Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy-36-37

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 2

31

Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy


(1970) 2 SCC 272

M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J. - This is an appeal from the order, August 4, 1969, of a Full
Bench of the High Court of Delhi; rejecting a plaint filed by the six appellants claiming a
decree for Rs 26,000/- as damages for defamatory statements made by Shri Sanjiva Reddy
(former Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Shri Y. B. Chavan (Home Minister) and three members
of Parliament on the floor of the Lok Sabha during a Calling Attention Motion. The High
Court held that no proceedings could be taken in a Court of law in respect of what was said on
the floor of Parliament in view of Article 105(2) of the Constitution. The High Court,
however, certified the case as fit for appeal to this Court under Article 133(i)(a) of the
Constitution and this appeal has been brought.
2. Notice of the lodgment of the appeal was issued to the respondents in due course but
they have not appeared. The Union Government which joined, at its request, as a party in the
High Court alone appeared through the Attorney-General. We have not considered it
necessary to hear the Union Government.
3. The facts of the case, in so far as they are relevant to our present purpose, may be
briefly stated. The appellants claim to be the admirers and followers of Jagaduru
Shankaracharya of Goverdan Peeth, Puri. In March, 1969, a World Hindu Religious
Conference was held at Patna. The Shankaracharya took part in it and is reported to have
observed that untouchability was in harmony with the tenets of Hinduism and that no law
could stand in it? way and to have walked out when the National Anthem was played.
4. On April 2, 1969 Shri Narendra Kumar Salve, M. P. (Betui) moved a Calling Attention
Motion in the Lok Sabha and gave particulars of the happening. A discussion followed and
the respondents execrated the Shankaracharya. According to the appellants, the respondents:
“gave themselves up to the use of language which was more common place than
serious, more lax than dignified, more unparliamentary than sober and jokes and puns
were bandied around the playful spree, and his Holiness Jagadguru Shankaracharya
Ananta Shri Vihushit Swami Shri Niranjan Deva Teertha of Govardhan Peeth, Puri,
was made to appear as a superous (sic) dog.”
The appellants who hold the Shankaracharya in high esteem felt scandalized and brought
the action for damages placing the damages at Rs 26,000. The plaint was rejected as the High
Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit.
5. Article 105 of the Constitution, which defines the powers, privileges and immunities of
Parliament and its Members, provides:
“105. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament, there shall be freedom of
speech in Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in
respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee
32

thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the
authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges, and immunities of each House of
Parliament, and of the members and the committees of each House, shall be such as
may from time to time be defined by Parliament by law, and, until so defined, shall
be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of
its members and committees, and at the commencement of this Constitution.
(4) The provisions of clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons
who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise of
Parliament or any Committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of
Parliament.”
6. The High Court held that in view of clause (2) of the Article no proceedings could
lie in any Court in Parliament and the plaint must, therefore, be rejected.
7. Mr Lekhi in arguing this appeal drew our attention to an observation of this Court in
Special Reference No. 1 of l964 [(1965) 1 SCR 413, 455], where this Court dealing with the
provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution pointed out that the immunity under that Article
was against an alleged irregularity of procedure but not against an illegality, and contended
that the same principle should be applied here to determine whether what was said was
outside the discussion on a Calling Attention Motion. According to him the immunity granted
by ^he second .clause of the one hundred and fifth article was to what was relevant to the
business of Parliament and not to something which was utterly irrelevant.
8. In our judgment it is not possible to read the provisions of the article in the way
suggested. The article means what it says in language which could not be plainer. The article
confers immunity inter alia in respect of “anything said......in Parliament”. The word
‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to ‘everything’. The only limitation arises
from the words ‘in Parliament’ which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course
of the business of Parliament. We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabba. Once it
was proved that Parliament was sitting and Its business was being transacted, anything said
during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any Court this immunity
is not only complete but is as it should be. It is of the essence of parliamentary system of
Government that people’s representatives should be free to express themselves without fear of
legal consequences. What they say is only subject to the discipline of the rules of Parliament,
the good sense of the members and the control of proceedings by the Speaker. The Courts
have no say in the matter and should really have none.
9. Mr Lekhi attempted to base arguments upon the analogy of an Irish case and another
from Massachussetts reported in May’s Parliamentary Practice. In view of the clear
provisions of our Constitution we are not required to act on analogies of other legislative
bodies. The decision under appeal was thus correct. The appeal fails and is dismissed.

*****

You might also like