1. MR.

LOKESH DHAWAN VS UNION OF INDIA (UOI)

AND ORS. ON 11 AUGUST, 2003 2004 IAD DELHI 165

FACTS

1. The petitioner is a chartered accountant. On the basis of a complaint made by the

respondent No. 4, the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
(Respondent No. 2) (hereinafter referred to as a Council) referred the case to the
Disciplinary Committee.
2. The third charge was not examined by the disciplinary committee in view of the
statement of the complainant that it had no evidence to support the same.
3. Thus, in the inquiry report the disciplinary committee was concerned with the second
charge only. In respect of this charge, i.e., the second charge the disciplinary
committee found the petitioner to be not guilty the only charge which remained was
charge No. 1 which, as aforesaid, had been admitted by the petitioner. Accordingly,
the disciplinary committee concluded its report dated 17.1.2000.
4. Based upon the admission of the petitioner, the disciplinary committee after holding
the inquiry in the prescribed manner reported the result of the same to the Council.
The Council considered the report of the disciplinary committee at its meetings held
from 21st to 24th June, 2001 at New Delhi.
5. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the Council on 3.6.2002 seeking a
review of the "decision" of the Council taken under Section 21(5) read with Section
21(3) of the said Act on the report of the disciplinary committee. This review
application dated 3.6.2002 filed by the petitioner was rejected by a letter dated
9.10.2002 sent by the Council to the petitioner.

ISUUE

Whether the petitioner was guilty of any professional or other misconduct?

RULE

Section 21 read with Section 22 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.

JUDGEMNET

It was held that “the present case involves determination by the High Court of the entire case
of the petitioner. It is a safeguard provided in the statute itself whereby the Council is not
empowered to pass the orders but the same is left to the High Court in the event the case is
forwarded by the Council. It is a built-in safeguard in the statute itself and it must not be
permitted to be by-passed by allowing recourse records to proceedings under Article
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter also the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed”

ANALYSIS

The party had statutory remedy of assailing the order passed by the District Court by filing an
appeal to the High Court itself, he could not bypass the said remedy and take recourse to
proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Such a course of action may enable
a litigant to defeat the provisions of the Statute which may provide for certain conditions for
filing the appeal, like limitation, payment of court fee or deposit of some amount or
fulfilment of some other conditions for entertaining the appeal.
 2. R. MUTHUKRISHNAN VS THE REGISTRAR GENERAL
OF THE HIGH ON 28 JANUARY, 2019, WRIT PETITION
[C] NO. 612 OF 2016

FACTS

1. The petitioner, who is an Advocate, has filed the petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India, questioning the vires of amended Rules 14 A, 14B, 14C and 14-
D of the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras
under section 34(1) of the Advocates’ Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the
Advocates’ Act’).
2. The High Court has inserted Rule 14A in the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970
empowering the High Court to debar an Advocate from practicing. The High Court
has been empowered to take action under Rule Signature Not Verified 14B where any
misconduct referred to under Rule 14A is committed by a Digitally signed by
JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date: 2019.01.30 13:33:19.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner was guilty of any professional or other misconduct?

RULE

Section 21 read with Section 22

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned
authorities as observed by this Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra (supra), which right cannot be
totally curtailed, however, making such allegation publicly tantamount to contempt of court
and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken care of either by the Bar Council
under the Advocates Act and by the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The
misconduct as specified in Rule 14A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt of
court and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction.”
ANALYSIS

The High Court is not authorized by the provisions of the Advocates Act to frame such
rules. Section 34 does not confer such power of debarment by way of disciplinary methods or
disciplinary inquiry as against an advocate as that has to be dealt with by the Bar Council as
provided in other sections in a different chapter of the Act. It is only when the advocate is
found guilty of contempt of court, as provided in Rule 14 as existed in the Madras High Court
Rules, 1970 takes care of situation until and unless an advocate who has committed contempt
of court purges himself of contempt shall not be entitled to appear or act or plead in the
Court. The debarment cannot be ordered by the High Court until and unless advocate is
prosecuted under the Contempt of Courts Act. It cannot be resorted to by undertaking
disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under the Rules 14A to 14D as amended in 2016.
That is a clear usurpation of the power of the Bar Council and is wholly impermissible in
view of the decision of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of
India (supra) that has been followed in all the subsequent decisions as already discussed.
There is no doubt about it that the incidents pointed out were grim and stern action was
required against the erring advocates as they belied the entire nobility of the lawyer’s
profession.
 3. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA VS M. V.
DABHOLKAR ETC. ETC ON 13 AUGUST, 1975, 1975 AIR
2092

FACTS

1. The Bar Council of Maharashtra on 8 August, 1964 considered a complaint received

from the High Court against the respondents and resolved that the complaint received
from the High Court against the respondents be referred to the disciplinary committee.
2. Another resolution was passed by the Bar Council of Maharashtra on the same day
whereby Messrs Hotchand Advani, R. W. Adik and S. C. Chagla were elected as
members of the disciplinary committee to enquire into the complaints.
3. The aforesaid disciplinary committee met on 19 March, 1965 and heard the advocates
for the Bar Council of the State of Maharashtra.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Maharashtra on 27 June,
1973 found the respondents guilty of conduct which seriously lowered the reputation of the
Bar in the eyes of the public. The disciplinary committee directed that the respondents would
stand suspended from practising as advocates for a period of three years. The suspension
orders were to be operative from 1 August 1973”.

ANALYSIS
The functions of the Bar Council of India are inter alia to lay down standards of professional
conduct and etiquette, to lay down the procedure to be followed by its disciplinary committee
and the disciplinary committee of State Bar Councils, to safeguard the rights, privileges and
interests of advocates and to exercise general supervision and control over State Bar Councils
Disciplinary committees are constituted by each Bar Council. A Bar Council is required to
constitute one or more disciplinary committees each of which shall consist of three persons of
whom two shall be persons elected by the Council from amongst its members and the other
shall be A person co-opted by the Council from amongst advocates who possess the
qualifications specified in the proviso to section 3(2) of the Act and are not members of the
Council, and the senior most advocate amongst the members of a disciplinary committee
shall be its Chairman. Section 38 provides for appeal to the Supreme Court. Section 38 states
that any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council
of India under section 36 or section 37 or the Attorney-General of India or the Advocate-
General of the State, as the case may be, may prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court.
 4. AKSHYA KUMAR SARANGI VS BAR COUNCIL OF
WEST BENGAL & ANR ON 26 AUGUST, 2021, W.P.O. (P)
NO. 06 OF 2021

FACTS

1. The petitioner is a practising advocate of this Court and have taken out this Public
Interest Litigation espousing the cause of four members of the Bar Council of West
Bengal who protested against the letter dated 25.6.2021 issued by the Chairman of the
said Bar Council raising grievance against the Chief Justice (Acting) in discharging
his administrative duties and making it public in different medias having an impact on
the impartiality of the Judicial System and partition attitude having shown to selected
class of the litigation.
2. The foundation of the present PIL is that the Chairman has used the official letterhead
of the Bar Council and percolating his own views which cannot be regarded as the
views of the collective members of the Bar Council and such action is in flagrant
violation of the statutory provision and the rules governing the said Bar Council
amounting to misconduct within the sweep of the aforesaid statutory provision.

ISUUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “The first rule in this branch of contempt power is a wise economy of use by
the Court of this branch of its jurisdiction. The Court will act with seriousness and severity
where justice is jeopardized by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the Judges, where the
attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The Court is willing to ignore,
by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences - the dogs may bark, the caravan will
pass. The Court will not be prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability. Much rather, it
shall take a noetic look at the conspectus of features and be guided by a constellation of
constitutional and other considerations when it chooses to use, or desist from using, its power
of contempt."

ANALYSIS

The Advocates Act, 1961 gave autonomy to a Bar Council of a State or Bar Council of India
and Section 6(1) empowers them to make such action deemed necessary to set their house in
order, to prevent fail in professional conduct and to punish the incorrigible as not benefitting
the noble profession apart from admission of the advocates of its roll. Section 6 (1) (c) and
rules made in that behalf, Sections 9, 35, 36-B and 37 enjoin it to entertain and determine
cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll. The members of the judiciary are drawn
primarily and invariably from the Bar at different levels. Their power under the Act ends
threat and extends no further. Article 121 of the Constitution prohibits discussion by the
members of parliament of the conduct of any Judge as provided under Article
124(4) and (5) and in the manner laid down under the Act, the Rules and the rules of business
of Parliament therewith. By necessary implication, no other forum or for a or platform is
available for discussion of the conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties as a Judge of
the Supreme Court or the High Court, much less a Bar Council or group of practising
advocates.
 5. KHANDAN KUMAR DAS VS THE STATE OF ASSAM
AND 3 ORS ON 17 AUGUST, 2021, WP(C)/3264/2017

FACTS

1. Mr. P.J. Saikia, the learned counsel who had entered appearance on behalf of the
respondent no. 3 and 4, i.e. the Biswanath Chariali Municipal Board and its Chairman,
is present and has submitted at the outset that during the pendency of this writ
petition, the term of the said Board had expired and the said Board has been taken
over by the Deputy Commissioner, Biswanath Chariali and the affairs of the
respondent no. 3 i.e. the Biswanath Municipal Board is now run by the Deputy
Commissioner through a nominated officer and Page No.# 4/24 therefore, at present
there is no Chairman i.e. respondent no. 4
2. Here is no record of any vakalatnama filed by the learned counsel for the respondent
nos. 3 and 4 along with or prior to filing of the affidavit-in-opposition. However, on
record is a vakalatnama signed by the Chairperson of Biswanath Municipal Board,
which was filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 by Mr. M.R. Adhikari and
Mr. P.N. Sharma, learned counsel. The Court is unable to find vakalatnama of Mr.
P.J. Saikia, learned counsel on record.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “As the respondents have deprived the petitioner of the fruits of judgment and
order dated 12.10.2015 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 3407/2015, and compelled him two
more rounds of writ petition and to file contempt petition, the petitioner is found entitled to
cost of litigation in respect of these two writ petitions, which is assessed at Rs.30,000/-
(Rupees Thirty thousand only). The respondent no. 3 shall pay such cost to the petitioner
within a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date of this order, failing which it would be open
to the petitioner to realize such cost as envisaged under the Gauhati High Court Rules.”

ANALYSIS

As early as in 1957 in the case of Manak Lal vs. Dr. Prem Chand, 1957 SCR 575: AIR 1957
SC 425 an advocate was held guilty for professional misconduct by a Tribunal of Three
Members. The matter was argued before the High Court. An objection was taken before the
High Court, that one of the members had appeared on behalf of the complainant and
therefore, he was disqualified from acting as a member of the Tribunal. A question arose
before this Court, that since such an objection was not taken before the Tribunal, whether it
amounted to waiver. waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be
bound is fully cognizant of his rights, and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or
chooses one benefit instead of another, either, but not both, of which he might claim.
 6. EX. HEAD CONSTABLE CHAMEL SINGH. VS SH. KULDEEP
BHATIA, ADVOCATE. ON 30 JULY, 2021,

FACTS

1. The complainant is a former Border Security Force personnel. He was discharged

from the said force on medical grounds on 22.07.2009. His grievance against his
department was that while releasing his retiral benefits his department did not pay
interest amounting to Rs.3 lacs on the compensation amount payable under Prahari
Insurance Scheme.
2. In order to claim this amount, he contacted the opposite party in the month of April,
2012 for filing appropriate petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Chandigarh. The opposite party demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- as fee for this
purpose which the complainant paid him in cash. Thereafter, the opposite party again
demanded a sum of Rs.20,000/- and asked him to deposit the Ex. Head Constable
Chamel Singh Vs. Kuldeep Bhatia, Advocate & Ors.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “The learned District Forum after appreciation of oral as well as documentary
evidence on record has returned findings that the complainant has failed to prove that there
was any deficiency of service or unfair trade practice on the part of the opposite party. In the
facts and circumstances of the present case, no fault can be found in the findings returned by
the learned District Forum. As a sequel of our above discussion, we hold that the impugned
order dated 31.10.2019 passed by the learned District Forum, Kangra at Dharamshala does
not suffer from any legal infirmity and as such, the instant appeal filed by the
appellant/complainant is devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The parties are,
however, left to bear their own costs.”

ANALYSIS

The complainant in this case is feeling aggrieved by the professional misconduct of the
opposite party who was engaged by him to prosecute his before the Central Administrative
Tribunal against his department. Before filing the instant complaint, the complainant had
filed a complaint against the opposite party before the Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh
under the provisions of Advocates Act, 1961 for his professional misconduct. The opposite
party has claimed that the said complaint has already been dismissed by the Bar Council. On
the other hand, the complainant has not placed on record any material to show the outcome of
his complaint. In view of this, the version of the opposite party that the complaint filed by the
complainant against him was dismissed by the Bar council has to be accepted. In these facts
and circumstances, we are of the opinion that since the complainant has already
unsuccessfully availed a statutory remedy it is not proper for any fora under Consumer Ex.
Head Constable Chamel Singh Vs. Kuldeep Bhatia, Advocate & Ors.
 7. AAKASH SRIVASTAVA VS STATE OF HP AND ORS ON
20 JULY, 2021, 4423 OF 2020 A/W

FACTS

1. Dr. Radha Krishan Government Medical College, Hamirpur, H.P. Vide notification
dated 22.4.2016 (Annexure P-12), Department of Medical Education, Government of
Himachal Pradesh, framed terms and conditions for the appointment of Professor,
Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, Tutors, Senior Residents and Junior
Residents (on contractual basis), in the newly opened Government Medical College
2. In the year, 2016, Director, Medical Education and Research, Himachal Pradesh,
issued an advertisement inviting therein applications from candidates fulfilling the
eligibility criteria for selection of Senior Residents in various specialties of Pt.
Jawahar Lal Nehru Govt. Medical College, Chamba and Dr. Radhakrishnan
Government Medical College, Hamirpur, H.P., on tenure basis initially for a period of
six months through walk-in-interview (Annexure P-13). In the aforesaid
advertisement, it stood specifically mentioned/prescribed that tenure of Senior
Residency can be extended upto three years as per performance.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “Allowing the respondents to bar the "repeat tenure" against the post of Sr.
Resident/tutor in the opposite feeder channel, would render all the previous service rendered
by the petitioners and other similarly situate persons redundant/effaced. Moreover,
petitioners, despite falling in the relevant point of roster, as meant for them vis-à-vis the
promotional post of Assistant professor would be completely ousted from the categories,
who, otherwise are eligible to be promoted against post of Assistant Professor under 50 %
quota mentioned for promotion. As a corollary, this Court finds illegality and infirmity in the
afore condition barring the "repeat tenure" to the petitioners, against the contractual post of
Residents/tutors/tutor specialist and as such, same is declared arbitrary and unjust and
accordingly, same deserves to be quashed and set-aside, as a consequence of which, selected
candidates against the post concerned are required to be offered letters of appointment
forthwith by the respondents provided the initial selection of the candidate concerned is /was
in complete adherence of the relevant norms.”

ANALYSIS

In the aforesaid clause of essential qualification, a candidate aspiring to be recruited against

the direct quota besides having basic qualification also needs to have three years teaching
experience as Lecturer, Registrar and Demonstrator and Resident after doing post-graduation
in the concerned speciality in any recognised medical college. Had the respondent included
category of Sr. Residents/tutors in the aforesaid clause, Sr. Resident/tutor after having
completed their three years period would have otherwise become eligible to be appointed
against the post of Assistant Professor. However, in the case at hand, neither Sr.
Resident/Tutor have been held entitled to be considered to be appointed against the post of
Assistant Professor under direct quota nor they have been kept as one of the feeder categories
among other two feeder.
 8. LAKSHMI MURDESHWAR PURI VS SAKET GOKHALE
ON 13 JULY, 2021, CS(OS) 300/2021

FACTS

1. The plaintiff joined the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) in 1974. She served as
Ambassador to Hungary as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plaintiff served as
an Indian diplomat for 28 years. She demitted public service in February, 2018.
2. During her tenure with the UNCTAD in Geneva, the plaintiff decided to purchase
Apartment No. 4A, Residence Prevert, Chemin des Couleuvres, 1295, Tannay,
Switzerland.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 36 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “the right of the defendant to respond, on affidavit, to the allegations
contained in the present application, cannot be denied. As such, even while disposing of this
application with the directions that follow, the right of the defendant to seek modification or
vacation of this order, by following the procedure prescribed in law in that regard, shall
remain reserved. Any application moved for the said purpose shall, needless to say, be
decided on its own merits.”

ANALYSIS

The damage that the plaintiff, and her husband, have suffered, as a result of the tweets of the
defendant is apparent; but that is one of the unavoidable pitfalls of access to social media
platforms and the way in which they work, by those who abuse their facility, as the defendant
has, in the present case, prima facie chosen to do. The two decisions on which Mr. Naveed
chose to rely do not advance the case of the defendant at all. They merely highlight the
importance of transparency with respect to the affairs, financial and otherwise, of those
intending to contest elections. There can, quite obviously, be no cavil in that regard. As
already noted hereinbefore, I have scrutinised the affidavits filed by the plaintiff's husband
while standing for elections, and I do not, prima facie, find any concealment therein. Mr.
Maninder Singh is correct in his submission that there is no column, in the said affidavits,
which would require including the details of the finances provided by the plaintiff's daughter
towards purchase of the Swiss Apartment. In any event, given the exhaustive disclosures
contained in the affidavits filed by the plaintiff's husband, as well as by the plaintiff herself in
her Income Tax returns, it can hardly be said, prima facie, that the plaintiff, or her husband,
were less than candid in declaring not only the purchase of the Swiss Apartment, but its value
as well as the source from which funds were obtained for the said purpose, so as to justify the
tirade launched against them by the defendant, by his unending series of tweets.
 9. TANUJA KANTHULA VS STATE ON 15 JUNE, 2021,
CRL. O.P. NO. 10387 OF 2021

FACTS

1. The whole melee started only after issuance of the challan. It is the allegation of the
prosecution that on the challan being issued, the 2nd petitioner quarreled with the
police officials on duty and, thereafter, had a telephonic conversation, which resulted
in the arrival of the 1st petitioner at the scene in another car. 
2. The resultant scene thereafter is history, which was flashed throughout the length and
breadth of the State by the visual media. The overall picture of the said scene,
according to the prosecution, is that the 1st petitioner, claiming and proclaiming that
she is an advocate, used filthy, abusive and unparliamentary language, used
derogatory words and castigated the police officials on duty and in fact threatened
them that they will be stripped off their uniforms, if they tried to intervene and cause
any hindrance to the movement of the petitioners.

ISSUE

Whether the Bar Council of a State is "a person aggrieved" to maintain an appeal
under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 hereinafter called the Act?

RULE

Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961

JUDGEMENT

It was held that “In the above stated scenario, if this Court fails to take any action against the
said individual, Mr. R.Krishnamoorthy, it would have a cascading  effect of eroding the faith
that the general public have on the justice delivery system and also push the judicial system
into doldrums. In such a backdrop, this Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case where this
Court has to initiate criminal contempt as provided u/s 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
Accordingly, the Registry is directed to issue notice regarding initiation of Suo Motu
Criminal Contempt proceedings against the said Mr.R.Krishnamoorthy as provided for u/s 14
of the Contempt of Courts Act and, thereafter, place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief
Justice for being listed before the appropriate Bench for hearing.”

ANALYSIS

The said provision speaks only about the complaint received on which action is initiated by
the Bar Council. However, insofar as instances, which comes to the knowledge of the Bar
Council for which no complaint is received by the Bar Council, it is not clear as to what is the
mechanism by which the Bar Council initiates action against the concerned member, if at all
it initiates any action against such erring members. It is also not clear from the status report as
to the Suo motu powers of the Bar Council in dealing with such instances, where the
unprofessional act comes to the knowledge of the Bar Council, though not on the basis of a
complaint, in which cases, the matters such as these go unnoticed, though it is in the public
domain and reaches the ears and eyes of the public through the visual media. However, the
status report is silent, which would only lead to the inference that generally no action is taken
against such persons, if there is no complaint before the Bar Council. It is evident from the
said status report that the mechanism revolves around the provisions of the Advocates Act. It
is the fair submission on behalf of the Bar that action is taken only on the complaint being
received by the Bar Council against any erring advocate. However, what this Court is more
bothered about is the fact that not all unprofessional conduct or other misconducts lead to a
complaint being written by the Bar Council.
 10. L.C. G O Y A L V. MRS. S U R E S H J O S H I &
ORS

FACTS

1. The respondent had engaged the appellant, who is a practicing Advocate of the High
Court of Delhi as well as an Advocate on Record, for filing a suit for injunction in the
Delhi High Court. Having done as instructed, the appellant is alleged to have charged
a fee amounting to Rs. 25,491/-, and also a further sum of Rs.6,500/- out of which
Rs.3,500/- was paid through cheque and a sum of Rs.3,000/- in cash, which the
respondent duly paid.
2. In 1992 the respondent came to know that the appellant had not deposited the process
fee and also did not press the application for interim injunction filed in the suit.
3. It was later found on enquiry by the respondent that the appellant had misappropriated
a sum of Rs. 25,102/- and also did not take any steps towards the progress of the case.
The appellant thereafter issued a cheque dated 31.3.93 for a sum of Rs. 38,000/- on
account of refund of court fee amount along with interest. The cheque
was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds.
4. All further communications sent by the respondent was ignored and under such
circumstances the complainant filed a complaint before the Delhi Bar Council.
Since the said complaint could not be decided within the stipulated time it stood
transferred to Bar Council of India.
5. The Bar Council of India having found that the appellant has committed professional
misconduct, suspended his license to practice for a period of five years vide its order
dated 02.03.1998. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed an appeal before
the Apex Court.

ISSUE

Whether purposely failing to show the exact amount of court fee to be paid on the plaint with
the intention to misappropriate money amounts to misconduct?

RULE
JUDGEMENT

The Court addressed all the issues raised by both the parties, including the claims of the
appellant that the respondent had allegedly falsified the signature on the
dishonoured cheque. The Court was in agreement with the finding recorded by the Bar
Council and were of the view that the aforesaid established circumstances clearly show that
exact amount of court fee to be paid on the plaint was purposely kept vague and
subsequently three pages were substituted so that the complainant may not able to know the
exact amount of court fee paid on the plaint. The Apex Court went on to hold that: “The
legal profession is known as a noble profession having high traditions and has been
catering to the need of the society for a very long time past. Thus, the members of this
profession are expected to uphold those traditions and serve the society with sincerity and
honestly. If such are the expectations from a noble profession, its members must conduct
themselves which may be worthy of emulation. By doing any act which is contrary to the
accepted norms and standards of this profession, a member of the profession not only
discredits himself, but also brings disrepute to the profession to which he belongs.”

ANALYSIS

On the appellant’s counsel having given an undertaking on behalf of the appellant to the
effect that the appellant would conform to the standards of the legal profession, and due to
the fact that he has deposited a sum of Rs. 40,000/- to be paid to the respondents, The
Supreme Court modified the order of the Disciplinary Committee, of suspending the
appellants licence to practice for a period five years and reduced it to two and a half years,
provided the appellant also deposits interest on Rs. 38,000/ - w.e.f 31.03.1993 till the date
of payment of money to the plaintiffs @ Rs. 9% per anum.
 11. H A R I S H CH A N D R A T I W A R I V. B A I J U

FACTS

Appellant was enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of state of U.P in
May,1982, and has been practicing ever since. Appellant was engaged by Baiju
respondent, in a land acquisition case in which the respondent was claimant for
compensation. Compensation of Rs. 8,118/- for acquisition of Land of the said
Baiju. Same was deposited by the state in the court. The appellant applied for
releasing the amount and as per the Courts order withdrew the amount on 2 September

1987 but he did not return it to the client to whom it was due nor did he informed
client about the receipt of the amount. When the client got the knowledge of it and
after failing the to get amount written by the Advocate, a complainant was lodged by him
with the Bar Council of the State for initiating suitable disciplinary action against Appellant.
On 12 June 1988, appellant filed a reply to the said complaint accepting the
Representation of the respondent by him and withdrawing of money, but adopted a
defence that he had returned the amount to the client after deducting his fees and
expenses. In addition to this Appellant on 3 August 1988 filed an affidavit before
State Bar Council which stated that the parties had arrived at a compromise. However, the
respondent denied the contents of the affidavit and also denied having received any
amount from the appellant. The matter was then transferred to the Bar Council of India
under section 36B(2) of the Advocate’s Act 1961. The disciplinary committee
conducted enquiry and had concluded that the affidavit dated 3 August, 1988, was
forged and that application was fabricated. The Committee then imposed a
punishment of suspending the Advocate from practice for a period of 3 years.
Aggrieved by this order that an appeal was made before the Apex C ourt under Section 38 of
advocate Act ,1961.

ISSUE

What should be the quantum of punishment to be awarded to the delinquent advocate

in light of the severity of the offense?

RULE
JUDGEMENT

The appeal had been disposed by imposing a punishment of removal of the name of the
appellant from the roll of the advocates. He stands debarred from practicing in any court or
before any authority or person in India.

ANALYSIS

Forgery and Misappropriation of money— lawyer withdrew money ordered as

compensation to the client and did not inform client about the receipt of the amount. Later
forged an affidavit saying that a compromise was struck between the lawyer and the client.

Advocates Act 1961, Section 36B, Disposal of disciplinary proceedings—

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where on the

commencement of the Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1973 (60 of 1973), any
proceedings in respect of any disciplinary matter against an advocate is pending
before the disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council, that disciplinary committee of the
State Bar Council shall dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of
such commencement or within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of
the complaint or, as the case may be, the date of initiation of the
proceedings at the instance of the State Bar Council, whichever is later, failing which such
proceedings shall stand transferred to the Bar Council of India for disposal under sub-
section (1).

Advocates Act 1961, Section 35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct―

(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned
and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the following
orders, namely: ―
a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the
State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed;
b) reprimand the advocate;
 c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit;

d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.

12. V. C. RA N G A D U R A I V. D. G O P A L A N

FACTS

In the present case V. C. Rangadurai was an advocate, Devasenapathy was a 70-year- old
deaf man, and Smt. D. Kamalammal was also in her seventies. They had given Mr.
Rangadurai two promissory notes and had also paid the advocate’s fees as
requested. Despite this, the Advocate neglected to file the lawsuit on time. The limitation
period was over. After spending a long time roaming about the advocate's office, the old
man found that the advocate had misled him by failing to file cases on time even after
collecting the payments and providing false court dates. He lodged a complaint the with
Tamil Nadu State Bar Council's disciplinary committee, which found the advocate guilty
and barred him for six years following an investigation. But the Bar Council of India upheld
the said findings but reduced the period of suspension to one year. Aggrieved by this order,
appeal was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether appellant has committed professional misconduct or not?

2. Whether the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India justified
in holding the appellants guilty of the professional misconduct and punishing him for
the same?
3. Whether the advocate is allowed to undertake free legal aid during the period of his
suspension?

RULE

JUDGEMENT
The Court ordered that the appellant should during the period of suspension, be
debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or person in India. The
Appellant was required to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500/- to the victim of the misconduct
and produce a receipt give an undertaking as directed viz., accepting the suspension
from practice for a year and willingness to undertake work under any legal aid body
in Tamil Nadu and agree to do only free legal and for one year as reasonably directed

by the Board and shall not during that period accept any private engagement.

ANALYSIS

It was clarified by Justice Krishna Iyer in this per curium, as a principle that it is an
obligation on the lawyer entrusted with a case and its brief to follow the principles
of professional ethics and consequently protect the client’s interests. The failure to do
so would be a Professional Misconduct. The Ratio observes that relation between a
lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. The advocate is in the position of
trust. And No free legal aid service during the tim e of suspension. The court
observed no specific ground for interference with the finding of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India. It is the breach of integrity and lack of probity for a
lawyer to wrongfully withhold money of his client an d the appellant has committed
a grave professional misconduct as relation between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India has already
shown leniency and reduced the suspension from 6 to 1 ye ar. Suspension should be
debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or person in India and
and no free legal aid service during the time of suspension.
 13. CH A N D R A S H E K H A R S O N I V. B A R
CO U N C I L O F RA J A S T H A N & O RS.

FACTS

The appellant was accused for the act that he had procured the brief of the
complainant in another case on a fee of Rs 300/- on the representation that he would
secure a favourable report from the Radiologist showing that there was a fracture of
the skull.

It appears that the complainant Bhaniya and his wife Smt. Galki were assaulted as
a result of which they received head injuries. Both of them were examin ed by Dr.
Raman Varma and he referred them to a Radiologist. Dr. Mangal Sharma, Radiologist sent
a report to the Station House Officer that he found nothing abnormal in the X - ray
plate of the complainant Bhaniya but from the X-ray plate of Smt. Galki he
suspected a fracture of the skull and suggested that he should refer the matter to a
Specialist. The appellant approached the complainant with the X-ray plates taken by
Dr. Sharma and promised to get a favourable report if he was engaged as a
counsel and said that Rs 300/- had to be paid to Dr. Sharma.

The appellant then sent the complainant along with a letter to Dr. Sharma to the
effect: “Dear Doctor Sahib, I am sending the man to you with X -ray plate. Your
amount is lying with me. I will come to Jalore in the evening and see you. Please, do his
work and it should be done positively in his favour. Dr. Mangal Sharma sent
another report to the Station House Officer saying: There is fracture in the skull.”
The appellant wrote the letter but he put forward a false plea. He pleaded that he had sent
the letter to one Dr. Surinder Singh Lodha, Homeopath and also Editor of a
newspaper Jan Prahari for publication of an advertisement. He tried to substantiate
his plea by examining Dr. Surinder Singh Lodha and one Mahipal Kumar through
whom he is supposed to have sent the letter. The appellant in his statement stated,
when confronted with the letter, that the words "I am sending the man to you with X - ray
plate" relate to the X-ray plate sent by him to Dr. Lodha, the words "Your amount
is lying with me" relate to Rs. 20/- given to Mahipal for being handed over to Dr.

Appeal under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 before the Apex Court was
directed against an order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
dated January 7, 1977 upholding the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar
Council of Rajasthan, Jodhpur dated July 21, 1974 by which the appellant has been
held guilty of professional misconduct and suspended from practice for a period of three
years under Section 35(c) of the Act.

ISSUE

Whether the Appellant is accused for offering a bribe to the Radiologist and wh ether the
plea taken by the appellant is accepted?

Whether the Appellant is also accused for changing sides in a criminal case?
Whether the ban of three years on the appellant justified?

RULE

JUDGEMENT

The Court found no reason to interfere with the findings of the

Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and hence addresses the
question before it in whole. The Court however felt that the punishment of
suspension from practice for a period of three years to a junior member of the bar
like the appellant is rather severe. The lapse on the part of the appellant was
perhaps due to the fact that in the struggle for existence he had to resort to such
malpractices. The apex Court felt it would meet the ends of justice if they
reduce the period of suspension from three years to one year.

ANALYSIS

The Apex Court in a per curium concur with the Disciplinary Committee. It is not in
accordance with professional etiquette for an advocate while retained by one party to accept
the brief of the other. The judgment does not have any obiter dicta but the Ratio
holds that it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express
consent given by all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts. The appellant
would not have appeared for the other side except with the permission of the
learned Magistrate. Counsel's paramount duty is to the client, and where he finds

that there is conflict of interests, he should refrain from doing anything which would harm
any interests of his client. The State Bar Council however found the appellant guilty
of the second charge viz. that he had procured the brief of the complainant in
another case on a fee of Rs. 300/- on the representation that he would secure a
favourable report from the Radiologist showing that there was a fracture of the skull. The
appellant was guilty of reprehensible conduct. The preamble to Chapter II Part VI
of the Rules lays down that an advocate shall at all times, comfort himself in a
manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, privileged member of the
community and a gentleman. R. 4 of this Chapter provides that an advocate shall use his
best effort to restrain and prevent his client from resorting to sharp and unfair
practices etc. There is a long catena of decisions laying down that offering of bribe
or giving bribe or taking money from the client for the purpose of giving bribe
amounts to grave professional misconduct. It is not in controversy that the appellant
wrote the letter but he put forward a false plea which he has failed to substantiate.
The fact remains that the incriminating letter has been produced by the complainant
and Dr. Sharma who after reading it returned the same to him.
 14. SATISH KUMAR SHARMA V. BAR COUNCIL OF
H.P. (2001) 2 SCC 365) BENCH: - S.V. PATIL, R.C.
LAHOTI

FACTS

 1975 – 76: Appellant secured LL.B. and was appointed as Assistant (Legal) by the
HPSEB.
 1978: Post re-designated as `Law Officer Grade-II’
 6.9.1983: By order, Appellant was to act as advocate of the Board
 13.10.1983: Application seeking enrolment was filed with the Respondent
 28.3.1984: Respondent informed that Appellant does not meet requirement of rules,
and should be first designated as ‘law officer.’ Also requested for order and terms of
appointment.
 11.6.1984: HPSEB modified the earlier order dt. 6.9.1983 which changed the
designation to ‘law officer.’
 9.7.1984: Respondent issued certificate of enrolment.
 8.5.1991: Appellant was given ad hoc promotion to the post of Under Secretary
(Legal)-cum-Law Officer, which order also stated that he would continue to work
in the Legal Cell of the Secretariat of the Board.
 14.1.1993: Appellant promoted as Under Secretary (Legal)-cum-Law Officer on
officiating basis.
 13.9.1993: Respondent called upon Appellant to appear before Committee on
28.9.1993 along with all connected documents in regard to his enrolment as an
advocate.
 27.12.1993: SCN issued to appellant requiring him to explain as to why his enrolment
should not be withdrawn
 25.2.1994: Appellant stated that there was no ground for withdrawal of his enrolment.
 30.1.1995: Appellant promoted as Deputy Secretary (Legal)-cum-Law Officer on ad
hoc basis and was also required to continue to work in the Legal Cell.
 12.5.1996: Respondent passed a resolution unanimously withdrawing the enrolment
of the appellant with immediate effect
  It is this resolution, validity and correctness of which was assailed by the Appellant
before the Hon’ble High Court in the writ petition. The division bench of the
Hon’ble High Court dismissed the writ petition.
 Hence, Appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether the appellant in the course of his full- time employment, did any other
work besides functioning as an advocate on behalf of the board?
2. Whether a salaried employee can be an ‘advocate’ under the Advocates Act?
3. Whether is it an act of professional misconduct?

RULE

JUDGEMENT

the Supreme Court in Satish Kumar Sharma v. Bar Council of Himachal Pradesh9 clarified
the position and held "If a full-time employee is not pleading on behalf of his employer, or if
terms of employment are such that he does not have to act or plead but is required to do other
kinds of functions, then he ceases to be an advocate. The latter is then a mere employee of the
government or the body corporate". Communications between a company and other
professionals can be compelled to be disclosed before any competent authority as no
privilege is extended to other professionals.

According to the judgement:-

 Rule 49 applies where an advocate is a full-time salaried employee of any person,

government, firm, corporation or concern. Indubitably, legislators cannot be styled or
characterized as full-time salaried employees as such, much less of the specified
entities. For, there is no relationship of employer and employee.

 The status of legislators (MPs/MLAs/MLCs) is of a member of the House

(Parliament/State Assembly). The mere fact that they draw salary under the 1954 Act
or different allowances under the relevant Rules framed under the said Act does not
 result in creation of a relationship of employer and employee between the
Government and the legislators, despite the description of payment received by them
in the name of salary.

 Indeed, the legislators are deemed to be public servants, but their status is sui generis
and certainly not one of a full-time salaried employee of any person, government,
firm, corporation or concern as such.

 Even the expansive definition of term ―person in the General Clauses Act will be of
no avail. The term ―Employment may be an expansive expression but considering
the Constitutional scheme, the legislators being elected people‘s representatives
occupy a seat in the Parliament/Legislative Assembly or Council as its members but
are not in the employment of or for that matter full-time salaried employees as such.
They occupy a special position so long as the House is not dissolved.

 The fact that disciplinary or privilege action can be initiated against them by the
Speaker of the House does not mean that they can be treated as full-time salaried
employees.

 Similarly, the participation of the legislators in the House for the conduct of its
business, by no standards can be considered as service rendered to an employer.

ANALYSIS

This writ petition assumes importance as it brings into question the legality of elected
legislative representatives working simultaneously as advocates in a court of law. The
principal contention raised in support by the appellants is that Rule 49 of the Bar Council of
India Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) prohibits advocates from working as a full-
time salaried employee of any person, government, firm, corporation or concern. 

The Apex Court is called upon to either declare that legislators can no longer work
simultaneously as advocates or declare Rule 49 to be unconstitutional and void as an
alternative relief. The judgement deals with the constitutionality of such an overlap while
underlining the independent power of the Bar Council to make rules. 
 15. D. P. CHADHA V. TRIYUGI NARAIN MISHRA AND
ORS (2001) 2 SCC 365) BENCH: - S.V. PATIL, R.C.
LAHOTI
FACTS

 Advocate D.P. Chadha (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) was engaged by Shri
Triyugi Narain Mishra (hereinafter referred to as complainant)to represent the
complainant in an ejection suit. The complainant was running a school in the said
tenanted premises.
 While the proceedings were going on in the Civil Court at Jaipur, the complainant was
contesting for elections in the State of U.P. and was therefore unavailable to appear in
person before the court.
 The appellant who was in possession of a blank vakalatnama and a blank paper, both
signed by the complainant, used the said documents for fabricating a compromise
petition whereby the complainant was made to suffer a decree for eviction. The same
was also used to engage Adv. Anil Sharma as advocate on behalf of the complainant.
 The proceedings of the court and the several documents relating thereto go to show
that the plaintiff company moved an application discharging their advocate and
engaging Adv. Rajesh Jain to represent the plaintiff company.
 The proceedings also shows that a deliberate attempt have been made by the three
erring advocates to avoid the appearance of the complainant before the court, to
prevent the complainant from gathering knowledge of the compromise filed in court
and creating a situation whereby the court was compelled to pass a decree though the
court felt suspicious of the compromise and wanted presence of complainant to be
secured before the decree was passed.
 The complainant moved the State Bar Council for professional misconduct against the
three advocates who had colluded to bring the false compromise in existence without
his knowledge and for preventing the complainant from gathering knowledge of the
alleged compromise.
 After examination of the witnesses and relevant documents and affording the parties
right to cross examination the State Bar Council found the appellant guilty. The
appellant was suspended from practice for a period of five years. Adv. Anil Sharma
 was also proceeded against along with the appellant and he too having been found
guilty was reprimanded.
 An appeal being preferred by the appellant to the Bar Council of India under Section
37 of the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as Act), the appeal was
dismissed and punishment was enhanced from suspension of practice from five years
to ten years.
 Hence, the appellant preferred the instant appeal before the Supreme Court by virtue of
Section 38 of the Act.

ISSUES
1) Whether appellant is liable for professional misconduct?
2) Whether the power exercised by Bar Council of India to vary the order of the State
Bar Council and enhance the punishment without affording the appellant an
opportunity to be heard sustainable?

RULE

JUDGEMENT
The appellant was found guilty of professional misconduct but since the Bar Council of India
failed to follow the principles of fair hearing its order was set aside and the order of the State
Bar council was restored

ANALYSIS

The bench opined that even though ‘misconduct’ has not been defined in the Act but it is an
expression with a sufficiently wide meaning considering the prime position which the
advocates occupy in the process of administration and justice delivery system and therefore
the courts justifiably expect from the lawyers a high standard of professional and moral
obligation in discharge of their duties. The Court also quoted an old saying which compared
the court and counsel to the two wheels of justice wherein the judges hold the reigns and the
opponent counsels act as wheels of the chariot and the mutual confidence in discharge of the
duties is what facilitates the movement of the chariot. Further, the court also stated that any
act or omission on the part of a lawyer which interrupts or misdirects the sacred flow of
justice or which renders a professional unworthy of right to excise the privilege of the
profession would amount to misconduct attracting the wrath of disciplinary jurisdiction.

16. NORATANMAN COURASIA V. M. R. MURALI,

(2004) 5 SCC 689 BENCH: CJI, S.B. SINHA, S.H.
KAPADIA.

FACTS

 The relationship between the appellant and the respondents herein is that of landlords
and tenant, A rent control proceeding was initiated by the respondents against the
appellant. While the rent control proceeding was pending in the small causes court,
they allegedly mis-conducted themselves by reason of following acts of omissions
and commissions.
 On 8.10.1993 when the appellant came out of the court hall of the said court, after
attending the appeal pending there, the first respondent allegedly came from behind
and hit him on his back and ran away.
 On 26.10.1993 while the appellant was coming out of the court hall, the first
respondent accompanied with some rowdy elements threatened to kill him. The matter
was allegedly reported to the police on the same day.
 On 1.3.1995 when the learned Xth Judge left for his chamber during the lunch break
and while the appellant was leaving the court hall along with his advocate Shri S.
Vijayranjan, the first respondent kicked him on the knee of his left leg in the court
room with an intention to cause injury and further asked him not to appear in the court
for evidence.
 The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu upon receipt of the said
complaint of the appellant herein initiated a proceeding. The matter ultimately
appeared to have been transferred to the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of
India

ISSUES

1. Whether the act of the advocate amounted to misconduct, the action against which
could be initiated in the Bar Council, even though he was not acting in the capacity of
an advocate?
RULE

JUDGEMENT

the Supreme court has held that misconduct has not been defined in the Advocates Act, 1966
but misconduct envisages breach of discipline, although it would not be possible to lay down
exhaustively as to what would constitute misconduct and indiscipline which, however, is
wide enough to include wrongful omission or commission, whether done or omitted to be
done intentionally or unintentionally.

ANALYSIS

In this particular case the bench explored the amplitude and extent of the words “professional
misconduct” in Section 35 of the Advocates Act. The facts of the case involved an advocate
(appearing as a litigant in the capacity of the respondent, and not an advocate in a rent control
proceeding) assaulted and kicked the complainant and asked him to refrain from proceeding
with the case.

Here, the Apex Court stated that the Advocates Act does not define the term ‘Misconduct’,
but misconduct pictures and includes the breach of discipline. The Advocate in this case
kicked the complainant, assaulting him, and then asked the complainant to abstain from
carrying on with the case. The Apex Court stated that it is an obligation on the lawyers to
follow the norms and rules related to behaviour. This type of behaviour was held unfit for any
professional.
 17. IN THE MATTER OF MR. ‘A’ AN ADVOCATE, AIR
1962 SC 1337M BENCH: M THAKKAR, B RAY

FACTS

The Advocate proceeded against for professional misconduct was enrolled as an advocate of
the Allahabad High Court in December 1958. In January 1961, he was enrolled as an
advocate of this Court. The proceedings against him were taken in accordance with the
procedure laid down in O. IV-A of the Supreme Court Rules. I March 1961 the Registrar of
this Court received a letter, marked 'Secret', from Secretary to the Government of
Maharashtra, in the Department of law & Judiciary, to the effect that the "Advocate on
Record" of the Supreme Court had addressed a post-card, dated January 1, 1961, to the
Minister of Law of the State of Maharashtra, which "constitutes a gross case of advertisement
and solicitation for work." The original post-card was enclosed with the letter, with the
request that the matter may be placed before the Chief Justice and the other Judges of the
Supreme Court for such action as to their Lordships may seem fit and proper.

The perusal of the letter suggests that the Advocate on record was addressing letter to the
Government of Maharashtra stating his knowledge and achievements thereby soliciting briefs
from them. When the matter was placed before the Chief Justice, he directed the Registrar
informally to enquire from the Advocate concerned, whether he had written the post-card in
question and bore his rubber stamp and signature. The Registrar called him, and in answer to
his queries, the Advocate admitted that the post-card bore his rubber stamp and signature and
that he had in fact dispatched it. He also informed the Registrar that he had addressed similar
post-cards to other parties. The Advocate added that he did not realise that in addressing
those post-cards he was committing any wrong or breach of etiquette.

The Chief Justice, on receiving the aforesaid information, placed the matter before a
Committee of three Judges of this Court, under r. 2, O. IV-A. The Committee considered the
matter referred to it, and on receiving its opinion, the Chief Justice constituted a Tribunal of
three members of the Bar, Shri Bishan Narain and Shri A. Ranganadham Chetty, Senior
Advocates, and Shri I. N. Shroff, Advocate, with Shri Bishan Narain as its President, for
holding the necessary enquiry into the alleged conduct of the Advocate proceeded against. In
reply to the notice served on the Advocate, he chose to behave in a most irresponsible way by
alleging that the complaint in question by the Government of Maharashtra "is false, mala fide
and misconceived". He denied that he had written the letter in question, which he
characterised as "the work of any miscreant". He added further that even if it were proved
that the letter in question had been written by him, a mere perusal of it would show that there
was nothing unprofessional or otherwise objectionable in it, and he added further that
"certainly it is not solicitation of work if one inquires from any person whether it requires or
wishes and agrees to have the services of another advocate".

The Advocate was examined as witness on his own behalf and the Tribunal put the post-card
to him. The Tribunal then asked few questions from the Advocate pertaining to the letter to
which he answered in affirmative. Finding that the Advocate was adamant in his denial that
he wrote the post-card or that he had made any statement before the Registrar, the Tribunal
called the Registrar as a witness and examined him on solemn affirmation. The Registrar
gave his evidence and fully supported his previous report that the Advocate had made those
admissions before him. After ascertaining and examining oral and documentary evidence, the
Tribunal held the Advocate guilty of Professional Misconduct and ordered five years
suspension for the same. To which the appeal was made by the Advocate challenging the
previously mentioned order of the Tribunal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES
1. Whether the addressing of a letter by the Advocate, stating his specialized knowledge in
legal profession to the Government of Maharashtra, soliciting their briefs, violates Rule
36 to Section IV of Chapter II of the BCI Rules, 1975?
2. Whether the Advocate in the present case is guilty of Professional Misconduct under
Section 35 of the Advocate Act, 1961?

RULE

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court held that writing letters stating his specialized knowledge for getting
brief violates theRule 36 to Section IV (Duty to Colleagues) of Chapter II (Standards of
Professional Conduct and Etiquette) of Part VI (Rules Governing Advocates) of the BCI
Rules, 1975. The previously mentioned act is punishable under Section 35 of the Advocate
Act, 1961.The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal against the Advocate for
the Punishment of five years being guilty of professional misconduct. The Supreme Court
held that he fully deserves the punishment of suspension from practice for five years. This
punishment will give him enough time and opportunity for deciding for himself, after deep
deliberation and introspection, whether he is fit to continue to be a member of the legal
profession. In our view, he is not. Let him learn that a lawyer must never be a liar.

ANALYSIS

The Advocate addressing letter to the government stating his knowledge and achievements in
the legal field for getting briefs is a grave professional misconduct. The misconduct attracts
Rule 36, Section IV, Chapter II, Part VI of the BCI Rules, 2008 and is thus punishable under
Section 35 of the Advocate Act, 1961 he is ignorant of the elementary rules of professional
ethics, he has demonstrated the inadequacy of his training and education befitting a member
of the profession of law. If he knew that it was highly improper to solicit a brief and even
then, wrote the post-card in question, he is a very unworthy member of the learned
profession. In any view of the matter, he does not appear to be possessed of a high moral
calibre, which is essential for a member of the legal profession.
 18. SAMBHU RAM YADAV V/S HANUMAN DAS
KHATRY, AIR 2001 SC 2509 BENCH: K.T. THOMAS,
Y.K. SABHARWAL

FACTS

 Complaint filed by the appellant against the advocate Mr. Hanuman Das Khatry
(respondent) before the Bar Council of Rajasthan.
 Allegation- The advocate wrote a letter to his client that the Judge who had to decide
his case accepts bribe and to give Rs. 10,000/- for a favourable decision.
 Contentions of respondent-advocate- No bribe was actually given to the Judge the
Judge was himself terminated on charges of taking illegal gratification. Hence there
was no serious misconduct by the advocate.
 Appeal made to the BCI under Sec 37 of the Advocates Act 1961. BCI directed his
name to be struck off and he be permanently debarred from practicing.
 Advocate filed a review under Sec 44 of Advocates Act and the BCI accepts the
review application. (Sec 44 states that the disciplinary committee of the BCI may
review its order within 60 days from the date of passing the order).
 Appeal made to Supreme Court under Sec 38 of Advocates Act.

ISSUES

Whether the disciplinary committee, in exercise of its review powers, could alter the initial
order of suspension?

RULE

JUDGEMENT

The duties of an Advocate are prescribed under Part VI of the BCI Rules and one of the
foremost duties is to conduct the functions and plead or act in a dignifies manner, to respect
& maintain dignity of the court and uphold client’s interests. The legal profession is based on
honesty and integrity of an Advocate and the Advocates Act 1961 has cast a responsibility on
the authorities to take action wherever it seems that the credibility & reputation of the
profession is eroded by certain persons or members of the Bar Associations. The advocate
had spent more than 50 years in legal profession and he is expected to have high moral
standards instead of dishonouring the profession. The Supreme Court held that the earlier
decision of the BCI was based on cogent evidences and relevant considerations.Also, in
review petition the BCI cannot take a different view upon the same facts as done by it in this
case. Hence, original order of the BCI was restored by the Apex Court and he was
permanently restrained from practicing.

ANALYSIS

The provisions of Section 35 of the Advocates Act deal with professional misconduct of
lawyers and advocates in India. A person is found guilty of professional misconduct; it shall
refer the case to a disciplinary committee, issue a show cause notice to the Advocate and the
Advocate General of the State. In the present case the advocate wrote a letter stating that the
concerned judge, before whom he suits is pending accepts bribes, and asked for Rs. 10,000 to
bribe and influence the judge to obtain a favourable order.
 19. PANDURANG DATTATRAYA KHANDEKAR VS
BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA, AIR 1984 SC 110
BENCH: A SEN, E VENKATARAMIAH, R MISRA

FACTS

 The complainants alleged various acts of professional misconduct against the

appellant and Agavane. According to them, the appellant and Agavane sometimes
impersonated as other advocates for whom the briefs were meant and at times they
directly approached the clients and adopted questionable methods charging exorbitant
fees.
 On January 7, 1974 the appellant and Agavane are alleged to have got the remarriage
of a couple S.B. Potdar and Smt. Leelawati Dhavale performed although their divorce
was not legal. The accusation is that the appellant and Agavane induced Potdar and
Smt.
 Dhavale to part with Rs. 100 towards their professional fee on the faith of an
assurance that the affidavit sworn by them before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Poona to the effect that they had divorced their respective spouses and had got
married at Poona on January 7, 1974 as per Hindu rites would be sufficient proof of
their marriage.
 On February 22, 1974 the appellant and Agavane drew up an affidavit containing a
recital that Smt. Sonubai Girju Valekar of Loni Bhapkar, Tehsil Baramati, District
Poona had made a gift of her lands to her grand-daughter Smt. Mangala Ramesh
Ghorpade.
 The charge is that she had met all the lawyers except these two and all of them
advised her to give the market value of the land intended to be gifted and pay ad
valorem stamp duty thereon indicating the amount of stamp duty and the registration
charges payable, but these two lawyers told her that she should not unnecessarily
spend a large amount over the stamp duty and registration charges and they would
instead have the work done within an amount of Rs. 50 which was finally settled at
Rs. 45.
 Group of 12 advocate practicing in two courts of S.D. Ms in the collectorate of Pune
are the complainants both the state bar council and Bar Council of Delhi through
its disciplinary committee found the appellant and one Agvane Guilty of giving
 improper legal advice and held the charge of professional misconduct provided the
and suspended the appellant for a period of 4 months and Agvane for a period of 2
months therefrom. Hence, an appeal was preferred.

ISSUES

1. Whether appellant has committed professional misconduct or not any other conduct?
2. Whether there was any evidence upon which the Disciplinary Committee could
reasonably find that they have been guilty of 'professional misconduct' within the
meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Act?

RULE

JUDGEMENT
The appellant court found that they were not guilty of professional misconduct. The sentence
awarded by the disciplinary committee of the bar council of India suspending the appellant
for a period of 4 months and Agvane for a period of 2 months was set aside. The proceedings
drawn against them under Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 are
dropped.

ANALYSIS
The First charge was that the appellant was guilty of drawing up a false affidavit to the effect
that Potdar and Smt. Dhavale had been married at Poona on January 7, 1974 according to
Hindu rites although no such marriage was ever performed. The affidavit was signed by both
the parties before the sub divisional magistrate. It stated that “we have today married at
Poona as per Hindu rites”. They both appeared before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and
verified the affidavit Ex. C-13 to be true to their personal knowledge. They were both
anxious to leave Poona and brought a document styled as a marriage certificate obtained
Under Section 5 of the Bombay Registration of Marriages Act, 1953 under which even Hindu
marriages have to be registered.
Analyzing the evidence of record, the Court observed that it is difficult to believe that Potdar
and Smt. Dhavale could be made upon to swear an affidavit of the kind unless it was prepared
on their instructions. Further, the Court held that there is nothing unprofessional for an
advocate to draft an affidavit on the instructions of his client. Further, the Court relied on
certain facts to say that the appellant prepared the false affidavit upon the instructions of their
client. However, the concern is whether drawing up of false affidavit even upon the
instruction of parties’ amounts to professional misconduct when the advocate knows that the
statement in the affidavit is false.

20.