stemmed from Topsun's outstanding VAT deficiency
for the months of January to June 2000 in the amount of P3,827,564.64, and a compromise
penalty of P25,000 for the same period. Topsun failed and refused to pay its outstanding
obligations despite several demands and the service of the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy.

Mallari denied that Topsun had any outstanding internal revenue tax liability as evidenced by
the Certificate of No Tax Liability. However, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila Gideon C.
Mendoza found probable cause to indict the respondents. He thus recommended the filing of an
Information against them for violation of Section 255 in relation to Sections 253 and 256 of the
NIRC before the CTA.

An Information was subsequently filed before the CTA First Division. The CTA First Division
observed that in a DOJ Resolution, the respondents were charged with failure to pay overdue
"deficiency VAT" in the amount of P3,827,564.64 and "compromise penalty" of P25,000.00.
However, the Information stated that they failed to pay "deficiency income tax" in the said
amounts. Further, the CTA First Division noted that the recommendation for the criminal
prosecution or the filing of the criminal information for violation of the Tax Code was without the
written approval of the CIR. This approval should have been secured pursuant to the NIRC and
the Revised Rules of the CTA. Lastly, the motion to adopt the allegations contained in the
Counter-Affidavit of Mallari, and the Reply to the Counter-Affidavit and its Annexes were not
attached to the Information. Thus, the CTA ordered ACP Mendoza to make the necessary
formal correction in the Information against the accused.

The CTA First Division eventually dismissed the criminal complaint for failure of ACP Mendoza
to obey a lawful order of the court, i.e., to submit a certified true copy of the Memorandum of the
CIR authorizing Regional Director Misajon to prosecute and conduct proceedings. ACP
Mendoza received the said CTA First Division Resolution on January 13, 2010. Hence, on
January 18, 2010, the special counsels/prosecutors of the BIR Manila filed their Entry of
Appearance with Leave to Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration. 

However, the CTA Special First Division denied the said Motion for Reconsideration due to late
filing. It observed that based on the records, the BIR received its Dec. 14, 2009 Resolution on
December 17, 2009, while the Office of the City Prosecutor received the same on Dec. 21,
2009; hence, the prosecution had until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to
file the Motion for Reconsideration. Regrettably, the prosecution filed its Motion for
Reconsideration only on January 18, 2010 or 14 days late beyond the prescribed 15-day period
for filing the same. Moreover, it failed to sufficiently explain why it belatedly filed its Motion for
Reconsideration which could have allowed the relaxation of the procedural rules. Thus, the
Motion for Reconsideration was deemed a mere scrap of paper for having been filed late.

On appeal, the CTA En Banc merely affirmed the findings of the Special First Division holding
that the Motion for Reconsideration was belatedly filed. Consequently, the December 14, 2009
Resolution of the CTA First Division has already become final. Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUE:
WON the Resolution dated Dec. 14, 2009 has already become final

RULING:

Yes. The petition was denied. The Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the 15-day
prescribed period.

Section 1, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, it states that an aggrieved party shall file a
motion for reconsideration within 15 days from the date he/she received notice of the assailed
decision, resolution or order of the court in question.

In this case, as correctly pointed out by the CTA Special First Division, the BIR Main Office and
the Office of the City Prosecutor received the Notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of
the CTA First Division on December 17, 2009 and December 21, 2009, respectively. From the
date of receipt, petitioner only had until January 4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to
file its Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner, however, filed its motion only on January 18, 2010
or 14 days beyond the prescribed period. Thus, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from
the findings of the CTA Special First Division, which was affirmed by the CTA En Banc, that
petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Consequently, petitioner's failure to duly file on time a Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
First Division's December 14, 2009 Resolution resulted in losing its right to assail the CTA First
Division's judgment before this Court. This is in accordance with the basic rule that a party who
fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed
by law for the purpose loses the right to do so.

Consequently, the CTA First Division December 14, 2009 Resolution had already attained
finality because of petitioner's failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period allowed under the CTA's revised internal rules. As a rule, judgments or
orders become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The
finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no
appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. The court need not even
pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law.

Thus, since the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division has already attained
finality, it now becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Although
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioner failed to prove that the case falls under
any of the instances.
 5. TELUS INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. AND MICHAEL SY VS. HARVEY DE
GUZMAN
G.R. No. 202676 | December 04, 2019 | HERNANDO, J.

As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect, therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Th Court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of Justice may be served thereby.

As to certification against forum shopping non-compliance therewith or a defect therein unlike in

verification is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof. Unless
there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."

FACTS:

Telus asserted that it first hired respondent Harvey De Guzman sometime in September 2004
as Inbound Sales Associate. His last post prior to the controversy was Senior Quality Analyst for
DELL After Point of Sale. Telus received an escalation complaint from Jeanelyn Flores, Team
Captain of DELL APoS, charging De Guzman of disrespect and ridicule towards a person.

Acting on the complaint of Flores, Telus issued a Due Process form to De Guzman on charges
of insulting or showing discourtesy, disrespect, or arrogance towards superiors or co-team
members and abusive behavior language which is outside the bounds of morality in violation of
Section 2, Disorderly Conduct, Items 60 and 61 of Telus' Code of Conduct. At the same time,
De Guzman was placed in preventive suspension and was directed to submit a written
explanation to answer the charges, which De Guzman complied and submitted his written
explanation.

Upon termination of the investigation, Telus found De Guzman's not liable for the offenses
charged and did not impose any disciplinary sanction against him. Accordingly, De Guzman's
preventive suspension was lifted and he was fully compensated during the period. Telus,
however, decided to remove De Guzman from his current designation and transfer him to
another practice. Telus sent De Guzman a Return to Work Order. Later on, Telus found out that
De Guzman already filed a complaint for constructive dismissal with monetary claims before the
NLRC notwithstanding that he was still on paid vacation leave and was receiving all benefits
during the said period.

The Labor Arbiter adjudged Telus guilty of constructively dismissing De Guzman. Upon review,
the NLRC overturned the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC found that De Guzman failed to
prove by substantial evidence that he was constructively dismissed. He then filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it adjudged Telus not guilty of illegally dismissing De Guzman. It agreed with
the findings of the Labor Arbiter that indeed De Guzman was constructively dismissed. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in admitting the Petition for Certiorari filed therein considering that
the accompanying Verification and Certification of Non-Forum shopping was defective
which merits the outright dismissal of the Petition

RULING:

NO. In Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, the Court restated

the jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of

defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.

a) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect, therein does not necessarily

render the pleading fatally defective. Th Court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of Justice may be served thereby.

b) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge
to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.

c) As to certification against forum shopping non-compliance therewith or a defect therein

unlike in verification is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof. unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

d) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners
in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense,
the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.

e) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his behalf.
The issue as to alleged defective Verification and Certification of Non Forum Shopping
appended to the Petition for Certiorari filed before the appellate court is rendered moot given the
full resolution of the said Petition. The said court properly dispensed with the issue of the
alleged defective Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping given the overriding
merits of the case. Indeed per jurisprudence, strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. Moreover, the fact that De
Guzman’s mere allegation of forgery will not suffice to declare the petition as defective. It is De
Guzman's own lookout to assail the alleged forgery and as manifested, he is willing to attest to
the authenticity of the signature if so required.
 6. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC., N.C. PULUMBARIT, INC., N.C.P. LEASING
CORPORATION AND NEMENCIO C. PULUMBARIT, SR. VS. UNION BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 228898 | December 04, 2019 | INTING, J.

Simply put, the main issue in the injunction case, i.e., whether Union Bank should be
permanently enjoined from collecting rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad
Shopping Mall, no longer need to be resolved by the RTC, given that the Contract to Sell, which
allowed Maunlad Homes to possess the property and collect rentals from its tenants, had
already been determined to be without any force and effect by the Court in the ejectment case.
Consequently, Union Bank, being the owner of the commercial complex, cannot be legally
enjoined from collecting rental payments from the property's tenants.

To allow the RTC to adjudicate the issue would run the risk of violating the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments should it find the issuance of permanent injunctive relief in
Maunlad Homes' favor to be proper. After all, the Court's definitive judgment in the ejectment
case, being final and executory is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal.

FACTS:

On July 5, 2002, respondent Union Bank, as the seller, and Maunlad Homes, Inc., as the buyer,
entered into a Contract to Sell involving a commercial complex located in Malolos, Bulacan
known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall. The contract was basically a "buy-back agreement" of
the property, which had been previously foreclosed by the bank. The terms of the contract
allowed Maunlad Homes to retain possession and management of the Maunlad Shopping Mall,
and collect rental payments from its tenants. The contract also stipulated that in the event of
rescission due to failure to pay the monthly amortizations or to comply with its terms and
conditions, Maunlad Homes will be required to immediately vacate the property and voluntarily
turn over possession thereof to Union Bank.

Maunlad Homes, however, eventually defaulted in the payment of its monthly amortizations to
the bank. Consequently, Union Bank sent Maunlad Homes a Notice of Rescission of Contract,
wherein the bank demanded payment of the installments due within 30 days from receipt;
otherwise, it shall deem the contract automatically rescinded. Despite receipt of the notice,
Maunlad Homes still failed to pay the monthly amortizations it owed to the bank. As its demands
were left unheeded, Union Bank filed an ejectment case against Maunlad Homes before MeTC
of Makati City.

Union Bank began to interfere in the operations and management of the Maunlad Shopping
Mall, and convinced its tenants to pay rent directly to the bank instead, which prompted
Maunlad Homes to file an injunction case to prevent the bank from collecting rental payments
from the tenants of the commercial complex.
The RTC granted Maunlad Homes' application for preliminary injunction. Consequently, Union
Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC-Orders. The CA
granted the same, and reversed the RTC rulings for lack of factual and legal basis. Maunlad
Homes, thereafter, elevated the case to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The
Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA Decision, and reinstated the RTC Order.

Meanwhile, on May 18, 2005, the MeTC dismissed Union Bank's ejectment complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. It held that the proper action to resolve the parties' conflicting claims of right of
possession over the property on the basis of ownership was an accion reivindicatoria, over
which it had no jurisdiction. On appeal, RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling holding that the issues
raised in the ejectment complaint were beyond those commonly involved in an unlawful detainer
suit. It also held that the proper venue for the ejectment case was in Malolos, Bulacan;
notwithstanding, the waiver of venue stipulation in the Contract to Sell. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision.

Aggrieved, Union Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court before the Court assailing the CA ruling. The Court reversed and set aside the CA
Decision.

To recall, the Court, in the injunction case, reinstated the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the RTC against Union Bank and remanded the case to the trial court for the resolution of the
issue of injunction.

When the Decision attained finality dated Aug. 2012, Union Bank immediately moved for the
dismissal of the injunction case before the RTC on the ground of mootness. It claimed that the
legal and factual issues involved in the complaint for injunction had already been resolved in the
ejectment case.

The RTC denied the motion but the CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint for
injunction for having been rendered moot by the SC’s decision in the ejectment case.

ISSUE:

WON the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for injunction for having been rendered
moot by the Decision dated August 15, 2012

RULING:

YES. In order to determine whether the Complaint for injunction has indeed become moot and
academic, we must now carefully examine the Court's Decisions dated December 23, 2008 in
G.R. No. 179898 (the injunction case) and August 15, 2012 in G.R. No. 190071 (the ejectment
case).
In the injunction case, the Court found it premature for the CA to rule on Maunlad Homes' right
to collect rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping Mall as the issue had yet
to be resolved by the RTC. At the time, what was at issue was the propriety of the RTC 's
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against Union Bank to enjoin the bank from collecting
rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad Shopping Mall. The Court found the issuance
of the writ proper and directed the RTC to resolve the issue of permanent injunction with
dispatch.

Then came the ruling in the ejectment case wherein the Court categorically ruled that Maunlad
Homes had lost its right to possess the property under the Contract to Sell when it defaulted in
the payment of its monthly amortizations to Union Bank. The Court thus ordered Maunlad
Homes to vacate the Maunlad Shopping Mall and to pay rentals-in-arrears and rentals accruing
in the interim until it turned over possession of the property to Union Bank The case was
thereafter remanded to the MeTC of Makati City for the determination of the amount of rentals
due.

In light of these, it is quite obvious that the Court's ruling in the ejectment case had effectively
rendered any further adjudication in the injunction case unnecessary and superfluous.

Simply put, the main issue in the injunction case, i.e., whether Union Bank should be
permanently enjoined from collecting rental payments from the tenants of the Maunlad
Shopping Mall, no longer need to be resolved by the RTC, given that the Contract to Sell, which
allowed Maunlad Homes to possess the property and collect rentals from its tenants, had
already been determined to be without any force and effect by the Court in the ejectment case.
Consequently, Union Bank, being the owner of the commercial complex, cannot be legally
enjoined from collecting rental payments from the property's tenants.

To allow the RTC to adjudicate the issue would run the risk of violating the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments should it find the issuance of permanent injunctive relief in
Maunlad Homes' favor to be proper. After all, the Court's definitive judgment in the ejectment
case, being final and executory is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal.