José Jiménez Avello (1998) Metapsychology in Ferenczi. Death Instinct or Death Passion, International Forum of Psychoanalysis, 7 (4), 229-234

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Int Forum Psychoanal 7:(229–233), 1998

Metapsychology in Ferenczi: Death Instinct or Death Passion?


José Jiménez Avello, Madrid, Spain

Jiménez Avello, Metapsychology in Ferenczi: Death Instict or Death Passion? Int Forum Psychoanal
1998;7:229–233. Stockholm. ISSN 0803-706X.
In Freud’s perspective the severe clinical phenomena related to repetition-compulsion depend on death
instinct, while according to Ferenczi they depend on severe early traumas provoked by human actions.
Concepts and ideas stemming from Ferenczi’s posthumous notes seem to be especially relevant for
understanding how trauma may result in devastating effects. If a traumatic assault occurs at an early
developmental period, which might be described as a ‘‘mimetic period’’, causing a displeasure that exceeds
the capacity of tolerance of the ego, the ego tries to manage it by a mimetic reproduction of the aggressor’s
desires. This mimetic reaction leaves an imprint in the subject, which Ferenczi calls ‘‘alien transplant’’. In
line with the idea of an intrusive potential of the environment, Ferenczi also suggests, following Descartes,
that the ‘‘passions’’ of the soul are created as a reaction to the suffering inflicted from outside. If we
compare Freud’s ideas with those of Ferenczi, we find that Ferenczi’s concept of ‘‘alient transplant’’
is equivalent to Freud’s concept of ‘‘death instinct’’. In order to make this correspondence apparent, it is
suggested to call it ‘‘death passion’’. This point is illustrated with a clinical vignette.
José Jiménez Avello, Ph.D. C. Sagasta, 12, 28004 Madrid, Spain

The collection of Ferenczi’s notes and fragments, implicitly questioned in Thalassa (6). Here Ferenczi
which includes the Clinical Diary (1), the notes of spoke of a ‘‘perpetual oscillation between life and
the period 1930–1931, and those made after October death instincts’’, thus handling the concept in a
1932 (2), represents a very valuable information slightly different way, since the supremacy of the
covering a wide range of subjects. Sometimes they death instinct over the life instinct was assumed by
deal with further developments of previous and well- Freud to be one of the intrinsic traits of the former. A
known lines of thought, and sometimes they reveal further step was accomplished in ‘‘The Unwelcome
aspects of Ferenczi’s reflections, which hardly appear Child and His Death Instinct’’ (7), where the dis-
in his published works. turbances, which in Freud’s view appeared as ‘‘a
Among the radically new ideas, the fragmentary congenital weakness of the will to live’’ (due to the
reformulation of the Freudian metapsychological exceeding quantity of the death instinct), Ferenczi
concepts is especially significant. The progressive considered, at least in some cases, as early conse-
criticism of Freud’s concept of ‘‘death instinct’’ (3), quences of trauma. According to him, the effects of
which resulted in an almost complete abandonment the trauma could be erroneously assumed to be
of it, deserves a special reconsideration, given that congenital, because of the extremely early onset of
the necessity of this concept had been suggested by the trauma.
Ferenczi, before the notorious formulation by Freud. These differences in nuances in the work published
Therefore, the criticism developed by Ferenczi was during Ferenczi’s lifetime acquire a much greater
not only directed towards Freud, but also towards meaning in the posthumously published notes (2).
himself. Thus, already in the first notes of 1930 we find the
According to Lou Andreas-Salomé (4), Ferenczi remark that the term ‘‘death instinct’’ is not very
had suggested the idea of a ‘‘tendency towards convincing (10 August, 1930), and a few days later
inertia’’ (5), which Freud initially rejected, at least we find the proposal to replace it by the notion of an
in the form of a ‘‘death tendency’’ proposed by ‘‘altruistic instinct’’ (24 August 1930).
Ferenczi. However, once Freud had embraced this A new theory begins to emerge from this moment
idea, which represented the ‘‘third step’’ in the on, which gradually differentiates itself by introdu-
dualistic approach to the instincts (3), Ferenczi cing ‘‘a slight modification of Freud’s assumption of
soon began to manifest his discrepancies. life and death instincts’’ (1:41) (23 February 1932).
The ‘‘hegemony’’ of the death instinct was already Indeed, Ferenczi finally abandons the assumption of

䉷 Scandinavian University Press 1998. ISSN 0803-706X


230 J Jiménez Avello Int Forum Psychoanal 7, 1998

a death instinct, and embraces the idea that there are relations’’ had not been sufficiently appreciated by
only life instincts (8). Freud (30 June, 1932). What had not been sufficiently
Yet, the following questions arises: if there is no appreciated was the malleability of the psyche
death instinct, if the supremacy of life instincts and during this period. This malleability is referred to in
the pleasure principle are maintained, how can we different ways. In the Clinical Diary Ferenczi speaks,
explain the severe clinical symptoms related to the for example, of ‘‘The idea of the still half-dissolved
compulsion to repeat, which lead Freud to concep- state (consistency) of the childish personality’’ (7
tualise a death instinct? We could here rely on April, 1932). Much earlier, in The Phenomena of
Ferenczi’s idea that early and massive traumas, espe- Hysterical Materialisation (11), he had hinted at the
cially those caused by the ‘‘significant Others’’, are existence of ‘‘autoplastic reactions’’ in the psychic
equivalent to constitutional factors (7). But how can apparatus. The term ‘‘autoplastic’’ referred to the
these traumas explain phenomena such as traumatic fact, that the modification of the self was a substitute
dreams and neuroses, suicidal behaviour or primary for the modification of the environment. The term
masochism? Or: How can the incapability for analy- which is most characteristic in the notes, is ‘‘mimi-
sis in certain cases be explained without resorting to cry’’, written in English. In the biological sense the
a possible death instinct? term refers, for example, to the change of colour of
Among the new ideas elaborated in Ferenczi’s the chameleon in order to blend with the surround-
Clinical Diary (1), the following appear especially ings. The function of mimicry is therefore to adapt
relevant with regard to these questions: first, the to the environment, to survive in it and to be confused
concept of a ‘‘purely mimetic period’’ (mimicry) with it. According to Ferenczi, the tendencies to
(30 June, 1932); second, the reference to ‘‘alien self-assertion are very weak during the ‘‘phase of
transplants’’ (7 April, 1932); and third, the in-depth pure mimicry’’. An excess of environmental pressure
study of the concept of ‘‘passion’’ (3 July, 1932). elicits the protective response of mimicry in order
to comply with the pleasure principle. He says:
‘‘. . . mimicry reaction in nature is more primary
Mimicry (Half-Dissolved State, than the self-assertive or self-important reaction . . .’’
Autoplastic Reactions) (30 June, 1932).
Many years earlier Ferenczi had presented his The value of the idea of a very early ‘‘mimicry’’
hypothesis about the construction of the psyche in phase becomes clearer if we consider it within the
Introjection and Transference (9), where the psyche construction of the psyche from the state of ‘‘human
results from an interplay of introjections and pro- puppy’’ to the one of ‘‘human being’’ (‘‘Le petit
jections, and in Stages in the Development of the d’homme’’ and ‘‘l’être humain’’ respectively,
Sense of Reality (5), which, according to Balint (10), according to Althusser). The psyche, assumed to be
is the first work ever written about the genesis of in a ‘‘half-dissolved state’’, during this phase com-
the Self. Here Ferenczi describes the evolution of the plies with the demands of the pleasure principle by
subject from a primary stage ruled by the pleasure its plasticity. Ferenczi writes that:
principle (the ‘‘period of unconditional omnipo- . . . in this {state} the unpleasure also comes to an end
tence’’ or ‘‘monist state’’), to the supremacy of the at last, though not by changing the external world but by
reality principle. This theoretical framework is on the yielding of the living substance, that is, a partial
the whole preserved in his posthumous notes, even if relinquishing of the weak self-assertive impulse that
he does not openly refer to it. However it is referred has just been attempted, an immediate resignation
to in the Clinical Diary, where a new phase is even and adaptation of the self to the environment (30 June,
1932).
added between the ‘‘period of unconditional omni-
potence’’ and and that of ‘‘magical-hallucinatory
omnipotence’’. Here Ferenczi come to the conclusion The ‘‘Alien Transplants’’
that the hallucinatory period ‘‘is preceded by a purely This idea of a mimicry reaction points to the extreme
mimetic period’’ (30 June 1932). Ferenczi was aware plasticity of the psyche in adverse situations. It
that this period corresponded to Freud’s concept enables us to understand how the consequences of
of primary identification, however he was not satis- the environment on the psyche can become so pro-
fied with the latter. Indeed he wrote that the impor- found to the point of being confused with the sub-
tance of ‘‘identification as a stage preceding object ject’s own impulses.
Int Forum Psychoanal 7, 1998 Metapsychology in Ferenczi: death instinct or death passion? 231
Ferenczi introduces the concept of ‘‘alien trans- subjectivity was the dualism between res cogitans
plants’’ to describe this profound presence of the and res extensa, between the soul and the body. Yet
Other in the subject (1): Ferenczi was especially interested in Descartes as
. . . adults forcibly inject their will, particularly psychic
author of the Essay on the Passions (13). Could these
contents of an unpleasant nature, into the childish person- two features be somehow related?
ality. These split-off, alien transplants vegetate in the If we repeat the search for the word ‘‘passion’’
other person during the whole life. (7 April, 1932). ourselves, but in the Dictionary of the Spanish Royal
Academy (14), we find:
The expression ‘‘alien transplants’’ evokes the notion
both of grafts on a plant and the loosing of boundaries Passion: 1. Action of suffering. 2. By analogy, that of
between the subject and the Other, and acquires even Jesus Christ. 3. The opposite to action. 4. Passive state
greater impact in connection with the concept of in the subject. 5. Any disturbance or disordered emotion
of the spirit. 6. Very strong penchant or preference of one
‘‘mimicry’’, since both point to a process originating person towards another. 7. Vehement appetite or penchant
in another person’s intrusive actions and mind. towards something. 8 (. . .)
Furthermore, the idea of ‘‘alien transplants’’ makes
concepts such as ‘‘introjection of the aggressor’’ and Perhaps all the different meanings contribute to the
‘‘identification with the aggressor’’ more effective. It Ferenczian idea of passion, but that of ‘‘Vehement
also makes it possible to reconsider the phenomena appetite or penchant towards something’’ best
related to repetition compulsion that Freud consid- corresponds to Ferenczi’s idea. The quality that
ered to be of instinctual origin. Ferenczi seems to should be especially stressed is ‘‘vehement’’,
conceive them, instead, as a passionate response of because it contrasts with the idea of ‘‘tenderness’’,
the subject to the traumatogenic action of the Other. which was used by Ferenczi precisely for highlight-
ing this type of opposition. The vehement character
is more apparent in the definition of ‘‘passion’’ found
Passion by Ferenczi in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, where
it is said; ‘‘The modern use generally restricts the
Ferenczi uses the term ‘‘passion’’ more and more term to strong and uncontrolled emotions’’. If we
frequently in his last works. The most famous paper combine the meanings of both dictionaries, we could
in which he used the term is Confusion of tongues say that ‘‘passions’’ refer to ‘‘vehement (strong and
between adults and the child (12). Here, in the uncontrolled) appetites and penchants’’.
Appendix we find a reference to the Cartesian roots Now, according to Descartes, passions originated
of the meaning of ‘‘passion’’ as used by Ferenczi: in bodily suffering and not in the soul (in the inborn
‘‘Psycho-analysis willingly agrees with the disposition, we might say), affecting the ‘‘res cogi-
Cartesian idea that passions are brought about by tans’’ of a man as a response to the suffering coming
suffering, but perhaps will have to find an answer to from the body and the environment. The reference to
the question of what it is that introduces the element Cartesianism in the paper Confusion of tongues
of suffering, and with it sadomasochism, into the between adults and the child (12) becomes more
playful gratifications at the level of tenderness.’’ understandable if we relate it to the question: what
(12:166). then makes suffering break into ‘‘the playful grati-
Ferenczi refers to Descartes also in a fragment of fications at the level of tenderness’’ in a child?
the Journal, especially the undated notes after those Ferenczi’s answer seems to be that suffering installs
of 30 July 1932. It seems that Ferenczi searched for itself as a passion in the soul as a result of the
several entries in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, traumatogenic actions of the environment.
among them the entries ‘‘Passion’’ and ‘‘Cartesian-
ism’’. Why was Ferenczi interested in Descartes?
Does the reference to this philosopher play any role Death Passion
in Ferenczi’s ongoing revision of Freudian meta- In order to clarify this point I would like to compare
psychology? The fact of referring to the philosopher the Freudian notion of death instinct with the concept
with whom the modern investigation of the Subject of ‘‘death passion’’. What I mean by the latter is
began, certainly shows the radical character of the imprint provoked in the subject when the action
Ferenczi questioning. As is well-known, the shape of the other is a sadistic one. We can say that death
given by Descartes to the modern investigation of passion is inoculated, and describe this process as
232 J Jiménez Avello Int Forum Psychoanal 7, 1998

an ‘‘alien transplant’’ which brings confusion about Mother and daughter share the painful experience
what is inborn and what is acquired. ‘‘Death of this situation. At times one is impressed by the
passion’’ is grafted onto the subject by external similarity in tone and content of their stories. Eloisa
actions, whereas Freud’s ‘‘death instinct’’ originates was born from a ‘‘chance pregnancy’’. Initially the
within the subject. According to Ferenczi the pregnancy was well accepted by her mother, because
assumption of a death instinct is not only erroneous, she wanted to have children. When the child was
but also ‘‘pessimistic’’ and even ‘‘sadistic’’ (1). He born, however, the mother’s relationship with her
remarks that ‘‘The idea of the death instinct goes husband strongly deteriorated. The husband ‘‘soon
too far, is already tinged with sadism (. . .).’’ (13 realised how difficult it is to have a child’’ and aban-
August 1932). My impression is that Ferenczi doned both the mother and the child. Eloisa knew this
characterises the concept of death instinct as sadistic story well: in part, thanks to her own memories, since
precisely because it reiterates at a theoretical level the situation lasted until she was eight years old, and
the confusing effect about what is inborn and what in part thanks to what her mother had told her.
is acquired, and thereby it disguises the damaging Eloisa is full of feelings of impotence and envy.
action of the Other, exonerating the latter. In short She and her mother are ‘‘outcasts’’ and will never
the concept of ‘‘death instinct’’ has a confusing and be able to modify their situation. She also feels
disavowing function, providing a sort of scientific guilty for complicating her mother’s life; she is a
coverage to the traumatogenic action performed by bad scholar and a difficult child. And now, on top of
the aggressor. It is well known that such a ‘‘dis- everything, she even needs psychotherapy.
avowal’’ constitutes, according to Ferenczi, the These and other clinical elements give the feeling
quintessence of the trauma. of somebody afflicted by overwhelming guilt. She
When the theory does not unveil the horror of the seems especially guilty about her mother’s fate.
sadistic action of the other, it is because the theory Indeed, she is a girl of acceptable physical appearance,
itself if impregnated with this sadism, because it well groomed and sufficiently well dressed. She
is a ‘‘passionate’’ science, in Ferenczi’s Cartesian attends school like any other child of her age, and
terminology (1): ‘‘Even science is ‘passionate’, when speaks correct Spanish (not her mother’s case), she has
it sees and recognises only selfish instincts’’ (13 time for pleasure, etc. In other words, it is her mother’s
August, 1932). and not her own situation that may be considered
unfortunate. Yet, Eloisa appears as an ‘‘Unwelcome
Child’’ (7). Unwelcome by her father, of course, but
Vignette—The Case of Eloisa1 also by her mother, who in spite of being devoted,
Some aspects of the treatment of Eloisa may provide points to her as the irreparable cause of her misfortune.
a clinical illustration of this view. Eloisa was thirteen From the beginning, the therapist sensed the threat
years old when she, accompanied by her mother, of a psychotic outbreak. Three specific moments
consulted a psychotherapist because of an increasing from the same session may serve to demonstrate
block of the capability to study, growing emotional this risk:
disorders and anxiety and a vanishing desire to
live. The poor conditions of their lives are espe- — Eloisa has brief episodes (in this and other
cially relevant in this case. She is the only child of sessions), lasting less than one minute, in which she
a mother who decided to escape from a poor eco- seems to be ‘‘gone’’, absent, ‘‘not-being-here’’—as
nomic and matrimonial situation, emigrating with put in the Clinical Diary by Ferenczi (14 November,
her daughter from their native country. Her mother 1932). Classical psychiatric treatises describe these
had herself been an only child deprived of her father. episodes as a ‘‘fading’’ which is similar to an epilep-
As immigrants in Spain, Eloisa and her mother have tic absence, which might be an early symptom of
suffered all kinds of hardships and stress. The mother schizophrenic psychosis.
manages to earn a meagre living by filling many of — At a certain point she reveals that she is having
the twenty-four hours of the day with exhausting and certain fantasies, which, on the one hand, attract
unappealing work. her and on the other shock her ‘‘because they are
too real’’. This sensation of the reality of her fanta-
1
I wish to thank Eloisa’s therapist for authorising me to use this sies is accompanied by Eloisa’s anxious gestures,
material, initially known by me for purposes of supervision. engendering the suspect of a hallucinatory process.
Int Forum Psychoanal 7, 1998 Metapsychology in Ferenczi: death instinct or death passion? 233
Shortly after that she tells about her fantasies, 2. Ferenczi S. Notes and fragments (1920 and 1930–2). Final
Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psychoanalysis.
‘‘even unpleasant’’, of being a stone, a tree or any London: Hogarth Press; 1955;216–279.
other element in Nature. She narrates this experience 3. Freud S. Más allá del principio del placer. Obras completas, Buenos
in a poetic language. Afterwards, during a long Aires: Amorrotu, 1976.
4. Andreas-Salomé L. 10–11/Septembre/1913. Avec Ferenczi, Journal
silence, the therapist finds himself thinking about d’une année (1912–1913). Paris: Gallimard, 1970.
the risk of suicide in this girl. Later Eloisa talks 5. Ferenczi S. Stages in the development of the sense of reality (1913).
First contributions to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press:
about suicide, revealing that she has never attempted 1952:213–239.
suicide ‘‘because it would be too easy’’. 6. Ferenczi S. Thalassa: A theory of genitality. London: H. Karnac
The supervisor makes here the hypothesis that Books, 1989.
7. Ferenczi S. The unwelcome child and his death instinct (1929).
the suicidal tendencies, which are active in Eloisa, Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis.
belong to her mother. London: Hogarth Press; 1955:102–107.
8. Jiménez Avello J. Au-delà de la pulsion de mort. Le Coq-Héron,
This vignette may suffice to illustrate Eloisa’s 1998;149.
9. Ferenczi S. Introjection and transference (1909). First contributions
psychic situation as the result not only of a difficult to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth Press; 1952:35–93.
life, but also of an ‘‘alien transplant’’, stemming from 10. Balint M. Sándor Ferenczi, 1913–1919. In: Ferenczi S. Oeuvres
her mother, and inoculated in the child during the complètes, Paris: Payot, 1968.
11. Ferenczi S. The phenomena of hysterical materialization (1919).
‘‘mimicry phase’’, and resulting in a life threatening Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-
‘‘death passion’’. Where does the ‘‘death instinct’’ analysis. London: Karnac Books, 1994:89–104.
12. Ferenczi S. Confusion of tongues between adults and the child
remain in all this? Nowhere. As put by Ferenczi in (1933). Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-
one of his notebooks: ‘‘Nothing but life-instinct. analysis. London: Hogarth Press; 1955:156–167.
Death-instinct, a mistake (Pessimistic)’’ (15). 13. Descartes R. Tratado de las pasiones (1649). Barcelona: Iberia, 1985.
14. Real Academia Española. Diccionario de la lengua española. (XXI
edición), Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1992.
References 15. Dupont J. Les notes brèves de Sándor Ferenczi. Le Coq-Héron,
1998:149.
1. Dupont J, ed. The clinical diary of Sándor Ferenczi (1985).
Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Summaries in German and Spanish


Jiménez Avello J. Todestrieb oder Todesleidenschaft? Jiménez Avello, J. La metapsicologı́a en Ferenczi: ¿pulsión de
muerte o pasión de muerte?
Die groben klinischen Phänomene, die Freud mit dem Wieder-
holungszwang als Ausdruck des Todestriebes verstand, beruhen El concepto freudiano de pulsión de muerte (Freud 1920g), fue
für Ferenczi auf schweren Traumatisierungen in frühen Entwick- puesto en cuestión gradualmente en los últimos trabajos de
lungsstadien, die durch schädliche Vorgänge ganz anderer Natur Ferenczi: en la obra publicada en vida del autor las diferencias
bewirkt werden. Um die verheerenden Folgen solcher Trauma- son de matices, pero en las anotaciones datadas publicadas
tisierungen zu erklären, werden bestimmte Ideen und Begriffe póstumamente, Ferenczi desestima por completo la ide de pul-
aus Ferenczis Nachlass besonders bedeutungsvoll. So gibt es ein sión de muerte y crea una nueva teorı́a pulsional según la cual
Konzept einer frühen ‘‘reinen Mimikriperiode’’, in der das ich, ‘‘sólo hay pulsiones de vida’’. Los graves fenómenos clı́nicos en
dessen Tragfähigkeit durch Unlust überfordert wird, zur Begwäl- relación con la compulsión a la repetición que en Freud eran
tigung eine Mimikrireaktion entwickelt und sich den Wünschen atribuidos a la pulsión de muerte, para Ferenczi se deben a graves
derjenigen anpasst, die es überfordern. Diese Mimikrireaktion traumatismos sufridos precozmente por acciones deletereas de
hinterlässt ihre Spuren, die Ferenczi Gedächtnisspuren nennt. los otros significativos. Para explicar como los traumatismos
Andererseits schlägt Ferenczi in Übereinstimmung mit Descartes pueden llegar a tener tan devastadores efectos, ciertos términos e
in Hinblick auf das intrusive Potential der Umgebung vor, die ideas de las notas póstumas cobran especial relevancia. Ası́
Entstehung von Leidenschaft nicht in der Seele zu suchen, sondern ocurre con la conceptualización de una precocı́sima ‘‘fase de
sie als Antwort der Seele auf ein von aussen auferlegtes Leid zu mimetismo puro’’ durante la cual, si el displacer supera los
verstehen. Aus diesen Gründen schlage ich vor, die Gedächtnis- lı́mites de tolerancia de yo, éste trata de manejarlo mimetizan-
spuren, die in Ferenczis Auffassung mit Freuds Todestrieb ver- dose con los deseos del/los causantes de tal displacer. Esta
gleichbar sind, als Todes-Leidenschaft zu bezeichnen. mimetización (mimicry reaction), deja huellas en el sujeto a las
que Ferenczi denomina ‘‘transplantes extraños’’. Por otra parte, y
coherentemente con estas ideas sobre el potencial intrusivo del
entorno, Ferenczi plantea, siguiendo a Descartes, que las
‘‘pasiones’’ no se originan en el ‘‘alma’’, sino que son la respuesta
de ésta al sulfrimiento inflingido desde fuera. Por ello, y a fines de
contrastar las ideas de Freud con las de Ferenczi, propongo, tras
ilustrarlo con una viñeta clı́nica, denominar al ‘‘transplante
extraño’’ que equivaldrı́a en la teorı́a ferencziana al concepto
freudiano de pulsión de muerte, como ‘‘pasión de muerte’’.
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