Week 1 - August 2 - What is Psychology? Why Study History?

PSY 30013

Learning Objectives

1. EXPLAIN THE AIMS, TEACHING STRUCTURE, AND ASSESSMENT OF THIS UNIT.

2. DESCRIBE AND CRITICALLY EXAMINE DEFINITIONS OF “PSYCHOLOGY,” RELATING THESE TO YOUR OWN VIEW OF
WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS AND WHAT IT SHOULD BE.

3. EXPLAIN THE CHALLENGE OF “DISCIPLINARY DIVERSITY” IN PSYCHOLOGY AND OUTLINE SOME OF THE WAYS IN
WHICH THE DISCIPLINE IS (OR COULD BE) UNIFIED.

4. EXPLAIN, WITH EXAMPLES, STANOVICH’S DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENCE.

5. OUTLINE SOME OF THE DIFFERENT “WAYS OF DOING HISTORY,” AND DESCRIBE THE BENEFITS AND
LIMITATIONS OF THESE APPROACHES.

6. DESCRIBE SOME “PATTERNS OF HISTORY” AND RELATE THESE TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF PSYCHOLOGY.

7. DESCRIBE AND GIVE EXAMPLES OF SOME “DRIVERS OF HISTORY.”

8. EXPLAIN WHAT MIND-BODY DUALISM IS AND OUTLINE THE “COGITO” ARGUMENT FOR THE MIND-BODY
DISTINCTION. 9. DISTINGUISH BETWEEN “MENTALISTIC” AND “BEHAVIOURAL” CONCEPTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Lecture content

Unit Structure/Narrative

1. Psychology and history

2. Philosophy, science, and philosophy of science

3. Founding Fathers 1: Fechner, Wundt and the birth of modern scientific psychology

4. Founding Fathers 2: William James and the birth of American psychology

5. Crisis: Measurement in psychology

6. Behaviourism

7. The cognitive revolution

8. Neuroscience, biological models

9. Mental health and mental disorders

10. Talk Therapy

11. Present day crisis

12. The hard problem of psychology

What is Psychology?

Reading 1

Stanovich, K.E. (2004). Psychology is alive and well (and doing fine among the sciences). In How to think straight
about psychology (7ed). (pp. 1-18). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

• Something to do with minds? Thoughts? Feelings? Behaviour? All the above? Something else?

• Write down your thoughts – Seriously, write something down.

Stanovich

• Is psychology a single discipline? – No, but is any science?

• Is psychology the unique in its study of human behaviour? – No, other disciplines and sciences study humanity

• Science then?

– See above

• All this talk of behaviour, what about thinking? PSY30013 History and Philosophy of Psychology Domains of
psychology

• Behavioural

• Mental

• Two things justify psych as a distinct discipline

1. Conclusions about behaviour are drawn from scientific evidence

2. Applications of psychological knowledge derive from and are tested using scientific methods OK, so what’s
science?

• What is science?

Stanovich on Science

1. Systematic empiricism

2. Publically verifiable knowledge

3. Solvable problems

– that is testable hypotheses

Both science and psychology start in philosophy

Question

• Does your view of psychology include things that are NOT behaviour?

• Does your view of psychology include things that are NOT science?

Homework

• Write YOUR definition of psychology

– What should psychology be?

What is history?

Reading 2
Woody, W.D. & Viney, M. (2017). Chapter 1 - Critical issues in historical studies.

In A history of psychology: Emergence of science and application (6ed). (pp. 3-13) Boston, MA: Pearson.

What is History

• The study of the past?

• What are the “data” of historiography?

• Can it be objective?

Perspectives on History

• Judging the past vs understanding the past

• Past-mindedness vs presentism

• A working definition

– The interpretive study of events (through “data”) in the human past

• Data can be “objective”

• Interpretation can be rigorous, but always proceeds from assumptions

Theories of History: Patterns

Can we characterise the “path” of history?

• Linear Progressive

• Cyclic

• Chaotic

Theories of History: Drivers

Does history have common “causal” entities?

• Zeitgeist

• Ortgeist

• Great-people

Perspectives: New vs Old History

• History written by insiders

– Internalist views

– Whiggish views

• Other views…

• cf philosophy of science

• What is this a history of?

Philosophy - A taster

What is Philosophy?

• Philo – sophos

– Lover or friend of wisdom

• Related terms

– Episteme - knowledge

– Techne – “craft” or “art”

• All Western intellectual traditions have some kind of antecedent in classical philosophy

– Don’t read too much into this – the enduring questions endure for a reason!

Origins of Psychology

Psychology began in

• 1879

• Well…back to antiquity

Aristotle

• Does not distrust the senses.

• We learn everything through them. They work, otherwise we wouldn’t.

• Foreshadows empiricism

Aristotle: The First Psychology Text?

• Para psych – “about the soul”

– Desire and reason

• Presages Freud

– Senses/perception

– Laws of association

• Similarity

• Contiguity

• Frequency/repetition

• Contrast

Philosophy – Big Questions

• Most Western intellectual traditions begin inside philosophy

True Knowledge

• Universal

• Necessary

• Certain

vs

• Specific

• Contingent

• Probable •
What is the mind?

• How do we know anything?

Descartes – Father of Modern Philosophy?

• French born

• 1596-1650

• Mathematician, philosopher, scientist

Broad Trends

• Renaissance – 14-16 Century

• Scientific Revolution – 16-18 Century

• The Enlightenment – 17-18 Century

• Late Modern – 19-20 Century

Descartes

• Significant contribution to mathematics

– Cartesian coordinates

– Analytic geometry

– Mathematics as the language of natural science

• NB math is rational and has TRUE knowledge

• Significant contribution to the optics Descartes Dream

Cartesian/Substance Dualism

• Mind and body are two different types of stuff

• Descartes was a rationalist

• Wanted a break from traditional philosophy

• Start from scratch

• Complete certainty

Theories of Mind and Body

• I have a mind

• I have a body

• These work together…

• The body is observable

• The mind is only observable to its owner – Privileged (and infallible?)

The Cogito

• I doubt everything…doubt that I have a body…but

• I can’t doubt that I am doubting

• I can’t doubt that

• I think, therefore I am

• Leibnitz’s indiscernibility of identicals

• I can’t doubt I have a mind, but…

• I can doubt I have a body, ergo…

• Mind and body are different things

Substance (Cartesian) Dualism

• The philosophical position that mind and body are different types of things

• That is made of different “stuff”

• Res extensa

– “things extended”

• Res cogitans

– “things thinking”

Classic Dichotomies

• Free-will vs determinism

– Bodies are subject to the laws of nature, but minds…?

• Individualism vs relationality

• Nature vs nurture

• Mental vs physical

• Rationalism vs empiricism

The Mind-Body Problem

• How do body and mind causally interact?

Abandon causal links or

• Abandon dualism Is there a third option?

Is this psychology or philosophy? It’s BOTH (but it was philosophy)

• Descartes was interested in epistemology – that is how we know things BUT

• His exploration plays into Western conceptions of mind and metaphysics

Terminology

WATCH CAREFULLY

• Note that philosophy, psychology, and philosophy of mind all use very similar terms It’s all about context

• When you see a term, check your context, make sure you understand it

Psychology and Philosophy of Mind

Saving Dualism: Occasionalism

• Malebranche

Saving Dualism: Parallelism

• Wilhelm Gottfried Leibnitz

Saving Dualism: Epiphenomenalism

• Mental events arise from physical ones, but

• Mental events do not interact causally with physical events

If not dualism, then what?

• Monism

– Mental

– Physical

Monism - Mental: Idealism

• The stuff of the universe is fundamentally mental

Panpsychism and Hylozoism

In (recentish) Psychology…

• Wait and see…

• Behaviourism

– Revisit

• Functionalism

– Revisit

Ludwig Wittgenstein

• Private language argument

• Philosophical Investigations (1953)

Monism: Reductive materialism

Type physicalism

• Mental states have a particular form which relates to a specific physical (e.g., neuro/electro/chemical)

Psychology Eliminative Materialism

• We’re asking the wrong question – Or

• We don’t yet understand the question

Multiple Instantiation and Functionalism

• Hilary Putnam

– Computer scientist, philosopher

– Multiple instantiation

• Multiple physical states can instantiate the same mental state, but not vice versa

– Functionalism

Monism: Token physicalism and Multiple instantiation

• Similar to type physicalism but admits that there may be more than one way to instantiate a mental state

Isms…

• We will study a number of isms

• General

– Rationalism, empiricism, materialism

• Disciplinary

– Structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, cognitivism, etc.

Next Time

• What is philosophy?

• What is science?

– History and philosophy of science

– How do we know stuff Leads up to “grandfathers” of psychology in mid 19th Century

Lesson plan

1. Think very carefully and try to write YOUR definition of what psychology is:

• What is psychology’s subject matter? That is what does psychology study?

Psychology is the scientific investigation of human’s and not humans patterns of behaviour and in case of humans,
their patterns of thoughts and feelings as well, including its deviances. This allow the development of applications
and interventions under scientific foundations.

• What methods should be used?

The scientific method.

• Should psychology be theoretical, practical, both, or something else?

• What are the roles of theory and data in psychology?

2. How is psychology viewed?

• What is the “Freud problem”

• How do you think psychology is viewed by the general public?

• Does this view differ from your description in #1?

3. Stanovich speaks of “diversity in psychology”. What does he mean by this and what does he say the
implications of diversity are?

4. What does Stanovich mean when he says psychology has “unity in science”?
5. Explain and differentiate the “empirical component” and “interpretive aspect” of history.

6. Write your own definition of the

i) linear-progressive,

ii) cyclic, and

iii) chaotic patterns of history.

7. Write your own definition of i) zeitgeist, ii) ortgeist, and iii) great person drivers of history.

Zeitgeist The spirit of the time. Contrasts with the great-person theory of history and
emphasizes the importance of time and place ( Ortgeist ) as conditions for the
production and acceptance of new ideas.

Ortgeist The spirit of the place. Contrasts with the great-person theory of history and
emphasizes the importance of place and time ( Zeitgeist ) as conditions for the
production and acceptance of new ideas.

great-person theory The view that unique individuals play a causal role
in history. Contrast with Zeitgeist and Ortgeist.
8. What do YOU think mind is?
Review Questions

1. List and briefly describe five reasons for the study of history.
- History Enriches Our Sense of Time. (history is memory)
- History Teaches a Healthy Skepticism (History teaches us to be wary of the big claim, the single
method to end all methods, and the one and only definition).
- Contribution to Liberal Education (Historical studies promote perspective, integration, context, and
sensitivity to the fact that everything is in a complex environment of other things. Knowledge of the
history of a discipline such as psychology helps us overcome the narrowness of specialization)
- History Teaches Humility (When we study history, we are humbled by the genius, the effort, and the
creative insight of previous thinkers)
- History Influences Human Thought Processe (knowledge of history “gives us distance not only from
our immediate objective, but from our own thinking).

2. What is historiography? What issues are typically studied in historiography?

The writing of history along with the study of the methodological and philosophical issues that are pertinent to
the work of the historian.

3. What is history? Do you agree that history has an empirical component?

The interpretive study of the events of the human past.

4. In what sense can the historian be objective?

objectivity in history An attitude of the historical researcher marked by an attempt to present fairly all sides of an
issue.

5. List and describe three hypotheses regarding the pattern or direction of history.

- cyclical hypothesis

The belief that history can be understood in terms of repetitive patterns or cycles. For example, it might
be argued that freedom is lost, only to be regained and lost again; thus, there is endless repetition.

- linear-progressive hypothesis

A view of history marked by belief in the inevitable growth and progress of human knowledge and
institutions.

- chaos hypothesis

The belief that there is no pattern or direction in history; history has no meaning except that attributed to it
by humans.

6. Describe specific developments in the latter part of the twentieth century that contributed to the advance
of scholarly work in the history of psychology.

- In addition to earlier and modern texts, numerous books of readings in the history of psychology have
been published
- Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences was first published in January 1965 and, ten months
later, the Archives of the History of American Psychology were established in Ohio at the University of
Akron.
- In 1967, the first graduate program offering a Ph.D. in the history of psychology was established at
the University of New Hampshire.
- Because of the growth of scholarly work, the American Psychological Association approved a journal,
History of Psychology , launched in 1998.

Online Discussion

1.Thinking about your OWN views and experiences, what do YOU think psychology should be? What should its
subject matter, methods, and applications be? Does this differ from the psychology you are being taught in class? Do
your ideas differ from those of other students?

Personally, I think that the study of psychology based on evidence, which have been taught in Swinburne, makes a
lot of sense. Especially when it regards to mental disorders treatments and interventions, an approach that is
scientifically accepted provides a greater opportunity to satisfactory outcomes.

2.Stanovich repeatedly describes psychology as the scientific study of behaviour. Does Stanovich mean that
psychology does not or should not study thinking and feeling? Explain your answer.

3.Do YOU think psychology as taught in your course is more than the study of behaviour? Give examples from your
course.

4.Do YOU think psychology should be only the study of behaviour or should it include other things? Give you
REASON and if you think psychology is more than behaviour list what this “more” is.

5.What relevance does history have for the modern study of psychology? Explain/justify your position.

6.Where the history of an idea has been explained in textbooks, do you think textbooks implicitly or explicitly have a
presentist view of their topic?
 Week 2 - August 9 - Philosophy, Science, and the Philosophy of Science
PSY 30013

Readings

Philosophical Issues

But man, proud man, Drest in a little briefe authoritie, Most ignorant of what he’s most
assur’d (His glassie Essence) like an angry Ape Plaies such phantastique tricks before
high heauen, As makes the Angels weepe. —William Shakespeare (1604– 1605/1964)
A study of the history of psychology is much more meaningful if you are aware of
perennial psychological themes and issues that have emerged and re-emerged since
antiquity (Robinson, 2013). In this chapter, we’ll examine critical historical and
philosophical problems and issues that shaped psychology’s development.

Epistemology

The term epistemology is derived from the Greek episteme, which means to understand
or to know. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with theories of
knowledge. As you might guess, psychologists have had a longstanding curiosity about
epistemological issues. For example, Jean Piaget (1896– 1980) was trained in zoology
and gained fame for his studies of human cognitive development, but he didn’t
consider himself a biologist or a psychologist. Instead, Piaget viewed himself as a
student of genetic epistemology , the study of the ways we solve problems as a
function of our age and level of development. As a genetic epistemologist, Piaget
demonstrated that our understanding of the world and our ways of solving problems
evolve as we mature. Let’s take a look at epistemological issues that hold special
relevance for psychologists.

A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge

As you read the history of psychology, you’ll encounter the idea that certain truths are
presumed to be known a priori. What does that mean? The philosophical term a priori
comes from the Latin meaning “from what is prior” or “from what comes before.” By
contrast, the term a posteriori means “from what comes later.” A posteriori refers to
that which is derived from or comes after experience and a priori refers to self-evident
truths given in experience without learning. For example, if A is larger than B and B is
larger than C , then A is larger than C. The truth of the proposition seems intuitively
obvious. No one would deny that the proposition itself is known through experience.
That is, without experience, we would not even know about the proposition. But we can
still claim to know the truth of the relationships among A, B , and C through intellectual
insight alone. In other words, we can grasp certain relationships without learning or
benefit of prior experience. According to the theory of a priori knowledge, it can be
argued, for example, that one could immediately grasp the truth of a statement such as
“We cannot both exist and not exist at the same time.” Philosophers and psychologists
have struggled with the role of the a priori in human knowledge. Extreme claims
contribute to the problem. For instance, some thinkers argue that knowledge of good
and evil is known a priori. On the other extreme, we encounter the argument that all
knowledge is dependent on experience. Psychologists emphasize the centrality of
experience as the basis of knowledge. But like philosophers, we wrestle with evidence
that some relationships are discerned without learning or previous experience.

Nativism versus Empiricism

This issue is a close relative to the issue of a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
Nativism holds that some perceptions are operational from birth, built in as a natural
outcome of the structural and functional properties of the nervous system. By contrast,
empiricism holds that all perceptions are learned or developed from experience. The
problem of depth perception illustrates the dispute between nativists and empiricists.
We have the ability to see our world in three dimensions, but do we learn to see in depth
or is depth perception a natural or unlearned ability? Classic research suggests that
newborns have perceptual abilities that may not be learned. Gibson and Walk (1960)
constructed a visual cliff, a platform that ended in a steep drop but was covered by a
bridge of transparent glass. Although it was safe to cross the transparent bridge, baby
goats and chicks only a few hours old avoided the visual cliff. Wertheimer (1961)
demonstrated that newborn human infants, only minutes old, will turn their heads in the
direction of a sound. Is the turning of the head learned or is it a native ability? Later in
the text, we explore the work of philosophers and psychologists who examine these
issues. Instinct versus Learning The problem of instinct versus learning has had a
turbulent history during psychology’s modern era (see Diamond, 1971, 1974a). Many
early psychologists stressed the role of instincts in human and animal psychology.
William McDougall (1871– 1938) was perhaps the best example of an early theorist
who believed that instincts play a central role in human life. McDougall (1908/1960)
claimed that instincts operate in diverse behaviors such as curiosity, fighting, and
maternal behavior. After a time, a group of psychologists called behaviorists replaced
instinct theories with an emphasis on learning. Behaviorists assumed that we learn to
be aggressive, to be inquisitive, and to be good parents. Behaviorist research showed
that some behaviors assumed to be instinctual were subject to learning. In early
studies, ZingYang Kuo (1898– 1970) demonstrated that rat killing by cats is more
subject to learning than anybody of the time had believed (1921, 1924). Depending on
rearing conditions, baby kittens may grow to become rat killers but may also grow up
fearful of rats or may grow tolerant or even cooperative, living peacefully in the same
cages with rats and eating and drinking from the same dishes. Kuo showed that the
conditioning history of the individual kitten is a key to understanding that kitten’s later
interaction with rats. Across these and other studies, Kuo (1924) sought to break down
the nature– nurture distinction in psychology (Honeycutt, 2011). Although behaviorism
demonstrated the importance of learning, it did not banish instinct theory from
psychology. Interest in the topic accelerated after World War II. Ethologists such as
Konrad Lorenz (1903– 1989) and Nikolaas “Niko” Tinbergen (1907– 1988) and
sociobiologists such as Edward O. Wilson (b. 1929) contributed new insights to the
area. Desmond Morris’s 1967 bestselling book The Naked Ape also stimulated public
awareness of instinct theory. Terms such as a priori , nativism , and instinct refer to
abilities or capacities built into living systems. Important differences appear in the
capacities denoted by these terms. For example, a priori knowledge is more cognitive
than an instinct, which appears with a high degree of automaticity. A native ability such
as the innate capacity to see in depth also seems less cognitive than a priori
knowledge, which refers to real intellectual insight or the capacity to discern certain
fundamental relationships. Terms such as a posteriori , empiricism , and learning are
somewhat comparable because they stress the importance of experience.

What Are the Criteria by Which We Claim to Know Truth?

As human beings, we live our lives and make decisions based on epistemological
categories that serve as guides to knowledge. On what grounds can we claim to have
knowledge? On the grounds of authority? What about reason? Faith? Personal
observation? Science? A clash of epistemologies provides the essential ingredient in
disputes between science and law, between science and religion, and even between
scientists and other scientists. Let’s take a look at common epistemological criteria
used as a basis for knowledge.

AU T H O R I T Y

Reference to authority is the most common method of assessing truth. During

childhood, we incorporate the values, beliefs, and judgments of our parents. They serve
as original authorities during our formative years. As we mature, we find authority
everywhere in modern culture— teachers, sacred texts, the media, cul- tural institutions,
political and religious leaders, and legal codes. We often neglect independent
verification or substantiation— the word of the authority is sufficient. In his 1947 book
Man for Himself , psychologist Erich Fromm (1900– 1980) provided a thoughtful
analysis of the problem of authority. For Fromm, the great sin in authoritarian
epistemology is to become too much like the authority. If we become as
knowledgeable as the authority, we no longer need its information and direction. As a
means of survival, some authorities discourage questions and restrict information so
followers will not discover contradictory opinions. Authorities may encourage study, but
only if it is sanctioned and determined to be “safe.” Abuse often begins when an
authority claims to be the exclusive and complete basis of knowledge. History
uncovers countless examples of the abuse of authority. The Spanish theologian
Michael Servetus (1511– 1553) was branded a heretic for not conforming to accepted
scripture. He was burned at the stake. Almost a halfcentury later, Giordano Bruno
(1548– 1600) was condemned to the same fate for unorthodox religious, scientific, and
political opinions. The executions of Bruno and Servetus exemplify how commitment to
authority can crush threatening ideas. Shakespeare’s quotation at the beginning of this
chapter may have been rooted in outrage at the abuse of authority. Unfortunately,
authoritarian abuse is not a historical relic. Abusive authoritarian forces steal into art,
literature, science, religion, politics, and people themselves. The 1978 mass suicide of
over nine hundred Americans in Jonestown, Guyana (see Time , 1978; Layton, 1998)
remains a tragic example of abusive authoritarian control. The balance between
necessary and abusive authority is a critical problem confronting every human group,
particularly because people easily rationalize or even idealize authority, even abusive
authority (Woody, 2009). Within the history of psychology, we will encounter the
problem of authority over and over again. Despite potential for abuse, authority has
utilitarian value. The scientist, for example, may rely on other scientists and
experiments for fresh insights. Authority can be useful, but there is a potential for
problems when it cannot be tested, questioned, or doubted.

EMPIRICISM

The term empiricism is derived from Greek and Latin terms that were close in meaning
to our word experience. In contemporary usage, empiricism refers to a theory of
knowledge where experience plays a central role. Experience of the world depends on
sensory information. According to empiricism, knowledge is based on observable facts
represented in experience. As the story of the history of psychology unfolds, we will see
that empiricism is often contrasted with rationalism, our next topic. Empiricists can be
discovered in most historical periods and places, but Great Britain boasted a line of
thinkers who gave priority to experience. John Locke (1632– 1704) argued that there is
nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses. An earlier British
empiricist, Francis Bacon (1561– 1626), has been called the Great Herald of the
Empirical Spirit because of his campaign to encourage observation and data collection.
For Bacon, we should rely less on authority and more on the empirical method. From an
uncritical standpoint, empiricism seems an obvious alternative to authority as a way of
obtaining knowledge. But empiricism as a way of knowing is not free of problems. First,
as discussed with a priori and a posteriori knowledge, certain forms of knowledge may
not depend on sensory information. We also know that sensory information can be
unreliable. The senses are easily conditioned by emotion, social context, learning, and
motivation. It is little wonder that philosophers and psychologists raised questions
about the adequacy of empiricism as a way of knowing.

R AT IONA LIS M

The term rationalism comes from the same Latin root as the term reason. Rationalists
argue that the mind has innate organizing principles so information from the senses is
filtered and patterned in ways that shape thinking. Rationalists believe sensory
information alone is not an adequate basis for knowledge. They emphasize the activity
of mind, the capacity to reason, and the ability to discern some meanings on an
intuitive basis. Early philosophers and scientists such as Descartes, Galileo, Leibniz,
and Kant advocated rationalism. Early psychologists and philosophers debated
whether the new psychology should be based on empiricism or rationalism. As early as
1732, Christian von Wolff wrote a book titled Empirical Psychology ; two years later, he
wrote a complementary book titled Rational Psychology. In the United States, Laurens
Hickok also wrote separate books under the titles of Rational Psychology (1849) and
Empirical Psychology (1854). Early writers believed rationalism and empiricism offered
useful but different methods. As we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, the tensions between
rational and empirical psychology remain with us. A

ESTHETICISM

Aestheticism is a doctrine that the principles of beauty apply to other arenas of

thought. In this sense, aestheticism is an epistemology or way of knowing; for
aestheticists, inquiry itself is a search for truth and beauty. This perspective is well
illustrated in the book The Double Helix by Watson (1968). After Watson and Crick
constructed the DNA model, the comment was made that the model was “too pretty not
to be true” (Watson, 1968, p. 134). The aesthetic test has been of historical importance
in the humanities— especially in art and music— but scientists also seem to delight in a
beautiful model or theory. Physicist Paul Dirac, as quoted by Brush (1974b), “stated that
a theorist should prefer beautiful equations to uglier ones that yield closer agreement
with experimental data” (p. 1167).

P R AG M AT I S M

Pragmatic philosophy offers still another perspective on epistemology. The term

pragmatism is derived from a Greek root, translated as pragma , which refers to “things
accomplished” or “things done.” In this tradition, Francis Bacon believed we should
emphasize theories and propositions that can be tested. Immanuel Kant used the term
pragmatic to refer to that which is prudent. Under the late nineteenth-century leadership
of Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced purse ) and William James, pragmatism
became a major philosophical movement. Peirce and James emphasized the practical
consequences of theories, definitions, ideas, and concepts. In typical American fashion,
James talked about the “cash value” of an idea. Does the idea produce real productive
work that makes a difference in the world of experience? Or does it lead to dead ends
and muddled thinking? James believed that viable ideas produce sustained intellectual
and physical work. He argued that a definition does not close our intellectual quest; on
the contrary, a good definition raises questions and invigorates additional work (see
James, 1907/1975b). For the pragmatist, the world is in flux, and concepts must be
altered and updated to be responsive to new discoveries. Concepts can outlive their
usefulness and may need to be discarded. As methods improve and cultural biases
shift, truth itself changes. Pragmatism judges truth in terms of utility or workability, but
this is not the whole story. Rather, pragmatism calls for a deep awareness of change,
particularly changes in methods and worldviews, and a suspicion of big claims that
cover too much territory. James (1876b) revealed his pragmatic side when he defined
philosophy as the “habit of always seeing an alternative” (p. 178). One problem with
pragmatism is that an idea or concept may appear sterile or unworkable in the present
intellectual context but may yield important truths at a later time. The Copernican
model of the solar system appeared unworkable at first, but later revolutionized our
knowledge of astrophysics. A naïve, extreme, or corrupted dose of pragmatism may
discourage inquiry. William James and other pragmatists, however, would never permit
such a consequence. James was more interested in opening than in closing doors (see
James, 1909/1977).

SKEPTICISM

According to skepticism , all truth claims are suspect and must be questioned. So it
might appear counterintuitive to include skepticism as a way of knowing, but in the
words of Rauch (1993), “all of your conclusions, every single one of them, may need to
be corrected” (p. 45). Rauch argues for an epistemic humility that encourages skeptical
analysis as an essential part of science and all honest inquiry. We need not surrender
provisional knowledge, but we must be suspicious of certitude because there is always
a new perspective or a fresh discovery that challenges old conclusions. Skepticism, as
a method of discovering problems, can serve as a potent source of progress and
knowledge. A society that discourages critical analysis and skepticism risks freezing
the knowledge industry. In contrast, a society that encourages a skeptical ethic along
with an evolutionary epistemology will be dynamic and open to the discovery mission
(see Harrison, 2006). A productive and progressive science thrives on adversarial
positions, conflicting theories, healthy curiosity, and a sincere skeptical attitude. Later
in the text, we’ll see how curiosity was considered a sin for centuries and how such a
view resulted in intellectual stagnation. We will also show how skepticism in the late
Renaissance period stimulated the development of modern science. The Role of
Emotions in Knowledge Emotions play in our belief structures, complicating the
problem of human knowledge. It can be challenging to sort out our competing beliefs
when we are dispassionate. When emotions such as hate, fear, love, and anger enter
the picture, our knowledge problems are compounded. Throughout this text, we will
visit tensions between authority and reason. Though emotions may attach to either
authority or reason, strong emotions are more likely to be associated with authority
than with reason. Nevertheless, the dissonance associated with the violation of reason
may be a source of emotion. Let us return, however, to a consideration of emotion and
its relation to authority. Authority is visible in our most vulnerable moments such as
birth, marriage or other long-term commitments, illness, tragedy, and death. We sing to
authority songs of praise, gratitude, thanksgiving, worship, and allegiance. Though
protest music attacks authority, it is rare to encounter music inspired by claims of
reason or logic, but it is common to encounter music inspired by claims of authority.
We create symbols inspired by authority and then idolize those symbols and pledge our
allegiance to them. We set aside special holidays to celebrate authority, and we
participate in self-denial and in rituals that underscore our loyalty and commitment.
Failure to observe a ritual is often a source of the most intense anxiety and self-
criticism. Our personal identity is seldom tied to reason like the character of Mr. Spock
in the classic Star Trek movies and television series. Personal identities of the
overwhelming majority, even in matters such as dress and food, reflect authorities.
Deviance may trigger legitimate fears of social ostracism. For example, people who
undergo a dramatic conversion from one belief to another may be disowned by parents
or other authorities (Jacoby, 2016). Though science values openness, a scientific
community may ostracize a scientist who deviates from standard practice. Emotional
problems are compounded when we believe that authority is absolute and immune
from questioning. When reason and authority clash, as they often do, the problem is
both intellectual and emotional (Viney & Woody, 2017). The emotional power of
authority is reflected in memory. Memorization is a valued activity in authority systems,
and those who can recite the words of authority from memory are held up as role
models. Children, especially, are encouraged to commit the words of authority to
memory. A mechanical recitation is often more valued than a reflective and creative
analysis. We will see that the history of science generally and of psychology
specifically, is partly a history of shifting epistemologies. Few topics are as important
to human welfare and survival as epistemology, yet the subject is avoided or neglected
because of its vexing questions. Unfortunately, emotion coupled with ignorance and the
inevitable blind spots encountered in all belief systems undermine the critical reflection
necessary to understand belief structures. The problem of knowledge is not a trivial or
irrelevant metaphysical issue. It is a practical problem relevant to daily life and should
thus be confronted in a vigorous and honest fashion. The Shakespeare quotation is a
poetic reminder of the certitude that often accompanies ignorance and its
consequences. We come full circle to our original question. On what grounds can we
lay claim to knowledge? We turn now to the interplay between science and
epistemology. Science and Epistemology Conceived as a way of knowing, science can
be understood in terms of epistemological assumptions and commitments that include
empirical, rational, pragmatic, and aesthetic components. From the beginning of the
modern period, philosophers of science have studied scientific methodology, but they
could not agree on what science is or how it operates. Later, we will observe
disagreements about the nature of science, particularly between Francis Bacon and
René Descartes, two of the original modern philosophers of science. Because of long-
standing disagreements about scientific methodology, we must caution against
assuming that there is only one traditional view of science. In what follows, we will
examine three critical thinkers to gain insight into their philosophies about science and
epistemology.

KARL RAIMOND POPPER

Sir Karl Raimond Popper (1902– 1994) was born in Vienna, where he studied
mathematics, physics, and philosophy at the University of Vienna. His 1935 book The
Logic of Scientific Discovery is a classic in the philosophy of science. He had a long
and distinguished career and enjoyed extensive acclaim for his unique work in the
philosophy of science. Popper argued that consistent positive observational evidence
does not justify universal conclusions. For example, every observed swan (thus far)
may have been white, but we are not therefore justified in making a claim that all swans
must be white. The observation of a single black swan falsifies the claim. According to
Popper, the integrity of science hinges on an honest quest for negative instances or
disconfirmation. Survivability is not the first task of a good theory; rather, a good theory
possesses the virtues of simplicity, clarity, testability, and falsifiability. A theory that is
not falsifiable is a theory that is vague and that cannot be subjected to rigorous tests.
For example, during the witch hunts in the late Renaissance a numb or insensitive part
of the body was sometimes explained as the point of entry of demons into the body.
Such an explanation is vague; it does not lend itself to empirical testing. How would
one set up an experiment to test such an explanation? Popper (1959) was basically
offering a “theory of theories” (p. 59). His larger vision of the scientific enterprise is that
it is by no means a basis for certitude. What Popper offers is an evolutionary
epistemology that emphasizes the crucial role of explicit and rigorous theories in
scientific thought. He likened scientific theories to “nets cast to catch what we call ‘the
world’: to rationalize, to explain, and to master it. We endeavor to make the mesh ever
finer and finer” (p. 59). There is the hope of progress, but no grounds for certainty.
According to Popper, genuine scientific theory is not invulnerable, and a major
characteristic of science is that it does evolve. Popper’s philosophy of science has
been criticized (Toulmin, 1972; Kitcher, 1982) but it has served as an important attempt
to set up a demarcation between science and those pseudosciences that focus
exclusively on confirmation but that ignore negative instances.

THOMAS S.KUHN

As the author of Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Thomas The S. Kuhn (1922– 1996)
wrote one of the most influential books in the history and philosophy of science. Kuhn
was initially interested in theoretical physics, but after assisting with an elementary
science course for nonscientists, his interests shifted to the history and philosophy of
science. Specifically, he confessed that historical scientific studies “radically
undermined some of [his] basic conceptions about the nature of science and the
reasons for its special success” (Kuhn, 1970, p. v). Kuhn’s work emphasized the
importance of understanding science in terms of community structures and historical
development. The scientific community shares an intellectual background, standard
reference sources, textbooks, ways of solving problems, and values. The community
exerts pressures on the individual, especially during student years and in early
scientific-professional years when the young scientist is establishing a reputation. Kuhn
did not mean that the scientific community is a closed club. Such an interpretation is an
unfortunate “popular caricature of Kuhn’s position” (Kitcher, 1982, p. 168). Kuhn
recognized the diversities that exist in the scientific community. Nevertheless, there is
much that community members share in common. Kuhn was interested in the evolution
of science over time. Competing schools of thought mark early prescientific
development and are prone to quarrel over basic definitions, methods, and
assumptions. He noted that the early stages of electrical research gave rise to
competing views about the nature of electricity. The same is true in psychology as early
psychologists engaged in vigorous debates over subject matter and appropriate
methods. Kuhn (1970) notes that the early search for research consensus is difficult
because “all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given
science are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far more
nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development makes
familiar” (p. 15). In time, one competing school will prevail over the others. The
dominant school attracts a loyal following while promising a set of problems worthy of
sustained study. The leading school now dictates the intellectual agenda, ushering in a
transition to what Kuhn called normal science . Normal science has a record of past
achievement; it defines problem areas and provides methods of practice. Most
scientists work in this tradition. When the time is right, Kuhn tells us, a paradigm
emerges as an elaboration on the meaning of normal science. In a sociological sense,
paradigm refers to “the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on,
shared by members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). The term also refers to
conventional ways of approaching and solving problems. Paradigms define boundaries
within which scientists do their work and clarify the legitimate methods of analysis and
ways of looking at problems. In the course of normal science, serendipitous findings
and anomalies cannot be ignored. Sometimes discoveries occur through accidents and
at other times are theory driven. Kuhn (1970) noted that X-rays are “a classic case of
discovery through accident, a type that occurs more frequently than the impersonal
standards of scientific reporting allow us easily to realize” (p. 57). He described events
that led German physicist Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen (1845– 1923) to discover X-rays
and how even a notable scientist such as Lord Kelvin (1824– 1907) believed they were
a hoax. The prevailing paradigm had not predicted or anticipated Röntgen’s X-ray
discovery, but it was a finding that could not be ignored. In most cases, efforts are
made to assimilate new discoveries or anomalies into the prevailing paradigm. Such
efforts are understandable because the scientific community has a vested interest in
the traditional paradigm. It has commanded loyalties and lifetimes of hard work.
However, tests of competing theories that lead to a succession of anomalous findings
can become so compelling they cannot be ignored (Joireman & Van Lange, 2015). Such
a turn of events creates a crisis that causes some members of the community to lose
faith. The community response is predictable: Some try to find ad hoc hypotheses to
rescue the paradigm, whereas others search for new ways to organize the larger
picture. According to Kuhn, scientific revolutions are marked by new and more
successful organizations of the world. With a paradigm shift, a new vision replaces the
old way of seeing things. Kuhn (1970) noted that his “book portrays scientific
development as a succession of tradition-bound periods punctuated by noncumulative
breaks” (p. 208). Following a revolution, the old paradigm is rejected and scientists
return to a normal science that operates within the new paradigm. Both Kuhn and
Popper advanced evolutionary epistemologies, and both challenged absolutistic
approaches to science. Kuhn has a broader interpretation of what counts as legitimate
science than does Popper. Mopping-up activities, accidental discoveries, and
descriptive studies all comprise the business of science. Kuhn has been criticized for
covering too much ground with the term paradigm. He acknowledged the criticism and
attempted to correct it. Kuhn’s model of science was subjected to the same criticism
leveled against Popper— namely, that it does not do justice to the extreme diversity in
the history of science. We turn now to a third orientation that offers a radical difference
from Popper and Kuhn.

PAUL K. FEYERABEND

In his book Science in the Making , Joel Hildebrand, a chemist and former president of
the American Chemical Association, challenged the idea that there is one scientific
method. Hildebrand (1957) argued that “to be successful in unlocking doors concealing
nature’s secrets, a person must have ingenuity. If [we do] not have the key for the lock,
[we] must not hesitate to pick it, to climb in a window, or even kick in a panel” (p. 26).
Hildebrand argues that scientific success values ingenuity and determination more
than method. Hildebrand’s statement is by no means esoteric. In Reflections of a
Physicist , Percy W. Bridgman (1955) said, “there is no scientific method as such” (p.
416). In that same source, he pointed out that scientists do not follow “any prescribed
course of action . . .[;] science is what scientists do, and there are as many scientific
methods as there are individual scientists” (p. 83). Zoologist P. B. Medawar (1984)
shared the same sentiment in his book The Limits of Science : “There is indeed no such
thing as ‘the’ scientific method. A scientist uses a very great variety of stratagems . . .
[and] no procedure of discovery can be logically scripted” (p. 51). Medawar challenged
the idea that breakthroughs follow a calculus of discovery. Perhaps some discoveries
arrive in such a neat fashion, but he argued for the role of serendipity in science.
Consider again the discovery of X-rays. Medawar (1984, p. 46) asks us to imagine a
scientist prior to 1900 approaching a funding agency with a proposal “to discover a
means of making human flesh transparent.” The idea would be greeted with scorn. Still,
the discovery of X-rays didn’t follow any preplanned logical pathway connected to
scientific goal setting. Hildebrand, Bridgman, and Medawar do not wish to undermine
respect for science. Quite the contrary, they have a keen interest in scientific
advancement. What they are saying is that science is not as tidy, objective, and
coherent as we have been led to believe. Similar themes are advanced by Brush
(1974b), Cartwright (1999), and Swan (2015). In a 1975 book titled Against Method ,
Paul K. Feyerabend (1924– 1994) outlined an anarchistic theory of knowledge.
Although acknowledging the negative implications of anarchism, especially for political
science, he finds appropriate and healthy implications for anarchism in epistemology
and science. His analysis of the history of science offers a vigorous disagreement with
Popper and Kuhn. Feyerabend (1975) contended, The idea of a method that contains
firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of
science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical
research— there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in
epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other. It becomes evident that such
violations are not accidental events; they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of
inattention which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are
necessary for progress. (p. 23) Feyerabend went on to say that conscious decisions to
break from conventional wisdom and method are not only facts in the history of
science but necessary to the progress of science. In his thinking, successful and
creative scientists break or reverse rules, defend ad hoc hypotheses, work inductively
and then deductively, and work sometimes for unity and sometimes for plurality. The
rule, he tells us, is anything goes. Feyerabend (1975) argued that “even a lawand-order
science will succeed only if anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to take place”
(p. 26). Drawing on examples from the history of science as evidence, he suggested
that “the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a
view of [human beings and their] social surroundings” (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 27, 1988).
Feyerabend’s position should not be viewed as a debunking or skepticism regarding
science. However, his position calls for closer scrutiny of the history of scientific
discovery. He also encourages more detailed empirical analysis of what scientists
actually do. For example, is the handson lab work of the chemist the same method as
the astronomer calculating the trajectory of a comet? Does the theoretical
mathematician use the same methods as the marine biologist who studies the feeding
habits of sharks? Is there one scientific method adapted for various fields of science or
is there a diversity of methods within specific disciplines? Does this assumption of a
single method inhibit our inquiry (Hood, 2013)? If there is no one scientific method, are
there at least features (e.g., the importance of quantification) that all methods share? 

Relevance of Epistemology to Psychology 

Early psychologists disagreed about the appropriate methodology for the new
psychology. Should there be one method or many? If there is but one, which should it
be? The philosophy of science dictates such questions. From some points of view, the
scientific status of psychology hinges on methodological purity. Other philosophy-
ofscience considerations dictate psychology’s status among the sciences. Within
Kuhn’s scheme, psychology could be regarded as a pre-paradigmatic science. It enjoys
higher status in Feyerabend’s scheme if for no other reason than that the
methodological purity of all the sciences is called into question. Further, there is wider
latitude of acceptance in Feyerabend’s scheme about what constitutes “normal
science.” The issues raised here are of historical interest, but they also command the
attention of contemporary scientists and philosophers. As we proceed through the
history of psychology, we will encounter questions about the nature of science and the
scientific status of psychology. The Problem of Causality From the time of Aristotle to
the present, philosophers and scientists have debated the nature and meaning of
causation. Contributing to the richness of the problem are questions concerning the
possible influence of unconscious processes in human life, the role of intention or
purpose in determining behavior, and the question of whether the individual can be an
agent of change (i.e., a cause). In what follows, we will review classic and modern
approaches to the problem of causation. Aristotle struggled with the meaning of
causation, paving the way for centuries of debate and speculation on the issue. He
believed that causation is not a simple one-dimensional affair. To know the cause of
anything, we must understand several things. First, we must understand what
conditions led up to the event. Aristotle referred to antecedent conditions as the
efficient cause , essentially that which sets a thing in motion. When domino B falls after
being hit by A , we can say that the movement of A is the efficient cause of the fall of B.
Aristotle also believed we need to understand the material structure of a thing to
understand causation. When a physician takes a hammer and strikes the patellar
tendon, the knee reflex will cause the patient’s leg to kick. If the physician’s hammer is
the efficient cause of the reflex, there must also be a material cause. In this case, we
would not observe the reflex if there had been nerve or muscle damage. So part of the
cause of the reflex is the material structure of the knee including the nerves, tendons,
and muscles. In other words, the reflex depends on a physical substrate, which Aristotle
called the material cause . Domino A (an efficient cause) impacting domino B could
knock B over if both were made of the same material. But if B were made of lead and A
of light wood, then B would not fall when impacted by A. The so-called causal sequence
depends on a material structure as well as antecedent conditions. Aristotle described a
third kind of cause known as the formal cause . This refers to the form, shape, or
identifying properties of a thing. A sculptor may chisel away at two pieces of granite,
using one to create a bust of Beethoven and the other to shape a likeness of Mozart.
For both busts, the material is the same but the form is different. The formal cause
carries information value. The functional or causal properties of a thing depend on
form. Domino B would not fall when impacted by A if it were too short or different in
form than A. So form may also be essential to an understanding of a causal sequence.
An airplane could be constructed of appropriate material (material cause) and have an
excellent propulsion system (efficient cause), but if the wing were damaged or poorly
designed (formal cause), the plane would not fly. According to Aristotle, if you want to
understand a sequence of events, you need to know its goal or purpose. Let’s return to
the knee reflex example. The physician was conducting a neurological exam, so she
used a small hammer to tap the patient’s knee. That was her purpose. Aristotle called
this the final cause , the end or purpose for which a change was produced. Aristotle
might say you cannot understand the knee reflex, or rather the cause of the knee reflex,
until you understand the physician’s intention or purpose. For Aristotle, knowledge of
causation rests on understanding antecedent conditions, material, form, and the
purpose for which a thing was intended. Aristotle believed in a balance of all four
dimensions of causation. His student, Theophrastus, believed science should concern
itself primarily with material and efficient causation and not with final causation. The
Aristotelian notion of final causation should not be confused with teleological
interpretations of the world encountered in numerous theological beliefs. The term
teleology refers to purpose or design. Technically, teleology can be defined as the
investigation of evidence that there is design or purpose in nature. The assumption of
design leads to the next question: What was the origin of the design or purpose? There
are two types of teleological answers to that question. Intrinsic teleology is the position
that design, order, and purpose are immanent in nature— simple manifestations or
characteristics of nature. But extrinsic teleology makes the claim that any design in
nature reflects the work of a designer and that the designer has imbued the design with
the designer’s own purpose. Though Aristotle believed in an unmoved mover (God), it is
questionable as to whether he would subscribe to the kind of teleology encountered in
some theologies. Intrinsic teleology has become archaic in physics and chemistry.
Psychologists can’t dismiss intrinsic teleology as easily. Despite attempts by
behaviorists to build a psychological science like physics based on material and
efficient causation, teleology or purpose has constituted a persistent problem for
psychologists. Even if the will is rarely discussed in contemporary psychology, many
psychologists have found it difficult, if not impossible, to resist expressions such as
goal-directed, intention, plans, purposive behavior, anticipation , and expectancy. Such
terms, unless defined in unusual ways, suggest intrinsic teleology or final causation.
But can human behavior be explained with the same material and efficient causation
used to explain the movement of a billiard ball, the trajectory of a comet, or the changes
in the metabolism of a cell? Or must we invoke some form of final causation to account
for the complexity of human behavior? We will encounter opposition to teleological
explanations in the works of theorists such as Jacques Loeb, John B. Watson, Clark
Hull, and B. F. Skinner, while theorists such as William McDougall, Edward Chace
Tolman, and Gordon Allport favor teleological explanations. Rychlak and Rychlak
(1990a, 1990b) and Rychlak (1994) insist that teleological assumptions play a critical
role in psychology. You may have heard the familiar warning that correlation does not
imply causation. But neither does correlation imply that there is not a causal
relationship between two events. Correlation is neutral with respect to the question of
causation. Perhaps causation is not a scientific construct. Maybe it is simply a
historical and philosophical curiosity. To be sure, there are those who are content to
study correlations or functional relationships. But the idea of causality is so entrenched
in common sense that it refuses to vanish. Some still argue that science entails a
search for fundamental processes that underlie and explain correlational data. In
psychology, questions associated with the problem of causality will show themselves
time after time. Some of the questions are as follows: To what extent do events
influence us that are not a part of our consciousness? If unconscious processes
influence us, then can we claim to be rational or free? Is it possible to build an adequate
science of human experience and behavior on the basis of material and efficient
causes? Can we rise above cause-and-effect relations and exercise freedom of choice?
This question will recur throughout the book. 
Free Will and Determinism 

Do we have some degree of control over the direction of our lives or are all things,
including human experience and behavior, subject to the laws of causation? Is there
anything that is uncaused? Such questions lie at the heart of one of philosophy’s oldest
problems. Several of psychology’s greatest figures have dedicated serious
consideration to this issue. Sigmund Freud, John Watson, Ivan Pavlov, and B. F. Skinner
stand in the determinist camp, whereas William James, Carl Jung, Gordon Allport, and
Carl Rogers are committed to a belief in freedom of choice. The issue of free will and
determinism is an issue with far-reaching implications for psychology, science, the law,
and theories of punishment. If humans have some degree of freedom, then a
psychology based on strict determinism cannot do justice to its subject matter. On the
other hand, if causality exists in nature— including human nature— then belief in
freedom of choice is unwarranted or may even work against scientific investigations.
This issue is more alive now than a half-century ago. It has been the subject of
numerous books and articles in psychology (see Bloom, 2014; Boyer, 2014; Burns,
2014; Eagleman, 2011; Harris, 2012; Lawton & Churchland, 2013; Viney & Parker, 2016).
The doctrine of free will assumes that people make choices that are to some degree
independent of antecedent conditions. It assumes we can, at least somewhat, rise
above genetic, chemical, physical, and social influences. We can anticipate alternatives
in the decision-making process and weigh their possible outcomes. Behavior may be
predictable, but there’s an element of unpredictability in our actions. If we feel we can
rise above causal forces, we’re more likely to view ourselves as rational or responsible
creatures. By the way, most advocates of free will do not attribute this quality to
animals. Most people who believe in free will agree that environmental and genetic
forces impose limitations on us, but they still believe in at least some freedom of
choice. Although free will proponents may disagree about the power of the causes that
affect our lives, they are likely to believe that the person or the self is not simply passive
or reactive. Instead, the self acts on the environment with awareness and purpose.
Let’s take a look at arguments in support of free will.

1. Argument for an adequate explanation of human experience.

Psychologists have never been able to make perfect predictions of simple, let alone
complex, behavior. For example, there’s no way we can write biographies in advance.
Such predictive failure challenges the adequacy of strict determinism. The determinist
position struggles with the spontaneity and unpredictability in human behavior. Those
who endorse free will claim that their position offers a better fit with our observations
and theories about experience and behavior. The free will perspective is embarrassed
by neither our regularities nor our irregularities, uncertainties, and novelties.

2. Logical contradictions in determinism.

Proponents of free will argue that if determinism is true, a determinist cannot logically
declare that he or she believes in determinism. Why? Because the determinist is not the
real believer. Belief is a mere consequence of antecedents. According to determinism,
the very words I believe in determinism are conditioned by more fundamental forces. It
is not that one believes in determinism, but that consequences have transpired to result
in the statement I believe in determinism. Strict determinism implies a passive nature
about the self that is well illustrated in B. F. Skinner’s (1983a) statement, “If I am right
about human behavior, I have written the autobiography of a nonperson” (p. 32).

3. Argument from morality.

Free will believers argue that determinism makes a mess of morality. According to
determinism, any immoral behavior can be explained in terms of causes that had no
prevision of the ends they were achieving. In other words, individuals are not
responsible for their actions. Indeed, the term responsibility is a hollow term— it means
little more than ability to respond. Argument from indeterminism. Promoters of free will
argue that strict determinism is a pre-twentieth-century concept that is no longer
applicable in the physical sciences. Following quantum theory and Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, the physical world must now be viewed from a probabilistic rather
than a strictly causal framework. The doctrine of indeterminism holds that it is not
possible to apply strict cause-and-effect explanations in the world of subatomic
particles. This well-known doctrine has led some individuals to argue that
indeterminism applies to psychology. Although indeterminism is not identical with
purposive free will, an indeterminist would tell us that human behavior is characterized
by an inherent uncertainty. As you can guess, the free will perspective has not gone
unchallenged.

Determinism states that there are causes, both known and unknown, for every behavior
or experience. Taylor (1967b) defined determinism as the philosophical doctrine that
“states that for everything that ever happens there are conditions such that, given them,
nothing else could happen” (p. 359). The great physicist Albert Einstein (1879– 1955)
proclaimed, “God doesn’t play dice with the universe” (Michelmore, 1962, p. 128). As a
determinist, Einstein believed that the law of cause and effect operates at every level of
reality. He once remarked that “God is clever, but . . . not malicious” (Michelmore, 1962,
p. 111). Einstein is suggesting that the world, because of its lawfulness, is knowable. It
may be difficult to discover causes and laws, but with persistence we can make
discoveries. This is the optimistic side of determinism: Nature is knowable, and
problems can be solved when cause-and-effect relations are discovered. Belief in
freedom of the will may discourage inquiry (such a belief may have delayed the
development of a scientific psychology). In this respect, the determinist offers the
following rebuttal to indeterminism: Even if indeterminism applies to the world of
fundamental particles, it is not applicable in larger physical systems. A system as
complicated, say, as a basketball remains as a reliable and determinate system, even if
the behavior of the smallest physical units sustaining it is indeterminate. Historically,
science has always proceeded on the assumption of the lawfulness or statistical
regularity of its subject matter. But now let us turn to a few major arguments in defense
of determinism.

1. Historical argument.

The history of the free will– determinism controversy is a history of victories for
determinism and retreats for the theory of free will. With increasing knowledge of brain
structure and function, lawful explanations are extended to an everwidening spectrum
of behaviors. The term will once occupied a great amount of space in psychology
textbooks, but as knowledge progressed, we had less need for the term. In the history
of neuroscience, for example, mechanistic explanations have replaced explanations
based on the will on countless occasions.

2. Argument from morality.

The determinist can counter free will arguments by stating that belief in free will can
also make a mess of morality. Many of history’s most barbaric practices were justified
on the grounds that the victim had made a free choice and now deserved punishment.
From medieval times, aggressive witch-hunts led to the persecution of people who
allegedly used free will to make a pact with the devil.

3. Argument from reasonable expectancy.

As we think about our world, we develop reasonable expectations that things are
lawful. The world is not capricious; given a specific set of weather conditions, we can
have a reasonable expectation that a Chinook wind will hit Boulder, Colorado, within a
specified period of time. In a similar manner, we may reasonably expect stress and
other circumstances to contribute to an emotional breakdown. We don’t need to
attribute the breakdown to an act of free choice. Most of us live our lives on the basis
of reasonable expectations. If an expectation is not confirmed, we assume we
neglected to take some variable into consideration. Without determinism, we have no
grounds for reasonable expectations about the world. The free will– determinism
debate is a defining issue for psychology. Throughout the book, we will outline where
various psychologists stand on this issue. As noted, the issue is alive and well in
contemporary psychology.

With the advance of the neurosciences, the debates over free will and determinism
have, if anything, intensified and grown more technical (see Baer et al., 2008; Libet,
1985; Schlosser, 2012; Wegner, 2002). Many of the recent debates have centered
around research on neurophysiological precursors of intentions. If intentions lack
automaticity and some degree of causal efficacy, do we have free will? If the
conclusion is negative, we are still haunted by vexing existential questions raised by
William James (1979a). Am I the author of nothing? What does it mean to face a world
foredone? the mind or do they study only behavior? All of these are ontological
questions because they ask the essential question: What is real? Let’s explore some
traditional solutions to ontological problems.

Monism

According to monistic philosophy, everything belongs in some intimate way to

everything else. As an elegant solution to the problem of ontology, monism suggests
that reality, whatever it is, is all of one piece. If everything belongs in an intimate way to
every other thing, then nothing is alien or foreign because all things are part of one
thing. What appears as foreign or alien is only a product of the present gaps in our
knowledge. Monism offers hope for a unity of knowledge because we all study the
same thing, but at different levels and from diverse perspectives. One form of monism
nurtures the belief that psychology is reducible to the field of physics. Although
monism appeals to simplicity, a major problem arises because monists can’t agree
about what the one and only reality is. Monism, in fact, comes in oppositional forms.
Let’s consider them and their implications for the mind– brain problem. The Mind–
Body Problem The mind– body problem belongs to a subdisciplinary area of philosophy
known as ontology. Philosophers have used the term ontology in diverse ways. For our
purposes, we can define it as the study of the nature and relations of being. When we
ask, “what is real?” we are asking an ontological question. Is the mind real? Is there a
mind that is somehow independent from the brain? What is the relationship between
the mind and the brain? Is there one fundamental reality (monism), two (dualism), or
perhaps many (pluralism)? If there is more than one reality, how do the various types of
reality coexist— and do they influence each other? Do psychologists study

M AT E R I A L I S M

Materialism is a monistic ontology characterized by the belief that matter is the

fundamental constituent of all things. A material monist might argue that the body
exists, but not the mind. Terms such as mind , spirit , and consciousness are
understood in terms of the material, efficient, and formal operations of brain activity
(Lawton & Churchland, 2013). It follows that there is no mind– brain problem as such
because all so-called mental activity is reducible to physical, chemical, or physiological
processes. Many key figures such as Democritus, Thomas Hobbes, Julien Offray de la
Mettrie, Herman von Helmholtz, Ivan Pavlov, and John B. Watson were materialists.

IDEALISM

As an alternative to materialism, emphasizes mind or spirit as the preeminent feature

of life. It represents a radical departure from materialism and a different emphasis with
respect to the mind– body problem. According to idealism, as the term is employed in
philosophy, the mental world of experience is foundational to all science and, for that
matter, all knowledge. It would be impossible to know anything apart from
consciousness or experience. Thus, the mental world (experience, awareness,
consciousness) has priority— it is the only world to which we have immediate access.
The material world is regarded as derivative— an intellectual or philosophical product
that has its origin in the world of experience. For the idealist, psychology is the science
that studies mental processes and experience. Further, an idealist would argue that all
science begins with experience and is about experience. Thus, it is the mind or the
mental world that has ontological status. The material world is a construction— a mere
by-product of a more important reality. Several key figures, including Plato, George
Berkeley, and Gustav Fechner, identified with idealism.

DOUBLE-ASPECTMONISM

This variety of monism displays sensitivity to the claims of materialism and idealism.
Double-aspect monism emphasizes the idea that there is a language for mental
processes and a language for underlying physical processes, but both languages refer
to the same reality. We use words such as mind, experience, consciousness,
awareness , and thinking. We also have a rich and growing language that refers to
fundamental physical structures and processes such as neurons, neurotransmitters,
cell assemblies, and synaptic transmission. According to double-aspect monism, both
languages are legitimate but both refer to the same underlying reality approached from
two perspectives. Benedict Spinoza, an early advocate of double-aspect theory, argued
that human beings may be described in mentalistic terms or in the language of the
physical sciences. The two languages provide different perspectives just as one may
describe a coin from the perspective of either side. According to double-aspect theory,
the mind– body problem is a problem of language. The ontological problem, however,
remains. What is real? Is reality reduced to words? Despite its problems, double-aspect
theory can embrace a tolerant and robust approach to psychology that includes
legitimate roles for descriptions that refer to mental and to physical processes.

EPIPHENOMENALISM

A final version of monism, epiphenomenalism , is often classified as a dualistic

position, but for reasons that shall soon be apparent, it is more accurately classified as
a monistic position. An epiphenomenon is an appearance or a kind of “overflow”
resulting from the operation of something that is more basic or fundamental.
According to epiphenomenalism, mental processes (e.g., thought, consciousness,
cognitions) are a kind of “overflow” or by-product of brain activity. The mental world
has no independent status; it is a mere epiphenomenon or appearance. According to
epiphenomenalism, causality always runs one way, from the physical to the mental.
There is no mental causation because the mind has no independent status apart from
its physical substrate. Epiphenomenalism is clearly a variation of materialism.

Dualism
In contrast with monism, dualism asserts that there are two fundamental orders of
reality— mind and body. Each has ontic (i.e., real) status. Naïvely, most of us experience
the reality of mental processes; we also experience the reality of the physical world.
According to the dualistic position, we are assured that neither the mental nor the
physical world is a mere appearance. For all its popular appeal, at least to the
Westerner, dualism presents a major problem. If there are two orders of reality, how do
they get along with each other? Can one influence the other? Or can each influence the
other, and if so, how? Most dualistic mind– body positions address the issue of how
mind and body collaborate. Let’s examine the better-known positions. 

INTERACTIONISM 

According to interactionism , sometimes called the commonsense position, mental

events are real— they influence each other and they influence bodily events. Bodily
events also influence each other and mental events. Although interactionism
sometimes appeals to common sense, it is not without problems. First, interactionists
have difficulty specifying how an immaterial mental system can be causal with respect
to a physical system (or, for that matter, how a material system can be causal with
respect to an immaterial one). Second, a major problem centers around the locus of
interaction. Where do mind and body influence each other? René Descartes, history’s
most famous interactionist, addressed this problem with considerable courage and
suggested that the pineal gland, located in the center of the head, is the seat of
interaction. Centuries later, we have found that people can function fairly well following
a pinealectomy. In this sense, Descartes’s theory of the locus of interaction was
testable but was demonstrated to be wrong. Descartes also failed to show how a
mental event can influence physical events and vice versa. His followers’ subsequent
attempts also proved unsuccessful. For all its commonsense appeal, interactionism
leaves us with more questions than answers.

PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM

According to psychophysical parallelism , mental events are real, and they influence
other mental events. Bodily events are also real, and they influence other bodily events.
Mental events cannot, however, influence bodily events, and bodily events cannot
influence mental events. The two orders of reality are nevertheless, by definition,
parallel with each other. That is, whatever is happening in one order is happening
simultaneously in the other order. The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the best-
known advocate of this position, provides an intriguing allegory. Imagine that mind and
body are like two clocks on a wall, each displaying the same time. They are
synchronized but independent. One clock has no causal influence over the other, yet
they func- tion in agreement with each other. According to Leibniz, mind and body are
by definition parallel, but there is no causal influence between these two independent
orders of reality. Parallelism avoids the problems encountered in the interactionist
position, but at a considerable expense— it flies in the face of common sense. Most of
us, for example, assume that the experience of pain is connected to the chance
encounter with the hot stove top and the resulting burn. The burn is both mental and
physical, and there appears to be a causal connection between them, even though the
supporter of parallelism must argue that they are independent yet harmonious. The
larger problem is that parallelism implies a kind of preestablished harmony between
mind and body. Explaining how preestablished harmony works might prove more
difficult than explaining an interaction.

EMERGENTISM

The philosophical position known as emergentism , in at least one of its variations,

argues that mental processes are produced by brain processes, but are qualitatively
different. For example, the experience of a toothache emerges out of complex
neurological activity that may have been activated by decay or some kind of damage.
The experience itself, though emerging out of bodily activity, is not captured by
descriptions of bodily activity. The experience seems to have a career of its own and a
reality that is qualitatively set apart. To clarify, let’s take an analogy from chemistry.
Salt is a product of sodium and chloride, yet the compound salt has unique properties
that differ from sodium and chloride. Sodium alone or chloride alone can be lethal to
the living organism, yet when combined in the form of salt, they can prove vital to life.
The compound seems to have “emergent” properties of its own that are not a simple
summation of separate elements. In a similar manner, mental processes, though
produced by brain processes, are radically and qualitatively different. The experience of
a sunrise, a poem, or a symphonic passage emerges from brain activity, but the global
mental experience with its inspirational, affective, and associative meanings appears to
be a reality unto itself quite different qualitatively from the underlying firing of neurons
or the neurochemical activities in the synapse. Emergentism is by no means a unified
or consistent philosophical orientation. There are varieties of emergentism such as
epiphenomenalism that are more consistent with monism (Crick, 1994), but other
varieties that are more consistent with dualism. Thus, an emergentist might argue that
causal forces work from the parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts. Such
an argument is consistent with a functional or pragmatic dualism, if not a metaphysical
dualism. Let us turn now to another approach to the problem of ontology.

Pluralism

A final commonsense belief is that we live in a “multiverse” of separate orders of

things. Ontological pluralism embraces the reality of mind and body but also insists
that these two orders do not exhaust the possibilities. In a discussion of ontological
pluralism, MacCormac (1990) pointed out that concepts arise “from physical brain
processes . . . but they do not always find their origin solely in brain activity” (p. 417). A
concept may have its origin in any of a great number of cultural sources, but because it
depends on the physical system for its expression, its causal sources can be diverse.
An ontological pluralist may believe that there are many separate real things, including
different types of conscious experience and other orders of reality that do not obey
rules that we know. Pluralism raises even more problems than interactionism. For each
separate reality we posit, we must now struggle with the problem of the interaction of
that reality with others. For example, as the mind– body theorist must struggle with
how mind and body influence each other, a pluralist may struggle with mind– body
interactions as well as the problem of theodicy (the relation of God to the world) and
other actual or potential interactions. It is little wonder that those with unity-loving
natures are repulsed by pluralism— it is a messy philosophy. But the pluralist would
insist that the world is not simple and that our complex and messy world can only be
described by similar theories. Pluralism has been a continuing subject of interest in
philosophy and science throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first
century (see Ford, 1990; James, 1909/1977; Reck, 1990). A major variation on pluralism
could be labeled attributive pluralism . This position emphasizes the relationship
between an object and the words used to describe the object. People, as users of
words, may attribute various qualities to an object. For example, let’s take the question,
what is a sunset? A plurality of possible descriptions exists as an answer. Now imagine
that we pose this question to a sample of different professionals. If we called on a
physicist, a musician, a neuroscientist, an artist, a psychologist, and a poet, we would
find a delightful array of explanations. The musician might invite us to listen to a new
composition, “The Sunset Symphony,” capturing the sunset as an auditory experience.
Not to be outdone, the artist shows us a canvas depicting a sun fading above a
seascape, revealed in vivid oil paint. Both are aesthetic representations, but we may
ask, what is the real sunset? Does the physicist have the answer with all her elegant
mathematical formulae? What about the neuroscientist who shares impressive
monitoring of retinal images and occipital activity? Does the psychologist’s analysis of
the perceptual process offer the answer? Or even his normative testing on what
sunsets mean to different people. Or shall we give the poet the final word? To
adjudicate the claims of our scholars, we might convene a panel of philosophers
consisting of two monists and two pluralists. The monists agree that the true sunset is
one thing but disagree on what that one thing is— for one it is physical, for the other,
experiential. One of the pluralists argues that there are many objective sunsets. The
other contends that there are many legitimate descriptive modes: Sunsets are, after all,
what we describe them to be. The most fundamental reality is, therefore, our words. But
the other pluralist insists that realities exist beyond our words. Let us now leave the
mind– body problem, with the comment that the various schools and systems of
psychology we encounter will disagree with each other on this issue. We will encounter
materialists, double-aspect theorists, pluralists, interactionists, and others. A major key
to understanding a given school or system will be to assess that school’s or system’s
position on the mind– body problem.

Psychogeny
A close relative of the study of mind– body relations is encountered in the problem of
psychogeny ( sy KAW gin ee ). The term psychogeny is derived from the Greek term
psyche ( sy kee ), which has been translated as spirit , soul , mind , or consciousness .
Each of these terms has different connotations, but they also share something in
common in that they each refer to a principle of existence that embodies mentalistic
concepts such as awareness, consciousness, sentience, or experience. Psychogeny
may be defined as the study of the origin of psyche or the study of theories of the origin
of psyche. Two very broad theories are briefly reviewed in the materials that follow, but
more detailed discussion is available (see Viney & Woody, 1995).

P S Y C H O G E N I C I D E N T I T Y T H E O RY

Two key features of psychogenic identity theory are that

(1) psyche is instilled in the primitive biological substratum of the organism at a given
point in time, and

(2) there is continuity or identity between the psychically endowed biological

substratum and the later mature, self-reflective, fully conscious adult.

Psychogenic identity theorists have never been able to agree with each other about the
time of infusion of psyche into the body. For centuries, theologians argued that an
embryo becomes human at forty days if it is male and eighty days if it is female (see De
Rosa, 1988). More recently, a popular belief claimed that psyche is instilled at
fertilization. Kuhse and Singer (1993), in their work on embryo experimentation, note,
“what this claim amounts to is that the newly fertilized egg, the early embryo, and I are
in some sense of the term, the same individual” (p. 66). Because of its emphasis on the
independence of psyche, psychogenic identity theory is consistent with idealism and
some forms of dualism. Although identity theory has popular appeal, it is not without a
host of problems, many of which surfaced from recent work in embryo
experimentation. An example of a major problem with psychogenic identity theory is
encountered in research on microsurgical sectioning of fertilized eggs. According to
some forms of psychogenic identity theory, conception (the fertilization of an egg)
marks the entry point of psyche into its material substrate. A colony of cells (a morula
or blastocyst) develops following conception and results, according to psychogenic
identity theory, in one body and one psyche. But we now know that following
conception the morula can be surgically divided resulting in two, three, four, or more
individuals. Each piece can be transplanted into a host, and we can artificially create
twins, triplets, or quadruplets. Such procedures have long been used in the production
of dairy cattle (see Seidel & Elsden, 1989) and are in theory, if not practice, available to
humans (see Elmer-DeWitt, 1993). At conception, according to psychogenic identity
theory, there was one psyche and one body. But assume now that the developing
blastocyst is cut in half and there are now two bodies. If both bodies possess a psyche,
the second psyche must have been instilled after conception. Thus, the theory of the
entry of psyche exclusively at the time of conception raises important questions. There
are other problems for psychogenic identity theory. For example, in the early days of
pregnancy, two separate colonies of cells (twins) developing in the uterus may float
together and now form one individual— a chimera (see Austin, 1989). If both bodies
possessed a psyche prior to floating together, what happened to the second psyche
after the two came together? Clearly, for all of its popular appeal, psychogenic identity
theory is not without serious problems. We now consider a second theory of
psychogeny.

PSYCHOGENIC EMERGENTISM

Psychogenic emergentism is an alternative theory of the origin of psyche. Psyche,

according to this position, has no independent origin of its own, but rather develops
with the developing body. Further, the complexity and the functional properties of the
mental arena are dependent on the health and well-being of the organism. Psychogenic
emergentism avoids the problems of identity theory, but comes with a set of problems
of its own. One of the major problems associated with psychogenic emergentism has
to do with the arbitrary time of emergence. According to the theory, psyche is
associated with some arbitrary level of neural complexity, but how much complexity is
required? Is there some remote sense in which a single cell is conscious? Is a colony of
cells, without a nervous system and without a circulatory system, conscious? At the
other end of the scale, one might insist that consciousness is not consciousness until it
is aware of itself. But how do we know when an organism has the capacity for reflective
self-awareness? Psychogenic emergentism suffers the same problem as identity
theory. Neither theory provides a satisfactory scientific answer regarding the time of
infusion or emergence of psyche into a material substrate. Another problem for
psychogenic emergentism has to do with the experienced continuity of consciousness.
I am the same I or me today as many years ago. Although my world may have been
unstable resulting in experiences I could never have imagined and although I may not
believe the same things I once did, it is nevertheless the same me who has changed.
The persistent and obstinate nature of experienced continuity challenges psychogenic
emergentism. We live in a constantly changing world that should result in major shifts
in psyche, yet most of us experience ourselves to be remarkably consistent over time.
The psychogenic emergentist might argue that pathological discontinuities and
disassociations exist in personality, often resulting from environmental changes or
neurological damage. Such a rebuttal appears appropriate. Discontinuities in
personality may well present a challenge to identity theory with its emphasis on a
somewhat autonomous psyche. But it is also true that continuity of personality,
especially in the face of change or even crisis, presents a challenge to emergentism
with its emphasis on a more fragile and dependent psyche. There are many other
problems and issues, including some interesting moral issues, associated with both
theories (see Viney & Woody, 1995). The relationship of mind and brain, like the
problem of free will and determinism, is neither a relic of the past nor exclusively a
philosophical problem. Indeed, there may be a greater outpouring of scholarly work on
this problem at the dawn of the twenty-first century than at any other time in history.
Contemporary philosophers, biologists, neuroscientists, computer scientists, and
psychologists have produced a wealth of thoughtful approaches to the problem (see
Buncombe, 1995; Crick, 1994; Dennett, 1991; Edelman, 1992; Searle, 1992, 1995a,
1995b; Tye, 1995). The mystery of the mental arena remains as elusive as ever, but
contemporary advances in the neurosciences, the computing sciences, biology,
psychology, and philosophy may provide additional pieces for a puzzle that is of
unparalleled complexity. The Problem of Explanation The word explain comes from the
Latin explanare , which means to make plain, flatten, or spread out. As we use it, the
word explain refers to attempts to interpret or understand events or relationships. If
you’ve worked with small children, you know a single word can satisfy as a nominal
explanation. A child may be content to learn that “this dog is a collie, but that one is a
golden retriever.” Before long, we learn that words are arbitrary, so deeper
understandings and more nuanced interpretations are needed. Simple words or
phrases seldom explain anything. For example, throughout history and in the present,
the word free will is offered as an explanation for desirable and undesirable behaviors—
many legal and religious systems draw on this explanation. However, scientists often
hold nagging and legitimate concerns about whether free will can explain anything (see
Viney, 1990). Explanations based on the words of an authority are also problematic but
very common in most cultural settings. Aristotle’s causes, covered earlier in this
chapter, can be regarded as the “four be-causes” in that they explain why things
happen. For example, the billiard ball rolls into the pocket because external forces
propelled it. This explanation is based on material and efficient causation. Now
consider a different example: Wynona decided to go for lunch because she was hungry.
This is a teleological explanation based on intention or purpose. Four additional
explanatory modes encountered in science and in psychology are covered in the
following section. Whether there is any explanatory mode free of problems is arguable.

Explanation by Analogies and Comparisons

The term analogy comes from the Greek analogia , referring to proportion or equality of
ratios. In everyday use, analogy refers to the idea that one thing is somewhat like
another thing even though the two are also different. Scientists have drawn analogies
between the structure of atoms and the structure of our solar system. René Descartes
compared nerves to water pipes. In medical circles, cholesterol is compared to sticky
deposits that clog pipes. Explanations by comparisons are central to the development
of human cognitive processes. Small children use comparisons to form concepts. A
kitten is to a cat as a puppy is to a dog, or a car is to a driver as an airplane is to a pilot.
In politics, comparisons are used in pejorative ways when Democrats are compared to
Communists and Republicans to Fascists. Such comparisons underscore the danger of
thinking in terms of comparisons and analogies. An emphasis on the similarities
between one thing and another can lead to overgeneralization, faulty thinking, or
outright error. Let’s consider a greater problem that happens when we overemphasize
the explanatory legitimacy of presumed similarities. A judge, while sentencing a
teenager, acknowledged that the juvenile came from a disadvantaged home. The judge
added that scores of other teenagers come from disadvantaged backgrounds but don’t
commit crimes. What are the problems with the comparison made by the judge?
Further careful analysis will reveal all kinds of differences between the subject and the
comparison targets. One purpose of science (and all critical and responsible thinking)
is to engage in the relentless pursuit of the hidden and visible differences that make
real differences in the world. Superficial and shallow comparisons based on presumed
likenesses are unworthy of serious thinkers. Analogies may be helpful, but they should
evoke deep suspicions (see Simanek, 2014). At best, analogies and comparisons offer
programs for more intellectual work. At worst, they promote intellectual laziness.

MODELS AS EXPLANATIONS

Models in science are comparable to analogies (see Eacker, 1975; Hesse, 1967), but
more sophisticated. The term model in scientific literature refers to a conceptual
framework marked by attempts to find logical, structural, or functional similarities
between one thing and another. Psychologists have used steam boiler models to
explain emotional expression. The greater the pressure generated in a steam boiler, the
greater the need for a release of energy, or an explosion will occur. The model suggests
that the pressures of living generate energy. If such energy is “bottled up” or not
released through healthy exercise and verbal expression, then a nervous breakdown
may result. The same cautions that apply to simple analogies apply to models. A model
may be helpful, but it may fail to do justice to the target it seeks to explain. Later, we
will encounter a school of humanistic psychology that rejects all models in favor of a
direct study of human beings.

N U M E R I CA L E X P L A NAT I O N S

Science has made remarkable progress in quantifying an increasing range of natural

phenomena. This development is so critical that later sections are devoted to often
surprising quantitative breakthroughs that influenced the emerging science of
psychology. An early pioneer in the area named Francis Galton believed that every
bodily and mental attribute could be quantified and summarized in a mathematical
formula. In this tradition, formulae have been written to describe sensory thresholds,
intellectual ability, mortality expectations, the relative contributions of heredity and
environment to specific behaviors, and a host of other areas. Such formulae provide
descriptive and predictive tools for the scientist, but can a mathematical formula
unpack the deeper nature of the target it seeks to explain? Is intelligence the same as
an intelligence quotient? In a way, we return to the same problem we encountered with
analogies. When can we be sure we have a real identity between one thing and
another? Quantitative explanations are integral to science, but may leave us grasping
for more nuanced truths.
NEUROLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

The advent of brain sciences brought a growing faith that human experience and
behavior can be explained in terms of underlying neurophysiological processes. As
explored in later chapters, recent history has witnessed unprecedented advances in our
understanding of the relationship between the nervous system and psychological
processes. But can we believe that underlying neural processes offer adequate
explanations for psychological events? There’s no question we benefit from knowing
that deposits of amyloidal plaques in nerve structures are asso- ciated with Alzheimer’s
disease. The discovery of such plaques may uncover a piece of the puzzle and even
suggest intervention techniques, but we may still lack an adequate explanation for the
disease’s role in experience and behavior. We must still struggle with the possible roles
of heredity, diet, exercise, a more penetrating analysis of the chemistry of amyloidal
proteins, immune reactions to such proteins, and so forth. Biochemical explanations,
though useful, may leave us without a satisfactory explanation of the ultimate causes
and characteristics of the disease and, particularly, the experience of the disease. The
virtue of neuroscience centers on its practical and heuristic values. A concept or a
theory with heuristic value is one that leads to productive new ideas and hypotheses.
Neurological and physiological explanations lead to questions of a biochemical,
chemical, or physical nature. Each level of analysis presents new mysteries but may fail
to provide an adequate explanatory framework relevant to all the dimensions of a
problem. As noted earlier, no explanation is free of problems. As we explore how
scholars throughout history have explained psychological phenomena, it is helpful to
think critically about the problem of explanation. In what sense are analogies and
models helpful and in what sense are they misleading? Does the identification of a
physiological or neurological correlate of a psychological event do justice to the
complexity of that event? There are schools of thought (e.g., the Gestalt school and the
psychology of William James), as well as cognitive psychologists (Lombrozo, 2015),
and neuroscientists (Uttal, 2001, 2013), who question whether one level of explanation
(e.g., the neurological level) can ever do justice to another level (e.g., the psychological
level). We will revisit the problem of explanation in new and interesting ways. In
addition to the philosophical problems mentioned in this chapter, additional problems
are of special interest for psychologists. Do human beings have an essential built-in
moral nature (i.e., are we morally good, evil, or simply neutral at birth)? What is the
appropriate unit of study in psychology? Should we focus on part processes such as
reflex activity or should we focus on the whole organism in its natural environment?
Such issues and others like them will surface as we consider the various systems of
psychology. If you are interested, several resources focus on philosophical issues in
psychology (Eacker, 1972, 1975; Rubenstein & Slife, 1988; Wertheimer, 1972). 
 Review Questions

1. Define the term epistemology. 

The term epistemology is derived from the Greek episteme, which means to understand or to know.
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with theories of knowledge. As you might guess, psychologists
have had a longstanding curiosity about epistemological issues. For example, Jean Piaget (1896– 1980) was
trained in zoology and gained fame for his studies of human cognitive development, but he didn’t consider
himself a biologist or a psychologist. Instead, Piaget viewed himself as a student of genetic epistemology , the
study of the ways we solve problems as a function of our age and level of development. As a genetic
epistemologist, Piaget demonstrated that our understanding of the world and our ways of solving problems
evolve as we mature. Let’s take a look at epistemological issues that hold special relevance for psychologists.

2. Distinguish between a priori and a posteriori knowledge. 

As you read the history of psychology, you’ll encounter the idea that certain truths are presumed to be known a
priori. What does that mean? The philosophical term a priori comes from the Latin meaning “from what is prior” or
“from what comes before.” By contrast, the term a posteriori means “from what comes later.” A posteriori refers to
that which is derived from or comes after experience and a priori refers to self-evident truths given in experience
without learning. For example, if A is larger than B and B is larger than C , then A is larger than C. The truth of the
proposition seems intuitively obvious. No one would deny that the proposition itself is known through experience.
That is, without experience, we would not even know about the proposition. But we can still claim to know the truth
of the relationships among A, B , and C through intellectual insight alone. In other words, we can grasp certain
relationships without learning or benefit of prior experience. According to the theory of a priori knowledge, it can be
argued, for example, that one could immediately grasp the truth of a statement such as “We cannot both exist and
not exist at the same time.” Philosophers and psychologists have struggled with the role of the a priori in human
knowledge. Extreme claims contribute to the problem. For instance, some thinkers argue that knowledge of good
and evil is known a priori. On the other extreme, we encounter the argument that all knowledge is dependent on
experience. Psychologists emphasize the centrality of experience as the basis of knowledge. But like philosophers,
we wrestle with evidence that some relationships are discerned without learning or previous experience.

3. Differentiate between nativist and empiricist accounts of depth perception. 

This issue is a close relative to the issue of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Nativism holds that some perceptions
are operational from birth, built in as a natural outcome of the structural and functional properties of the nervous
system. By contrast, empiricism holds that all perceptions are learned or developed from experience. The problem
of depth perception illustrates the dispute between nativists and empiricists. We have the ability to see our world in
three dimensions, but do we learn to see in depth or is depth perception a natural or unlearned ability? Classic
research suggests that newborns have perceptual abilities that may not be learned. Gibson and Walk (1960)
constructed a visual cliff, a platform that ended in a steep drop but was covered by a bridge of transparent glass.
Although it was safe to cross the transparent bridge, baby goats and chicks only a few hours old avoided the visual
cliff. Wertheimer (1961) demonstrated that newborn human infants, only minutes old, will turn their heads in the
direction of a sound. Is the turning of the head learned or is it a native ability? Later in the text, we explore the work
of philosophers and psychologists who examine these issues. Instinct versus Learning The problem of instinct versus
learning has had a turbulent history during psychology’s modern era (see Diamond, 1971, 1974a). Many early
psychologists stressed the role of instincts in human and animal psychology. William McDougall (1871– 1938) was
perhaps the best example of an early theorist who believed that instincts play a central role in human life. McDougall
(1908/1960) claimed that instincts operate in diverse behaviors such as curiosity, fighting, and maternal behavior.
After a time, a group of psychologists called behaviorists replaced instinct theories with an emphasis on learning.
Behaviorists assumed that we learn to be aggressive, to be inquisitive, and to be good parents. Behaviorist research
showed that some behaviors assumed to be instinctual were subject to learning. In early studies, ZingYang Kuo
(1898– 1970) demonstrated that rat killing by cats is more subject to learning than anybody of the time had believed
(1921, 1924). Depending on rearing conditions, baby kittens may grow to become rat killers but may also grow up
fearful of rats or may grow tolerant or even cooperative, living peacefully in the same cages with rats and eating and
drinking from the same dishes. Kuo showed that the conditioning history of the individual kitten is a key to
understanding that kitten’s later interaction with rats. Across these and other studies, Kuo (1924) sought to break
down the nature– nurture distinction in psychology (Honeycutt, 2011). Although behaviorism demonstrated the
importance of learning, it did not banish instinct theory from psychology. Interest in the topic accelerated after
World War II. Ethologists such as Konrad Lorenz (1903– 1989) and Nikolaas “Niko” Tinbergen (1907– 1988) and
sociobiologists such as Edward O. Wilson (b. 1929) contributed new insights to the area. Desmond Morris’s 1967
bestselling book The Naked Ape also stimulated public awareness of instinct theory. Terms such as a priori ,
nativism , and instinct refer to abilities or capacities built into living systems. Important differences appear in the
capacities denoted by these terms. For example, a priori knowledge is more cognitive than an instinct, which appears
with a high degree of automaticity. A native ability such as the innate capacity to see in depth also seems less
cognitive than a priori knowledge, which refers to real intellectual insight or the capacity to discern certain
fundamental relationships. Terms such as a posteriori , empiricism , and learning are somewhat comparable because
they stress the importance of experience.

4. Briefly explain at least five different ways of assessing truth. 

AU T H O R I T Y

Reference to authority is the most common method of assessing truth. During childhood, we incorporate the values,
beliefs, and judgments of our parents. They serve as original authorities during our formative years. As we mature,
we find authority everywhere in modern culture— teachers, sacred texts, the media, cultural institutions, political
and religious leaders, and legal codes. We often neglect independent verification or substantiation— the word of the
authority is sufficient. In his 1947 book Man for Himself , psychologist Erich Fromm (1900– 1980) provided a
thoughtful analysis of the problem of authority. For Fromm, the great sin in authoritarian epistemology is to become
too much like the authority. If we become as knowledgeable as the authority, we no longer need its information and
direction. As a means of survival, some authorities discourage questions and restrict information so followers will not
discover contradictory opinions. Authorities may encourage study, but only if it is sanctioned and determined to be
“safe.” Abuse often begins when an authority claims to be the exclusive and complete basis of knowledge. History
uncovers countless examples of the abuse of authority. The Spanish theologian Michael Servetus (1511– 1553) was
branded a heretic for not conforming to accepted scripture. He was burned at the stake. Almost a halfcentury later,
Giordano Bruno (1548– 1600) was condemned to the same fate for unorthodox religious, scientific, and political
opinions. The executions of Bruno and Servetus exemplify how commitment to authority can crush threatening
ideas. Shakespeare’s quotation at the beginning of this chapter may have been rooted in outrage at the abuse of
authority. Unfortunately, authoritarian abuse is not a historical relic. Abusive authoritarian forces steal into art,
literature, science, religion, politics, and people themselves. The 1978 mass suicide of over nine hundred Americans
in Jonestown, Guyana (see Time , 1978; Layton, 1998) remains a tragic example of abusive authoritarian control. The
balance between necessary and abusive authority is a critical problem confronting every human group, particularly
because people easily rationalize or even idealize authority, even abusive authority (Woody, 2009). Within the
history of psychology, we will encounter the problem of authority over and over again. Despite potential for abuse,
authority has utilitarian value. The scientist, for example, may rely on other scientists and experiments for fresh
insights. Authority can be useful, but there is a potential for problems when it cannot be tested, questioned, or
doubted.

EMPIRICISM

The term empiricism is derived from Greek and Latin terms that were close in meaning to our word experience. In
contemporary usage, empiricism refers to a theory of knowledge where experience plays a central role. Experience
of the world depends on sensory information. According to empiricism, knowledge is based on observable facts
represented in experience. As the story of the history of psychology unfolds, we will see that empiricism is often
contrasted with rationalism, our next topic. Empiricists can be discovered in most historical periods and places, but
Great Britain boasted a line of thinkers who gave priority to experience. John Locke (1632– 1704) argued that there
is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses. An earlier British empiricist, Francis Bacon (1561–
1626), has been called the Great Herald of the Empirical Spirit because of his campaign to encourage observation
and data collection. For Bacon, we should rely less on authority and more on the empirical method. From an
uncritical standpoint, empiricism seems an obvious alternative to authority as a way of obtaining knowledge. But
empiricism as a way of knowing is not free of problems. First, as discussed with a priori and a posteriori knowledge,
certain forms of knowledge may not depend on sensory information. We also know that sensory information can be
unreliable. The senses are easily conditioned by emotion, social context, learning, and motivation. It is little wonder
that philosophers and psychologists raised questions about the adequacy of empiricism as a way of knowing.

R AT IONA LIS M

The term rationalism comes from the same Latin root as the term reason. Rationalists argue that the mind has
innate organizing principles so information from the senses is filtered and patterned in ways that shape thinking.
Rationalists believe sensory information alone is not an adequate basis for knowledge. They emphasize the activity
of mind, the capacity to reason, and the ability to discern some meanings on an intuitive basis. Early philosophers
and scientists such as Descartes, Galileo, Leibniz, and Kant advocated rationalism. Early psychologists and
philosophers debated whether the new psychology should be based on empiricism or rationalism. As early as 1732,
Christian von Wolff wrote a book titled Empirical Psychology ; two years later, he wrote a complementary book titled
Rational Psychology. In the United States, Laurens Hickok also wrote separate books under the titles of Rational
Psychology (1849) and Empirical Psychology (1854). Early writers believed rationalism and empiricism offered useful
but different methods. As we will see in Chapters 6 and 7, the tensions between rational and empirical psychology
remain with us. A

ESTHETICISM

Aestheticism is a doctrine that the principles of beauty apply to other arenas of thought. In this sense, aestheticism
is an epistemology or way of knowing; for aestheticists, inquiry itself is a search for truth and beauty. This
perspective is well illustrated in the book The Double Helix by Watson (1968). After Watson and Crick constructed
the DNA model, the comment was made that the model was “too pretty not to be true” (Watson, 1968, p. 134). The
aesthetic test has been of historical importance in the humanities— especially in art and music— but scientists also
seem to delight in a beautiful model or theory. Physicist Paul Dirac, as quoted by Brush (1974b), “stated that a
theorist should prefer beautiful equations to uglier ones that yield closer agreement with experimental data” (p.
1167).

P R AG M AT I S M

Pragmatic philosophy offers still another perspective on epistemology. The term pragmatism is derived from a Greek
root, translated as pragma , which refers to “things accomplished” or “things done.” In this tradition, Francis Bacon
believed we should emphasize theories and propositions that can be tested. Immanuel Kant used the term
pragmatic to refer to that which is prudent. Under the late nineteenth-century leadership of Charles Sanders Peirce
(pronounced purse ) and William James, pragmatism became a major philosophical movement. Peirce and James
emphasized the practical consequences of theories, definitions, ideas, and concepts. In typical American fashion,
James talked about the “cash value” of an idea. Does the idea produce real productive work that makes a difference
in the world of experience? Or does it lead to dead ends and muddled thinking? James believed that viable ideas
produce sustained intellectual and physical work. He argued that a definition does not close our intellectual quest;
on the contrary, a good definition raises questions and invigorates additional work (see James, 1907/1975b). For the
pragmatist, the world is in flux, and concepts must be altered and updated to be responsive to new discoveries.
Concepts can outlive their usefulness and may need to be discarded. As methods improve and cultural biases shift,
truth itself changes. Pragmatism judges truth in terms of utility or workability, but this is not the whole story. Rather,
pragmatism calls for a deep awareness of change, particularly changes in methods and worldviews, and a suspicion
of big claims that cover too much territory. James (1876b) revealed his pragmatic side when he defined philosophy
as the “habit of always seeing an alternative” (p. 178). One problem with pragmatism is that an idea or concept may
appear sterile or unworkable in the present intellectual context but may yield important truths at a later time. The
Copernican model of the solar system appeared unworkable at first, but later revolutionized our knowledge of
astrophysics. A naïve, extreme, or corrupted dose of pragmatism may discourage inquiry. William James and other
pragmatists, however, would never permit such a consequence. James was more interested in opening than in
closing doors (see James, 1909/1977).

SKEPTICISM

According to skepticism , all truth claims are suspect and must be questioned. So it might appear counterintuitive to
include skepticism as a way of knowing, but in the words of Rauch (1993), “all of your conclusions, every single one
of them, may need to be corrected” (p. 45). Rauch argues for an epistemic humility that encourages skeptical
analysis as an essential part of science and all honest inquiry. We need not surrender provisional knowledge, but we
must be suspicious of certitude because there is always a new perspective or a fresh discovery that challenges old
conclusions. Skepticism, as a method of discovering problems, can serve as a potent source of progress and
knowledge. A society that discourages critical analysis and skepticism risks freezing the knowledge industry. In
contrast, a society that encourages a skeptical ethic along with an evolutionary epistemology will be dynamic and
open to the discovery mission (see Harrison, 2006). A productive and progressive science thrives on adversarial
positions, conflicting theories, healthy curiosity, and a sincere skeptical attitude. Later in the text, we’ll see how
curiosity was considered a sin for centuries and how such a view resulted in intellectual stagnation. We will also
show how skepticism in the late Renaissance period stimulated the development of modern science. The Role of
Emotions in Knowledge Emotions play in our belief structures, complicating the problem of human knowledge. It can
be challenging to sort out our competing beliefs when we are dispassionate. When emotions such as hate, fear, love,
and anger enter the picture, our knowledge problems are compounded. Throughout this text, we will visit tensions
between authority and reason. Though emotions may attach to either authority or reason, strong emotions are more
likely to be associated with authority than with reason. Nevertheless, the dissonance associated with the violation of
reason may be a source of emotion. Let us return, however, to a consideration of emotion and its relation to
authority. Authority is visible in our most vulnerable moments such as birth, marriage or other long-term
commitments, illness, tragedy, and death. We sing to authority songs of praise, gratitude, thanksgiving, worship, and
allegiance. Though protest music attacks authority, it is rare to encounter music inspired by claims of reason or logic,
but it is common to encounter music inspired by claims of authority. We create symbols inspired by authority and
then idolize those symbols and pledge our allegiance to them. We set aside special holidays to celebrate authority,
and we participate in self-denial and in rituals that underscore our loyalty and commitment. Failure to observe a
ritual is often a source of the most intense anxiety and self-criticism. Our personal identity is seldom tied to reason
like the character of Mr. Spock in the classic Star Trek movies and television series. Personal identities of the
overwhelming majority, even in matters such as dress and food, reflect authorities. Deviance may trigger legitimate
fears of social ostracism. For example, people who undergo a dramatic conversion from one belief to another may
be disowned by parents or other authorities (Jacoby, 2016). Though science values openness, a scientific community
may ostracize a scientist who deviates from standard practice. Emotional problems are compounded when we
believe that authority is absolute and immune from questioning. When reason and authority clash, as they often do,
the problem is both intellectual and emotional (Viney & Woody, 2017). The emotional power of authority is reflected
in memory. Memorization is a valued activity in authority systems, and those who can recite the words of authority
from memory are held up as role models. Children, especially, are encouraged to commit the words of authority to
memory. A mechanical recitation is often more valued than a reflective and creative analysis. We will see that the
history of science generally and of psychology specifically, is partly a history of shifting epistemologies. Few topics
are as important to human welfare and survival as epistemology, yet the subject is avoided or neglected because of
its vexing questions. Unfortunately, emotion coupled with ignorance and the inevitable blind spots encountered in
all belief systems undermine the critical reflection necessary to understand belief structures. The problem of
knowledge is not a trivial or irrelevant metaphysical issue. It is a practical problem relevant to daily life and should
thus be confronted in a vigorous and honest fashion. The Shakespeare quotation is a poetic reminder of the
certitude that often accompanies ignorance and its consequences. We come full circle to our original question. On
what grounds can we lay claim to knowledge? We turn now to the interplay between science and epistemology.
Science and Epistemology Conceived as a way of knowing, science can be understood in terms of epistemological
assumptions and commitments that include empirical, rational, pragmatic, and aesthetic components. From the
beginning of the modern period, philosophers of science have studied scientific methodology, but they could not
agree on what science is or how it operates. Later, we will observe disagreements about the nature of science,
particularly between Francis Bacon and René Descartes, two of the original modern philosophers of science. Because
of long-standing disagreements about scientific methodology, we must caution against assuming that there is only
one traditional view of science. In what follows, we will examine three critical thinkers to gain insight into their
philosophies about science and epistemology.

5. What risks come with the reliance on authority for knowledge? 

- We often neglect independent verification or substantiation— the word of the authority is sufficient

- the great sin in authoritarian epistemology is to become too much like the authority. If we become as
knowledgeable as the authority, we no longer need its information and direction

- As a means of survival, some authorities discourage questions and restrict information so followers will not
discover contradictory opinions. Authorities may encourage study, but only if it is sanctioned and determined to be
“safe.”

- Abuse often begins when an authority claims to be the exclusive and complete basis of knowledge

6. According to Karl Popper, what is the key distinguishing feature between a legitimate science and
pseudoscience? 

Popper argued that consistent positive observational evidence does not justify universal conclusions. For example,
every observed swan (thus far) may have been white, but we are not therefore justified in making a claim that all
swans must be white. The observation of a single black swan falsifies the claim. According to Popper, the integrity of
science hinges on an honest quest for negative instances or disconfirmation. According to Popper, genuine scientific
theory is not invulnerable, and a major characteristic of science is that it does evolve. Popper’s philosophy of
science has been criticized (Toulmin, 1972; Kitcher, 1982) but it has served as an important attempt to set up a
demarcation between science and those pseudosciences that focus exclusively on confirmation but that ignore
negative instances.

7. Trace Kuhn’s view on the development of science. What does Kuhn mean by terms such as normal science and
paradigm ? 

The leading school now dictates the intellectual agenda, ushering in a transition to what Kuhn called normal science .
Normal science has a record of past achievement; it defines problem areas and provides methods of practice. Most
scientists work in this tradition. When the time is right, Kuhn tells us, a paradigm emerges as an elaboration on the
meaning of normal science. In a sociological sense, paradigm refers to “the entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on, shared by members of a given community” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175). The term also refers to
conventional ways of approaching and solving problems. Paradigms define boundaries within which scientists do
their work and clarify the legitimate methods of analysis and ways of looking at problems. In the course of normal
science, serendipitous findings and anomalies cannot be ignored. Sometimes discoveries occur through accidents
and at other times are theory driven.

8. If you were arguing for Feyerabend’s philosophy of science, what evidence would you employ? 

Paul K. Feyerabend (1924– 1994) outlined an anarchistic theory of knowledge. Although acknowledging the negative
implications of anarchism, especially for political science, he finds appropriate and healthy implications for
anarchism in epistemology and science. His analysis of the history of science offers a vigorous disagreement with
Popper and Kuhn. Feyerabend (1975) contended, The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and
absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted
with the results of historical research— there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in
epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental
events; they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided. On the
contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress. (p. 23) Feyerabend went on to say that conscious decisions to
break from conventional wisdom and method are not only facts in the history of science but necessary to the
progress of science. In his thinking, successful and creative scientists break or reverse rules, defend ad hoc
hypotheses, work inductively and then deductively, and work sometimes for unity and sometimes for plurality. The
rule, he tells us, is anything goes. Feyerabend (1975) argued that “even a lawand-order science will succeed only if
anarchistic moves are occasionally allowed to take place” (p. 26). Drawing on examples from the history of science as
evidence, he suggested that “the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view
of [human beings and their] social surroundings” (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 27, 1988).

9. List and briefly describe Aristotle’s four kinds of causation. 

 Material cause: "that out of which" it is made.

 Efficient Cause: the source of the objects principle of change or stability.

 Formal Cause: the essence of the object.

 Final Cause: the end/goal of the object, or what the object is good for.

10. Distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology. 

Intrinsic teleology is the position that design, order, and purpose are immanent in nature— simple manifestations
or characteristics of nature whereas extrinsic teleology makes the claim that any design in nature reflects the work
of a designer and that the designer has imbued the design with the designer’s own purpose.

11. Advance three arguments in support of determinism and three arguments in defence of free will. 

Determinism: the belief in universal causation. Implies that whatever happens is based on antecedents such that,
given them, nothing else could happen.

1. Historical argument.

The history of the free will– determinism controversy is a history of victories for determinism and retreats for the
theory of free will. With increasing knowledge of brain structure and function, lawful explanations are extended to
an everwidening spectrum of behaviors. The term will once occupied a great amount of space in psychology
textbooks, but as knowledge progressed, we had less need for the term. In the history of neuroscience, for example,
mechanistic explanations have replaced explanations based on the will on countless occasions.

2. Argument from morality.

The determinist can counter free will arguments by stating that belief in free will can also make a mess of morality.
Many of history’s most barbaric practices were justified on the grounds that the victim had made a free choice and
now deserved punishment. From medieval times, aggressive witch-hunts led to the persecution of people who
allegedly used free will to make a pact with the devil.

3. Argument from reasonable expectancy.

As we think about our world, we develop reasonable expectations that things are lawful. The world is not capricious;
given a specific set of weather conditions, we can have a reasonable expectation that a Chinook wind will hit
Boulder, Colorado, within a specified period of time. In a similar manner, we may reasonably expect stress and other
circumstances to contribute to an emotional breakdown. We don’t need to attribute the breakdown to an act of free
choice. Most of us live our lives on the basis of reasonable expectations. If an expectation is not confirmed, we
assume we neglected to take some variable into consideration. Without determinism, we have no grounds for
reasonable expectations about the world. The free will– determinism debate is a defining issue for psychology.
Throughout the book, we will outline where various psychologists stand on this issue. As noted, the issue is alive and
well in contemporary psychology.

Free will: the assumption that human beings make choices that are to some degree independent of antecedent
conditions. Contrast with determinism. 

1. Argument for an adequate explanation of human experience.

Psychologists have never been able to make perfect predictions of simple, let alone complex, behavior. For example,
there’s no way we can write biographies in advance. Such predictive failure challenges the adequacy of strict
determinism. The determinist position struggles with the spontaneity and unpredictability in human behavior. Those
who endorse free will claim that their position offers a better fit with our observations and theories about
experience and behavior. The free will perspective is embarrassed by neither our regularities nor our irregularities,
uncertainties, and novelties.

2. Logical contradictions in determinism.

Proponents of free will argue that if determinism is true, a determinist cannot logically declare that he or she
believes in determinism. Why? Because the determinist is not the real believer. Belief is a mere consequence of
antecedents. According to determinism, the very words I believe in determinism are conditioned by more
fundamental forces. It is not that one believes in determinism, but that consequences have transpired to result in
the statement I believe in determinism. Strict determinism implies a passive nature about the self that is well
illustrated in B. F. Skinner’s (1983a) statement, “If I am right about human behavior, I have written the
autobiography of a nonperson” (p. 32).

3. Argument from morality.

Free will believers argue that determinism makes a mess of morality. According to determinism, any immoral
behavior can be explained in terms of causes that had no prevision of the ends they were achieving. In other words,
individuals are not responsible for their actions. Indeed, the term responsibility is a hollow term— it means little
more than ability to respond. Argument from indeterminism. Promoters of free will argue that strict determinism is a
pre-twentieth-century concept that is no longer applicable in the physical sciences. Following quantum theory and
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the physical world must now be viewed from a probabilistic rather than a strictly
causal framework. The doctrine of indeterminism holds that it is not possible to apply strict cause-and-effect
explanations in the world of subatomic particles. This well-known doctrine has led some individuals to argue that
indeterminism applies to psychology. Although indeterminism is not identical with purposive free will, an
indeterminist would tell us that human behavior is characterized by an inherent uncertainty. As you can guess, the
free will perspective has not gone unchallenged.

12. Outline two monistic and two dualistic approaches to mind and brain. 

Monism

According to monistic philosophy, everything belongs in some intimate way to everything else. As an elegant
solution to the problem of ontology, monism suggests that reality, whatever it is, is all of one piece. If everything
belongs in an intimate way to every other thing, then nothing is alien or foreign because all things are part of one
thing. What appears as foreign, or alien is only a product of the present gaps in our knowledge. Monism offers
hope for a unity of knowledge because we all study the same thing, but at different levels and from diverse
perspectives. One form of monism nurtures the belief that psychology is reducible to the field of physics. Although
monism appeals to simplicity, a major problem arises because monists can’t agree about what the one and only
reality is. Monism, in fact, comes in oppositional forms. Let’s consider them and their implications for the mind–
brain problem.

The Mind– Body Problem

The mind– body problem belongs to a sub disciplinary area of philosophy known as ontology. Philosophers have
used the term ontology in diverse ways. For our purposes, we can define it as the study of the nature and relations
of being. When we ask, “what is real?” we are asking an ontological question. Is the mind real? Is there a mind that is
somehow independent from the brain? What is the relationship between the mind and the brain? Is there one
fundamental reality (monism), two (dualism), or perhaps many (pluralism)? If there is more than one reality, how do
the various types of reality coexist— and do they influence each other? Do psychologists study preeminent feature
of life. It represents a radical departure from materialism and a different emphasis with respect to the mind– body
problem. According to idealism, as the term is employed in philosophy, the mental world of experience is
foundational to all science and, for that matter, all knowledge. It would be impossible to know anything apart from
consciousness or experience. Thus, the mental world (experience, awareness, consciousness) has priority— it is the
only world to which we have immediate access. The material world is regarded as derivative— an intellectual or
philosophical product that has its origin in the world of experience. For the idealist, psychology is the science that
studies mental processes and experience. Further, an idealist would argue that all science begins with experience
and is about experience. Thus, it is the mind or the mental world that has ontological status. The material world is a
construction— a mere by-product of a more important reality. Several key figures, including Plato, George Berkeley,
and Gustav Fechner, identified with idealism.

M AT E R I A L I S M

Materialism is a monistic ontology characterized by the belief that matter is the fundamental constituent of all
things. A material monist might argue that the body exists, but not the mind. Terms such as mind , spirit , and
consciousness are understood in terms of the material, efficient, and formal operations of brain activity (Lawton &
Churchland, 2013). It follows that there is no mind– brain problem as such because all so-called mental activity is
reducible to physical, chemical, or physiological processes. Many key figures such as Democritus, Thomas Hobbes,
Julien Offray de la Mettrie, Herman von Helmholtz, Ivan Pavlov, and John B. Watson were materialists.

IDEALISM

As an alternative to materialism, emphasizes mind or spirit as the preeminent feature of life. It represents a radical
departure from materialism and a different emphasis with respect to the mind– body problem. According to
idealism, as the term is employed in philosophy, the mental world of experience is foundational to all science and,
for that matter, all knowledge. It would be impossible to know anything apart from consciousness or experience.
Thus, the mental world (experience, awareness, consciousness) has priority— it is the only world to which we have
immediate access. The material world is regarded as derivative— an intellectual or philosophical product that has its
origin in the world of experience. For the idealist, psychology is the science that studies mental processes and
experience. Further, an idealist would argue that all science begins with experience and is about experience. Thus, it
is the mind or the mental world that has ontological status. The material world is a construction— a mere by-product
of a more important reality. Several key figures, including Plato, George Berkeley, and Gustav Fechner, identified
with idealism.

DOUBLE-ASPECTMONISM

This variety of monism displays sensitivity to the claims of materialism and idealism. Double-aspect monism
emphasizes the idea that there is a language for mental processes and a language for underlying physical processes,
but both languages refer to the same reality. We use words such as mind, experience, consciousness, awareness ,
and thinking. We also have a rich and growing language that refers to fundamental physical structures and processes
such as neurons, neurotransmitters, cell assemblies, and synaptic transmission. According to double-aspect monism,
both languages are legitimate but both refer to the same underlying reality approached from two perspectives.
Benedict Spinoza, an early advocate of double-aspect theory, argued that human beings may be described in
mentalistic terms or in the language of the physical sciences. The two languages provide different perspectives just
as one may describe a coin from the perspective of either side. According to double-aspect theory, the mind– body
problem is a problem of language. The ontological problem, however, remains. What is real? Is reality reduced to
words? Despite its problems, double-aspect theory can embrace a tolerant and robust approach to psychology that
includes legitimate roles for descriptions that refer to mental and to physical processes.

EPIPHENOMENALISM

A final version of monism, epiphenomenalism , is often classified as a dualistic position, but for reasons that shall
soon be apparent, it is more accurately classified as a monistic position. An epiphenomenon is an appearance or a
kind of “overflow” resulting from the operation of something that is more basic or fundamental. According to
epiphenomenalism, mental processes (e.g., thought, consciousness, cognitions) are a kind of “overflow” or by-
product of brain activity. The mental world has no independent status; it is a mere epiphenomenon or appearance.
According to epiphenomenalism, causality always runs one way, from the physical to the mental. There is no mental
causation because the mind has no independent status apart from its physical substrate. Epiphenomenalism is
clearly a variation of materialism.

Dualism
In contrast with monism, dualism asserts that there are two fundamental orders of reality— mind and body. Each
has ontic (i.e., real) status. Naïvely, most of us experience the reality of mental processes; we also experience the
reality of the physical world. According to the dualistic position, we are assured that neither the mental nor the
physical world is a mere appearance. For all its popular appeal, at least to the Westerner, dualism presents a major
problem. If there are two orders of reality, how do they get along with each other? Can one influence the other? Or
can each influence the other, and if so, how? Most dualistic mind– body positions address the issue of how mind and
body collaborate. Let’s examine the better-known positions. 

INTERACTIONISM

According to interactionism, sometimes called the common sense position, mental events are real— they influence
each other and they influence bodily events. Bodily events also influence each other and mental events. Although
interactionism sometimes appeals to common sense, it is not without problems. First, interactionists have difficulty
specifying how an immaterial mental system can be causal with respect to a physical system (or, for that matter,
how a material system can be causal with respect to an immaterial one). Second, a major problem centers around
the locus of interaction. Where do mind and body influence each other? René Descartes, history’s most famous
interactionist, addressed this problem with considerable courage and suggested that the pineal gland, located in the
center of the head, is the seat of interaction. Centuries later, we have found that people can function fairly well
following a pinealectomy. In this sense, Descartes’s theory of the locus of interaction was testable but was
demonstrated to be wrong. Descartes also failed to show how a mental event can influence physical events and vice
versa. His followers’ subsequent attempts also proved unsuccessful. For all its commonsense appeal, interactionism
leaves us with more questions than answers.

PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM

According to psychophysical parallelism, mental events are real, and they influence other mental events. Bodily
events are also real, and they influence other bodily events. Mental events cannot, however, influence bodily events,
and bodily events cannot influence mental events. The two orders of reality are nevertheless, by definition, parallel
with each other. That is, whatever is happening in one order is happening simultaneously in the other order. The
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the best-known advocate of this position, provides an intriguing allegory.
Imagine that mind and body are like two clocks on a wall, each displaying the same time. They are synchronized but
independent. One clock has no causal influence over the other, yet they func- tion in agreement with each other.
According to Leibniz, mind and body are by definition parallel, but there is no causal influence between these two
independent orders of reality. Parallelism avoids the problems encountered in the interactionist position, but at a
considerable expense— it flies in the face of common sense. Most of us, for example, assume that the experience of
pain is connected to the chance encounter with the hot stove top and the resulting burn. The burn is both mental
and physical, and there appears to be a causal connection between them, even though the supporter of parallelism
must argue that they are independent yet harmonious. The larger problem is that parallelism implies a kind of
preestablished harmony between mind and body. Explaining how preestablished harmony works might prove more
difficult than explaining an interaction.

EMERGENTISM

The philosophical position known as emergentism, in at least one of its variations, argues that mental processes are
produced by brain processes, but are qualitatively different. For example, the experience of a toothache emerges
out of complex neurological activity that may have been activated by decay or some kind of damage. The experience
itself, though emerging out of bodily activity, is not captured by descriptions of bodily activity. The experience seems
to have a career of its own and a reality that is qualitatively set apart. To clarify, let’s take an analogy from chemistry.
Salt is a product of sodium and chloride, yet the compound salt has unique properties that differ from sodium and
chloride. Sodium alone or chloride alone can be lethal to the living organism, yet when combined in the form of salt,
they can prove vital to life. The compound seems to have “emergent” properties of its own that are not a simple
summation of separate elements. In a similar manner, mental processes, though produced by brain processes, are
radically and qualitatively different. The experience of a sunrise, a poem, or a symphonic passage emerges from
brain activity, but the global mental experience with its inspirational, affective, and associative meanings appears to
be a reality unto itself quite different qualitatively from the underlying firing of neurons or the neurochemical
activities in the synapse. Emergentism is by no means a unified or consistent philosophical orientation. There are
varieties of emergentism such as epiphenomenalism that are more consistent with monism (Crick, 1994), but other
varieties that are more consistent with dualism. Thus, an emergentist might argue that causal forces work from the
parts to the whole and from the whole to the parts. Such an argument is consistent with a functional or pragmatic
dualism, if not a metaphysical dualism. Let us turn now to another approach to the problem of ontology.

13. Which of the various mind– brain positions seem most adequate to you? What are some of the problems with
this position? 

14. Outline two major problems for psychogenic identity theory encountered in recent research on embryo
experimentation. 

Psychogenic identity theory: a theory of the origin of psyche that stresses the continuity or identity of the psychically
endowed biological substratum of the organism and the later mature, self-reflective, fully conscious adult. 

Two key features of psychogenic identity theory are that

(1) psyche is instilled in the primitive biological substratum of the organism at a given point in time, and

(2) there is continuity or identity between the psychically endowed biological substratum and the later mature, self-
reflective, fully conscious adult.

PSYCHOGENIC EMERGENTISM

Psychogenic emergentism is an alternative theory of the origin of psyche. Psyche, according to this position, has no
independent origin of its own, but rather develops with the developing body. Further, the complexity and the
functional properties of the mental arena are dependent on the health and well-being of the organism. Psychogenic
emergentism avoids the problems of identity theory, but comes with a set of problems of its own. One of the major
problems associated with psychogenic emergentism has to do with the arbitrary time of emergence. According to
the theory, psyche is associated with some arbitrary level of neural complexity, but how much complexity is
required? Is there some remote sense in which a single cell is conscious? Is a colony of cells, without a nervous
system and without a circulatory system, conscious? At the other end of the scale, one might insist that
consciousness is not consciousness until it is aware of itself. But how do we know when an organism has the
capacity for reflective self-awareness? Psychogenic emergentism suffers the same problem as identity theory.
Neither theory provides a satisfactory scientific answer regarding the time of infusion or emergence of psyche into
a material substrate. Another problem for psychogenic emergentism has to do with the experienced continuity of
consciousness. I am the same I or me today as many years ago. Although my world may have been unstable
resulting in experiences I could never have imagined and although I may not believe the same things I once did, it
is nevertheless the same me who has changed. The persistent and obstinate nature of experienced continuity
challenges psychogenic emergentism. We live in a constantly changing world that should result in major shifts in
psyche, yet most of us experience ourselves to be remarkably consistent over time. The psychogenic emergentist
might argue that pathological discontinuities and disassociations exist in personality, often resulting from
environmental changes or neurological damage. Such a rebuttal appears appropriate. Discontinuities in personality
may well present a challenge to identity theory with its emphasis on a somewhat autonomous psyche. But it is also
true that continuity of personality, especially in the face of change or even crisis, presents a challenge to
emergentism with its emphasis on a more fragile and dependent psyche. There are many other problems and issues,
including some interesting moral issues, associated with both theories (see Viney & Woody, 1995). The relationship
of mind and brain, like the problem of free will and determinism, is neither a relic of the past nor exclusively a
philosophical problem. Indeed, there may be a greater outpouring of scholarly work on this problem at the dawn of
the twenty-first century than at any other time in history. Contemporary philosophers, biologists, neuroscientists,
computer scientists, and psychologists have produced a wealth of thoughtful approaches to the problem (see
Buncombe, 1995; Crick, 1994; Dennett, 1991; Edelman, 1992; Searle, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Tye, 1995). The mystery of
the mental arena remains as elusive as ever, but contemporary advances in the neurosciences, the computing
sciences, biology, psychology, and philosophy may provide additional pieces for a puzzle that is of unparalleled
complexity.

15. What are the strengths and weaknesses of arguments by analogy? 

The term analogy comes from the Greek analogia , referring to proportion or equality of ratios. In everyday use,
analogy refers to the idea that one thing is somewhat like another thing even though the two are also different.
Scientists have drawn analogies between the structure of atoms and the structure of our solar system. René
Descartes compared nerves to water pipes. In medical circles, cholesterol is compared to sticky deposits that clog
pipes.

- Explanations by comparisons are central to the development of human cognitive processes. Small children use
comparisons to form concepts. A kitten is to a cat as a puppy is to a dog, or a car is to a driver as an airplane is to a
pilot. In politics, comparisons are used in pejorative ways when Democrats are compared to Communists and
Republicans to Fascists. Such comparisons underscore the danger of thinking in terms of comparisons and analogies.

- An emphasis on the similarities between one thing and another can lead to overgeneralization, faulty thinking, or
outright error. Let’s consider a greater problem that happens when we overemphasize the explanatory legitimacy of
presumed similarities. A judge, while sentencing a teenager, acknowledged that the juvenile came from a
disadvantaged home. The judge added that scores of other teenagers come from disadvantaged backgrounds but
don’t commit crimes. What are the problems with the comparison made by the judge? Further careful analysis will
reveal all kinds of differences between the subject and the comparison targets. One purpose of science (and all
critical and responsible thinking) is to engage in the relentless pursuit of the hidden and visible differences that make
real differences in the world. Superficial and shallow comparisons based on presumed likenesses are unworthy of
serious thinkers. Analogies may be helpful, but they should evoke deep suspicions (see Simanek, 2014). At best,
analogies and comparisons offer programs for more intellectual work. At worst, they promote intellectual laziness.

Glossary 

aestheticism The belief that the principles of beauty are applicable to other arenas of thought. In epistemology,
aestheticism attempts to integrate truth and beauty. 

a posteriori Literally, from what is later . Generally refers to the belief that knowledge is dependent on experience
and past learning. Contrast with a prior. 

a priori Literally, from what is prior . Generally refers to the presumed capacity to discern truths through intellectual
insights with minimal dependence on past experience and past learning. Contrast with a posterior . 

attributive pluralism Emphasizes the varieties of descriptive modes applicable for most phenomena. For example, a
sunset may be described in the language of physics, anthropology, psychology, or any of a variety of other
disciplinary languages. Events can also be described poetically or musically. 

authority One of the most common tests of truth. Reference to books, institutions, legal codes, or other people as
appropriate and adequate repositories of knowledge. 

determinism The belief in universal causation. Implies that whatever happens is based on antecedents such that,
given them, nothing else could happen. Contrast with free will. 

double-aspect monism A mind– brain position emphasizing the availability of two languages to describe the same
phenomena. In this case, there is the language of physiology versus language that employs mentalistic concepts. The
position assumes that both refer to the same underlying reality. 

dualism The belief that there are two fundamentally different realities. For example, mental processes are
considered by the dualist to be largely independent and qualitatively different from brain processes. 
efficient cause According to Aristotle, the force that sets a thing in motion. Thus, domino A , impacting domino B , is
the efficient cause of the fall of B. 

emergentism A mind– brain position embracing the idea that mental processes are produced by brain processes.
Some emergentists believe that mental processes, though produced by brain processes, are qualitatively different
from the physical system from which they emerge. 

empiricism A philosophical position that emphasizes the importance of experience, observation, and learning in the
acquisition of knowledge. 

epiphenomenalism A mind– body position marked by the belief that physical events are causal with respect to
mental events. Mental events are viewed as completely dependent on physical functions and, as such, have no
independent existence or causal efficacy. 

epistemology A branch of philosophy concerned with problems of knowledge such as what can we know or how can
we know? 

extrinsic teleology The view that design or order in nature reflects the work of a designer. 

Feyerabend, Paul K. (1924– 1994) Philosopher of science who has argued for an anarchistic epistemology marked by
belief that there is no such thing as a single unified and unchanging scientific method. 

final cause According to Aristotle, the goals or purposes for which an action was intended. 

formal cause The form or shape that contributes to a causal sequence. Thus, an airplane could not fly if critical
components were not shaped properly. 

free will The assumption that human beings make choices that are to some degree independent of antecedent
conditions. Contrast with determinism. 

genetic epistemology The study of ways of knowing and ways of solving problems as a function of developmental
level. 

idealism A philosophical orientation emphasizing mind or spirit as the preeminent feature of life. Contrast with
materialism. 

indeterminism The doctrine that it is impossible to apply strict cause-and-effect explanations to events at the
subatomic level. 

instinct An organized sequence of behaviors characteristic of a given species. It is assumed that instinctive behaviors
are not learned. 

interactionism A common sense belief in the interdependence of the mental and the physical realms. According to
this position, mental events may be causal with respect to physical events and vice versa. 

intrinsic teleology The position that design, order, and purpose are immanent in nature. 

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1922– 1996) A philosopher of science who emphasized the importance of understanding science in
terms of its community structures and evolutionary processes. His book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one
of the most influential works in its field in the twentieth century. 

learning Any change in performance or behavior that is attributable to the effects of practice or experience. 

material cause Aristotle’s contention that things behave as they do partly because of their material structure. For
example, a billiard ball could not function properly if it were made of cork or rubber. 

materialism A monistic ontology characterized by the belief that all real things are composed exclusively of matter.
Implies that all being can be understood in terms of the principles of material structure. 

monism The position that reality is one thing. Thus, everything relates to everything else in a completely
interconnected world. Contrast with pluralism. 
nativism The position that there are perceptions that are built in or operational from birth and that are informative
about the world. For example, the nativist argues that we have an innate capacity to see in depth. Contrast with
empiricism. 

normal science A notion introduced by Thomas Kuhn that refers to conventional ways of solving problems in science
at a given time or during the reign of a particular paradigm.

ontology A branch of philosophy that studies the nature and relations of being. Considers the question, “what is
real?” 

paradigm According to Thomas Kuhn, the beliefs, attitudes, values, methods, and assumptions that guide the
intellectual community at a given time. 

pluralism The belief that there are many real things and many different orders of reality. Contrast with monism . 

Popper, Karl Raimond (1902– 1994) Mathematician and philosopher noted for a hypothetico-deductive approach to
science. His book The Logic of Scientific Discovery is one of the classics in the philosophy of science. 

pragmatism A U.S. philosophical movement associated with the work of Charles S. Pierce and William James. James
emphasized the close connections between empiricism, pluralism, and pragmatism. According to pragmatism,
concepts must be judged in terms of their cash value or the practical work they do in the world. Thus, truth is judged
by utility and the practical consequences achieved by an idea. 

psyche The Greek term for soul or mind. Includes mental processes such as thought, memory, sensation, and
perception. 

psychogenic emergentism The idea that mental processes develop or emerge with the development of the body. 

psychogenic identity theory A theory of the origin of psyche that stresses the continuity or identity of the psychically
endowed biological substratum of the organism and the later mature, self-reflective, fully conscious adult. 

psychogeny Literally, the origin of psyche. Theories of the origin of psyche. 

psychophysical parallelism A mind– brain doctrine that assumes the independent existence of mental and physical
events. According to parallelism, the mental and the physical are, by definition, congruent. They do not interact with
each other; rather, they are like two clocks that always agree on the time, but are nevertheless independent
systems. 

rationalism A philosophical orientation deriving from the Latin ratio , meaning to reason or think. Rationalist
philosophers emphasize a priori knowledge, deduction, and an active mind that selectively organizes sensory data. 

skepticism The philosophical position that all truth claims are suspect and must be questioned. 

teleology Refers to purpose or design. According to Aristotle, design or purpose is an intrinsic part of the natural
order. Thus, it is the purpose of a seed to sprout under the proper conditions and grow into a plant. Such a teleology
can be thought of as intrinsic and is in contrast with the extrinsic teleology encountered in certain religions. Extrinsic
teleology implies that things do what they do because they fulfill purposes imposed by a deity.

Journal Questions for this Week

1. What is metaphysics?

Derived from the Greek meta ta physika ("after the things of nature"); referring to an idea, doctrine, or posited
reality outside of human sense perception. In modern philosophical terminology, metaphysics refers to the studies
of what cannot be reached through objective studies of material reality. Areas of metaphysical studies
include ontology, cosmology, and often, epistemology. Metaphysical - Longer definition: Metaphysics is a type of
philosophy or study that uses broad concepts to help define reality and our understanding of it. ... Metaphysics
might include the study of the nature of the human mind, the definition and meaning of existence, or the nature of
space, time, and/or causality.
2. What is epistemology?

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It is concerned with the mind’s relation to reality. What is it for this relation
to be one of knowledge? Do we know things? And if we do, how and when do we know things? These questions, and
so the field of epistemology, is as old as philosophy itself. Answering these questions requires considering the
relationship between knowledge, truth, belief, reason, evidence and reliability. It requires considering the different
psychological routes to knowledge, including different processes of reasoning – logical and scientific – introspection,
perception, memory, testimony and intuition. And it requires considering the nature of the known reality: How we
know our own minds differs from how we know the minds of others; social realities are differently known to mental
ones; the route to scientific knowledge is different to the route to mathematical knowledge; and moral knowledge is
not merely factual. And throughout these debates there is the constant undercurrent of scepticism, which suggests
that we can never know the reality behind appearances.

The field of epistemology is thus now a vast one with numerous research areas and issues. Sheffield has an
established excellence in a wide range of these areas. We received research grants to work on the epistemology
of testimony, the value, rationality, and normativity of trust, the education and the civic significance of intellectual
virtues. We have received grants to put on conferences on the philosophy of trust and transcendental responses to
scepticism. We have a particularly keen interest in the more social dimensions of epistemology, and in the
interconnections between the moral and the epistemic. 

Both James Lenman and Max Khan Hayward have worked on moral epistemology, the relationship between moral
and epistemic values and the way in which epistemic constraints impact on moral theory. The question of whether
you can have moral or practical reasons for belief, and how moral or practical and epistemic reason interact is also a
theme that emerges in Paul Faulkner’s work, which has focused on the knowledge we acquire from testimony and
the role of trust in this process. Paul has a book on this Knowledge on Trust, which had a special journal symposium
dedicated to discussing it. This focus has led Faulkner to write extensively on social epistemology. What is the place
of friendship in epistemology? Can we communicate moral knowledge, aesthetic knowledge and our knowledge of
what our experiences are like? What should we say about the more collective dimensions of knowledge, such
as collaborative science? How should we respond to disagreement? What should we make of other ways of
thinking that seem alien or plain wrong? Is there any epistemic rationality to conversion? 

One response here is to think that any confidence must be based on epistemic virtues, where virtue epistemology is
something that figures prominently in Ryan Byerly’s work, given his interest in the intellectual virtues and their social
cultivation. Ryan is currently writing a book Intellectual Dependability: A Virtue Theory of the Epistemic and
Educational Ideal. Related to disagreement, Rosanna Keefe has written on what is involved in the suspension of
belief. Her approach to this takes a more formal direction and involves an investigation to degrees of belief and
the vagueness that infect belief. 

This avenue connects with Dominic Gregory’s interest in modal epistemology or the study of our knowledge of the
necessary and possible. He is also interested in the role our imagination can play in grounding this knowledge. The
sceptical undercurrent in epistemology is then represented in the work of Bob Stern whose book Transcendental
Arguments and Scepticism  discusses the efficacy of transcendental arguments in responding
to scepticism and sceptical doubt.

3. According to Woody and Viney what are the six ways of knowing truth?

Authority
Empiricism
Pragmatism
Rationalism
Estheticism
Skepticism
4. Give a definition of the “empirical” way of “knowing truth” and provide an example of this in psychological
research.

5. What do Wood yand Viney consider Karl Popper’s key contributions to philosophy of science (i.e., how did
Popper say science should be done?)

O Give an example of a psychology study you have read which clearly exhibits an approach which Popper
would approve of.

O Give an example of a psychology study you have read which clearly exhibits an approach which Popper
would NOT approve of.

6. According to Woody and Viney how does Thomas Kuhn describe the conduct of science and scientific
“progress”?

O Describe some research from the history of psychology which is an example Kuhnian “normal” science.
Explain why your example fits this description.

O Describe some research from the history of psychology which is an example Kuhnian “revolution”.
Explain why your example fits this description.

7. Stanovich states that there is no agreement on what science is, but argues that there isa small set of elements
all scientists would agree on. According to Stanovich what are the three elements of science? Give a definition and
example of each –preferably and example from a psychology unit you have studied.

Online Discussion

These questions form the basis for starting the discussion. See Canvas for further instructions.

1.Thinking about your OWN views and experiences, what do YOU think psychology to should be? What should its
subject matter, methods, and applications be? Does this differ from the psychology you are being taught in class?

2.Do you think psychology IS currently a science? If not, are any subdisciplines of psychology sciences?

3.Do you think psychology SHOULD be a science? Justify or explain your position.

4.If psychology is not currently a science, what would need to change to make it one?

5.What is meant by mind? How do we know we have a mind? How do we know others have minds?