University of Helsinki, Main Building

8-13 June 2015

 Printed by Hakapaino Oy

Layout design: Anita Välikangas (Idepap Oy)

Text editing: Ilona Nevalainen (Academic Events Finland Ltd),
Mikko E. Virtanen (Ruesdahl) and Päivi Seppälä (Academic Events Finland Ltd)
Welcome4
Organizers and sponsors 6
Programme10
Pre-conference Workshops 
& Tutorials 48
Index to Poster Session 61
TSC 2015 East-West Forum Posters 82
Keynote Lectures 86
Plenary Lectures 89
Symposiums101
Workshop Demos 144
Abstracts146
TSC 2015 East-West
Forum Abstracts 373
Practical information 396
Registered Participants 400
Name index 406
Conference Rooms 414
Map of Helsinki 418
W e l co m e

Welcome

We would like to welcome you warmly to ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness 2015’, the 21st
annual international, interdisciplinary conference on the fundamental questions connected
with conscious experience.
Toward a Science of Consciousness (TSC) is the largest and longest-running interdiscipli-
nary conference emphasizing broad and rigorous approaches to the study of conscious aware-
ness. Topical areas include neuroscience, philosophy, psychology, biology, quantum physics,
meditation and altered states, machine consciousness, and culture and experiential phenom-
enology. Cutting edge, controversial issues receive special attention. Held annually since 1994,
the TSC conferences alternate yearly between Tucson, Arizona and various locations around
the world. The University of Helsinki is proud to host TSC 2015 in the Great Hall of its neo-
classical main building located in the downtown area.
The first conference was held in 1994 in Tucson and continues to be held in Tucson in
even-numbered years, alternating with TSC conferences in collaboration with groups in vari-
ous locations around the world: 1995–Ischia, Italy; 1997–Elsinore, Denmark; 1999–Tokyo,
Japan; 2001–Skövde, Sweden; 2003–Prague, Czech Republic; 2005– Copenhagen, Denmark;
2007–Budapest, Hungary; 2009–Hong Kong, China; 2011– Stockholm, Sweden; 2013 Agra,
India. The next conference in this series, with a new title “The Science of Consciousness”, will
take place in Tucson April 25-30, 2016.
TSC conferences continue to bring together various fields approaching the issue of con-
sciousness from different perspectives, orientations and methodologies. These include not
only academic subjects within the social and natural sciences, medicine and humanities, but
also contemplative and experiential traditions, arts and culture. TSC aims to integrate these
disciplines, bridge gaps and pursue relevant details in the spirit of a genuine dialogue.

4 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 W e l co m e

We are very pleased about the attention that TSC 2015 has received and the number of
leading thinkers from different areas of study that we have managed to secure as the keynote
and plenary speakers. We received 585 high quality submissions for the conference, of which
we have been able to accept 416, making the acceptance percentage 71%. We are most grateful
for your support and look forward to meeting you in Helsinki!

Enjoy Helsinki!
On behalf of the local organizing committee

Paavo Pylkkänen (chair)

Tuomas Tahko (co-chair)
Päivi Seppälä (conference manager)

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 5

O r g ani z ers and sponsors

Organizers and sponsors

– warm thanks to everyone!

Local organizers
• Finnish Society for Scientific Metaphysics
• Division of Theoretical Philosophy (Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art
Studies, University of Helsinki). 

Co-organizers
• the Center for Consciousness Studies, the University of Arizona
• the Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, Sweden.
• Centre for Consciousness Studies, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Deemed University

Programme Committee
Paavo Pylkkänen, chair (University of Helsinki and University of Skövde)
Stuart Hameroff, co-chair (University of Arizona)
Tuomas Tahko, co-chair (University of Helsinki)

Harald Atmanspacher (CH Zürich and  Freiburg University)

Petri Ala-Laurila (Aalto University, Espoo)
Stefan Berglund (University of Skövde)
Ron Chrisley (University of Sussex)
Ivan M. Havel (CTS, Charles University, Prague)
Risto Ilmoniemi (Aalto University, Espoo)
Sakari Kallio (University of Skövde)
Hans Liljenström (SLU Uppsala)
B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (Stockholm University)
Kirsti Lonka (University of Helsinki)
Donnchadh O’Conaill (Durham University)
Tuomas K. Pernu (University of Helsinki)
Mika Perälä (University of Helsinki)
Pauliina Remes (Uppsala University)

6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 O r g ani z ers and sponsors

Pilleriin Sikka (University of Skövde)

Maxim Stamenov (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia)
Peter Århem (Karolinska, Stockholm)

Local Organizing Committee

Paavo Pylkkänen (chair)
Tuomas Tahko (co-chair)
Päivi Seppälä (conference manager)
Ilmari Hirvonen
Tarja Kallio-Tamminen
Ilkka Pättiniemi
Ilona Nevalainen (conference manager’s assistant)

International Advisory Committee

Abi Behar Montefiore (University of Arizona)
Christer Perfjell (Perfjell Foundation)

Special Thanks
Graphic design: Anita Välikangas

Web design: Juho Pääkkönen
Pictures of Helsinki: Visit Helsinki Material Bank

Financial Supporters and Sponsors

• Federation of Finnish Learned Societies (TSV)
• University of Helsinki
• The Center for Consciousness Studies, the University of Arizona
• Centre for Consciousness Studies, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Deemed University

Sponsors: Exhibition and conference materials

• John Benjamins Publishing Company
• Oxford University Press
• Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group
• American Psychological Association / Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research,
and Practice
• Participants have an opportunity to try Shiatsu massage for free, courtesy of Nordic
Shiatsu Centre

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7

O r g ani z ers and sponsors

Conference venue
The conference venue is located in the Main Building of the University of Helsinki (official
address: Fabianinkatu 33). You can access the building either from Fabianinkatu (33) or
Unioninkatu (the Senate Square side). Most of the conference rooms are located on the Sen-
ate Square side, in the old wing of the building.

Registration and information

You will find the conference registration and information desk on the ground floor of the old
side (take the stairs down from the main lobby of the old side when entering from the Senate
Square).

IT IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED, THAT CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PICK UP

THEIR CONFERENCE MATERIAL ON MONDAY TO AVOID THE TUESDAY MORN-
ING RUSH HOUR AT THE REGISTRATION DESK.

The registration desk accepts ONLY CASH PAYMENTS.

The registration and information desk will be in your service

Monday : 8:00 – 20:00

Tuesday: 8:00 – 18:30
Wednesday: 8:00 – 17:00
Thursday: 8:00 – 18:30
Friday: 8:00 – 19:00
Saturday: 8:30 – 15:00

Registration desk phone number: +358440612273.

8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 9
P ro g ra m

Program (printed on 12 May 2015)

MONDAY 8 JUNE

Prem Saran Satsangi


8:00AM-8:00PM Vishal Sahni

Sona Ahuja

Registration Sukhdev Roy

Prakash Sahni

Shiroman Prakas
Welcome to TSC 2015! Before attending Pritam Pyari

conference sessions, please pick up your badge Roy Saran
and conference material at the registration desk! Pyari
Sant
You will find the conference registration and Saran
Dayal
information desk on the ground floor of the old Pyari Srivastava

side of University of Helsinki Main Building (take Dayal Sandhu

the stairs down from the main lobby of the old Suman Kumari

side when entering from the Senate Square). Archana Kapoor

Jyoti Arora

The registration desk accepts ONLY CASH
Ravindra Bhardwaj

PAYMENTS
Prem Pyari

Anoop Srivastava

Venue - Main Building Lobby (old side) Gazal Mathur

Address: Senate Square Sohang Mathur

Sumitra Srivastava

CM Markan

Priti Gupta

8:20AM-6:30PM Seema Bhat

Laxminarayan Bhat
East-West Forum Karan Narain

Mukti Srivastava

Pre-conference workshop Anjoo Bhatnagar

Nihar Srivastav

Speakers Phool Chand Bhatnagar

Vijai Kumar

Stuart Hameroff
 Devendra Chaturvedi

Saran Satsangi

Rocco J. Gennaro
 Namita Bhatia

Bani Dayal Dhir
 Soami Das Bhatia

V. Prem Lata
 Chhavi Gupta
Gopi
Subhash Kak Chand Gupta
Anirban Bandyopadhyay

Mani Bhaumik
 See pp. 376–397 for abstracts and pp. 84–86 East-
John Hagelin

Tarja Kallio-Tamminen
 West Forum poster index
Max Velmans

Douglas E. Friesen
 Venue - Main Building (new side), room 5

1 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 P ro g ra m

9:00AM-12:00PM 9:00AM-1:00PM

MediYoga - a therapeutic Scientific Field Theories of

form of yoga Consciousness – Recent
Pre-conference workshop Developments. Pre-
Speakers
conference workshop
Pre-conference workshop
Daniela Lindqvist
My Yoga
 Speakers
Riitta Mantovaara
Friteko Balans
 Andrew Fingelkurts

Milla Rosengård-Bärlund BM-Science - Brain & Mind Technologies Research Centre


University of Pavia Alexander Fingelkurts

BM-Science - Brain & Mind Technologies Research Centre


Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV Giuseppe Vitiello

University of Salerno


Walter Freeman

Universitiy of California, Berkeley


9:00AM-1:00PM Robert Kozma

University of Memphis
How non-reductionist Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII
monism avoids the
many problems of
reductive physicalism and 9:00AM-1:00PM
functionalism Tutorial on Interval Timing
Pre-conference workshop
 Pre-conference workshop
Speaker
Speaker
Max Velmans

Goldsmiths, University of London Peter Raulefs

R&D, QIQCS, Santa Clara
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XII
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 1 1

P ro g ra m

2:00PM-6:00PM Speaker
Ahmad Sohrabi

Clinical Hypnosis, Meditative University of Kurdistan
Stages and Mantras in Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII
Palliative Care: Techniques
for Effectively Relieving Pain
and Suffering in chronic 2:00PM-6:00PM
illnesses
 Pre-conference workshop
Transcultural Perspective
on Consciousness: a bridge
Speakers between Anthropology,
Paola Brugnoli
 Medicine and Physics
Verona University


Siddhartha Agarwal
 Pre-conference workshop
Saran Ashram Hospital and DEI, Dayalbagh
Speakers
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV
Tania Simona Re 

University of Genoa
Giuseppe Vitiello

2:00PM-6:00PM University of Salerno


Carlo Ventura

University of Bologna

Dual-Aspect Alternatives Juha Pentikäinen

to Physicalism and Their University of Helsinki


Mario Simoes

Implications LIMMIT Laboratory

Martins Jorge Emanuel
Pre-conference workshop 
 IMMIT Laboratory
L

Speakers Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV

Michael Silberstein

Elizabethtown College and UMD
William Seager

University of Toronto


6:15PM-7:45PM
Julian Kiverstein

University of Amsterdam

 Pre-conference keynote
Michael D. Kirchhoff

University of Wollongong

lecture: Basil Hiley
Keynote lecture
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XII
Chair
Paavo Pylkkänen
, Universities of Helsinki and
2:00PM-6:00PM Skövde

Masked and Unmasked Speaker and title

Priming: Insights from Can recent work on weak values in quantum
mechanics provide new insights into the
Recent Experiments and mind-matter relationship?
Neurocomputational Models Basil Hiley, 
Department of Physics, University
College, London, ENGLAND
Pre-conference workshop
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall

1 2 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 TUESDAY 9 JU NE

TUESDAY 9 JUNE

8:00AM-10:30AM
Speakers and titles
Registration Social interaction in the core of human brain
function
Riitta Hari, Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND
Welcome to TSC 2015! Before attending
conference sessions, please pick up your badge You are Part of Me: Conceptual and
and conference material at the registration desk! Embodied Aspects of the Self-Other
You will find the conference registration and Relationship
information desk on the ground floor of the old Lara Maister, Royal Holloway University of
side of the University of Helsinki, Main Building London, ENGLAND
(take the stairs down from the main lobby of the
old side when entering from the Senate Square). Empathy and affective sharing
Dan Zahavi, Department of Media, Cognition
The registration desk accepts ONLY CASH and Communication, University of Copenhagen,
PAYMENTS. DENMARK  

Venue - Main Building, old side lobby Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Address: Senate Square

1:00PM-2:30PM
10:30AM-11:00AM
Lunch
Welcome
Venue - Main Building, foyers
Speakers
Paavo Pylkkänen, 
Universities of Helsinki and
Skövde

 2:30PM-4:35PM
Tuomas Tahko, 
University of Helsinki

Agency, Self and Will
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall Concurrent talks

Chair
11:00AM-1:00PM Peter Forrest
, Oxford University

Plenary: Social Speakers and titles

neuroscience, body Some notions about the connections
between consciousness and self-
perception and consciousness
phenomenology Heidi Haanila, Department of Behavioural
Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku,
Plenary lecture Turku, FINLAND [13]

Chair Projective Simulation and the Taxonomy of

Agency 

Léon Homeyer, Philosophy, University of
Donnchadh O’Conaill
, University of Leeds Stuttgart, Stuttgart, GERMANY
Giacomo Lini, University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart,
GERMANY [104]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 1 3

P ro g ra m

Conscious Intentionality and its First-Person 2:30PM-4:35PM

Knowledge 

Amir Horowitz, History, Philosophy, and Judaic
Studies, The Open University of Israel, R’anana, Dualism vs. Materialism I
ISRAEL [185] Concurrent talks
Agentive experience and knowledge of action
Joshua Shepherd, Philosophy, University of Chair
Oxford, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM [149]
Kim Davies, 
University of Durham

The Effective Power of the Illusion of
Conscious 
Will Speakers and titles
Bradford Stockdale, Philosophy, Florida State
The Ontology of E. J. Lowe’s Substance
University, Tallahassee, USA [119]
Dualism
Alex Carruth, Philosophy, Durham Emergence
Venue - Main Building, auditorium X
Project, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM
Sophie Gibb, Durham University, Durham, UNITED
KINGDOM [41]
2:30PM-4:35PM The Super-Overdetermination Problem

John Donaldson, Philosophy, University of
Attention Glasgow, Glasgow, UNITED KINGDOM [43]

Concurrent talks Zombie Worlds and the Conditional Analysis

Strategy
Jussi Haukioja, Department of Philosophy and
Chair Religious Studies, NTNU Trondheim, NORWAY
[80]
Astrid Schomaecker
, Humboldt Universität Berlin
One-Dimensional versus Two-Dimensional
Speakers and titles Zombies 

Robert Michels, Department of philosophy,
Attentional attractors and visual awareness University of Geneva, Genève, SWITZERLAND

David Carmel, Psychology, University or Edinburgh, [86]
Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM [223]
Fundamentality Physicalism and the
Attention is the Deployment of Extra Intelligibility Constraint
Processing Capacity Gabriel Rabin, Philosophy, ANU; New York
Peter Fazekas, Philosophy / Cognitive University in Abu Dhabi, Canberra, AUSTRALIA
Neuroscience Research Unit, Aarhus University, [68]

Aarhus, DENMARK
Bence Nanay, Centre for Philosophical Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV
Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp,
BELGIUM [235]


Synesthetic Experience and Attention: An 2:30PM-4:35PM

Additional Perspective 

Mila Marinova, Cognitive Science and Psychology,
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, BULGARIA [238]
Emotion I
Concurrent talks
The Occurrent Unpleasantness Of Pains: A
New Representationalist Account 
 Chair
Andrew Melnyk, Department of Philosophy
University of Missouri , Columbia, USA [59] Daniel Shargel, 
Lawrence Technological
University
A case of consciousness without attention?

Henry Taylor, Philosophy, University of Durham,
Durham, UNITED KINGDOM [239]

Venue - Main Building, auditorium I

1 4 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 TUESDAY 9 JU NE

Speakers and titles Tensions in Clark’s and Chalmers’ extended

mind theses
Predictive processing, interoception and Tobias Schlicht, Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-
emotional experience Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY [29]
Jose M. Araya, Philosophy, The University
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM [254] Contemplative Pedagogical Practices for
Transformation in Consciousness
Emotions and the Distinction Sona Ahuja, Dayalbagh Educational Institute,
Between Minimal and Narrative Self: A INDIA
Phenomenological Account Sadhna Sharma, Faculty of Education,
Anna Bortolan, Philosophy, Durham University, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Durham, UNITED KINGDOM [318] [232]

Exploring transformations in affective From Extended Mind to Extended Conscious

consciousness using mixed methods: Mind
The value of incorporating the subjective Pii Telakivi, Philosophy, University of Helsinki,
viewpoint Helsinki, FINLAND [33]
Emily Hammond, Psychology, University of
Exeter, Exeter, UNITED KINGDOM [320] Venue - Main Building, room 3
How can we account for the badness of pain?
Max Hayward, Philosophy, Columbia University,
New York, NY, USA [184] 2:30PM-4:35PM
The early ontogenesis of existential feelings
Jussi Saarinen, Department of Social Sciences Free Will and Personal
and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä,
Jyväskylä, FINLAND [324]
Identity I
Concurrent talks
Venue - Main Building, auditorium III
Chair
Kristjan Loorits, University of Helsinki
2:30PM-4:35PM
Speakers and titles
Extended Mind Conscious Agency and the Preconscious/
Unconscious Self 
Concurrent talks
Max Velmans, Psychology, Goldsmiths,
University of London, London, UNITED
Chair
KINGDOM [164]
Gabriel Rabin, 
ANU; New York University in Abu
Dhabi A neurodynamic perspective on free will,
decision making and downward causation
Speakers and titles Hans Liljenström, The Sigtuna Foundation,
Agora for Biosystems, Sigtuna, SWEDEN [173]
Advaita Vedanta and the Extended Mind
Hypothesis: Panpsychism and Perception an Free Will and Consciousness
Indo-Analytic Inquiry Pakize Arikan Sandikcioglu, Sociology, Nevsehir
Vaidya Anand , Philosophy, San Jose State Haci Bektas Veli University, Nevsehir, TURKEY
University, San Jose, USA [165]
Purushottama Bilimoria, University of California,
Berkeley, Berkeley, USA [241] Specifically human? Agency and the
limitations of a Neo-Kantian picture of self-
A Place for Phenomenal Consciousness in consciousness
the Extended Mind Outlook Irene Bucelli, Philosophy , King’s College
Tom Buller, Philosophy, Illinois State University, London, LONDON , UNITED KINGDOM [154]
Normal, USA [92]
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 1 5

P ro g ra m

2:30 PM-4:35PM Robert Kozma, Memphis University, Memphis

TN, USA
Structure of Consciousness Giuseppe Vitiello, Physics “E.R.Caianiello”,
University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY
Concurrent talks
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV
Chair
Mihretu Guta,
Durham University

Speakers and titles 2:30PM-4:35PM

Parts of Consciousness Language, Communication
Cameron Bosinski, Biology, University of
Hartford, West Hartford, USA [111] and Consciousness
Mentality as a Domain in Consciousness Symposium
Fabrice Bothereau, Lycée, Ministère Education
Nationale, Blois, FRANCE [40] Speakers and titles
Who the Hell is Conscious, and What the Collective activities, social information and
Heck of? – A Constructivist Solution to the consciousness (CANCELLED)
Mind-Body Problem Alexander Almér, University of Gothenburg,
Ilkka Kallio, Independent scholar, Helsinki, SWEDEN
FINLAND [16]
A semiotic basis for consciousness
Towards a Holistic Conception of Jens Allwood, University of Gothenburg,
Phenomenal Consciousness SWEDEN
Holger Thiel, Philosophy, Central European
Degrees and/or levels of conscousness
University Budapest, Berlin, GERMANY [74]
in communication – evidence from
Degrees of Consciousness - Implications for neurolinguistics
Autonomy Elisabeth Ahlsén, SCCIIL Interdisciplinary
Anna Frammartino Wilks, Philosophy, Acadia Center and Division of Communication and
University, Wolfville NS, CANADA [75] Cognition, Department of Applied IT, University
of Gothenburg, SWEDEN
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI Language and consciousness - Unconscious
meanings? Jackendoff’s Unconscious
meaning hypothesis revisited 
Fredrik Stjernberg, University of Linköping,
2:30PM-4:35PM SWEDEN

Consciousness inheres Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII

in intermittent fields of
intensive activity density 2:30PM-4:35PM
in cortical neuropil
that implement the Modelling the Self through
neurodynamics of the Others: Reciprocity,
action-perception cycle Synchronization and
Symposium Predictive Coding
Symposium
Speakers
Walter Freeman, Molecular & Cell Biology,
Universitiy of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

1 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 TUESDAY 9 JU NE

Speakers and titles Time consciousness: how the body and brain
create our experience of time
Predictive Coding and the Social Brain Marc Wittmann, Institute for Frontier Areas
Anna Ciaunica, Philosophy, Institute of of Psychology & Mental Health, Freiburg,
Philosophy - Porto, Porto, PORTUGAL Centre GERMANY 
for the Study of Senses, Institute of Philosophy,
University of London, UK  Venue - Main Building, auditorium II
Mutual awareness and reciprocity in social
interactions as necessary criteria for mental
alignment 4:35PM-5:00PM
Merle Fairhurst, Institute of Philosophy, London,
London, UNITED KINGDOM
Break
Feeling Objects, Persons and Oneself. A      
Case of Peripersonal Space Experience?
Thomas Jacobi, Institute of Philosophy, Basel, Venue - Main Building, foyers
SWITZERLAND

Contextual features in the social experience

of synchronised human movement 5:00PM-6:00PM
Jacques Launay, Experimental Psychology,
University of Oxford, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM  Keynote lecture: Jaakko
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX Hintikka
Keynote lecture

2:30PM-4:35PM Chair
Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki
The Embodiment of the
Conscious Mind: The Speakers and titles
relevance of bodily signals Levels of explanation in neuroscience
for mental processes Jaakko Hintikka, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
and Boston University, USA  
Symposium
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Speakers and titles
Psychophysiological mechanisms
of “embodiment”: The relevance 6:15PM-8:00PM
of‘interoception’ as a basis of the embodied
mind
Beate M. Herbert, Clinical Psychology and
University Reception
Psychotherapy, University of Tuebingen, Ulm, Social Program
GERMANY 
The University of Helsinki welcomes the
Differentiating dimensions of conference participants after the first conference
interoception as a function of conscious day. The welcome reception will be hosted by
access:Implications for affective processing dean Hanna Snellman. After dean Snellman’s
Sarah Garfinkel, Sackler Centre for welcoming speech, conference participants are
Consciousness Science, University of Sussex,
treated to a wine and salad buffet.
Brighton, UNITED KINGDOM (with Critchley
Hugo D) 
Venue - University Main Building, Press Hall
Nonverbal synchrony: Embodiment of mental Foyer
and communicative processes
Wolfgang Tschacher, Department of
Psychotherapy, University Hospital Bern, Bern,
SWITZERLAND (with Ramseyer Fabian) 

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 1 7

P ro g ra m

WEDNESDAY 10 JUNE

8:30AM-10:30AM 11:00AM-12:00PM

Plenary: Dreams, Virtual Keynote lecture: Jean-Pierre

Realities and Hypnosis Changeux
Plenary lecture Keynote lecture

Chair Chair
Hans Liljenström
, Sigtuna Foundation, Agora for
Talis Bachmann
, University of Tartu
 Biosystems

Speakers and titles Speakers and titles

An Integrative Model of Hypnosis:  A 35-year Toward a molecular biology of conscious
Program of Research processing: consequences for drug design 
Steven Jay Lynn, Psychology Department, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Kavli Institute for Brain &
Binghamton University (SUNY), New York, USA Mind UCSD, San Diego, USA Institut Pasteur &
Collège de France, Paris, FRANCE  
Towards a Unified Science of Dreaming and
Consciousness Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Antti Revonsuo, University of Turku, FINLAND
and University of Skövde, SWEDEN

From virtual realities to virtual selves:  12:10PM-1:00PM

Dreams, spatiotemporal self-location, and
minimal phenomenal selfhood
Jennifer M. Windt, Monash University,
Education and personality
AUSTRALIA   Concurrent talks
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall Chair
Pii Telakivi, University of Helsinki

10:30AM-11:00AM Speakers and titles

The impact of Personality Traits on the View
Break of Uniqueness of Consciousness
     Petri Kajonius, Work- and Organizational
Venue - Main Building, foyers Psychology, Department of Psychology,
Trollhättan, SWEDEN [284]

Reflection and becoming aware as a teacher

in academics’ teacher development
Anne Nevgi, Centre for Research and
Development in Higher Educ, University of
Helsinki, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
[369]

Venue - Main Building, auditorium I

1 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 W EDN E SDAY 10 J U N E

12:10PM-1:00PM Chair
Vilius Dranseika
, Vilnius University
Emergence I Speakers and titles
Concurrent talks
Do we have any inference about early visual
Chair representation?
Reza Ebrahimpour, Department of Computer
Jesse Mulder
, Utrecht University Engineering , Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training
University, Tehran, IRAN
Speakers and titles Sajjad Zabbah, School of Cognitive Sciences
(SCS), Institute for Research in Fundamental
The Non-Causal Account of Spontaneous Sciences, Tehran, IRAN
Emergence of Phenomenal Consciousness Amirhossein Farzmahdi, School of Cognitive
Mihretu Guta, Philosophy , Durham University , Sciences (SCS), Institute for Research in
Durham, UNITED KINGDOM [134] Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, IRAN [217]

Language and Ontological Emergence: The influence of visual identification on

Evidence for Ontological Emergence from visual awareness
Linguistics Michal Wierzchon, Institute of Psychology,
James Miller, Philosophy, Durham University, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Durham , UNITED KINGDOM [135] Marta Siedlecka, Institute of Psychology,
Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII Boryslaw Paulewicz, Faculty in Katowice,
University of Social Sciences and Humanities,
Katowice, POLAND [216]

12:10PM-1:00PM Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI

Evolution I
Concurrent talks 12:10PM-1:00PM

Chair Memory I
Tuomas Pernu, University of Helsinki Concurrent talks

Speakers and titles Chair

The overflow model of the evolution of Joel Parthemore
, University of Skövde
consciousness
Ken Mogi, Fundamental Research Laboratory, Speakers and titles
Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo,
JAPAN [230] Non-locality and intuition as the second
foundation of knowledge
EEG Attractor Dimensions. Why so many? Ede Frecska, Psychiatry, University of Debrecen,
Peter Walling, Retired Anesthesiologist, Baylor Debrecen, HUNGARY
Uni Med Center, Bartonville. Texas, USA [302] Luis Eduardo Luna, Wasiwaska Research
Center [220]
Venue - Main Building, auditorium II
Consciousness as Concept-Based and
Dynamic Mental State
Viljo Martikainen, School of Science and
12:10PM-1:00PM Technology, Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND
[24]
Implicit and Explicit Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV
Processes I
Concurrent talks

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 1 9

P ro g ra m

12:10PM-1:00PM 12:10PM-1:00PM

Mental Imagery Seemings and

Concurrent talks Representationalism
Concurrent talks
Chair
Chair
Anna Frammartino Wilks, 
Acadia University
Jennifer Lyke, 
Richard Stockton College
Speakers and titles
Speakers and titles
Mental Imagery as a sign system?
Jelena Issajeva, Ragnar Nurkse School of A Taxonomy of Seemings
Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Jonathan Farrell, Philosophy, University of
Technology, Tallinn, ESTONIA [187] Manchester, Manchester, UNITED KINGDOM [6]

What imagination teaches us about the Presentationalism

subjective perspectivity of consciousness Dirk Franken, Philosophy, University of Stuttgart,
Magdalena Balcerak Jackson, Philosophy / Münster, GERMANY [7] 
Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz,
Konstanz, GERMANY [14] Venue - Main Building, auditorium III

Venue - Main Building, room 3

12:10PM-1:00PM

12:10PM-1:00PM Sleep and Dreaming

Concurrent talks
Quantum Cognition and
Integrative Models Chair
Concurrent talks Sakari Kallio, University of Turku

Chair Speakers and titles

Ilmari Hirvonen, University of Helsinki The phenomenal world of the sleeping
brain: merging Predictive Processing and
Speakers and titles Integrated Information Theory
Alessio Bucci, Philosophy, University of
A Critical Look at Quantum Cognition Edinburgh alumnus (independent), Venezia,
Ilkka Pättiniemi, Department of Philosophy, ITALY
History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Matteo Grasso, Philosophy, Roma 3 University,
Helsinki, FINLAND [147]  Roma, ITALY [123]

How a cyclical structure of interlocking Lucid Dreams and Cognitive Functioning in

dimensions can connect a discrete Pilot Cadets
neurological event to the universe of Nirit Soffer-Dudek, Psychology, Ben-Gurion
conscious experience University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, ISRAEL
Christopher Edwards, unaffiliated, Guelph, Shirley Gordon, Psychology Branch, IDF Medical
CANADA  [299] Corps, Chief Surgeon Headquarters, Israeli Air
Force, Ramat-Gan, ISRAEL [342]
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI

2 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 W EDN E SDAY 10 J U N E

12:10PM-1:00PM 2:30PM-4:35PM

Time and Time Travel Dualism vs. Materialism II

Concurrent talks Concurrent talks

Chair Chair
Pia Tikka
, Aalto University Michael Silberstein, Elizabethtown College and
UMD
Speakers and titles
Speakers and titles
Multi Dimensional Time, Retro Causality and
Consciousness Consciousness as Self-Sensing?:
Allan Emrén, N/A, Nuchem Research AB, Challenging a classical philosophical
Tollered, SWEDEN [292] conception
Deborah Goldgaber, Philosophy, Louisiana State
Virtual time travel: How to go back in time, University, Baton Rouge, USA [12]
kill your grandparents, and get back alive
Doron Friedman, Communications , IDC, The Mind-Brain Identity Theory and the
Herzliya, ISRAEL [364] Explanatory Gap
Donnchadh O’Conaill, Philosophy, University of
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV Leeds, Leeds, UNITED KINGDOM [65]

Compositional subjects: A physicalist

approach to the problem of experience
12:10PM-1:00PM Anand Rangarajan, Computer and Information
Science and Engineering, University of Florida,
Gainesville, USA [69]
Workshop: Go With the Flow
Will our concept of “phenomenal
Demo Workshop consciousness” change?
Astrid Schomaecker, Berlin School of Mind
Speaker and Brain, Humboldt Universität Berlin, Berin,
GERMANY [130]
Naama Kostiner, Hemisphere, Haifa, ISRAEL
Emergent Materialism: An Inflationary
(max. 24 participants). Defense
Philip Woodward, Philosophy, Indiana,
Venue - Main Building, auditorium X University,Bloomington, IN, USA [76] 

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV

1:00PM-2:30PM

Lunch 2:30PM-4:35PM
   
Venue - Main Building, foyers
Free Will and Personal
Identity II
Concurrent talks

Chair
Alessandro Salice
, University of Copenhagen

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 2 1

P ro g ra m

Speakers and titles Speakers and titles

Is this still Julie? Study participant’s Information Integration Theory As a
use of proper names is not indicative of Foundation for a Science of Consciousness
their intuitions about personal identity Andreas Chatzopoulos, University of Turku,
Vilius Dranseika, Dept. of Logic and History Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku,
of Philosophy, Vilnius University, Vilnius, FINLAND [1]
LITHUANIA [155]
Consciousness as information in philosophy
Rethinking libertarianism: Looking for free and neuroscience: Double-Aspect and
will in all the wrong places Integrated Information Theory compared
Joel Parthemore, Dept. of Neuroscience and Matteo Grasso, Philosophy, Communication
Philosophy, University of Skövde, Skövde, and Media Studies, Roma Tre University, Rome,
SWEDEN [174] ITALY [79]
Surfing the waves of the slow cortical Integrated Information Theory, Constructive
potentials – new aspects in the Empiricism, and the metaphysics of
neurophysiological study of free will consciousness
Stefan Schmidt, Dept. Psychosomatic Medicine, Joseph Neisser, Philosophy , Grinnell College,
University Medical Center Freiburg, Freiburg, Grinnell, Iowa, USA [64]
GERMANY
Han-Gue Jo, University Medical Center Freiburg, Coalescing Minds and Personal Identity
Freiburg, GERMANY ,  Harri Valpola, ZenRobotics Ltd, , FINLAND
Marc Wittmann, Institute for Frontier Sciences, Kaj Sotala, Machine Intelligence Research
Freiburg, GERMANY Institute, Helsinki, FINLAND [163]
Thilo Hinterberger, University Medical Center
Regensburg, Regensburg, GERMANY [176] Neural Information as the Amount of a
Description of Consciousness.
The Identity of a Person: a Compatibilist Yoshi Tamori, Human Information System
Argument laboratory, Kanazawa Institute of Technology,
Krzysztof Swiatek, Humanities and Social Hakusan- shi/Ishikawa, JAPAN
Sciences, Athabasca University, Edmonton, Kanna Kakuda, Bio/Chemical Science,
CANADA [161] Kanazawa Institute of Technology, Hakusan-shi/
Ishikawa, JAPAN
Three Versions of Ontological Commitment Yuko Uryu, Bio/Chemical Science, Kanazawa
to the Concept of Free Will Institute of Technology, Hakusan-shi/Ishikawa,
Elzbieta Szymanska-Swiatek, Humanities JAPAN [214]
and Social Sciences, Athabasca University,
Edmonton, CANADA [162]
Venue - Main Building, auditorium I
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI

2:30PM-4:35PM
2:30PM-4:35PM
Introspection and Self-
Integrated Information Consciousness
Theory of Consciousness I Concurrent talks
Concurrent talks Chair
Chair
Jonathan Farrell
, University of Manchester
Ron Chrisley
, University of Sussex
Speakers and titles
Introspective disagreement
Sascha Benjamin Fink, Institute of Philosophy,
University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg,
GERMANY [317]

2 2 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 W EDN E SDAY 10 J U N E

What about self-consciousness’s EEG differences between meditators and

transparency? A study of consciousness’s non-meditators during multistable perception
roles and functions in self-access. Jürgen Kornmeier, Perception and Cognition,
Loraine Gerardin-Laverge, Philosophy, IGPP, Freiburg, GERMANY
University of Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Evelyn Friedel, Section Visual Function,
Lyon, FRANCE [10] University Eye-Hospital, Freiburg, GERMANY
Stefan Schmidt, Klinik für Psychosomatische
The Experiential Paradox of Consciousness Medizin, Freiburg, GERMANY
and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem Harald Atmanspacher, Collegium Helveticum,
Arzu Gokmen, Philosophy, Bogazici University, Zürich, SWITZERLAND Marc Wittmann, IGPP,
Istanbul, TURKEY [11] Freiburg, GERMANY [331]
The Self-Perception Theory 40 Years Later Power Law of Meditational Consciousness
(More or Less) Prem Saran Satsangi, Advisory Committee on
Giuseppe Lo Dico, Psychology, Catholic Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institutions,
University , Milan, ITALY [144] Agra, INDIA 
Vishal Sahni, Centre for Consciousness Studies,
A unified account of self-knowledge Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Lukas Schwengerer, Philosophy, University of [325]
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM [148]
Investigating the Depths of Consciousness
Venue - Main Building, auditorium X Through Meditation. Outlines of
an Interdisciplinary Contemplative
Phenomenology
Terje Sparby, Bender Institute of Neuroimaging,
2:30PM-4:35PM University of Giessen, Gießen, GERMANY [335]

Meditation Venue - Main Building, auditorium III

Concurrent talks

Chair 2:30PM-4:35PM
Pilleriin Sikka, University of Skövde Panpsychism
Speakers and titles Concurrent talks
Long-term meditation alters both visual Chair
responses and resting state fluctuations in
visual and DMN areas Vaidya Anand
, San Jose State University
Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Neurobiology, The
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Speakers and titles
ISRAEL
Michal Harel, The Weizmann Institute of If Matter Matters: Navigating Panpsychism’s
Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL Daunting Moral Implications
Avital Hahami, The Weizmann Institute of E. Alexander Howe, Philosophy, University of
Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL Missouri, Columbia, USA [50]
Amos Arieli, The Weizmann Institute of Science,
Rehovot, ISRAEL Argument against Chalmers’ panpsychism
Rafael Malach, The Weizmann Institute of Anton Kuznetsov, Philosophy Department,
Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL [328] Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow,
RUSSIAN FEDERATION [53]
Where is My Mind? Investigating the Neural
Correlates of Mind Wandering and Meditation Methodology of consciousness
Tracy Brandmeyer, Neuroscience, CNRS, restoration: differentiation or integration?
Toulouse, FRANCE  Arnaud Delorme, Olga Maksakova, rehabilitation, Burdenko
Neuroscience, CNRS, Toulouse, FRANCE [206] Neurosurgical Institute, Moscow, RUSSIAN
FEDERATION [23]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 2 3

P ro g ra m

Why the Panpsychist Argument Against 2:30PM-4:35PM

Emergentism Fails
Jakub Mihalik, Department of Philosophy and
Religious Studies, Charles University, Faculty of Exceptional Experiences
Philosophy, Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC [60] Symposium
Prospects for a science of panpsychism
Giuliano Sterrantino, Philosophy, University of Speakers and titles
Sydney, Sydney, AUSTRALIA [102]
Versions of dual-aspect thinking and mind-
matter correlations
Venue - Main Building, room 3 Harald Atmanspacher, Physics/Philosophy,
Collegium Helveticum Zurich, SWITZERLAND 

How exceptional are “meaningful

2:30PM-4:35PM coincidences”? A neuropsychological view
Peter Brugger, Neuropsychology, University
Physicalism and Hospital Zurich, SWITZERLAND 
Materialism Patterns of exceptional experiences and their
mental representations
Concurrent talks Wolfgang Fach, Psychology, Institute for Frontier
Areas of Psychology, Freiburg, GERMANY 
Chair
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII
Jens Allwood, 
University of Gothenburg

Speakers and titles

Molyneux Question and Sensory Fields
2:30PM-4:35PM
Tony Cheng, Philosophy, University College
London, Taipei, TAIWAN [42] Local and large-scale
Chalmers versus existential phenomenology neuronal dynamics
on experience and reality
Jonathan Knowles, Philosophy and Religious
in conscious sensory
Studies, Norwegian University of Science and perception
Technology, Kolsås, NORWAY [18]
Symposium
The Search for the Location of
Consciousness: Can Structural Realism Speakers and titles
Provide the Answer?
Kristjan Loorits, Theoretical philosophy, Critical neuronal dynamics and local and
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND [56] large oscillations predict conscioussensory
perception
The illusory dualism of consciousness as Satu Palva, Neuroscience Center, University of
wanting Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND 
Merin Nielsen, Philosophy, University of
Queensland, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA [87]  Functional network architectures shape
upcoming perception: the win2conframework
The myth of reductive materialism: a critique Nicholas A. Peatfield, University of Trento,
of Jaegwon Kim Trento, ITALY 
Christoffer Skogholt, Faculty of Theology, Faith-
and worldview studies, Uppsala, SWEDEN [117] A neural mechanism to generate
subjectivity?
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI Catherine Tallon-Baudry, Laboratoire de
Neurosciences Cognitives, Ecole Normale
Superieure, Paris, FRANCE 

2 4 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 W EDN E SDAY 10 J U N E

Distilling the neural correlates of conscious and Biomedical Engineering, Aalto University
perception School of Science, Espoo, FINLAND 
Jaan, Aru Institute of Computer Science,
University of Tartu, ESTONIA  Consciousness and brain complexity: a
perturbational approach
Venue - Main Building, auditorium II Marcello Massimini, Department of Biomedical
and Clinical Sciences, University of Milan, ITALY 

TMS and consciousness: a view from the

2:30PM-4:35PM University of Tartu in Tallinn
Talis Bachmann, University of Tartu, Tartu,
ESTONIA Rutiku Renate, University of Tartu,
Phenomenal Concepts and ESTONIA 
The Phenomenal Concept TMS to occipital cortex in the awake state
Strategy: New Challenges and NREM sleep
Jaan Aru, Institute of Public Law and Institute of
Symposium Computer Science, University of Tartu, ESTONIA
Mihkel Stamm, Institute of Public Law and
Speakers and titles Institute of Computer Science, University of
Tartu, ESTONIA
Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Renate Rutiku, Institute of Public Law and
Opaque Institute of Computer Science, University of
Esa Diaz-Leon, Dept. of Logic, History & Phil. Tartu, ESTONIA
of Science, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Talis Bachmann, Institute of Public Law and
SPAIN  Institute of Computer Science, University of
Tartu, ESTONIA 
Embodied Conceivability: Phenomenal
Concepts and Contingency Assessing the level of consciousness within
Andrea Elpidorou, University of Louisville, non-REM sleep using TMS–EEG and a serial-
Louisville, USA (with Dove G.)  awakening paradigm
Jaakko O. Nieminen, Dept. of Psychiatry,
Phenomenal Concepts and Epistemic University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Emotions Department of Neuroscience and Biomedical
Benedicte Veillet, University of Michigan-Flint, Engineering, Aalto University School of Science,
Flint, USA  Espoo, FINLAND
Olivia Gosseries, Dept. of Psychiatry, University
The Motivational Consequences of Quoting of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Experiences Francesca Siclari, Dept. of Psychiatry,
Assaf Weksler, Ben Gurion University, Beer University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Sheva, ISRAEL  University Hospital of Lausanne, Lausanne,
SWITZERLAND
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV Melanie Boly, Dept. of Neurology, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Postle Bradley, Dept. of Psychiatry, University
of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USADept. of
2:30PM-4:35PM Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison,
WI, USA
Transcranial Magnetic Giulio Tononi, Dept. of Psychiatry, University of
Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Stimulation (TMS) in
the Study of States of Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX
Consciousness
Symposium

Speakers and titles

TMS and the Modulation of Conscious States
Risto Ilmoniemi, Department of Neuroscience

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 2 5

P ro g ra m

4:45PM-7:45PM

Poster session
TSC 20/East West Forum Poster Session
Number of posters (TSC 2015): 180 
Number of posters (East West Forum): 31

All poster session participants are treated to light

snacks. Drinks can be purchased separately at
the restaurant bar.  

Speakers and titles

Please consult the poster session index on
pages 63–86

Venue - Restaurant Bank 

Address: Unioninkatu 20, 400 metres from the
TSC 2015 conference site

2 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 T H U R SDAY 11 J U N E

THURSDAY 11 JUNE

8:30AM-10:30AM
Speakers and titles
Plenary: Quantum ideas in The Mystery of the Mystery of Consciousness
Consciousness Studies John Heil, Washington University in St Louis,
Missouri, USA 
Plenary lecture
The Empirical Case for Physicalism
Alyssa Ney, Department of Philosophy,
Chair University of Rochester, New York, USA 
Basil Hiley, University College, London
Physicalism without Causal Closure
David Papineau, King’s College London,
Speakers and titles ENGLAND and Graduate Center, City University
Quantum ideas in consciousness studies of New York, USA
Harald Atmanspacher, Institute for Frontier Areas
of Psychology and Mental Health, Freiburg, Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
GERMANY

Reflections on using quantum theory to

model cognitive phenomena 1:00PM-2:30PM
Peter Bruza, Queensland University of
Technology, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA Lunch
Our (reprensented) world a quantum-like     
object Venue - Main Building, foyers
Ariane   Lambert-Mogiliansky, Paris School of
Economics, Paris, FRANCE

Venue - Main Building, Great Hall 2:30PM-4:35PM

Dissipative Models and

10:30AM-11:00AM Chaos
Break Concurrent talks
      
Chair
Venue - Main Building, foyers
Andrew Duggins
, University of Sydney


Speakers and titles

11:00AM-1:00PM
Matter and mind are unified in the AM pattern
and its Double
Plenary: Metaphysics of Walter Freeman, Molecular & Cell Biology,
Consciossness University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA,
USA [8]
Plenary lecture
Measuring mind-matter interactions using
single-trial EEG decoding
Chair Jacob Jolij, Psychology, University of Groningen,
Tuomas Tahko
, University of Helsinki
 Groningen, NETHERLANDS Boshoff Lieze,
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen,
NETHERLANDS [82]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 2 7

P ro g ra m

Quantum Entanglement in DNA: From An Apple a Day Keeps the Dualist Away
Information Storage to the Holographic Ilmari Hirvonen, Department of Philosophy,
Genome History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki,
P Kurian, National Human Genome Center/ Helsinki, FINLAND [81]
Physics and Astronomy, Howard University,
Washington, DC, USA On a Confusion about which Intuition to
G Dunston, Microbiology/National Human Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy
Genome Center, Howard University College of One
Medicine, Washington, DC, USA, Miguel Ángel Sebastián, Instituto de
J Lindesay, Physics and Astronomy, Howard Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad
University, Washington, DC, USA [310] Nacional Autonoma de México, Mexico DF,
MEXICO [129]
How can chaos theory help to explain
existence of qualia? How Can Predictive Processing Address the
Grzegorz Lisowski, Philosophy, University of Hard Problem?
Warsaw, Warsaw, POLAND [84] Dave Ward, Philosophy, University Of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM [132]  
Experimental test of the dissipative many-
body model of brain. Nonlinear brain Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII
dynamics modelling of memories and Bessel
Functions in Mass Action
Giuseppe Vitiello, Physics “E.R.Caianiello”,
University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY 2:30PM-4:35PM
Walter Freeman, Molecular and Cell Biology,
University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Antonio Capolupo, Physics “E.R.Caianiello”,
Intentionality and
University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY Representation
Robert Kozma, Mathematics, Memphis
University, Memphis TN, USA Concurrent talks 
Andrés Olivares del Campo, The Blackett
Laboratory, Imperial College London, London, Chair
UNITED KINGDOM [225]
Petronella Foultier, 
Stockholm University
Venue - Main Building, auditorium III
Speakers and titles
Structural Representation and the Problem of
2:30PM-4:35PM Liberality
Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Philosophy, King’s College
London/Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin,
Hard Problem GERMANY [180]
Concurrent talks The Nature of Primitive Intentionality
Eva-Maria Engelen, Philosophy, University of
Chair Konstanz, Konstanz, GERMANY [182]

Alex Carruth
, Durham Emergence Project Are Thoughts Ever Experiences?

Peter Forrest, Philosophy, Oxford University,
Speakers and titles Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM [46]

Cognitive Action Theory of Consciousness Constancies: Towards an Integrated

Wolfgang Baer, Research and Development, Perspective
Nascent Systems Inc., Carmel Valley, CA, USA Alexander Morgan, Center for Integrative
[38] Neuroscience, University of Tübingen,
Out of Left Field: A Transcendental Tübingen, GERMANY [192]
Understanding of the Hard Problem
Kim Davies, Philosophy, University of Durham
Durham, UNITED KINGDOM [124]

2 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 T H U R SDAY 11 J U N E

Intentionality as the mark of the mental in Speakers and titles

philosophical naturalism
Pentti Määttänen, Department of Philosophy, A Phenomenological Investigation Reframing
History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Mediums as Mystics
Helsinki, FINLAND [193]   Jennifer Lyke, Psychology, Richard Stockton
College, Galloway, USA [338]
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI
The nature and etiology of unsymbolized
thinking
Fernando Martínez-Manrique, Philosophy
2:30PM-4:35PM I, University of Granada, Granada, SPAIN
Agustín Vicente, Linguistic and Basque Studies,
Ikerbasque, University of the Basque Country,
Neural Correlates of Vitoria, SPAIN [259]
Consciousness I Involved consciousness: Maori relationships
Concurrent talks with things in the world
Carl Mika, Faculty of Education, University of
Chair Waikato, Hamilton, NEW ZEALAND [323]

Risto Ilmoniemi
, Aalto University Conscious Agent Theory: A formal theory of

consciousness
Speakers and titles Chetan Prakash, Mathematics, California State
University, San Bernardino, USA
Explanatory Unification in Consciousness Donald Hoffman, Cognitive Sciences, University
Studies: The Case of Neural Synchrony of California, Irvine, USA [67]
T.J. Kasperbauer, Department of Food and
Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Serious Music – A means for communicating
Copenhagen, DENMARK [200] with, observing and evolving the nonverbal
mind
Representational Resonances of the Noor Zehra , Musicology, Sanjan Nagar Institute
Claustrum of Philosophy and Arts , Lahore, PAKISTAN
Alex Laks, Research & Development, Epsilon Iram Tauqir, Philosophy, Sanjar Nagar Institute of
Learning, Vancouver, CANADA [20] Philosophy of Arts, PAKISTAN [361]  

Looking for the Mechanisms of the Contents Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV
of Consciousness
Alfredo Vernazzani, Institut für Philosophie,
Universität Bonn, Bonn, GERMANY [151] 
2:30PM-4:35PM
TBA 1
TBA 2 Perception and
Venue - Main Building, auditorium X
Hallucination
Concurrent talks

Chair
2:30PM-4:35PM
Timothy Bayne
, University of Manchester
Nonverbal Experience Speakers and titles
Concurrent talks
Actual Consciousness and Science
Chair Ted Honderich, University College London &
University of Bath [49]
Tarja Kallio-Tamminen, University of Helsinki

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 2 9

P ro g ra m

The use of sound and music in contemporary The Spatial Properties of Consciousness
shamanic rituals in the creation of altered Robert Worden, Neuroscience, Open Mapping
states of consciousness Software, ely, UNITED KINGDOM [120]    
Elina Hytönen-Ng, Humanistic department,
University of Eastern Finland, Jyväskylä, Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV
FINLAND [337]

Apparitions, Narrative and Consciousness:

An Early 19th-Century Theory of 2:30PM-4:35PM
Hallucinations
Tommi Kakko, Language, Translation and
Literary Studies, University of Tampere, Against Mindless
FINLAND [350] Pragmatism: A Symposium
Hypnotic visual hallucinations: goal directed on Consciousness and C. S.
mental imagery or automatic conscious
experiences? Peirce’s Semiotics
Sakari Kallio, University of Skövde, SWEDEN,
Symposium
University of Turku, FINLAND [218]

Hallucination as perception of Chair

spatiotemporally gerrymandered objects –
Jelena Issajeva
, Tallinn University of Technology
the argument from hallucination debunked
Riccardo Manzotti, Psychology “G.Fabris”, IULM
University, Lavagna, ITALY [57]   Speakers and titles
Overcoming “Tone”-Deafness: Minding
Venue - Main Building, room 3 Qualia as a Means of Qualifying
Consciousness
Vincent Colapietro, Department of Philosophy,
Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
2:30PM-4:35PM USA

Qualia I The Possibility of Naturalism

Erkki Kilpinen, Department of Sociology,
 Concurrent talks University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND 

Chair Pragmatism as a Logical Study of

Consciousness
Erick Llamas
, ANU Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Ragnar Nurkse School of
Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of
Speakers and titles Technology, Tallinn, ESTONIA 

Phenomenal Concepts and Language The Status of Degenerate Signs in the

Darragh Byrne, Philosophy, University of Application of Peirce
Birmingham, Birmingham, UNITED KINGDOM Tyler Bennett, Department of Semiotics, Tartu
[93] University, Tartu, ESTONIA 

Pain as a mode of presentation Must a Pragmatist Interested in

Stephane Lemaire, Philosophy, University of Consciousness be Pragmatic 24 Hours a
Rennes 1, Rennes, FRANCE [98] Day?
Marc Champagne, Diagrammatic Mind
Illusions of Affection Project,Department of Philosophy, History,
Diamantis Mihailis, Philosophy, New York Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
University, New York, NY, USA [99] FINLAND 

What one can and cannot show by appealing Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX
to the ’transparency’ of experience
Pär Sundström, Historical, Philosophical, and
Religious Studies, Umeå University, Umeå,
SWEDEN [100]

3 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 T H U R SDAY 11 J U N E

2:30PM-4:35PM Limits of temporal phenomenology

Michal Klincewicz, Berlin School of Mind and
Brain, Berlin, GERMANY 
Astronauts and Avatars:
Exploring Consciousness An Argument Against Illusions of Duration
Sean Power, University College Cork, Cork,
through the Art and Science IRELAND 
of Embodiment Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI
Symposium

Chair
2:30PM-4:35PM
Denise Doyle
, University of Wolverhampton

Video Game Play and
Speakers and titles
Nightmare Protection
Gravity and its Sisters
Susan Kozel, School of Art and Culture, Malmo
Hypothesis
University, Malmo, SWEDEN Symposium
Space, Design, and the Astronaut
Thais Russomano, MicroG-PUCRS, PUCRS, Speakers and titles
Porto Alegre, BRAZIL  Video Game Nightmare Protection Thesis: An
Aerial Stories (Revised): A return to a Experimental Inquiry
consideration of the flying laboratory Carson Flockhart, MacEwan University,
Louise Wilson, Fine Art, University of Lincoln, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
Lincoln, UNITED KINGDOM  An Inquiry into the Lack of the Nightmare
Intersubjectively shared (un)consciousness Protection Associated with Video Game Play
enacted on cinema screen Arielle Boyes, MacEwan University, Edmonton,
Pia Tikka, School of Film,Televisionand Alberta, CANADA
Scenography, Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND  TBA 
Jayne Gackenbach, Psychology, MacEwan
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV University, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA

Emerging Implications of Virtual Reality

Game Play on Dreams
2:30PM-4:35PM Anne Sinyard, MacEwan University, Edmonton,
Alberta, CANADA 
Subjective time in context COMMENTATOR: Katja Valli, University of
Symposium Turku, Turku, FINLAND 

Chair Venue - Main Building, auditorium II

Valtteri Arstila, University of Turku

Speakers and titles 4:35PM-5:00PM

Temporal limits of folk psychology
Bruno Mölder, University of Tartu, Tartu,
Break
ESTONIA       

Temporal experience and the sense of reality

Venue - Main Building, foyers
Julian Kiverstein, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS 

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 3 1

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5:00PM-6:00PM 6:30PM-8:00PM

Keynote lecture: David City Hall Reception

Chalmers Social Program
Keynote lecture The City of Helsinki hosts a welcome reception for
the conference quests in the heart of the historic
Chair centre next to the sea-side Market Square. After
a welcome speech by a city representative, the
Paavo Pylkkänen, Universities of Helsinki and guests have a chance to enjoy a light buffet dinner
Skövde
 and the architecture of the City Hall.
Speakers and titles Venue - City Hall,
Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Address: Pohjoisesplanadi 11-13 (300
Function metres from the conference site)
David Chalmers, New York University, USA,
Australian National University, AUSTRALIA
(with Kelvin McQueen VU Amsterdam, Tel Aviv
University, NETHERLANDS)

Venue - Main Building, Great Hall

3 2 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 FR IDAY 12 JU NE

FRIDAY 12 JUNE

8:30AM-10:30AM 11:00AM-1:00PM

Plenary: Brain networks, Plenary: Consciousness and

anesthesia and quantum Structuralism
evolution Plenary lecture
Plenary lecture Chair
Chair Alyssa Ney, University of Rochester
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, Paris School of Speakers and titles
Economics
The Consciousness Constraint on
Speakers and titles Fundamental Metaphysics
Philip Goff, Central European University,
Anesthetics Can Disrupt Electron Resonance Budapest, HUNGARY
Effects in Microtubules
Travis J. A. Craddock, Clinical Systems Biology Structuralism and Consciousness
Group, Institute for Neuro-Immune Medicine, James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy,
Nova Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, University of Bristol, ENGLAND
Florida, USA
Structure, Objects and Presence
The ‘Quantum pleasure principle’ and ‘Orch William Seager, Department of Philosophy,
OR’–How life and the brain evolved to feel University of Toronto, CANADA
good 
Stuart, Hameroff, Anesthesiology, Center for Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Consciousness Studies, Banner-University
Medical Center, The University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona, USA

General Relationship of Brain Network

1:00PM-2:30PM
Topology and State of Consciousness
UnCheol Lee, Department of Anesthesiology, Lunch
University of Michigan Medical School, Ann     
Arbor, Michigan, USA
Venue - Main Building, foyers
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall

2:30PM-3:30PM
10:30AM-11:00AM
Keynote lecture: Patricia S.
Break Churchland
      
Keynote lecture
Venue - Main Building, foyers
Chair
Harald Atmanspacher, Collegium Helveticum
Zurich

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 3 3

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Speaker and title Colour layering and colour relationalism

Derek Brown, Philosophy, Brandon University,
Bamboozled by “modal logic” Brandon, CANADA [242]
Patricia S. Churchland, University of California
San Diego & Salk Institute, San Diego, “Strange” Fictional Minds. Mimetic
California, USA and Literary Models of Constructing
Consciousness in Literature
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall Anna Ovaska, The Department of Finnish,
Finno-Ugrian and Scandi, University of Helsinki,
Helsinki, FINLAND [351]

3:45PM-5:00PM Venue - Main Building, auditorium X

Action, Perception and

Reasoning 3:45PM-5:00PM
Concurrent talks Consciousness and Mental
Chair Disorders I
Henry Taylor
, University of Durham
Concurrent talks
Speakers and titles
Chair
Embodied Reasoning via Motor-Spatial
Models Tuomas Vesterinen
, University of Helsinki
J.C. Berendzen, Philosophy, Loyola University
New Orleans, New Orleans, USA [283] Speakers and titles
Can We Make Folk-Psychological Sense of Evidence for a New Savant Skill in Nonverbal
Animal Reasons for Acting? Autistic Children
Caitlin Hamblin, Philosophy, Psychology, and Diane Powell, Psychiatry, ISSAC, Medford, OR,
Embodied Cognition, University of Edinburgh, USA [348]
Edinbugh, UNITED KINGDOM [138]
Addiction Recovery: The Result of a Radical
Beyond Error Correction: Homeostasis in Change in Consciousness
Action and Perception Constance Scharff, Research, Cliffside Malibu,
Russ McBride, Department of Philosophy, Austin, USA [316]
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA [274]
The Developmental Basis of Visuomotor
Venue - Main Building, auditorium II Capabilities and the Causal Nature of Motor
Clumsiness to Cognitive and Empathic
Dysfunction
Costa Vakalopoulos, Medicine, Private Practice,
3:45PM-5:00PM Melbourne, AUSTRALIA [289]   

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV

Art, Fiction and Vision
Concurrent talks

Chair 3:45PM-5:00PM
Jaakko Rustanius, University of Arts, Helsinki Creativity
Speakers and titles Concurrent talks
‘Seecular’ – visual stimuli in cultural contexts Chair
and their present relevance in an art-science
project Tülay Schakir, KuvA, Finland
Hannes Bend, Institute of Neuroscience,
University of Oregon, Eugene, USA [348]

3 4 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 FR IDAY 12 JU NE

Speakers and titles 3:45PM-5:00PM

Combination of Western and Eastern
perspectives on creativity in a four-criterion Machine Consciousness
construct Concurrent talks
Anatoliy Kharkhurin, International Studies,
American University of Sharjah, Sharjah,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES [356]
Chair
Riccardo Manzotti
, IULM University

The Quintessential Tension: conceptual
pluralism and creativity
Christopher Robertson, Philosophy, Independent
Speakers and titles
(formerly Sorbonne Paris IV), Paris, FRANCE Is Computation a Physically Real Basis for
[212] Consciousness?
Adam McKenty, N/A, Independent scholar,
What does creative thinking really mean?
Mansons Landing, CANADA Per Sundin,
Judit Simon, Social Sciences, Special Education
Physics, Milano-Bicocca University, Milano,
Stockholm University, Stockholm, SWEDEN
ITALY [85]
[326]
Reviewing Tests for Machine Consciousness
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX Aida Raoult, Computational Institute, University
of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA’ Roman
Yampolskiy, Computer Engineering and
Computer Science, University of Louisville,
3:45PM-5:00PM Louisville, KY, USA [107]

Emotion II Subjectivity, Objectivity, Feelings, and Vision

John A. Strozier, Science, Mathematics &
Concurrent talks Technology, SUNY/Empire State College,
Sedona, AZ, USA [109] 
Chair
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII
Max Hayward
, Columbia University

Speakers and titles

3:45PM-5:00PM
Consciousness of Shame and Perspectival
Alternatives
Phillip Emerson, philosophy, Binghamton Mindfulness
University, Binghamton, USA [255]
      Concurrent talks
The Emotional Function of Bodily
Perceptions Chair
Daniel Shargel, Humanities, Social Sciences
Anne Nevgi
, University of Helsinki
and Communications, Lawrence Technological
University, Southfield, USA [116]
Speakers and titles
TBA
Becoming more conscious: using the
Consciousness Quotient Inventory (CQ-i) as
Venue - Main Building, auditorium III
a psychological tool for increasing conscious
awareness and facilitating inner growth
process
Ovidiu Brazdau, Research, Consciousness
Quotient Institute, New York, USA Jennifer Luna
Tuazon, West Visayas State University, Iloilo,
PHILIPPINES [286]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 3 5

P ro g ra m

Achieving body self-awareness in 3:45PM-5:00PM

playing a musical instrument through the
phenomenological method
Annamaria Minafra, Lifelong and Comparative Neural Correlates of
Education, UCL Institute of Education, Firenze, Consciousness II
ITALY [359]
Concurrent talks
MUUPU – A mindfulness and value-based
research program to reduce work burnout
and to promote well-being Chair
Anne Puolakanaho, Psychology, University of Satu Palva
, University of Helsinki
Jyvaskyla, University of Jyvaskyla, FINLAND
Sanna Kinnunen, Psychology, University of
Jyvaskyla, University of Jyvaskyla, FINLAND
Speakers and titles
[341]   Is Frontal and Parietal Cortical Activity
Necessary for Perceptual Consciousness?
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI Ausaf Farooqui, Attention Group, MRC-Cognition
& Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UNITED
KINGDOM
Tom Manly, Attention Group, MRC-Cognition
3:45PM-5:00PM & Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UNITED
KINGDOM [207] 
Music and Art Scientific Understanding of Consciousness
Concurrent talks in terms of Anatomy and Physiology
Tom Gedeon, Research School of Computer
Chair Science, Australian National University, Acton,
AUSTRALIA
Denise Doyle
, University of Wolverhampton
 L. Andrew Coward, Research School of
Computer Science, Australian National
Speakers and titles University, Acton, AUSTRALIA [208] 

Synchronized music perception by QEEG measurement of a post-mortem human

production brain: geometry, electromagnetic resonance,
Rolf Bader, University of Hamburg, Institute of and the sense of self
Systematic Musicology, Hamburg, GERMANY Brendan Lehman, Behavioural Neuroscience,
[357] Laurentian University, Sudbury, ON, CANADA
Nicholas Rouleau, Laurentian University,
Waking Space: The Emerging Art Object, Sudbury, ON, CANADA [304]
Quantum Theory, and Algorithmic Art Steven
J. Breaux, Visual Arts, University of Louisiana- Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV
Lafayette, Lafayette, USA [354]

Perceptual consciousness and time in artistic

experience 3:45PM-5:00PM
Timo Laiho, Department of Philosophy, History,
Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki,
FINLAND [358] Sensori-Motor Approaches
Concurrent talks
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV
Chair
Francis Steen
, UCLA

Speakers and titles

An Ecological Account of Self-
Consciousness
Caglan Cinar Dilek, Central European University,
HUNGARY [137]

3 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 FR IDAY 12 JU NE

Enacting Abstractness and Concreteness: A 5:30PM-7:30PM

Naturalistic and Phenomenological Approach
Alexander Jeuk, Philosophy, University of
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA [188]
Plenary: East vs. West on
the Hard Problemructure of
From a sensorimotor account of conscious
quality, to a sensorimotor account of Consciousness
phenomenal consciousness tout court
Plenary lecture
David Silverman, Laboratoire Psychologie de la
Perception, Paris Descartes University, Paris,
FRANCE [101]  Chair
Stuart Hameroff, University of Arizona
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI
Speakers and titles
Out-of-body experiences, and what they tell
3:45PM-5:00PM us about our selves
Susan Blackmore, University of Plymouth,
Social Ontology and Plymouth, ENGLAND
Personal Identity One Universe, One Mind
Deepak Chopra, The Chopra Center, Carlsbad,
Concurrent talks California, USA 

Chair Three Different Hard Problems of

Consciousness?
Ludwig Jaskolla, Munich School of Philosophy Rocco J. Gennaro, University of Southern
Indiana, Evansville Indiana, USA
Speakers and titles
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Conscious Spacetime - related to integration
of 1st and 3rd perspective of consciousness
and integration of block time and subjective
time 7:45PM-10:30PM
Jan Pilotti, Theoretical Physics, Pilotti
Science&Art, Örebro, SWEDEN [66]
Conference Dinner
Two ways of sharing goals
Alessandro Salice, Center for Subjectivity Social Program
Research, University of Copenhagen,
Copenhagen S, DENMARK The Old Student House represents neo-
Glenda Satne, Center for Subjectivity Research, renaissance style of architecture. It is owned by
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen S, the Student Union of the University of Helsinki,
DENMARK [375] which is one the richest student organizations in
the world. Since 1870, the building has witnessed
The Artificial Other all the turmoils of the Finnish society, inluding
Kari Yli-Annala, Film and Scenography, Aalto the 1968 student movement. What will happen
University, Helsinki, FINLAND [375] when “the Old” houses the TSC 2015 conference
dinner? 
Venue - Main Building, room 3
The dinner requires online preregistration. The
price of the dinner is 60 € (incl. three courses, an
aperitif, 2 glasses of wine and a coffee/tea with an
5:00PM-5:30PM avec). There might be some extra dinner tickets
for sale at the Conference Office during the first
conference days (if there are any last minute
Break cancellations)
      
Venue - The Old Student House,,
Venue - Main Building, foyers Address: Mannerheimintie 3, 400 metres
from the conference site

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 3 7

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10:30PM-11:59PM

Poetry Slam/Zombie Blues

Social Program
Open to all conference participants! If you are
not registered to the conference dinner, you
may arrive after 10.30 PM at Restaurant Wanha
(Mannerheimintie 3). 

Schedule: 

23.00 Poetry Slam: The stage is open to all poets

of consciousness!

23.30 Zombie Blues: Attendees are invited to

perform one or more verses of the Zombie Blues
and to invent new soulless verses!

Zombie Blues opening verse:  “I act like you act /

I do what you do / But I don’t know what it’s like to
be you / What consciousness is / I ain’t got a clue
/ I got the Zombie Blues”. 

Zombie Blues will be accompanied by Ari

Vakkilainen and Poetry Slam moderated by Karri
Liikkanen.   

Venue - The Old Student House, Restaurant

Vanha
Address: Mannerheimintie 3, in the heart of
Helsinki, 400 metres from the conference
site

3 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 SATUR DAY 13 JU NE

SATURDAY 13 JUNE Speakers and titles

The origin of the Analytic-Continental
Divide: Brentano’s Dual Methodology and its
Resurge in the Embodiment Concept Today
9:00AM-11:05AM Richard Baker, Monash University, Monash
University, Melbourne, AUSTRALIA [39]
Cognitive Development A 21st Century Monadology: Re-Drafting
Concurrent talks Leibniz’s Idea of Perception in Terms of
Modern
Chair Jonathan Edwards, Medicine, University College
London, London, UNITED KINGDOM [44]
TBA
The conceptuality of intuition according to
Hegel
Speakers and titles Heikki Ikaheimo, School of Humanities
What Can Be Learned from Learning to Count and languages, UNSW Australia, Sydney,
Charles Card, Physics and Astronomy, University AUSTRALIA [186]
of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, CANADA
On the structure of consciousness and self-
[269]  
consciousness
Seeing Oneself through the Eyes of Others: Arto Laitinen, School of Social Sciences and
Visual versus Social Perspective-taking in Humanities, University of Tampere, University of
Early Infancy Tampere, FINLAND [201]
Anna Ciaunica, Philosophy, Institute of
Locke and Stickgold on Activity of Mind in
Philosophy - Porto, Porto, PORTUGAL [270]
Dreaming
A reverse causality will make us understand Markku Roinila, Department of Philosophy,
consciousness and human knowing History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki,
Arne Kjellman, Computer and Systems Science, Helsinki, FINLAND [71]
Stockholm University, Jarvso, SWEDEN [52]  
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV
The priority of third-person mentalization:
implications for the theory of attachment 
Cristina Meini, Philosophy, Univ. Piemonte
Orientale, Univ. S. Raffaele, Vercelli, ITALY 9:00AM-11:05AM
Massimo Marraffa, Università Roma Tre, Rome,
ITALY [160] Phenomenal Concepts and
Color experience in newborn babies: A Representation
problem for representationalism?
Claudia Passos, Department of Philosophy, Concurrent talks
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de
Janeiro, BRAZIL [194] Chair
Venue - Main Building, auditorium III Esa Diaz-Leon, University of Barcelona

Speakers and titles

9:00AM-11:05AM Understanding understanding: how
Searleans and behaviourists agree
Jon Erik Andersson, Philosophy, Lund University,
History of Philosophy Lund, SWEDEN [36]

Concurrent talks Singular mental files

Juan Jose Lara, Philosophy, IES. Tirant lo Blanc,
Chair Elche, SPAIN [190]

Holger Thiel, 
Central European University

Budapest

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 3 9

P ro g ra m

Phenomenology and Externalism: a Perfect 9:00AM-11:05AM

Marriage?
Corijn van Mazijk, Philosophy, University of
Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS [327] Qualia II
Phenomenology Is Contingently Concurrent talks
Representational
Ayoob Shahmoradi, Philosophy, Sydney Chair
University, Sydney, AUSTRALIA [195]
TBA
Are phenomenal concepts innate?
Assaf Weksler, Philosophy, Ben Gurion Speakers and titles
University, Modiin, ISRAEL [34]
The Geometry and Physics of the
Multidimensional World
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI Alexander Egoyan, Health Care Economics
and Management, University Geomedi, Tbilisi,
GEORGIA [298]
9:00AM-11:05AM Does Apriority Entail Necessity? A Study of
Pure Phenomenal Concepts
Phenomenology and the Shao-An Hsu, Philosophy, National Taiwan
University, Taipei, TAIWAN [51]
Self
The unkowable qualia problem for a priori
Concurrent talks theories of consciousness
Erick Llamas, Philosophy, ANU, Canberra,
Chair AUSTRALIA [55]
Kari Yli-Annala, 
Aalto University Phenomenal Information as Knowing Why
Hedda Hassel Mørch, Philosophy, University of
Speakers and titles Oslo, Oslo, NORWAY [63]
Being No One Else. On Barry Dainton’s Ignorance of Color: An Intentionalist Look at
Concept of the Person in “The Phenomenal Mary The Color Scientist
Self” Isik Sarihan, Philosophy, Central European
Ludwig Jaskolla, Philosophy, Munich School University & Uni. Fribourg, Fribourg,
of Philosophy, Munich, GERMANY Ludwig SWITZERLAND [128]
Gierstl, Munich School of Philosophy, Munich,
GERMANY [159] Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV
A Phenomenologically Motivated Approach
to Introspection
Ivan M. Havel, Center for Theoretical Study, 9:00AM-11:05AM
Charles University Prague, Prague, CZECH
REPUBLIC [321]
Quantum Theory and
Intentional Horizon and Cognitive
Phenomenology Relativity
Marta Jorba, Department of Philosophy,
University of Girona, Barcelona, SPAIN [322] Concurrent talks

Rationality and the privacy of the Self Chair

Francis Pearson, Philosophy, Durham University,
Durham, UNITED KINGDOM [88] Johanna Blomqvist
, Mindstream.fi

Panpsychism’s Hard Problem: A Comparative Speakers and titles

Analysis of Explanatory Gaps
Luke Roelofs, Philosophy, University of Toronto, A physicalist/Topological Dual-Aspect
Toronto, CANADA [70] Information Theory of Consciousness
Uzi Awret, Physics., Trinity Washington
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XII University., falls church va., USA [37]

4 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 SATUR DAY 13 JU NE

Mind as Brain and Brain as Mind: A Double Janet Metcalfe, Columbia University, New York,
Face View On Mental Causation USA [245]
Jonas Goncalves Coelho, University of Sao
Paulo State, Bauru, BRAZIL [112] As Time Passes by: Motion-speed dilates
and contracts subjective estimation of time
Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder: The intervals
Relativity of Visual Experience Thomas Nyman, Department of Psychology
Andrew Duggins, Neurology, University of and Logopedics (IPL), Åbo Akademi, Turku,
Sydney, Westmead, AUSTRALIA Xin Zhang, FINLAND [281]
Westmead Hospital, Westmead, AUSTRALIA
[243] Perceiving change: between retention and
extension
Irreducibility of the Logic of Integrated Vasilis Tsompanidis, Philosophy, Universidade
Information: From Quantum Coherence to do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Novo Hamburgo,
Unity of Consciousness and Beyond BRAZIL [282]
Marcin J. Schroeder, Basic Education, Akita
International University, Akita, JAPAN [295] Venue - Main Building, room 3
The Physics of Value: Consciousness as
modulator of the Bohmian Quantum Potential
to achieve biologically advantageous 9:00AM-11:05AM
resource allocation
Francis Steen, Comm Studies, UCLA, Los
Angeles, USA [118] Consciousness in
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI
the Vegetative State:
Conceptual, Empirical and
Ethical Perspectives
9:00AM-11:05AM Symposium

Temporal Consciousness Speakers and titles

Concurrent talks Probing Consciousness in the Vegetative

State: Challenges and Opportunities
Chair Timothy Bayne, Philosophy, University of
Manchester, Manchester, UNITED KINGDOM 
James Miller, 
Durham University
Consciousness in Behaviourally non-
Responsive Patients: Insights from
Speakers and titles Neuroimaging
The Hard Problem of Temporal Qualia: Raechelle Gibson, The University of Western
Undercutting the Illusion of Temporal Flow Ontario, Department of Psychology, CANADA
Stephen Barker, Philosophy, University of
Executive functioning and the neural basis of
Nottingham, Nottingham, UNITED KINGDOM
consciousness
[91]
Lisa Miracchi, New York University, New York,
Consciousness for the Past/Present/Future USA 
- Chronestesia: Experiments of a Stubborn
fMRI research in the Context of Intensive
Illusion
Care: Ethical Considerations
Ronald Gruber, Medical Center, Stanford
Charles Weijer, University of Western Ontario,
University , Palo Alto, CA, USA
London, Ontario, CANADA 
Richard Block, Psychology, Montana State U.,
Bozeman, Montana, USA,
Michael Bach, University of Freiburg, GERMANY Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX
[280]

Subjective Temporal Properties of Voluntary

Action 
Matti Vuorre, Psychology, Columbia University,
New York, USA

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 4 1

P ro g ra m

9:00AM-11:05AM 9:00AM-11:05AM

Dreams and nightmares in Early Modern Roots of the

consciousness studies Concept of Consciousness
Symposium Symposium

Chair Speakers and titles

Katja Valli
, University of Turku & University of Lessons from Descartes’ Sensory Dualism
Skövde Jani Sinokki, University of Turku, Turku,
FINLAND 
Speakers and titles
Locke on the Primacy of Self-Consciousness
The Social Simulation Theory of dreaming Vili Lähteenmäki, Department of Philosophy,
Katja Valli, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND 
Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of
Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University Hume’s Account of Consciousness
of Turku, FINLAND School of Bioscience, Jani Hakkarainen, University of Tampere,
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Tampere, FINLAND 
Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
(with Jarno Tuominen and Antti Revonsuo) Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV
Social perception and interactions in dreams
– Any support for the socialsimulation
theory? 9:00AM-11:05AM
Jarno Tuominen, Centre for Cognitive
Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center,
Department of Behavioural Sciences and
The physics and
Philosophy, University of Turku, FINLAND (with metaphysics of time in
Katja Valli and Antti Revosuo)
relation to consciousness
Neurophysiological Correlates of Emotions in
REM Sleep Dreams Symposium
Sikka Pilleriin, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience,
Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of
Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University Speakers and titles
of Turku, FINLAND, School of Bioscience,
Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and On ‘Gilding or Staining’ the World with
Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN (with Temporal Passage
Noreika Valdas, Katja Valli and Antti Revonsuo) Adrian Bardon, Wake Forest University, USA

Prevalence and risk factors of frequent Consciousness as a Foundational Attribute

nightmares among adults of Reality, with Physics Phenomena, such
Nils Sandman, National Institute for Health as Dynamical Space, Quantum Theory,
and Welfare, Public Health Genomics Unit and Relativistic Effects, being Emergent
Institute for Molecular Medicine FIMM, Helsinki, Reginald T. Cahill, School of Chemical and
FINLAND Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Physical Sciences, Flinders University,
Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of AUSTRALIA 
Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND (with Katja Valli, Erkki Could the postulation of subjective temporal
Kronholm, Antti Revonsuo, Tiina Laatikainen, dimensions enable the flow of time?
Tiina Paunio) Jonathan Schooler, UC Santa Barbara, USA 

The physics and metaphysics of time in

Venue - Main Building, auditorium II relation to consciousness
Tam Hunt, J.D., UC Santa Barbara, USA

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII

4 2 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 SATUR DAY 13 JU NE

11:15 AM-12:00PM 11:15AM-12:05PM

Integrated Information Metaphysics of

Theory of Consciousness II Consciousness
Concurrent talks Concurrent talks

Chair Chair
Felix Siebenhühner, University of Helsinki Matteo Grasso
, Roma Tre University


Speakers and titles Speakers and titles

Unconscious cross-modal associative Towards an Aristotelian Theory of
learning: A challenge for integration theories Consciousness
of consciousness Jesse Mulder, Philosophy, Utrecht University,
Ron Chrisley, Sackler Centre for Consciousness Utrecht, NETHERLANDS [25]
Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, UNITED
KINGDOM Quantum Bayesianism and the Hard Problem
Ryan Scott, University of Sussex, Falmer, of Consciousness
UNITED KINGDOM Shiroman Prakash, Physics, Dayalbagh
Jason Samaha, University of Wisconsin, Educational Institute , Agra, INDIA [127]
Madison, USA
Zoltan Dienes, University of Sussex, Falmer, Venue - Main Building, auditorium IX
UNITED KINGDOM [265]

Attribution and quality of non-human

consciousness 11:15AM-12:05PM
Yasuko Kitano, Department of History and
Philosophy of Science, University of Tokyo,
Gunma, JAPAN [17]  
Cinema
Venue - Main Building, room 3 Concurrent talks

Chair
11:15 AM-12:00PM Jaakko Rustanius, University of Arts, Helsinki

Speakers and titles

Phenomenology and Dance
From Hitchcock to Penrose: How cinema and
Concurrent talks storytelling connects us at the deepest level
of reality
Chair Nick Day, Media Education, Conscious Pictures,
Sonoma, USA [355]
Timo Laiho
, University of Helsinki
TBA
Speakers and titles
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XII
Thinking toes...? Proposing a reflective order of
embodied self-consciousness
Camille Buttingsrud, Philosophy, Former: University
of Copenhagen, Copenhagen S, DENMARK [319]

Bodily Awareness and Reflection: The

Phenomenology of Dance
Petronella Foultier, Philosophy, Stockholm
University, Stockholm, SWEDEN [183]    

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XV

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11:15AM-12:05PM 11:15AM-12:05PM
Consciousness and Mental Emergence II
Disorders II Concurrent talks
Concurrent talks
Chair
Miguel Ángel Sebastián, 
Universidad Nacional
Chair
Autonoma de México
Tam Hunt
, UC Santa Barbara
Speakers and titles
Speakers and titles Teleology does not emerge from complexity
Miguel García-Valdecasas, Institute for Culture
Experience Sampling Elevating
and Society, University of Navarra, Pamplona,
Consciousness
SPAIN
Jacques Habra, Self Echo, Noospheric Jonathan
Nathaniel Barrett, Institute for Culture and
Schooler, Psychological & Brain Sciences, UC
Society, University of Navarra, Pamplona, SPAIN
Santa Barbara [315]
Javier Sánchez Cañizares, University of
The Detection and Reference of Mental Navarra, Pamplona, SPAIN [133]
Disorders
What is it like to be the quiddities of non-
Tuomas Vesterinen, Theoretical philosophy,
emergent but irreducible macro-level
University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND [152]
information?
Luke McGowan, Neuroscience , UCI, LA, USA
Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIV [58]

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XIII

11:15AM-12:05PM

Decoherence and 11:15AM-12:05PM

Microtubules
Concurrent talks
Evolution II
Concurrent talks
Chair
Stuart Hameroff, University of Arizona
Chair
Uzi Awret
, Trinity Washington University.
Speakers and titles
Decoherence in brain processes and the
Speakers and titles
forces of nature On Free Will and the Evolutionary Function
Maurice Goodman, School of Physics, Dublin of Qualia
Institute of Technology, Dublin, IRELAND [293]  Andre LeBlanc, History, John Abbott College,
Clarifying Bandyopadhyay’s microtubule Montreal, CANADA [172]
research claims: Experiments, Instruments,
Theoretical Interpretations Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the
Cameron Keys,Center for Nanotechnology in Role of Consciousness in Understanding
Society, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA Fabio Sterpetti, Philosophy, Sapienza University
[142]   of Rome, Roma, ITALY [150]   

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XVI Venue - Main Building, auditorium II

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11:15AM-12:05PM 11:15AM-12:05PM

Implicit and Explicit Vision

Processes II Concurrent talks
Concurrent talks
Chair
Chair Tommi Kakko
, University of Tampere
Max Velmans
, Goldsmiths, University of London
Speakers and titles
Speakers and titles How does a hybrid account of the dynamical
The Computer Person Revisited: Conscious and embodied approaches in cognitive
Representation and Control in Learning a science interpret the notion of constitution of
Control Task the visual perceptual content
Thomas Wilson, Psychology, Bellarmine Amalia Tsakiri, Department of Philosophy and
University, Louisville, USA Donelson Dulany, History of Science, National and Kapodistrian
Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana- University of Athens, Athens, GREECE
Champaign, Champaign, USA [197] Michael Vinos, Department of Philosophy and
History of Science, National and Kapodistrian
Implicit and explicit processing of facial University of Athens, Athens, GREECE [196]
attractiveness in healthy adult males and
females: highdensity ERP study TBA
Elena Mnatsakanian, HHNA lab, IHNA &NP
RAS, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [229]   Venue - Main Building, auditorium III

Venue - Main Building, auditorium XI

12:05PM-1:00PM

11:15AM-12:05PM Lunch
     
Memory II Venue - Main Building, foyers
Concurrent talks

Chair 1:00PM-1:45PM
Petri Kajonius, 
Department of Psychology,
Trollhättan Plenary: Consciousness and
Speakers and titles
Transcranial Ultrasound
Plenary lecture
Consciousness as representation formation
from a neural Darwinian perspective Chair
Anna Kocsis, Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy,
Zagreb, CROATIA Stuart Hameroff, University of Arizona
Vjeran Keric, Psychology and Cognitive Science,
New Bulgarian University, Sofia, BULGARIA Speakers and titles
[189]
The promise of altering consciousness and
TBA treating brain disorders with transcranial
ultrasound (TUS)
Venue - Main Building, auditorium IV John JB Allen, Psychology, University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona, USA
Joseph L. Sanguinetti, Psychology, University of
Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

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Sterling Cooley, Berkeley Ultrasound, Berkeley 2:00PM-3:00PM

CA, USA
Stuart, Hameroff, Anesthesiology, Center for
Consciousness Studies, Banner-University Closing Panel Discussion
Medical Center, The University of Arizona, Plenary lecture
Tucson, Arizona, USA
Panelists TBA
Demo: The ‘NeuroResonator’ - A Transcranial
Ultrasound (‘TUS’) Device Modulating
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall
Consciousness and Cognition 
Sterling Cooley, Berkeley Ultrasound, Berkeley
CA, USA
Joseph L. Sanguinetti, Psychology, University of
Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
7:00PM-10:00PM
John JB Allen, Psychology, University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona, USA End of Consciousness Party
Stuart, Hameroff, Anesthesiology, Center for
Consciousness Studies, Banner-University Social Program
Medical Center, The University of Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona, USA There is no better way to end your conference week
than having a great party! End of Consciousness
Venue - Main Building, Great Hall Party will be organized at restaurant/night club
Maxine, over the roof tops of Helsinki (900 metres
from the conference site). The restaurant is
booked exclusively for the confence participants
until 10.00 PM and the bar is open all night. See
you all there!

Venue - Restaurant Maxine

Address: Urho Kekkosen katu, 1 A, 6th floor

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Pre-conference Workshops
& Tutorials

MediYoga - a therapeutic form of yoga

Lindqvist Daniela
My Yoga, Espoo, FINLAND
Mantovaara Riitta
Friteko Balans, Lappträsk, SWEDEN,
Bernardi Luciano
University of Pavia, ITALY
Time: Monday, June 8, 9:00am – 12:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium IV

MediYoga was established and developed by Göran Boll in Stockholm, Sweden. MediYoga has its origins in classic Kunda-
lini yoga and started to take shape as early as 1998, when an initial partnership project was launched with one of the world´s
leading medical universities.
Our aim is to make yoga a natural part of society and an everyday feature of people’s lives, in school, at work, in the
healthcare sector etc. This is where yoga is needed. We do this via new research projects, developing courses and products
and services that help make yoga more accessible and available where it delivers genuine benefits – right in the heart of fast
paced modern everyday life.
Research on MediYoga has been conducted in Sweden since 1998 when the first Swedish study on MediYoga for
chronic back pain was conducted. Several hospitals have been conducting research into MediYoga for various heart prob-
lems, heart attacks, atrial fibrillation and strokes etc. One of the hospitals has also been using MediYoga as a regular part
of rehabilitation for its cardiac patients since January 2010. Numerous other hospitals around Sweden are continuing their
studies in MediYoga.
A study into MediYoga for type-1 diabetics, the first in Finland, is starting in early 2015. The patients are recruited from
the another study (launched in 2003) where the significance of early disorders of the autonomic nervsystem in the devel-
opment of type-1 diabetic patients is studied. A sample of patients will be participating in a MediYoga group. The lead re-
searcher is Doctor Milla Rosengård-Bärlund, a diabetes specialist under the guidance of Professor Per-Henrik Groop.
Yoga in general and MediYoga in particular are powerful complementary methods for therapy and rehabilitation. Their
regular practice will affect, reduce and even cure many physical, mental and emotional imbalances. Today yoga is prescribed
as a treatment at several American, Swedish and Norwegian hospitals for e.g. the rehabilitation of stroke, heart and cancer
patients. MediYoga is available at around a dozen hospitals in Sweden and Norway today, plus some 50-60 clinics and a
handful of specialist clinics for rehabilitation, pain relief etc., where it has become a standard part of treatment.
Practising yoga affects the body and its inner organs in numerous ways. It builds flexible and strong muscles, affects di-
gestion and hormone balance, produces a more resilient and durable nervous system, helps balance the right and left halves
of the brain and improves your sleeping habits –to name just a few benefits.
MediYoga exercises are performed slowly and in a controlled manner. They are designed to develop physical flexibil-
ity, create mental relaxation and provide insight. Breathing plays a fundamental role in MediYoga and in yoga philosophy

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breathing embodies Prana, the vital force. Breathing is an unconscious action for most people. However we can consciously
change this through the use of different breathing techniques. Breathing is also a direct reflection of different emotional
states. If we are under stress, our breathing is rapid and shallow. If we are relaxed, we breathe deeper, calmer breaths. Which
means by consciously changing the way we breathe we can directly affect the way we feel and create physical, mental and
emotional harmony inside ourselves. Breathing is a unique way of being able to directly affect the subconscious processes in
our mind and body. Long deep, conscious breathing is fundamental to MediYoga.

The preliminary program of the workshop:

9am-10am Dr Milla Rosengård-Bärlund will present preliminary results from the first Finnish MediYoga study.
10am-11am MediYoga and Conscious Breathing; We are practising conscious breathing through the most fundamental
MediYoga excercises. We are sitting on a chair or cross-legs on a yoga mat on the floor. Meditation is an important part
of MediYoga. The yoga programme is normally concluded with meditation and there are many ways to meditate. There
will be yoga exercises to suit everyone and yogic techniques that you can easily incorporate into your everyday life.
11am-12am Discussion and presentation of studies involving MediYoga and meditation.

How non-reductionist monism avoids the

many problems of reductive physicalism and
functionalism
Velmans Max
University of London
Time: Monday, June 8, 9:00am – 1:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XII

This workshop is organized into two 90-minute sessions separated by a 30 min coffee break.
Session 1 Tutorial: In Western consciousness studies, the difficulties surrounding “consciousness” are usually associated
with phenomenal consciousness and its qualia. This meaning of consciousness is also central to how consciousness and its
contents are understood in common language and in everyday life. Although conscious phenomena appear to have phenom-
enal properties that are different to the properties of neural states, reductive physicalism and functionalism argue that sci-
ence will ultimately show these to be nothing more than states or functions of the brain. In the tutorial part of this workshop
we examine 7 fundamental problems for these reductive positions: (1) although neuroscience and cognitive science can in
principle identify the neural states (physically or functionally defined) that cause or correlate with given conscious experi-
ences, that does not satisfy the criteria for ontological reduction; (2) while numerous attempts have been made to redefine
consciousness in a way that would allow such a reduction, these redefinitions, without exception “beg the question” thereby
evading the problems posed by phenomenal consciousness rather than avoiding them; (3) reductive arguments usually
confound theory reduction with phenomenal reduction; (4) redefining consciousness in terms of the brain processes with
which it is most closely associated usually confounds three different senses in which a process can “be conscious”: it can be
conscious (a) in the sense that one is conscious of it, (b) in the sense that its operation results in or is accompanied by phe-
nomenal consciousness, and (c) in the sense that consciousness plays a causal role in that process. Consequently the effect
of such functionalist redefinitions is to obscure rather than clarify the relation of phenomenal consciousness to its associ-
ated processing in the brain; (5) reductive arguments tend to confound the “world appearance-reality distinction” (that the
world is not really as it appears to be) with the “appearance appearance-reality distinction” (that an appearance is not really
as it appears to be); (6) Ontological reductionism impedes rather than fosters the science of consciousness: nearly all reduc-
tionist and non-reductionist philosophies of consciousness accept that physical causal antecedents and correlates of given
of conscious experiences can in principle be found. Consequently both encourage the search for such physical antecedents
and correlates by appropriate third-person methods. However, in questioning the value of first-person methods, reduction-
ist philosophies discourage the development of such methods thereby impeding rather than fostering a more complete sci-
ence of consciousness (in the ways exemplified, for example, by neurophenomenology and experiential neuroscience) (7)
most reductionist philosophies adopt implicitly dualist assumptions about the properties of the conscious phenomenology
that they seek to reduce (assuming for example that conscious phenomenology has neither spatial location nor extension).

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However such dualist characterizations of conscious phenomenology misdescribe much of it. For example, the visually ex-
perienced world does seem to have spatial location and extension. This turns out to have severe consequences for the inter-
nal coherence of reductionist philosophies, which we will examine if there is sufficient time.
The remainder of Session 1 will show how non-reductionist forms of monism such as panpsychism, dual-aspect mon-
ism and reflexive monism are able to follow the natural contours of conscious experience, thereby avoiding the problems
above, and fostering a more “natural’ science of consciousness. Their adoption also alters the nature of the so-called “hard
problem” of consciousness.
Session 2. Elaboration, discussion and debate:Given the range of material covered in Session 1, set against the current
popularity of reductionist thought and the likely presence of many reductionists at the conference, the entire 90 min of ses-
sion 2 will be devoted to (a) elaboration of any points covered in Session 1 (if required by the participants) and (b) open
discussion and debate.

Scientific Field Theories of Consciousness –

Recent Developments
Fingelkurts Andrew
BM-Science - Brain & Mind Technologies Research Center, Espoo,
Fingelkurts Alexander
BM-Science - Brain & Mind Technologies Research Center, Espoo,
Freeman Walter
University of California at Berkeley,
Vitiello Giuseppe
University of Salerno,
Kozma Robert
University of Memphis
Time: Monday, June 8, 9:00am – 1:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XIII

This workshop will observe exclusively scientific field theories of consciousness concerning the everyday conscious experi-
ences of individuals (including such sensations as colours, sounds, smells, tastes or somatosensation) and not the theories in
which the word “field” is used to mean an abstract or esoteric entity.
The field theories of consciousness are theories that postulate that consciousness is identical with a field (or some aspect
of it) in the general sense in which the term “field” is used in physics, i.e. a field in which the property that exists at each point
in a particular region of the space-time continuum is objectively measurable. In other words, consciousness is seen as having
not only temporal duration, but also extension in space.
It is a common consensus that in the 1930s and 40s the Gestalt theorist Wolfgang Köhler put forward the foundations
for an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness. More specifically, in his work “field theory” (Köhler 1940) he referred
to brain electric fields as cortical correlates of percepts. Latter, the proper neuroscientific formulations of the electromag-
netic field theory of consciousness have been developed by Robert Charman (1997), Susan Pockett (1999, 2000), John-
joe McFadden (2000, 2002), Roy John (2001), Andrew Fingelkurts and Alexander Fingelkurts (2001, 2005, 2008), Walter
Freeman (2006, 2007), Paul Nunez (2006, 2007).
Some electromagnetic theories of consciousness are also quantum mind theories of consciousness. Examples include
quantum brain dynamics (QBD) approaches of Mari Jibu and Kunio Yasue (1995) and of Giuseppe Vitiello (2001, 2002).
The basic concept in QBD is that the electrical dipoles of the water molecules in the brain constitute a cortical field. The
quanta of this field are described as corticons. QBD proposes that the cortical field not only interacts with, but also to a
good extent controls the neuronal networks.

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Time-Table:
9:00 – 9:20 – Welcoming word. Dr. Andrew Fingelkurts
9:20 – 9:50 – Prof. Walter Freeman Consciousness as We Know it Began with a Hunter’s Plan.
9:50 – 10:00 – Questions and answers
10:00 – 10:30 – Prof. Giuseppe Vitiello,A Proposed Solution to the Mind-Brain Relationship.
10:30 – 10:40 – Questions and answers
10:40 – 11:10 – Prof. Robert Kozma. A Field Level in Brain Functional Architecture – Is It the Phenomenal
Consciousness.
11:10 – 11:20 – Questions and answers
11:20 – 11:35 – Break
11:35 – 12:05 – Dr. Alexander Fingelkurts. A Field Level in Brain Functional Architecture – Is It the Phenom-
enal Consciousness.
12:05 – 12:15 – Questions and answers
12:15 – 12:45 – Dr. Andrew Fingelkurts Experimental Support to the Brain Operational Architectonics Theory
of Phenomenal Consciousness.
12:45 – 13:00 – General discussion.

Consciousness as we know it began with a hunter’s plan *

Freeman Walter J
Division of Neurobiology, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

Animals search for food and shelter by locomotion through time and space. The elemental event is the action-perception
cycle, which has three stages. In the first stage a volley of action potentials initiated by an act of search (sniff, saccade, etc.)
triggers the formation of a macroscopic wave packet that caries a pattern of amplitude modulation (AM) that can be ob-
served non-invasively from scalp EEGs of human volunteers perceiving stimuli. The first stage gives emotional awareness
of the stimulus. The wave packet is filtered and sent to the entorhinal cortex, where it is combined with wave packets from
all sensory systems. This triggers the second stage forming a concept as a multimodal flash memory that is passed through
the hippocampal formation where it is assigned a place in the life-long memory of the subject. In the third stage the output
of the entorhinal cortex triggers the formation of a global wave packet that synchronizes some oscillatory activity of most if
not all of the cerebral cortex. Therefore I postulate that the global wave packet, the third stage in the cycle requiring ~0.2 sec-
onds, expresses the global accommodation that culminates the action-perception cycle with a plan and a prediction for the
next cycle. In humans each embodies a social contract for cooperation that requires prediction and understanding of others’
minds.

* Adapted from Freeman WJ. (2014) pp. 140-148, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Phi-
losophy, vol. 10, no. 1, 2014. 1. Freeman WJ. (2001) How Brains Make Up Their Minds. New York: Columbia
UP. 2. Freeman WJ, Quian Quiroga R. (2013) Imaging Brain Function with EEG. Springer.

A proposed solution to the mind-brain relationship

Vitiello Giuseppe
Department of Physics “E.R.Caianiello” and INFN 84084 Fisciano (Salerno), Italy

As shown by laboratory observations, the brain goes through a continuous flow of phase transitions, in a succession of am-
plitude modulated (AM) and phase modulated (PM) patterns (wave packets) correlated with categories of conditioned
stimuli. These ordered patterns of coherently oscillating neuronal assemblies are described in the dissipative quantum
model of brain (DQMB) by means of spontaneous breakdown of symmetry triggered by external stimulus. Their sequenc-
ing is associated to the non-unitary time evolution implied by dissipation. The brain is indeed an open system in permanent
interaction with the environment. In the DQMB the balance of energy and matter between the brain and the environment
requires the doubling of the degrees of freedom of the brain. The environment, thus described by the doubled degrees of
freedom as the time reversed image of the brain, appears then as the “Double” of the brain. The consciousness act is in the
trade between the brain and its environment, in the permanent dialog between the brain and its Double. In this way, by up-

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dating of the meanings of the flows of information exchanged in its relation with the Double, the brain construct knowledge
in its own world, builds its own mind. The complex system of the Double, the brain and their relationship may describe the
mind-brain dynamic relationship.

1. Freeman WJ. Mass Action in the Nervous System (Academic Press, New York 1975/2004). 2. Freeman WJ
and Quian Quiroga R. Imaging brain function with EEG (Springer, New York 2013). 3. Vitiello G. My Double
Unveiled ( John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2001). 4. Freeman WJ, Capolupo A, Kozma R, Olivares del Campo A,
Vitiello G. submitted for publication. 5. Freeman WJ. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2015;31, in print. 6. Vi-
tiello G. The use of many-body physics and thermodynamics to describe the dynamics of rhythmic generators in
sensory cortices engaged in memory and learning. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2015;31:7-12.

Experimental Evidences of the Phase Transition Models of Conscious Experience

Kozma Robert
Department of Mathematical Sciences, University of Memphis, TN 38152, USA

In this work, we introduce recent results of the analysis of ECoG data, identifying synchronization effects with sudden transi-
tions in spatio-temporal neurodynamics, which are hypothesized to relate to conscious experience. Previous studies indicated
that higher cognitive processing is manifested via cortical singularities [1-4]. In those works a hypothesis is outlined about the
cognitive cycle. This work provides extensive analysis of the dynamics of spatio-temporal patterns of amplitude and frequency
and postulates neural correlates of the cognitive cycle, in particular of the “aha” moment. The studies employ quantitative features
including analytic amplitudes (AA) and instantaneous frequencies (IF) derived from Hilbert transforms, and pragmatic infor-
mation (PI) indexes [5-9]. We describe the time evolution of the spatio-temporal dynamics through repeated phase transitions
using mathematical models of large-scale networks [10]. The analyzed responses show significant nonlinear events characterizing
the cognitive cycle in the 1s window following stimuli as follows: (a) The initial “Awe” (0-0.1 s) period, which is due to the direct
imprint of the sensory stimuli. (b) Chaotic Exploration (0.1-0.3 s) describing the brain as dynamical system searching through
its reservoir of past experiences. (c) The “Aha” moment (0.3-0.45 s) corresponding to the link between the sensory stimulus and
meaningful individual desires and experiences. (d) Chaotic Integration (0.45-0.6 s), when the new knowledge is incorporated
in the brain dynamics, by adjusting its landscape if warranted. (e) Finally, a dramatic drop (0.6-0.9 s) indicates a return to back-
ground brain dynamics and unfolding a response. We discuss the implications of the results in understanding the development of
human consciousness and the emergence of shared meaning in relationships with others. We conjecture that this analysis could
eventually shed light on how to develop an ethical framework for decision making, considering and emphasizing the construc-
tive aspects of intention and creativity in the context of universal values and behavioral responses, for the future benefit and the
peaceful development of humanity [9, 11-13]. This is a joint work with W.J. Freeman, J.J. Davis, and G. Gillett.

1. Freeman, W.J. (2006) Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas, Mind & Matter Vol.
6(2), 2006, pp. 207–234. 2. Freeman, W. J. (2008) A pseudo-equilibrium thermodynamic model of informa-
tion processing in nonlinear brain dynamics. Neural Networks, 21(2), 257-265. 3. Freeman, W.J. Quiroga, R.
Q, (2013) Imaging Brain Function with EEG: Advanced Temporal and Spatial Analysis of Electroencephalo-
graphic Signals,” Springer Verlag. 4. Davis, J.J., Kozma, R. (2013) Creation of Knowledge & Meaning Manifested
via Cortical Singularities in Cognition, - Towards a Methodology to Understand Intentionality and Critical Be-
havior in Neural Correlates of Awareness, Proc. Int. Conf. Awareness Computing IEEE SSCI 2013, IEEE Press,
# 923. Singapore, April 16-19, 2013. 5. Atmanspacher, H., Scheingraber, H. (1990) Pragmatic information and
dynamical instabilities in a multimode continuous-wave dye laser. Canadian Journal of Physics, 68(9), 728-737.
6. Freeman, W. J., Holmes, M. D. (2005) Metastability, instability, and state transition in neocortex. Neural Net-
works, 18(5), 497-504. 7. Stam, C. J., Nolte, G., Daffertshofer, A. (2007) Phase lag index: assessment of func-
tional connectivity from multi channel EEG and MEG with diminished bias from common sources. Human
brain mapping, 28(11), 1178-1193. 8. Kozma, R., Davis, J. J., & Freeman, W. J. (2012) Synchronized Minima
in ECoG Power at Frequencies Between Beta-Gamma Oscillations Disclose Cortical Singularities in Cognition.
Journal of Neuroscience and Neuroengineering, 1(1), 13-23. 9. Davis J.J., G. Gillett, W.J. Freeman, R. Kozma
(2015). Brentano on Consciousness: A striking correlation with ECoG findings about the Cognitive Cycle and
the Emergence of Knowledge and Meaning (submitted, 2015). 10. Kozma, R., Puljic, M., Freeman, W. J. (2014)
Thermodynamic Model of Criticality in the Cortex Based On EEG/ECOG Data, in: Criticality in Neural Sys-
tems (ed: D. Plenz), Wiley. 11. Thompson, E., Varela, F. (2001) Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and

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Consciousness, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 418–425. 12. Fingelkurts, A. A., & Fingelkurts, A. A. (2001).
Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: towards solving the mind-brain problem. Brain
and Mind, 2(3), 261-296. 13. Barsalou, L.W. (2008) Grounded Cognition, Annual Rev. Psychol., 59: 617–645.

A Field Level in Brain Functional Architecture – Is It the Phenomenal

Consciousness
Fingelkurts Alexander
BM-Science – Brain & Mind Technologies Research Centre, Espoo, Finland

Phenomenal consciousness refers to a highest level of organization in the brain and captures all immediate and undeniable
(from the first-person perspective) phenomena of subjective experiences (concerning hearing, seeing, touching, feeling,
embodiment, moving, and thinking) that present to any person right now (subjective present) and right here (subjective
space). It is a real and a natural phenomenon that is tightly anchored to a biological reality found in the human brain [1]. If
it is so, then there must be a specific level of brain organization (and a specific spatial–temporal grain in it) that functions as
the direct realization base of the phenomenal world. We propose that the brain operational architectonics (OA), centered
on the notion of operation, is the only brain level that satisfies requirements needed for consciousness to emerge [2]. Ac-
cording to this view the simplest mental/cognitive operations (responsible for qualia or simple computations) are presented
in the brain in the form of local 3D fields produced by transient functional neuronal assemblies, while complex operations
(responsible for complex objects, images or thoughts) are brought into existence by joint simple operations (temporal cou-
pling of local 3D fields by means of operational synchrony, OS) in the form of so-called operational modules (OM) of var-
ied complexity [3]. Therefore, brain OA is presented as a highly structured and dynamic extracellular electric field nested
in spatial and temporal domains and over a range of frequencies, thus forming a particular operational space–time (OST).
OST level has emergent properties relatively independent from the neurophysiological (neuroanatomical) properties of the
brain [4,5]. Phenomenal (subjective) level supervenes on the operational (OST) level with one-to-one correspondence and
ontologically it is inseparable from it [4,5]. OST level is best captured by the electroencephalogram (EEG) measurement
[2,3,4,5].

1. Revonsuo A. Inner presence: consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2006. 2. Fin-
gelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA. Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: towards solv-
ing the mind-brain problem. Brain Mind 2001;2:261–96. 3. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Neves CFH. Phe-
nomenological architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain: the unified metastable contin-
uum. J New Math Nat Comput 2009;5:221–44. 4. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Neves CFH. Natural world
physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time. Phys Life Rev 2010;7:195–249. 5. Fingelkurts
AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Neves CFH. Consciousness as a phenomenon in the operational architectonics of brain
organization: Criticality and self-organization considerations. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 2013;55:13–31.

Experimental Support to the Brain Operational Architectonics Theory of

Phenomenal Consciousness
Fingelkurts Andrew
BM-Science – Brain & Mind Technologies Research Centre, Espoo, Finland

Most neuroscientists agree that further understanding of phenomenal consciousness will rely upon the view according to which
phenomenal consciousness is grounded to material carrier processes that take place in the brain [1]. According to the brain
Operational Architectonics (OA) theory, such processes take place at the electromagnetic field produced by the brain, thus
being the highest level of brain’s functional organization [2]. Indeed, brain generates a highly structured and dynamic extracel-
lular electric field nested in spatial and temporal domains and over a range of frequencies. This field exists within brain internal
physical space–time (IPST) and is best captured by the electroencephalogram (EEG) measurement. Detailed analysis of the
structure of EEG’s complex hierarchical and nested architecture reveals a specific operational space–time (OST) which liter-
ally resides within the IPST and is isomorphic to phenomenal space–time (PST) [3]. Therefore such OST level may serve as
the potential neurophysiological constituent of the phenomenal consciousness’ architecture [4]. If it is true, change in circum-
stances when awareness expression is either weakened or lost completely should bring changes to the brain OA. Application of

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OA methodology to EEGs of patients who are in a permanent vegetative state (VS) or in a minimally conscious state (MCS)
revels that when neuronal assemblies get very small, short-lived, highly unstable and do not communicate with each other, con-
sciousness fades leading to complete unawareness of self and the environment [5,6]. Other experimental models of conscious-
ness such as pure hypnosis [7] or sleep dreams [8] and manipulation of subjective awareness by TMS [9] revealed additional
information supporting the view according to which it is an intact coordinated activity (operational synchrony) among rela-
tively large, long-lived, and stable neuronal assemblies within particular temporal scales that is important for enabling routine
representational processes to be integrated within a coherent phenomenal world from the first-person perspective [5,6].

1. Revonsuo A. Inner presence: consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2006. 2.
Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA. Operational architectonics of the human brain biopotential field: towards
solving the mind-brain problem. Brain Mind 2001;2:261–96. 3. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Neves CFH.
Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time. Phys Life Rev 2010;7:195–249.
4. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Neves CFH. Consciousness as a phenomenon in the operational archi-
tectonics of brain organization: Criticality and self-organization considerations. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
2013;55:13–31. 5. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Bagnato S, Boccagni C, Galardi G. Toward operational
architectonics of consciousness: basic evidence from patients with severe cerebral injuries. Cogn Process.
2012;13:111-131. 6. Fingelkurts AA, Fingelkurts AA, Bagnato S, Boccagni C, Galardi G. DMN operational syn-
chrony relates to self-consciousness: evidence from patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states. Open
Neuroimag J 2012;6:55–68. 7. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA, Kallio S, Revonsuo A. Cortex functional con-
nectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: an EEG case study. Neuropsychologia 2007;45:1452–
1462. 8. Fingelkurts AnA, Fingelkurts AlA. Present moment, past, and future: mental kaleidoscope. Front Psy-
chol 2014;5:395. 9. Fingelkurts AnA., Fingelkurts AlA., Neves CFH. The structure of brain electromagnetic
field relates to subjective experience: exogenous magnetic field stimulation study. Neuroscience Finland 2013
Meeting: “Optogenetics and brain stimulation”. Helsinki, Finland; March 22, 2013.

Tutorial on INTERVAL TIMING

Raulefs Peter
R&D, QIQCS, Santa Clara, USA
Time: Monday, June 8, 9:00am – 1:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XV

Format: 4 hour tutorial (lecture with slides/videos/handouts) discussing a comprehensive view of the current understand-
ing of interval timing in humans and animals.
Senses of time, including duration, past/present/future, rhythm, and simultaneity are salient cognitive features. Time
is experienced as a stream of conscious events that integrate sensory, motor, and many cognitive processes. Timing mecha-
nisms in animals and humans span a wide range of 10 orders of magnitude, from microseconds to days. In this tutorial, we
focus on interval timing that involves im- and explicitly estimating the duration and temporal relations of time intervals in
the range of 100s of milliseconds to a few minutes. Participants learn key (1) psychophysical and neurophysiological find-
ings, (2) information processing models explaining the findings with (3) their proposed neurobiological implementations
and assessments of their consistency with experimental findings as reported by end-2014.
Program:
1 Introduction, motivation and scope: Scope and significance of interval timing; Approach: How experimental findings
and models lead to understanding of cognitive processes; Outline
2 Psychophysical (PP) findings: Experimental procedures. Key findings: Mean accuracy; Scalar property; Non-scalar
properties; Non-temporal processes modulating time perception (incl. signal modalities and properties, attention, arousal,
emotions).
3 Neurophysiological (NP) findings: EEG/Contingent Negative Variation; Climbing neural activity; Spatial-temporal
neural firing patterns; Membrane currents and firing rates;
4 Information processing (IP) models: Clock/pacemaker-accumulator models; Scalar Timing Theory; Encoding/de-
coding timing information from statistical processes. Evaluating IP models vs. PP/NP findings.
5 Neurophysiological models and neural substrates: Drift-diffusion model; Striatal beat frequency model; Ramping activity;

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Recurrent networks/synfire chains; State space trajectories; Oscillator models. Evaluating IP/NP models vs. PP/NP findings.
6 Integration of IP and NP models into cognitive architectures: Distributed, dedicated, intrinsic timers; Timing in the
Neuronal Dynamic Global Workspace model.
7 Open problems and future directions

Clinical Hypnosis, Meditative Stages and

Mantras in Palliative Care: Techniques for
Effectively Relieving Pain and Suffering in
chronic illnesses.
Brugnoli Paola
Department of Anesthesiology, Intensive Care and Pain Therapy, Verona University, ITALY
Agarwal 
Siddhartha
MD, Physician, Saran Ashram Hospital and Hon. Lec. D.E.I, Dayalbagh, INDIA
Monday, June 8, 2015, 2:00pm – 6:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XV

Clinical Hypnosis, Meditative Stages and Mantras, are recognized in medicine as effective complementary therapies for pain
and symptom’s relief, in Palliative Care. Like the WHO’s guidelines for Palliative Care, they: “provide relief from pain and
other distressing symptoms; affirm life and regards dying as a normal process; intend neither to hasten or postpone death;
integrate the psychological and spiritual aspects of patient care; offer support system to help patients live as actively as pos-
sible until death; offer support system to help the family cope during the patients’ illness; use a team approach to address the
needs of patients and their families; will enhance quality of life; they are applicable early in the course of illness, in conjunc-
tion with other therapies.”
“Hypnosis typically involves an introduction to the procedure during which the subject is told that suggestions for im-
aginative experiences will be presented. The hypnotic induction is an extended initial suggestion for using one’s imagination,
and may contain further elaborations of the introduction. A hypnotic procedure is used to encourage and evaluate responses
to suggestions. When using hypnosis, one person (the subject) is guided by another (the hypnotist) to respond to sugges-
tions for changes in subjective experience, alterations in perception, sensation, emotion, thought or behavior. Persons can
also learn self-hypnosis, which is the act of administering hypnotic procedures on one’s own.” (APA American Psychological
Association Division 30; ASCH American Society of Clinical Hypnosis).
The term Meditation refers to a broad variety of practices that includes techniques designed to promote relaxation,
build internal energy and realize inner self or one’s spirit entity, and develop compassion, love, patience, generosity and for-
giveness. The Meditation slowly and gradually purifies the person and dissolves ego , so one forgets himself(physical frame)
and mingles with the vast ocean of LOVE where there is no suffering and pain and only Eternal joy is experienced , thus
enabling its practitioner to enjoy an indestructible sense of well-being while engaging in any life activity and at any age.
“Mantra” means a sacred utterance, numinous sound, or a syllable, word, phonemes, or group of words believed by
some to have psychological and spiritual power. Mantra may or may not be syntactic or have literal meaning; the spiritual
value of mantra comes when it is audible, visible, or present in thought. Earliest Mantras were composed in Vedic times by
Hindus in India, and those are at least 3000 years old. Mantras come in many forms, including ?c (verses from Rigveda for
example) and saman (musical chants from the Samaveda for example). They are typically melodic, mathematically struc-
tured meters, resonant with numinous qualities. At its simplest, the word ? (Aum, Om) is the most heard of Mantra. They
are melodic phrases with spiritual interpretations such as human longing for truth, reality, light, immortality, peace, love,
knowledge and action. They are musically uplifting and spiritually meaningful.
The sounds or mantras which bring about relaxation can be external or internal. The de-stressing effect of external
sounds and music is well known to all of us. But, the hearing of internal music or sounds is an extremely Blessed and Eso-
teric phenomenon. It encompasses in itself the Ultimate Truth and Reality. The practice of hearing such internal sounds is
known as Surat Shabd Yoga Abhyas and is being taught in Radhasoami Faith. The ultimate outcome is music of enlighten-
ment and experiencing Sat-Chit-Anand-Prakash , which is the eternal state of joy and Love.

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This work wants to emphasize how these pathways are focused on providing patients with relief from suffering, pain and
stress, in Palliative Care.
This workshop will focus on practical skill for clinicians, building for those therapists who work with chronic and/or
progressive health conditions, especially at the end of life.
Further, we will explore several techniques and ways of integrating Clinical Hypnosis, Meditative Stages and Mantras,
into everyday practice.
Drawing on current research in psychology, pain therapy and cognitive neuroscience, in this workshop, we will investi-
gate the effects of the use of Hypnosis, Meditative Stages and Mantras, in the treatment of Pain Therapy and Palliative Care,
including special techniques for pain and suffering relief.
During and at the conclusion of this workshop, the attendee will be able to:
1) Understand recent neurobiological evidence regarding brain function in hypnosis and meditative stages;
2) Review the role of Hypnosis, Meditation and Mantras, in the treatment of pain and suffering at the end of life, and in
chronic illnesses;
3) Use many different techniques of integrating Clinical Hypnosis, Meditative Stages and Mantras into clinical work, for
the therapists interested in awakening the mind and opening the heart at the end of life.

AUTHORS: Dr. Maria Paola Brugnoli, MD, Spec. Anesthesia, Intensive Care, Pain Therapy and Palliative Care,
Department of Anesthesiology, Intensive Care and Pain Therapy, University of Verona, Hospital GB Rossi, Ve-
rona, Italy. ASCH member, American Society of Clinical [email protected]; Dr. Siddharth
Agarwal, MD,(General Medicine) Consultant Physician at Saran Ashram Hospital and Sidharth Nursing
Home, Agra; Hon. Lecturer at Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Deemed University, Dayalbagh, Agra, India.
Member: AIST, Italy. Email: [email protected]

Dual-Aspect Alternatives to Physicalism and

Their Implications
Silberstein Michael
College Park, Elizabethtown College and UMD, USA
Seager William
University of Toronto, CANADA
Kiverstein Julian
University of Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS
Kirchhoff Michael D.
Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong, Australia
Time: Monday, June 8, 2:00pm – 6:00pm
Place: Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XII

There is now a growing consensus among philosophers of mind and researchers in the foundations of cognitive science that
physicalism generally, and mind-to-brain reduction in particular, maybe inadequate as a basis for understanding phenom-
enal experience. On the philosophical side this change is largely the result of the failure of physicalism to convincingly dis-
charge the hard problem of consciousness. On the scientific side, it is the lack of progress toward a sound understanding of
neural correlates of phenomenal experience, in other words the failure of cognitive neuroscience to bridge the explanatory
gap. More and more, it is no longer believed that merely giving cognitive neuroscience more time is going to solve the prob-
lem. Phenomenal experience is turning out to be a hard problem indeed.
The evidence for this sea change is all around. First, there is a renewed interest in the previously moribund neutral mon-
ism, dual-aspect monism and panpsychism. Second, there is renewed interest in the phenomenological tradition (and first-
person techniques more generally) within both philosophy and science. Third, some highly regarded and hard-nosed neuro-
scientists are starting to take seriously information-theoretic accounts of conscious experience that strongly suggest panpsy-
chism and dual-aspect frameworks of thinking. Fourth there is an explosion of activity in embodied and extended cognitive

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science with its non-brain centric focus, and increasing attempts to extend extended cognitive science to phenomenal expe-
rience. The latter includes a renewed interest in ecological, dynamical and enactive accounts of psychology. Fifth, an increas-
ing number of cognitive scientists are taking seriously modeling techniques deriving from concepts of quantum theory that
allow us to unify phenomenological, cognitive, neural and information-theoretic accounts of conscious experience.
While there are many differences amongst these various theories and models of the mind, taken together, they suggest
that physicalist-based theories of mental activity maybe severely limited or simply false. Historically, changes in the philo-
sophical foundations of a scientific discipline often bring about profound methodological and theoretical changes within
that scientific discipline itself. In this case we are seeing how philosophical changes in thinking about the mind are causing
ripples in cognitive science and neuroscience, and in turn, changes in thinking about how the brain works (e.g., distributed
rather than localized), embodied cognition, etc., lead to changes in how conscious experience is conceived. Whether one
talks about “couplings”, “entanglement” or “self-organization”, one emerging picture is that mind, brain, body, and environ-
ment ultimately form a mental-physical non-dual unity of sorts.
The purpose of this pre-conference workshop is to explore the new developments with respect to these philosophical
alternatives to physicalism and the concomitant new developments in cognitive science and neuroscience, and to discuss
possible future directions and applications in both philosophy and science.
Format: The workshop will be four hours long. There will be four speakers that explore different and often competing
accounts of these new developments. The first two speakers, Michael Silberstein and William Seager, will focus on philo-
sophical aspects, and the last two speakers, Julian Kiverstein and Michael D. Kirchhoff, will focus on new developments in
cognitive science. Each speaker will be subject to questions from other speakers and the audience after their presentation.
At the end of the session all speakers will form a joint panel to answer questions of more general scope from the audience.
Speakers: Michael Silberstein. Elizabethtown College and UMD, College Park. Has written recently on neutral monism
and accounts of phenomenal experience in ecology psychology, enactivism and phenomenology. Is guest editing a special
issue of JCS on the very topic of this workshop that will appear in the summer of 2015.
William Seager. University of Toronto.
Julian Kiverstein. Assistant Professor of Neurophilosophy, University of Amsterdam. His collaborators include Any
Clark. For more information see http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Julian_Kiverstein
Dr. Michael D. Kirchhoff (Lecturer in Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Inquiry
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia)
My research is located in one of the most exciting and fast moving areas of research in contemporary philosophy,
namely the overlap between the empirical sciences of mind and naturalistic philosophy of mind. In my PhD, I investigated
certain aspects of the metaphysical underpinnings of the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition through an examination of var-
ious metaphysical relations of dependence such as material constitution, realization, composition, supervenience, and emer-
gence. My recent research focuses primarily on exploring to possibility of diachronic inter-level relations of dependence in
cognitive systems and in dynamical systems more generally.
Current research projects
I am currently working on a proposal for a Discovery Early Career Researcher Award with the Australian Research
Council. If awarded, this proposal will investigate diachronic dependency in the empirical and theoretical sciences of cogni-
tion. Alongside this project, I intend to explore issues such as micro-temporality, the free energy principle and the self, and
work on second-wave arguments for the hypothesis of extended cognition.

Masked and Unmasked Priming: Insights from

Recent Experiments and Neurocomputational
Models 

Sohrabi Ahmad
Department of Psychology , University of Kurdistan, IRAN
Time: 8th June, 2:00pm – 6:00pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium XIII

In this workshop I present current debates in masked priming using state of art experiments and models, focusing our model
(Sohrabi and West, 2009) which has been cited and reviewed in several recent papers from 2009 to 2014 (e.g., Boy and

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Sumner, 2010; Krüger et al., 2011; McBride et al., 2012; Whitmarsh et al., 2013; Gaschler et al., 2014). Although some
of these authors have raised questions about some aspects of the model, I am going to show its application for areas not
covered in the original paper. First I am reviewing the masked priming topic and then I am going to mention some of those
points raised by the above mentioned authors.
In masked priming tasks, a brief masked stimulus (the prime) can affect the decision on the stimulus that follows
(the target). A prime, a mask, and a target are presented sequentially and the task is to make a decision on the target. The
result is usually a Positive Congruency Effect (PCE), also known as the positive compatibility effect. In PCE, the prime
improves the decision (in terms of the speed and accuracy) on the target if they are congruent and vice verse if they are
incongruent. Conversely, a negative priming effect has been found, called the Negative Congruency Effect (NCE). This
effect is also known as the negative compatibility effect, where paradoxically the prime improves the decision on the tar-
get if they are incongruent and vice verse if they are congruent. These changes in priming direction are caused or affected
by a variety of different factors, including but not limited to: Prime-target SOA, Prime duration, Mask density, Mask type,
Degradation, Attention, etc.
Our model, unlike other available ones, is a biologically plausible, based on established neural mechanisms and algo-
rithms. It consists of different layers that are shown in the following slides: Input layer (IL), representation layer (RL), alert
attention layer (AA), cognitive layer (CL) and motor layer (ML). The model, in addition to being biologically compelling,
shows many dynamic effects in RT and error patterns that have not been shown previously (such as the changes in RT and
the size of priming effects through time). Interestingly, it can mimic the biphasic change in ERP measures, something similar
to N100 and P300 components.
In the model the NCE is caused by refractory period of attention (and conflict), showing a similar basis for NCE and
“Attentional blink”. According to the model, attention has two phases, with short SOAs target processing is facilitated by at-
tention, but with long SOA target processing is diminished due to an attentional refractory period. This refractory period is
caused by neuromodulation, i.e., a non-linear multiplication, rather than addition or incrimination. This feature of the model
make it a little bit hard to understand that is why some author (e.g., Boy and Sumner, 2010; McBride et al., 2012; but see
Krüger et al., 2011) think that it is similar to perceptual models.
During the two session workshop (four hours), first, I am going to review relevant experimental and neuroimaging stud-
ies in the area of masked priming and relevant areas such as primed agency, attentional blink, and other decision making
processes. I will be demonstrating these cognitive processes using specific software such as a Matlab toolbox for masked
priming, STOP-IT software for attention, and my own Visual Basic based software for masked and unmasked priming and
attentional blink. Next, I will be showing relevant models with a focus on our own model. Using, a custom program devel-
oped by Visual Basic, I will demonstrate the main features and underlying neurocomputational mechanism through hands
on simulations.

Transcultural Perspective on Consciousness:

a bridge between Anthropology, Medicine and
Physics
Re Tania
Unesco Chair “Anthropology of Health Biosphere and Healing Systems”
University of Genoa, ITALY
Vitiello Giuseppe
Department of Physics “E.R.Caianiello” and INFN - 84084 Fisciano (Salerno)- Italy
Pentikäinen Juha

Department of Comparative Religion at the University of Helsinki
Carlo Ventura

University of Bologna – Molecular Biology Department VID Association
Time: 8th June, 2.00 pm – 6.00 pm
Place: University of Helsinki, Main Building (old side, Senate square), auditorium IV

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The last 5-10 years have witnessed huge steps and the vast mobilization of multidisciplinary competences “toward a Science
of Consciousness”, as clearly illustrated in the recent international conference on that topic held in Stockholm under the
patronage of the Center for Consciousness Studies of the University of Arizona and of the Perfjell Foundation, with the col-
laboration of the postdocs of the Karolinska Institute. At the same time that Science, and especially Medical Anthropology,
Neuroscience and the Physics of Consciousness progresses, tools and new understanding have been developed that will
allow for the transfer of much of that basic Science into clinical practice. This transfer doesn’t only concern the clinical prac-
tice exclusively with mental disease but also the regular clinical practice where a person or a patient, using his, or her mind,
can influence the progression of disease, becoming what one could rightly call a therapeutic partner.
This is an old issue in different cultures that uses different “states of consciousness” to foster the healing pro-
cess.
The need to establish connections between Medicine, especially in the therapeutic aspect (healing), and all the in-
formation already obtained from the mind-matter phenomenology has led to much experimentation and theorizing in this
border and transcultural area.
During the symposium an interdisciplinary and international group formed by anthropologist who have studied altered
states of consciousness in different cultures, medical doctors who uses states of consciousness to treat patients with the sup-
port of quantum physics and molecular biologists will try to define a transcultural perspective on consciousness merging
anthropology, medicine and physics.

1. Analysis of the material and immaterial elements in the healing places

Tania Re
Unesco Chair “Anthropology of Health Biosphere and Healing Systems”
University of Genoa, ITALY

The research project involves a multidisciplinary team of anthropologists, physicists, chemists, ethnobotanical, architects and
medical doctors and its primary objective is the analysis of places of healing and the processes that have in place.
In particular, in
it was analyzed Mayantuyacu, a healing center located in the Peruvian Amazon where the ancient art of healing ashanika is set.
Mayantuyacu is situated on the bank of a river with thermal water at 100 ° flowing in the middle of the forest. Around the
central Maloca, where is the common life, were built to accommodate malocas other people who come to Mayantuyacu to
know and to seek treatment from knowing millennial ashanika and properties of thousands of plants including plants teacher.
Results: We analyzed the following elements: water, music (icaros), teacher plants, ceremonial architectures (malocas)
involved during the healing ceremonies and their impact on different species (plants, animals and humans).
Particularly we
analysed the following elements :
1.Architecture: we present preliminary results obtained by the study of the ethnographic emphasis has allowed us to
identify the presence of sacred spaces and their periodic re-enactment in ceremonial events, which constitute the central event
of the transmission of a world view and a stable and harmonious relationship with the landscape and with other living beings
2.Water: we present preliminary results obtained by the study of the electrical conductivity measurements on different
samples
3.Music: we present preliminary results obtained by the study of the heart mechanical vibrations by means laser
Doppler vibrometry. We compare the recorded signals for an individual in two different conditions: at rest and listening to
the music of the South American shamans. An analysis of the shaman music is also realized, by using the decomposition
method in time domain, in order to study self-similar structures of the listened music.
4.Teaching plants : We present preliminary results obtained by the study of the different properties of the teaching
plants used by the ashanika.

2. On the unity of knowledge as implied by the undividable consciousness act


Vitiello Giuseppe
Department of Physics “E.R.Caianiello” and INFN - 84084 Fisciano (Salerno)- Italy

The formation of spatially extended domains of neuronal synchronized oscillations and their rapid sequencing in the form
of phase transitions in the brain functional activity characterize the permanent, continual relation of the brain with the en-
vironment in which it is embedded. Brains dissipate metabolic energy at rates 10-fold greater than rates in other organs and
the brain phase transitions between different dynamical regimes appear to be crucial in the engagement of the subject with
the environment in the action-perception cycle. The study of the continual updating of the meanings of the information

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exchanged with the environment cannot be faced within one single discipline, such as neuroscience, biology, physics, an-
thropology, etc.. It requires the support of the methods and tools which are specific of each of these disciplines, but it is also
crucial to adopt a unifying standpoint. Indeed, the unity of knowledge emerges from the very same brain activity, which pro-
ceeds from information to meanings as known and constructed by the brain itself, which we describe as its Double. The act
of consciousness resides in the permanent dialog between the brain and its Double. Consciousness, and knowledge stem-
ming from it, is in fact translational and transcultural with respect to the many different facets under which Nature, including
the same brain, can be viewed and studied.

3. Inside-Out Connectedness: Happiness Trance Coherence in a Multimodal

Neurofeedback Environment.
Simoes Mario
Martins Jorge Emanuel

LIMMIT Laboratory – Faculty of Medicine – Lisbon – Portugal

Developed as a neurofeedback BMI to help creating a fully immersion experience of the subject, in order to induce a Subjec-
tive Happiness State and Long-Term Well-Being, with Clinical Hypnosis, as a self-taught Altered State of Consciousness.
The main outcome of this project is to adapt the healthcare environment to a more mindfulness meditative experience. The
multimodal neurofeedback environment is the informational experiential matrix where the subject will create the heart-
brain-body neuroplastical coherence to achieve the Inside-Out Connectedness. Moreover, with this approach it is intended
to bridge the classical East meditative practices with a musical and visual Brain-Machine Interface environment and the
knowledge and application of clinical and experimental Hypnosis of the West culture.

4. States of Consciousness in the Nordic world

Pentikäinen Juha

Department of Comparative Religion at the University of Helsinki

Shamanism is one of the main manifestations of Sami Pre-Christian religion, and many of its functions have remained a part
of the Sami world view until recently in spite of the fact that almost all the Sami are at least formally baptized Christians
nowadays. The natural centre of the drum is the sun. This does not, however, mean that the Sami had worshipped the sun
god, as has been supposed by some scholars until now. The more probable interpretation is that the drum has been read and
interpreted in a perennially varied way, due to the season, person and problem in question.
The oval form of the drum and the location of the figures towards the heliocentric sun indicate the same. The director of
the shamanistic session, the noaidi or the shaman was an expert in shamanic folklore. He had to know the myths about the
origins of the universe and about the culture. Mythic time is cyclic. The early golden times are brought to the present every
time a social, cultural or private crisis takes place.

5. Ancient healing systems and regenerative medicine

Ventura Carlo

University of Bologna – Molecular Biology Department VID Association

Oscillation and synchronization of multiple oscillators is a fascinating manifestation of self organization in the Universe.
There is now recent and compelling evidence that celestial mechanics is mirrored in molecular biology. Coupling of oscilla-
tory patterns, and their synchronization into a Rhythm is emerging as the underpinning of essential processes of life. Until
recently, the standard view has conceived the mammalian circadian clock as a kind of orchestrator located at the level of
suprachiasmatic nuclei and spreading through the living organism.
Ethnomedicine, the study of the traditional or ancestral medicine of the various populations of the world, deals with a
space-time vision of the preventive, hygienic and curative procedures, whether they tend towards the more magic-religious or
the merely empirical. In all traditional healing systems belonging to different cultures the Sounds are part of each traditional
healing systems: for example Mantra in the Eastern word, Icaros in the Amazonian ethnic medicine, Prayers in western world.
Can Sounds belonging to ancient healing system be a way to treat new diseases through regenerative medicine? Can
these sounds be used to prevent cell ageing?

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Index to Poster Session

Wednesday, June 10, 4:45pm – 7:45pm

• Priming In Process Philosophy,

Chuang Yi Hsin
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN [2]

• General Information Model of Consciousnesses of a Person

Dyukarev Mikhaile
Consciousnesses of a Person, The Center «Development of the Personality», Kharkov, UKRAINE [3]

• Toward A Definition Of “consciousness Itself”

Emami Ahmad, Islamic philosophy, Iranian Institute of philosophy , Qom, IRAN [4]

• Metaphorical nature of consciousness

Gáliková Silvia
Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, SLOVAKIA [9]

• The concept of consciousness: a four-fold taxonomy and a unified conception

Jakub Jonkisz
Faculty of Management and Computer Science, University of Bielsko-Biala, Bielsko-Biala, POLAND [15]

• Consciousness, Science, and Philosophy

Kondor Zsuzsanna
Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, HUNGARY [19]

• A New View of Human Reality

Yilai Li
N/A, Independent, Suzhou, CHINA [21]

• Troubles with pre-reflective self-consciousness

Alfredo Paternoster
Department of Arts and Philosophy, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, ITALY [27]

• Consciousness is nothing but INTERFACE phenomenon

Raisuddin Shaikh
Reservoir, Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Noida Up, INDIA [28]

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• A Bandwidth Model of Consciousness: Integrating the Carrier Medium Into

Our Conception of Modulatory Phenomena
Smith Kaleb
Clinical Psychology, Saybrook University, Seattle, USA [30]

• On Measurement of Consciousness
Sriramamurti P
Centre for Consciousness Studies, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [31]

• Consciousness and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds

Stoll Joshua
Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, USA [32]

• Compatibility of Rumi’s revelations with quantum interpretation of

consciousness
Ahmadpour Shahriar
Anatomical Sciences, North Khorasan University of Medical Sciences, Bojnurd, IRAN
Foghi Khadijeh
North Khorasan University of Medical Sciences, Bojnurd, IRAN [35]

• Meaning, Existence, and Integrated Information

Electra Dorian
Philosophy/Natural Sciences, Shimer College, Houston, USA [45]

• Arrangements
Gill Richard
Retired, Cheltenham, UNITED KINGDOM [47]

• The NOW and Consciousness: a Comparison

Holbrook Dwight
Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, POLAND [48]

• From Primordial Sleep to Consciousness

Limnell Petteri
Philosophy, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND [54]

• Panpsychism and Constructive Co-consciousness

Miller Gregory
Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UNITED KINGDOM [61]

• Conscious Spacetime - related to integration of 1st and 3rd perspective of

consciousness and integration of block time and subjective time
Pilotti Jan
Theoretical Physics, Pilotti Science&Art, Örebro, SWEDEN [66]

• The Biodynamic Breakthrough Model: An Elegant Framework for Non-Linear

Creativity in a Conscious Universe
Seneca Jankel Nick
n/a, Individual, Lewes, UNITED KINGDOM , [72]

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• Not Your Father’s Modesty: Empiricism, Consciousness, and the A Priori- A

Reply to Funkhouser
Stepanenko Walter
Philosophy, The University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA [73]

• How to mathematically define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as

physics quantities?
Xiu Rulin
Research Department, Institute of Soul Mind Body Science, Keaau, USA
Sha Zhi Gang
Research Department, Institute of Soul Mind Body Science, Keaau, USA [77]

• Beliefs in dualism and personal values

Grankvist Gunne
Department for Social and Behavioral Studies, University West, Trollhattan, SWEDEN [78]

• The mind-body problem and human-technology interaction research

Karvonen Hannu
Department of Computer Science, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND
Kauppinen Tommi
Helsinki, FINLAND [83]

• Pineal Gland 2.0

Spector Shirtz Aviv
History and Philosophy of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, jerusalem, ISRAEL [89]

• The Vulgar Notion of Matter: the Common Denominator of Materialism and

Dualism
Uygun Tunç Duygu
Philosophy, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, TURKEY [90]

• Inverse Zombies and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness

Cavalcante Felix Francisco Helio
Departament of Philosophy, Universidade Federal do Ceara, Fortaleza, BRAZIL [94]

• Does Prediction Error Minimization framework endorse David Chalmers’

representational theory of phenomenal content?
Dolega Krzysztof
Philosophy II, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY [95]

• Fish are blind: further insights into phenomenal consciousness

Key Brian
School of Biomedical Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA [97]

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• A Naturalistic Qualia Model: The Function, Neural Correlates and Evolution of

Qualia
Westerlund Joakim
Stockholm university, Psychology department, Stockholm, SWEDEN
Lindström Jonathan
Stockholm SWEDEN
Dalkvist Jan
Stockholm, SWEDEN [103]

• Conscienceness – the correlation between Machine Ethics and Machine

Consciousness
Komuda Radoslaw
Graduate School of Information Sci. and Technology, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN
Rzepka Rafal
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN , Kenji Araki, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN [105]

• Definition of the Consciousness Concept as Pattern Recognition Properties of

Cognitive System Sets
de Paiva Gilberto
Curso Sup. Tecnológico em Manutenção Industrial, Fatec Osaco, Prefeito Hirant Sanazar, São Paulo, BRAZIL [106]

• Language-Centered World Simulator for Testing Various Approaches to

Machine Consciousness
Rzepka Rafal
Graduate School of Information Sci. and Technology, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN
Araki Kenji
Hokkaido University, JAPAN [108]

• Consciousness and the causal efficacy of semantics. On automaton theory,

grammar, and the notion that all mental causes are syntactic
Hermoso-Duran Juan
Psychology, Colegio Universitario Cardenal Cisneros, Madrid, SPAIN [113]

• Could be Quantum Consciousness the purpose of the whole universe to

achieve self-awareness? An inextricable machine to identify the “Propositum” of
each particle
Muñoz-Jiménez Daniel
Neurophilosophy, University La Salle, México City, MEXICO
Muñoz-Jiménez Gerardo
Plastic Surgery, General Hospital Dr. Manuel Gea González, Mexico City, MEXICO
C. Tena-Calderon Brandia,
Care Quality comition, Volcare/Crossroads Care, Canterbury, UNITED KINGDOM, [114]

• Consciousness from an Analogue Representation of Space

Worden Robert
Neuroscience, Open Mapping Software, Ely, UNITED KINGDOM, [115]

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• Functionalism and Teleology

Yang Kai-Chung
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN [121]

• The Peircean foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of

Consciousness
Arnold John
Humanities, Shimer College, Chicago, USA [122]

• Occipital and left temporal EEG correlates of phenomenal consciousness

Dinis Pereira Vitor Manuel
Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group, University of Lisbon, Lisboa, PORTUGAL [125]

• Four conceptions of the hard problem of consciousness

Dorsey Jonathan
Philosophy, Texas Tech, Lubbock, USA , [126]
CANCELLED

• Consciousness: A by-product of two mirroring processes

Turjman Odeh
Music Therapy, Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development, Jerusalem, PALESTINE [131]

• Brute Experience, Embedded Cognition and Extended Mind

Ray Rajib
Department of Philosophy, Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi, Delhi, INDIA
Panda Ranjan
Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Insitute of Technology, Mumbai, INDIA [136]

• A proposed mathematical model based on neuro fuzzy system for human

consciousness
Swami Sahni Pooja
NRCVEE , Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Sahni Prakash
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [139]

• Logical Patterns in the Life Cycle of Optimal and Self-Regulationg Systems:

Principles of Hexalogic Dialectics
Cavaller Victor
Information and Communication Sciences, UOC, Barcelona, SPAIN [140]

• Inference and Consciousness

Chevalier Jean-Marie
Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Paris, FRANCE [141]

• Ideality, symbolic mediation and scientific representation

Kilakos Dimitris
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, Athens, GREECE [143]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 6 5

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• First-, Second- and Third-Person Perspectives in Science and Contemplative

Traditions: Neurophenomenology, Buddhism and General Semantics
Lukas Wolfgang
Institute for Astro- and Particle Physics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, AUSTRIA [145]

• The Table of Consciousness Researchers

McKenty Adam
N/A, Independent scholar, Mansons Landing, CANADA [146]

• Ontological Commitment to the Self as a non-physical entity in Contemporary

Psychology
Bleau Renee
Education, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UNITED KINGDOM
Janssen-Lauret Frederique
Dept of Philosophy, University of Campinas, Sao Paulo, BRAZIL [153]

• Whole Genome Transformation of Human Identity

Dunston G
Microbiology/National Human Genome Center, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA
Kurian P
National Human Genome Center/Physics and Astronomy, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA [156]

• Collective Through Our Soft Anatomy

Garcia Armando
N/A, Austin, USA , [157]

• The Person or ‘spiritulo’ in philosophical practice and psychiatric

rehabilitation
Heinänen Hannu
Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, FINLAND [158]

• Neural dynamics of free intentional action: a high-density EEG study

Becev Ondrej
Faculty of Medicine, Masaryk University, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
Brázdil Milan
Behavioral and Social Neuroscience, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
Lamoš Martin
Multimodal and Functional Neuroimaging, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
Marecek Radek
Multimodal and Functional Neuroimaging, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
[166]

• A Compatibilist Strategy for Responding to the Manipulation Arguments

Besedin Artem
Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [167]

6 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

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‘• The Chaotic Brain: A Case for Compatibilism

Grygiel Wojciech
Philosophy, The Pontifical University of John Paul II, Kraków, POLAND [168]

• A Graded Approach to Free–will

Kant Pratul
Assoc. of Alumni and Friends of Dayalbagh Ed. Inst, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Fremont, USA
Sudhish Prem Sewak
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [170]

• A Study of Predictability of Mind

Ken Zhi Abraham Lim
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN [171]

• Do Patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Have Free Will?

Ueng Yunn
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University , Taipei, TAIWAN [177]

• Can The Naive Realist Explain Sensory Integration

Cavedon-Taylor Daniel
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Antwerp, Antwerp, BELGIUM [178]

• Does visual experience overflow intermediate-level processing?

Clarke Sam
Philosophy, The University of Wawick, Coventry, UNITED KINGDOM [179]

• Singular mental files

Lara Juan Jose
Philosophy, IES. Tirant lo Blanc, Elche, SPAIN [190]

• Explicit and implicit understanding of other’s behaviors and goals

Martens Judith
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY [191]

• A Model for Simulation of Consciousness

Akula Chandramouli
Project Management, Tech Mahindra Ltd, PUNE, INDIA [198]

• Money as Taboo and Postmoney – new way of changing consciousness

Ivantchev Boyan
Finance, VUZF University, Sofia, BULGARIA [199]

• Conscious states beyond physical and linguistic forms.

Megvinyte Marija
Philosophy, King’s College London, London, UNITED KINGDOM [202]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 6 7

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• Consciousness and Spiritual Intelligence

(SQ): an Incorporated Move towards Global Peace
Srivastava Savita
Foundationas of Education, Faculty of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institution, Agra, INDIA [204]

• Channelizing Thoughts to Elevate Consciousness

Anubhooti Verma
Theology, Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Bangalore, INDIA
Rahul Mathur
Information Systems, IIM Calcutta, Bangalore, INDIA
Vineeta Mathur
Theology,Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Agra, INDIA [205]

• Neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception

Hirvonen Jonni
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Wang Sheng
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Monto Simo
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Palva Matias
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Palva Satu
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND [209]

• Single-subject analyses of N400 ERP component: Implications for

consciousness studies
Kallionpää Roosa
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku,
FINLAND
Scheinin Annalotta
Turku PET Centre, University of Turku, FINLAND
Sandman Nils
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Karvonen Milla
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Kallioinen Minna
Turku University Hospital, Turku, FINLAND
Maksimow Anu
Turku University Hospital, Turku, FINLAND
Revonsuo Antti
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Scheinin Harry
Turku PET Centre, University of Turku, FINLAND
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND [210]

6 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

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• Electroencephalographic Coherence and Cortical Acetylcholine During

Ketamine-Induced Unconsciousness
Silverstein Brian
Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Pal Dinesh
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Hambrecht-Wiedbusch Viviane
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Mashour George
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA [213]

• Resting-state EEG study of hypoxic coma patients; A preliminary report

Yamanoglu Merve
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hanoglu Lutfu
Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Erdogan Cem
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hizarci Burcu
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildiz Sultan
Biophysics, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Tezcan Gunay
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Kizilarslan Deniz
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Canpolat Gamze
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Toprak Guven
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Oz Huseyin
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Helvaci Yilmaz Nesrin
Neurology, Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY [215]

• Level of processing as one of the prerequisites for conscious perception

Derda Monika
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Koculak Marcin
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Binder Marek
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND [216]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 6 9

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• Effects of Natural Environment on Consciousness: A correlational Study

Sahni Pooja
NRCVEE , Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Kumar Jyoti
IDDC, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Singh Kamlesh
HUSS, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA [219]

• Non-locality and intuition as the second foundation of knowledge

Frecska Ede
Psychiatry, University of Debrecen, Debrecen, HUNGARY
Luna Luis Eduardo
Wasiwaska Research Center [220]

• Coding for Consciousness: Neurite Branching and Selective Neural Circuit

Activation
Beran Jim
N/A, Redwood Falls, Minnesota, USA [221]

• DNA Consciousness: From Theory to Science

Grandy John
Medicine, North Country Urgent Care, Watertown, USA [222]

• Power spectral analysis of EEG signal in Fp1-A1 grid during full

consciousness and general anaesthesia with inhalation anesthetic gas
(Sevorane and Desflurane).
Sániová B.
Drobný M.
Clinic of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Medicine, Slovak Republic
Fischer M.
Clinic of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Medicine, Slovak Republic
Drobná E.
Essenius Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital in Martin, Armed Forces Academy of General MR Štefánik in
Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovak Republic
Hamžík J.
Thoracic Surgery Clinic, Slovak Republic [223]

• The Quantum Consciousness and the Social Experience of Cinema.

Is Affective Response Related With a Quantum Coherent State Between
Observers?
Camargo-Perez Luis
Experimental Development, Centro de Investigación Frontera y Filosofía, Mexico, MEXICO
Muñoz-Jimenez Daniel
Facultad Mexicana de Medicina, Universidad La Salle, Mexico, MEXICO [224]

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• The differences and similarities between the consciousness of dream and

wakefulness: A phenomenological and electrophysiological study
Suzgun Eyup
Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hanoglu Lutfu
Neurology, Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yamanoglu Merve
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildiz Sultan
Biophysics, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Cadirci Fadime
Neuroscience master’s student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Mantar Nagihan
Neuroscience master’s student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Toprak Guven
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Helvaci Yilmaz Nesrin
Neurology, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildirim Erol
Psychology, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yalciner Betul
Neurology, Bayindir Hospital, Istanbul, TURKEY
Agargun Mehmet Yucel
Psychiatry, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY [226]

• Indeterminacy in the Central Nervous System

Beal Daniel
Psychiatry, Cincinnati VAMC and the University of Cincinnati, CINCINNATI, USA [228]

• Archaeoacoustic Investigation of a Prehistoric Cave Site: Frequency-

Dependent Sound Amplification and Potential Relevance for Neurotheology
Tessaro Lucas
Human Studies, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Gaona Jose
Faculty of Medicine, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid, Madrid, SPAIN
Rouleau Nicolas
Experimental Psychology, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Caswell Joseph
Human Studies, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Burke Ryan
Department of Biology, Université de Limoges, Limoges, FRANCE
Schumacher David
PRG Anomalous Research Unit, Red Lion, USA [231]

• Effect of Yoga and Meditation on Metacognition and Mind-wandering

Ahuja Sona
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [232]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7 1

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• The neurofeedback training affects physiological signals but not behavior

performance of attenion
Chen Yen
Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, TAIWAN
Shiauhua Liu
Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, TAIWAN [234]

• A science of compassionate care: A new challenge for a science of

consciousness in contemporary neuroethics
Gorjup Rado
Institute for Transdisciplinary Research, SLOVENIA
Gorjup Niko
ITR - Institute for Transdisciplinary Research, SLOVENIA [236]

• Consciousness prefers direct gaze to averted gaze in change detection

Lyyra Pessi
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND
Hietanen Jari K.
Human Information Processing Laboratory, School of Social Sciences and Humanities/Psychology, University of
Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND
Astikainen Piia
Department of Psychology, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND [237]

• How to Integrate Emotions

Thomsen Knud
NUM, Paul Scherrer Insitut, Villigen, SWITZERLAND , [240]

• Top-down completion in peripheral vision reduces perceptual vagueness

Sayim Bilge
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, BELGIUM
Wagemans Johan
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, BELGIUM [244]

• The influence of visual identification on visual awareness

Wierzchon Michal
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Siedlecka Marta
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Paulewicz Boryslaw
Faculty in Katowice, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Katowice, POLAND [246]

• Rapid auditory categorization in the right parietal lobe

Fuscà Marco
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY
Levine Seth
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY
Schwarzbach Jens
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY [247]

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• Parietal cortex encodes domain-general categories

Levine Seth
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY
Schwarzbach Jens
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY [248]

• Change of irrelevant features in tasks as the condition of appearance of

regular errors
Andriyanova Natalya
Psychology, Sain-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [249]

• Difficulty and processing fluency in visual one-shot learning.

Ishikawa Tetsuo
Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN
Toshima Mayumi
Department of Informatics, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, JAPAN ,
Mogi Ken
Fundamental Research Laboratory, Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo, JAPAN [250]

• Conscious and unconscious components in implicit learning

Ivanchei Ivan
Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [251]

• Unconscious Learning of Cognitive Structures with Emotional Components

Jurchis Razvan
Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA
Opre Adrian
Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA [252]

• Metacognition and modification of ephemeral feelings

Onzo Ayako
Pharmacy, Kinjo Gakuin University, Hadano, JAPAN
Mogi Ken
Sony CSL, Tokyo, JAPAN [257]

• Productive networks of the brain

Laine Pauli
Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND [258]

• Low-level Features in Mental Images

Martarelli Corinna S.
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND
Mast Fred W.
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND [260]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7 3

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• Behavioral Relevance of Consciousness for Human Action: Explorations with

the Simon Task Paradigm
Gök Selvi Elif
Cognitive Science, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY
Hohenberger Annette
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY [261]

• Influence of gender, occupation and tolerance to uncertainty on the Iowa

Gambling Task performance
Ivanovskyy Mykola
Psychology, Moscow State University, Moscow , RUSSIAN FEDERATION [262]

• The Relationship between Perceived Transgression Wrongness and

Forgiveness when having received Apologies: Moderating Effects of Explicit and
Implicit Self-Esteem
Lim Sung Moon
Psychology, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Ghim Sungchan
Psychology, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Yoo Hyeonjeong
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Lim Jijun
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Lee Seohee
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Choi Yeoul
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Shin Nari
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA [263]

• Demonstrations that Implicit Social Cognitions Measured by IAT are

Represented in Awareness
Wilson Thomas
Psychology, Bellermine University, Louisville, USA
Pennington Charlotte
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Monk Rebecca
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Qureshi Adam
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Zhou Jin
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Heim Derek
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM [264]

CANCELLED

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• Dynamics of a negative choice in identifying ambiguous images

Filippova Margarita
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Miroshnikov Sergey
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Chernov Roman
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [266]

• Aftereffects in solving dual-meaning anagrams

Naumenko Olga
Psychology, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Kostina Daria
Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [267]

• Consciousness and elevator travel – the relationship between self-

consciousness and elevator design
Rousi Rebekah
Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Jyväskylä, Kinkomaa, FINLAND [268]

• The predictive role of consciousness in determining the Meta-Cognitive ability

Mehra Jyoti
IT, IBM, Mohali, INDIA
Ahuja Sona
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Education Institute, Agra, INDIA [271]

• Differences in a formal reasoning stage in adolescents with different level of

intelligence.
Saulina Ekaterina
Department of Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [272]

• Mindfulness and Memory Sensitivity: Opposite sides of the same coin?

Tonkovic Mirjana
Department of Psychology, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA
Vranic Andrea
Department of Psychology, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA [273]

• Embodied Knowledge and Distributed Cognition: The role of Cognitive Maps.

Lins Marcos
Department of Production Engineering, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL
Leal Rachel
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL [275]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7 5

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• Rubber hand illusion alters thermoception in the disowned real hand.

Lukowska Marta
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Siedlecka Marta
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND [276]

• Influence of prior causal belief on sense of agency – the cue integration

approach
Majchrowicz Bartosz
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND [277]

• What do male and female mental health trainees think about their mood?
Rani Prachi
Department of Neuroscience, Narayana Hrudayalaya Hospital, Bangalore, INDIA
Mehrotra Seema
NIMHANS, Bangalore, INDIA [278]

• A metacognition model of the social aspects of consciousness.

Toshima Mayumi
Department of Informatics, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, JAPAN
Ishikawa Tetsuo
Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN
Oyama Keizo
Digital Content & Media Sciences Research Division, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, JAPAN
Mogi Ken
Fundamental Research Laboratory, Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo, JAPAN [285]

• Why we need a new paradigm to study the evolution of the mind.

Gabriel Rami
HHSS, Research group in Mind, Science, and Culture, Columbia College Chicago, Chicago, USA [287]

• Coping with stressful situations: A comparison between Tanzanian and

Emirati university students.
Al Miskry Abdullah Seif
Psychology & Counseling, UAE University, Al Ain, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Hamid Abdalla A. R. M.
Psychology & Counseling, UAE University, Al Ain, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES [288]

• Wigner’s Friend Paradox and Intersubjectivity

Borgheai Seyyed Bahram
Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, IRAN
Golshani Mehdi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, IRAN [290]

7 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 I nde x to P oster S ession

• Increased coincidence detection for quantum versus pseudo random

generated numbers.
Boshoff Lieze
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS
Jolij Jacob
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS [291]

• Are quantum probabilities subjective states of belief or states of nature ‘out

there’?
John Small
Faversham, UNITED KINGDOM [296]

• Experimental Results Support the Notion of Generalised Non-locality in Mind-

Matter Interactions
Walach Harald
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Horan Majella
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
von Lucadou Walter
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany [297]

• Consciousness as an inevitable phenomenon derived from the maximization

of information transfer
Perez Velazquez Jose Luis
Neuroscience & Mental Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, CANADA
Guevara Erra Ramon
Inserm, Paris, FRANCE [300]

• Fractal Geometry as the Basis for Hierarchical Computing in the Brain

Gupta Saatviki
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, New Delhi, INDIA
Gupta Arun Kumar
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, INDIA
Nandita Gupta
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, INDIA [301]

• Using principles of light science to enhance the doctor-patient relationship.

Jamieson Susan
Medicine, Dr Susan Jamieson Integrative Medical Practice, Hong Kong, HONGKONG [303]

• The influence of terahertz radiation on biological systems: heating, resonance

and non-linear resonance
Popova Svetlana
Laboratory of Laser Biophysics, ILP SB RAS, Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
[305]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7 7

I nde x to P oster S ession

• Bioelectromagnetics in Microbes ans Mosquitoes: A Comparative Study With

Special Reference to Biofield
Richa
Zoology, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Chaturvedi D. K.
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Parkash Sam
Zoology, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [306]

• Biophotons and Magnetoreceptors in Red Blood Cells:The Conscious

Conversation
Agarwal Sapna
Pathology, Saran Ashram Hospital, Dayalbagh, Agra, INDIA [307]

• Does consciousness and electrons exist in water - a necessity for all forms of
life?
Fredriksson Ingrid
Authr, Triquetra-Return AB, Årjäng, SWEDEN [308]

• Instantaneous Correlations of Gravitational Curvature at a Distance and their

Role in the Brain Processes
Egoyan Alexander
Health Care Economics and Management, University Geomedi, Tbilisi, GEORGIA [309]

• Tubulin conformation and hydrophobic pockets : An in-vitro study

Sahni Pushpa
Chemistry, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [311]

• Mental and Spiritual Evolution Awakens Consciousness and Spiritual

Awareness
Mathur Vineeta
Theology, Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Agra, INDIA [312]

• With powerful subconsciousness, why do we need consciousness?

Wu Dylan
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cogniti, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN [313]

• Can consciousness influence our epigenetics and can epigenetics influence

our consciousness?
Fredriksson Ingrid
Author, Triqetra-Return AB, Årjäng, SWEDEN [314]

• Samaadhi – An Explanation of Non-Locality in the Human Psyche?

MacPhail Jean C.
Santa Fe, NM, USA [332]

7 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 I nde x to P oster S ession

• Can Mind comprehend Mind?

Roy Sukhdev
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Saran Sant
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [333]

• Meditation and Ignorance: Concepts of Positive and Negative Ignoring

Wilson Margot
Philosophy, University of Glasgow, New Haw, UNITED KINGDOM [336]

• The use of sound and music in contemporary shamanic rituals in the creation
of altered states of consciousness
Hytönen-Ng Elina
Humanistic department, University of Eastern Finland, Jyväskylä, FINLAND [337]

• Paraphenomenological Methodology: proposal of foundation for investigation

resources and self- development of phenomenology operant on psychic
phenomena.
Schlosser Ulysses
Holociclo, Center for Higher Studies of the Conscientiology, Foz do Iguaçu, BRAZIL [339]

• Dreaming and Lucid Dreaming Based on an Ontology of Experience

Day Latasha
Consciousness &Transformative Studies, John F. Kennedy University, Pleasant Hill, USA [340]

• Lucid dreaming and personality: results on Russian sample

Vorobiova Alicia
School of Psychology, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Pozdniakov Ivan
School of Psychology, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Gordeeva Olga
Faculty of Psychology, Moscow State University, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION [343]

• Structural Analogies between Process Oriented Psychology and Quantum

Theory in the Context of a Dual Aspect Monism
Widdra Tobias
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, GERMANY [344]

• Sentient companions predicted and modeled into existence: explaining the

tulpa phenomenon
Sotala Kaj
Computer Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND [345]

• What it is like to be a non-sentient bat?

Spector Shirtz Aviv
History and Philosophy of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, ISRAEL [346]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 7 9

I nde x to P oster S ession

• Explorations Into Remote Viewing Microscopic Organisms (“The Phage”) and

the Effects of Biological Scientists’ Exposure to Non Local Perception Within a
Multidisciplinary Approach
Katz Debra
Parapsychology, International School of Clairvoyance, Phelan, CA 92329, USA
Beem Lance
Lead Researcher, Kari Beem Research Foundation, Sacramento, CA, USA, [347]

• Research on Anomalous Effect in Distant Intention Research

Schmidt Stefan
Transcultural Health Sciences, Europa Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder
Exceptional Experiences, University for Humanistics, Utrecht, NL
Academic Section for the Evaluation of Complementary Medicine, University Medical Center Freiburg, Germany
Center for Meditation, Mindfulness and Neuroscience Research, University Medical Center Freiburg, Germany [349]

• Intermedia Performance and Consciousness

Anstey Josephine
Media Study, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, USA [352]

• Determination of State of Consciousness with Indian Classical Music Ragas

and Color
Roy Sukhdev
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Pyari Pritam
Music, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Roy Saran Pyari
Sociology and Political Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Saran Sant
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [360]

• All knowledge is personal:

exploring the ‘via’ of the tacit dimension for addressing domestic abuse and
intimate violence
Dijkstra Sietske
Research, Dijkstra Agency, Utrecht, NETHERLANDS [362]

• Maintaining Personhood by Recognition in Long-Term Care for Older People

Pirhonen Jari
School of Health Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND
Laitinen Arto
School of Social sciences nd Humanities, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND [363]

• The role of consciousness and the possibility of consciousness in criminal law

Brito Ana
CEDIS, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa, PORTUGAL [365]

8 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 I nde x to P oster S ession

• “Taking Emotions Seriously: How Do Emotions Affect Our Ethical Decisions?”

Mun Cecilea
SHPRS, Arizona State University, Richmond, USA [366]

• Conscious Leadership: A pre-requisite for the Learning Organizations

Chauhan Vaibhav
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Sharma Sadhna
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Satsangee Nandita
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [367]

• Phenomenology of learning History: 6 case studies with children in primary

school
Lesar Mateja
Master Program Cognitive Science, Faculty of pedagogy, Ribnica, SLOVENIA
Kordeš Urban
Faculty of pedagogy, Ljubljana, Ljubljana, SLOVENIA [368]

• Factors Impacting Intuitive Consciousness: A Study of the Intuitive

Consciousness of Library-Going Children
Satsangee Nandita
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Paul Sarla
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA [370]

• An application of metacognitive strategies in second language writing

Suwanthep Jitpanat
School of Foreign Languages, Suranaree University Of Technology, Nakhonratchasima, THAILAND [371]

• Film as consciousness. The body, the soul and the consciousness of film.
Antonia Giannoccaro
Film, School of creative arts, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UNITED KINGDOM [372]

• ‘All for one, one for all’: collective consciousness and the genealogy of the
concept of ‘esprit de corps’
de Miranda Luis
Literatures, Languages and Cultures, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM [373]

• Business Leadership, Synchronicity, and Psychophysical Reality

Laveman David
Executive Business Consultancy, Laveman & Associates , New Hope, Pa, USA [374]

• Trauma, grief and mystical experiences in 19th century U.S. history

Zaccarini Cristina
History, Adelphi University, New York, USA [376]

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 8 1

T S C 2 0 1 5 E ast – W est F oru m P osters

TSC 2015 East–West

Forum Posters

• F01 An explorative study on CGPA Grading System and Adolescent’s self

worth
Seema Rani Bangalore Nagaraja
Vadapalli Asha

• F02 Transmigration of Soul and Consciousness

Satsangi Anirudh Kumar
Seenappa Sunitha N

• F03 Systems spiritual quantum theory of creation and consciousness and its
representation by Bonds graph
Sundaram Mani
Sundaram Prem

• F04 Spiritual sounds as the essence of consciousness in different religions

Mathur Reena
Mathur Gaurav

• F05 ‘Intuitive Communication Expressways’ – The Science behind Sustaining

& Harnessing the Spiritual Progress
Sahibzada Amit Dayal

• F06 Mental and Spiritual Evolution Awakens Consciousness and Spiritual

Awareness
Mathur Vineeta

• F07 Nature of Pure Consciousness according to the Upanishads

Prasada Rao Durga

• F08 Assessing effect of Disease Progression on Consciousness

Agarwal Siddharth
Agarwal Sapna
Singh Preetvanti

8 2 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 T S C 2 0 1 5 E ast – W est F oru m P osters

• F09 Systems Approach to Conscious living

Satsangi Sumiran
Satsangi Shipra

• F10 Bhakti Marg (Path of devotion) a Super highway to ultimate

consciousness- A Sant Mat perspective
Satsangi Ranjeet
Saini Dayal

• F11 Perceptions on the Discursive Location of Non-Violence [ahimsa]: a

survey of practitioners of Radhasoami Mat
Sahgal Smita
Sahgal Sanjeev

• F12 The Linkage between Spirituality in Work Place and Organizational

Performance : A Literature Review
Mittal Priyanka
Sandhu Dayal

• F13 Ontology and Epistemology of Consciousness : A Perspective

Sriramamurti P

• F14 Click Blackhole to Pick Consciousness

Singh Swati

• F15 A Work Life Balance Consciousness among Working Women in India

Nigam Shalini
Goswami Neelni

• F16 Spiritual Ecological Consciousness and Sustainability Findings from an

Empirical Study on Two Higher Education Domains of India
Kumari Srivastava Prem
Rai Pratibha
Shukla Saumya

• F17 Effects of Natural Environment on Human Conciousness: A Correlational

Study
Sahni Pooja
Kumar Jyoti

• F18 Phenomenology of higher order conscious experience in a Natural

Environment
Sharan Swami
Sahni Pooja

• F19 Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram: A System of Education

Nigam Shalini
Jain Sanjay

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 8 3

T S C 2 0 1 5 E ast – W est F oru m P osters

• F20 Spiritual Ecology in Dayalbagh Way of Life: A Different Story

Sri-Narain Mukti
Narain Karan
Srivastava Anoop
Srivastava Dayal Pyari

• F21 Dayalbagh Eco-village - A Spiritual Home

Sahni Mukti
Sahni Pushpa

• F22 New Tendencies in Hindu Religion

Sharma Prem Kali

• F23 Entrepreneurial Intuition

Dayal Arsh

• F24 Spiritual Exercise and Meditation Training at Workplace

Mittal Priyanka
Sandhu Dayal

• F25 Is Investment Decision of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)

A Conscious Choice ? A study of Indian MSMEs Using Multiple Case Study
Approach
Kandikonda Santi Swarup
Sri-Narain Mukti
Narain Karan

• F26 Consciousness- Divinity and Trinity of Human Form

Arora Kanta

• F27 Peace Education for Universal Consciousness

Srivastava Savita

• F28 Treating Vital Force Induces Holistic Healing and not mere Symptom
Relief: A Pilot Study
Saraswathi Sudha
Kumar Vijai

• F29 Consciousness and reality

Perfjell Christer

• F30 Consciousness of Vedanta and Modern Science

Srivastava Preeti
Srivastava Savita

• F31 Exploring Consciousness

Sahni Sudhir
Sahni Renu

8 4 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 8 5
Keynote Lectures

Keynote Lectures

Pre-Conference Keynote Lecture:

Can recent work on weak values in quantum mechanics provide new insights
into the mind-matter relationship?
Hiley Basil. J.
Department of Physics, University College, London WC1E 6BT, ENGLAND
TPRU, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, ENGLAND
Monday, June 8, 6:15pm – 7:45pm
The early attempts of Bohm to provide an ontology for quantum phenomena revealed a new form of energy, the quantum
potential energy. The properties of this energy are very different from the familiar classical potential energy in that its source
is internal, yet contains information about the environment leading to a context dependent time evolution found in quan-
tum processes. This energy is nonlocal and offers an explanation of the EPR paradox and quantum teleportation. In an at-
tempt to understand the role of this potential, Bohm and Hiley suggested that it should be considered as an information
potential, leading to a new notion of active information.
In some recent work I have shown that this energy is an essential feature of all quantum phenomena arising in the rela-
tivistic Dirac equation and in quantum field theory. This energy is encoded in the phase of the wave function and recent
advances in the theory of weak measurements allow an experimental investigation of this energy. This opens up a new way of
exploring the notion of active information which may offer new insights into the mind-matter relation.

Levels of explanation in neuroscience

Hintikka Jaakko
University of Helsinki, FINLAND and Boston University, USA
Tuesday, June 9, 5:00pm – 6:00pm
David Marr has distinguished three interacting levels of explanation that have rough computational analogues.

1. A computational (conceptual) level (defines “the goal of the computation”, e.g. identifies the mathematical func-
tion to be computed).
2. An algorithmic level (presents an algorithm for computing the function)
3. A hardware level (specifies how the algorithm is implemented physically)

Marr uses the distinction in his study of human visual cognition, emphasizing the critical importance of the conceptual
level from an information-processing point of view. In this talk, his distinction will be related to philosophical and meth-
odological questions, including the aim and prospects of phenomenology and the syntax-semantics contrast. In particular
Marr’s distinction will be related to two problem complexes in cognitive studies:

8 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 Keynote Lectures

a) The contrast in visual cognition between two systems, the “what” system and the “where” system is traced back to
two different kinds of framework of identification, perspectival and public ones.
b) The conceptual nature of autism is analyzed and related to deficient mental mastery of more than one perspective
at the same time.

Toward a molecular biology of conscious processing: consequences for drug

design 
Changeux Jean-Pierre
Kavli Institute for Brain & Mind UCSD, San Diego, USA
Institut Pasteur & Collège de France, Paris, FRANCE
Wednesday, June 10, 11:00am – 12:00pm
Comparative analysis of the anatomy and psychophysics of brain development and evolution has led to the identification of
features related to the emergence of conscious processing, in particular the development and maturation of the long-range
connections between the prefrontal, parieto-temporal, and cingulate areas of the cerebral cortex. This network of long range
connections has been hypothesized to contribute to the Global Neuronal Workspace for conscious processing (Dehaene et
al 1998 ; Dehaene & Changeux 2011). In parallel, the analysis of gene-expression time-series data of rodent & human brain
development has led to the detailed description of hierarchical networks of transcription factors (TFs), controlling coher-
ent gene groups expression at several nested hierarchical levels of cortical development (Tsigelny et al. 2012). Attempts are
being made in the identification in silico of the gene sets concerned with the long period of postnatal maturation which
characterizes the Human brain and the synaptic selection (stabilization and pruning) that controls long-range connectiv-
ity development which takes place during this period through spontaneous and evoked activity and/or by endogenous/
pharmacological modulators. The occurrence of possible allosteric switches mediated by the TFs and various allosteric re-
ceptors under the control of threshold concentration of orthosteric and allosteric modulatory agents possibly resulting into
the discrete emergence of defined conscious processes is investigated. Last, analysis of the gene-expression patterns of the
receptors for neurotransmitters (acetylcholine, glutamate, GABA) and neuropeptides (NGF, BDNF, etc.) engaged in regu-
lation of the various states of conscious processing during brain development by pharmacological agents such as nicotinic
compounds, benzodiazepine, and general anesthetics are currently under investigation.

References: Dehaene, S., M. Kerszberg and J. P. Changeux, A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful
cognitive tasks.” Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 95: 14529-14534; (1998)  ; Dehaene S, Changeux JP (2011) Ex-
perimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 70:200–227. Tsigelny IF, Kouznetsova
VL, Baitaluk M, Changeux JP.(2013) A hierarchical coherent-gene-group model for brain development. Genes
Brain Behav. 12:147-65. Changeux JP (2014) Protein dynamics and the allosteric transitions of pentameric re-
ceptor channels. Biophys Rev. 6:311-321 ; Cecchini M, Changeux JP (2014) The nicotinic acetylcholine recep-
tor and its prokaryotic homologues: Structure, conformational transitions & allosteric modulation. Neurophar-
macology Dec 18. pii: S0028-3908(14)00450-X. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropharm.2014.12.006

Consciousness and the Collapse of the Wave Function

David Chalmers
New York University, USA
Australian National University, AUSTRALIA

co-authored with
Kelvin McQueen
VU Amsterdam, Tel Aviv University, NETHERLANDS

The idea that consciousness collapse the quantum wave function is often invoked both as a potential solution to the quan-
tum measurement problem and as a potential role for consciousness in the physical world.  But it is typically dismissed and

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 8 7

Keynote Lectures

has rarely been made precise.  We put forward a way of making the idea precise and explore its benefits and costs both for
understanding physics and for understanding consciousness.

Bamboozled by “modal logic”

Churchland Patricia S.
University of California San Diego & Salk Institute, San Diego, California, USA
Friday June 12, 2:30pm – 3:30pm
Neuroscientists exploring the neural mechanisms supporting conscious experience may feel obliged to embrace constraints
drawn from modal logic concerning what counts as a genuine empirical discovery of an identity; that is, a discovery that
two distinct measurements in fact measure one and the same kind of thing. In the history of science we see many empirical
discoveries of identity; e.g. light is electromagnetic radiation. Such discoveries notwithstanding, from modal logic we get
the trumped-up philosophical idea that a scientific identity claim is true only if it is necessarily true. What does “necessarily”
mean? This: the statement must be true in all possible worlds. And what does that mean? Is there a consensus about this?
No. Is the set of “all” possible worlds well-defined? No. So how do we assess a “necessary” claim? “Modal intuitions” about a
thing’s “essence” may be invoked. Essence? That is what the thing necessarily has; i.e. has in all possible worlds. Wait. Isn’t the
argument going in a circle? Another dubious point: if you can imagine that a certain identity claim is false in some possible
world, then the alleged claim cannot be necessarily true, and hence the discovered identity is no real identity. Luckily, im-
agination and modal intuitions (of the right people) have a magical quality. This idea about necessary truths, originating in
medieval times, is not tested against reality in the way that, say, Bayes’ theorem is. But it feeds pseudo logic into arguments
against neurobiological approaches to consciousness by imagining zombies in possible worlds, and other god-awful, dead-
end, scientifically-impaired nonsense

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 P l enary Lectures

Plenary Lectures

Social Neuroscience, Body Perception and

Phenomenology
Tuesday, June 9, 11:00am – 1:00pm

Social interaction in the core of human brain function

Hari Riitta
Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND

Social interaction is among the most complex functions humans (and their brains) perform. Even so, the interaction is
most of the time surprisingly smooth and effortless, suggesting reliance on pivotal brain mechanisms. Still the brain basis
of human social interaction is poorly understood. One reason may be that—due to technical limitations—most brain imag-
ing has taken place on single subjects who are considered as passive and static spectators rather than as engaged interactors
whose state would dynamically vary during the experiment.
Recording of brain activity simultaneously from two interacting persons might bring some new light into the brain basis
of social interaction, especially during fast-paced interactions, such as turn-takings during conversation. Ultimately, the
2-person recordings could allow distinction between interactive and reactive modes of brain function.
Recent brain-imaging findings, especially on the mirroring systems, imply that our brains and minds are not as private as
we often think. For example, during an emotionally laden movie, large parts of the viewers’ brains tune into a common tick-
ing, informing about brain networks that support intersubjectively shared contents of the mind.

You are Part of Me: Conceptual and Embodied Aspects of the Self-Other
Relationship
Maister Lara
Royal Holloway University of London, ENGLAND

The relationship between the way we represent our own bodies and the bodies of others is flexible, dynamic and sensitive to
experimental manipulations. Shared bodily experiences, such as synchronized touch between individuals, have been used
to induce bodily illusions whereby another person’s physical features are incorporated into the representation of one’s own
body. We are now discovering that this ‘overlap’ between the bodily representations of self and other can have striking effects
on a wide range of social processes, including emotion recognition, social attention and even implicit attitudes towards ra-
cial outgroups. Intriguingly, this relationship between social cognition and overlap in self-other body representations may be
bidirectional; close relationships and trustworthy social interactions also lead to alterations in the embodied representations
of self and other.
We compare these findings with the social effects of incorporating another person into the conceptual, rather than bod-
ily, self-representation. Simple self-association tasks can be used to elicit an incorporation of another person’s face into the

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P l enary Lectures

conceptual self-representation, and this again leads to changes in the way we process social information related to that per-
son. The relationships between conceptual and embodied aspects of social relationships are discussed, and interpreted in
terms of a hierarchical model of the self.

Empathy and affective sharing

Zahavi Dan
Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, DENMARK

The current debate about empathy is characterized by many disagreements, but there is still widespread consensus that em-
pathy involves some kind of affective sharing. In my talk, I will first problematize this claim and argue that the proper locus
for affective sharing is in the domain of collective intentionality and not in that of empathy. In the second part, I will look
at some recent proposals regarding the nature of collective emotions, criticize the idea that collective emotions involve the
sharing of one single experiential episode (the so-called token identity account), and suggest an alternative account that
draws on some ideas found in classical phenomenology

Dreams, Virtual Realities and Hypnosis

Wednesday, June 10, 8:30am – 10:30am

An Integrative Model of Hypnosis: A 35-year Program of Research

Lynn Steven Jay
Psychology Department, Binghamton University (SUNY), New York, USA

In this presentation, I will summarize elements of a 35-year program of hypnosis research that support an integrative model
of hypnosis and hypnotic phenomena (Lynn, Laurence, & Kirsch, 2015), which takes into account the roles of social, cul-
tural, and cognitive variables at play both in and out of hypnosis as determinants of the multifaceted experience of hypnosis.
I will present research that addresses topics that include expectancies, imaginative suggestibility, rapport, the experience of
involuntariness, and the modification of hypnotic responsiveness in the course of presenting a framework for understanding
the dynamic nature of hypnotic responding. I will suggest that the search for neurophysiological correlates of hypnotic sug-
gestibility holds promise for arriving at a more complete understanding of the hypnotic experience.

Towards a Unified Science of Dreaming and Consciousness

Revonsuo Antti
University of Turku, FINLAND
University of Skövde, SWEDEN

Before the modern science of consciousness emerged, the nature of dreaming and the relationship between dreaming and
consciousness were controversial topics. In dream research, researchers were unable to come up with a universally shared
definition of “dreaming” that would have guided research. In philosophy, the main question used to be whether or not
dreaming is a subjective conscious experience occuring during sleep. These questions have now largely been settled in the
context of the science of consciousness. A more unified science of dreaming and consciousness now rests on two core as-
sumptions that are widely shared by the leading researchers and philosophers in the field: First, dreaming belongs to the
same ontological category as (phenomenal) consciousness - dreaming consists of subjective, qualitative experiences occur-
ring during sleep. Second, dreaming has a universal form that defines it. Dreaming consists of spatiotemporal and immersive
experiences that simulate a world, or being-in-a-world experiences. Dreams are like a virtual reality that is internally generated
by the brain, in isolation from concurrent sensory and motor interactions with external reality. These two core principles
have recently led to the formulation of new theories of the origin, form, and function of dreaming. I call them here “simula-

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 P l enary Lectures

tion theories of dreaming”. At least four different empirically-based simulation theories are currently trying to explain dream-
ing. They all accept the basic assumption that dreaming is world-simulation, but they differ as to what the function of the
simulation is. In this talk, I will present the core principles of the simulations theories and analyse their similarities and
differences. An important task for the future of the unified science of dreaming and consciousness is to derive empirically
testable predictions from these theories, and then to test which theories most accurately predict the contents of dreaming.

From virtual realities to virtual selves: Dreams, spatiotemporal self-location, and

minimal phenomenal selfhood
Windt Jennifer M.
Monash University, AUSTRALIA

Dreams are often described as virtual realities and are sometimes even considered as the gold standard against which immer-
sive virtual environments can be measured. But what exactly do we mean when we describe dreams as virtual realities? How
can we isolate and empirically ground the necessary and sufficient properties for dreaming to arise? And what is the relation-
ship between the experience of a virtual world and the self in dreams? In this talk, I present an empirically informed, multi-
level model of dream experience. I propose that dreams are essentially immersive spatiotemporal experiences, in which self-
location arises with respect to a largely hallucinatory reference frame. The simplest form of dreaming is also an example of
minimal phenomenal selfhood, in which the experience of being or having a self is reduced to spatiotemporal self-location
arising independently of bodily experience. Moreover, the analysis of phenomenal selfhood in dreams is the key towards un-
derstanding what is distinctive about dream experience. The example of sleep onset experience is particularly useful in this
context, because it helps identify the phenomenological and neurobiological changes that accompany the transition from
wakefulness via sleep onset to full-fledged dreaming. The proposed model of dreams and experiences during sleep-wake
transition has important implications for philosophical and experimental work on dreams, consciousness, and the self.

Quantum ideas in Consciousness Studies

Thursday, June 11, 8:30am – 10:30am

Quantum ideas in consciousness studies

Atmanspacher Harald
Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health, Freiburg, GERMANY

Starting with early speculations by Niels Bohr and others, the proposal to apply basic ideas of quantum theory to mental sys-
tems has received increasing attention over past decades. While a number of approaches focus on quantum physical mecha-
nisms for brain activity, others try to utilize formal quantum structures to study mental and  behavioral processes directly,
leaving open the question of how these are correlated with brain activity. Attempts of the latter kind, using quantum ideas in
consciousness studies, have led to successful approaches to understand challenging problems in psychology and cognitive
science.
It is a key conceptual insight in this new field that the observation of a mental state does not only yield a result (quan-
titative or qualitative), but also implies a generally uncontrollable backreaction on that state. This feature can be formally
expressed in terms of non-commuting operations. Examples from the areas of (low- and high-level) decision making and
learning will be presented to demonstrate how non-commutativity and its consequences can predict and explain central
features of mental activity in novel ways.

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Reflections on using quantum theory to model cognitive phenomena

Bruza Peter
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA

For some years we have drawn both inspiration and formalism from quantum theory in order to model cognitive phenom-
ena in new ways. Transplanting theory into a new domain brings about challenges, e.g., what bridging analogies are appro-
priate, and then precisely identifying what aspects of these analogies require careful attention for a valid translation into the
new domain. This talk will cover examples of how we have modelled various cognitive phenomena using quantum theory,
principally human memory and the processing of conceptual combinations. Together with these examples, there will be
reflections on the lessons learnt regarding the translational aspects of the research.

Our (reprensented) world a quantum-like object

Lambert-Mogiliansky Ariane 
Paris School of Economics, Paris, FRANCE

It has been suggested that observed cognitive limitations may be an expression of the quantum-like structure of the mind.
In this paper we explore some implications of this hypothesis for learning i.e., for the construction of a representation of
the world. For a quantum-like individual, there exists a multiplicity of mentally incompatible (Bohr complementary) but
equally valid and complete representations (mental pictures) of the world. The process of learning i.e., of constructing a
representation involves two kinds of operations on the mental picture. The acquisition of new data which is modelled as a
preparation procedure and the processing of data which is modelled as an introspective measurement operation. This pro-
cess is shown not converge to a single mental picture but can oscillate forever. We define a concept of entropy to capture rel-
ative intrinsic uncertainty. The analysis suggests a new perspective on learning. First, it implies that we must turn to double
objectification as in Quantum Mechanics: the cognitive process is the primary object of learning. Second, it suggests that a
representation of the world arises as the result of creative interplay between the mind and the environment. There is a degree
of freedom that modifies the objective of rational learning.

Metaphysics of Consciousness
Thursday, June 11, 11:00am – 1:00pm

The Mystery of the Mystery of Consciousness

Heil John
Washington University in St Louis, Missouri, USA

The mystery or puzzle of consciousness - the ‘hard problem’ - has all the earmarks of a purely philosophical puzzle, one aris-
ing from substantive background assumptions that generate a space of possible solutions, none of which is especially satisfy-
ing. The paper discusses three such assumptions, argues that they are optional, and suggests replacements that could result
in the mystery of consciousness’s becoming a straightforward empirical puzzle.

The Empirical Case for Physicalism

Ney Alyssa
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, New York, USA

In this paper, I examine the inductive argument for physicalism as it is standardly understood, presenting some challenges
from recent developments in the philosophy of science. I present some alternative ways of construing the empirical support
for physicalism and thus optimism for a physical reduction of consciousness.

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Physicalism without Causal Closure

Papineau David
King’s College London, ENGLAND
Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

The standard argument for physicalism assumes the causal closure of the physical, based on the absence of ‘special’ forces
in fundamental physics. But there are good reasons to suppose causation is an emergent macroscopic phenomenon, in the
thermodynamic sense, akin to the increase of entropy. If this is right, then facts about fundamental physics have no direct
implications for macroscopic causal patterns. And indeed there are independent reasons to think that that the physical realm
is not in fact causally closed. Even so, I shall argue that there remain strong reasons for embracing physicalism. However, the
case needs to carefully constructed. We need to make sure that we do not beg the question in favour of physicalism, and that
we introduce causal notions at the right place in the argument.

Brain networks, anesthesia and quantum

evolution
Friday, June 12, 8:30am –10:30am

Anesthetics Can Disrupt Electron Resonance Effects in Microtubules

Craddock Travis J. A.
Clinical Systems Biology Group, Institute for Neuro-Immune Medicine
Nova Southeastern University, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, USA

Arguably the greatest medical discovery of all time, anesthesia remains enigmatic. Despite a century of research, the mecha-
nism by which anesthetic molecules cause reversible loss of consciousness and memory is still unknown. What do anesthet-
ics share in common to allow them to produce such a unitary effect?
Anesthetic action appears to depend on a molecule’s hydrophobicity, dipolarity/polarizability, and potential to
disrupt hydrogen bonds, consistent with the Meyer-Overton correlation. Fundamentally these weak intramolecular
forces are quantum mechanical in nature. While it was once touted that biological systems were far too ``warm, wet, and
noisy’’ to support quantum phenomena, recent experimental results and theoretical analyses have shown that thermal
energy may assist, rather than disrupt, quantum phenomena, especially in the “dry” hydrophobic interiors of biomol-
ecules. This is evidenced in the emerging field of ‘quantum biology’, which ranges from quantum coherence in photo-
synthesis and magneto-reception in bird navigation to quantum olfaction, and individual photon effects in vision. This
leads us to inquire, if the brain also makes use of quantum effects and if anesthetics may disrupt these processes? In re-
cent years research has found anesthetics bind directly to, and affect the expression of, the protein tubulin, which forms
microtubule cytoskeletal structures. Could the weak force interactions of anesthetics with microtubules lead to anesthe-
sia?
A framework describing how anesthetic disruption of normal microtubule via weak intramolecular forces can result
in cognitive impairment and loss of consciousness will be discussed. The interaction of volatile anesthetics with cy-
toskeletal microtubules will be examined, and predictions of anesthetic binding locations on tubulin will be shown. Fur-
thermore, evidence will be presented of coherent energy transfer between amino acids in tubulin, and how anesthetic
molecules can impair these resonant vibrations potentially propagating to microtubule dysfunction, neural dysregula-
tion and unconsciousness.

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The ‘Quantum pleasure principle’ and ‘Orch OR’–How life and the brain evolved
to feel good
Hameroff Stuart
Anesthesiology, Center for Consciousness Studies, Banner-University Medical Center, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

Conscious behavior serves to optimize feelings (e.g. ‘dopaminergic reward’, Freud’s ‘pleasure principle’), but computational
approaches can’t account for feelings (‘qualia’), the ‘hard problem’, some theorists resorting to ‘panpsychism’, suggesting
qualia are intrinsic features of the universe. Sir Roger Penrose (1989) proposed qualia accompany self-collapse of the quan-
tum wavefunction due to ‘objective reduction’ (‘OR’), an objective threshold for reduction/collapse connected to the fine
scale structure of spacetime geometry. Qualia accompanying OR in random, polar environments would be non-cognitive
and inconsequential (‘proto-conscious’). The Penrose-Hameroff ‘Orch OR’ theory (1995; 1996; 2014) suggests properly
organized (‘orchestrated’) quantum computations occur in the brain in cytoskeletal microtubules inside neurons, and ter-
minate by ‘orchestrated OR’ to give full, rich conscious moments composed of qualia. In Orch OR, quantum states are
proposed to (1) originate in non-polar pi resonance ‘quantum channels’ inside microtubule proteins, (2) be ‘orchestrated’
(‘Orch’) by synaptic inputs, memory and microtubule resonances, (3) collapse/reduce after time t according to the uncer-
tainty principle E=h/t in concert with electroencephalography (EEG), (4) give integrated moments of conscious awareness
and purposeful causal behavior by regulating axonal firings and synaptic plasticity, and (5) occur primarily in dendritic-
somatic microtubules in cortical layer V pyramidal neurons. Evidence for Orch OR includes microtubule quantum reso-
nances, e.g. in megahertz, and anesthetic gases (which erase consciousness) acting in non-polar quantum channels within
microtubules. Orch OR implies the brain evolved to orchestrate OR, optimizing pleasurable qualia already existing in the
universe. It is suggested here that billions of years ago, dopamine-like molecules and RNA coalesced and self-organized to
optimize OR-mediated qualia in non-polar, ‘quantum-friendly’ regions of the ‘primordial soup’, precipitating the ‘ORigin’
of life. Microtubules, and eventually the brain evolved to orchestrate and optimize OR-mediated pleasure and its behavioral
pursuit.

General Relationship of Brain Network Topology and State of Consciousness

Lee UnCheol
Department of Anesthesiology, University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA

How distinct regional activities in the brain are synthetized into a unified experience is an essential question in the study
of consciousness. Current brain connectome projects are attempting to construct a map of the structural and functional
network connections in the brain. A critical aspect of these projects is to understand how network organization determines
local functions and information transfer, which is essential to achieve higher cognitive brain functions. In this presentation,
I will discuss the general relationship of global topology, local dynamics, and direction of information transfer in brain net-
works and how it governs global information integration. I will also explain how anesthesia, a strong neuropharmacological
perturbation, changes both the brain network and consciousness by modifying the network topology, local dynamics, and
direction of information transfer. Despite the heterogeneity of neurochemical mechanisms, neurophysiological responses
and behavioral responses across different anesthetics, they all have a common endpoint, that is, unconsciousness. Based on
our recent analytical, computational, and empirical data analysis results, we found that the selective inhibition of feedback
connectivity from frontal to parietal regions that is associated with conscious information processing in the brain is a com-
mon mechanism through which diverse anesthetics induce unconsciousness. Our work suggests that changes of informa-
tion transfer across states of human consciousness are driven by alterations of brain network topology.

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Consciousness and Structuralism

Friday, June 12,11:00am – 1:00pm

The Consciousness Constraint on Fundamental Metaphysics

Goff Philip
Central European University, Budapest, HUNGARY

Ladyman, Ross ad Spurrett argue that metaphysics should be governed by the following principle
Principle of Naturalistic Closure – Any new metaphysical claim that is to be taken seriously at time t should be motivated
by, and only by, the service it would perform, if true, in showing how two or more specific scientific hypotheses, at least one
of which is drawn from fundamental physics, jointly explain more than the sum of what is explained by the two hypotheses
taken separately.
I argue against this principle on the grounds that there is a basic non-empirical (if empirical data is the data of third-per-
son observations) source of data which it ignores: the access each human being has to the reality of her or his own conscious
experience. I try to capture this in the following constraint on metaphysics:
The Consciousness Constraint – Any theory of fundamental reality which is to be taken seriously must be able to account
for the fact that at least some phenomenal concepts are satisfied (where phenomenal concepts are the concepts we form
when we attend to experience and think about it in terms of what it’s like).
There is a strong case that any form of pure physicalism, i.e. any theory of fundamental reality according to which it can
be exhaustively described in the mathematico-nomic vocabulary of physics, fails to meet this constraint, and hence ought
not to be taken seriously. Given this, there is serious work to be done in metaphysics formulating theories of fundamental
reality which render the data of physics consistent with the reality of consciousness. It follows that there is more to serious
metaphysics than is allowed by the Principle of Naturalistic Closure.
I will finish by outlining what seems to me the most plausible way of doing this serious work, the Russell-Eddington in-
spired view – currently enjoying a revival after nearly a century of neglect – which has become known as ‘Russellian monism.’

Structuralism and Consciousness

Ladyman James
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, ENGLAND

Structural realism is a popular view in the philosophy of science, but there are many different accounts of what it means to
be a realist about structure. Epistemic forms (according to which all we can know is structure) have no implications for the
metaphysics of consciousness. However, since they are compatible with the physical world having all manner of unknowable
intrinsic natures they arguably leave the status of consciousness in the physical world a completely open question. Ontic
forms of structural realism seem to have various implications for debates about consciousness. On the one hand, they seem
to transform in more or less radical ways how we should think about physicalism. Ladyman’s and Ross’s (2007) defense of
ontic structural realism is compatible with the thesis that there is no fundamental physical level of reality, and the rejection
of strong, if not all, forms of physicalism and reductionism. They argue that special science ontology is as real as anything
physical.
The picture of a world made of little things and causation as microbangings criticized by Ladyman and Ross is arguably
what drives the intuition that the physical and the mental are worlds apart. Descartes is forced to his ontology of the mental
by his ontology of the physical. A world of pure extension and geometric and kinetic properties is so denuded of qualities
that it seems to lack the resources to generate the mind on its own. In contemporary physics, the materiality of bulk mat-
ter, its impenetrability and extension, is emergent from the electromagnetic interactions of atoms that occupy a vanishingly
small part of space. The properties of the quantum fields that give rise to the particles that compose those atoms are re-
mote from experience, and everyday materiality and inconceivable without advanced mathematics. It is hard to rule out that
quantum fields might have some proto-consciousness just because they are so bizarre as it is.
On the other hand, Ladyman and Ross are inspired in part by Dennett’s Real Patterns and their empiricism does not
allow for introspection or intuition to be regarded as a source of scientific knowledge. Ontic structural realism is often taken
to be the claim that the structure is all there is and that intrinsic qualitative natures do not exist, and the qualia and phe-
nomenal character associated with conscious states seem to be exactly the kind of properties with which ontic structuralism

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dispenses. Furthermore, there is a form of physicalism compatible with there being no fundamental level, and Ladyman and
Ross argue for an asymmetry between physics and the rest of science. In considering how to reconcile these viewpoints on
consciousness and structuralism it is worth asking if consciousness is any more problematic for structuralism than other
emergent features of the world such as life, norms and pure mathematics. What is the special problem of consciousness and
physical structure if there is one and what exactly is the relation if any between the first/third person distinction and the
quality/structure distinction?

Structure, Objects and Presence

Seager William
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, CANADA

As a philosophy of science, structuralism has much to recommend it. Structural features are things that persist across sci-
entific revolutions even as the theories describing them come and go. Structuralism can tell us why science succeeds at ac-
cumulating knowledge while its theories are inevitably slain by new observations. It is almost an obvious truth that physi-
cal science, certainly this is so in the more fundamental domains, reveals only dispositional, rela- tional and/or structural
features of the world. The nature of properties one might regard as intrinsic aspects of individual entities, such as mass or
charge, turn out upon scientific investigation to be exhausted by the system of relations into which they enter. As we dive
into the quantum domain the entities them- selves seem to dissolve away. Location, number and distinctive individuality all
disappear.
As a metaphysics of nature, structuralism faces severe difficulties. It is not clear how it can honour the distinction be-
tween the abstract and the concrete. The world, after all, is not just pure mathematics. The loss of objects might be tolerable
in a radically different metaphysical picture of the world where the objects in question are unfamiliar exotica of theoretical
physics. But the contagion cannot be contained. According to the science based metaphysics, the quotidian objects of eve-
ryday life are nothing but congeries of theoretical entities. You can’t make something out of nothing. So structuralism con-
strued metaphysically must have a story to tell about the status of both scientific objects and the familiar things of ordinary
life. Structuralists have spent much effort and ingenuity on the former issue but less on the latter.
Consciousness makes this latter problem worse. Consciousness is evidently a property and, it would seem, like any
property needs objects to support its instantiation. These we call conscious subjects. You are one of them. According to the
science based structuralist metaphysics the material object which is your brain (or body) has at best a derivative existence.
It should not be counted among what really exists. Consciousness seems to insist that there are definite objects with at least
momentary individuality separated from all other things and determinately countable by the impossibility of the sharing
of token experi- ences. Consciousness also seems to stand as direct proof of qualitative intrinsic properties which do not
reduce to mere relational structure.
Curiously, an old doctrine may point the way to a strange rapprochement. Neutral monism holds that both the mental
and physical realms are constructs. Objects disappear. They become structural constructs. Minds and subjects also dissolve
into another set of structural constructs. Both constructs are grounded in the same ‘stuff ’, which is the primitive presence of
the neutral. This makes sense of a structure based metaphysics. It shows why science is limited to revelation of structure. It
reveals why the problem of consciousness seems so intractable. Its cost is the demotion of physics from its recent promotion
to guide to ultimate ontology. Its not obvious that this cost is not worth paying.

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East vs. West on the Hard Problem

Friday, June 12, 5:30pm – 7:30pm

Out-of-body experiences, and what they tell us about our selves

Blackmore Susan
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, ENGLAND

In an out-of-body experience (OBE) you seem to perceive the world from a location outside your physical body. This kind
of definition, settled on in the 1970s, is purely descriptive. If you seem to be out of your body then, by definition, it is an
OBE. This leaves open for research the big question – does something leave the body or not? If it does, what is it? A soul,
spirit, astral body? If not, how can these vivid, realistic and compelling experiences be explained?
It was my own experience in 1970 that set me on a lifetime of trying to understand the OBE. As Metzinger puts it, after
such an experience “it is almost impossible not to become an ontological dualist” and I did. Yet this kind of dualism makes
no sense in the light of our current understanding of the world. So OBEs provide a great challenge. Can they, as many peo-
ple believe, overthrow scientific monism and prove that consciousness is possible beyond the body?
This battle was played out in nineteenth century psychical research, in early twentieth century astral projection, and in
a flurry of more serious research in the 1970s and 80s. Yet the distinction always seemed to be trivialised into two camps.
Either OBEs are ‘real’ and are actual journeys of the conscious self, or they are ‘just illusions’, ‘only hallucinations’, the ‘mean-
ingless twitchings’ of neurons. In other words, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’, fascinating or of no interest at all.
The truth is far more interesting. Since 2002, when Olaf Blanke induced an OBE by stimulating the right temporopa-
rietal junction, research has leapt ahead. Blanke attributes OBEs to “disturbed self-processing at the TPJ” because this area
constructs our body schema, a detailed and constantly updated model of our body oriented in space. Evoked potential map-
ping while mentally transforming one’s body pinpoints the same area and TMS disrupts such imaginings. Brain damage or
direct stimulation at the TPJ can induce mystical and religious experiences, OBEs, autoscopy and other dissociations. In
addition, three aspects of self-modelling – point of view, embodiment and ownership – have been independently manipu-
lated using virtual reality techniques that induce cleverly constructed full body illusions, and these share many features of
naturally occurring OBEs.
This exciting research shows that Stuart Hameroff and Deepak Chopra are wrong when they claim that “Modern sci-
ence is unable to explain NDEs/OBEs, and ignores and derides such reports as unscientific folly or hallucination.” We are
not ignoring OBEs. Although there are many details yet to be understood, the outline is becoming clear. Indeed scientists
and philosophers are now using OBEs to investigate our in-body experience and the very nature of selfhood.
Far from being evidence for dualism, OBEs may now help us understand how illusions of duality, including the hard
problem, come about in a nondual universe.

One Universe, One Mind

Chopra Deepak
The Chopra Center, Carlsbad, California, USA

The possibility of a conscious universe has tantalized cosmologists who believe that the mind-matter divide is unsatisfactory.
If consciousness is non-dual, a belief shared by Planck and Schrödinger, then a “mind first” approach must solve the same
inherent complexities as the current “matter first” cosmology. 
This session aims to examine the principles that might govern a conscious universe, bearing in mind that if it is truly
monistic, consciousness must pertain from the Planck scale to the macro scale, from the earliest instant of creation to the
present day. In a word, it must be the “constant of constants.”
Despite enormous advances in mapping out the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) and explorations into the
fundamental nature of matter in the universe through particle physics, there remains no explanation of reality itself. 
 If reality is consciousness-based and non-dual, the following axioms should be admitted: 
 1. The universe doesn’t contain consciousness, nor is consciousness in it as a property. Everything is consciousness and
its modulations. 
2. Consciousness is acausal, holistic, non-local, and dimensionless. 

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3. In its expressed forms, consciousness is dynamic but at the same time sentient, recursive, synchronous, and comple-
mentary. These properties exist intrinsically in creation, whether manifest or unmanifest. 
4. Consciousness differentiates as knower, process of knowing and known (observer, process of observation, observed
objects), with the proviso that the observer is not necessarily human or even individual. 
5. Consciousness is self-regulating, self-evolving, and self-aware. 
6. Consciousness is creative.  
7. Among living things, the evolution of species is driven by the evolution of “species of consciousness.” 
8. The evolution of the universe is essentially mental and perceptual. Each species of consciousness organizes reality
around its perceptual/mental capacity, and these capacities evolve. 
 
For participants who wish, a contemplative meditation on non-duality will be offered, with the aim of giving the actual ex-
perience of the axioms just listed. 

Three Different Hard Problems of Consciousness?

Gennaro Rocco J.
University of Southern Indiana, Evansville Indiana, USA

The Hard Problem of Consciousness is mainly directed at materialist attempts to explain consciousness, e.g. how or why
do conscious states arise from a physical or neural basis (Chalmers 1995)? I will first briefly argue that the hard problem
is often framed in a somewhat contentious fashion and that it may not be insurmountable for materialist (and reduction-
ist) theories of consciousness. Indeed, if it is insurmountable, then it would really instead be the “impossible problem” and
there must be an even stronger barrier to understanding the physical-consciousness link, perhaps closer to what has been
called “mysterianism” (McGinn 1991). Second, I urge that a better approach at the present time is to opt for a mentalistic
reductionist theory (e.g. such as the higher-order thought, or HOT, theory of consciousness) and then to look for the neural
realizations of such a theory (Gennaro 2012). I argue that this approach can avoid some of the problems with the more
direct materialist strategy and that dualists are not better off than materialists or HOT theorists anyway. Third, to the extent
that Eastern Philosophy tends to have greater sympathy for idealism, I argue that it faces what we might call an even more
formidable “reverse hard problem,” namely, how we can each experience a fairly unified and intersubjective world of at least
“apparently” mind-independent physical objects (including human bodies and brains!).

Chalmers, D. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 200 – 219.
Gennaro, R. 2012. The Consciousness Paradox. MIT Press. McGinn, C. 1991. The Problem of Consciousness. Ox-
ford: Blackwell.

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Consciousness and Transcranial Ultrasound

Saturday, June 13, 1:00pm – 1:45pm

The promise of altering consciousness and treating brain disorders with

transcranial ultrasound (TUS)
Allen John JB
Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
Sanguinetti Joseph L.
Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
Cooley Sterling
Berkeley Ultrasound, Berkeley CA, USA
Hameroff Stuart
Anesthesiology, Center for Consciousness Studies, Banner-University Medical Center, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

Several stimulation techniques have been developed to non-invasively modulate brain function, alter mood and conscious-
ness, and treat mental and cognitive disorders. These include transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), transcranial direct
current and alternating current stimulation (tDCS, tACS), and transcranial ultrasound (TUS). Ultrasound (US) consists of
mechanical vibrations, typically 0.5 to 8 megahertz, and has been used in medicine for nearly a century. At high intensities
US can heat and damage tissue but at low, sub-thermal intensities and durations (FDA guideline <750 mW/cm2) TUS is
safe and painless. Motivated by EEG and fMRI evidence of asymmetrical frontal activity being related to mood and mood
disorders, we conducted trials of TUS targeting inferolateral frontal cortex. Using a medical imaging GE ultrasound de-
vice, our group published the first human (double blind) TUS study for mood in 2013. In subsequent studies using a com-
mercial device (Thync, Inc.), we’ve shown that TUS for 15 or 30 seconds at 150 mW/cm2 to right fronto-temporal cortex
results in 30 to 40 minutes of mood enhancement (as measured by Visual Analogue Mood Scales, VAMS, and Global Af-
fect scores). EEG recordings showed increased gamma activity near the TUS site, and and no change in EEG activity over
the contralateral hemisphere. Additionally, for some participants, TUS at the vertex, which targeted the anterior cingulate
cortex, resulted in anecdotal ‘out-of-body experience’ and uncontrolled laughter. These studies suggest the promise of TUS
for successfully treating depression and other psychiatric disorders. Moreover, recent studies showed that TUS improves
Alzheimer’s symptoms and pathology in animal models, suggesting the merit of human trials. The mechanism by which
TUS might alter conscious mood, or enhance cognition is unknown, as are mechanisms for TMS, tDCS and tACS. It may
be noted that microtubules, composed of tubulin, the brain’s most prevalent protein, and major components of the neuronal
cytoskeleton (which destabilize in Alzheimer’s) have electro-mechanical resonances in megahertz. Functional vibrations of
microtubules may be important for consciousness and cognition, and a therapeutic target for TUS. With a new device, the
‘NeuroResonator’ (Berkeley Ultrasound) we plan clinical studies of TUS effects on depression, Alzheimer’s, traumatic brain
injury, post-traumatic stress disorders and emergence from anesthesia.  

The ‘NeuroResonator’ – A Transcranial Ultrasound (‘TUS’) Device Modulating

Consciousness and Cognition
Cooley Sterling
Berkeley Ultrasound, Berkeley CA, USA
Sanguinetti Joseph L.
Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
Allen John JB
Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
Hameroff Stuart
Anesthesiology, Center for Consciousness Studies, Banner-University Medical Center, The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

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The treatment of mental and cognitive disorders can be approached through non-invasive brain stimulation techniques in-
cluding transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), transcranial alternating
current stimulation (tACS) and transcranial ultrasound (TUS)1.
Ultrasound (US) consists of mechanical vibrations, e.g. in megahertz (MHz), used in medical imaging and therapy for
nearly a century. Unlike other modalities, TUS can be focused, and penetrates through (rather than around) the brain. At
low doses (FDA: < 750 mW/cm2) and brief durations, TUS is safe and painless. Recent studies show TUS improves Alzhei-
mer’s memory dysfunction in animals,2,3 and enhances mood4,5 and cognition6 in humans.
Using a General Electric ultrasound imaging device, our group (Hameroff et al, 2013)4 published the first human (dou-
ble blind) TUS study on mental states. With subsequent studies using a commercial device (U+, Thync), we (Sanguinetti
et al., 2015)5 have shown that 15 to 30 seconds of low intensity (< 150 mW/cm2) TUS at 0.5 MHz or 2 MHz results in 30
to 40 minutes of mood enhancement (Visual Analogue Mood Scales ‘VAMS’, and Global Affect scores). In vitro, ultrasound
promotes neuronal growth and stabilizes microtubule disassembly,7 possibly by MHz resonance in microtubules.8 TUS is
safe and painless when transmitted at non-thermal intensities, and may be beneficial for mental states and cognitive function
in brain injury, Alzheimer’s, post-traumatic stress disorders, depression, coma, pediatric developmental delay and medita-
tion. We plan such studies with the ‘NeuroResonator’, a new TUS device from Berkeley Ultrasound.
The NeuroResonator is specifically designed to modulate human mental and cognitive states and disorders at non-
thermal ultrasound intensities. It has two output transducers whose ultrasound parameters can be regulated through a con-
venient user interface. Placement on various locations on the scalp with an external headset strap allows TUS at one or two
locations at various settings (frequency, pulse modulation, duration). Generally we use 0.5 MHz to right fronto-temporal
scalp for mood enhancement, but in preliminary, as-yet-unpublished results, other sites have been shown safe at sub-thermal
exposures. The NeuroResonator can also drive transcranial alternating current stimulation (tACS), another promising ap-
proach for neuromodulation.
The parameter spaces for TUS and tACS, especially in relation to particular clinical situations are vast. With the Neu-
roResonator we are seeking collaborative researchers to safely explore these parameters for various clinical situations. The
device is based on Open Source software that allows lightly trained users to modify the existing device for specific needs.
While mechanisms for effects of TMS, tDCS and tACS are unknown, TUS is thought to act via mechanical action on
neurons, and specifically on cytoskeletal structures and dynamics inside brain neurons, e.g. MHz resonances in microtu-
bules.8 We believe TUS offers unique opportunities to repair neurons, regulate synapses, improve cognition and optimize
mood and mental states.
As animal studies have shown TUS improves Alzheimer’s symptoms and pathology,2,3 we envision TUS treatment in
humans of Alzheimer’s disease (in which microtubules are disrupted), traumatic brain injury, pediatric developmental delay,
coma, PTSD, mood disorders and in meditation.
We invite TSC 2015 conference participants to try the NeuroResonator, e.g. for mood enhancement, at our conference
demo booth.

References: 1. Sanguinetti et al (2014) Human Brain Stimulation with Transcranial Ultrasound: Potential Ap-
plications for Mental Health. In: Bio electromagnetic and Subtle Energy Medicine, 2nd edition, CRC Press, pp 355-
360. 2. Leinenga G, Goetz J (2015) Scanning ultrasound removes amyloid-β and restores memory in an Alzhei-
mer’s disease mouse model. Sci Transl Med (7) 278, 33 DOI: 10.1126/scitranslmed.aaa2512
See http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/12/alzheimers-breakthrough-as-ultrasound-successfully-
treats-disease-in-mice 3. Jordao et al (2013) Experimental Neurology 248:16-29. 4. Hameroff et al (2013) Tran-
scranial ultrasound (TUS) effects on mental states: a pilot study. Brain Stimul, 2013; May; 6(3):409-15.
5. Sanguinetti JL et al (2015) Transcranial Ultrasound (‘TUS’) at 2 MHz to Right Prefrontal Cortex Improves
Mood in Healthy Volunteers, in preparation. 6. Legon et al (2013) Transcranial focused ultrasound modulates
activity of primary somatosensory cortex in humans, Nature Neuroscience 17, 322 doi:10.1038/nn.3620
7. Low-intensity ultrasound (US) stabilizes microtubules and promotes neurite outgrowth (2015) Raman U,
Gupta S, Parker S, Gupta N, Gupta AK, Duffield C, Ghosh S, Hameroff S (2015) in preparation. 8. Sahu S,
Ghosh S, Fujita D, Bandyopadhyay A (2014) Scientific Reports 4 7303-1 DOI:10.1038/srep07303 See: Cal-
cutta Telegraph http://www.telegraphindia.com/1150403/jsp/nation/story_12399.jsp#.VR36leGzl2B Deep
inside cells, a clue to the mind - Indian physicists find signatures of hidden information-processing network G.S.
Mudur

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Symposiums

Consciousness inheres in intermittent fields of

intensive activity density in cortical neuropil
that implement the neurodynamics of the action-
perception cycle
Freeman Walter
Molecular & Cell Biology, Universitiy of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
Kozma Robert
Memphis University, Memphis TN, USA, Giuseppe Vitiello, Salerno University, Salerno Italy, ITALY
Vitiello Giuseppe
Physics “E.R.Caianiello”, University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY
Tuesday, June 9, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

We propose a solution to the mind-body problem. We base our theory on the anatomy, physiology, and evolution of the
vertebrate forebrain, and on our descriptions of the dynamics of neural masses using ordinary differential equations, Bes-
sel functions, random graph theory, and dissipative quantum field theory. Our approach to consciousness focuses on the
action-perception cycle, which we conceive to hve three stages. In Stage 1 each primary sensory cortex converts informa-
tion to a perception by categorizing a sensory input and initiating convergence to an attractor, which rebuilds the category
from memory. In Stage 2 the limbic cortex converts multiple perceptions to a conception by concatenation of multimodal
remembrances in the entorhinal cortex and incorporating time and place markers on passage of the percept through the hip-
pocampus. In Stage 3 the forebrain converts the conception to action by constructing a global status evaluation that includes
a summary of the situation, a plan of action, and a set of predictions of what the consequences of action will be.
Each Stage requires a change of state in the forebrain that we identify as a phase transition. Each state lasts ~200 msec.
The whole cycle minimally requires 0.6 sec. We infer that Stage 1 conveys a feeling of apprehension owing to the immediate
activation of the amygdala and hypothalamus giving emotion. Stage 2 conveys a flash of insight and recognition by multi-
modal synthesis. Stage 3 brings the remembered meaning of the stimulus and the choice to act or not to act, as the case may
be, preparatory to deeper involvement of the frontal lobes. We report our findings to the TSC as a testable model of con-
sciousness that is grounded in both experimental data and theory.
There is a piece missing in the puzzle of brain dynamics as it is characterized in terms of action potentials in neural net-
works. Here we conceive that missing piece as a continuous field of neural activity. We propose to expand the neuron doc-
trine to include a family of fields that emerge in the dense compactions of axonal and dendritic terminal branches that con-
stitute laminated neuropil as the substance of cortex that embeds neural networks. The fields of activity are simultaneously
expressed in the density of synaptic current and the density of action potentials that constitute a pulse cloud, to which corti-

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cal neurons intermittently contribute pulses in a form of time-sharing. This rotation of the duty cycle among local groupings
of neurons forming columns is the essence of mass action. Neurons recruited into mass actions retain their independence, as
shown by the seeming randomness of their pulse firing, even as they sustain narrow band oscillatory synaptic currents that
modulate their firing probabilities and rates.
We conceive the change of state in each Stage as a phase transition from a low energy, gas-like, chaotic phase to a high-
energy, liquid-like, ordered phase. All neurons are synchronized mostly subthreshold in a narrow band oscillation. That cre-
ates our missing piece: a superconducting-like pool in the neuropil that expresses memories in AM patterns and sustains
awareness.
In the macroscopic dynamics of the superconducting-like pool the element of function is not an action potential or a
unitary postsynaptic potential (PSP). In the limit of the continuum the element of integration is an infinitesimal of activ-
ity density. It is expressed simultaneously by infinitesimals of pulse density and wave density in circular causality. Whereas
neural networks are described in the three Euclidean dimensions of cortex, the pulse and wave densities are described in the
two surface dimensions. Wave density is best estimated from electrocorticograms (ECoG), measured at the cortical surface
above the epicenter where the dendritic currents exert their control over the trigger zones of the active neurons.
We have measured these fields in the primary sensory cortices for olfaction, touch, hearing and vision. Most im-
portantly, the pool sustains the field with everywhere a local source of energy, the intensity of which is determined
by the local synaptic modifications from prior reinforcement learning. Collectively they make a spatial pattern of am-
plitude modulation (AM) when its attractor is accessed by a stimulus. By our hypothesis the intense activity in the
pool is immediately perceived; the local field potentials are neural correlates of awareness. The pool and its field last
3 to 5 cycles of the carrier, then desynchronize upon weakening of interaction by frequency dispersion. The short dura-
tions enable rapid sampling of the environment and immediate integration across modalities into gestalts. It is the
speed of detailed total memory recall by which the pool provides an evolutionary advantage in the struggle for survival.

1. Capolupo A, Freeman WJ, Vitiello G (2013) Chapter 16 in: Liljenström H (ed.) Advances in Cognitive Neu-
rodynamics (IV). 2. Freeman WJ, Quian Quiroga R (2013) Imaging Brain Function with EEG. Springer. 3.
Freeman WJ, Kozma R, Li G, Quian Quiroga R, Vitiello G, Zhang T (2013). Chapter 17 in: Liljenström H (ed.)
Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (IV). 4. Kozma, R., Puljic, M., Balister, P., Bollobás, B., & Freeman, W. J.
(2005).. Biological Cybernetics, 92(6), 367-379

Language, Communication and Consciousness

Tuesday, June 9, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

In this workshop, we want to explore the relation between language, communication and consciousness.
We want to address
questions like:


1) To what extent is consciousness semiotic in nature?

2) What types of linguistic influence are there on consciousness and cognition?
3) Are there non-linguistic, even non-semiotic types of consciousness and cognition?

4) What is the influence of communication and dialog on consciousness and cognition?
5) What are the consequences of differences between languages for consciousness and cognition?

6) Do multilingual speakers have a different kind of consciousness from monolingual speakers?

7) Do language and communication throw light on the question of whether language and communication are continuous,
gradable rather than categorical phenomena in nature?

The following speakers will participate:
Elisabeth Ahlsén, Jens Allwood, Alexander Almér, Fredrik Stjernberg

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Collective activities, social information and consciousness CANCELLED

Almér Alexander
University of Gothenburg, SWEDEN

Almér and Allwood has proposed (forthcoming) a general model of sociality based on a set of biological types of collective
activities, ranging from non- conscious bacterial group behavior, to the constitution of institutional facts among humans.
Searle, Tuomela, Gilbert, Bratman and others have instigated a continuing discussion about what constitutes various basic
forms of collective modes of intentionality, agency and action. Searle, amongst others, have emphasized the importance of
we-intentionality for social ontology, as a significant and (conceptually) necessary ingredient in the making of institutional
facts.
Almér and Allwood (ibid) see no reason for modelling the composition and nature of the social world (naturalistically
as Searle intends) with such narrow focus on certain high-level intentional contents or modes. Instead we should aim for a
more general “social theory” covering the various forms and levels of “purposeful” group behavior, observing that prima
facie purposeful collective activities seem to obtain among abundant (perhaps all) kinds of life forms. The model we suggest
contain different “layers” of sociality (what constitutes social facts). The layers differ in how the information is processed,
and in what information is processed at the level of individual organisms as compared to what collective purposes define the
collective activity. We characterize types of organism collective activity based on degrees of type, complexity, and aware-
ness of represented information. The most basic collective activity type we chose to call proto- social, since no social signal-
ing (based on type of info processed) is going on. To exemplify how this model apply in concrete cases consider ants col-
lectively building a nest. As far as we know, the information processing in control of each individual ant in this case is quite
simple, following simple information transformations from stimuli to behavior. The collective effect is certainly purposeful
seen from a biological evolutionary perspective – the construction of a nest. However, the mental states of individual ants do
not explicitly represent this collective purpose. To indicate how the dimension of awareness is introduced: ants might e.g.,
explicitly represent certain social information (presence, movement and nearby location of group members, etc.), but still
not be aware of this information.
In this Context, Almér is going further analyze and evaluate various conceptions of consciousness/awareness that could
be included in the general framework of collective activity proposed by Almér and Allwood. Two questions will be brought
into focus. First, is there any need of distinguishing between individual and collective consciousness. Secondly, can is there
any exclusive role for consciousness to play in collective activities, such that no comparable activity (e.g., in terms of pur-
pose, type of information processed, effectivity, etc.) could obtain without conscious processing going on? The last theme
relates to whether consciousness has any evolutionary anchoring or not. That in turn of relates to the longstanding debate
over its nature as physical or not so much so.

A semiotic basis for consciousness

Allwood Jens
Department of Applied Information Technology, University of Gothenburg, SWEDEN

This paper/talk explores the idea that cognition is fundamentally semiotic in nature. Using as a point of departure the Pei-
rcean trichotomy index, icon and symbol (Peirce 1031-1958), the paper first attempts to distinguish between aspects of
consciousness and cognition that are linguistically influenced/dependent and aspects that are not or less so. In a second
step, this is then used to give an account of communication as giving rise to degrees of intentionality and awareness. I will
also explore the idea that linguistic meaning should be conceived of in terms of perspectival meaning potentials combined
with semantic-epistemic-cognitive operations (Allwood 2003, 2008). Thirdly, a proposal is formulated (relying on the afore-
mentioned meaning potentials and semantic-epistemic operations) in which meaning in communication is seem as an inter-
play between activation of private and shared meaning, which gives us a basis for an understanding of the phenomenon of
collective consciousness (cf. Durkheim 1893).

References
Allwood, J. (2003). Meaning Potential and Context: Some Consequences for the Analysis of Variation
in Meaning. In: Cuyckens, Hubert, Dirven, René & Taylor, John R. (eds.) Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Seman-
tics. Mouton de Gruyter. s. 29-65. Allwood, J. (2008). Dimensions of embodied communication - towards a ty-
pology of embodied communication. Wachsmuth, Ipke: Lenzen, Manuela & Knoblish, Günther (eds.).Embodied
Communication in Humans and Machines. Oxford University Press.. s. 257-81. (24 s.)
Durkheim, Emile. (1893).
The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. W. D. Halls, intro. Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press, 1997, pp. 39, 60,

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108.
Peirce, C. S. (1931-1958.) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. Edited by Charles Hartshorne,
Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931–1958; vols. 1–6 ed-
ited by Charles Harteshorne and Paul Weiss, 1931–1935; vols. 7–8 edited by Arthur W. Burks, 1958).

Degrees and/or levels of conscousness in communication – evidence from

neurolinguistics
Ahlsén Elisabeth
SCCIIL Interdisciplinary Center and Division of Communication and Cognition, Department of Applied IT, University of
Gothenburg

This talk considers communication in relation to different degrees and/or levels of consciousness in persons with acquired
brain damage. Two types of disorders are discussed: (i) aphasia (an acquired language disorder after brain damage) and (ii)
apraxia (a disorder affecting the ability to perform movements and actions according to own intentions).
The talk departs from a model of communication and levels/degrees of consciousness presented by Allwood, Kopp,
Grammer, Ahlsén et al. (2008) (see also Kopp, Allwood, Ahlsén et al 2008) and seeks to combine this model with a sug-
gested account of aphasia, apraxia in relation to “embodied communication” and the potential role of mirror neurons in
communication (Ahlsén 2007, 2008, Allwood, 2008).
An analysis of multimodal naturalistic communication, relating con-
sciousness in the production of words and the production of gestures is used for exemplifying the issues that arise from
observations of expressive behavior and the information about the role of consciousness they can provide (cf. Ahlsén 2011,
Ahlsén and Schwarz 2013, Ahlsén 2014).

References: Ahlsén, E. (2008). Embodied communication – aphasia, apraxia and the possible role of mirror-
ing and imitation. Clinical Linguistics and Phonetics, June 2008: 22(4-5): 1-5.
Ahlsén, E. 2008. Neurological dis-
orders of embodied feedback. In.I. Wachsmuth, G., Knoblich & M. Lenzen (eds.) Embodied Communication in
Humans and Machines. Oxford: Oxford University. Press, pp. 285-304. Ahlsén, E. (2011). Towards an integrated
view of gestures related to speech, Proceedings of the 3rd Nordic Symposium on Multimodal Communication. Edi-
tors: Patrizia Paggio, Elisabeth Ahlsén, Jens Allwood, Kristiina Jokinen, Costanza Navarretta. NEALT Proceedings Se-
ries. 15 (2111) s. 72-77. Ahlsén, E. ; Schwarz, A. (2013). Features of aphasic gesturing – An exploratory study of
features in gestures produced by persons with and without aphasia. Clinical Linguistics and Phonetics. 27 (10-11)
s. 823-836.
Ahlsén, E. (2014). Gestures used in word search episodes – by persons with and without aphasia.
Paper presented at the Second European Symposium on Multimodal Communication. Tartu, 2014.
Allwood,
J. ; Kopp, S. ; Grammer, K. et al. (2008). The Analysis of Embodied Communicative Feedback in Multimodal
Corpora - a prerequisite for behavior simulation.. Language Resources and Evaluation. 41 (3-4) s. 255-272.
Kopp,
S. ; Allwood, J. ; Ahlsén, E. et al. (2008). Modeling Embodied Feedback with Virtual Humans. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. 4930 s. 18-37.
Allwood, J. (2008). A Typology of Embodied Communication. Wachmuth,
Ipke; Lenzen, Manuela and Knoblich, Günther (eds.) Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines. Oxford
University Press. 257-284.

Language and consciousness


Unconscious meanings? Jackendoff’s Unconscious meaning hypothesis revisited
Stjernberg Fredrik
Linköping University, SWEDEN

In several works, Ray Jackendoff ( Jackendoff 2007, 2012) has developed a view on the relations between language and con-
sciousness. According to his view, which he called the Unconscious Meaning Hypothesis (2012:90f), the phenomenologi-
cal aspect of thinking is the phonological part of the thought, not the thought itself. ”[W]e can
only be aware of the content
of our thoughts if they’re linked with pronunciation.” (ibid.) The thought is unconscious. This view is in
sharp opposition to
most other views of consciousness. Jackendoff lists a couple of theories of consciousness that are incompatible with his view
( Jackendoff 2009:88ff), and here we find Baars’ workspace theory, HoT theories, and several others. Since many of these
incompatible theories make up a kind of mainstream view of consciousness, it remains an open question what Jackendoff
means by consciousness – if almost every other theory of consciousness is discarded by his theory, what makes it a theory of

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consciousness? My talk will be focussing on a few specific phenomena that are relevant, and perhaps the familiar tip-of-the-
tongue phenomenon is best known here. It will be argued that Jackendoff ’s view leave it too much of a mystery how thought
can have the effects it does have, which means that his views at least have to be revised. There is too little evidence for the
supposed workings of a non-conscious level of thought. Contrasting views of Chafe (1994) and Fodor (2008) are discussed.

References: Chafe, W. (1994), Discourse, Consciousness, and Time. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Fodor, J. (2008), LOT2, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Jackendoff, R. (2007), Language, Consciousness,
Culture: Essays on Mental Structure, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. -- (2012), A User’s Guide to Thought and
Meaning. Oxford, Oxford University Press

Modelling the Self through Others: Reciprocity,

Synchronization and Predictive Coding
Tuesday, June 9, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

In recent years, the propensity to analyse cognition on the basis of purely abstract models unrelated to the life of the body,
the social/physical environment, and the brain regions governing the body’s functioning in the world, has been vigorously
challenged. As a result, a significant number of researchers now argue that cognition ought to be understood primarily by
taking into account the larger brain-body-environment dynamics. Our symposium will bring together two philosophers and
two experimental psychologists with the aim of exploring connections between the bodily self and the underlying processes
involved in bodily coupling during social interaction. We will use evidence from neuroscience and psychology to contrib-
ute to the philosophical debate on the emergence and constitution of the self as well as self-other relatedness and, hence,
explore two key questions: First, how useful is the recent predictive coding framework for understanding self-other related-
ness and what questions need to be addressed within this particular research programme? Second, what is the role of other
people and the environment in building a sense of being a self and, more specifically, what are the philosophical implications
regarding increasing evidence that involvement with others and reciprocity and synchronization in bodily coupling influ-
ence social bonding?
We start with the idea that when it comes to understanding cognition at the basic level, the infant is – to use Words-
worth’s metaphor – ‘father to the man’. Indeed, evidence has been mounting that infants have much more sophisticated so-
cial-cognitive skills than previously suspected. This issue is crucial since, as Sommerville & Woodward (2010:84) pointed
out, assessing infants’ understanding of others’ behaviour provides not only a snapshot of the child’s developing mind , but
also a panorama of the very nature of cognition itself. Recent work on predictive coding suggests that the basic pre-reflective
experience of being a self is the result of an ongoing predictive coding process within a generative model that is centered on
the organism. If minimal selfhood is therefore a matter of construing internal models that successfully predict or match the
sensory consequences of our own movement, intentions in actions, our sensory input, then it is crucial to investigate to what
extent the dynamic aspect refers exclusively to a self-centred continuity or encompasses self-other relatedness as well. We
move on to discuss experimental data that investigates more closely the link between synchronized human movement and
social experience in order to focus specifically on a) the role of dyadic interaction in exploring self- vs. other awareness, and
b) the role of synchronisation in perceived social bonding between group members. The overarching claim of these studies
is that bodily movements are not only tailored to sustain the flow of an emerging and ongoing self-awareness, but may also
demonstrate “publicly” self-regulation of movement that anticipates others’ response and behaviour. Finally, we will focus
on a specific type of experience of “feeling the other” which is able to track the whereabouts of objects and persons, when
the subject herself is in fact not attending perceptually to the intentional targets and therefore has at best only highly limited
access to certain environmental cues. Indeed, recent experimental work on peripersonal space supports the idea that there is
a special type of bonding between self and other which not only goes beyond perceptual or behavioural states but seems to
redefine the spatial parameters of how far one seems to extend oneself as a subject of experience.
In summary, this symposium aims to develop a framework for investigating the self-other connectedness, based on the-
oretical, phenomenological, and experimental evidence, with a specific focus on the experience of building a sense of self
through the experience of others.

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Contributed talks (in alphabetical order)

Predictive Coding and the Social Brain

Ciaunica Anna
Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy - Porto, Porto, PORTUGAL
Centre for the Study of Senses, Institute of Philosophy, University of London, UK

Recent work on predictive coding suggested that the basic pre-reflective experience of being a self is the result of an ongoing
predictive coding process within a generative model that is centered onto the organism. (Friston et al. 2006; Friston 2009,
2010; Hohwy 2007; Clark 2013). Yet, it is not clear whether this “ongoing” dynamic aspect refers exclusively to a self-centred
continuity or encompasses self-other relatedness as well. In this paper I draw on recent empirical findings on the develop-
mental primacy of social versus visual perspective-taking (Moll and Kadipasaoglu 2013) to provide a nuanced understand-
ing of the notion of basic pre-reflective self-awareness. It is widely admitted that the sensorimotor synchronization of bodily
coupling between infant/caregiver supports the formation of interpersonal bonds. Indeed, from the start, infants process a
rudimentary sensorimotor understanding of how modulations of bodily movements and attentional focusing affect sensory
change. Sensorimotor understanding is the implicit, pre-reflective understanding that we, as embodied agents, possess the
sensorimotor skills needed to secure experiential access to different relevant features of the world, by using our bodily move-
ments in appropriate ways. Babies are highly skilled perceivers in this sense. In this paper I argue that at the basic level, mini-
mal self-awareness might be modelled through ‘bodily coupling’ and synchronization with others. In other words, for the
system’s self-modelling to be successful, the self needs to be embedded not only into the causal network of the physical world
(Knoblich et al. 2003; Metzinger 2004a, 2005), but also into the socially interactive world (Bruineberg & Rietveld 2014).

Mutual awareness and reciprocity in social interactions as necessary criteria for

mental alignment
Fairhurst Merle
Institute of Philosophy, London, London, UNITED KINGDOM

Based on a series of functional MRI (fMRI) studies implementing a finger tapping task with an adaptive virtual partner, a
summary of the results will be presented describing the sensorimotor mechanisms that allow for varying degrees of behav-
ioural synchronization as well as a variable sense of perceived self-other overlap. The use of this reduced model of dyadic
interaction extends to the ability to explore self- vs. other awareness and interdependence as well as a non-verbal, dynamic
two-way exchange. This along with similar recent work to identify the nature of and mechanisms underlying social action
and thought, highlight the need for at least two minimal criteria for so called coupling or alignment of two minds interact-
ing. The talk will be organised around an evolving theoretical concept of mental alignment and how this may differ from
mere behavioural or even neural synchronization. More specifically, it will be argued that varying degrees of mutual aware-
ness and reciprocity may underlie true alignment and discuss the potential benefit of doing something together extends
beyond simply optimising performance.

Beyond Synchronisation: Imitation and complementarity in social interaction.

Farmer Harry
Research Associate in Social Neuroscience, Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, Gower Street, London
WC1E 6BT, UK
Hale Jo
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK

In this talk we consider how joint actions other than simply synchrony of movements can affect people’s perceptions of so-
cial interaction. We first consider the case of imitation and review previous work demonstrating that being imitated leads the
imitated person to view the imitator in a more positive and prosocial light and further that people selectively imitate others

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in order to build up feelings of rapport and affiliation. We present two recent studies from our lab that used motion tracking
and virtual reality in order to develop a controlled paradigm for studying mimicry. These studies indicate that simple imita-
tion of body movements is not sufficient to cause increased positive perceptions and that being socially engaged with the
imitator also plays an important role. We then consider some possible causes of the positive effect of imitation on rapport
with an emphasis on the role of imitation in reducing the prediction error arising from the other person’s movements.
In the final section of the talk we move beyond imitation to question whether simply mirroring the actions of another
always leads to greater rapport and liking or whether in some circumstances complementary actions lead to a greater sense
of rapport than imitative ones. We highlight this this issue by presenting a series of studies on status and imitation which
suggest that status does not lead to increased mimicry and suggest that complementary rather than imitative gestures may be
more appropriate in building up rapport with someone who is of higher status than one’s self. We will argue that a predictive
coding perspective can be used to justify why in some situations complementarity may be more appropriate than mirroring
in terms of enhancing social bonding.

Feeling Objects, Persons and Oneself. A Case of Peripersonal Space Experience?

Jacobi Thomas
Institute of Philosophy, Basel, SWITZERLAND

In quite ordinary circumstances, we appear to be able to sense individual features in our surroundings, such as, persons and
objects, in a manner that seems quite unlike perceptual or emotional forms of representing the world. Not only does this
peculiar sense connect us with intentional targets in a non-standard way, it also feels distinctly different from any other kind
of experiential state. Significantly, this particular kind of feeling seems to be able to track the whereabouts of objects and
persons, when we have turned our gaze in another direction and therefore have only limited or no perceptual access at all
to certain environmental features. What is more, we also seem to be able not only to hone in on actual objects or events in
our surroundings but also to sense possibilities, be they opportunities or threats. Based on a phenomenological analysis of
relevant scenarios, I will claim that this kind of feeling, first, confers certain epistemic advantages on our ability to map and
subsequently navigate our environment and, second, that it amounts to a particular kind of self-experience. I will then ask
what kind of constraints any naturalistic explanation might be required to meet in order to account for these experiences
within a scientific framework. Finally, I will discuss how especially recent research on peripersonal space lends at least partial
support for these philosophical theses. Based on Hall (1966), Hyvarinen (1981) and Rizzolatti (1981, 1992), Graziano and
Gross examined in a series of foundational studies how the space (immediately) surrounding the body (1993, 1994, 1997,
1999) is represented in multisensory touch, vision, and sound based neurons. More recently, Serino (2014) has shown that
peripersonal space and body representation can dissociate and Serino (2013; 2014) and Tsakiris (2014) demonstrated how
peripersonal space boundaries can be modulated by social interaction.

Contextual features in the social experience of synchronised human movement

Launay Jacques
Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM

There is now much support for the proposal that synchronising movements with those of another person can lead to
some increased sense of trust or social closeness towards that person (e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009; Wiltermuth & Heath
2009; Cirelli et al, 2014), and these effects have generally been explained as a form of self-other merging that hap-
pens during the experience of matching performed movements with the perceived movements of a co-actor (e.g. Overy
& Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). In this paper I will discuss the importance of taking into account the broader context in
which shared interpersonal interactions occur, and the likelihood of having some ‘social’ experience in a group context
is perhaps much greater than we might anticipate. Our recent research has investigated the possibility that there are an
array of features of co-ordinated interpersonal interaction that might encourage people to feel closer to a co-actor, mak-
ing synchronisation only one example of shared movement that can have these effects. Firstly, we have found that mini-
mal levels of shared attention can cause people to report feeling socially closer to one another, but that shared motiva-
tion in the absence of shared success might not be sufficient to have this effect (Wolf, Launay & Dunbar, under review).
Secondly, we have found that exertion is a significant contributor towards the social bonding effects of synchronised
human movement (Tarr, Launay, Cohen & Dunbar, in prep.), again suggesting that synchronisation alone is not respon-
sible for previously reported effects. Finally I will present data investigating perceived formidability of groups of peo-

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ple moving in a synchronised or otherwise co-ordinated manner to demonstrate that synchronisation per se might
not be a driving factor in perceived social bonding between group members. While synchronised movements can influ-
ence social bonding, and therefore likely invoke some shared social experience while they are occurring, empirical
data suggests that this is probably only partially attributable to the experience of moving in time with another person.

The Embodiment of the Conscious Mind: The

relevance of bodily signals for mental processes
Chairs:
Herbert Beate M.
Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, University of Tuebingen, Ulm, GERMANY
Tschacher Wolfgang
Department of Psychotherapy, University Hospital Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND
Tuesday, June 9, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

The concept of „embodiment” recognizes the role the body plays in shaping our conscious mind; our thinking, emotions
and behavior. These processes of ‘embodied cognition’ are increasingly recognized to be important in our understanding of
mental functions in health and disease. Being aware of one’s body represents a crucial fundament of human “embodied” na-
ture, the ‘material me’, that is significantly related to self-awareness and ‘mineness’, and higher-order mental functions. Body
awareness comprises being aware of multiple bodily states including one’s thoughts, feelings and predictions regarding one’s
more or less accurately felt bodily signals. In this, embodiment goes beyond brain research by also considering peripheral
physiological and muscular action.
This symposium provides comprehensive insight into psychophysiological and neural mechanisms of ‘mind-body-inter-
action’ from basic and clinical research with relevant implications for our understanding of mental functions:
1. Study results and a conceptual framework are presented demonstrating the relevance of interoception (perception
and central processing of internal physiological bodily signals), as a relevant fundament of body awareness and an important
basis of embodiment, that is linked to cognitive and emotional functions. Insight is given into physiological mechanisms of
interoception that shape ‘embodied cognition’ and shed light on how and why people differ in their perceptual accuracy for
multiple internal bodily signals. It is demonstrated that mechanisms underlying interoception are of crucial relevance for
human adaptive behavior.
2. Recent concepts and empirical findings highlight that interoception can be
conceptualized as a three-dimensional construct with regard to subjective and objective measures of interoception, di-
viding interoceptive processes along dimensions of conscious access. Empirical evidence is demonstrated highlighting that
discrepancies between measures of interoception along consciousness dimensions help to understand how the body shapes
mental processes in healthy people as well as in individuals with mental disorders, such as persons on the autistic spectrum
and anxiety symptoms.
3. Going beyond the body interior, results from research on the embodiment of social interaction, using actigraphy and
video analyses, highlight important aspects of interpersonal bodily communication regulating social exchange in healthy
persons, psychotherapy outpatients and schizophrenia patients. These findings show how social interaction is embodied in
nonverbal behavior in healthy dyads as well as in psychotherapeutic settings, and that these processes are related to a dura-
tion measure of the social present (“nowness”) of a communicating dyad. In healthy dyads nonverbal synchrony predicted
the affective pleasantness of conversations; in psychotherapy the quality of interaction was represented by the degree of
nonverbal synchrony between therapist and patient.
4. That the whole body is of pivotal relevance for creating our experience of time is demonstrated by a conceptual frame-
work and empirical findings giving insight into neural and psychophysiological mechanisms of time perception. Results are
presented suggesting that physiological changes of the body form an internal signal to encode the duration of external events
and that the bodily self, as created by the continuous visceral and proprioceptive input from the body, is the functional an-

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chor of phenomenal experience – and of subjective time. The body of work on the intricate relationship between the self and
time will be presented and discussed.
Empirical findings and conceptual frameworks of this symposium contribute to a fundamental understanding of mech-
anisms of embodiment in constituting important functions of our conscious mind in everyday life, in health and disease.
These insights also contribute to a better understanding of the specifics of individuals’ embodied action and perception and
highlight promising targets for interventions in psychopathology.

Abstracts and Speakers:

I. Psychophysiological mechanisms of “embodiment”: The relevance of

‘interoception’ as a basis of the embodied mind
Herbert Beate M.
Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, University of Tuebingen, Ulm, GERMANY

The concept of “embodiment” refers to the importance of our body in shaping thinking, emotions and behavior, and pro-
cesses of embodied cognition are increasingly recognized to be important in understanding mental functions. Interoception
represents the processing and perception of internal bodily signals. It builds the basis of our “material me” and has been
shown to be of pivotal relevance for understanding mechanisms of “embodiment”.
There are pronounced interindividual differences in peoples’ perception accuracy for their visceral bodily signals (= in-
teroceptive sensitivity, IS). Up to now IS has been most commonly assessed by focusing on cardiac perception accuracy and
the cardiovascular system and objective measures of individuals’ IS (interoceptive perception accuracy) have been demon-
strated to be fundamentally related to individual differences in affective, cognitive and behavioral functions. This talk will
present data from selected studies giving insight into relevant mechanisms of interoception that have been largely unre-
solved up to today:
a) psychophysiological mechanisms of interoceptive sensitivity, by demonstrating that IS is accompanied and can be
manipulated by specific autonomic-nervous activity and associated cardiodynamic pattern, and b) mechanisms of “intero-
ception across modalities” by showing that an individiual’s cardiac perception accuracy is positively related to the percep-
tion accuracy of other visceral modalities such as gastric signals and feelings during specific conditions inducing activity in
the respective organ systems, c) the importance of the individual appraisal of one’s bodily sensations in shaping behavior,
and the relevance of these mechanisms for embodied functions such as adaptive and disturbed eating behavior with relevant
consequences for health and disease.

II. Differentiating dimensions of interoception as a function of conscious access:

Implications for affective processing
Garfinkel Sarah
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, UNITED KINGDOM
(with Critchley Hugo D)
Interoception refers to the signalling and perception of internal bodily sensations and has pervasive links to cognitive per-
formance and emotional experience, notably anxiety. Recently we proposed a three dimensional construct of interoception
which divided interoceptive processes along dimensions of conscious access (interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive aware-
ness and interoceptive sensibility). Here we provide initial empirical evidence for this model showing that these dimensions
represent potentially distinct interoceptive processes: interoceptive accuracy (also referred to as “interoceptive sensitivity”,
as gauged using objective tests of heartbeat perception accuracy), interoceptive awareness (a metacognitive measure such
as confidence-accuracy correspondence) and interoceptive sensibility (subjective self-evaluated cognisance of interoceptive
signals, as gauged using questionnaire and other self-report measures), display empirical dissociations across a normative
sample (N=80). These interoceptive dimensions became more closely related in a sub-group of high interoceptors. To test
the translational validity of these distinctions in a patient model, individuals on the Autistic Spectrum (AS, N=20) were
compared to matched controls (N=20). The AS group exhibited an increased dissociation between subjectively and ob-
jectively determined measures of interoception, as marked by significantly reduced interoceptive accuracy and enhanced

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sensibility. Moreover, the discrepancy between objective and subjective measures of interoception, which can be concep-
tualized as an interoceptive prediction error, was related to both anxiety symptoms and emotion processing deficits. This
work provides preliminary evidence to suggest that discrepancies between measures of interoception along consciousness
dimensions may have implications for how the body shapes mental processes. Further research should be sensitive to these
interoceptive axes to better determine their cognitive consequences and emotional expressions, as well as to delineate their
shared and distinct neural substrates.

III. Nonverbal synchrony: Embodiment of mental and communicative processes

Tschacher Wolfgang
Department of Psychotherapy, University Hospital Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND
(with Ramseyer Fabian)
Measures of nonverbal behavior can be used to evaluate mental processes, social interaction and communication. We per-
formed a number of projects on this ‘embodied communication’ background, addressing nonverbal behavior in dyadic in-
teraction processes in psychotherapy (104 therapy sessions of 70 patients) as well as in healthy dyads discussing topics of
general interest (two projects included 84 and 51 dyads, respectively). Nonverbal synchrony was assessed objectively using
an automated video-analysis algorithm (Motion Energy Analysis, MEA) developed in our laboratory. All participants were
unaware of the synchrony measure being assessed. In the initial psychotherapy project, we found the quality of interaction
was embodied in the degree of nonverbal synchrony between therapist and patient. In healthy dyads, synchrony was as-
sociated with the type of interaction and predicted the affective pleasantness of the conversations. This suggested that be-
yond the mere amount of movement, the degree of nonverbal synchrony between people is a pivotal predictor of features
of the interaction, of emotional responses in the individual, as well as an objective and sensitive indicator of the severity of
patients’ problems. A recent elaboration based on MEA concerned the definition of a duration measure of the social pre-
sent (‘nowness’) of a communicating dyad. We defined the social present as the extension of the temporal window within
which the nonverbal motion streams of interactants were significantly correlated. A pilot study showed that this duration has
an extension of around six seconds. Consistent with the previous results on embodied communication, we found associa-
tions of the social present with trait and state variables of the participants. In general, social synchronization is an important,
usually unattended, capacity that regulates social interaction and expresses the satisfaction with social exchange. Its analysis
provides valuable insights into embodied cognition and suggests promising targets for psychotherapeutic and other applica-
tions.

IV: Time consciousness: how the body and brain create our experience of time
Wittmann Marc
Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology & Mental Health, Freiburg, GERMANY

We are aware of the passage of time and we perceive duration, these experiences being strongly intertwined with affective
states. Nevertheless, the neural basis for the processing of time is still unknown. Based on recent conceptual and empirical
findings, a framework is presented suggesting that physiological changes of the body, the basis of our feeling states, form an
internal signal to encode the duration of external events. FMRI neuroimaging studies have shown how increasing neural ac-
tivity in the posterior insular cortex was related to the processing of temporal intervals in the multiple-seconds range. Given
the close connection between the insula and ascending body signals, it is possible that the accumulation of physiological
changes constitutes our experience of time. Moreover, it has been shown how the influence of affective states on time per-
ception depends upon the embodiment of emotions. That is, on a basic level, the bodily self, as created by the continuous
visceral and proprioceptive input from the body, is the functional anchor of phenomenal experience – and of subjective
time. The empirical work is in line with phenomenological conceptualizations that subjective time emerges through the ex-
istence of a conscious self across time as embodied entity. The entanglement of self-reflective consciousness, emotion and
body awareness with the experience of time is prominently disclosed in altered states of consciousness such as in experi-
ences of flow and of boredom, in meditative states, under the influence of drugs as well as in many psychiatric and neurolog-
ical conditions. An increased self-awareness coincides with an increased awareness of time. Conversely, a decreased aware-
ness of the self is associated with diminished awareness of time. The body of work on the intricate relationship between the
self and time will be presented and discussed.

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Exceptional Experiences
Organized by Harald Atmanspacher
(together with the Society for Mind-Matter Research)
Wednesday, June 10, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

Exceptional experiences (EE) are usually understood as deviations from what might be referred to as ordinary experiences,
i.e. experiences consistent with typical “reality models” that individuals develop to cope with their socio-cultural environ-
ment. In modern societies, basic elements of such models are established epistemological concepts (such as cause-and-ef-
fect relations) and scientific principles and laws (such as gravitation). Experiences inconsistent with those basic elements are
considered exceptional.
A well-known example of EE is the meaningful coincidence of events with no causal connection which are sometimes
referred to as „synchronistic”. Another example widely studied recently concerns „out-of-body” experiences (see, e.g., Brug-
ger et al. 2013), where an individual’s material body is typically seen by the same individual from outside their body.
Contrary to naive expectations, EE are not rare but abundant. They occur frequently within the populations of many
countries and across various sociocultural contexts. Although some EE show similarities with mental disorders, it would be
a mistake to identify them in general as such. In fact, the vast number of individuals reporting EE includes subclinical and
completely healthy subjects. Whether or not individuals tend to mental disorders depends on the frequency and intensity
of their EE. In this sense, EE can be regarded as a perfect study object for the hypothesis of a continuous spectrum between
mental health and mental disorder (van Os 2003).
In addition to their relevance for psychology, EE have been a permanent target of discussion in anthropology and reli-
gious studies, where they are often addressed as mystical experiences (Taves 2011, Luhrmann 2012). Metzinger’s (2003)
representational account within the philosophy of mind occasionally refers to some of these experiences, and mental states
with non-conceptual content (Bermudez 1995) can be related to EE as well. A comprehensive and systematic classification
of EE derives from dual-aspect frameworks such as outlined by Atmanspacher and Fach (2013).
In this symposium we will consider EE from the perspectives of the philosophy of mind and psychology. Speakers for
this proposal are Harald Atmanspacher Peter Brugger (neuropsychology, University Hospital Zurich), and Wolfgang Fach
(psychology, Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology, Freiburg).

Versions of dual-aspect thinking and mind-matter correlations

Atmanspacher Harald
Physics/Philosophy, Collegium Helveticum Zurich, SWITZERLAND

Dual-aspect monism and neutral monism offer interesting alternatives to physicalist positions concerning the mind-matter
problem. Both assume a psychophysically neutral domain underlying the mind-matter distinction, but they also differ in de-
finitive ways. Since the pioneering work of Spinoza 350 years ago, variants of both positions have been advanced by a num-
ber of protagonists. One of these variants, the dual-aspect monism proposed by Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Gustav Jung, will
be described and commented on in detail. As a unique feature in the Pauli-Jung conjecture, the duality of mental and mate-
rial aspects is specified in terms of a complementary relationship. This sounds innocent, but entails a number of peculiarities
distinguishing their approach from others, such as Russels’s neutral monism or Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism.
The Pauli-Jung conjecture suggests a distinction between two basically different kinds of mind-matter correlations
which have been denoted ‘structural’ and ‘induced’. While structural correlations define a baseline of ordinary, robust, repro-
ducible psychophysical correlations (such as mind-brain correlations or psychosomatic correlations), induced correlations
may be responsible for alterations and deviations (above or below) this baseline. Exceptional experiences can be understood
as experiences of such deviations.

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How exceptional are “meaningful coincidences”? A neuropsychological view

Brugger Peter
Neuropsychology, University Hospital Zurich, SWITZERLAND

There is general agreement: coincidences happen all the time. What makes people disagree is the “meaningfulness” of typi-
cal everyday coincidences. This contribution emphasizes the neuro-psychological foundation of seeing connections be-
tween two events. Even single cells, e.g. in the occipital cortex, consider coincidences as “meaningful” – otherwise we could
not spot illusory contours, could not perceive motion and would not be able to attribute intention to visual shapes hap-
hazardly moving around on a screen. On a higher cognitive level, perceiving the meaningfulness of a coincidence depends
on associative processing. Thus, an uncreative (nonassociative) mind may miss that two events are causally related in an
objective sense, while a creative mind (highly associative) may consider the potential meaningfulness of a coincidence that
escaped most others. On the “hypercreative” end, a deluded person may see connections everywhere. Experimental evi-
dence is provided, which shows differences in associative processing between persons, who interpret everyday coincidences
as instances of extrasensory perception and those, who believe they are “just chance”. The former rely on a broad and coarse
semantic analysis of paired associates, which makes them perceive more overlap between them. The latters’ more narrow
and focal associative analysis makes them see the two events more independent. Hemispheric differences in coarse vs. focal
semantic analysis may underlie, not only creative and delusional reasoning, but also the formation of paranormal belief.

Patterns of exceptional experiences and their mental representations

Fach Wolfgang
Psychology, Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology, Freiburg, GERMANY

According to Metzinger’s theory of mental representations, exceptional experiences (EE) can be understood as deviations
in a model of reality that consists of a self-domain and a world-domain as basic components. As a logical consequence of
this dual architecture, four classes of phenomena can be deduced and characterized as deviations concerning their loca-
tion (internal vs. external) or relation (coincidence vs. dissociation) in the overall reality model. Statistical analyses of more
than 2500 cases, collected at the counseling department of the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health
(IGPP) at Freiburg, Germany, revealed specific patterns of EE that are in agreement with the theoretical expectations. A
comparative study of IGPP clients and a survey of the general population in Switzerland shows no differences between
both groups except that EEs reported by IGPP clients show higher frequency and intensity than the general population.
Our results suggest that EE are a part of the human condition and that their phenomenology is grounded on fundamen-
tal ordering principles. EE seem to be distributed on a continuum and help-seeking behavior depends on their impact and,
as the case may be, on the presence of co-existing mental disorders. Assuming that a continuous distribution is also applica-
ble to the extent of symptoms of mental disorders, further investigations have to clarify how both continua are related and if
they are basically different.

Literature: H. Atmanspacher and W. Fach (2013): A structural-phenomenological typology of mind-matter cor-

relations. Journal of Analytical Psychology 58, 219-244. J.L. Bermudez (1995): Nonconceptual content: From
perceptual experience to subpersonal computational states. Mind and Language 10, 333-369. P. Brugger, B.
Lenggenhager and M.J. Giummarra (2013) Xenomelia: A social neuroscience view of altered bodily self-con-
sciouness. Frontiers in Psychology 4, article 203, 1-7. T. Metzinger (2003): Being No One. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge. A. Taves (2011): Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study of Reli-
gion and Other Special Things. Princeton University Press, Princeton. J. Van Os (2003): Is there a continuum of
psychotic experiences in the general population? Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale 12(4), 242-252.

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Local and large-scale neuronal dynamics in

conscious sensory perception
Wednesday, June 10, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

System-level neuronal mechanism underlying conscious perception and its subjective experience have remained enigmatic.
The conscious perception of sensory stimuli is dependent both on the pre-stimulus brain-state at which the stimulus occurs,
expectations of the stimulus content and onset, as well as on the processing of the sensory stimuli. During certain brain
states, even physically very weak sensory stimuli are detected while at the other brain-states these stimuli are not detected.
Which factors determine the fluctuations in the brain states and what are brain-states that support subsequent conscious
perception are some of the key questions in the quest for neural correlates for consciousness (NCC). In addition to pre-
stimulus factors, conscious perception and it´s subjective experience are also dependent on the post-stimulus processing.
One putative systems-level mechanism that could give rise to and regulate access to conscious perception is the syn-
chronization of neuronal oscillations in local and large-scale networks that coordinate and regulate neuronal processing
across neuronal circuits. Synchronization of neuronal oscillations could hence provide a means to coordinate communica-
tion across brain areas as well as to regulate neuronal processing in local sensory circuits in which sensory information is
processed.
In this symposium, we will discuss the neuronal and biological patterns that lead to and determine which sensory stim-
uli are consciously perceived, their subjective experience, as well as the neuronal dynamics that lead to fluctuations among
brain-states. We will specifically discuss studies, which have investigated NCC by using electro- and magnetoencephalog-
raphy (EEG and MEG) to record neuronal activity, and investigated the functional role of oscillations and brain critical
dynamics in giving rise to regulating conscious sensory perception.
When sensory stimuli are presented at the threshold of detection, their conscious perception varies from time-to time.
We will discuss studies, which have shown that the fluctuations in the detection of very weak sensory stimuli follow critical
dynamics similar to that observed in neuronal data (Palva et al., 2013 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci). These critical dynamics might
hence be one of the factors that determine brain-state fluctuations controlling the access to consciousness. However, the
brain critical dynamics is only one of the factors determining the conscious perception of weak sensory stimuli presented at
the threshold of detection. We thus further discuss the view that fluctuations in the alpha oscillations networks properties
before the onset of sensory stimuli are correlated with the subsequent conscious perception and are therefore reflect the
“Windows for consciousness” (Weisz et al., 2014 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci). Hence, in addition to long-lasting brain dynamics,
short temporal fluctuations of instantaneous brain states control also the access to consciousness.
In addition, we will discuss recent observation, which show that subsequent conscious perception of weak sensory stim-
uli is also predicted by neural responses being locked to heartbeats (Park et al, Nat Neurosci 2014) and encoding the self-
relevance of spontaneous thoughts (Babo-Rebelo et al, in prep). Further, evidence of the biological origin of consciousness
is discussed by data showing that neural dynamics in the default-mode network are influenced by the infra-slow (~0.05)
activity of the electrical pacemaker located in the stomach (Richter et al, in prep).
In addition to these multifaceted markers brain states as markers of conscious access, also the processing of sensory
stimuli which will be subsequently consciously perceived differs from that of the undetected stimuli. We will discuss finding,
which show that sensory stimuli which are detected evoke activity at different brain regions and at different frequency bands
compared to those that remain undetected are furthermore associated with the large-scale synchronization of neuronal ac-
tivity (Hirvonen et al., in preparation) while local gamma-band activity is present for both consciously perceived and unper-
ceived stimuli and hence is not a sufficient condition for conscious perception (Schwiedrzik et al., 2014 Cerebral Cortex).
Further, we will discuss the observations which show that the conscious perception is dependent both on the bottom-up
salience of the stimulus as well as on the top-down expectations of the perception (Melloni et al., 2011 J. Neurosci.).
Hence, taken together, in this symposium we will discuss various prestimulus and post-stimulus neuronal and biological
factors that may determine, which sensory stimuli are consciously perceived and which are not.

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Critical neuronal dynamics and local and large oscillations predict conscious
sensory perception
Palva Satu
Neuroscience Center, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

The conscious perception of weak sensory stimuli presented at the threshold of detection is governed largely by the neu-
ronal activity preceding stimulus presentation. It has been well known that detection of such stimuli tend to cluster in steaks
of perceived and unperceived trials of which dynamics follow critical behavior. However, it has not been clear what factors
contribute to and governs these behavioral fluctuations of conscious perception.
I will discuss findings in which we observed that both the fluctuations in the detection of weak auditory and visual stim-
uli were characterized by scale-free critical dynamics similarly to those of oscillation amplitude modulations. Importantly,
we observed that the neuronal and behavioral scaling laws were correlated hence suggesting that critical dynamics in neu-
ronal fluctuations is one of the determining factors of conscious perception (Palva et al., 2013 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci). Impor-
tantly, brain critical dynamics in the resting brain activity, were also predictive of task-state fluctuations suggesting that brain
intrinsic fluctuations are one of the large determinants of brain-state fluctuations.
In addition to prestimulus brain-states, also the post-stimulus markers of neuronal activity will predict whether stimuli
presented at the threshold of detection will be consciously perceived. It has been hypothesized that large-scale synchroniza-
tion across frontal and parietal brain areas could be crucial for conscious perception, but this far there is little evidence to
support this hypothesis, because of difficulties in characterizing synchrony from source reconstructed MEG data. I will thus
discuss data on the role of local amplitude and phase-dynamics as well as large-scale inter-areal synchrony in predicting of
conscious perception (Hirvonen et al., in preparation).
I propose that conscious perception results from complex and hierarchical sequence of neuronal interactions, which
together will lead to conscious perception of sensory stimuli.

Functional network architectures shape upcoming perception: the win2con

framework
Peatfield Nicholas A.,
University of Trento, Trento, ITALY

It is becoming increasingly accepted that perception is highly state-dependent. This does not only encompass markedly al-
tered behavioral and physiological states (e.g. sleep and wakefulness), but also moment-to-moment fluctuations. In particu-
lar in the context of the study of the so-called Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) distinct brain states form prereq-
uisites that influence neural processing of sensory information and thereby also phenomenological states. A relatively con-
sistent prestimulus finding using near threshold paradigms has been the reduced power of alpha activity in relevant sensory
regions. Following the influential view of alpha as reflecting the inhibitory state, the aforementioned finding has promoted
the conclusion that at least for near threshold stimuli- relatively enhanced levels of excitability in sensory areas processing
upcoming sensory information should promote its detection. In the first part of my talk I will attempt to make a synopsis of
the area and will argue that the pre-excitability hypothesis falls short in explaining central effects in consciousness research.
This will be followed by an introduction as well as experimental support of our framework called “windows to conscious-
ness” which emphasizes the role of pre-established coupling patterns in shaping upcoming perception. Time permitting, I
will furthermore give an outlook on our attempt to test central ideas of our framework by using combined transcranial elec-
trical stimulation and MEG.

A neural mechanism to generate subjectivity?

Tallon-Baudry Catherine
Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives, Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, FRANCE

Subjectivity is a central, defining feature of consciousness, but how it can be generated by the brain remains elusive. I pro-
pose that visceral organs (heart, gut) that constantly send neural information up to the central nervous system provide a po-
tentially important source of self-specifying information that has been so far mostly overlooked. Cerebral responses to those
organs would define a subject-centered referential from which first person perspective can be expressed. I will present recent

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findings in magneto-encephalographic data in humans measuring the neural response evoked at each heartbeat. I will show
that neural responses to heartbeats in key nodes of the default-mode network are relevant for subjectivity: neural responses
to heartbeats predict visual consciousness (Park et al, Nat Neurosci 2014) and encode the self-relevance of spontaneous
thoughts (Babo-Rebelo et al, in prep). Finally, I will show that spontaneous neural dynamics in the default-mode network
are influenced by the infra-slow (~0.05) activity of the electrical pacemaker located in the stomach (Richter et al, in prep).
Together, those results indicate that the central monitoring of the cardiac and gastric electrical pacemakers by the default-
mode network may constitute a source of self-specifying signals necessary for subjectivity.

Distilling the neural correlates of conscious perception.

Aru Jaan
Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, Estonia

It has been proposed that one key step for solving the mystery of consciousness is to locate the neural correlates of con-
sciousness (NCC). The paradigms for revealing the NCC have commonly applied the contrast between conditions with and
without conscious perception. I argue that such contrast does not exclusively reveal the neural processes directly related to
conscious experience of the target but also the prerequisites for and the consequences of conscious perception. Therefore,
understanding the neural bases of conscious experience requires the NCC to be experimentally distilled from these con-
founding processes. We ourselves have designed an experimental paradigm where conscious perception is modulated either
by sensory evidence or by prior knowledge. The logic of our approach is the following: although conscious perception could
be modulated through these two different prerequisite processes, conscious experience and thus the NCC should be the
same in both cases. Our aim has been to use this paradigm to empirically test some proposed markers of NCC. In particular,
we have tested whether a) local category specific gamma band responses and b) long-range synchrony could be mechanisms
of conscious perception. In both cases our tentative answer has been negative: in our studies both local gamma band re-
sponses and long-range synchrony received no support for being considered a NCC.

Phenomenal Concepts and The Phenomenal

Concept Strategy: New Challenges
Wednesday, June 10, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

The so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) is one of the most influential responses to anti-physicalist arguments
such as the conceivability argument and the knowledge argument. According to this strategy, phenomenal concepts provide
a distinctive way of referring to phenomenal states. These concepts allow us to introspectively refer to our own phenomenal
states in virtue of what they are like. The main idea of the PCS is that phenomenal concepts have some especial features that
explain why we can conceive of physical duplicates who lack phenomenal states, or why Mary—an expert on the physiology
of colour vision—would learn something new when seeing red for the first time (i.e. she would acquire new knowledge in
terms of new phenomenal beliefs involving new phenomenal concepts); and these features of phenomenal concepts are sup-
posed to be perfectly compatible with physicalism. That is, the PCS provides a physicalistically acceptable explanation of the
explanatory gap between the physical and the mental. In this symposium, the participants would like to explore new chal-
lenges to this strategy, so as to assess its main virtues and vices, and move the discussion forward.
Some of the challenges to the phenomenal concept strategy, or to the general claim that phenomenal concepts are dis-
tinctive concepts, that will be discussed in the symposium are the following. It has been argued that several theories of phe-
nomenal concepts provide accounts of how phenomenal concepts fix their referents that are viciously circular, because they
contend that phenomenal concepts refer to their referents by means of descriptions or sortals of the form “another experi-
ence of the same type”, which is also a phenomenal concept, which in turn will require another description/sortal of that
form, and so on and so forth. In addition, another important challenge has to do with the thesis of revelation, defended by
Goff, Levine, Nida-Rümelin and others, which has it that phenomenal concepts reveal something (or everything) about the
essence of their referents, which is allegedly incompatible with physicalism. These two problems will be discussed by Esa

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Diaz-Leon, who will try to find an account that can solve both problems at the same time. Andreas Elpidorou & Guy Dove
will introduce a novel challenge to the PCS: they argue that there is a body of evidence from the field of embodied cognition
that puts in jeopardy the PCS’s explanation of the appearance of contingency of the mind-body nexus. In their presentation
they will develop and defend a new solution to this important challenge. Bénédicte Veillet will focus on the knowledge argu-
ment and the prospects of the PCS to respond to this influential anti-physicalist argument. In particular, she focuses on an
aspect of the knowledge argument that has not received a lot of attention, namely, the role of the emotions that Mary is in-
tuitively supposed to instantiate when she experiences red for the first time, that is, she will feel surprised, or even mystified,
at the unpredictable nature of that experience. In addition, Veillet will explore the contrast between two kinds of epistemic
emotions: that of entertaining a satisfying explanation of a higher-order phenomenon in terms of a lower-level phenomenon
that does not leave anything out (such as explaining water in terms of H2O), and a non-satisfying explanation which does
leave something out (such as arguably that of explaining consciousness in physical terms). Veillet will argue that exploring
the role of those epistemic emotions will help the PCS in order to provide a satisfactory response to the knowledge argu-
ment. Assaf Weksler will focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts that advocates of the PCS often appeal to,
namely, the quotational account. He will argue that this view can provide a plausible account of the relation between pain
and the desire to get rid of it, and in particular, can provide a satisfactory explanation of why we want to get rid of the pain
experience itself and not only of the body damage it represents. As he argues, this would provide indirect support for the
quotational account of phenomenal concepts. Finally, Helen Yetter-Chappell will challenge an important assumption of the
PCS, namely, that the physical-phenomenal link is not a priori. At the same time, she will provide a novel explanation of why
it seems to us intuitively that the link is not a priori when actually it is, according to her view.
The symposium will consist of five 20-min individual presentations, followed by a 20-min general discussion.

Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular Nor Opaque

Diaz-Leon Esa
Dept. of Logic, History & Phil. of Science, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, SPAIN

Phenomenal concepts are those concepts that we use to think and talk about our phenomenal states, in virtue of what they
feel like, and whose reference is typically fixed by means of introspection. In this paper I will focus on an influential account
of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this
account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize some experiences as “another one
of those”. Michael Tye (2009) has argued that this account is viciously circular, because the relevant recognitional abilities
seem to involve descriptions of the form “another experience of the same type”, which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye
argues that we could perhaps avoid the circularity worry if we explain the reference-fixing of phenomenal concepts in terms
of dispositions to discriminate and re-identify tokens of the same type, without appealing to any further phenomenal con-
cept. However, he argues, this account faces another problem, namely, it seems incompatible with the intuitive claim that
phenomenal concepts seem to involve rich modes of presentation of their referents. Philip Goff (2011) has similarly argued
that most versions of a posteriori physicalism seem committed to the claim that phenomenal concepts are opaque, that is,
they cannot reveal anything about their nature of their referents, which seems problematic. In this paper, I will try to provide
a reconstruction of the recognitional account of phenomenal concepts so that it can avoid the circularity worry without en-
tailing that phenomenal concepts are opaque.

Embodied Conceivability: Phenomenal Concepts and Contingency

Elpidorou Andrea
University of Louisville, Louisville, USA
(with Dove G.)
Let “P” stand for the sentence “Mental facts are metaphysically necessitated by physical facts.” Although physicalism re-
quires that P is true necessarily, P appears to be contingent. The very appearance of P’s contingency is problematic for physi-
calism: it provides prima facie evidence for the contingency of P. It is thus incumbent upon proponents of physicalism to
explain the appearance of P’s contingency in a manner that is consistent with the necessity of P. The Phenomenal Concept
Strategy (PCS) offers what is perhaps the most influential and widely used physicalistically acceptable explanation of P’s ap-
pearance of contingency. According to PCS, P appears to be contingent because entertaining P involves the exercise of both

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physical and phenomenal concepts. But the exercise of those two kinds of concepts brings about a difference in introspec-
tive phenomenology: only the exercise of phenomenal concepts is thought to involve a distinctive phenomenologically-rich
experience. It is precisely this difference in phenomenology that is assumed to give rise to the appearance of contingency
and not the lack of a necessitation relation between the referents of the two types of concepts. Our aim in this essay is to
evaluate PCS’s explanation of P’s contingency. We show that the large body of evidence suggesting that our concepts are
often embodied and grounded in sensorimotor systems speaks against PCS’s explanation of P’s contingency. Specifically, we
argue that it is a mistake to insist that only the exercise of phenomenal concepts brings about an introspective phenomenol-
ogy. Even though explanations of P’s contingency that have been traditionally associated with PCS fail, it is still possible, we
show, to formulate a novel version of such accounts that is thoroughly in keeping with embodied cognition, that focuses on
features of physical concepts, and which successfully succeeds in explaining P’s appearance of contingency.

Phenomenal Concepts and Epistemic Emotions

Veillet Benedicte
University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, USA

Epistemic emotions turn out to be quite central to the typical anti-physicalist arguments about phenomenal conscious-
ness. Mary, we routinely assume, will feel surprised when she first sees red; we also assume that what she learns at that mo-
ment will feel new and significant to her. The Explanatory Gap, meanwhile, relies on an asymmetry in epistemic emotions:
whereas certain explanations feel satisfying, physicalist explanations of phenomenal properties always feel as though they’re
leaving something out.
Most often, these epistemic emotions function as (starting) data points. The success of the phenomenal concepts strat-
egy (PCS) and, within the PCS, of particular accounts of phenomenal concepts is measured in large part by whether or not
they can adequately explain (or predict) the existence and alleged strength of these epistemic emotions, e.g. of Mary’s sur-
prise (or mystification, see Holman 2013).
I believe, however, that defenders of the PCS have much to gain from a more thorough discussion of epistemic emo-
tions (qua epistemic emotions), of their general role in our psychology, and of their specific relation to our phenomenal
concepts. In the paper, I take a closer look at some of these emotions, especially feelings of learning, feelings of newness
and feelings of surprise. I hope to show that a better understanding of these emotions will ultimately bolster the physicalist’s
phenomenal concept strategy.

The Motivational Consequences of Quoting Experiences

Weksler Assaf
Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, ISRAEL

When we experience bodily pain, it seems that we desire both that the pain-quality experienced to be in the body (which I
assume to be a posteriori identical to tissue damage) will go away (call it desire1), and also that the pain experience itself will
go away (call it desire2). Apparently, desire1 is adaptive, while desire2 is not. For, whereas tissue damage decreases fitness,
*experience* of tissue damage does not. The existence of desire2 is therefore puzzling (I assume, with Aydede, 2000, and
Sobel, 2005, that the unpleasantness of the experience of pain is grounded in desire2, and hence the former cannot explain
why the latter exists). This puzzle generalizes to all pleasant and unpleasant perceptual experiences.
In this talk I argue that the quotational account of phenomenal concepts (Balog, 2012a, 2012b; Papineau, 2002, 2007)
can straightforwardly explain why desire2 exists, which is a point in favor of the account. According to the quotational ac-
count, roughly, an experience of pain is a mental symbol referring to tissue damage, and the phenomenal concept of the
experience of pain consists of the said symbol plus something that functions analogously to quotation marks, making the
compound concept refer to the symbol, rather than to tissue damage.
Here is the gist of my proposal. I argue that the desire-forming mechanism responsible for desire1 is prone to respond
to the phenomenal concept of pain by erroneously *using* the said symbol (roughly, treating is as referring to tissue dam-
age) instead of *mentioning* it (roughly, treating it as referring to itself). Next, I argue that this use/mention error leads to
the formation of desire2. Desire2 is thus a spandrel of the mechanism in question and the quotational nature of phenomenal
concepts.

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Phenomenal Concepts and the Psychological Gap

Yetter-Chappell Helen
University of York, York, UNITED KINGDOM

According to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, phenomenal concepts are so radically different from physical concepts
that even an ideally rational agent with complete physical information could not work out the phenomenal-physical truths a
priori. This is supposed to give the physicalist a way of accommodating our “dualistic” intuitions while rejecting the dualist’s
ontology. I aim to show that, contrary to PCS, an appropriately designed agent would be able to integrate their phenomenal
and physical concepts, such that the result is a priori knowledge of the phenomenal-physical truths. While I thus argue that
there’s no ideal epistemic gap, my account yields a novel explanation of why there would seem to be such a gap to agents
cognitively like us.

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) in the

Study of States of Consciousness
Wednesday, June 10 2:30pm – 4:35pm

This symposium aims at informing the audience on how TMS can be used to probe the brain and influence its state. Assum-
ing that there is a correspondence between brain states and conscious states, TMS provides a tool to directly influence and
measure aspects of this elusive phenomenon. The symposium will consist of 5 talks by experts in the field. Each talk will last
about 20 minutes, with 5 minutes reserved for discussion.
TMS is becoming a major tool for clinical diagnostics and treatment as well as for scientific experimentation. Recently,
much attention and effort has been put to developing the accuracy of its targeting and to the measurement of brain activity
concurrently with TMS. It appears that as we learn to undertand the mechanisms of the brain and its dynamics and as the
technology matures, we will be able to connect to the brain in unprecedented ways, influencing and learning about con-
scious and non-conscious states. This methodology may turn out to be extremely important in the experimental study of
brain states that play a role in defining our inner, conscious world.

TMS and the Modulation of Conscious States

Ilmoniemi Risto
Department of Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering, Aalto University School of Science, Espoo, FINLAND

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a noninvasive method to artifically modulate states of the brain. Inducing elec-
tric currents in cerebral tissue, TMS can trigger action potentials, i.e., elicit neuronal signal flow. By stimulating selected
cortical sites and by observing changes in brain activity or in task performance, one can learn a about cortical excitability,
plasticity and network dynamics. One can obtain diagnostic information as well as treat patients. TMS responses can also
inform us about the level of vigilance and how perception can be affected by targeted stimulation of relevant brain areas. Ap-
plications of TMS include presurgical determination of motor or language areas, depression therapy, and suppression of mi-
graine. Clinical studies and trials are underway to use TMS to alleviate tinnitus, to suppress hallucinations in schizophrenic
patients, to characterize and treat epilepsy, and to enhance the rehabilitation of stroke victims.
We are developing techniques for navigated TMS (nTMS) and methods to combine nTMS with multichannel EEG.
When TMS-evoked EEG is recorded, one obtains direct measures of cortical excitability and time- resolved area-to-area
connectivity. One can monitor brain changes in the course of treatment, medication, or rehabilitation. Or, as will be de-
scribed this symposium, one can measure and monitor levels of consciousness and its various characteristics.

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Consciousness and brain complexity: a perturbational approach


Massimini Marcello
Department of Biomedical and Clinical Sciences, University of Milan, ITALY

Theoretical considerations suggest that consciousness depends on the ability of neural elements to engage in complex ac-
tivity patterns that are, at once, distributed within a system of interacting cortical areas (integrated) and differentiated in
space and time (information-rich). We thus hypothesized that the level of consciousness could be estimated empirically by
perturbing the cortex to engage distributed interactions and by measuring the information content (algorithmic complex-
ity) of the resulting electroencephalographic (EEG) responses. We found that the algorithmic complexity of cortical EEG
responses to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) reliably discriminated the level of consciousness in single individu-
als (n ? 200) across different conditions in which consciousness was altered physiologically, pharmacologically and patho-
logically. This theoretically motivated quantification of brain complexity allows establishing a reliable, graded measurement
scale along the consciousness/unconsciousness spectrum and provides a principled approach for estimating the level of
consciousness at the bedside. Besides diagnostic applications, measuring the brain’s response to a direct cortical stimulation
provides novel mechanistic insight on the neurophysiological mechanisms of loss and recovery of consciousness.

TMS and consciousness: a view from the University of Tartu in Tallinn

Bachmann Talis
University of Tartu, Tartu, ESTONIA
Renate Rutiku
University of Tartu, ESTONIA

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) can be used for consciousness research in various ways. Experimental phenome-
nology approach allows studying consciousness by inducing artificial phosphenes or scotomas by TMS targeted at a specific
location in sensory cortex or sometimes even in other cortical areas. TMS masking allows subduing or eliminating target
consciousness by TMS and also provides valuable information when TMS-masking variables are compared to modal mask-
ing variables. Contrasting TMS effects on EEG signatures (TMS-evoked potentials or TEPs, spectral perturbations, etc.)
between conscious and
unconscious states or states of baseline level arousal and increased arousal level allows studying objective signatures of
varying mental states (with important implications for applied clinical context, especially anesthesiology). Analysing TEPs
produced when subjects are stimulated by varying modal sensory input and comparing the respective signatures induced
when different contents (including task- irrelevant contents) are processed by the brain allows development of TMS-based
detection and prediction of covert information processing. Evoking travelling waves of perturbations with TMS targeted at
a remote cortical locus allows studying the effects of long range connectivity-carried non-specific effects on the functional-
ity of certain distant brain regions. Causing changes of neuromodulation at the biochemical and ion-channel level in the
cortical tissue under TMS coil (e.g., in animal models in vivo) and observing the concomitant effects on awareness and con-
sciousness phenomena allows to better understand the role of certain endophenotypes in consciousness (when individual
differences are investigated) or the role of neuromediators and -modulators in consciousness in general. Perturbing
the functionality of higher level brain systems (e.g., in the frontal cortex) by TMS and observing the resulting cognitive
and behavioral effects allows studying higher-level functions of consciousness (including “free will” and moral behavior).
This list is not final. In our presentation we will describe the results of TMS-based research carried out in our laboratory
along with some of the above-mentioned perspectives of experimental inquiry.

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TMS to occipital cortex in the awake state and NREM sleep

Jaan Aru
Institute of Public Law and Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, ESTONIA
Stamm Mihkel
Institute of Public Law and Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, ESTONIA
Rutiku Renate
Institute of Public Law and Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, ESTONIA
Bachmann Talis
Institute of Public Law and Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, ESTONIA

Understanding the neurobiological underpinnings of the state of consciousness is important for fundamental science and
for the clinic. The differences of neural correlates of conscious and unconscious states can be studied by contrasting EEG
markers of brain activity between those two states. In the present study a task-free experimental setup was used to study the
different neural responsiveness in the conscious and unconscious states caused by occipital transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS). EEG responses to single and paired pulse TMS with a long inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 100 milliseconds
were investigated under Non- REM (NREM) sleep and wakefulness. The contribution of the first pulse was subtracted
to compare the additional neural processes caused by the second pulse. Qualitatively and quantitatively different EEG re-
sponses were observed when the second TMS impulse was added with this long ISI. In particular, in the paired pulse TMS
condition a robust positive deflection starting around 200 ms and lasting until 800 ms after the second pulse was found in
NREM sleep. This component was not obtained under wakefulness or when a single TMS pulse was applied in sleep. These
results demonstrate that the present experimental protocol could be potentially used for the assessment of the state of con-
sciousness.

Assessing the level of consciousness within non-REM sleep using TMS–EEG and
a serial-awakening paradigm

Nieminen Jaakko O. *
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Department of Neuroscience and Biomedical Engineering, Aalto
University School of Science, Espoo, FINLAND
Gosseries Olivia*
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Siclari Francesca
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
University Hospital of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Boly Melanie
Dept. of Neurology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Bradley Postle
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Dept. of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA
Tononi Giulio
Dept. of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI, USA

* Contributed equally
Combined transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (TMS– EEG) allows for directly and non-inva-
sively perturbing the brain and measuring the subsequent cortical response. Previous TMS–EEG studies have shown clear-
cut differences between conscious (e.g., normal wakefulness, rapid eye movement (REM) sleep) and unconscious condi-
tions (e.g., non-REM sleep, coma, anesthesia). When subjects are in stage N3 of the first sleep episode, TMS triggers stereo-
typical slow-wave-like responses. However, subjects awakened from NREM sleep throughout the night often report having
had dream-like experiences. Hence, we asked whether TMS–EEG responses would differ depending on the presence or

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absence of a conscious experience within the same behavioral state. For this study, 6 healthy participants underwent
TMS–EEG during NREM sleep (5 nights per subject). Brain activity was measured using a 60-channel TMS-compatible EEG
amplifier and single-pulse TMS was applied to the superior parietal cortex. After each TMS session (up to 16 per night), sub-
jects were awakened to ask for a dream report. We first averaged the TMS-evoked potential over the last few trials before the
awakenings. We then computed the global mean field amplitude (GMFA), the phase locking factor (PLF), the event-related
spectral perturbation (ERSP), and the state variance (SV). The results revealed increased bistability when the subjects did not
report any experience during sleep, as compared to when they did. Specifically, at around 150–200 ms after TMS, the negative
peak amplitude of the TMS-evoked response was larger and the GMFA was higher. PLF, ERSP, and SV also showed marked
differences depending on whether or not subjects reported having had a dream. Furthermore, the dream reports correlated
with parameters of the TMS–EEG responses. In summary, variations in the level of consciousness within the same behavioral
state—NREM sleep—are predicted by changes in the bistability of cortical networks revealed by TMS–EEG responses.

Against Mindless Pragmatism: A Symposium on

Consciousness and C. S. Peirce’s Semiotics
Chair:
Issajeva Jelena
Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, ESTONIA
Thursday, June 11, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

In his forthcoming book, Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs, Marc Champagne argues that current philosophical
puzzlement about the qualitative dimension of consciousness stems, historically and logically, from a failure to properly han-
dle the fine-grained distinctions found in the semiotic theory of the American polymath, Charles Sanders Peirce. The aim of
this symposium is to reflect on what that might mean for the other body of ideas Peirce is known for, pragmatism.
Most philosophers are familiar with the term-of-art “qualia,” but few know that it originally came from Peirce (Living-
ston 2004). He called them “qualisigns.” Indeed, Peirce used a sophisticated set of categories to show how all representations
must have some non-representational core. Since we humans have the ability to suppose those further elements of absent,
we can artificially divorce or “prescind” any given quality we experience (like red or the taste of pickled herring) from the
causal and inferential relations it is sandwiched in. Once enlisted in cognitive processes (like recollection, etc.), such quali-
ties may act as signs, but those qualities are not themselves signs, unless they are linked to something else by an interpreta-
tion. Building on this seminal Peircean idea, Champagne argues that many recurring confusions about consciousness result
from a failure to track where we have deliberately omitted those objects and interpretations.
The conjunction of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs is thus a natural one. In an essay titled “What is a
Sign?,” Peirce tells the reader that “[i]t is necessary to recognize three different states of mind” (EP2, 4). The first state of
mind Peirce invites us to consider is that of a red feeling, and nothing else. The reader who, saddled with an unexamined
folk semiotic theory, came in expecting a discussion of traffic signals, will likely wonder at this point whether Peirce has
veered off topic. He has not. Peirce’s goal is to evince the conditions for the possibility of sign-action. He wants to make
a point: with a quality like red and just red, there can be no flow of consciousness. If one finds such a flow, the impetus
must have come from a source different from the quality itself. Implicitly, Peirce is making an additional point, just as im-
portant, which is that we can follow through with his invitation to consider a quality like red in complete isolation from
anything else. Logically, as well as psychologically, it can be done. Peirce makes sure to emphasize that “nobody is really
in a state of feeling, pure and simple” as he just described it. Yet, he observes that “whenever we are awake, something is
present to the mind, and what is present, without reference to any compulsion or reason, is feeling” (ibid.). Hence, on
this reading, Peirce is not a “verificationist” who denies the experience of qualia. Much the opposite, he begins by telling
us that qualia are the most fundamental constituents of any mind. Champagne’s claim, in essence, is that Peircean semi-
otics is exactly the sort of “fundamental theory” David Chalmers has been searching for since his 1996 The Conscious
Mind.
The question posed by this symposium is: can one agree with this semiotic account of consciousness and still identify as
a “pragmatist?”

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This is a question worth asking, because some prominent Peirce scholars like T. L. Short (2007) have described semioti-
cians as “the wrong crowd.” In saying this, Short aligns himself with Cheryl Misak (2013), who argues that anything other
than a naturalist outlook corrupts the ideas of Peirce. Of course, Peirce’s fellow pragmatist, William James, was never an
enemy of conscious experience, but scholars like Short and Misak think pragmatists should rid themselves of such Jamesian
influences. Their stance thus makes functionalism—the idea that mental states are exhaustively characterised by how they
relate inputs and outputs—into the only account a self-respecting pragmatist should endorse. Champagne’s work, however,
shows that there is much in Peircean semiotics which can vindicate the claim that, in addition to functions, there is some-
thing “it is like” to undergo an experience, even if that quality cannot be scientifically studied.
One might argue that, because Chalmers (1996) asks us to imagine “zombies” who display no practical difference from
regular humans, that idea violates the founding intent of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Still, before Chalmers can delete qualia
from such experience-free zombies, he has to focus on a very narrow construal that deletes all relations from a given quality.
This construal of a lone quality bears a striking resemblance to what Peirce wrote about “Firstness.” Participants to this sym-
posium are thus invited to reflect on whether the commitments of pragmatism require a complete dismissal of conscious
experience.

Overcoming “Tone”-Deafness: Minding Qualia as a Means of Qualifying

Consciousness
Colapietro Vincent
Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA,

Especially in recent years, there has been an effort to link considerations of felt qualia (or “raw feels”) and the cognitive ac-
cessibility of various dimensions of human consciousness. This undertaking has not, until now, been much informed by
C. S. Peirce’s writings. This is unfortunate, since Peirce’s triadic categorial scheme and various distinctions regarding signs
provide us with the means by which to investigate consciousness in both its irreducibly phenomenal presence and its cogni-
tive accessibility. Even before my 1989 book, Peirce’s Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity,
I have been preoccupied with showing the relevance of Peirce’s work to this area of inquiry. My commitment to this task
was thus renewed and indeed deepened by a recent monograph. Marc Champagne has provided those interested in ques-
tions of consciousness with both an informed introduction to the most salient features of Peirce’s thought and a painstaking
treatment of pivotal questions in light of Peirce’s doctrine of categories and philosophy of signs. For someone who has long
been interested in both this philosopher and these questions, Champagne’s book is an extremely welcome addition to the
literature. There are, however, points about which even a sympathetic reader of Champagne’s timely contribution might ask
for fuller or deeper consideration. One of these is the distinction between qualia and qualisigns (firsts in their utter firstness
and in their semiotic function). Another is the role of phenomenology (or, as Peirce often termed it, phaneroscopy) in the
investigation of signs. If I would like to take this occasion as an opportunity to break a lance for both qualia in their utter
firstness and phenomenology in its semiotic salience, it is out of deep appreciation for what Champagne has accomplished
in Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs, not out of any fundamental dissatisfaction.

The Possibility of Naturalism

Kilpinen Erkki
Department of Sociology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

I am trying to do something analogous to the impressive new contribution by Marc Champagne, namely to stand in defence
of the naturalist approach to the semiotic consciousness, after his interesting opening. My starting point is that semiotic
is not about signs, it is about semeiosis, that is: sign-action (processes of interpretation), to borrow expressions by Max
Fisch and Thomas Sebeok. “We are forced to conclude that consciousness is an emergent from behavior,” declared George
Herbert Mead some eighty years ago, continuing “that so far from being a precondition of the social act, the social act is a
precondition of [consciousness]. The mechanism of the social act can be traced out without introducing into it the concep-
tion of consciousness as a separate element within that act.” Mead is here bringing to consummation the pragmatist project
in the philosophy of mind that Peirce initiated a generation earlier. That project can also be called semiotic, although, aside
from his “significant symbol,” Mead scarcely uses concepts redolent of semiotics. If one is not unduly enamoured with semi-
otic terminology, one might add that so much the better; the famous Peircean trichotomies are to be taken as our servants

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(called to service when need be) in semiotic studies, not as our masters. If one takes a look at consciousness studies today,
one finds that Mead has more than verbally foreshadowed the interpretation of consciousness that emerges from Antonio
Damasio’s psycho-physiological work, for example. Both share the starting point that only an acting being has any need for
mind and consciousness in the first place. This points toward the conclusion that a naturalistic philosophy of mind is pos-
sible from pragmatist premises. How far it is useful in practice is a question to be settled by empirical research.

Pragmatism as a Logical Study of Consciousness

Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko
Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, ESTONIA

Peirce’s pragmatism is a statement of the scientific method, concerned with finding out the highest grade of clearness, that
is, the meaning and purpose of signs that are of the nature of “thoughts, intellectual concepts and generalities.” Seen in this
pragmatist light, the scientific method would not seem to leave much room for the study of non-intentional phenomena
pertaining to the category of firstness. In that category, we find not only the terms familiar from contemporary philosophy
of mind, such as appearances, sensations and feelings, but more importantly, the more qualified ones of (i) “immediate con-
sciousness of quality” (and so not just any quality as such) and “single non-compound sensations” (and so not just any sen-
sation), as well as (ii) the sign-theoretic “tones and qualisigns,” “icons and images” (the latter the “first firstnesses” of icons)
and “rhemas,” and (iii) the phaneroscopic, logical and diagrammatic “logically indecomposable elements of thought,” “spots
and potentials,” “substantive possibilities,” and “sheets of consciousness.” Yet, a deeper analysis of what belongs to Peirce’s
preferred groups of notions (i)-(iii) reveals a rich theoretical structure within which they are embedded. Peirce wanted con-
sciousness to be a subject matter for logic. Objects of consciousness such as “the feelings a symphony inspires or that which
is in the soul of a furiously angry man in [the] presence of his enemy” can, Peirce held, be “perfectly well be expressed” in
the various logical graphs he pioneered. Interpreters work on a “special area of consciousness” which is similar to the “sheet”
used in all his calculi. Hence, as a complement to Champagne’s contribution, I propose to analyse the senses in which the
study of consciousness, or even qualia, could fall under the auspices of pragmatism.

The Status of Degenerate Signs in the Application of Peirce

Bennett Tyler
Department of Semiotics, Tartu University, Tartu, ESTONIA

T. L. Short attempts to distance Peirce’s sign theory from a great deal of current scholarship by claiming that semioticians
often lack a comprehensive enough understanding of his philosophy to perform persuasive analyses. Herman Parret adopts
a similar stance when he writes that semioticians’ use of Peirce “leads to the worst interpretations” (1994, p. xiii). It comes
out later that, for Short and Parret, the use of Peirce for object analysis, particularly analyses pertaining to art objects, is cat-
egorically incorrect. Although art objects can be targets of conscious awareness, they are presumably disqualified on account
of their failure to match the sort of pragmatic apprehension that Short prizes. In his contribution to the Cambridge Com-
panion to Peirce (2004), Short argues that artistic objects are essentially meaningless. This strangely positivistic take on
Peirce has it that, since the meaning of artistic objects can be grasped wholly in emotional interpretants, and since emotional
interpretants are never ultimate, art objects are meaningless. On Short’s view, only those parts of the sign process directly
involving arguments and producing ultimate interpretants are worthy of description. I believe that this provincial brand of
pragmatism downplays some of the most distinctive aspects of Peirce’s theory of signs, like the importance of primary ico-
nicity, abduction, and the genesis of signs. Hence, siding with Champagne, I argue that an effective Peircean taxonomy of
signs for object analysis depends on the ability to treat sub-tertiary signs independently of their eventual crystallization into
concrete habits of action. While degenerate signs like experiential qualities may not be fully-fledged signs in themselves,
this should not be used to separate semiotic inquiries deemed appropriate from those presumably conducted by “the wrong
crowd.”

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Must a Pragmatist Interested in Consciousness be Pragmatic 24 Hours a Day?

Champagne Marc
Diagrammatic Mind Project,Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

C. S. Peirce said, quite rightly, that if we want to make our ideas clear(er), then we should look downstream to their ac-
tual and potential effects. Yet, there is a tendency to overlook that this quintessential pragmatist recommendation is nested
in a conditional: if you want clarity, then you should do this and that. I see no reason why anyone should feel obliged, in
the strict deontological sense of a categorical imperative, to pursue intellectual clarity, come what may. Rather, that pursuit,
which finds its maximal expression in scientific inquiry, seems to be one among many. Of course, it is normal to think that, if
you are offered various options and you know which is best, then you should pick that best one. So, predictably, when Peirce
offers us three “grades of clearness” culminating in the pragmatic maxim, we naturally assume that the other two were there
mainly to rhetorically set the stage. However, the moment we do this, we walk away from the possibility of something not
defined by its causal or inferential role(s). Part of what has happened, I think, is that in their rush to be branded “naturalists,”
some pragmatists have lost sight of the fact that not everything is appropriately gauged by its current or anticipated practi-
cality. In Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs, I openly acknowledge that studying consciousness in its qualitative
“Firstness” will yield no tangible return on the investment. Yet, given that Peirce’s most primitive category admits of a pre-
scissive vindication, I argue that pragmatism is more plausible/palatable when it makes room for inefficiency, in the double
sense of a respite from progress and an escape from efficient causation. Hence, I think pragmatists interested in conscious-
ness needn’t—indeed shouldn’t—be pragmatic 24 hours a day.

Astronauts and Avatars: Exploring Consciousness

through the Art and Science of Embodiment
Chair:
Doyle Denise
Faculty of Arts, University of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, UNITED KINGDOM
Thursday, June 11, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

General Description
In 2005 Sian Ede wrote ‘a new aesthetic phenomenology is emerging via advances in digital technol-
ogy which might lead us to muse how far the paradoxically named ‘virtual’ brings us closer to lived experience’ (Ede, 2005,
p.111). How do artists and scientists approach the question of how the body relates to consciousness in the context of
new technologies? Neuroscientists Emily Cross and Luca Ticini suggest that ‘art, like everything else we do, is generated
from electrical impulses passed between the synapses of the brain, expressed through the body, and eventually appreciated
through the senses’ (Cross and Ticini, 2011, p.11), whilst Ede writes that ‘we so sensuously inhabit our bodies that it is hard
to see them as systems of knowledge, even in the purified arena of the laboratory or operating table’ (Ede, 2005, p.133). This
symposia’s aim is to examine the relationship between the body and consciousness and seeks out the conditions in which,
through the creative processes of new media arts practice, and through scientific exploration in the fields of neuroaesthetics
and neurophenomenology, this relationship can be further understood and articulated.
It is often in the investigations of artists that we can find reflections on the subjective relationship between the body
and consciousness. In the 1990s the new spaces of technology in virtual reality explored in the work of artist Char Davies,
and even in the outer space exploration of dancer and choreographer Kitsou Dubois, highlighted the question of what we
mean by the virtual, the weightless, or even the immaterial body. Curator Annick Bureaud commented how weightlessness
relates to cyberspace in that there are no privileged directions or hierarchies yet ‘weightlessness is inscribed in the limits of
the self and the human body’ (Bureaud, 2009, 4). Mikhail Ryklin reflecting on his experience of zero gravity writes, ‘even
a temporary stay in states of weightlessness and double gravity changes one’s relation to the body and its terrestrial pos-
sibilities (Ryklin in Triscott & La Frenais, 2005, p.15). Reflecting on her own experience of weightlessness Dubois wrote ‘it
was necessary [...] to concentrate on internal bodily space and the relation this holds with the surrounding space as well as
on the imaginary that emerges directly from this new body-space-time’ (Dubois in Kozel, 2007, p.110). Louise K. Wilson
notes however that what is ‘seldom mentioned is the actuality of being in a plane that is performing these diving maneovres’

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(2005). In 1997 Susan Kozel developed a performance experiment, Ghosts and Astronauts, drawing from previous research,
the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and from reflections on Dubois’s own records. In this ‘performers in [two] location[s]
were projected into the other for a physical exploration of intimacy, weightlessness and altered materiality’ (Kozel 2007,
104). Kozel commented that ‘it is uncanny to me how Dubois’s experiences in microgravity converge with my experiences
of telepresence in gravity’ (2007, 109). Susan Broadhurst devotes a whole chapter in her book, Digital Practices (2007), to
the topic of neuroaesthetics, commenting that ‘as scientific research progresses [it] bring[s] increased knowledge of how
visual imagery is constructed [...] that ultimately leads to a questioning of the very nature of our consciousness, identity
and being’ (2007, pp.47-48). Yet Cross and Ticini (2011) cite Anjan Chatterjee in his caution that future studies in this do-
main should make clear what neuroscientific data add to the study of aesthetics that behavioural experiments alone cannot
achieve (p.14).
Format of proposed symposium
Following an introduction to the topic, each speaker will present for 20 minutes, fol-
lowed by a 30 minutes panel discussion, addressing the following questions: (1) How do artists and scientists approach
the relationship between the body, space and consciousness? What paradigms should be considered for the following dec-
ades of the 21st century?
(2) How do artists and scientists approach the relationship between embodiment and technology?
How do art and science interpret the workings of consciousness in the conditions of the space of technology?
(3) What
is the value of art/science methods? What does art teach us that science cannot? What does science teach us that art can-
not?
(4) What future research directions should be considered for understanding consciousness in relation to embodiment,
gravity, and virtuality?

Gravity and its Sisters


Kozel Susan
School of Art and Culture, Malmo University, Malmo, SWEDEN

In 1997 Ghosts and Astronauts, a dance experiment using basic telematics, linked dancers in two theatres in London. The
piece was developed out of hours of improvisation around the theme of weightlessness. The studio where we improvised
was neither an anti-gravity chamber nor a sophisticated laboratory, but by using music with pronounced spaces between the
notes (a Morton Feldman composition) and movement instructions gleaned from Kitsou Dubois’s observations of move-
ment in zero-gravity we transformed our physical states prior even to introducing the technological components. The al-
tered states stayed with us for hours after re-entry into normal patterns of life. This talk revisits this performance through the
lens of somatic materialism, an articulation of somatic practices as a response to the philosophical discourse of speculative
materialism (Kozel, 2013). Somatic materialism opens the possibility for a phenomenological approach to affect, and ex-
pands the reflective capacity for exploration of liminal corporeal and perceptual states.
Neuroaesthetics relies on medical imaging. In contrast, artistic and phenomenological experiments in somatics rely on
powerful internal imagery coinciding, at times, with distinctive external spaces. Another artistic experiment with gravity was
the showing of video imagery of dancers moving slowly, weightlessly, in the Reactor Hall of the Royal Technical University
in Stockholm. The Reactor Hall is 20 metres underground, and in the mid 20th Century was a scientific laboratory for test-
ing nuclear reactors. The physical environment presses down on those in the hall, the weight of history, science and earth
exists in a sort of frisson (if no longer fission) with immanent corporeal spaces.
The title of this talk, Gravity and its Sisters is meant to refer to “Shame and its Sisters” the collection of Sylvan Tompkins
writing on affect edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwich and Adam Frank (1995). What are the sisters of gravity?
Dropping, falling, rising, floating, sinking, spiraling: affective states, states of consciousness, improvisational or medita-
tive practices, zones where knowledge and experience are constructed. In artistic experiments with gravity, corporeal states
are even more tightly entwined with states of consciousness.

Space, Design, and the Astronaut

Russomano Thais
MicroG-PUCRS, PUCRS, Porto Alegre, BRAZIL

Astronaut crew travelling inside a spacecraft, living on a Moon base or inhabiting a Mars colony, or completing daily work
tasks whilst wearing a spacesuit are all activities that need to be performed in as safe and comfortable a manner as possible.
These aspects, however, are dependent on how the living facilities, extra-terrestrial habitats and astronaut clothing for use
inside and outside a space vehicle are designed. This presentation aims to motivate the debate regarding creative ideas and

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plans in the area of Space & Design, since the environment of space differs greatly from that found on Earth. The partial
decrease or total absence of the gravitational force of Earth that is experienced by astronauts during a space mission must
inevitably have an impact on the way space vehicles, systems and devices are designed and used.
This paper intends to present the daily life of how astronauts eat, sleep, exercise and work during a space mission and
discuss the architectural and engineering requirements for the development, construction and validation of Moon bases and
Mars habitats. It will further consider space tourism, an emerging area that will become a reality in the near future and will
lead to the development over the coming decades of new technologies for the establishment of hotels in orbit around the
Earth and space gymnasiums for sports and leisure activities. The paper will be divided into two parts: it will firstly intro-
duce important aspects related to manned space flight and its relevance for space exploration; it will then discuss and pro-
pose better and more advanced ways to design space living environments, habitats, and space suits and clothing.

Aerial Stories (Revised): A return to a consideration of the flying laboratory

Wilson Louise
Fine Art, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, UNITED KINGDOM

On the Arts Catalyst (parabolic) MIR flight 001 in September 2001, I was temporarily categorized as ‘untrained naïve sub-
ject’ while taking part in a movement experiment, and, as such, was the counterpart to trained naïve subject, Morag Wight-
man (aerial artist). The scientist who assigned us our roles - Dr Anthony Bull (then bioengineering researcher at Imperial
College) - had devised a preliminary study of different movement control techniques in microgravity conditions. Of lasting
personal impact however was the erroneous first parabola where I accidentally lost physical bearings. Aside from this role
as test subject, I gathered material (at Star City, Russia) from some of the fellow flight participants - a few of whom were
musicians. Prior to, during and post- flight I conducted (and audio recorded) interviews. Largely anecdotal, these primarily
touched on the relationship between felt haptic sensation and autobiography.
My interest had been prompted by a fascination with the medical study of motion sickness – the body’s fault line (as I
saw it) that often asserts itself when experiencing different gravitational states and propelled motion. Any idea that the loss
of gravity creates something analogous to ‘floating’ (a word employed to promote commercial zero g flight) did not corre-
late with the sheer brute force we experienced. Additionally for some, the brain’s delicate chemistry had been modified by
chemical intervention (Scop-dex, a mixture of Scopolamine and Dexedrine) to both dull (anti-nausea medication) and to
heighten (stimulant to combat drowsiness) awareness. What was surprising subsequently was the affective response to dou-
ble gravity and to the shared experience of loss of gravity flashbacks.
This presentation would build on these ‘findings’ to address some parallels with the musicians’ analogies with the vis-
ceral effects of (low) frequencies (as produced by a bass sound system). These original interviews with the zero g partici-
pants – as well as recollections of my own responses - would be compared with more recent ones with the same people
– with a view to examining both the felt and remembered responses to such momentous gravitational states, and the idea of
gravitational frequency.

Intersubjectively shared (un)consciousness enacted on cinema screen

Tikka Pia
School of Film,Televisionand Scenography, Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND

This presentation discusses two ideas from the point of view of neurocinematics. On one hand, the idea of embodiment
and the situated physicality of the body on the cinema screen is considered. On the other, the antithesis of this idea is intro-
duced in terms of virtual realities that conflict with the experiential embodiment. These reflections will lean on empirical
explorations of cinematic narratives by a means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The idea of embodied
mind dates back to William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, among others. Gradually it has been ac-
cepted also within the field of neurosciences, together with the idea of enactive cognition introduced by Francisco Varela and
colleagues (1991) and that of embodied simulation by Vittorio Gallese (2005). While the first refers to the inseparable situ-
atedness of a subject within the surrounding world, the latter refers to the unconscious neural body-brain-world interaction
dynamics (Tikka 2008). My practical case studies will allow discussing how different viewers’ brains seem to respond to
the embodied presence of the human characters on the screen, as well as to the virtual realities conflicting with the familiar
experiential world. I will also discuss empirical findings that compare brain responses to the human characters on one hand
and human-like virtual agents on the other. In relation to this distinction, I will present my ongoing studies with an enac-

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tive avatar, as well as the use of live actress and her avatar side by side in a feature film. Unavoidably, I also need to touch
the widely studied issue of uncanny valley (originally coined by Mori 1970), that is, the experience of weirdness when con-
fronted with an virtual agent that is too close to human-likeness, but not quite enough (Cheetham et al. 2011). Finally, I will
present my approach to narrative co-presence, the intersubjectively shared experience of presence emerging in interaction of
the viewer and the enactive avatar on the screen.

Subjective time in context

Chair:
Arstila Valtteri
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, FINLAND
Thursday, June 11, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

Subjective time refers to our awareness of time and temporal properties. As an ever-present feature of our conscious states,
it structures all aspects of our experiences and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation. Although
subjective time often reflects objective time, time measurable by clock, the two are not necessarily the same—for example,
we may experience two simultaneous events as succeeding each other, say, when the lightning strike is perceived before the
thunder.
Much of the philosophical work on subjective time has focused on the nature of temporal experiences— experiences
that suggest the passing of time—and its implications for the temporal structure of consciousness and for the metaphysics of
time. On the one hand, there is the question of how to account for experiences as of temporally extended phenomena such
as change, motion and succession. What makes the question so intriguing is that these experiences appear to be difficult, if
not impossible to reconcile with the view that the contents of our experiences are confined to discrete instants of time. Thus
most theories of time consciousness subscribe to the doctrine of the specious present, according to which events appear to
us as temporally extended. The main disagreement then concerns how this doctrine should be understood in detail. On the
other hand, the same experiences and the (often agreed upon) continuous streamlike nature of consciousness suggest that
time itself flows—that there is a proper notion of (temporal) present and things change from current to past. The disagree-
ment here concerns whether time and temporal properties as experienced really have any implications for the metaphysical
debates about the nature of time, and if they have, then what those implications are. In short, major disagreements persist
but it can nevertheless be said that the competing philosophical positions and theories as regards these issues in subjective
time are mostly well defined and motivated.
Despite the fact that many prominent philosophers have considered these issues important (Husserl even considered
them as possibly the most important in phenomenology), the debates concerning them have had limited impact on other
philosophical topics and in the interdisciplinary field of consciousness studies. This is possibly for the reason that tradition-
ally the debate has been limited to the mentioned issues concerning the specious present and the metaphysics of temporal
experience and the wider relevance of subjective time has not been explicated. Moreover, unlike philosophers who have em-
phasized the temporal phenomenology, scientists have focused on more tractable side of the subjective time—namely the
performance in various temporal order or duration estimation experiments that usually involve making judgments about the
temporal properties of stimuli—and thus the philosophical investigations have had little influence on the scientific research
concerned with the subjective experience of time.
However, with several philosophers tackling the topic of subjective time recently, things are changing fast. Indeed, dur-
ing the past five years or so, the philosophers of subjective time have begun departing from the historically more prominent
lines of investigation and have begun to incorporate subjective time in new areas of discussion. The purpose of this sympo-
sium is to introduce these new approaches to the topic, which show the relevance of subjective time in broader context and
for the science of consciousness more generally. This will be done in the following four talks.

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Temporal limits of folk psychology

Mölder Bruno
University of Tartu, Tartu, ESTONIA

It has been claimed that certain familiar psychological categories and distinctions do not apply at very short time scales. In
particular, Daniel Dennett has argued that at microscopic time scale, we cannot apply the distinction between the revising of
memories and the revising of perceptions, which is readily applicable on longer time scales. The reason for this is that at the
small time scale there is no precise divide between processes that are conscious and not-yet-conscious. When we focus on
closer details, the point of view of the
subject becomes “temporally smeared” as he puts it. Dennett’s claim is squarely located in his Multiple Drafts model of
consciousness, but perhaps the idea of the temporal limits in the applicability of our everyday psychological categories can
also be upheld independently from this particular model. The framework that collects our everyday psychological notions
is usually called folk psychology. In the talk, I will thus explore the following question: is there a limited time scale in which
folk psychology is applicable and if that is the case, then what does this tell us about the nature of folk psychology and men-
tal phenomena? I will also comment on a related issue of what kind of vocabulary can we use to make sense of the processes
happening at short time scales, when the folk psychological terms do not apply there.

Temporal experience and the sense of reality

Kiverstein Julian
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS

In a number of recent papers Matthew Ratcliffe has shown how integral to normal conscious experience is a sense of reality
– a sense that an object is “there”, “present”, a “part of the same world as a perceiver”. Ratcliffe shows how an alteration in the
sense of reality forms the basis for what he calls a “delusional atmosphere” following Karl Jaspers, a change in thought and
experience which Ratcliffe shows is a common feature in both monothematic and polythematic delusions. In Capgras syn-
drome for instance patients describe everything as looking “strange, and “painted and unnatural” (Ellis & Young 1990). My
aim in this short talk will be twofold. First I will argue the sense of reality depends upon temporal experience. Particularly
important is the ability of a subject to anticipate possible ways in which his experience might unfold in the future. A simple
example is the experience of a three-dimensional object as having hidden sides – a part of our experience is an anticipa-
tion of what the object will reveal to us were we to explore it further. This anticipatory dimension of experience that lends
experience a future-directedness. It doesn’t just relate to spatial features like the occluded and hidden aspects of objects. It
also relates to practical possibilities (so-called “affordances”) that we experience objects as offering. We anticipate modes of
engagement and interaction with the environment. A second aim of my talk will be to evaluate recent empirical work by Anil
Seth and colleagues on conscious presence in which they employ the framework of hierarchical predictive coding to explain
the experience of conscious presence that people report in virtual reality. Seth doesn’t discuss the temporal dimension of
conscious presence, he focuses instead on the experience of spatial presence. However if the arguments of this paper are cor-
rect and spatial and temporal presence cannot be separated. The question I will finish up with in this talk concerns predic-
tion- error minimization and its role in underwriting a sense of reality.

Limits of temporal phenomenology

Klincewicz Michal
Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Berlin, GERMANY

Is subjective time something over and above the subjective experience of other, non-temporal features, such as colors and
sounds? In this talk I argue that, on the one hand, subjective time depends on experience of colors, sounds, and so on, but
it also depends on something more than just their succession. On this view, there is no distinct ‘time sense’ or organ of
time, but there are distinct and modality-specific temporal features that are the basis of subjective time. What motivates this
view is that some (but not all) of the celebrated phenomenological features of subjective time, such as seamless continu-
ity, temporal extension (interval durations), punctuality (the specious present moment), and directionality (arrow of time)
can be straightforwardly accounted for by the perception of non-temporal features. What is needed for such an account is a
function (or relation) that takes as its variable an ordered pair of mental qualities from the same family, e.g., two colors, two

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sounds. In that sense, we perceive time because we perceive non-temporal features, such as colors or sounds. But the rela-
tion that makes our subjective experience of these temporal features possible is something over and above the mere succes-
sion of these colors and sounds. So at least in that sense subjective time is constructed by a set of distinct modality-specific
processes that can be studied by standard empirical methods. Nonetheless, the phenomenology of dynamic passage of time
that is relevant to the debate about the metaphysics of time remains problematic for the view presented here. This is because
the experience of passage is, at least on the face of it, independent of any non-temporal features, such as colors or sounds,
and therefore modality-neutral. After outlining this problem, I offer some ways in which it could be addressed in the future.

An Argument Against Illusions of Duration

Power Sean
University College Cork, Cork, IRELAND

There are a number of possible illusions related to time consciousness--illusions of simultaneity, temporal order and dura-
tion. Illusions of duration seem to be the most common and easily identified. Most people have made judgements from their
experience about how long something has taken which fa ils to correspond to its length according to a clock. This can range
from how many years ago certain past events occurred, to the length of a just-heard sound, to durations in waiting rooms, to
Eagleman’s milliseconds drop (which subjects report as taking seconds).
It is argued here that, although we do indeed commonly make mistaken judgements about duration, we ought not to
conceive of these judgements as illusions of duration. The reason we ought not to do so comes from two claims defended
in this paper: First, it is not sufficient for an illusion that conscious experience merely contribute to mistaken judgements.
To be an illusion, the experience itself must be mistaken. Judgements from experience can be mistaken because of one’s
background beliefs. If those are mistaken, then one’s judgement can be mistaken--whatever the accuracy/inaccuracy of the
experience itself, and so without classifying the
experience as an illusion. Second, there is rarely (if ever) reason to explain mistaken judgements of duration from ex-
periences of duration in terms of mistaken experiences. A better explanation is that one mistakenly interprets experienced
duration in terms of an inapplicable standard--that of standard time. It is argued here that, whatever it is that we might be
experiencing in experiencing duration, there is little reason to think that it should be described and evaluated in terms of
standard time. Combined together, these claims lead to the position that there is rarely (if ever) reason to explain mistaken
judgements of duration as being due to illusions of duration.

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Video Game Play and the Nightmare Protection

Hypothesis
Gackenbach Jayne
Psychology, MacEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA

Flockhart Carson
MacEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
Boyes Arielle
MacEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
Sinyard Anne
MacEwan University, Edmonton, Alberta, CANADA
Valli Katja
University of Turku, Turku, FINLAND
Thursday, June 11, 2:30pm – 4:35pm

Digitally enhanced living permeates society and impacts human consciousness. Understanding such impacts and their rami-
fications is vitally important. One particular area that merits investigation is dreaming. On a theoretical level it has often been
pointed out that dreams are a constructed reality. Blackmore (2004) argues that waking reality is also constructed. While
waking constructed reality influences our lives the most, there are other constructed realities, which occur such as during
drug use, illness, hypnosis or meditation, that also impact our lives. However, never before has such a large part of the popu-
lation been affected so widely by a constructed alternative reality. Technology is used to construct alternative realities and
these constructions are having a wide impact. Digital impact studies have mostly focused on waking measures, but dreaming
impacts offer a more subtle, less halo effect, account of the impact of digital realities. This is based on Schredl and Hoffman’s
(2003) continuity hypothesis which holds that dreaming mentation is a continuation of waking thoughts and experiences,
but also the negative emotional regulation function of dreaming (Levin & Nielsen, 2007). Thus, for instance, our research
efforts have focused upon video game play and dreams and have found some impacts on dreams with potential clinical rel-
evance. We have found a nightmare protection effect (Gackenbach, Ellerman, & Hall, 2011) potentially through increased
dream control and lucidity (Gackenbach & Kuruvilla, 2013) among high end video game players. There is some evidence
that at least males who are long time frequent players of combat centric video games may transfer those well learned skills
into dreams where they are being attached as chase is the most often type of theme in nightmares. In the Gackenbach et al
(2011) study with soldiers it was found that those who played frequently had less threat and were more self-empowered in
their dreams of the military, than those who gamed but less frequently. This was after the major predictors of nightmares were
controlled for, emotional reactivity and past traumas. A cautionary note is that this study was done on soldiers prescreened
for not currently suffering PTSD. A follow-up study on college students replicated this finding for male students.
In this symposium past work on the nightmare protection thesis will be briefly reviewed by the chair. This introduction
will be followed by three papers detailing current research into this hypothesis and one paper examining how future VR im-
mersive game interfaces might impact subsequent night-time dreams. Finally, the discussant, Katja Valli of the University of
Turku, will comment upon this body of work.
The first paper will report upon an experimental study with male students who rarely or often play video games. Entitled
Video Game Nightmare Protection Thesis: An Experimental Inquiry, Carson Flockhart will describe a study where males who
play some video games and recall dreams once a week or more were selected for participation. Upon entering the labora-
tory they were asked to fill out a few surveys regarding media use history, emotional reactivity and history of trauma prior
to being exposed to the media tasks. Participants were then assigned to one of three conditions; playing one of two styles
of video games, combative or non-combative, or to search for scholarly articles online. The stimulus movie, which is shown
to all participants in a counterbalanced order, was a clip from Misery. It was chosen from the standardized list developed by
Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez and Philippot (2010), who determined that it evoked the most fear. Following the movie clip, and
each computer activity, participants
filled out questionnaires tailored to each activity. After the laboratory portion of the study was completed, participants
were asked to recall a dream on a subsequent night. These dreams were analyzed in terms of the degree of threat and whether
the scary movie was incorporated, while controlling for emotional reactivity and previous history of trauma. Initial analysis

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showed the expected nightmare protection effect for the high end gamers across type of game relative to a computer search
task. However, nightmare protection did not occur for low end male gamers. Due to the low number of males who rarely
play video games among university students, more data is being collected to verify these initial analyses.
As noted Gackenbach, Darlington, Ferguson, and Boyes (2013) reported on a replication of the military study on stu-
dents where they replicated the nightmare protection finding with the male student gamers but found the opposite reaction
among high end female gamers. That is, women seemed to suffer more from nightmares if they played a lot of video games.
The second study in this symposium investigates this reversal of the nightmare protection thesis in women. Arielle Boyes
will present her work An Inquiry into the Lack of the Nightmare Protection Associated with Video Game Play. Several possible
reasons for the inverse relationship of gaming to nightmare protection among female gamers were examined. They included
sex differences in type of game played, differences in coping mechanisms both awake and in dreams, and stereotype threat.
Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses and completed an online survey for course credit. This
included five questionnaires: demographics, media use history, Brief Cope Scale, Stereotype Threat, and a dream question-
naire. A recent nightmare was also gathered. The dreams were coded by independent raters using the Hall and Van de Castle
and Threat Simulation coding systems. Questions about the threat and how the dreamer coped with it in the dream follow
the nightmare recall query.
The nightmare protection thesis was replicated for males, but again the inverse was found for females. Results indicate
that males and females are playing different types of video games. Males leaning towards combat centric games such as: Call
of Duty and League of Legends. Females tending towards casual game play such as the Mario games. Thus there is some sup-
port for the notion that game genre preference may affect the female lack of nightmare protection. As for coping style there
were sex by gamer interactions for waking coping. When asked about their response to the threat in their nightmares, across
gaming history women were more likely to flee, tend or befriend than men. However, fighting was more common among
high end gaming men then high end gaming women. Stereotype threat did not evidence any gamer by sex results.
The third study in this symposium considers cultural differences in the effects of gaming on dreams, and especially on
nightmares or threat in dreams. Jayne Gackenbach will report on a recently completed study with three Chinese (one each
in Wuhan, Taiwan and Hong Kong) and one Canadian universities. A total of about 850 respondents filled out surveys in
Chinese or English examining their typical dreams, their self-construal as independent or interdependent, and their media
use history and preferences. A recent dream was also collected. First it should be noted that surprisingly there was no differ-
ence between the four university samples in independent self-construal, but there was a difference in interdependent self-
construal. Students in Wuhan had the highest interdependent scores followed by Taiwan and then Hong Kong and the low-
est such scores were evidenced in Canada.
Data on nightmares and threat in dreams will also be reported upon in this symposium and was coauthored by Sarkis
Hakopdjanian and Alison Ditner. As is typical in the nightmare literature across all samples women reported more night-
mares than men. When the three Chinese universities were collapsed there were more nightmares reported by the Chinese
than the Canadians. However, when the Chinese university data was treated individually then an interaction between sex,
gamer group and country emerged in self-reported nightmare frequency. The self-reported frequency of nightmares was
most diverse among the high end gamers for both males and females. Specifically, among men the Taiwanese high end gam-
ers reported the most nightmares with the Canadians reporting the least. While among women the Hong Kong high end
gamers reported the most nightmares with the female gamers from Wuhan reporting the least. In order to better understand
these complex self-reports about nightmare frequency we are currently coding their recent dreams for threat. These results
will be presented in this symposium.
The last study in this symposium is a look to the future of gaming with a new interface on the horizon which offers fully
immersive virtual reality (VR). Much attention has been given to the Oculus Rift head gear as the interface that will actually
bring full VR into the gaming and eventually to the Internet experience. Ann Sinyard will present this research, Emerging Im-
plications of Virtual Reality Game Play on Dreams. Using the second developers’ kit we are currently finishing a study examin-
ing the use of the Rift on waking and dreamt presence. Women who vary in gaming history but are very high dream recallers
and do not suffer from motion sickness nor take any drugs that have motion sickness as a side effect have been pre- screened
from a Canadian psychology research pool. They reported to the lab and after filling out questionnaire about their media use
history and preferences as well as reporting a recent dream and self-evaluating that dream as to its felt sense of presence, are
shown a couple of game like environments either on a computer monitor and with no special viewing apparatus or through
the Rift. They explore the environments using a controller interface. Following this exposure they report on their felt sense
of presence to the gaming simulations and then in the next few days report on a follow-up dream. The follow-up dream is
also self-reported by the respondents as to its felt sense of presence. This self-report of presence in dreams following a labo-
ratory game playing session is a methodology that has been used before in our laboratory with interesting results (Gacken-
bach & Rosie, 2011). Our expectation is of course that the Rift experients will report Rift dreams with more presence than
those who do not wear the Rift.

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References: Blackmore, S. (Ed.). (2004). Consciousness: An introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gackenbach, J.I., Darlington, M., Ferguson, M.L., & Boyes, A. (2013). Video game play as nightmare protec-
tion: A replication and extension. Dreaming. 23(2), 97-111. Gackenbach, J.I., Ellerman, E. & Hall, C. (2011).
Video Game Play as Nightmare Protection: A Preliminary Inquiry in Military Gamers. Dreaming. 21(4), 221-
245.
Gackenbach, J.I. & Kuruvilla, B. (2013). Cognitive Structure Associated with the Lucid Features of Gam-
ers Dreams, Dreaming. 23(4), 256-265.
Gackenbach, J.I. & Rosie, M. (2011). Presence in video game play
and nighttime dreams: an empirical inquiry. International Journal of Dream Research, 4(2), 98-109.
Levin, R.,
& Nielsen, T. A. (2007). Disturbed dreaming, posttraumatic stress disorder, and affect distress: A review and
neurocognitive model. Psychological Bulletin, 133(3), 482-528. Schaefer, A., Nils, F., Sanchez, X., Philippot, P.
(2010). Assessing the effectiveness of a large database of emotion-eliciting films: A new tool for emotion re-
searchers. Cognition and Emotion, 24(7), 1153-1172.
Schredl, M., & Hofmann, F. (2003). Continuity between
waking activities and dream activities. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 298-308.

Consciousness in the Vegetative State:

Conceptual, Empirical and Ethical Perspectives
Saturday, June 13, 9:00am -– 11:05am

The vegetative state is a condition in which patients are non-responsive to external stimuli, and exhibit no outward manifes-
tations of consciousness. However, over the last decade or so a significant body of evidence has emerged which suggests that
a small but significant minority of patients in this condition might retain some form of conscious experience. This sympo-
sium will examine the question of consciousness in the vegetative state from a number of perspectives.
The four participants in the symposium are Professor Tim Bayne (University of Manchester), Raechelle Gibson (Uni-
versity of Western Ontario), Dr. Lisa Mirrachi (New York University), and Professor Charles Weijer (University of Western
Ontario).
Bayne will open the symposium by presenting an overview of the various ways in which the vegetative state (VS) func-
tion as both a challenge and an opportunity for consciousness research. He will locate the VS within the current taxonomy
of disorders of consciousness, and will discuss ways in which current research is ‘problematizing’ this taxonomy. Drawing
on his previous work in this area, Bayne will examine a number of challenges facing any attempt to ascribe consciousness to
non-responsive patients. This talk will conclude by outlining a number of ways in which the science of consciousness might
be informed by neuroimaging studies of VS patients, focusing in particular on ways in which this research might constrain
accounts of the relationship between the levels of consciousness and the contents of consciousness.
The second talk will be given by Raechelle Gibson, a Vanier Scholar and doctoral candidate at the Mind and Brain In-
stitute, University of Western Ontario. Gibson will present the latest research from Dr. Adrian Owen’s group on the use of
neuroimaging techniques to identify consciousness in non-responsive patients with disorders of consciousness. Imaging has
revealed that as many as 19% of patients in this group can follow commands and communicate in some cases. These find-
ings hold across imaging techniques, as recently demonstrated by members of our research group (Gibson et al., 2014).
Moreover, we have also used neuroimaging to provide insight into how patients in this special population perceive the world
around them (Naci et al., 2014).
The third talk will be presented by Dr. Lisa Mirrachi, Bersoff Fellow and faculty member in the philosophy department
at New York University. Mirrachi will provide a philosophical analysis of the experimental results discussed by Dr. Naci.
Mirrachi will distinguish various ways in which evidence of executive functioning might be used as evidence of conscious-
ness, and will argue that a strong case can be made for linking certain kinds of executive functioning with the presence of
phenomenal consciousness. Mirrachi will also consider ways in which research into disorders of consciousness might in-
form accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness.
The final talk will be given by Prof. Charles Weijer, Canada Research Chair in Bioethics at the Rotman Institute of Phi-
losophy, University of Western Ontario. Weijer will examine the ethical dimensions of research into consciousness in vegeta-
tive state patients. Neuroimaging studies of non-responsive studies are in their infancy, and to date there has been almost no
systemic consideration of the ethical issues raised by such research. Weijer identifies six ethical issues raised by fMRI studies
involving this patient population: (1) Is the procedure therapeutic or nontherapeutic? (2) Have the risks of research partici-

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pation been minimized (3) Are the risks of nontherapeutic procedures no more than a minor increase above minimal risk?
(4) Have study participants been selected equitably? (5) Will valid surrogate consent for study participation be obtained?
(6) Are adequate plans in place to share research results with the responsible physician or the family?

References: Naci, L. et al. 2014. A common neural code for similar conscious experiences in different individu-
als, PNAS. Owen, A. et al. Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, Volume 313, p. 1402.

Probing Consciousness in the Vegetative State: Challenges and Opportunities

Bayne Timothy
Philosophy, University of Manchester, Manchester, UNITED KINGDOM

This talk introduces the symposium and provides some context for the three talks that follow. I begin by briefly outlining the
main diagnostic categories that are used to taxonomize global, non-transient disorders of consciousness, and I distinguish
these disorders from local disorders of consciousness on the one hand and transient disorders of consciousness on the other
hand. I then identify a number of challenges to this taxonomy that emerge from the results of recent neuroimaging investiga-
tions of non- responsive patients. The second part of the talk examines a number of ways in which probing consciousness
in VS patients represents both a challenge and an opportunity for consciousness studies. It functions as a challenge, for our
central (and some claim only) ways of ascribing consciousness to individuals involves behavioural responsiveness, and it
is of course precisely the capacity for such responsiveness that is lost in these patients. A number of methods of attempt-
ing to meet this challenge are examined, and these methods are critically discussed from both empirical and philosophical
perspectives. The talk concludes with a discussion of how the science of consciousness might be informed by neuroimaging
studies of VS patients. Two questions are singled out for particularly close attention here: Firstly, how are the contents of
consciousness are related to the levels of consciousness? Secondly, what is the functional role of consciousness?

Consciousness in Behaviourally non-Responsive Patients: Insights from

Neuroimaging
Gibson Raechelle
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Psychology, CANADA

In the absence of speech or action, it is challenging to identify the level of human consciousness from brain activity. It is
particularly difficult using traditional behavioural assessments to determine the level of consciousness, if any, in patients
rendered behaviourally non-responsive following severe head injury. Recently, researchers have applied neuroimaging tech-
niques to use brain function as a proxy for overt responses in a small proportion of these patients who retain awareness.
Using this approach, it is estimated that approximately 19% of patients in this group can follow commands and communi-
cate in some cases. These findings hold across imaging techniques, as recently demonstrated by members of our research
group (Gibson et al., 2014). Moreover, we have also used neuroimaging to provide insight into how patients in this special
population perceive the world around them (Naci et al., 2014). We have identified a neural index based on executive func-
tion can reliably predict conscious experience in response to real-world events unfolding over time. The findings suggest
that there is a common neural code that underpins similar conscious experiences. Importantly, this approach can determine
not only whether any given patient is conscious, but it can also infer what the contents of that conscious experience might
actually be. Together, these findings reveal important practical and ethical implications for the patient’s standard of care and
quality of life.

Executive functioning and the neural basis of consciousness Lisa Miracchi

Miracchi Lisa
New York University, New York, USA

Recent studies have indicated that some vegetative state (VS) patients can exhibit executive functioning that is substan-
tially similar to normal patients’ executive functioning in similar circumstances (e.g. Naci et al. 2014). Such evidence is often

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taken to be support for the view that VS patients, while behaviorally nonresponsive, are nonetheless phenomenally con-
scious. But what exactly is the evidential relationship supposed to be? Executive functioning and phenomenal consciousness
are, on the face of it, at least conceptually distinct. The appropriateness of this inference is further challenged by the increas-
ing evidence for unconscious executive functioning.
I will first argue that in order to make progress on this question it is important that we distinguish between executive
functioning that is characterized in terms that involve or presuppose consciousness (C-EF) and executive functioning that
is merely characterized in information-theoretic, computational, or functional terms (F-EF). While F-EF is conceptually
independent of phenomenal consciousness, C-EF is not. As such, while evidence for C-EF does indeed provide evidence
for consciousness, the evidential relationship between F-EF and consciousness is much more questionable. I will then argue
that the studies recently appealed to in support of phenomenal consciousness in VS patients provide direct evidence of
C-EF, not evidence of C-EF via evidence of F-EF. This is because the evidence of executive functioning in VS patients is
strong correlation in brain activity with normal patients who are engaging in executive functioning that is characterized in
terms that involve or presuppose consciousness (C-EF). These studies thus give us reason to believe that VS patients are
phenomenally conscious.

fMRI research in the Context of Intensive Care: Ethical Considerations

Weijer Charles
University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, CANADA

Acquired brain injury is a leading cause of disability and death. After a severe brain injury, patients are treated in an intensive
care unit and may be comatose for days. Prognosis is assessed using clinical examination, structural neuroimaging, biomark-
ers and electrophysiological testing. Although these tests are useful, prognostication is imprecise in the acutely comatose
state. As the majority of deaths following severe brain injury are the result of withdrawal of life support, accurate information
is essential for families and healthcare providers. Recent research has used functional MRI to assess intact neural networks
in comatose patients. Future fMRI studies may provide evidence of intact neural networks and cognitive function which
may, in turn, predict reversible impairments in consciousness. In this paper, we provide the first analysis of ethical issues in
fMRI research involving acutely comatose patients in the intensive care unit. We argue that six ethical issues ought to be ad-
dressed in any prospective fMRI study in this setting: (1) Is fMRI a therapeutic or nontherapeutic procedure in the study
context? (2) Have the risks of research participation, including the risks of intrahospital transport, been minimized consist-
ent with sound scientific design? (3) Are the risks of nontherapeutic procedures no more than a minor increase above mini-
mal risk? (4) Have study participants been selected equitably? (5) Will valid surrogate consent for study participation be
obtained? (6) Are adequate plans in place to share summary and individual research results with the responsible physician
or the family? While fMRI research holds considerable promise as a predictor of recovery of consciousness, difficult ethical
issues must be addressed in order for this potential to be realized.

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Dreams and nightmares in consciousness studies

Chair:
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
Saturday, June 13, 9:00am –11:05am

Dreams offer numerous although mostly unexplored possibilities in consciousness studies. The content and purpose of
dreams as well as the neural correlates of dream experiences are poorly understood, even though dreaming is the most often
naturally occurring altered state of consciousness.
In the Consciousness Research Group, hosted by the Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Turku, a
major line of research focuses on the dreaming brain, and the group has made both theoretical contributions to the field as
well as produced multiple influential empirical papers on dreaming. These publications have focused on the biological func-
tion of dreaming, on the development of new paradigms and methods to study the content of dreams, on the neural corre-
lates of dreaming, and on the form and content of dreams in various sleep stages across the night. The aim of this symposium
is to offer the audience a state of the art overview of the current dream research carried out in the Consciousness Research
Group, ranging from theoretical to empirical studies, and utilizing methods from EEG-based sleep laboratory recordings to
home dream diary studies, and to population based surveys.
First, we discuss the recently outlined Social Simulation Theory of dreaming, and contrast its predictions against two
currently widely accepted dream theories, the Continuity Hypothesis and the Threat Simulation Theory. We review the pre-
viously available empirical evidence for and against the predictions of the SST, and outline suggestions for future research.
Second, we present the results of the first empirical study conducted to directly test the predictions of the Social Simulation
Theory. Here, we aim to demonstrate whether or not social simulation function is a feasible explanation for the form and
content of dreams. Third, we turn to exploring the EEG correlates of emotions in REM sleep dreams, with the goal to relate
specific neurophysiological activity to dream phenomenology. In the last presentation, the prevalence of and risk factors for
frequent nightmares are discussed. We show that nightmares may represent a general symptom which signifies lowered well-
being.

The Social Simulation Theory of dreaming

Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
Tuominen Jarno
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
Antti Revonsuo
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN

The idea that dreaming is a simulation of the waking world is becoming a widely shared and accepted view among dream re-
searchers. This conception of dreaming has consequently led several researchers to propose various, yet closely related ideas
about the role of social interactions in dreams. Social content is known to be a universal and abundant feature of human
dreams, and can be characterized in manifold ways: as simulations of human social reality, of social skills, bonds, interac-

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tions, and networks as well as abilities of mindreading and social cognition. Recently, Revonsuo, Tuominen and Valli (in
press) have taken the first steps towards outlining an empirically testable Social Simulation Theory (SST) of dreaming. They
argue that the SST should be tested by directly contrasting its unique predictions with the major competing theories of
the nature and function of dreaming, such as the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) and the Threat Simulation Theory (TST).
These three major theories of dreaming make differing predictions about the quality and the quantity of social simulations
in dreams. By contrasting the hypotheses of these theories it will be possible to find out whether dreaming is an unselective
and probably non-functional simulation of the waking world (CH), a simulation primarily specialized in the simulation of
dangerous and threatening events that present important challenges for our survival and prosperity (TST), or a simulation
primarily specialized in training those social skills and bonds most important for us humans as a social species (SST). In
this presentation, the Social Simulation Theory will be explicated, and its predictions contrasted against those of the CH
and the TST. The state of the currently available empirical evidence for and against the predictions of the SST will be briefly
reviewed, and suggestions for future research will be outlined.

Social perception and interactions in dreams – Any support for the social
simulation theory?
Tuominen Jarno
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
Revonsuo Antti
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND

Although several researchers have proposed various, closely related ideas about the social aspects of our dreams, and how
they could simulate our social skills, bonds, interactions, and networks, only recently Revonsuo, Tuominen and Valli (in
press) have taken the first steps towards outlining an empirically testable Social Simulation Theory (SST). The aims of
the current study were to test some of the predictions of the newly formulated theory, and to pilot a new content analy-
sis method, the Social Simulation in Dreams Scale (SSDS), devised to yield detailed information about social perceptions
and interactions in dreams. Further, we aimed to replicate McNamara et al’s (2005) results regarding the differences in the
amount and nature of social interactions in REM and NREM dreams. Their results suggest that dreams during REM and
NREM sleep are specialized in simulating different types of social interactions. First, based on the SST, we hypothesized
that there should be more positive, bond strengthening social interaction with close than with unfamiliar persons in dreams.
Second, we predicted, based on McNamara’s findings, that there is a difference in the quality of social interactions in NREM
dream reports compared to REM dream reports. We content analyzed 115 REM and 115 NREM dreams from 15 partici-
pants (F=8, M=7) with SSDS, and contrasted the number of social perceptions and interactions, as well as the quality of
social interactions in the report types. The results will be reported in the presentation, and their implications for the Social
Simulation Theory discussed.

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Neurophysiological Correlates of Emotions in REM Sleep Dreams

Sikka Pilleriin
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
Noreika Valdas
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
Medical Research Council, Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UNITED KINDOM
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN
Revonsuo Antti
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, SWEDEN

Although considerable progress has been made in understanding the neurophysiology of REM sleep, relating this activity
to dream phenomenology has remained a challenge. As such, little is known about the neural correlates of dream emotions.
Understanding the neural basis of specific dream features, such as emotions, is important as it may provide insights into the
functions of dreams and sleep as well as brain functions during sleep in general. In the present study, we investigated the
relationship between EEG activity in different frequency bands (delta, theta, alpha, beta, gamma) and emotional experi-
ences in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep dreams. Sleep EEG recordings were obtained from 17 subjects who spent two
non-consecutive nights in the sleep laboratory. The subjects were awakened 5 min after the onset of every REM stage, after
which they gave an oral dream report and rated their dream emotions using the modified Differential Emotions Scale (self-
ratings). In the transcribed dream reports external judges rated the participants’ dream emotions using the same scale (ex-
ternal ratings). Preliminary results demonstrate that (1) negative emotions in REM sleep dreams are positively correlated
with average gamma power, the correlation being the strongest across the frontal and left hemispheric regions; (2) there is
no correlation between positive emotions in dreams and activity in any of the frequency bands; (3) the results are the same
independent of whether dream emotions were rated by the subjects themselves (self-ratings) or by external raters (external
ratings).The results are discussed in the light of the possible role of high frequency gamma band activity in emotional pro-
cessing and (dream) consciousness.

Prevalence and risk factors of frequent nightmares among adults

Sandman Nils
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Public Health Genomics Unit and Institute for Molecular Medicine FIMM, Helsinki,
FINLAND
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, University of Skövde, Skövde, SWEDEN
Kronholm Erkki
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Department of Chronic Disease Prevention, FINLAND

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Revonsuo Antti
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku Brain and Mind Center, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University
of Turku, FINLAND
School of Bioscience, University of Skövde, Skövde, SWEDEN
Laatikainen Tiina
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Department of Chronic Disease Prevention, FINLAND
University of Eastern Finland, Institute for Public Health and Clinical Nutrition, FINLAND
Paunio Tiina
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Public Health Genomics Unit and Institute for Molecular Medicine FIMM, Helsinki,
FINLAND
Helsinki University Hospital, Department of Psychiatry, Helsinki, FINLAND

Nightmares are intense dreams with negative emotional content. Occasional nightmares have lifetime prevalence approach-
ing 100% and are usually benign, but frequent nightmares can be a clinical problem. Frequent nightmares often co-occur with
sleep and mental health problems and increase risk for suicide. In the presentation, the results from three studies investigating
the prevalence of and risk factors for frequent nightmares as well as the association to seasonality are discussed. The studies
utilize data from the Finnish National FINRISK study. FINRISK is series of health surveys collected every 5 years since 1972.
The surveys consist of random cross sectional population samples of Finnish adults aged 25-74 who fill in a comprehensive
health questionnaire. Nightmares were assessed with self-estimated frequency during the last month. Nine surveys from FIN-
RISK from years 1972 to 2012 were used in the studies with N of the individual studies varying between 6258 and 69 813.
Prevalence of frequent nightmares among Finnish adults is 3-5% and the figures have remained relative stable over the years,
whereas a historical trend from 1972 to 2007 shows that occasional nightmares have become more common in Finland. Veter-
ans of the Second World War have increased nightmare prevalence compared to general population. Strongest risk factors for
experiencing frequent nightmares include insomnia and depression, and other major risk factors are female gender, heavy use
of alcohol, stress and low life satisfaction. Nightmares are also associated with seasonal variation in mood which is the main
symptom of seasonal affective disorder. In sum, among adults frequent nightmares are experienced by small but not insignifi-
cant part of the population. Those with frequent nightmares often also suffer from other sleep problems, symptoms of depres-
sion and low life satisfaction in general. As such, nightmares may represent a general symptom signifying lowered well-being.

Early Modern Roots of the Concept of

Consciousness
Saturday, June 13, 9:00am – 11:05am

There is a conspicuous disparity between our contemporary and early modern philosophers with regard to questions per-
taining to consciousness. First, the early moderns show much less interest in accounting for what makes consciousness come
about. Second, they provide us with few and often relatively broad characterizations of consciousness. The latter point is
striking in that consciousness is nonetheless in an important place for a number of early modern authors. Several early mod-
ern philosophers agree that insofar as something is to be counted as a mental phenomenon, it must be perceived by the
mind: the mind has to be conscious of it. Arguably, it is largely because of such commitment that authors such as Descartes
and Locke are regularly portrayed, in good and bad, as important precursors both for our contemporary concepts of con-
sciousness and problems associated with them. When the early moderns’ commitment to a seemingly central role for con-
sciousness is taken together with the lack of seeming specificity in describing what they take consciousness to be, it appears
a tempting and worthwhile task to try and analyse their conceptions of consciousness. The proposed symposium brings
together historians of philosophy well versed in contemporary discussions with the aim to provide a historically trustworthy
treatment of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that will be accessible and philosophically informative to the contempo-
rary philosopher of consciousness.

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Lessons from Descartes’ Sensory Dualism

Sinokki Jani
University of Turku, Turku, FINLAND

René Descartes is considered a paradigmatic mind-body dualist, for whom mind is an immaterial intellect and body con-
sists of solely mechanical properties. Yet his view about sensory perception (and the phenomenology related to it) seems
to stand in a surprising opposition to its modern dualist counterparts: Descartes holds that sensations, like seeing colors or
feeling heat, are in fact not immaterial, but true halfway-entities which consist in the intellect’s perception of the physical
brain events of the body.
The relevant brain-events consist of motion which is perceived by the intellect. The perceptual act is pure, or un-qual-
itative: only “content” it has is the motion which is the proper object of the act. Seeming qualitative aspects of experience
consist, for Descartes, merely in the limitedness of the intellectual powers of the mind perceiving the motion as not-motion,
to which confusion also the constitution of the nervous system contributes (resulting in what might be called lossy com-
pression).
For Descartes, there is thus no need to evoke immaterial qualitative entities—qualia—in order to explain sensation, for
his scheme doesn’t require them (nor do they fit in it). Sensation, for Descartes, is a mental act plus physical motion per-
ceived confusedly.
Modern dualists often hold that sensory experience involves an irreducible element the existence and emergence of
which cannot be accounted for by modern scientific anti-dualism. It is this kind of postulation of a non-physical nature to
these sensations that makes for the dualism.
Given Descartes’ view, it is easy to see that his view stands in intriguing contrast to his modern dualist fellows: the prime
case for dualism of modern discussion—sensation—is explicable in Descartes’ dualism in rather anti-dualistic terms. Un-
derstanding Descartes’ dualism proves highly beneficial for understanding why modern—qualia postulating—dualism is
problematic.

Locke on the Primacy of Self-Consciousness

Lähteenmäki Vili
Department of Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

Locke characterizes consciousness and reflection in strikingly similar ways, apt to suggest at least their partial synonymity:
“Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a Man’s own mind” (E: 2.1.19, 115) whereas reflection “is the Perception
of the Operations of our own Minds within us” (E: 2.1.4, 105). According to the received view, acts of the mind count as
what passes in the mind, while there are things that may pass in the mind other than mental acts (i.e. ideas as representa-
tions). This seems to make each case of reflection a case of consciousness, while not all cases of consciousness are cases of
reflection. And it has been argued that, given the various contexts these concepts are applied in, Locke must widen the no-
tion of reflection so that it is occasionally synonymous with consciousness.
I will argue that the whole issue of sameness of consciousness and reflection does not need to arise at all in Locke and,
consequently, that and why Locke is not a higher-order theorist about consciousness. A combination of two points also sug-
gests that we should not even expect to find an account in Locke of how a mental state becomes conscious. Firstly, he does
not have a notion of unconscious or non- conscious thought as a contrast class from which a need would arise to explain,
and against which to explain, how some thoughts come to be conscious. Secondly, he attributes consciousness to the subject
of thought and not mental states: “when we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so”
(II.xxvii.9).
This pervasiveness of consciousness leads to my main thesis: Locke treats all consciousness as (some type of) self-
consciousness. My argument is based on an analysis of the Lockean “mental items” whose existence is dependent on con-
sciousness. “Thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks” (II.i.19); Ideas “cease to be anything” when we are not
conscious of them (II.x2); “Consciousness ... makes every one to be what he calls self ” (II.xxvii.9). The self differs from
acts of thought and ideas in a crucial respect. For ideas and mental acts there is an ostensible correspondent in the reality of
things; both mental acts per se and external objects per se are real things (see, e.g., IV.iv.3). I will show that regarding the self
no similar correspondent is available. I will articulate Locke’s reasons to posit an experiential presence of self in all occurrent
thought, including the simplest and faintest of sensory perceptions.

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Hume’s Account of Consciousness

Hakkarainen Jani
University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND

It is standard to take Hume’s well-known bundle theory of the mind to involve the view that the mind consists of qualitative-
causal continuity of consciousness. Yet it is striking that Hume says very little about consciousness even in his most detailed
work A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40). In the first Book of the Treatise, Of the Understanding, “consciousness” oc-
curs only seven times. Accordingly, Hume’s account of consciousness is almost a neglected topic in otherwise enormous
Hume scholarship.
I have defended the interpretation that mental items, for which Hume’s term is “perception”, which are divided into “im-
pressions” and “ideas”, are nothing but sensible qualities (2011, 2015). One of the challenges that this interpretation faces
is to give an account of consciousness since Hume clearly thinks that perceptions are conscious (T 1.4.2.47). If perceptions
are nothing but sensible qualities, of what does their conscious nature consist? In this paper, I shall discuss the interpretative
possibility that my view of perceptions as qualities could be combined with Donald C. Ainslie’s account that consciousness
is an aspect of perceptions, which is not numerically distinct from perceptions.

The physics and metaphysics of time in relation

to consciousness
Saturday, June 13, 9:00am -– 11:05am

One of the seemingly undeniable aspects of conscious experience is the flow of time. Explaining this flow of time within the
context of modern physics has long been a difficult problem because many component theories in modern physics suggest
that time is asymmetric, which means there is no arrow of time inherent in the universe. The problem then becomes: if our
physical theories suggest there is no arrow of time why does our personal experience and all the data of our instruments sug-
gest that there is an arrow of time?
When the physicist Brian Greene was asked by my colleague, Jonathan Schooler, how he reconciled the illusory nature
of time with our experience of the flow of time, Greene said that he sees a psychiatrist. This moment of humor highlights the
very real problem that modern physics faces in reconciling the flow of time with our best physical theories about time.
The notion of a “block universe” arises from various theories, including metaphysical determinism and Einsteinian rela-
tivity. A block universe is one in which past, present and future all in some manner exist all once. As Einstein’s famous quote
suggests: “The distinction between past, present and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.” Determinism leads to a
block universe because all things are determined by the initial conditions of whatever system we are considering, including
the entire universe. So in a deterministic universe that began with the Big Bang the present and all moments since the Big
Bang were entirely determined by the very first moment of creation. The block universe flows from relativity theory due to
the relativity of simultaneity and the consequential lack of a universal “now” for all observers.
The block universe is not, however, universally accepted as an accurate conception of time. Lee Smolin, a leading phys-
icist now at the Perimeter Institute of Theoretical Physics in Toronto, stated in his 2006 book, The Trouble With Physics:
“More and more, I have the feeling that quantum theory and general relativity are both deeply wrong about the nature of
time. It is not enough to combine them. There is a deeper problem, perhaps going back to the origin of physics.”
Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ilya Prigogine was also very uncomfortable with conceptions of time in today’s physics.
He wrote in his 2003 book, The End of Certainty: “The spatialization of time is incompatible with both the evolving uni-
verse, which we observe around us, and our own human experience.” He also stated that we need to reformulate the
“laws of physics in accordance with the open, evolving universe in which man lives.”
This panel will explore notions of time in today’s physics and possible alternatives, including the process view of time
inherent in the process philosophy of Prigogine, Alfred North Whitehead, Henri Bergson, Leibniz and others.

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On ‘Gilding or Staining’ the World with Temporal Passage

Bardon Adrian
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, USA
Author, A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time; President, Philosophy of Time Society

Findings in metaphysics, and, more recently, in physics, weigh strongly against the reality of the passage of time. And yet, no
aspect of our lived experience of the world could be more difficult to dismiss. Attempts to resolve this massive discrepancy
between reality and experience lie at the center of much of the contemporary philosophy of time. I briefly sketch an account
of our ineluctable commitment to the passage of time that attributes it to a variety of psychological projection. Consider
our experience of color. Color is not a property of visible objects; it is rather a matter of how we typically respond to light
reflected at certain wavelengths. However, even knowing this, it is impossible to stop experiencing visible objects around us
as having color. The great Scottish philosopher David Hume argued that, as with our experience of colors and other sensory
properties, our belief in causal necessitation, substantial identity, and moral and aesthetic properties is in each case the result
of the mind “gilding or staining” the world with its own feelings via projection. I extend his account to encompass our com-
mitment to the passage of time, drawing also on Immanuel Kant and Robin Le Poidevin (among others). I also discuss how
being constituted so as to be subject to this inescapable illusion makes perfect evolutionary sense for beings with our kind of
conscious functionality.

Consciousness as a Foundational Attribute of Reality, with Physics Phenomena,

such as Dynamical Space, Quantum Theory, Relativistic Effects, being Emergent
Cahill Reginald T.
Professor, School of Chemical and Physical Sciences, Flinders University, AUSTRALIA

A new physics is emerging from a radically different comprehension of the nature of reality. The new “process physics”
views reality as a self-referential information system, where the information is semantic and active, that is, information that
has meaning in the system itself. This amounts to the assertion that reality is in a sense “self-aware” at all levels, though
clearly that such “self-awareness” is of a very limited form in most systems, but is there even at the level of quantum matter.
This new “process physics” is providing a unification and explanation of various phenomena within physics and with other
deep phenomena, including a basis for human consciousness. Various experiments using recently discovered quantum de-
tectors for dynamical space are now giving us the opportunity to explore various consciousness related phenomena, and also
giving a different explanation for the so-called “randomness” in quantum processes. This new physics also gives a different
account of time: this is now understood to be a universal process, indicative of a deep connectedness of all of reality, but
with relativistic clock effects now having a neo-Lorentz explanation, namely caused by motion through the dynamical space.

Could the postulation of subjective temporal dimensions enable the flow of

time?
Schooler Jonathan
Ph.D., UC Santa Barbara

In the current block universe account of time, all moments in time (past present and future) exist simultaneously. From this
standard view, the flow of time and the privileged nature of the present are illusions of consciousness. As Einstein observed
“The past, present and future are only illusions, even if stubborn ones.” The challenge is that if we accept the block universe
model of reality then in order to move through objective time, we have to move relative to something, and that something
cannot itself be time because all time exists simultaneously in the block universe. It is as if physics has built a pendulum
clock but left no space for the pendulum to swing. Although consciousness is capable of a great many illusions, I argue that
the flow of time and the privileged nature of the present are axiomatic aspects of existence, more certain that physical reality
itself. A seemingly reasonable solution is to posit an additional dimension (or dimensions) of subjective time. If there can
be multiple dimensions of space, then might there not also be multiple dimensions of time? In this talk, I propose that the

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flow of time emerges as a consequence of an observer’s movement through objective time relative to a currently unacknowledged
dimension or dimensions of subjective time. The postulation of an additional dimension or dimensions of subjective time could
potentially resolve the paradox of time and provide a realm for subjectivity.

The physics and metaphysics of time in relation to consciousness

Hunt Tam, J.D.
UC Santa Barbara

The concept of time is central to progress in the philosophy of mind and in physics. Conventional physics holds that time
is largely an illusion, a concept described as tenseless time. This paper explores the alternative concept of tensed time and
why modern physics moved away from this concept in the 20th Century, but may now be moving back toward some version
of tensed time. Phenomenologically, the reality of our own consciousness and the flow of time seem to be perhaps the two
most certain things we can each know from the evidence of our senses. I explore how tensed time, and specifically the pro-
cess philosophy notion of time, “process time,” can lead to solutions to the hard problem of consciousness, the question of
free will versus determinism, and in modern physics.

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Workshop Demos

Go With the Flow


Naama Kostiner
Hemisphere, Hemisphere, Haifa, ISRAEL

Modern day psychology defines our “Perception of Time” as a measurable, subjective experience. One’s values and hopes are
located within a spectrum of specific life events according to individual experiences, as narratives are being created around
them. The individual perception of the duration between these unfolding events marks a subjective timeframe.
In the 1960’s Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Professor of Psychology and Management and his team of colleges began to
study the phenomenon of what they have defined as “Flow”. Flow refers to a mental state of operation in which a person in
an activity is fully immersed in feelings of focus, full involvement, feeling energized, loaded and successful in the process of
the activity. In flow, emotions are positively experienced, and aligned with the task at hand. Subjects would report a feeling
of well-being, as they got “lost in their activity” and lost track of time.
In my last years of research and work as a psychotherapist, I began to take interest in the subject of flow and its effects on
our well-being.
In the following example I quote interviewee “Miss Y”, a 42 year old art teacher and mother of two. Miss Y describes
how the feeling of “getting lost in the flow and loosing track of time” while creating her art, helped her cope with a difficult
childhood.
“When I was a young girl, the world at times seemed like an overwhelming place to endure. I grew up in a slightly dys-
functional home you see, I felt like I needed to escape from this world into a safe zone I created for myself. I would crawl
under the living room table, close it all around with sheets and decorate it from the inside, like furnishing an indoor space.
There it felt safe and cozy. I would stay there for hours, playing, creating artworks for my walls of sheets. Time would fly by
and I wouldn’t notice. All the outside noises seemed to vanish. Until the sheets would be taken down, and it was time to
climb up from the ground and go to bed. I would always feel much better after being in that space. Until this day, as an adult
art teacher, I lose track of time as I create”...
Flow is perceived as an altered state that both “shelters” you from the outside world – turning inwards, yet at the same
time connects you to a stream of higher consciousness where a sense of well-being is felt. It is as though two distinct forces
work together disconnecting you from the way you perceive the world, in order to allow you to unite back with the world
from a different perspective. Spiritual traditions define this state as “being at one with things”.
In this workshop we will discuss the essence of flow, how is it that we feel like our sense of time disappears? How can the
state of flow be evoked and since it is known to affect our well-being, can we use it to overcome fear or trauma or simply “re-
author” or “re-story” the way we experience life events in our created time frame.
Throughout the workshop we will also carry out an interactive experience including a guided visualization session in
order to stimulate a sense of flow and test its effects on us.
About the lecturer: Naama Kostiner is a psychotherapist, personal well-being advisor and an artist. Her life is a maze of
merging cultures, as she has been raised and has lived in many different locations around the world including Europe, the
Americas and the Middle East. Spirituality has always played an important role in her life and is a continuing influence due
to her training in Native American shamanism amongst other paths. Accompanying her spiritual healing guidelines, she has
acquired a Master’s degree in
Clinical Social Work and is a certified group counselor. Based on her multidimensional therapeutic background,
Naama’s time today is dedicated to her private practice as a clinician and personal advisor, alongside research and teaching
on the subjects of psychology and consciousness. Naama has presented at Towards a Science of Consciousness conferences

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in Arizona and Stockholm on the subjects of Synesthesia, Discovering the benefits of consciousness expansion; Walking
Through Color - Treating habitual obstacles from a holistic perspective and Getting past negative thought patterns through
holistic – psychological and Meditative techniques.

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1 . P hi l osophy 147 1.1 T he C oncept of C onsciousness 1 4 7 1 . 2 Metaphysics of consciousness

Abstracts

1. Philosophy 147 4. Physical and Biological Sciences 319

1.1 The Concept of Consciousness 147 4.1 Quantum Theory 319
1.2 Metaphysics of consciousness 167 4.2 Space and Time 324
1.3 Materialism and Dualism 192 4.3 Intergrative Models 324
1.4 Qualia 200 4.4 Emergent and Hierarchical Systems 326
1.5 Machine Consciousness 207 4.5 Nonlinear Dynamics 326
1.6 Mental Causation and the Function 4.7 Bioelectromagnetics/resonance effects 327
of Consciousness 211 4.8 Biophysics and Living Processes 329
1.7 The ‘hard-problem’ and the 4.9 Evolution of Consciousness 332
explanatory gap 217 4.10 Medicine and Healing 333
1.8 Emergence and Consciousness 224
1.9 Higher Order Thought 226
1.10 Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 227 5. Experiential approaches 336
1.11 Personal Identity and the Self 235 5.1 Phenomenology 336
1.12 Free Will and Agency 242 5.2 Meditation, Contemplation and
1.13 Intentionality and Representation 249 Mysticisim 342
1.14 Miscellaneous 261 5.4 Other Altered States of Consciousness 348
5.6 Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 350
5.8 Anomalous Experiences 353
2. Neuroscience 266 5.9 Parapsychology 354
2.1 Neural Correlates of
Consciousness (general) 266
2.2 Vision 273 6. Culture and humanities 357
2.3 Other Sensory Modalities 274 6.1 Literature and Hermeneutics 357
2.8 Anesthesia 275 6.2 Art and Aesthetics 358
2.10 Quantum Neurodynamics 278 6.3 Music 361
2.14 Sleep and Waking 280 6.6 Sociology 364
2.15 Specific Brain Areas 281 6.8 Information Technology 365
2.16 Miscellaneous 281 6.9 Ethics and Legal Studies 366
6.10 Education 367
6.11 Miscellanous 370
3. Cognitive Sciences and Psychology 284
3.1 Attention 284
3.2 Vision 289 Plenary Talk Abstracts 373
3.3 Other Sensory Modalities 292 Oral Presentation Abstracts 379
3.4 Memory and Learning 294 Poster Presentation Abstracts 385
3.5 Emotion 296
3.6 Language 299
3.7 Mental Imagery 300
3.8 Implicit ans Explicit Procresses 301
3.9 Unconscious/conscious experience 304
3.11 Cognitive Development 306
3.14 Cognitive Architectures 309
3.16 Self-Consciousness and Metacognition 310
3.17 Temporal Consciousness 313
3.18 Intelligence ans Creativity 315
3.19 Miscellaneous 317

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1.0 Philosophy
1.1 The Concept of Consciousness

1 Information Integration Theory As a Foundation for a Science of Consciousness

Chatzopoulos Andreas
University of Turku, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, Turku, FINLAND

Giulio Tononi’s Information Integration Theory (IIT) states that the basis for consciousness is integrated information. This
may or may not be a correct analysis of the nature of concsiousness, but it is enough for an exhaustive account of conscious-
ness? Tononi seems to think so, but the theory does not bring any clarity in the question of how phenomenal experiences
are generated in the brain, nor does it explain intentionality, for example. My question is: Can IIT be developed to accomo-
date for these shortcomings somehow?
In order to answer this, I will look at the role of IIT in the wider context of science of consciousness in general, and the
philosophical basis regarding the underlying philosophy of science in particular. I will begin by showing that Tononi relies
heavily on a reductional view as the basis of IIT, and I will furthermore make use of the discussions by Bechtel (1988) and
Revonsuo (2006) to show that this approach is not especially appropriate for a science of consciousness. As an alternative
I will therefore examine the approach put forward by Revonsuo, an approach that uses a idealized multi-level model as the
basis for an explanation of consciousness.
To illustrate this point I will give an example of a three-level model of this sort and put forward proposals of what one
could expect to find at the two lowest levels. For example, the lower level would likely be the place for low-level systems
that interact with the environment (here I will use Bickhard’s theory of Interactivism as an example) while at the middle
level one could expect to find higher cognitive functions (perhaps along the lines of Gärdenfors’ Conceptual Spaces (2004)
which I will use here to illustrate my point). (Phenomenal level at the top would be left out of the discussion for the time
being.)
Now, what I aim to show with these proposals is that these theories can all be said to implement IIT. For example, In-
teractivism at the bottom level could easily be viewed as such an implementation since it describes a system which is able
to deal with a lot of information, information that also can be said to be integrated. Similar things could be claimed about
Gärdenfors’ Conceptual Spaces at the middle level.
All this is of course of a very speculative at this point, but what it implies is that that the real role of Tononi’s IIT may
be a foundational one. That is, IIT is nowhere near an exhaustive explanation of consciousness in itself, but the theory
may nevertheless be valuable as an explanation of a general underlying mechanism of the levels in an idealized multi-level
model of consciousness. If we accept this view, this insight can even serve as a criteria for future examinations of the levels
in such a model. For a research programme of the science of consciousness, I think that this can serve as an important
foundation.

2 Priming In Process Philosophy

Chuang Yi Hsin
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN

Priming is a universal cognitive phenomenon in human beings. It refers to an improvement or change in the identification,
production or classification of a stimulus, cause by prior involvement of a same or related stimulus. Priming is considered of
a process in preconscious, connecting unconscious and conscious in order to pass on the information. Psychologists usually
consider priming as a form of implicit memory, also an automatic cognitive process.
Under today’s advancement of brain imaging and neuron science, our understanding of priming is going more further
and further, but still, this cognitive process remains many details unknown. For example, psychologists believe that the prior
stimulus existing in preconscious, but if it was not raised by priming, will this kind of memory “exists”? If it do exists, how
long will it stay? If the process of priming goes through the path of implicit and explicit memory simultaneously, would the

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storage of prior stimulus be in implicit or explicit memory regions? Priming is thought of a activity under consciousness, but
what place it exactly is in human memory models if more and more result of brain image shows that it’s also interfered by
top-down cognitive process? Perhaps process philosophy could help us dealing with these questions.
Process philosophy is a theory raised by Alfred North Whitehead, which views the most fundamental existence in this
reality world is “event” rather than “substance”.
With respect to the composition of substances, the central issue of metaphys-
ics will be “time” and “change”. This dynamic process is neither the ramifications of static substances, nor the connection
between them, but the fundamental statement before things. Substances are merely the nodes between process and other
processes, or the product of it, but not the most essential component in this world.
To reconstruct priming with the view of process philosophy, we may find more interesting thinking from it. Viewing
priming as the most fundamental existence and both the prior and later stimulus are the manifestation of it, if priming effect
exists, the realness of the trace of stimulus in our mind is also confirmed. Take the variability of priming as the principle part
of this mental phenomenon; we will put more concentration on its functions and structures.
Still, there are many questions waiting to be defined. What kind of priming can be inferred to a process? Does everyone
have the same structure of priming? Will the difference of structures affect the validity of this process? Can perceptual, con-
ceptual and semantic process still be viewed as same processes? All these should be clarified by more readings and discus-
sions in philosophical and psychological domains.

3 General Information Model of Consciousnesses of a Person

Dyukarev Mikhaile
Consciousnesses of a Person, The Center «Development of the Personality», Kharkov, UKRAINE

Currently in Psychology, there are many disparate theories and models of consciousness, but the general model of con-
sciousness is absent. Purpose of this work is to present the General Information Model of Human Consciousness (claim-
ing to be the general theory of consciousness) and first results of its practical realization. Model features: this is the infor-
mation model that is the closest to computer technologies (main issues are information processing and decision-making);
the real nature of consciousness is not considered in this work; The Model is full; it is developed and practically imple-
mented for more than 20 years; its main abilities are the highly effective changes of a person in all consciousness compo-
nents.
In the work the following questions are thoroughly described:
1. The approach. Its essence: the Consciousness is de-
scribed as a supercomputer having its special architecture.
2. The model basis.
The model has four basic levels. Level 1. The
basic parts are classified according to the basic functions of Consciousness. Level 2. Consciousness centers (supercomputer
main parts). Level 3. Final devices for work with information (processors - each of them is responsible for its special func-
tions). Level 4. Data storage devices in Consciousness (thoughts, images, sensations, energy).
Each of the Model levels is
considered below.
3. The Consciousness basic parts are the Basic Consciousness (the “realized” management) and other
parts (Subconsciousness, Superconsciousness and the General Consciousness, that work automatically and execute com-
mands of the Basic Consciousness).
4. The basic Consciousness Centers (Information centers, 12 in total). The following
questions are considered. A. Structure of the Operating part Centers (Intelligence, Perception Center). B. Basic “technical”
structure of the Information centers. C. General information structure of the Centers.
5. The Final Devices for Work with
Information: Cogitative Structures (work with programs), Memory (servers, where information is stored), Management
Blocks (the general management).
6. Data storage devices: thoughts (Cogitative Structures programs), images (display of all
external information in consciousness), sensations (internal perception) and energy (as the concept — «that causes sensa-
tions»). Other questions (management commands, operating modes). As a matter of fact this is what our supercomputer
works with.
THE BASIC RESULTS
1. The object in view of the researches is reached, i.e. the represented model is full, it describes
all known
properties of consciousness.
2. The given model is productive on theoretical level (it leads to solution of other psychol-
ogy tasks and to creation of other author’s theories) and on practical level as well (long-term programs of Shaping of the
Personality, more than 15 thousand class periods).
3. The represented training programs give all necessary results in change
of the Inner world of a person and his/her Destiny.
CONCLUSIONS
1. We have all bases to hope that the given theory will be approved by other researchers. Being the
General Theory it can bring opportunities to psychology as well as to all other spheres of Knowledge.
2. The ultimate goal is
decision of vitally important task of Shaping of highly effective Person without any psycho-emotional problems.

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4 Toward A Definition Of “consciousness Itself”

Emami Ahmad
Islamic philosophy, Iranian Institute of philosophy , Qom, IRAN

Consciousness is the most important issue in contemporary philosophy of mind. But which notion of “consciousness” really
is and must be the subject of this discussion? What is exactly the consciousness whose nature and explanation of its emer-
gence is the main problem of philosophy of mind? The first step for all philosophical attempts in this regard is to precisely il-
luminate the subject of discussion; otherwise we may fall into fallacy and be misleading in our explanation of how conscious-
ness appears and its function and other related discussions. There are problems with various concepts and notions that have
been given of consciousness and more importantly, there are some ambiguities regarding their relations with each other. Also,
they don’t convey a completely accepted notion of consciousness suitable to be the main subject of consciousness studies in
philosophy of mind. There are even some views that consider obtaining a mental and logical definition of consciousness as
impossible. In this article, I will mention the various surrounding concepts of the main concept, i.e., “consciousness”, that pre-
vent our apprehension of “consciousness itself ” in various applications, and will try to reach a precise notion of consciousness
itself by conceptual and explanatory analysis. For this purpose first, I will make a disjunction between various dimensions of
the discussion pertaining to the definition of consciousness, and will distinguish between inquiry of the meaning of the word
“consciousness”, and the concept of consciousness, and the essence of consciousness, as well as the inquiry of the types of
consciousness, and other aspects in this regard. Also, I will pay attention to the difference between “consciousness” and the
conscious state. Reducing consciousness to the conscious state is another obstacle preventing us to obtain the notion of “con-
sciousness itself ”. To avoid this mistake we must investigate the characteristics that have been listed for conscious states, and
compare their relations to each other and to “consciousness”, and see which of them are necessary and essential for conscious-
ness to be consciousness, and which are accidental and separable. This will help us get closer to clarifying the concept of the
“consciousness itself ”. There are other kinds of mistakes in the path of obtaining a pure and limpid notion of consciousness,
one of which is confusion of consciousness with the subject of consciousness, which I will mention. In addition, I will inquire
different concepts that have been said to be different types of consciousness, most notably, “access consciousness, phenome-
nal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, and self-consciousness” and will
show that in some divisions, “consciousness itself ” wasn’t solely taken into consideration. Finally, I will offer necessary crite-
ria for mental states to be conscious, and try, regardless of ascribing consciousness to mental states, to give an accurate and
distinctive definition of consciousness and the criterion of being conscious, and offer it as the main subject of consciousness
studies in philosophy of mind, as well as clarifying the variety of consciousness from different perspectives.

5 Consciousness: what would Whitehead say? Tell us, what’s it all about, Alfie?
CANCELLED
Farleigh Peter
History and Philosophy of Science, The University of Sydney, Sydney, AUSTRALIA

What could be regarded as a minor theme in the study of consciousness in recent years has been to suggest that conscious-
ness be regarded as a fundamental aspect or element of the universe, just as, say, gravity is. This has revived notions of
panpsychism. David Chalmers in particular, has promoted the idea in response to the perceived lack of success of other ap-
proaches such as computational functionalism.
Talk of panpsychism in turn, has often been met with dismissing looks or even outright derision, though equally as often it
has evoked vague mentions of the metaphysical work of Alfred North Whitehead among others, including James, Bergson, Pei-
rce, and Clifford. But what exactly were Whitehead’s views, and how do they differ from contemporary framings of the mind-
body problem? What did Whitehead have to say on consciousness in general? How did he account for qualia? Can we specu-
late on how he would he view contemporary representationalist and computational accounts of the mind? Would he agree
with David Chalmers’ view that information plays the key role? And finally (and we can only guess) what would he have to say
about the Penrose-Hameroff theories? Should we look to Whitehead (and co.) for a metaphysical basis of consciousness?
I will provide a general overview of Whitehead’s event ontology, and show how it fits into the grand sweep of the history
of thought, and the part that both the physical and mental play in it. Space, Time and Matter as basic elements of a substance
ontology are here in this scheme, replaced by Extension, Relation and Event. Further, events or as he came to call them, ‘ac-
tual occasions,’ are psycho-physical in character. Whereas David Chalmers advocates for a dual-aspect theory of information
as a theory of consciousness, Whitehead argues for a dual-aspect theory of events. This is a theory not just for the mental, for
it is at the same time, a theory of the physical.

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6 A Taxonomy of Seemings
Farrell Jonathan
Philosophy, University of Manchester, Manchester, UNITED KINGDOM

In this paper, I offer a taxonomy of seemings: the mental states we are in when things seem some way to us. Philosophers ap-
peal to seemings in different areas of philosophy. Reiland (2014) appeals to seemings to answer questions about the content
of perceptual experiences. Bealer (1998) appeals to seemings to explain what intuitions are: intellectual seemings. And the
papers in Tucker (2013) consider whether seemings can give us (defeasible) justification for some of our beliefs. But it is
not obvious whether the seemings appealed to in each of these cases are the same kinds of states as those appealed to in the
others.
There are good reasons for being sceptical: it is widely recognised that we can mean different things when we use ‘seem’.
Chisholm (1957) describes two kinds. Epistemic seemings concern how we take the world to be (whether on the basis of
perception or not). Thus if I read that City have lost their best player to injury, it might now seem to me that United will
win this year’s competition. And perceptual seemings concern our perceptions: the stick half in the water seems bent (even
though I know it is not). There are also intellectual seemings: it seems to me that there could be a set that has as members
all and only those sets that do not contain themselves (even though I know that there could not be such a set). Experiential
seemings are perhaps a genus of seeming, under which some other kinds of seemings (e.g., perceptual and intellectual) fall.
We use the experiential sense of ‘seem’ to describe our experiences, and O’s seeming F to us is compatible with our knowing
that O is not F. Finally, justificatory seemings are mental states that give us (defeasible) reasons for accepting that the world
is as it seems—e.g., if it seems that there is a dagger before me, that is a (defeasible) reason for my believing that there is a
dagger before me. It is because there are these (apparently) different kinds of seemings that it is an open possibility that the
seemings discussed in, say, the philosophy of perception are not the same as those discussed in epistemology.
My taxonomy will make clear what connections there are between the different kinds of seemings in play and will allow
us to make progress on questions such as: how should we characterises different seemings—e.g., in terms of phenomenal
character, content, or whether they are propositional attitudes? What are the connections between different kinds of seem-
ings? Do some seemings reduce to other seemings (perhaps in tandem with other mental states)?

Bealer, George. “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.” In Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael R. DeP-
aul and William Ramsey, 201-239. 1998.
Chisholm, Roderick M. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Vol. 9. Cor-
nell University Press, 1957.
Reiland, Indrek. “On Experiencing High-Level Properties.” American Philosophical
Quarterly 51, no. 3 ( July 2014): 177-187.
Tucker, Chris, ed. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. OUP
USA, 2013.

7 Presentationalism
Franken Dirk
Philosophy, University of Stuttgart, Münster, GERMANY

I will put forward and defend an account of the phenomenal consciousness of experiences (henceforth, phenomenal con-
sciousnessex) which I call presentationalism. Presentationalism is admittedly simple-minded. It just says that an experience’s
phenomenal consciousness consists in nothing but its subject’s being acquainted with instances of certain sensible qualities
on certain existing particulars through this experiences.
My argument for presentationalism rests on three assumptions: First, that experiences are transparent, that is, that the
phenomenal quality of an experience is exhaustively determined by the sensible qualities its subject is acquainted with (in
this experience). Second, that this is a purely phenomenological fact and, third, that since it is a purely phenomenological
fact, accounting for it is a condition of adequacy for any account of phenomenal consciousnessex.
I will try to show that presentationalism is the only account available which has the capacity to meet this condition.
That presentationalism indeed has this capacity should be uncontroversial. So, it remains to be shown that this is not true
of any of the other accounts of phenomenal consciousnessex available. Fortunately, to establish this it is unnecessary to go
over all these accounts one by one, for many of them are incompatible with the transparency of experience for quite general
reasons: Note that the sensible qualities the subject of an experience is acquainted with not only determine the phenomenal
quality of this experience, but also constitute one kind of content (plausibly, there are more) of this experience. Hence, there
is a two-way dependence between the phenomenal quality and the relevant kind of content of this experience. This fact

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rules out two families of accounts of phenomenal consciousnessex straightforwardly: accounts treating phenomenal con-
sciousnessex as an altogether unstructured phenomenon (a mental paint) and accounts taking phenomenal consciousnes-
sex to consist (wholly or partly) in the subject’s awareness of the experience itself (howsoever this awareness is construed
in detail). What remains are accounts according to which phenomenal consciousnessex has some kind of world-directed
structure. They split into those assuming that this structure can be realized in the absence of any kind of sensible qualities
the subject is acquainted with, and those denying this. The former, while holding the status of orthodoxy, square badly with
the transparency of experience. If the phenomenal quality of an experience is exhaustively determined by the sensible quali-
ties the subject is acquainted with, it is hardly understandable how there can be a phenomenal quality at all in the absence
of any sensible qualities. The latter come in varieties, differing in the ontological status respectively ascribed to the sensible
qualities the subject is said to be acquainted with. One is presentationalism, according to which these sensible qualities have
to be instantiated on existing particulars. The others are ontologically more parsimonious. According to them, the sensible
qualities can be either instantiated at non-existing particulars or not instantiated at all. Unfortunately, however, these ac-
counts are not tenable. The entities they introduce as objects of acquaintance are just not of the right kind to be the objects
of someone’s acquaintance.

8 Matter and mind are unified in the AM pattern and its Double
Freeman Walter
Molecular & Cell Biology, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA, USA
In accord with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty [1], antedated by Aquinas, the mechanism by which subjects acquire
knowledge is the action-perception cycle. A subject engaged in search forms an attractor landscape of probabilities. An
observation brings a stimulus that collapses the distributions to certainty by selecting a basin of attraction. The neural
activity in each sensory cortex condenses from gas-like chaos to a liquid-like field of a collective well-known in quantum
physics [2] as a Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC). Its field has a ripple that expresses a memory of the stimulus by the
spatial pattern of amplitude modulation (AM) of the ripple [3]. The BEC carrying its AM pattern invades the amygdala
and hypothalamus, giving an emotional awareness. A second BEC expands through the limbic system giving a new AM
pattern. It is a flash memory binding the multimodal percepts together with the time and place of the gestalt provided
by the hippocampus A third BEC gives an AM pattern over the entire scalp, without localization, that is accompanied by
comprehension of the stimulus meaning [4]. The third BEC culminates each action-perception cycle at short durations
enabling several cycles each second.
I interpret each BEC as the brain’s status report on the search. Dissipative quantum field theory requires that each status
report be accompanied by a “Double”, which describes the impact on the environment of the open thermodynamic system
of brain and body in consuming matter and energy and shedding waste and heat. The Double is made by copying the AM
pattern and reversing time in the copy, so that every source becomes a sink and vice versa, giving brains the best available
predictor of the environment. My hypothesis is that the Double is consciousness as the immaterial accompaniment of mas-
sively coherent, highly textured brain activity. The copy is unconstrained by thermodynamics.

1. Merleau-Ponty M: The Structure of Behavior. Fischer AL [trans] Boston: Beacon; 1942/1963.
2. Freeman
WJ, Vitiello G: Nonlinear brain dynamics as macroscopic manifestation of underlying field dynamics. Physics
of Life Reviews 2006, 3: 93-118. 10.1016/j.plrev.2006.02.001,le.
3. Freeman WJ, Livi R, Obinata M, Vitiello G:
Cortical phase transitions, non-equilibrium thermodynamics and the time-dependent Ginzburg-Landau equa-
tion. Int J Mod Phys B 2012, 26 (6): 1250035. 10.1142/S021797921250035X.
4. Freeman WJ, Quian Quiroga
R: Imaging Brain Function with EEG: Advanced Temporal and Spatial imaging of Electroencephalographic Sig-
nals. New York: Springer 2013. 10.1007/978-1-4614-4984

9 Metaphorical nature of consciousness

Gáliková Silvia
Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, SLOVAKIA

Abstract Cognitive linguists have explored the idea that people speak metaphorically because they think, feel, and act meta-
phorically. Therefore, the analysis of the conceptual and experiential basis of linguistic categories and constructs has been
considered of primary importance. In their work J. Lakoff and M. Johnson (1999) emphasize the cognitive and creative

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role of conceptual metaphors. Together with Fauconnier, Turner, Grady, Kittay etc., they have demonstrated a fundamental
impact of unconscious metaphors on human life and behaviour. Metaphorical mappings are heavily used for conceptual-
izing, reasoning about subjective mental life, conscious deliberations, plans and actions. Structures of language are studied
as embodied reflections of general conceptual organization, categorization principles, and processing mechanisms (Gibbs,
Lakoff). In my presentation I intend to highlight the specific role of metaphor and metaphorical language in elucidating
the nature of human consciousness. My argumentation will proceed in three steps, firstly I aim to point out inconsistencies
in using the concept of consciousness (entity, process, state, property etc.) as for example: a) phenomenal consciousness,
necessarily involving the qualitative character of experience, b) states and contents of consciousness which refer to the back-
ground state that allows specific contents of experience to appear in our minds, c) structure of phenomenal consciousness
with clearest experiences in the center of consciousness, d) reflective consciousness, where we formulate conscious thoughts
about other experiences and thoughts, e) self-awareness, through which we „communicate“ experiences to ourselves and
others; f) unconscious information which could become conscious. Secondly, I attempt to support the claim of cognitive
linguistic theories of metaphor that the connections between our brains, minds, and language are much deeper than schol-
ars ever thought. Novel findings of experimental research highlight the role of bodily experiences in a variety of psychologi-
cal processes, from attention and memory to inference, judgment and action (Barsalou, 2008). Finally, I will argue, that the
analysis and use of metaphorical language in consciousness studies sheds light upon the persisting ontological problem of
the nature of conscious phenomena. To approach consciousness as an existing real phenomenon does not require first per-
son ontology based on the existence of conscious qua mental qua irreducible entities. Existence of a profound asymmetry
between experienced inner conscious life and a theoretical explanation of its nature is thus exclusively epistemic.

References:
Kittay, Eva: Metaphor. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1987.
Lakoff, George, Johnson, Mark:
Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. New York : Basic Books,
1999.
Leary, David (ed.): Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,
1994. Naranayan, Shrikanth: “Mappings in Art and Language: Conceptual Mappings in Neil Gaiman’s Sand-
man.” Honors thesis, University of California Berkeley, 2000.
Ortony, Andrew (ed.): Metaphor and Thought.
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996.

10 What about self-consciousness’s transparency?
A study of consciousness’s

roles and functions in self-access.
Geradin-Laverde Loraine
Philosophy, University of Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Lyon, FRANCE

In philosophy of mind, the notion of consciousness plays a major role in the definition of the person. In John Locke’s semi-
nal theory of personal identity, the introspective and reflexive dimensions of consciousness lead to the notion of self-con-
sciousness. Self-consciousness, then, can be extended as consciousness of being the same at different moments of time, that
is, episodic memory. The notion of consciousness, accordingly, is crucial for the definition of the person in Locke’s theory.
The metaphysical question: “How to define the self?” is reduced to the epistemic question: “How can I recognize myself?”.
What is striking in Locke’s theory is that self- knowledge is based on (and in a sense, reduced to) the immediacy and trans-
parency of self-consciousness. I will thus try to analyse first, why kinds of self-knowledge not reducible to self-consciousness
have been left aside in the definition of the person. I will then envision cases in which self-consciousness is absent, like
coma, and where self-consciousness is no longer immediate and transparent, and does not provide a priviledged access to
myself, like confabulation. I will try to show that self-consciousness is not as transparent as we usually think. I will propose
that one reason for this is that consciousness enables us to access narratives, and not “objective” contents. I will try to ex-
plore the recent research in neuropsychology and see what happens in this field to notions like episodic memory and its
alleged reliability. I will suggest to rethink episodic memory according to what we learn from cognitive science, and then
to draw some lesssons from that for our understanding of self-consciousness. Indeed, the picture of memory that emerges
from current scientific research disrupts the principled distinction between faithful memories and memory distorsions that
would be dysfunctional. In particular, according to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter, Addis, 2007),
one of the functions of episodic memory is to allow individuals to recombine elements of their past experiences in order to
construct scenarios of their own future. I will propose that research on consciousness could benefit from research on epi-
sodic memory, concerning in particular our understanding of the limits of transparency.

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11 The Experiential Paradox of Consciousness and Gödel’s Incompleteness

Theorem
Gokmen Arzu
Philosophy, Bogazici University, Istanbul, TURKEY

We know by our experiences that we’re conscious; however, consciousness, in its bare form, is never an object of our expe-
rience. That is, we have conscious experiences, but we have no experience of our bare consciousness. What is, then, con-
sciousness? How come we know that we have conscious experiences while our consciousness is never an object of our expe-
rience in its bare form?
My aim is to show that this paradoxical property of consciousness is exactly where we should dig into in order to reveal
the nature of consciousness and what it is. There are two main issues that I’ll bring into discussion concerning the conse-
quences of this paradox. First one is the intimate relation between the self and consciousness. I argue that the two cannot
be considered without the other. Also, I suggest that one’s knowledge of his being a self and one’s knowledge of his being
conscious have to be analyzed in a different epistemic structure than the classical subject-object dichotomy. I claim that the
very reason that this experiential paradox seems to arise is the classical epistemic approach to the knowledge of self and con-
sciousness. I’ll introduce the notion of knowing as being that to show why the classical epistemic dichotomy doesn’t hold in
the case of one’s knowledge of his bare self and bare consciousness. Therefore, while the paradox is dissolved, the very nature
of the self and consciousness will be revealed.
Second, I’ll discuss Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem (Gödel, 1931) which suggests that any consistent formal
system cannot prove its consistency. I’ll argue that the reason why the experiential paradox of consciousness arises and why
our attempts to detect our bare selves and bare consciousness fail, as Hume and Kant agree (Hume 1738, Kant 1781), is
very similar to the reason why consistent systems cannot prove their consistency. That is, as our epistemic structure depends
on the subject-object dichotomy, if a subject attempts to know himself then he ends up objectifying himself and he fails to
know himself as subject. Indeed, the subject is who performs the knowing and if he reflects upon himself to know himself
within his subject- hood, this is similar to an attempt of a consistent system to prove its consistency, which is a failure. The
same failure happens when a subject attempts to know his bare self and bare consciousness. Therefore, the Incompleteness
Theorem suggests that we should leave classical subject-object dichotomy when we attempt to know our subject-hood, self
and consciousness. Leaving the classical dichotomy, I suggest the notion of knowing by being that which rules out the objec-
tification of the subject. Why we need to shift from classical dichotomy to knowing by being that will reveal the very nature
of the self and consciousness and their intimate relation where I also discuss what qualia is within this intimacy.

12 Consciousness as Self-Sensing?: Challenging a classical philosophical

conception
Goldgaber Deborah
Philosophy, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA

Classic and contemporary philosophical literature describes the structure of consciousness (subjective self- awareness) in
terms of auto-affection, or self-sensing. However, recent work at the intersection of philosophy, cognitive science and neu-
roscience critique this model of consciousness and propose alternative frameworks. In this talk, my main goal is to motivate
these critiques of auto-affection—in part by demonstrating that this conception of consciousness remains a pre-supposition
in contemporary, phenomenological accounts of consciousness—and to show the philosophical significance of alternative
approaches to understanding consciousness.
The locus classicus for the understanding of consciousness as “auto-affection” is Kant’s description of subjectivity in
the first Critique. There he presents the following account of self-awareness: “we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly
affected.” Thus, the self is primarily to be understood in terms of an inward sensibility that is the root both of our self-aware-
ness and our hetero-awareness (awareness of a world beyond ourselves).
This model of consciousness is still prevalent today but has met critical resistance from at least two directions. On the
one hand are those who criticize the identification of “inward affection” with consciousness—viz., much that could be de-
scribed in terms of auto-affection does not rise to the level of consciousness. On the other hand, are those who criticize the
identification of consciousness with auto-affection—consciousness cannot be understood as immediate self-presentation
or self-sensing. The first argues that our understanding of the self or of subjective processes must be dissociated from ac-
counts of consciousness: we are, in many respects, “strangers to ourselves.” The second argues that consciousness cannot be

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understood in terms of an original, “first person” perspective but entails a “constitutive heterogeneity”: we are never simply
ourselves. In closing, I will present a promising versions of the second line of critique—as it appears in the continental, post-
phenomenological philosophical tradition—in order to specify the resources it offers for conceiving consciousness in terms
of the dynamic coupling of processes that are not themselves conscious or even “subjective.”

13 Some notions about the connections between consciousness and self-

consciousness
Haanila Heidi
Department of Behavioural Sciences and Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, FINLAND

A question, that any consciousness theory should take a stand for, concerns self-consciousness. In this presentation I analyze
different conceptions of self-consciousness concentrating especially on the notions of minimal form self-consciousness, and
on the implications they bear to consciousness studies.
In everyday life, self-consciousness is usually thought to be a matter of a person thinking about herself. Philosophers
call this kind of introspection as reflective self-consciousness (also ‘transitive self-consciousness’, ‘agentive judgments’) and
it is defined as a capacity to take oneself as the object of one’s reasoning and to think of oneself as oneself. However, among
philosophers there is a widespread agreement that we need to distinguish also another kind of, a more primitive form of
self-consciousness that philosophers have called for- me-ness (also ‘pre-reflective self-consciousness’, ‘intransitive self-con-
sciousness’, ‘agent-relative knowledge’). This notion of self is simply connected to the subjectivity of experience, i.e. the self
manifests itself as the subject of experience. For-me-ness is a minimum point of self-awareness, an invariant dimension in all
experiences, and as such a necessary condition for consciousness.
As a constitutive feature of phenomenal consciousness, the existence of for-me-ness has at least two kinds of implica-
tions for consciousness theories. Firstly, for-me-ness rules out the “anonymity theories of consciousness” (named as such
by Grünbaum & Zahavi) in which the phenomenal character of conscious states is identical to or supervenes on the state’s
representational intentional content. However, it seems that although the anonymity theories might be able to explain some
notions of self-consciousness they actually cannot account the minimal pre-reflective for-me-ness that as a necessary feature
of experience is needed to ground the higher notions of self-consciousness. Secondly, as the phenomenologists have no-
ticed, the existence of for-me-ness can be seen as a critique against higher order theories of consciousness. Higher- order ac-
counts of consciousness claim that consciousness is an extrinsic or relational property of those mental states that have it. In
contrast for-me-ness does not involve an additional mental state, but is rather to be understood as an intrinsic feature of the
primary experience. In this sense for-me-ness forms the categorical basis to our capacity for higher-order thoughts.
In addition to these theoretical insights, for-me-ness also bears implications for empirical consciousness research. These
implications have not yet been investigated in detail but the recent meta-analysis by Legrand & Ruby has indicated that on
the neural level the notion of for-me-ness is connected to self-specific sensory and motor processes in the parietal lobes.
This finding might be utilized in producing new hypotheses for empirical research, and in developing even more detailed
theoretical exploration. It might be claimed that self- specific processing is a necessary neural correlate for phenomenal con-
sciousness. In addition it could be stated that studying damages in the parietal lobes and in the connections between parietal
lobes and other brain regions reveals something essential about for-me-ness and along with it about phenomenal conscious-
ness. Furthermore, within the research of self-consciousness, it is theoretically highly interesting to sort out how for-me-ness
is connected with different modes of reflective self-consciousness.

14 What imagination teaches us about the subjective perspectivity of

consciousness
Balcerak Jackson Magdalena
Philosophy / Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, GERMANY

Many philosophers have argued that one of the most important aspects of what it means to be a conscious subject is to
have a subjective perspective, and what it means to be a conscious mental state is to be subjectively perspectival. As a con-
scious subject when we undergo conscious experiences such as perception, emotions, bodily sensations or certain forms
of conscious thought we have a particularly first-personal point of view on the things we experience. An intuitive idea that
seems suitable to capture this elusive but central feature of consciousness reappears in the philosophical, psychological and

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cognitive science literature: Mental states or attitudes are subjectively perspectival because they constitutively about oneself
or ineliminably mine. When a mental state is described as self-representational, then this typically involves the claim that it
represents not only the things I am primarily experiencing, but also represents myself having the experience. When a mental
state or a mental attitude is described as de se, then it is such that it is about oneself or concerns oneself under a mode of
presentation that only one can have of oneself.
In this talk, I will argue that this type of approach to the subjective perspectivity of consciousness is mistaken. The strat-
egy will be to look not at the paradigm cases of conscious experience like perception or conscious thought but at an unusual,
albeit very common kind of conscious experience: imaginings. The reason is the following: Imaginings – in the core sense
of the term that is to be distinguished from mere supposition – recreate corresponding mental states such as perception and
emotions by taking up central parts of their phenomenal character and their representational content. They are subjectively
perspectival just as their counterparts. However, in imagination we can not only take our own perspective under circum-
stances that differ from our actual circumstances, but also the perspective of another subject. This empathetic ability is a
crucial function of our imagination. So in imagination our perspective is not always our own perspective. I will present a rep-
resentational framework according to which the subjective perspectivity of imaginings and a fortiriori of other mental states
does not consist in the representation of oneself at all, but rather in the representation of certain (phenomenal) properties
(of external objects and persons) and certain property profiles to which the subject stands in a special relationship. I will
then discuss how this framework can easily accommodate a very central empirical observation that the alternative model
cannot easily explain. Our conscious experiences in which we put ourselves in other’s perspectives are subject to what psy-
chologists and cognitive scientists call egocentric default, anchoring or bias. That means that in imagining being somebody
else we still retain a lot about how we are. The suggested framework of phenomenal property profiles can capture this thick
aspect of self-involvement in our conscious experience.

15 The concept of consciousness: a four-fold taxonomy and a unified conception

Jakub Jonkisz
Faculty of Management and Computer Science, University of Bielsko-Biala, Bielsko-Biala, POLAND

In contemporary debates, as well as in research projects and clinical practice, a significant number of varieties of conscious-
ness have come to be distinguished: phenomenal and access, intransitive and transitive, creature and state, sensorimotor
and perceptual, first-order and higher-order, reflexive, core and self, normal and impaired and altered, minimal, clouded and
epileptic, visual and auditory, bodily and social, animal and machine – to name but a few. It is argued that virtually all of
them can be understood as constituted with reference to just four features of consciousness: its being cognizable from the
inside and from the outside, its referring to things, its depending on the states of an organism and its possessing diverse
functions. It would thus appear that almost all varieties of consciousness are ultimately amenable to being accommodated
within a four-fold taxonomy: one consisting of epistemic kinds, semantic orders, physiological states and pragmatic types of
consciousness.
If that is so, then it seems reasonable to hope that such a four-fold taxonomy would itself be clear enough to serve as a
sound theoretical framework and practical tool for subsequent research in the field. For example, it would allow one to map
out the relations between different aspects of consciousness in theoretically useful terms, enable more consistent analysis of
certain well known phenomena (e.g. blindsight, forms of agnosia), afford an enhanced toolset for characterizing impaired
states of consciousness, provide richer descriptions of animal consciousness and enable the establishing of more precise
criteria for putative ascriptions of machine consciousness. Of equal importance, though, is that this taxonomy makes a sig-
nificant step towards a properly formulated concept of consciousness itself – one that promises to integrate, or even perhaps
unify, consciousness studies as a field.
On the basis of the current state of the research presented here, it will be argued that any such unified concept of con-
sciousness should then be thought of as resting on a combination of biologically construed information (that will be evolu-
tionarily embedded, socially altered and subjectively grounded) and the four fundamental features of consciousness posited
within the proposed taxonomy (namely, its dual epistemic accessibility, semantic referentiality, physical determination and
pragmatic functionality). The thought that the resulting conception could be expected to lend justificatory weight to a com-
mitment to the ontological homogeneity of consciousness, construed specifically as a (biological) process of utilizing infor-
mation in action, will also then be explored.

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16 Who the Hell is Conscious, and What the Heck of? – A Constructivist Solution
to the Mind-Body Problem
Kallio Ilkka
Independent scholar, Helsinki, FINLAND

After an impressive load of experimental evidence, everyone nowadays knows that consciousness isn’t necessary for percep-
tion. Hence, it’s natural to ask what it is that consciousness is necessary for. Perception is always about the now and present.
Consciousness thus seems to be needed for experiencing the temporally and spatially absent, essentially the past and future.
In fact, it’s impossible to be conscious of the present at all. Consciousness always lags perception by about half a second,
Benjamin Libet experimentally found out. A percept itself, then, is never a conscious experience, only the possibly following
thought about it is. Phenomenality’s or experientiality’s being a sufficient condition for consciousness is thereby ruled out
whereas it is necessary for consciousness and all other experience by definition.
As the past is gone and the future waiting in the wings one can’t experience them directly but only through their indirect
conscious representations. Like David Rosenthal has persistently argued, conscious experiences are of one representational
order higher than is required of perception.
A temporally bidirectional mental structure about absence, consciousness may equal Endel Tulving’s episodic memory
shown by Demis Hassabis to be essential for thinking about future as well. Consciousness is never primarily about physical
things but always about mental constructs – like past and future – that may or may not be grounded in physical reality.
Our physical bodies have somehow become capable of creating mental constructs to compound our originally purely
physical experience. Alas, within consciousness studies mental constructs are habitually conflated with their intentions.
Peter Carruthers distinguishes himself by having at least remarked upon this theoretically fateful overlooking of the Brenta-
nian difference between the perception-based physical and the consciousness- based mental contents of the mind.
We tend to conflate the mental person with its physical body, ourselves’ included and in particular. Consciousness is
imputed to the body although only the constructed person is capable of experiencing mental entities, i.e. being conscious.
Furthermore, it’s only ever conscious of other things in its own ontological category, the class of mental constructs, never of
anything physical.
The physical and the mental are not two independently existing classes of substances or even of properties. Nor do they
share a mysterious identity. The physical is the perceptible. The mental – though constructed by the physical body – is what
is only seen with the mind’s eye, i.e. what resides in the mental space of consciousness.
It’s pointless to argue for physical reduction of the mental as that Rylean category mistake in reverse wouldn’t explain
but would eliminate the constructed consciousness altogether. Even Daniel Dennett and the Churchlands might not revel in
the new-found Zombieland.
Julian Jaynes explained how the mental construct of consciousness, the progenitor of all the rest, might first have come
about on the basis of metaphor. As our financialized society is increasingly being built on belief- dependent mental con-
structs, aka Searlean institutional facts, it matters what we think of them, the more so the more basic ones are in question.
The problem of consciousness is a matter of life and death.

17 Attribution and quality of non-human consciousness

Yasuko Kitano
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Tokyo, Gunma, JAPAN

It has been 20 years since Aaron Sloman (1992) said, “there’s no point in expecting agreement on which subset is required
for an animal or machine to be conscious.” His concern has not yet disappeared in that our concept of “consciousness” con-
sists of a large number of clusters and thus “unpacking the suitcase of consciousness” (Minsky 2006) is necessary. Nonethe-
less, it is also true that the study of consciousness has advanced during the last 20 years. From a philosophical point of view, I
wish to shed light on three major issues for future research into non-human consciousness.
Firstly, the following three issues have been high on the agenda.
(1) To dissociate two questions: attribution (to oneself, to other members of the species, or to trans-species members
of the social network) and phenomenology of conscious experience.
(2) To specify the articulation of phenomenology in the particular type of consciousness (human, non-human animal
or, artifact).
(3) To specify the informational role of awareness in such conscious systems.
In these, Integrated Information Theory (IIT, Tononi 2008) and Attention Schema Theory (AST, Graziano 2013) make

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significant contributions. They have different theoretical focuses and advantages. IIT focuses on point (2): it starts from
phenomenology and aims to explain the key aspects of content such as qualitative unity and conceptual distinction. In con-
trast, AST, taking human sociality as a starting point, can avoid the problems about consciousness-attribution in point (1)
and specify which informational chunk has to do with awareness, where it also has an advantage in point (3). Secondly, I
argue that they have different problems with overgeneralization; and lastly, that IIT and AST are compatible with a variety
of possibilities of non-human consciousness in both attribution and phenomenology.

18 Chalmers versus existential phenomenology on experience and reality

Knowles Jonathan
Philosophy and Religious Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Kolsås, NORWAY

According to a standard view, since conscious experience is a product of our brains, and knowledge is a feature of con-
sciousness, we can never really know or at least be totally certain about anything of our surroundings; for we might be a
brain in vat, or in the Matrix. In different ways, David Chalmers (2005, 2012) and, building on the ideas of the ‘existen-
tial phenomenologists’, Hubert and Stephen Dreyfus (2005, henceforth ‘D&D’) reject this line of thinking: for both, the
possibility of envatment, though real, does not bar knowledge of our surroundings, though it may bar knowledge of the
underlying nature of these surroundings. For Chalmers this is because there is a certain flexibility in what our concepts like
‘water’, ‘hair’ and even ‘electron’ refer to: they refer to whatever causes certain characteristic experiences, and as long as the
structure of these experiences is instantiated by the world, they are veridical. For D&D by contrast the thought is simpler:
experience just is, phenomenologically speaking, embodied coping with external things like tables and chairs; so – at least
assuming phenomenological analysis has a certain priority in our understanding of consciousness – in a Matrix world, with
the same experience, we are still coping with such external things, and thus presumably also having (mainly) true beliefs
about them. However D&D do not think that our beliefs about underlying causal processes, such as ‘germs cause disease’,
need remain true; whereas Chalmers thinks they will if our experience faithfully tracks an underlying causal structure in
the Matrix.
In this paper I defend the existential phenomenlogical position (or at least something similar) as favourable to Chalm-
ers’. Chalmers picture is one in which experiences represent the world but are themselves non- relationistically character-
ised; moreover, they represent reality only up to causal-structural isomorphism, so that the categorical basis of that reality
is left open by what we learn from them. The view has led Chalmers to consider the possibility of panpsychism or panpro-
topsychism as theories of the categorical basis of reality (Chalmers 2013).
There are several problems with this line: i) it makes it unclear (I will argue) what it is to be in Matrix as opposed to a
non-Matrix world; ii) Chalmers’ view of experience as something intrinsic is, as D&D would point out, phenomenologi-
cally implausible (G. E. Moore’s idea of the ‘transparency’ of experience is also relevant here); iii) panpsychism (and similar
views) are bizarre, to be avoided if possible – apart from facing grave challenges in explaining real, organism level conscious-
ness, as Chalmers himself concedes.
Building on D&D’s ideas, we can offer an alternative, more satisfying picture: We see
experience as conversant about a world that is subject-relative, i.e. a world for us (cf. Noë 2004, Thompson 2007), and the
science of physics, and possibly other mechanistic sciences, whatever exactly they reveal (e.g. a Matrix or non-Matrix sce-
nario), as conversant about levels of being which underlie or help to explain the nature of this world. No metaphysics, of
Chalmers’ kind, is involved, and in this way the position is one that we can make sense of and is also naturalistically respecta-
ble (not ‘bizarre’). An apparent drawback of the existential phenomenological view is that it seems it must renounce the goal
of explaining, in any full sense, how we know what we think we know, something Chalmers’ view aspires to do. However that
is arguably not a cost if one gives up – that is, renounces as empty, without denying – the idea of a single, unified ‘Reality’,
‘out there’, to know (cf. Price 2011).

References
Chalmers, D. (2005) ‘The matrix as metaphysics’ in C. Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix,
OUP. (2012) Constructing the World, OUP. (2013) ’Panpsychism and protopanpsychism’ Amherst Lecture in
Philosophy 8, http://www.amherstlecture.org/chalmers2013/chalmers2013_ALP.pdf.
Dreyfus, H. & Dreyfus,
S. (2005) ‘Existential phenomenology and the brave new world of The Matrix’ in C. Grau, ed., Philosophers Ex-
plore the Matrix, OUP.
Noë, A. (2004) Action in Perception, MIT Press.
Price, H. (2011) Naturalism without
Mirrors, OUP.
Thompson, E. (2007) Mind in Life, Harvard UP.

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19 Consciousness, Science, and Philosophy

Kondor Zsuzsanna
Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, HUNGARY

Consciousness was ever related to the mind, quite explicitly to thought (in a broad sense, according to Descartes) and self-
identity. After a time it was considered as being a function, and recent philosophical interest has turned to conscious experi-
ence, whilst scientific research stuck with neural functioning.
In the last decades, consciousness has been considered as being “both the most obvious and the most mysterious fea-
ture of our minds” (Gregory); a fundamental biological adaptation and at the same time a testable and measurable vari-
able (Baars); an illusion (Blackmore); and a brain capacity, viz. the capacity of applying sensorimotor laws (O’Regan). As
a theoretical construct, we can consider it as a linguistic affair (according to Sellars), though scientific evidence may make
us hesitate, and we should be cautious because it is a polymorphic, (and in case of phenomenal consciousness an empty,
semantically disengaged) concept (Sloman). These are just a few influential conceptions.
As we continue to encounter promising advancements in scientific research, it is easy to get the impression that the role
of philosophy regarding consciousness is changing. But it may well be that “philosophers often ask good questions but they
have no techniques for getting the answers”, as Francis Crick put it in an interview. (Blackmore 2005:74) Is it possible that
as with physics, philosophy has to accept the application of different theories when we face different scales?
In my talk, I will suggest that the perspective from and the scale on which philosophical inquiry takes place are im-
portant in conducting scientific research in the long run, and will consider whether different avenues of investigation, such
as dynamic Global Workspace Theory and the sensorimotor approach can be considered as complementary theories on
a common ground. Both approaches have advantages and deficiencies and try to grasp consciousness within a functional
framework and anchor this function into either neuronal activity or bodily skills. But it is worth considering whether we
are talking about the same phenomena when identifying consciousness with special brain activity versus when we regard
consciousness as being a general function of living beings as they relate to their environment relying on their evolving bodily
skills.

20 Representational Resonances of the Claustrum

Laks Alex
Research & Development, Epsilon Learning, Vancouver, CANADA

Representational Resonances of the Claustrum. What kind of thing is consciousness?

If consciousness were a thing, it would have to be a perspective in that it incorporates a representation (being “of some-
thing”) with a singular point of view. And inasmuch as it is generated by the activity of neuronal circuits, consciousness
would contribute to the brain’s primary function by providing the perspective needed to coordinate the body’s actions in the
world. After all, a nervous system requires some unified representation of body and world if it is to successfully move a body
through the world. This paper will show how such representations are formed by the activity of resonating cortical areas
integrated through the claustrum.
The components of consciousness are activated in episodic terms by the distinctively resonating microcircuitry of the
human cortex. The body itself is represented somatotopically by activity along the central sulcus, while its motor actions and
action plans are found anteriorly in the frontal lobe’s “how” pathways (with goals and motivations represented in prefrontal
and orbitofrontal “why” pathways). Features of the world and its objects are maintained posteriorly from representations
of exterosensory qualia through the (3 D) spatial–motion calculations in the “where” pathway of the parietal lobe and the
boundary–shape computations in the “what” pathway of the temporal lobe, respectively. In this way cortical activity can be
seen to constitute the various elements and structures of episodic consciousness, including language; yet it begs an answer
to the question of how these varied cognitive components are integrated into a unified viewpoint.
This “binding problem” is resolved through the deepest layer of cortex with its connections to the claustrum — a wavy,
tapered sheet of uniformly interwoven (excitatory) neurons and (inhibitory) interneurons that resonates in synchrony with
cortical microcircuitry and its episodic representations of the body acting in the world. It is the singular neuronal nucleus
that integrates resonating cortical representations to form the unified experiential space of conscious awareness. In fact,
whereas the cortex has some thirty retinotopic maps of the visual field, the claustrum has just one (in the back corner) that
is laid out physically in three dimensions — as we experience it consciously; and reflecting the cortex, anteriorly it houses an

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integrated representation of the body. [See e.g. Smythies, Edelstein & Ramachandran, 2014, The Claustrum.] The claustrum
solves the binding problem because it instantiates a unitary network of neurons that resonates as an instrumental whole with
cortical representations of the world and the body’s actions in it. Furthermore, its principal outputs project to the caudate
nucleus that mediates voluntary control over bodily movements, to the hippocampal complex with its control over episodic
memory, learning and cognition, as well as to the amygdala with its limbic and affective functions.
Thus, mediated by the claustrum, consciousness becomes the process of neuronal resonances forming the integrated
perspective and representation (or umwelt) the brain uses to coordinate the body’s actions in the world. In short, it is the
brain’s representation of the body in the world.

21 A New View of Human Reality

Yilai Li
N/A, Independent, Suzhou, CHINA

Throughout history, human phenomena have always been identified as including (among other things) thinking and perceiv-
ing. As a consequence of this identification, the makeup of human reality has universally been accepted as either including the
mental or consisting entirely of it (depending on what kind of metaphysical position one holds) and the view that men have
minds is generally taken for granted. This paper offers a new view of human reality. At the core of this view is a new identity
of human phenomena as phenomenal property instantiations. Hence, I claim that human reality includes nothing mental.
Rather, it either partially or entirely (depending on whether or not a physical world is postulated to exist) consists of entities
that bear nothing but phenomenal property or properties and that only exist in very short time spans (many of which are
below 0.5 seconds) as they instantiate their property or properties. I call such entities “subjective existences”. On this view,
the word “consciousness” is just a general term for human phenomena which can be used to refer to any specific human phe-
nomenon. Combining this view of human reality with a sort of non-solipsism, the resulting picture takes being human as well
as other animals as at least primarily a matter of subjective existences successively and often simultaneously instantiating their
property or properties. The paper falls into two parts. P1 elucidates the present view by giving a detailed introduction of sub-
jective existences as well as by showing how various specific human phenomena universally identified as mental phenomena
such as perceiving, remembering, imagining, thinking, having attitudes and experiencing emotions are actually subjective ex-
istences instantiating their property or properties. In P2, I introduce several quasi-regularities that govern the process of being
human (i.e. the process in which subjective existences successively and often simultaneously instantiating their property or
properties) through casually explaining various specific human phenomena. “Why do some people experience illusions while
others under the same circumstances don’t? Why can some people remember a certain event under certain circumstances
while some others who experienced the same can’t? Why do some people often have creative thoughts while others don’t?
Why does some word mean one thing to some people while it means another to others? Why is some people’s attribution of
an event different than others’? Why do some people take a positive attitude toward a certain thing while others take a nega-
tive one? Why do some people often change their attitude toward a certain thing while others don’t?” Just like anyone else as
I assume, I can’t give clear-cut answers to any of such questions. However, due to the existence of quasi-regularities, I can do
“the next best thing” of giving clear-cut casual explanations to the phenomena referred to in such questions.

22 Fully integrated consciousness is not computable

Maguire Phil
Computer Science, Maynooth University, Maynooth, IRELAND
Maguire Rebecca
National College of Ireland, Dublin, IRELAND

A leading theory of consciousness is Tononi’s (2008) integrated information theory. The theory proposes that conscious-
ness is an information processing phenomenon and can thus be quantified in terms of a systems’ organizational structure,
specifically its capacity to integrate information. According to Tononi, what we mean when we say that the human brain
produces consciousness is that it integrates information, thus producing behaviour which reflects the actions of a unified,
singular system.
We offer an alternative quantification to Tononi’s (2008) of the integration of an encoding process operating on a stimu-
lus as the minimum informational distance between the original state of the encoded stimulus and any possible edited state.

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If every state is completely different to the original, then the integration is 1; if there exists an edited state which is only trivi-
ally removed, the integration is 0.
For example, when an image on a digital camera is altered, the informational distance between the camera’s original and
edited state is small. In contrast, a neurosurgeon struggles to edit the memories of a person’s brain: changing even the slight-
est detail requires the contents of their brain to be completely reconstructed. The edit distance is so great that her original
brain state is largely useless for identifying a target edited brain state.
Using this formulization we prove an interesting result, namely that lossless information integration cannot be achieved by
a computable process. According to the integrated information theory, when we think of another person as conscious we are
viewing them as a completely integrated and unified information processing system, with no feasible means of disintegrating
their conscious cognition into disjoint components. We assume that their behaviour calls into play all of their memories and
reflects full coordination of their sensory input. We prove that this form of complete integration cannot be modeled computa-
tionally.
The apparent unitary nature of consciousness does not require a mystical process of integration which transcends physi-
cal computability. Our result merely establishes a link between integration and irreversibility, the cause of which can be due
to limitations in the observer’s perspective. While we intuitively assume that consciousness must be a fundamental property
as defined from a God’s eye perspective, the attribution of this property always takes place in a social context. When people
attribute consciousness to a system they are acknowledging a subjective inability to break it down into a set of independ-
ent components, forcing them to treat its actions as the behaviour of a unified, integrated whole. The irreversibility here is
observer-centric, as opposed to absolute.
Rather than establishing a new property of consciousness, our result can therefore be interpreted as merely clarifying
what is meant by the use of this concept. Specifically, conscious behaviour is that which is resistant to our best attempts at
decomposition. What we mean by consciousness is a form of action that is incomputable.

23 Methodology of consciousness restoration: differentiation or integration?

Maksakova Olga
Rehabilitation, Burdenko Neurosurgical Institute, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The work with unconscious patients after traumatic brain injuries need not only in specialized knowledge and practical
skills. We ought to possess main direction of our actions and what our expectations are in every bit of interaction with the
patient.
Patient’s behavioral patterns emerging both as reactions (including vegetative) to interventions or to environmental
factors, and without any external influences are transformed to clinical conclusions based on classification approach con-
cerning awareness more than consciousness. Effective work is hindered because of ignorance of phenomenological experi-
ence. Extraordinary and complex phenomenon of consciousness appears by way of linear “recovery” scaled-down model
restricting contribution to theory of consciousness and to treatment of TBI patients.
D.Chalmers proposes to assign multilevel oppositions to characterize consciousness: 1. phenomenological - neurobio-
logical;
2. metaphysical - epistemological;
3. perceptual - cognitive; 4. integrating - differentiating.

We’ll discuss role of the last opposition in rehabilitation process.
Some rules have to be assimilated before interactions
with the patient: body and mind are inseparable; brain is part of the body not the only substrate of investigation as neuro-
science assumes. Experience of our body interrelated with the world is a starting point of all mind forms. Consciousness
starts from bodily feelings via bodily images. Person is the unity of brain, body and environment. This is important not only
because of methodology, but pin practice, otherwise rehabilitation of unconscious patients wouldn’t go beyond physical and
pharmacological exposures to nervous tissue. Differentiation of scientific methodologies isn’t more than a convenient mode
of knowledge, yet their integration doesn’t come to formal facts summing.
Integration and differentiation are complemen-
tary in rehabilitation process. Problems of different levels arise successively: distinction of separate bodily signals — control
of vital functions; familiarization of one’s one body as entirety — separation from outward things; integration of biodynami-
cal and sensory tissue — formation of “living movement”, its reduction to motor program; appearance of others in the field
— choice of significant persons. This dynamics of oppositions is very individual and in some cases results in reconstructing
entity that recognizes itself as the person.

Our tools and methods are utterly differentiated. Poorly translatable professional languages address to different aspects
of “body-mind” phenomenon. Appeal to interdisciplinary work often appears as arranging the so-called individual rehabili-
tation programs that come to differentiated training of disturbed functions. This approach is unacceptable for unconscious
patients, who are in need of integrating context. Only transdisciplinary rehabilitation team is capable to use and to give back
a patient integration-differentiation opposition of consciousness. In frames of their professions participants communicate

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and interact with each other and a patient according definite rules, arrange dynamical contacts by feedback, interpret signals,
change intervention pliably.

Dialogue is the most powerful tool of rehabilitation team. According humanistic paradigm the presence of Other and
communication are essential for emerging and shaping of consciousness. The team is the best performer of Other’s role, yet
it is able to integrate patient’s family and to teach dialogical actions.
The team approach may become research instrument in
science of consciousness with self-organizing complex system paradigm.

24 Consciousness as Concept-Based and Dunamic Mental State

Martikainen Viljo
School of Science and Technology, Aalto University, Espoo, FINLAND

I am approaching the eternal problem of consciousness as a scientific mental realist. As a realist I see man as mentally steered
biological, social, and rational actor created by the physical, chemical, biological, and cultural phases of the evolutionary
processes. As a scientist I am trying to make an understandable description, a logical explanation, and a reliable proof of the
substance, structure and functions of consciousness.
Ungerleider and Mishkin found 1982 the dorsal and ventral streams when brains were processing visual information. I
have supposed that the dorsal stream can be seen as the on-line connection and the ventral steam as the memory line con-
nection with subject’s environment and its changes.
In my research work I have supposed that analogically the same type of dynamics happens in all sensory areas. Thus our
mental experiencings, or our sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and thinking, are always formed by these dynamic on-line
and memory-line connections with our environment and its changes.
In fact I believe that the ability of central and periph-
eral nervous systems to this kind of on-line interpretations of the meanings of the sensory information has worked as the
main factor when the fittest for surviving were selected.
Our sensations, perceptions, thoughts, and thinking are all subsisting entities and at the same time mental elements of
our minds. All of them need a material or existing bases formed by brain system and its connections with the outer world.
Thus my ontology is two-dimensional monism.
This processual formation and situation relevant use of concepts has made it so difficult to find out what consciousness
is. I see consciousness as concept-based mental state, which is our normal mental state of our everyday awake time enabling
us to perform our daily duties without any greater problems. Similarly I see also perception and knowledge as a concept
based mental state in which the attributes are describing the object of subject’s attention.
The brain’s ability to make this transformation on line has been the key criteria when the survivals have been selected in
the processes of evolution. The sensory information must become interpreted and fast. That’s why the human concepts are
dynamic and in most cases also situation relevantly filled with those attributes which explain the different meanings of the
subject’s environment and the objects of attention.

References:
Baars, B. (1988) A cognitive Theory of Cosciousness. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Bad-
dely, Allan.(1997) Human Memory: Theory and Practice. Hove, UK: Psychology Press Ltd. Martikainen, Viljo.
(2004) Concepts and Mind as Dynamic Memory Systems Structuring the Human Mental. http://otalib.aalto.
fi/fi/kokoelmat_tiedonhaku/e-julkaisut/vaitoskirjat/
Pylkkänen, Paavo. (2007) Mind, Matter and the Impli-
cate Order, New York and Berlin, Springer. Revonsuo, Antti. (2010) Consciousness - The Science of Subjectiv-
ity. London, Psychology Press. Seager, William.(1999) Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and assess-
ment. London Roudledge.

25 Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Consciousness

Mulder Jesse
Philosophy, Utrecht University, Utrecht, NETHERLANDS

There is a tendency to chop up the central question as to the mind’s place in nature into bits, each to be dealt with by con-
structing a dedicated piece of theory. Consciousness, for instance, is thought to be one amongst many features of mind
(along with intentionality, rationality, emotion, perception, behavior, etc.). And consciousness itself is divided into (e.g.)
‘creature consciousness’ and ‘state consciousness’, the latter again into a state’s ‘qualitative’, ‘phenomenal’ and ‘subjective
character’, its ‘accessibility’, its ‘reflexivity’, etc. The bits of theory developed for each of these aspects are to be empirically

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tested (if applicable), and finally to be put together so as to yield an overarching Grand Theory. Robert van Gulick expresses
as much in the conclusion of his recent overview article:
“A comprehensive understanding of consciousness will likely require theories of many types. ... [A] synthetic and plural-
istic approach may provide the best road to future progress” (SEP: Consciousness, revised 2014).
It is important to distinguish the variety of mental phenomena, but though there is nothing wrong in principle with a
subsequent ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, there is a danger lurking: accepting a distinction all too easily comes with accept-
ing a separation, and hence with the thought that the relevant phenomena can be adequately understood in isolation (a
modular theory of the mind, for instance, is particularly prone to such a conception).
This paper proposes to explore a view on consciousness (and the mind) that is strongly unified from the very start,
based on an Aristotelian (hylomorphic) understanding of unity in general. An exploration of what the unity of a diverse
range of natural phenomena consists in leads to a distinctively formal understanding of the mind as the principle of unity of
the hosting organism. The approach is shown to be evolution-friendly, and to be void of any traces of dualism: qua principle
of unity, the mind is on a par with e.g. the principle of unity of an electron, of water, or of a tree.
Consciousness is what logically distinguishes the principles of unity of sensitive beings (animals) from the principles of
unity of living things in general – just as a form of teleology logically distinguishes the principles of unity of animate from
those of inanimate nature (and just as temporality logically distinguishes the principles of unity of concrete objects in gen-
eral from those of abstract objects).
The Aristotelian approach has several advantages: (1) subjectivity, qualitative character and the like now appear as dis-
tinguishable but inseparable aspects of consciousness; (2) it allows for a study of ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ with-
out identifying consciousness with such correlates (for consciousness is the principle uniting such correlates into one con-
scious organism); and (3) it allows for a holistic understanding of conscious beings throughout their (micro- and macro-
level) organization, thus avoiding the exclusive identification of mind with brain, which tends to reduce the rest of the body
to the status of a mere tool.

26 The Epistemology of Consciousness: Consciousness as a Magic Trick

Ryan Nefdt, Philosophy
University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UNITED KINGDOM

The problem of consciousness has perplexed thinkers from various disciplines for decades (perhaps centuries). Roughly,
how do we account for an essentially qualitative experience within a physical system like a human brain? This is the “hard
problem” or the “the problem of experience” discussed by Chalmers (1995). Along with the information-processing aspect
of perception (the “easy problem”) there is a distinctively subjective aspect, the experience of which it is like to be in these
states. In this paper, I explore this issue from the perspective of epistemology, specifically what the current epistemic state
of research in the field of consciousness is. I argue that the sheer difficulty of the problem should not lead us into the sort
of epistemic defeatism of McGinn’s transcendental naturalism (1996) (or the “apparent” comprehensive treatment of con-
sciousness found in books such as Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991)). I compare our current epistemic state to the
situation prior to the revelation of a magic trick (not to be confused with the “Magic” approach of McGinn’s DIME charac-
terisation (1996: 41)). I further argue that, as the analogy suggests, we have the conceptual and theoretical tools to deal with
the problem of consciousness (unlike homo-erectus and the mathematics proof) but the missing ingredient is a systematic
correspondence between the qualitative phenomena and the physical neural system, i.e. a step by step explanation of the re-
lationship between these states and their physical instantiations. In this way I conclude that cognitive science faces a similar
(and no more devastating) dilemma to the biolinguist attempting to explain the physical and biological underpinnings of
her generative grammars. In this latter case, there is no suggestion of epistemic defeatism or conceptual ineptitude but rather
optimism and direction for future research, I suggest a similar optimism for consciousness studies.

27 Troubles with pre-reflective self-consciousness

Alfredo Paternoster
Department of Arts and Philosophy, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, ITALY

The notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness has recently played a prominent role in the debates about the self. Several
authors, both in analytic and phenomenological tradition, have suggested that there is a particular kind of self-consciousness
that goes (intrinsically) with every conscious act. It is a very precocious kind of mental state that can already be found in

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newborn infants, at the age of 2-3 months or even before.

In this talk I discuss to which extent and how we can make sense of this notion. I will show that, even if there are certain
precocious mental abilities that, in a revisionary way of speaking, are described as a form of self- consciousness, yet this
qualification is misleading, and there are good reasons to insist that any kind of self- consciousness is a more sophisticated
representational state, which necessarily requires mental abilities that are available only since the age of one year and a half,
to say the least.
Firstly, I take into consideration Gallagher & Zahavi’s notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness. I critically discuss its
phenomenological evidence and its psychological evidence. My conclusion will be that phenomenological evidence is poor,
while psychological evidence shows, at most, that pre-reflective self- consciousness takes place in the baby not before 12-15
months.
Then I challenge Bermudez’s claim that implicit knowledge about one’s own body is a form of pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness, comparing my view to Musholt’s and Baker’s similar (on some aspects) accounts. The outline of my argument is
the following. Even if infants do have states of objectual consciousness, they can hardly be conscious of their self, since the
self is not a simple object like any other (e.g., like an external object or a part of the body). The notion of self involves, to say
the least, the whole body of the organism, experienced as one’s own body. Therefore an infant cannot have the sort of repre-
sentations required by the consciousness of the self.
To this it could be replied that the concept of pre-reflective self-consciousness has been set out exactly to argue that
there is a kind of non-objectual self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of consciousness that does not amount to a relation between
an organism and a particular object (in this case, the self). So the argument to the effect that pre-reflective self-conscious-
ness is not self-consciousness would be question begging, since it assumes from the start (as a premise) a requirement on
the notion of self-consciousness that the friends of pre-reflective self-consciousness reject.
Yet, I refrain from concluding that the issue is merely terminological. In fact, different theoretical consequences can be
drawn depending on assuming rather than rejecting the talk of pre-reflective self-consciousness. In the final part of the talk I ex-
plain why I think this is the case and so the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness should after all be rejected as misleading.

28 Consciousness is nothing but INTERFACE phenomenon

Raisuddin Shaikh
Reservoir, Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, Noida Up, INDIA

Consciousness is nothing but INTERFACE phenomenon. Similar to that happens in computers and mobiles. There inter-
facing happens due to traffic-effect of electricity in the electronic circuits.
A living being gets ability of Consciousness due
to TRAFFIC EFFECT of flow of nerve transmitters in the neural network. Consciousness is by design and has no Free Will
which has also been proved by Psychologist Skinner’s experiments. Thus consciousness now becomes a subject of study of
Science or Natural Laws.
A comparative study of road traffic and social organization will aid to understand the above. A city is a living- being and
a nation too is a living-being. Therefore a city and a nation both have consciousness. When we block any road to a city for
traffic, the city responds as a whole. The phenomenon like Phantom Traffic Jam and others can substantiate further.
We are struggling to understand Consciousness because we first missed to define what life is. The phenomenon of life
precedes the phenomenon of consciousness.

29 Tensions in Clark’s and Chalmers’ extended mind theses

Schlicht Tobias
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY

If the mind is extended, then the vehicles of mental processes include parts of the environment as constitutive elements
(Clark & Chalmers 1998, Menary 2010). For example, a blind man’s cane may count as a cognitive extension in the case of
seeing, or a smartphone may count as a cognitive extension of memory. In this debate cognition and consciousness are typi-
cally distinguished. Whereas ‘cognition’ comprises a bundle of functions like perceiving, thinking, remembering, learning
etc., consciousness is understood in its subjective phenomenal sense, i.e. in the sense that there is something that it is like
to experience something (tasting red wine, say). The strongest claim in this debate is that both cognition and consciousness
are extended (Noë 2009); the weakest claim is that neither cognition nor consciousness is literally extended, while both are
supported causally by these external factors (Adams & Aizawa 2008); finally, Clark (2009) and Chalmers (2008) defend a

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position in-between these extremes, arguing that while cognition is extended, consciousness is not. In this talk it is argued
that this middle position is not plausible. Since both authors seem to argue from different starting points with regard to con-
sciousness, it is crucial to discuss them separately.
First, Chalmers presupposes (a) a wrong-headed notion of ‘cognition’ as ‘information-processing, where information
is to be understood in Shannon’s sense, and (b) his own distinction between the ‘easy problems’ of explaining cognition
and the ‘hard’ problem of explaining phenomenal consciousness. It will be shown that this notion of information does not
capture what is essential about human cognition, and that the easy problems cannot be solved in the way it is presupposed
in the argument. That has fatal consequences for the extended cognition claim.
Second, although Clark does not agree with
Chalmers’ dualism but instead defends functionalism also for consciousness, he still argues that consciousness is different
from other cognitive functions in that it cannot extend beyond the brain (2009). He challenges others who argue that con-
sciousness is also extended with the causal-constitution-fallacy that had been put forward against his own account by Adams
& Aizawa (2008). Yet, his own reason for thinking that consciousness is brainbound is not persuasive as a criterion to single
out consciousness from other cognitive functions.
Finally, it is demonstrated, based on the example of Otto, the patient suf-
fering from Alzheimer’s disease, (1) that Otto’s cognitive process of remembering would not get off the ground if it weren’t
for some involvement of a conscious element such that Clark and Chalmers would have to argue either that both conscious-
ness and cognition are extended or neither of them.

30 A Bandwidth Model of Consciousness: Integrating the Carrier Medium Into

Our Conception of Modulatory Phenomena
Smith Kaleb
Clinical Psychology, Saybrook University, Seattle, USA

Consciousness research has reached a standstill, according to eminent theoretician, Bernard Baars, during a recent Stanford
University symposium. While I am in agreement with Baars that there have been few major advances in the field for some
time, part of the problem seems to be that we’ve exhausted the utility of our current metaphors. For this reason, I’d like to
propose a new metaphor: a model which conceptualizes consciousness as a spectrum of frequencies whose natural divi-
sion into discrete bandwidths defines the boundaries of state-specific content and perception. By defining consciousness in
terms of radiant spectra, many of the known laws governing the electromagnetic spectrum can be applied to comprehend
the subtle mechanics of subjectivity, objectivity, states of consciousness, dimensionality, and sensate awareness. In thinking
of consciousness as information traversing a medium, we are granted a new set of analogies with which we can apply the
well-defined principles of telecommunication to understand facets of awareness previously outside the limits of our pur-
view. By modeling consciousness in this way, and utilizing the known processes governing modulatory phenomenon, a valu-
able set of insights can be inferred; generalizable properties of transmission which can be applied to understand the non-ob-
servable ranges of periodic phenomena. Among these generalizable characteristics are the properties of carrier medium and
the mechanics of its density in nature, from which we may apply the model of carrier modulation to better understand the
transmission of consciousness across unobservable or yet-immeasurable mediums in nature. By applying these established
spectral models to conscious experience, we are afforded a set of useful new parameters with which to represent the ranges
of human awareness and the discrete states which divide our consciousness systemically, as distinct ranges of frequency, or
bandwidths.

31 On Measurement of Consciousness
Sriramamurti P
Centre for Consciousness Studies, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Consciousness is what knows and measures everything else. Then how to measure consciousness itself? One cannot use
a candle light to illumine the brilliance of Sun. But nature provided inner and outer senses that can be used by the spirit
entity – a speck of Supreme Source of Consciousness to understand and measure consciousness at different levels. It is the
same spirit entity embodied in human body that experiences consciousness of objects and the self at various levels. All per-
ceptions of consciousness have neural correlates besides mental modifications and they are recorded in human brain. Each
experience has a neural impulse circuitry that is imprinted on the brain and perceived at the physical level of brain reflecting
on the face. Not only the outward sensory currents helping perception of internal objects, but also the inner feelings, emo-

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 1 . 1 T he C oncept of C onsciousness

tions, higher ecstasies of spiritual experiences reflect in the highly neuroplastic brain contusions and features. Physiognomy
of a person speaks of his inner mental and spiritual states. Conversely, a person who contemplates those human forms can
imbibe those qualities in them. In this process, an assessment of the perceived person’s attainment can be inferred. These
attainments do influence the surrounding physical force fields as well which can be measured by EEG, fMRI and such in-
struments. Though it is only an embodied human spirit that can perceive others’ level of consciousness, the effects on sur-
rounding physical force fields as well as the behavioural patterns of such entities throw light on the level of consciousness of
the subject spirit entity. The level of consciousness reached by a person can be detected by another subject who has reached
the same level or higher level only.
The religious traditions extant in the world attained higher levels of spiritual consciousness and set forth the attainment
of those levels as the summum bonum of human life. They taught different techniques for their attainment and described
several stages one has to cross while gradually traversing the path to the goal. The changes that come about in the mental
attitude and personal behaviour of the seekers are explained in detail. Also, the changes coming about in their physical fea-
tures, emotions and their influence on physical and social environment are described. They are experiential, experimental
and repeatable in nature making them appeal to scientific minded seekers. They are verifiable by modern machines also.
The inherent characteristics of Spirit Force are reflected at every level of creation - spiritual, mental and physical - both
in macrocosm and human microcosm. The currents of Spirit Force emerging from its Transcendental Reservoir remain im-
manent in all individual spirit entities sustaining and controlling them and their activities. All the activities of Spirit Force
are accompanied by sound vibrations resonating at all levels in a subtle manner. They are felt at nerve centres and apertures
in the spine and brain casting their shadows on mental and physical counterparts and natural, bio-chemical, electromagnetic
fields and social surroundings. They can be studied and measured substantiating the gradual ascension of the spirit by obser-
vation of neuro- impulse circuitry patterns and behavioural modes.

References :
1. The Principal Upanishads, Ed. S. Radharkrishnan.
2. Discourses on Radhasoami Faith, Pt. Brahm
Sankar Misra, Param Guru Maharaj Sahab.
3. Expositions on Truth, Ultimate Reality and Supreme Being, Re-
vered Prof. Prem Saran Satsangi Sahab.

32 Consciousness and the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds

Stoll Joshua
Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, USA

The conceptual problem of other minds arises as we try to extend our understanding of first person experiences (e.g. pains)
to third person attributions: because I presumably learn or otherwise know what pain (or consciousness in general, for that
matter)is solely from my own experiences, the question becomes how I can make sense of attributions of consciousness to
others. This paper will explore the problem and two ways to assuage the problem: one leaning towards a verificationist, be-
haviorist, or otherwise empiricist answer, the other towards a more innatist or reflectivist answer. After inquiring into these
kinds of answers, I will suggest that they neglect a key feature of our acquaintance with others, and thus of our concept of
consciousness: our second person interactions. I will then approach the conceptual problem from enactive, embodied per-
spectives, emphasizing the role of interaction in the development of several important features of our concept of conscious-
ness.

33 From Extended Mind to Extended Conscious Mind

Telakivi Pii
Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

Why should brain and body be a privileged and exclusive boundary for consciousness? In my paper, I argue that they are
not, and criticize the long-standing internalist tradition in the philosophy of mind. In the past few decades, many philoso-
phers have begun to question the brain-bound view about cognition, for example in discussions concerning the Extended
Mind (EM) (Clark & Chalmers 1998) and 4E-cognition (Gallagher 2008; Ward & Stapleton 2012). However, most of the
proponents of the EM and 4E -theses claim that what extends outside the head is merely the cognitive part of the mind, not
consciousness as conscious/phenomenal experience. My aim is to take a step further, and argue that in addition to cogni-
tion, also conscious experience extends outside the skin and skull.

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The view I am defending, the Extended Conscious Mind (ECM), emphasizes the connectedness of perception, action
and experience: conscious experience is not restricted to or located (solely) in the brain, but instead it is based on inter-
actions between the body, the brain, the environment and other individuals. One promising version of ECM is based on
sensorimotor dynamics (e.g. Noë 2004; O’Regan & Noë 2001), where conscious experience supervenes on the embodied
agent and its dynamic sensorimotor interaction with the environment. I analyse the argument for sensorimotor dynamics
through its main critic, Andy Clark (2009, 2012). Although I disagree with Clark’s conclusion that conscious experience is
purely a neural process, his arguments offer a fruitful foundation for a further development of the theory of extended con-
sciousness. It has even been argued (Pepper 2013) that Clark’s own theory against ECM is not only compatible with ECM
but it actually supports it. I scrutinize Pepper’s argument, further develop it, and claim that if we accept extended cognition,
we should also accept extended consciousness.
In the remainder of the paper, I examine a very interesting case related to ECM – sensory substitution (SS). In SS, sub-
jects can learn to feel through technical devices (see Bach-y-Rita & Kercel 2003). However, whether SS shows that con-
scious experiences can be formed outside the head is controversial. Clark takes SS to be a case only for EM, not for ECM.
Others (e.g. Kiverstein & Farina 2012; Noë 2004) claim that SS shows that also ECM is correct. I agree with the latter, and
suggest that Clark and other opponents of ECM should accept that the conscious mind extends outside the head, too.

34 Are phenomenal concepts innate?

Weksler Assaf
Philosophy, Ben Gurion University, Modiin, ISRAEL

Phenomenal concepts are the concepts we employ in thinking about what it is like to have conscious experiences of various
types. These concepts play a key role in the debate between physicalists and anti- physicalists. I focus on simple (rather than
complex) phenomenal concepts, such as the phenomenal concepts of color experiences. In order to possess the phenom-
enal concept of a given experience type, one needs to undergo an experience of that type (call this “the possession con-
straint”). It might appear obvious that the possession constraint implies that phenomenal concepts are learned. In the talk
I would like to examine the prospects and implications of the contrary hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that phenomenal
concepts are innate. The paper has three sections:
Section 1: On an influential view of innate representations, an innate representation is (roughly) a mental symbol “de-
signed” by natural selection for the purpose of indicating (causally co-varying with) a specific property (Prinz, 2002). This
view implies that some perceptual representations (e.g., of colors) are innate (cf. Prinz, ibid.). Utilizing this framework, I
argue that the possession constraint is compatible with the innateness of phenomenal concepts. On the suggested story, phe-
nomenal concepts are not learned from experience. Rather, these concepts are “dormant” and are “activated” by experience.
Section2: On the influential constitutional account of phenomenal concepts, the latter are not triggered by experiences;
they are instead constituted by them (Balog, 2012; Papineau, 2002, 2007). The constitutional account therefore conflicts
with the hypothesis that phenomenal concepts are innate. I explore a way of resolving the conflict, by holding that phenom-
enal concepts are only partly innate, because they are constituted by experiences whose content is innate.
Section 3: Tooby, Cosmides and Barrett (2005) develop a strategy for arguing for innateness of concepts. Applied to the
case of phenomenal concepts, the upshot is the following argument. (1) There are innate mechanisms using some phenom-
enal concepts; (2) innate mechanisms require innate concepts; therefore (3) some phenomenal concepts are innate. I assess
this argument. Specifically, I examine whether (2) should be rejected in favor of a weaker premise, according to which innate
mechanisms require concepts that are (at least) partly innate. With this modification, the argument can at most establish
that phenomenal concepts are partly innate.

Bibliography: Balog, K. (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In S. Gozzano & C. Hill (Eds.),
New Perspectives on Type Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press. Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking
About Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Papineau, D. (2007). Phenomenal and Perceptual
Concepts. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Prinz, J. J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Tooby, J., Cosmides, L.,
& Barrett, H. C. (2005). Resolving the Debate on Innate Ideas. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.),
The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. New York: Oxford University Press.

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1.2. Metaphysics of consciousness

35 Compatibility of Rumi’s revelations with quantum interpretation of

consciousness
Ahmadpour Shahriar
Anatomical Sciences, North Khorasan University of Medical Sciences, Bojnurd, IRAN
Foghi Khadijeh
North Khorasan University of Medical Sciences, Bojnurd, IRAN

In recent decades neuroscientists have attempted to unravel the hidden aspects of consciousness with quantum principles.
One of the most particular theory was proposed by Penrose and Hameroff (Orchestrated Objective Reduction, OR). Ac-
cording to Penrose, consciousness is particular types of wave collapse (reduction) which occur in neuronal level, in sense
that consciousness exist as an indispensable value of our universe . Curiously the same interpretation on consciousness
could be traced in some eastern mystical texts, in which various forms of consciousness were expressed . The term cosmic
consciousness and conscious elements have been used in the religious texts of Hinduism and soofism. Undoubtedly one
of the most known soofi , poem and theologian in the eastern world is Rumi(1207). His poetries have been well known
through the world, but one of the valuable aspects of his demeanour, revelation, and the vestige of his grand spiritual experi-
ence in his poets has been missed. His subjective experience (lucid dreaming or revelation) and attitude toward conscious-
ness show a great degree of compatibility with quantum principle both implicitly and explicitly. This paper is an attempt
to elucidate this compatibility and open a new window to approach consciousness issue from a different perspective. This
study provided substantial evidence signifying the depth of Rumi’s view. To sum up seven main axes from Rumi’s thoughts
were inferred:1) Universe is made up from fine particles 2) which are in motion (kinetic) constantly 3) these particle are
conscious 4) Fine elements of the universe are of potential to convert and form different materials (in philosophy terms:
property) .5) All creatures (animate and inanimate) are composed of these fine and conscious elements, but posses differ-
ent forms and level of organization (substance in philosophy term). 6) These fine elements could communicate each other
by means of wave (whisper). 7) Cosmic consciousness. According to Rumi it can be assumed consciousness, likes Platonic
value and physical constants, is everywhere but due to some biologic and evolutionary constraints we cannot perceive other
forms of consciousness. In other word Rumi believed that consciousness is everywhere and everything is conscious ( fun-
damentalism). Rumi has attempted to clarify this point that consciousness exists as an element of universe and hence con-
scious-based objects are buoyant in a cosmic matrix of consciousness. In this way, one will be able to reach at conscious
level when interact with emitted whispers (wave).Thus each creature, animate or inanimate, as a function of wave will come
into existence after superposition. The practical Sequel of soofism attitude toward the consciousness is some kind of Unity
in that pure consciousness engenders and flows through the all creatures. Therefore the source of consciousness must be
sought somewhere outside of human skull content (not emerged from it).

36 Understanding understanding: how Searleans and behaviourists agree

Andersson Jon Erik
Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, SWEDEN

For Searle, behaviour is not sufficient for phenomenal understanding, while behaviourists, here represented by Dennett,
claim that no accompanying phenomenology is necessary for behavioural understanding. These positions translate into the
exact same formula: ~ (x → y). This is due to a certain familiar logical bond, such that if p is a necessary condition for q, q is a
sufficient condition for p. Given this, we can see that both seek to establish the negation of the following conditional: Behav-
ioural understanding → phenomenal understanding. They seem to disagree, but are ultimately arguing for the same point. They
come to different conclusions regarding what goes on in the Chinese Room solely by the work of implicit premises, while
only two premises can be built from the thought experiment. Their arguments are analysed:
i) Searle:
P1 : Understanding (behavioural)
P2 : ~ Understanding (phenomenal)
P3 (implicit) : U (phenomenal ) ↔

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1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

U simpliciter
Conclusion 1 : ~ U simpliciter (« There is no understanding in the Chinese room ») Conclusion 2 : ~ (U be-

havioural → U simpliciter) (« Behavioural understanding is not sufficient for “real” understanding »)
C1 is derived from P2
and P3, leaving P1 ignored.
C2 is derived from P1 and C1 : if we can conclude that there is no (phenomenal) understand-
ing happening even though we have obvious behavioural understanding, then behavioural understanding is insufficient for
(phenomenal) understanding.
ii) Dennett:
P1 : Understanding (behavioural)
P2 : ~ Understanding (phenomenal)
P3 (implicit) : U (behavioural)
↔ U simpliciter
C1 : U simpliciter (« There is understanding in the Chinese room »)
C2 : ~ (U simpliciter → U phenom-
enal) («Phenomenal understanding is not necessary for “real” understanding»)
C1 is derived from P1 and P3, leaving P2
ignored.
C2 is derived from P2 and C1: if we can conclude that there is (behavioural) understanding happening without
evidence for any phenomenal experience of understanding, then phenomenal understanding is not necessary for (behav-
ioural) understanding.
Apart from the semantic issue of whether to analyse “understanding” phenomenally, behaviourally, disjunctively or con-
junctively, there are methodological and metaphysical insights to be had. In Blindsight, phenomenal visual experience is
not necessary for vision-guided behaviour, while such behaviour is not sufficient for phenomenal experience. The hypoth-
esis is suggested that the conditional in the other direction, phenomenal cognition → behavioural cognition, positively holds
for consciousness as such. This is in fact the contraposition of a standard methodological assumption used when detecting
consciousness in the Vegetative State: ~ behavioural cognition → ~ phenomenal cognition. This seems to be contradicted by
Anton’s Syndrome, but this objection is refuted since it relies on an outdated division between internal and external behav-
iour. Anything measurable by fMRI or MEG should count as behaviour. This denies the possibility of any consciousness at
perfect rest or in frozen matter, and sharpens a metaphysically crucial distinction regarding phenomenological evidence:
if we accept phenomenal cognition → behavioural cognition, then this blocks Descartes inference from there being thinking
to there being a res cogitans, while it still supports James’ “Fundamental Fact”, that consciousness occurs. The ontological
conclusion, with methodological applications, is that consciousness belongs to the category of process and not of object or
property.

37 A physicalist/Topological Dual-Aspect Information Theory of Consciousness.

Awret Uzi
Physics., Trinity Washington University., falls church va., USA

Combining two of David Chalmers’ ‘favorite’ approaches to consciousness - “Constitutive Russellian Protopsychism” and
“Ddual –Aspect Information Theory”, posits information as the protophenomenal categorical bearer of relational/dispo-
sitional microphysical properties. Protophenomenal properties are non- phenomenal but can be shown apriorily to result
in phenomenality in the right circumstances. Holding that these properties belong to the information itself and not to the
physical realizer of the information demands that information be in some sense concrete.
Information seems more basic than the ‘physical’, grounding the three pillars of modern physics, - relativity, QM and
thermodynamics. Information is Lorenz invariant and unlike mass is intrinsic to its inertial frame.
Do physically realized bits
that lack relational/dispositional physical properties exist? Here I will bring two examples from modern physics of what I
call - ‘naked bits’, in which ordinarily realized bits ‘shed’ their relational properties but continue to exist. First, singularities,
with their purely geometric bits and the Bekenstein Bound which only depends on bit number and is independent of any
particular physical realization. Second, the ‘Quantum Cheshire Cat’ in which particles are separated from their relational
physical properties.
The multiple-realizability problem of consciousness is serious enough to convince philosophers like Pereboom that
while consciousness is physically realized it cannot be identical to its physical realizers however this is problematic in itself.
Naked bits avoid this problem because they are only realized non-relationaly.
Pan-protopsychism provides a flexible opening position for handling a spectrum of ‘consciousness theories’ stretching
from panpsychism to non-reductive physicalism. In theories closer to the panpsychic part of the spectrum it is the intrin-
sic protophenomenal properties themselves that do most of the explanatory work while in theories closer to non-reductive
physicalism it is the physical context that does most of the work. One way of minimizing our ideological commitments is
providing a physical context rich enough to explain how ‘minimally protophenomenal’ (yet non-phenomenal) properties
give rise to phenomanility.
Since ‘naked bits’ are closely related to space and time exploring the physical context that might cause protophenom-
enal entities to give rise to phenomenality should begin, at a minimum, with time-dependent spatial topologies. After ar-
guing that the smallest number of qbits that can instantiate constitutive, non- relational self-access is a single qbit inhabit-

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 1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

ing a closed time-like curve ( satisfying the Deutsch consistency conditions) I will point out that if we consider persons
as distinct spatiotemporal ‘enclosures’ (resembling David Lewis’ ‘Island Universes’) then a topological theorem by Robert
Geroch (1978 ) ensures that the demarcation conditions of such spatiotemporal worlds also constrain their internal con-
ditions in a way that guarantees its ‘world mates’ constitutive ,non-relational, intimate yet peculiar, self-access. Parsimony
suggests that the same physical conditions that make consciousness so hard to access from ‘without’ also endow it with
intimate and peculiar self-access from ‘within’ resulting in a physicalist/topological dual aspect information theory in which
the protophenomenal yields the phenomenal when naked bits gain non-relational self-access. I will end with acquaintance,
re-acquaintance and what I will term ‘Edenic Topology’

38 Cognitive Action Theory of Consciousness

Baer Wolfgang
Research and Development, Nascent Systems Inc., Carmel Valley, CA, USA

This paper presents the physical formulation of David Chalmers solution to the “hard problem” of consciousness and Lev-
ine’s “explanatory gap”. This done by recognizing We are a larger process than the objective bodies we see? To discover the
nature of the bigger We, first note a fundamental characteristic of consciousness is our ability to experience our feelings and
sensations directly while at the same time we can only infer the feelings of others from the outside. Conversely in physics
objects are seen from the outside using gravito-electric forces but we infer that they are held together by inner forces, which
can never be experienced directly. Comparing these observations allows us to identify primitive consciousness with internal
material forces and correlate the flow of our daily experiences with the propagation of change through inner and outer as-
pects of our material structure. Since change is measured by quantities of action I will show how we can describe our daily
conscious experience as a physical flow of action through the interior of our material Now plane and likewise all conscious
experience as a flow of action through all parts of the rest of the Universe.
Continuing with the pan-psychic assumption that a primitive awareness is incorporated in a flow of action through
time, this paper will show how disturbances propagating in otherwise stable action structures provide both an explanation
of consciousness within physical events as well as a contextual mechanism for the expansion of quantum theory. Quantum
theory will be shown to be a linear approximation of a Cognitive Action Theory, which is applicable when the disturbances
are small enough to remain within the elastic limit of reversibility. We will identify small disturbances with deBroglie waves
that do not collapse but are captured as memories from a flow of action through the observer into cyclic storage loops. The
rate of action flowing through our Now is the energy pattern experienced as qualia.
The recognition that we are processes that incorporate our objective experiences, including that of our own body, rather
than simply physical objects is the key to understanding consciousness and key to the next evolutionary step for science.

Reference: Baer, W. „ Force of Consciousness in Mass Charge Interactions” , Cosmos and History: The Journal
of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 10, No 1 (2014), URL; http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/
journal/article/view/421

39 The origin of the Analytic-Continental Divide: Brentano’s Dual Methodology

and its Resurge in the Embodiment Concept Today
Baker Richard
Monash University, Melbourne, AUSTRALIA

Franz Brentano (1838 – 1917) was the first philosopher and psychologist who saw two modes or aspects as necessary com-
ponents in the research of consciousness. His first published large-scale work was Psychology form an Empirical Standpoint,
in which he introduced two different types of phenomena, Physical Phenomena and Mental Phenomena. He understood
mental phenomena as what occurs purely in the mind; they are acts of consciousness. In contrast to mental phenomena,
to him physical phenomena are the objects of our outside perception, including colours and shapes, leading to hypotheses
about the perceived outside world. To Brentano mental phenomena are intentionally directed towards an object, includ-
ing my own consciousness when I am reflecting upon it. Logically, Brentano allocated two different disciplines to each of
these two types of phenomena: Mental phenomena are investigated in descriptive psychology, which includes the topics of
emotion, perception and judgment; here first-person observations are permitted. The other discipline, genetic, or initially

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1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

empirical, psychology, investigates physical objective phenomena and by this method seeks to find the causes for mental
phenomena; it examines psychological phenomena by means of third-party verifiable experiments. To understand the mind
and consciousness included to him this empirical-scientific method.
I will demonstrate how Brentano shaped the future of psychology as well as philosophy, and how his dual methodology
was later separated into two methods, laying the ground for the split into Logical Positivism, derived from Brentano’s em-
pirical psychology, and the Continental Approach, following his descriptive philosophy and phenomenology.
Merleau-Ponty’s attempts to engage with logical positivistic methodology were refuted by the latter, and logical positiv-
ism continued to exclude subjective phenomenological data. I will argue that more recently the concept of Embodiment is
a resurge of Bretano’s dual approach and has contributed to a renewed rapprochement of Brentano’s two methods, spear-
headed by a phenomenologist, Gallagher, as well as by an analytic philosopher, Bermúdez.
Whilst the Scientific Method is the basis of all consciousness research, I will argue that, following Brentano and in line
with the concept of Embodiment, subjective data should not be excluded from a Theory of Consciousness.

40 Mentality as a Domain in Consciousness

Bothereau Fabrice
Lycée, Ministère Education Nationale, Blois, FRANCE

As far as I know, the mental character of consciousness is something which is still resisting theoretization in the cloud of
interpretations which belong to the very domain labelled as ‘Consciousness’. The capitalization of the word intends to il-
lustrate the fact that Consciousness is a Domain. I borrow the notion of ‘domain’ from Woese, Kandler and Wheelis (1990)
in order to recall that, in biology, the Domain allows to subsume one characteristic, say life, to distinct instantiations (i.e.,
species) of life. Hence the notion of Domain is very wide, and, at the same time, quite analytic.
In itself, it seems that Con-
sciousness as a Domain suffices to consider every topic which belongs or could belong to anything as conscious, from the
aphasic process of intentionality to the actualization of a thought (I believe that the intentional character of consciousness,
its ‘aboutness’, is quite nonsemantic ; whereas the actualization of a thought generally is). Yet, notwithstanding the fact that
Consciousness is a Domain, it seems ubiquitous in the sense that we find Consciousness in every possible and imaginable
instantiation ; from ‘self- consciousness’ to ‘vision’, through ‘neutral monism’ (to mention a very few ‘entries’.
Now, if the
Domain (Consciousness) is always kept in mind, by the very use of the notion of ‘consciousness’, is it always the same ‘con-
sciousness’ that we speak about ; the one which might even seem to provide a ‘unity’ (Bayne 2010, for example) ? I do not
think so ; and more, I think that, in such a use, the notion (the specific use of it, not be mixed with the Domain) is definitely
too big to be bitten. What I intend to say is that the Domain of ‘Consciousness’ cannot stand on its own ; it must deal with
another Domain ; namely, the Domain of Mentality.
Once I have advanced the notion of ‘mentality’ as co-present with the
notion of ‘consciousness’, it might look as if I posit that, on one side, we would have consciousness, and that, on the other,
we would have mentality. I will try to show in this paper that things are more complex. The notions of consciousness and
mentality could be thought of as a mereological association ( Jonshton 2006), a Mereological Universalism (Rea 1998), or
a Mereological Essentialism (Chisholm 1976).
But in my opinion, the mereology of nature and order, say, does not go as far
as it should. What is the topic, and, by the way, the topic of my paper ? This topic is the thinking of ‘Mentality’. I will assume
that we need to produce a theory of mentality in order to get closer to the Domain of Consciousness. Once this need will be
understood, we will be able to sketch the features of what could be the Domain of Mentality ; therefore, to provide a non-
materialist theory of mentality.

41 The Ontology of E. J. Lowe’s Substance Dualism

Carruth Alex
Philosophy, Durham Emergence Project, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM
Gibb Sophie
Durham University, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

In the contemporary mental causation debate there is a general assumption that interactive substance dualism must be false
in virtue of the supposed causal completeness of the physical domain, according to which every physical event has a suf-
ficient physical cause. Interactive substance dualists typically respond to this problem by rejecting the causal completeness
principle.

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However, E. J. Lowe’s model of psychophysical causation instead offers a way of reconciling interactive substance dual-
ism with the causal completeness principle. It does this by denying the homogeneity of the causal relata—more specifi-
cally, by invoking a distinction between ‘fact causation’ and ‘event causation’. According to Lowe, purely physical causation
is event causation, the bringing about of particular effects. (For example, moving your arm in just this fashion as you take a
drink). In contrast, psychophysical causation involves fact causation, the making it the case that an effect of a certain kind
occurred. (For example, the fact that an event of the sort ‘drinking’ happened at all).
Given this model of psychophysical causation, the dualist can therefore accept that every physical event has a sufficient
physical cause as, according to it, mental events do not cause physical events. Rather, the mental is causally efficacious in
virtue of causing certain facts to obtain, about which the causal completeness principle is silent.
But Lowe’s dualist model is only as plausible as the distinction between fact and event causation upon which it rests. In
this paper it is argued that a suitable distinction between fact and event causation can only be maintained by someone who
is also willing to accept something along the lines of the four-category ontology which Lowe defends—a theoretical link
which is neither obvious prima facie nor highlighted in Lowe’s own work on either subject. The fact that accepting Lowe’s
model of psychophysical causation compels one to accept his four-category ontology may not have troubled Lowe. How-
ever, it makes his dualist account unattractive to those who wish to accept no more than one or two fundamental ontological
categories in their ontology.

42 Molyneux Question and Sensory Fields

Cheng Tony
Philosophy, University College London, Taipei, TAIWAN

Suppose a congenitally blind person gains the capacity to see. Can she recognise the shapes of objects in front of her purely by
vision, without any help from tactile experiences? This is a thorny question raised by William Molyneux to John Locke more
than three hundreds years ago. Many philosophers have attempted to answered this question, but it is fair to say that today there
is still no consensus. Psychologists have treated this as an empirical issue and conducted ingenious studies with newly sighted
subjects (Held et al. 2011) and with young children (Streri 2012). In science most people also agree that the difficulties in this
area have not been entirely overcome. In this talk I do not attempt to answer this question directly; instead I will provide a new
angle to approach it. Molyneux Question concerns the spatial dimension of perceptions: shapes are paradigmatic spatial proper-
ties. In vision, one natural and important way to understand this spatial dimension is to invoke a notion of visual field – a field
that contains visible objects and phenomena such as tables and chairs, shadows and rainbows, and so on. Although this invoca-
tion of visual field seems innocent enough, it is actually not a neutral notion. In particular, there are sensationalist, representa-
tionalist, and relationalist understandings of visual field. Sensationalism holds that visual field consists in a 2D array of visual im-
pressions, and those impressions have complex connections to the external world (e.g., Block on mental paint, Peacocke on sen-
sational properties, and Rosenthal on mental qualities). Representationalism holds that visual field is populated by visual repre-
sentations, and they claim that in this way illusions and hallucinations can be explained by intentionality. Relationalism claims
that visual field is relational in the sense that the field of view in front of the viewer is part of the visual field. They argue that this
view is the most ontologically economical one, as they do not need to postulate sensations or representations for vision. This it-
self is a difficult question, but it is instructive to consider an analogues discussion in the realm of touch and compare it to vision.
Martin (1992) argues that although both vision and touch are canonical spatial senses, the way they take in spatial properties
are quite different. There is no analogous sense of sensory field in the case of touch. Haggard et al. (2011) attempt to provide
counter evidence from an empirical point of view. In the case of touch, the debate between sensationalism, representationalism,
and relationalism is also valid. Basically, the more vision and touch are similar in this regard, the more positive evidence we have
for the Molyneux Question. For example if sensationalism is right in both vision and touch, then we have stronger reasons to be-
lieve that the answer to the Molyneux should be positive. If one theory is plausible for one modality but implausible for another
one, then we have more reasons to believe in the negative answer. On this occasion I pursue this approach as far as I can.

43 The Super-Overdetermination Problem

Donaldson John
Philosophy, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UNITED KINGDOM

Everyone has misarticulated the overdetermination problem faced by non-reductive physicalism (NRP). I disambiguate the
traditional l articulations and show that none them are a genuine problem for NRP. I then show how to articulate a genuine

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overdetermination problem for NRP that answers to the original intuition on which the NRP-overdetermination debate
rests. I call my articulation the ‘super-overdetermination problem’ and demonstrate that it is a special case of the mind-body
problem. This, I contend, tells us that NRPists have taken a major wrong turn by trying to solve the purported overdetermi-
nation problem faced by NRP independently of the mind-body problem.
The argument in outline:
I first note the original intuition on which the NRP-overdetermination debate rests: that there appears to be some kind
of problematic competition between psychological and physical explanations of human bodily movement. I call this ‘Mal-
colm’s intuition’, as it was first expressed (in the most relevant context) by Norman Malcolm in his ‘The Conceivability of
Mechanism’ (1968). I specify two conditions for articulating Malcolm’s intuition properly: (i) that a genuine problem be
articulated; (ii) that any articulation answer appropriately to the intuition.
I then outline the theory which is the primary target of the overdetermination problem: NRP.
Following this, I distinguish four kinds of overdetermination: ‘flukey’, ‘incoherent’, ‘incomplete’ and ‘complete’, which
have erroneously been deemed to be the problematic kind of overdetermination faced by NRP. I show that none of them are
genuine problems for NRP.
I then lay out what I take as the best articulation of Malcolm’s intuition given that NRP is the target: the ‘super- overde-
termination problem’, and I show how it is a genuine problem for NRP and answers to the original intuition.
Because of the close similarities between the super-overdetermination problem and the mind-body problem as faced by
NRP, I finish by discussing whether or not they are distinct problems at all. I argue that because the range of possible solu-
tions to each problem is different, the problems are not identical. I suggest that the super-overdetermination problem is best
viewed as a special case of the more general mind-body problem, and that this has important consequences for the assess-
ment of NRP.

44 A 21st Century Monadology: Re-Drafting Leibniz’s Idea of Perception in Terms

of Modern Physics
Edwards Jonathan
Medicine, University College London, London, UNITED KINGDOM

GW Leibniz summarized his natural philosophy at the end of his life in 90 paragraphs now known as the Monadology. The
key points are as follows: The universe is composed of indivisible dynamic (not ‘material’) units or Monads. These have no
parts, nor ‘extension’, in the intuitive sense of being ‘solid’ (strictly antitypic). They consist of a constant internal dynamic
principle, which is also their mode of ‘perception’ of the universe, and so they can be considered as ‘points of view’. ‘Matter’,
as we are familiar with it, is a well-founded illusion based on our perception of aggregates of Monads. Aggregates of Monads
that form animate bodies are also associated with additional ‘dominant’ Monads that constitute a further indivisible unit as-
sociated with the dynamics of the entire body.
Although the Monadology reflects ideas that contributed directly to the evolution of the laws of motion in terms of
recognition of the nature of conservation laws and other key insights like the relative nature of space and time, it has largely
been ignored on the grounds of being ‘metaphysical’, with the implication that this means ‘non-physical’. However, Leibniz
is very clear that for him metaphysics is simply a layer of explanation deeper to his contemporary physics, not ‘non-physical’.
In the succeeding 300 years, as understanding of physics has deepened, a remarkable number of Leibniz’s claims have
been vindicated. Quantum theory is based on indivisible dynamic units with a constant internal dynamic principle. These
units have no antitypy, unless they form aggregates, which then appear to ‘fill up space’. More intriguingly, recent field theory
indicates that aggregate bodies are indeed associated with additional indivisible dynamic units, based on quanta such as
phonons. And an operational view of ‘perception’ or ‘experience’ based on Descartes idea that “every action is also a pas-
sion”, or every ‘influencing’ is also a ‘being influenced by’, fits well with the relational structure of modern physics equations.
There is little doubt that, like Descartes, Leibniz gets some practical applications wrong – maybe in relation to domi-
nant dynamic units both in human bodies and marble tiles. Nevertheless, the premises from which he argues may be as
useful now as they were in the run-up to Newton’s Laws. As part of a resurgence of interest in Leibniz at the tercentenary
of Monadology an attempt has been made to re-draft the original text in terms of modern physics with as little re-working
as possible. This can be found at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/jonathan- edwards/monadology. Perhaps the central theme is the
re-interpretation of progression in harmony, not as ‘parallelism’, but in terms of both the correspondence principle and the
Bose/Fermi duality. This may help to provide a nuanced resolution to recent debate between philosophers such as Garber,
Phemister and Arthur about the relation of body to spirit, in both the seventeenth century and the present day.

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45 Meaning, Existence, and Integrated Information

Electra Dorian
Philosophy/Natural Sciences, Shimer College, Houston, USA

Giulio Tononi (Tononi 2008) in his integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT), briefly discusses how the no-
tion of integrated information is closely related to the notion of meaning, and more generally, semantics. Meaning, like con-
sciousness, is integrated information. The meaning of a word is determined by a complex set of informational relationships
between numerous contextual factors: the words surrounding it, who says it, the time and place and tone in which it is said,
social conventions, and more (Wittgenstein 1953). The meaning of any single element in a complex system, like conscious-
ness or language, cannot be considered in isolation. It can only be considered in the context of the network of mutually in-
fluencing, mutually defining, and mutually constraining factors and relationships that compose the system. These informa-
tional relationships are what define the elements of a system, make them mean what mean and in a very literal sense, make
them what they actually are (i.e. the elements are transformed by their relationships to one another). The system as a whole
contains more information than the sum of its parts (Tononi, Aristotle). This updated spin on the classic anti-reductionist
idea is not only relevant to the question of consciousness, but to the ontological foundation of science as a whole. In this
paper, I connect the idea of meaning as integrated information to radical notions of thinghood and existence proposed by
Bruno Latour in Pandora’s Hope (Latour 1999). Latour, drawing on Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy (White-
head 1929), paints a picture of reality (and science) in which subjects (scientists) and objects (of study) define each other’s
attributes and existence through “events” in time (experiments) in which both are transformed. This is contrasted with a
traditional view of science in which it is assumed that things in the external world simply are what they are and that their
“objective existence” is discovered through experiments. As an alternative to this, Latour proposes the notion of “articula-
tion,” a process of co-creation between subject and object (“propositions”) in which both are independent actors, yet inex-
tricably interrelated in a process of mutual transformation. This notion helps make it possible for Latour to define existence
as a gradient as opposed to an all-or-nothing concept. I tie Latour’s notion of relative existence back into Tononi’s definition
of meaning, and consciousness as a gradient property that can exist in different degrees, different contexts, at different times,
and in different events. Based on these ideas I suggest adjustments in our current ontology that may need to be made as part
of a scientific paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962) in order to address, overcome, or reframe the “hard problem of consciousness”
(Chalmers 1996).

46 Are Thoughts Ever Experiences?

Forrest Peter
Philosophy, Oxford University, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM

The recent debate in philosophy of mind over whether thought has its own distinctive phenomenology, so- called cognitive
phenomenology (CP), has led to a sharp division between proponents and skeptics of CP.
The paper I propose to present
critically examines an ambitious argument against the existence of CP, which is based on a particular view of the metaphysi-
cal nature of thoughts endorsed by Peter Geach, Matthew Soteriou, and Michael Tye. The argument, roughly, is that experi-
ences, those mental entities that have phenomenology, persist as processes, while thoughts, on the other hand, are non-
processive states or events. So no thoughts are experiences.
I present two responses to this argument in defense of CP. First, I discuss the various ways we might understand phe-
nomenology to be proprietary to cognition or thought, and I argue that the best alternatives do not entail that thoughts
must literally instantiate, or be the “bearers” of, the phenomenology in question. So I suggest the anti-CP argument’s con-
clusion, that thoughts are not experiences, does not entail, all on its own, that CP does not exist.
Second, I attack the claim that thoughts never temporally unfold as processes. Understood as justified on a priori
grounds, this claim seems to be motivated by the idea that a subject’s entertaining a unified propositional content in thought
must happen in a single moment. In other words, “you can’t think half a thought”: the whole thought content arrives at
once, if it arrives at all. But I appeal to considerations raised by the Language of Thought hypothesis to argue that this idea
is dubious at best: the constituents of a thought can be grasped as a unity without necessarily being grasped simultaneously.
Alternatively, the view that thoughts never temporally unfold as processes can be understood as an a posteriori claim, justi-
fied by appeal to introspection. But I conclude by arguing that the a posteriori claim rests on dubious assumptions about
how our thoughts introspectively seem to us and what this can tell us about their actual temporal structure. The result is that
cognitive phenomenology is safe from the argument that it must not exist because thoughts are not experiences.

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47 Arrangements
Gill Richard
Retired, Cheltenham, UNITED KINGDOM

It is proposed that the only fundamental entities in the world are arrangements, including things of the mind. It is also pro-
posed that the concept of physical closure is not a general principle and applies only to simple isolated systems. This allows
for the introduction of mental objects into things that are overtly physical.
There are two quite separate aspects to science: the study and knowledge of what things can be found in the world; and the
discovery of the laws that control their development in space-time. The constituents of matter form a layered hierarchy in which
atoms are made from simpler particles that have sub-structures that eventually may be composed of strings in an inaccessible,
multidimensional space. However, the nature of a physical object is not determined by its constituents but by their arrangement,
for things made of either atoms or Lego bricks. The arrangement determines the nature of the object and is the fundamental en-
tity. This is in accord with the practice of science: when contemplating her test tube, no chemist would feel impelled to remark,
‘I do/don’t know how the quarks are changing.’ Instead, her words would be entirely in the language of atoms and molecules
that she regards as things in themselves. The concept of an arrangement is sufficiently wide to include the established laws of
science and our mental objects. It is proposed that the old mind-matter division should be replaced by the idea that everything
is an arrangement. This removes the need for any form of philosophical dualism and can replace the philosophy of physicalism.
However, things of the mind are recognised as having distinctive properties, and a way of exploring these is needed
outside the scope of the sciences. It is suggested that mental things can be investigated by considering them as arrangements
that, in contrast to most arrangements, have a meaning, and this must be sought in their relationships with other arrange-
ments. This can be very complex.
Although the world about us contains continuously changing events, these can be considered as a succession of arrange-
ments, changing in time, but always, with no known exceptions, in a way that is in accord with the laws of science. Although
not all events are deterministic, for those that are, it is necessary to know their initial conditions before anything can be said
about their subsequent development. For purely physical objects, this can be done in terms of physical co-ordinates, but this
approach is not possible for complex objects. For the human mind, the specification of the initial conditions can be made
most succinctly by the use of language, and this allows things regarded as mental to creep into the development of events.
In conclusion, the concept of an arrangement allows the construction of a monist philosophy that escapes from the ex-
tremes of physicalism and idealism and provides a new perspective on the mind.

48 The NOW and Consciousness: a Comparison

Holbrook Dwight
Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, POLAND

This paper will begin by showing in what ways consciousness and the NOW pose similar problems. These include the chal-
lenge of conceptualization, squeamishness about attaching any putative “material” existence to something that defies tradi-
tional notions of what qualifies as objective or thing-like, and the question of origins or emergence. Where do consciousness
and the NOW come from?
From here we move to the subject of the NOW’s distinctiveness, and how it is that there can be more to it than clock
time and indexicality. We begin by noting that the NOW is inter-relational (inter-relational rather than intersubjective) in a
way that one’s privatized (brain-based) consciousness is not. What I observe and attend to is not what you observe and at-
tend to – i.e., we each have our own individual perspectives. By contrast, we share NOWs, or rather the NOW (in the singu-
lar), in a communal way. Otherwise, consensus would be impossible. How would any knowledge be possible if the temporal
occasion marking what I witness – an event of any kind -- did not co-occur with the possibility of the temporal occasion of
your witnessing as well? Or take the quandary that a notion of “knowledge” ends up with when the event I am witnessing
is not a present-time event. Here before me stands a yesterday you or a tomorrow Einstein. This leads to a further point. If
what I come to know is other than, or not reducible to, my own private mental constructions, if in other words there is an
independent or objective reality that science and our own mutual consensus confirms, it must necessarily be predicated on
the NOW’s co-occurrence, not on what one thinks or perceives as an individual. Finally, it will be explored how the NOW,
unlike consciousness as such, secures a starting point for what comes to be known and what comes to be empirically inves-
tigated. In this respect, it can be argued that present time precedes and is prerequisite for the past. In other words, it is con-
tended there cannot be a past without a present. Conceptually it may be possible, but the conceptual always presumes, as a
starting point, a first person perspective, an experiential NOW presupposed in any conceptualization.

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The paper concludes by posing the problem of ontological relativism. If what comes to be known – and remembered –
is contingent on the NOW, how can the objective world, the world that science explores, have ontological independence?
Here we draw a distinction between observer dependence or consciousness dependence, and NOW dependence. We con-
clude that it is misleading to consider the NOW as privatized in consciousness. We situate the NOW in nature. It exposes it-
self through the channel of a first person perspective but, being situated in nature, it is common to every human perspective,
and in that respect comparable to objects of scientific investigation approached from a third person perspective.

49 Actual Consciousness and Science

Honderich Ted
University College London & University of Bath

What follows with respect to the science of consciousness from a defensible philosophical account of its nature? Dispute
about its nature has been largely owed to no adequate initial clarification of the subject, despite five leading ideas of it. A
clarifying database with respect to consciousness in the primary ordinary sense issues in the theory or analysis of it that is
Actualism, partly by way of consideration of other theories, in particular the finding that functionalism and related cogni-
tive science are essentially identical to traditional dualism or spiritualism. Consciousness, rather, is what is called actual
consciousness. What is actual with consciousness in perception is an external subjective physical world. Being perceptually
conscious is no more whatever than the doubly dependent existence of an external world. What is actual with cognitive and
affective consciousness, however, is internal – representations-with-attitude. They differ from the representations in this
printed sentence by being actual. The actuality with all consciousness consists in subjective physicality, whose characteris-
tics are counterparts to those of objective physicality, but different in perceptual as against cognitive and affective conscious-
ness. Chalmers’ supposed hard problem of consciousness does not exist. The pessimisms of Chomsky, Nagel, McGinn and
spiritualists generally about a consciousness analysis are unfounded. Actualism vindicates, frees, and gives to the science of
consciousness a theory of its subject that is fertile or pregnant, a workplace. The theory satisfies criteria, including those hav-
ing to do with the difference and the causal reality of consciousness. It supports the proposition that neither the philosophy
nor the science of consciousness must be only the handmaiden of the other. Philosophy’s role is not the ownership but the
greater concentration on the logic of ordinary intelligence: clarity, consistency and validity, completeness, generalness.

50 If Matter Matters: Navigating Panpsychism’s Daunting Moral Implications

Howe E. Alexander
Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, USA

An orgasm feels good. Hearing the Weiner Philharmoniker also feels good. Hearing a screaming infant, however, does not
feel good. By reflecting on the qualitative similarities and differences between these three experiences, I develop a novel
distinction between two features of qualitative experience that rescues panpsychism from its most damning objection: what
I call the “objection from morally ruinous consequences.” According to this objection, panpsychism entails that every funda-
mental bit of matter is morally significant.
Panpsychism is the theory that the ultimate constituents of the universe—be they particles, strings, fields—are occur-
rently experiential. Literally, there is something that it is like to be an “ultimate.” This claim is most often met with an incred-
ulous stare and is dismissed out of hand. But such dismissal is wrongheaded. It is difficult to transmute this incredulous stare
into a principled objection, which I demonstrate by providing a careful, systematic, and frank presentation of panpsychism
that has been missing from the literature. I then argue that of the various objections that we can tease out of the incredulous
stare, the strongest objection is what I call the “objection from morally ruinous consequences.”
I argue that on any plausible moral theory, the capacity for qualitative experience confers a non-zero degree of moral
relevance. Panpsychism therefore entails that the ultimate constituents of the universe are morally relevant: Morality is ren-
dered an impossible project. This is what I am calling the “objection from morally ruinous consequences.” In order to lay to
bed the alleged “absurdity” of panpsychism, we must overcome this objection. By reflecting on orgasms, we can do just that.
The familiar notion of qualitative experience conflates between two distinct features of qualitative experience: the AF-
FECTIVE character of an experience and the PHENOMENAL character of an experience. Roughly, the phenomenal char-
acter of an experience is “what it is like” to have the experience. The affective character is whether “what it is like” is pleasant
or unpleasant. Recalling our earlier examples of an orgasm and hearing the Philharmonic, we can say that the feeling of an
orgasm is affectively similar to hearing the Vienna Philharmonic, but phenomenally dissimilar.

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The objection from morally ruinous consequences was predicated on a conflation between two features of qualitative
experience. I argue that qualitative experience is morally relevant in virtue of the affective character of experience, rather
than the phenomenal character of experience. If affective character can be shown to be a second-order or emergent property
of phenomenal character, rather than a first-order or intrinsic property of phenomenal character, then the two features of
qualitative experience can come apart. By separating affective and phenomenal character, the panpsychist can then posit that
phenomenal character as fundamental and ubiquitous, while affective character is not. This distinction may rescue panpsy-
chism from its ruinous moral entailments: On my proposal panpsychism is committed to there being qualitative experience
at the fundamental level of the material world, but the experience of that matter won’t matter (morally).

51 Does Apriority Entail Necessity? A Study of Pure Phenomenal Concepts

Hsu Shao-An
Philosophy, National Taiwan University, Taipei, TAIWAN

Although I experience phenomenal redness when I see a tomato, I might have experienced a different phenomenal property
that I have never experienced before and cannot experience in my present epistemic position. In contrast, phenomenal es-
sentialists hold that the phenomenal properties of my conscious experience are grasped via pure phenomenal concepts not
only a priori, but also necessarily. I agree that once I acquired a pure phenomenal concept, say, ‘R’, I could not conceive of its
actual extension R not as it is, but I would not thereupon agree that it is necessary that I have the concept ‘R’. Consider David
Chalmers’s epistemic two-dimensional semantics. For pure phenomenal concept ‘R’, its epistemic intension is grounded on
the fact that the epistemic counterparts share the same narrow content in which the concept ‘R’ is involved; that is the way I
consider worlds as actual, given the phenomenal property R as the data. Phenomenal essentialists then argue that the epis-
temic intension of ‘R’ coincides with its subjunctive intension iff R can be grasped a priori — ‘R’ having the same extension
in all possible worlds considered as actual. However, I argue that, when considering worlds as counterfactual, the worlds
my epistemic counterparts are in might not be the closest ones in the counterfactual context. Or, to put it differently, the
epistemic nearness does not imply the subjunctive nearness. The world in which my epistemic counterpart S1 shares with
me the same phenomenal property but differs in the underlying physical property is farther than the world in which my
subjunctive counterpart S2 shares the same physical property yet has a different phenomenal property. The reason is this:
simply substituting a different phenomenal property, say, X, as long as X belongs to the same kind (i.e. phenomenal proper-
ties of color experience) and occupies the same position in the causal network as the original one R does, would change the
world much less than changing the underlying causal structure while preserving R. (Note that the property X corresponds
to pure phenomenal concept ‘X’, rather than ‘R’.) It is not theoretically economic to sacrifice the fundamental structure of
worlds for just keeping my phenomenal property intact. It implies that, had I insisted on considering those worlds, which
have the same phenomenal property R falling under the concept ‘R’ such that ‘R’ is subjunctively rigid, as counterfactual, I
would have chosen the less possible counterfactual worlds relative to my actual world instead of the more possible ones that
I should have chosen. The moral is this: a priori accessibility of a phenomenal property from my actual vantage point does
not entail its metaphysically necessary accessibility. In addition, to justify the conception of such subjunctive counterparts
which are causal-structurally identical to me but have a different intrinsic phenomenal property, I shall also defend certain
version of quidditism.

52 A reverse causality will make us understand consciousness and human

knowing.
Kjellman Arne
Computer and Systems Science, Stockholm University, Jarvso, SWEDEN

Man has a peculiar inclination for thinking that an ‘external world’ of unproblematic access is given to him by some God or
Evolution. How come we take for given that the ‘world’ we scrutinize is external to our minds and not internal? The physi-
cist Ernst Mach, following the lead of Franz Brentano, once tried the daring of questioning this assumption, but due to poor
understanding this move is sadly forgotten today.
So what is the reason for the common belief that our universe is unary and of a common access to all living beings,
which is an idea that during time profoundly has penetrated man’s cultures and his religions? The claim is advanced that
there are several reasons:
1. A profound misunderstanding of the human project of knowledge construction
2. The claim

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for an exclusive access to Truth that for a long time has been a useful weapon in man’s fight for power
3. Preconceived and
unconscious ideas giving rise to misleading metaphysical foundations
4. An assumed casual direction that inevitably calls
for some miracle
When we seriously take on Mach’s contemporary Henri Poincare’s statement: “We need not, therefore
ask if Nature is one, but how she is one,” we soon recognize that Protagoras’ ancient suggestion that “man is the measure
of everything” can provide a useful path to understand human knowledge. The solution is to accept, that we all, each and
every one, have access to only one world namely our inside and strictly private universe – i.e., rather a priverse. Using this
striking and obvious intuition will pave the way for a new apprehension of both personal and scientific knowing.
However
the price to pay for previous trespasses is high. A non-intuitive change of the direction of causality is called for – and thereby
I also come to understand that my priverse is mainly the result of process construction rather than some result of objective
discovery.
There are two possible, mutually exclusive, approaches to the build-up of human knowledge: The classical Object-
Oriented Approach (OOA) and the Subject-Oriented (SOA) – and the claim is advanced that the latter path is the only one
that is logically coherent.
Dressing the classical Newtonian paradigm of science in the clothes of Mario Bunge’s metaphysical
foundation, this paper sets out a new paradigm - a monistic theory of personal thinking that readily encompasses every thin/
kin/g – without the need for the ontology of classical science.

53 Argument against Chalmers’ panpsychism

Kuznetsov Anton
Philosophy Department, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Argument against Chalmers ‘panpsychism
The argument that I’m going to represent tries to refute panpsychism not tending
to criticize the principles of Chalmers’ philosophy; it’s derived from the truth of these principles. It’s primarily based on the
article «Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism» and on the second chapter of “the Conscious mind”, which is regarded most
crucial for non-physical intuitions from my point of view.
Chalmers ‘panpsychism rests on several assumptions 1. The conceivability argument is true.
2. The causal argument is true.
3. Consciousness is causally relevant.
The basis of the conceivability argument is a two-dimensional semantics, suggesting that
1. The terms of natural kinds have two intensions – primary and secondary.
1.1. The primary intension may include a plurality of secondary intension of the term in different possible worlds.
1.2. Secondary intension implies only one primary intension in all possible worlds. Thus, the primary intension defines
the term gently, while the secondary tightly, being the fundamental definition of the term.
2. The term consciousness is “anomalous”, as its primary and secondary intensions are identical. This is a “phenomenal feel”.
Another basis of the conceivability argument Is the position that any metaphysical possibility is logical for two reasons
1. What is logically impossible is impossible at any other meaning, and hence also in the metaphysical.
2. If something is metaphysically possible and if it’s out of logical possibility, then this cannot be made meaningful state-
ment.
The basis for the causal argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical
The basis for the causal efficacy of consciousness is an attempt to close the “explanatory gap” arising out of the first two
arguments. While maintaining the validity of these arguments (since you can try to deny the truth of one or the other, or
just two), we come to two options.
1. Epiphenomenalism
2. The causal relevance of consciousness
From the first is derived dualism, from the second – panpsychism.
The basis of consciousness in the case of panpsychism is protophenomenal properties.
Protophenomenal properties:
1. Run physical functions and are a kind of intrinsic properties.
2. Fully or partially constitute consciousness, as the constitution can transmit the causal relevance from protophenom-
enal properties to consciousness.
3. They are not phenomenal, as this would lead to the absurd position that the mower or dirty socks have consciousness.
Now back to the conceivability argument. This is a key argument in favor of the irreducibility of consciousness to physi-
cal, in favor of dualistic intuitions. The only one strict base of it is the ideas noted above. All the rest are just widespread
intuitions that the presence of consciousness is too obvious and the like.
So look at these steps

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1. If the “phenomenal feel” is not the primary and the secondary intensions of the term “consciousness” at the same
time, then the conceivability argument is false
2. Consciousness is constituted by special combination of protophenomenal properties
3. In every possible world rep-
lica of this combination implies the existence of consciousness
4. Hence, the combination of protophenomenal properties is the secondary intension of the term “consciousness”
5. Protophenomenal properties are not phenomenal
6. Hence, the secondary intension of the term “consciousness” is
not “a phenomenal feel” 7. Therefore, the conceivability argument is false
As we can see, the concept of constitutive panpsychism leads to the denial of its base. This does not mean the falsity of
constitutive panpsychism, but nevertheless constitutive panpsychism loses all weight in discussion of metaphysics of con-
sciousness because of lacking any foundation.

54 From Primordial Sleep to Consciousness

Limnell Petteri
Philosophy, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND

Perhaps consciousness enters into the world via what could be called ”primordial sleep state”. Ontologically, this sleep state
comes first as the organism and it’s brain and nervous system matures. Consciousness follows later. At some point biophysi-
cal processes generate dreamless sleep and then later, more powerful and wakeful states of consciousness. At least when and
after a baby has born – if not before. Maybe a newborn wakes up when it ”experiences” the first breath outside the womb. It
has been studied that this outside-the- womb-experience is so dramatic that it wakes up the baby to experience life. Anyway,
it seems plausible to ask weather consciousness is something one wakes up to. Protoconsciousness matures gradually in pri-
mordial sleep, which seems to be crucial for there to be consciousness.
Recent literature and certain studies point to this direction (e.g. Hobson 2009, Koch 2009, Lagercrantz & Changeux
2009)). Consciousness may not have to emerge out of mysterious nothingness (ontological emergence) but instead of pre-
vious antecedent states. Primordial sleep state is not necessarily a conscious state but ontologically it precedes it. It doesn’t
necessarily feel like anything to be in this state, but it seems to be a state that exist between purely biological/physical and
conscious state. We don’t feel nor experience anything while at certain sleep states. Sometimes we don’t feel nor experience
anything while even being awake!
If ontological emergence of Consciousness is not necessary nor even plausible, then, let us try to recognize the states
prior to C-states. One plausible way leads to (dreamless) sleep states. Primordial sleep state is some kind of a protoconscious
state. Idea is not new but nowadays it has some new flesh in it. Perhaps we should talk about a metastate from which we
wake up and become conscious.
My main point is to argue in favor of the plausibility of the process from protoconsciousness (or metastate) via primor-
dial sleep state to awakening. How does it feel to wake up first time? I don’t remember but it felt better and more conscious
the more I did it. At some point there where feelings and memories and conscious perceptions.

55 The unkowable qualia problem for a priori theories of consciousness

Llamas Erick
Philosophy, ANU, Canberra, AUSTRALIA

The unknown qualia problem for panpsychism

I present a problem for the a priori knowability of certain conditionals about consciousness. The problem arises for any
view that holds: (i) we can know a priori certain conditional statements whose conditional sign is flanked by phenomenal
concepts and (ii) that a subject can only possess the phenomenal concepts that are available to her given the physical ar-
rangement of the subject. This last thesis was made famous by Nagel (1979) where he held that in order to know what is it
like to be a bat one must be a bat. The thesis seems to be a good working hypothesis and independently plausible. As a blind
person cannot see the colours that a non-blind subject can see, a human male cannot know what is it like to menstruate.
To illustrate the problem assume the truth of panpsychism and consider the following conditional: if micro q then
macro q, where ‘micro q’ stands for any quale that is had by the relevant type of micro entity, and ‘macro q’ for any quale that
we, as humans, normally have, like phenomenal red. Now, in order to know the truth of the conditional one must be able to
entertain it, but one cannot entertain it if one cannot, in principle, possess the phenomenal concepts that compose the con-
ditional. The problem is that if (ii) is true then the phenomenal concepts that flank the conditional cannot be possessed by

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a human being, because we are physically very different from the fundamental particles. The problem generalises. If a con-
ditional is composed by at least one phenomenal concept, then that conditional can be entertained only by a certain kind of
subject, where the kind is individuated by the physical arrangement of the subject.
This has certain consequences for our understanding of what an ideal reasoner might be; for the information that a cos-
moscope can deliver and for the explanatory powers that an a priori theory of consciousness can possess. Specifically in the
context of panpsychism, it has implications for an aspect of the combination problem: the qualitative combination problem
(what Chalmers calls the palette problem). In this paper I defend the truth of (ii) and explore the restrictions its truth im-
poses to any a priori theory of consciousness.

56 The Search for the Location of Consciousness: Can Structural Realism

Provide the Answer?
Loorits Kristjan
Theoretical philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

Despite the remarkable progress made in consciousness research during recent decades, there is still no sign of a basic agree-
ment on where consciousness is located in the natural world. Most of the neurobiological theories hold that consciousness
is located in our brains, whereas the majority of enactive, sensorimotor, autopoietic and intentionalist theories claim that
consciousness is, at least partly, constituted in our interaction with the environment. The neurobiological view performs
better in explaining how we can be conscious of our dreams, hallucinations and imaginary objects. For example, it can be
argued that dreams of permanently paralyzed people have neural correlates but lack interactional ones. Different interaction-
ist approaches, on the other hand, offer a more satisfying explanation of how we can talk about our consciousness in the first
place: while neural processes are hidden beneath the scull, interactions between an organism and its environment are open
to public epistemic access.
I will argue that the framework of structural realism allows us to endorse the neural view, without rejecting the valuable
insights of the interactionist approach. In a nutshell, structural realism allows us to see consciousness as a certain relational
structure that can be tracked both in neural processes and in behavioral interactions. However, while many aspects of con-
sciousness can be tracked more easily in behavioral interactions, it seems that the entire structure of consciousness can be
tracked only in neural processes because those are, indeed, the only natural phenomenon that we know to correlate with
dreams of permanently paralyzed people. I will argue that structural realism also helps us to understand how we can talk
about consciousness even if it is hidden beneath our sculls. It has often been stressed by the proponents of the interaction-
ist approach that communication is only possible in terms of public phenomena, and that neural processes are not public in
the relevant sense. But if consciousness is essentially a certain relational structure, then it should be possible to describe it
in whichever terms we choose. For, according to one of the most central ideas of structural realism, as far as our description
of an object is structurally accurate, it does not matter in which terms we describe it. In other words, the relational structure
under consideration need not be public; it is only required that it can be described in terms of public phenomena. Therefore,
structural realism allows us to endorse the view according to which consciousness is located in our brains, but can neverthe-
less be described in terms of behavioral interactions and elements of our environment.

57 Hallucination as perception of spatiotemporally gerrymandered objects – the

argument from hallucination debunked
Manzotti Riccardo
Psychology “G.Fabris”, IULM University, Lavagna, ITALY

In contrast with a widespread belief, this paper defends the view that in hallucination there is always a physical object. This
paper shows where, when and what such a physical object is. Such an object is a spatiotemporal gerrymandered object that
is not unlike everyday objects albeit being less accessible for practical purposes. Recently, the argument from hallucination
has been used to back up the common kind assumption, which is often split in two parts (Macpherson, 2013):
? Premise 1: In hallucination, there is no real object
? Premise 2: Introspectively, hallucination and perception are the
same
Usually premise 1 goes undisputed. The real fight begins afterwards. Based on whether premise 2 is held true or false,
various possibilities are considered. For instance, to save realism, disjunctivism denies premise 2. Or, one may accept prem-
ise 2 and embrace either sense-data, or representationalism, or indirect perception.
This paper takes a different turn and

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questions whether premise 1 is false. I challenge premise 1 – on both empirical and conceptual ground. The lynchpin of
the proposal is that all alleged cases of hallucination are cases of perception, albeit unusual. In short, when one hallucinates
x, one perceives x, although circumstances may be such that one feels the need to distinguish what is going on during hal-
lucinations from other more mundane cases of perception. The difference is neither in existence of the perceptual object or
in the kind of mental act. The difference is the spatiotemporal location of the object.
Briefly, in everyday perception, when
S perceives x, it is easy to point to the spatiotemporal location occupied by x. When S hallucinates, say, y, it is not that easy.
It is not impossible though - it is just more difficult. Here, I show how, where and when it is possible to do so. As a result,
the layman believes that y is not there to be perceived while x is. I will show that x is neither more real nor more ‘there’ than
y.
The crux of the matter is that it is possible to mount a sorite case that links perception and hallucination insofar the build-
ing blocks of one’s hallucinations are particulars with which one has had actual causal intercourse. I will back up such a claim
with empirical data (direct brain stimulation a la Penfield, TMS, drug induced hallucination, after images, super saturated
red, Benham top, psychotic hallucinations, post traumatic disorder induce hallucinations, dreams, hypnopompic and hypna-
gogic hallucinations, day dreaming, Martian colors, greenish-red and yellowish-blues, impossible colors, mental imagery in
congenitally blinds, synesthesia, aura in migraine, phantom limb, Charles Bonnet’s syndrome, and more). In all such cases,
without a previous actual causal intercourse, no corresponding hallucination ensues.
I will show how it is possible to stretch
the notion of perception so to encompass objects that take place in an extended spatiotemporal span. Bottom-line: I pro-
pose to model hallucination as perception of reshuffled spatiotemporal gerrymandered objects.

58 What is it like to be the quiddities of non-emergent but irreducible macro-

level information?
McGowan Luke
Neuroscience, UCI, LA, USA

On the one hand, there are convincing arguments that what is relevant to the presence and content of phenomenal con-
sciousness is not what a system is made of but how a system is organized (Chalmers 1996, 2013; Tononi 2008, 2013; Teg-
mark 2014). Indeed, the principle of organizational invariance says that two systems with the same functional organization,
regardless of constituents, will have qualitatively identical experiences (Chalmers 1996). On the other hand, there are con-
vincing arguments that some version of constitutive Type-F monism is the only way to avoid the perils of reductive physical-
ism and emergent and epiphenomenal dualisms (Chalmers 2013). However, it is not clear how we might reconcile an appar-
ent tension between the causal closure of fundamental physics with the fact that the principle of organizational invariance
seems to require fundamental connections between information and phenomenology above the fundamental microphysical
level (Chalmers 2013). This paper argues that a proper understanding of the metaphysics of information removes this ap-
parent tension. An analysis of information in terms of counterfactuals provides an objective, observer-independent, non-
emergent, a-causal theory of informational properties, including macro-level informational properties (Cohen and Meskin
2006). Because information is a- causal and non-emergent on this view, a theory of consciousness can appeal to irreducible
macro-level informational properties without violating microphysical causal closure. Thus we can employ a Type-F meta-
physics and talk about the phenomenal quiddities of those macro-informational states. On this view, there is no tension be-
tween organizational invariance and informational constitutive Type-F panpsychicism. Further, the combination problem
does not arise – macro-phenomenal content comes from irreducible macro- information. This view also supplies a proper
metaphysics for an IIT-kind of story. Another happy consequence of this view is that, properly understood, there is no em-
pirical difference between Type-A materialism and constitutive Russellian monism.

59 The Occurrent Unpleasantness Of Pains: A New Representationalist Account

Melnyk Andrew
Department of Philosophy , University of Missouri , Columbia, USA

Pains are typically unpleasant. In particular, they exhibit an unpleasantness that is introspectible, and that lasts approxi-
mately as long as the pain itself. I shall refer to this unpleasantness as “the occurrent unpleasantness of a pain”. The occurrent
unpleasantness of a pain does not exhaust the pain’s affective side, as psychologists of pain routinely note, but it is all that
this paper discusses.
What exactly is the occurrent unpleasantness of a pain? It is only in recent years that philosophers have begun to address

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this question, often under the heading of the “painfulness” or “hurtfulness” of pains (e.g., Aydede and Fulkerson 2013). One
proposal holds that it is quite independent of a pain’s phenomenal character: it is a cognitive desire for the pain to cease that
is typically caused by the pain while it is occurring (e.g., Lycan 1996). By contrast, two other proposals treat the occurrent
unpleasantness of a pain as an aspect of the pain’s phenomenal character, and do so, moreover, by extending a representa-
tionalist account of the phenomenal character of a pain to its occurrent unpleasantness:
The occurrent unpleasantness of a pain is the pain’s non-conceptually representing that something bad is going on in the
pain-feeler’s body (e.g., Tye and Cutter 2011; O’Sullivan and Schroer 2012).
Pains are imperative (rather than descriptive) representations, and the occurrent unpleasantness of a pain is its imperati-
val character (e.g., Klein 2007 and 2010; Bain 2011).
This paper proposes a new representationalist account of the occurrent unpleasantness of pains. It too extends represen-
tationalism about the phenomenal character of pains, but not by treating the occurrent unpleasantness of pains as a further
descriptive aspect of pains, and not by identifying pains with imperatives. Instead, it claims that pains are a combination of
a non-conceptual descriptive representation that certain things are now going on in one’s body and a non-conceptual direc-
tive representation (“descriptive” and “directive” in the sense of Millikan 2004) that there not be those things now going on
in one’s body. The paper first elucidates this formulation of the new account of pains and of their occurrent unpleasantness,
and then shows that it has advantages over the earlier representationalist proposals.

60 Why the Panpsychist Argument Against Emergentism Fails?

Mihalik Jakub
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Charles University, Faculty of Philosophy, Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC

For philosophers working on the mind-body problem who are critical of attempts at a materialist reduction of phenom-
enal consciousness, emergentism and panpsychism have been the two most common and most widely explored alternatives.
Alongside other motivations, one strong reason why non-materialist philosophers are attracted to panpsychism (or some
version of Russellian monism) is their discontent with emergentism (see e.g. Nagel 1979, 2012; Strawson 2006; Rosenberg
2004). In this paper I will explore the ways in which Thomas Nagel and Galen Strawson—two thinkers who have expressed
preference for panpsychism—argue against emergentism and thereby indirectly motivate panpsychism. I seek to show that,
despite certain differences, both Nagel and Strawson in effect hope to derive an ontological conclusion from epistemic
premises concerning a lack of discernible logical necessitation between truths about consciousness and truths about the
physical properties of the brain.
This step, as taken by Nagel, has been criticised by James Van Cleve (1990), a proponent of emergentism, who argues
that Nagel crucially relies on the correctness of what Van Cleve calls mereological rationalism, according to which all truths
about properties of wholes are logically necessitated by truths about properties of the whole’s micro-parts and truths about
their combination. According to Van Cleve, the emergentists can easily reject this thesis and hold that the necessity in ques-
tion is not of the logical but rather merely of nomological kind. Emergentism is then, Van Cleve argues, compatible with a
lack of logical necessitation between micro-truths and macro-truths.
I shall argue that Van Cleve’s position is ultimately implausible since Van Cleve, although he may well have some motiva-
tion for rejecting causal rationalism, does not have any discernible argument for the rejection of mereological rationalism. In
particular, I will show, rejecting mereological rationalism would require one to take an additional—and actually quite unac-
ceptable—step. I will explain why this additional step should be resisted. The principle problem is that Van Cleve implicitly
assumes that causal relations are diachronic which leads him to overlook the role of mereological rationalism in synchronic
causal relations. When, however, we focus on synchronic causal relations, his rejection of mereological rationalism is much
less attractive and may even be incoherent. I will conclude by considering whether Van Cleve can even save the diachronic
forms of emergentism (defended by, for example, O’Connor and Wong 2005) against the arguments of Strawson and Nagel.

References:
Nagel, T. 1979. Panpsychism. In Mortal Questions, 181–195. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press. Nagel, T. 2012. Mind and Cosmos. Why the Neodarwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly
Wrong. Oxford. Oxford Univerity Press. O’Connor, T., and Wong, Hong Yu 2005. The Metaphysics of Emer-
gence. Noûs 39, 658-678. Rosenberg, G. 2004. A Place for Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. 2006. Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism? Journal of Consciousness Studies
13, no.10–11, 3–31. Van Cleve, J. 1990. Mind–Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical
Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, 215–226.

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61 Panpsychism and Constructive Co-consciousness

Miller Gregory
Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UNITED KINGDOM

Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism provide elegant and promising alternatives to both Physicalism and Dualism, but such
virtues are threatened by the absence of intelligible solutions to the ‘combination problem’. My aim is to argue that the prop-
erties that the panprotopsychist proposes as a means to solve the combination problem are inconceivable. Such proper-
ties fail to offer a maximally desirable solution to the combination problem and we should therefore refrain from adopting
panprotopsychism. However, the panpsychist must be able to show their solution to the combination problem doesn’t face
an equally threatening problem of inconceivability and unintelligibility. Chalmers’ (fc) recent taxonomy of the facets of the
combination problem briefly considers the ‘phenomenal bonding’ solution (Goff 2009, fc) but it is soon dismissed. As it
stands, Goff ’s (2009, fc) solution of a phenomenal bonding relation does seem to merely trade one inconceivable intrinsic
property for another inconceivable relational property, thereby failing to make panpsychism any more intelligible than its
contenders. However, I aim to show that the panpsychist does in fact have a viable solution in the phenomenal bonding
relation, as long as they buttress their account with a positive conception in the form of the ‘co-consciousness’ relation. If
the panpsychist is willing to adopt this account they may avoid the charge of inconceivability and unintelligibility brought
against their rival.
Once we begin to characterise the relation, however, co-consciousness brings with it its own set of com-
plications. The first is whether the panpsychist is entitled to appeal to such a relation. Many believe co- consciousness to be
the explanandum and not a possible explanans, so on this understanding such an appeal would be merely helping oneself
to the explanandum. But the most immediate problem is whether the relation is transitive or not. If so, then panpsychism
soon collapses into idealism (Dainton 2011). If not, then the relation may prove useful, but it is certainly antagonistic to
orthodox Cartesian views regarding the unity (and partial unity) of consciousness. To make the latter claim I will argue that
the panpsychist may appeal to ‘overlapping phenomenal perspectives’ (Lockwood 1989), however, in doing so they must
overcome a cluster of objections including (but not exhausting) the ‘subject assignment problem’ (Bayne 2010); the ‘shar-
ing problem’ or ‘exclusivity constraint’ (Dainton 2000 argue that overlapping phenomenal perspectives do allow the panpsy-
chist to at least circumscribe these worries, but whether an appeal to exotic phenomenal structures allows them to rebut all
these objections, whilst still maintaining their theoretical advantage, is yet to be seen. Tentatively supposing they may, once
one accepts the possibility of overlapping phenomenal perspectives, one is no longer obliged to individuate experiences in
terms of subjects. This allows co-consciousness to be a constructive relation and the panpsychist to thereby avoid the charge
of helping themselves to the explanandum.

62 Naive Realism, Attention, and Phenomenal Character: A Reply to Block

Moran Alex
Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM

Naïve realists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is determined by the qualitative nature of its
objects. Ned Block (2010) has argued that this view conflicts with recent empirical findings concerning the ways that at-
tention can influence perception, specifically those of Tse (2005) and Carrasco et al. (2004). In this paper [talk], I reply to
Block on the naïve realist’s behalf, by re-interpreting the two experimental paradigms on which Block’s case against naïve
realism turns, in a way that both fits the empirical data, and is perfectly consistent with naïve realism.
I begin by outlining clearly the naïve realist view, which is typically stated rather cryptically by its proponents. In par-
ticular, I emphasise that what motivates naïve realism is in large part a broader metaphysical picture according to which
the external world is genuinely qualitative, so that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience could plausibly be
thought to derive from the nature of external reality. Having thus set up the view to be defended, I turn to outlining Block’s
arguments against it, and responding.
First, I present Block’s argument turning on the ‘Tse-illusion’ paradigm, in which subject’s seem able to ‘voluntarily
darken’ one of the three spheres presented to them just by directing attention in the right way. Block’s argument, in brief, is
that the ‘dark aspect’ of the subject’s experience in such a case should not be thought of as being determined by a feature of
the world - since, after all, the disk is not really dark, but merely seems that way due to the focus of attention by the subject
– but that this conflicts with the naïve realist’s core claim that it is always the qualitative nature of the objects of percep-
tion that determine phenomenal character. In response, I argue that, by considering the various ways that naïve realists have
sought to handle cases of illusion more generally (none of which Block considers), the Tse-illusion can be plausibly inter-
preted along naïve realist lines, in a way that undermines Block’s argument.

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I then turn to what Block considers his central case against the naïve realist. The argument turns on Carrasco’s paradigm,
in which the apparent effect of transient attention is to increase the contrast of one of two Gabor patches presented to the
subject, so that one looks higher in contrast than the other when in fact they are the same in contrast. Again, Block argues
that the subject in this case has a perceptual experience with phenomenal character not determined by the nature of the ob-
ject perceived, but rather by the direction of transient attention. In reply, I develop an interpretation of Carrasco’s paradigm
according to which, in the relevant cases, the effect of transient attention is to induce a partial hallucination in the subject. I
then argue that one can use the resources which naïve realist’s have developed to handle hallucination cases more generally
to respond to Block’s argument, and interpret Carrasco’s paradigm in a naive realist friendly way.

References: Block, N. (2010) ‘Attention and Mental Paint’, Philosophical Issues, 20, Philosophy of Mind. Car-
rasco, M., Ling, S., & Read, S. (2004). ‘Attention alters appearance’ Nature Neuroscience, 7, 308–313. Tse, P. U.
(2005) ‘Voluntary attention modulates the brightness of overlapping transparent surfaces’ Vision Research, 45,
1095–1098.

63 Phenomenal Information as Knowing Why

Mørch Hedda Hassel
Philosophy, University of Oslo, Oslo, NORWAY

According to the knowledge argument ( Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal information is knowledge of facts – knowing
that. According to the ability hypothesis (Lewis 1983), phenomenal information is knowing how. I will argue that some
phenomenal information is knowing why. Someone who has just experienced pain for the first time, learns not only that
this is what pain is like, but also why people tend to avoid it. In the literature, there has been discussion of how learning
what it is like to feel pain yields normative knowledge: it tells us why pain is bad and why inflicting it is wrong. I argue that
phenomenal information can answer not only normative why- questions but causal why-questions, and that it answers such
questions in a distinct way. Firstly, it explains regularities in an ultimate way, i.e., it stops regresses of why-questions in a way
physical information cannot. Secondly, it enables prediction of the regularities it explains without the assistance of inductive
reasoning, which is something physical information cannot either. It follows from this that phenomenal information is not
identical to physical information.

64 Integrated Information Theory, Constructive Empiricism, and the metaphysics

of consciousness
Neisser Joseph
Philosophy, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, USA

Proponents of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claim significant progress toward a science of consciousness (e.g., Ton-
oni & Koch, 2014). IIT is touted as both a formal model and an empirical measure that is more powerful and general than
any mere neural correlate of consciousness. With IIT, it is claimed, we can independently determine whether there is con-
sciousness in a given system, where, and how much. Within empirical science these claims are unprecedented; within meta-
physics of mind they border on incredible. It is time for philosophers of science to take notice.
Consciousness is widely assumed to be a problem shared by scientists and metaphysicians alike. The general form of
this shared problem may be expressed in the question, how could consciousness possibly have emerged at all in a physical
world? I take it that this question must be understood either as a metaphysical question or a scientific question, but not both
(van Fraassen, 2004). I argue that IIT does not in itself entail any particular ontological commitment, and that it is compat-
ible with various metaphysical theses about consciousness including identity theory, eliminativism, nonreductive physical-
ism, and dualism.
Consider the following: Suppose Tononi & Koch (2014) opened their paper on Integrated Information Theory with a
statement of commitment to ontological naturalism, affirming the belief that there is nothing supernatural or transcendental
about consciousness. Suppose they specified that they intend the term “consciousness” to mean *subjective qualia* in the
strongest metaphysical sense, citing, e.g., Chalmers (1996). I suggest that when Tononi & Koch then came to the end of
their paper, they would find that this statement made no difference to its content; the arguments and evidence would be
unchanged if they has written its negation (this example adapted from van Fraassen, 1995).

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Nevertheless, IIT represents important progress toward a science of consciousness. The model makes conceptual ad-
vances over its predecessors in both the representation and measurement of the phenomenon. Discussion will show the
specific ways in which these two innovations render IIT more empirically adequate than any prior theory of consciousness,
including the NCC (Metzinger, 2000). But whether IIT merits acceptance or not is an empirical issue that does not turn on
any further ontological belief, and does not even require an ontological commitment to “naturalism.” In any event, it is un-
likely that philosophical curiosity about consciousness will be satisfied.

65 The Mind-Brain Identity Theory and the Explanatory Gap

O’Conaill Donnchadh
Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds, UNITED KINGDOM

In recent years there has been a resurgence of type-identity physicalism (Hill & McLaughlin 1999, Papineau 2002, Polger
2011). One proposed advantage of this view is that it disposes of the explanatory gap, understood as the need to explain why
brain states or neural activity should give rise to conscious experiences. Since it is impossible to explain why something is
identical with itself, if the identity theory is correct then the explanatory gap cannot be raised as a problem.
However, the claim that conscious experiences are identical with brain states can be questioned in another way, by ask-
ing whether or not it is possible for a conscious experience to be identical to a brain state or a neural process. An answer to
this question requires moving beyond recent literature on the identity theory to clarify what is involved in claiming that an
entity of one ontological category (e.g., a brain state or a neural process) is identical to an entity of another category (a con-
scious experience). Entities have their criteria of identity in virtue of the ontological category to which they belong (Wig-
gins 2001; Lowe 2013). Only entities with the same criteria of identity can be understood as being identical (so for instance
a statue cannot be identified with the lump of material which constitutes it). In order to properly evaluate identity claims, we
need to know what the criteria for identity of the respective entities are.
Drawing on Williamson’s discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the phenomenal charac-
ters of conscious experiences (Williamson 2013), I shall outline criteria of identity for experiences and for brain states or
neural processes, respectively. I shall then outline weak and strong versions of a new explanatory gap facing the identity
theory, a gap concerning the need for an explanation of how it is possible for a conscious experience to be identified with
a brain state or a neural process. The weak version is the suggestion that until the identity theorist shows that conscious
experiences have the same criteria of identity as brain states or neural processes, the identity-claim cannot be accepted. The
strong version is the claim that neither states nor neural processes have the same criteria of identity as conscious experi-
ences, and so cannot be identical to them.

References
-Hill, C. S. & McLaughlin, B. P. (1999) ‘There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in
Chalmers’ Philosophy’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454.
-Lowe, E. J. (2013)
Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-Papineau, D.
(2002) Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-Polger, T. W. (2011) ‘Identity Theo-
ries’ Philosophy Compass 4 (5): 822-834.
-Wiggins, D. (2001) Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. -Williamson, T. (2013) Identity and Discrimination (revised and updated edition).
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

66 Conscious Spacetime - related to integration of 1st and 3rd perspective of

consciousness and integration of block time and subjective time
Pilotti Jan
Theoretical Physics, Pilotti Science&Art, Örebro, SWEDEN

At TSC 2014 panel discussion ”The next 20 years” Jonathan Schooler posed two problems: A:The relation between 3rd per-
son and 1st person perspective of consciousness.
B: Physics says flowtime is an illusion as universe exists as ”blocktime”. Yet we feel that now is real and experiencing
change, so if blocktime is true there must exist an additional time dimension, a subjective time to describe our movement
through objective time or spacetime.
These problems can be illuminated in the view of Conscious Spacetime presented at TSC 2014.
Taking existence as ab-

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 1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

solute, that is independent of observer, it can rigorously be proven in Einstein’s theory of relativity that spacetime is ontologi-
cal four-dimensional. So in physical reality all events past, present and future exist at once. It is also argued that when persons
near death experience their whole life at once this can be interpreted as that 4D spacetime is open for direct experience. Yet
we ordinarily experience each now separately and chancing. There are arguments to extend Einstein’s theory of relativity to six
dimensions three space and three time dimensions and it is here argued that phenomenal experience taken as fundamental can
be described in 6D spacetime which, in contrast to 4D, also allow many possible futures. It will be argued that one of these extra
time dimensions can serve as subjective time indicating how our consciousness of the now moves trough the 5D spacetime. The
brain in this view does not produce experiences which are identified with events in spacetime. The function of the brain is as a
”timemachine” limiting our consciousness to the now but also allowing the change of now as we journey through spacetime.
In the 6D spacetime, (which admits superluminal phenomena) a thought about the future is interpreted as a future pos-
sibility, which exists in the future of spacetime, because in spacetime all that can happen already exists. When I write this sen-
tence on my computer it is an adequate description for another person, the so called third person perspective, to state that pro-
cesses in my brain are the causes of the movement of my arms and fingers to touch the keyboard causing the text on the screen.
But in my own perspective, the first person perspective, it is an equally adequate description to state that it is my focus on the
thought = my mental picture of the text on the screen in a possible future world which causes the writing. That is, the order
between cause and effect is relative and dependent on the perspective of the observer. Concerning consciousness reversal of
the order between cause and effect is an asset, as it seems to explain part of the difference between third person and first person
perspectives. As superluminal causality admit frames where the order between cause and effect is changed I think the example
shows a possible relation between conscious causality and superluminal causality.
Maudlin in his analysis of Bells theorem concludes:
”Violation of Bell’s inequality does require superluminal causal con-
nections”

67 Conscious Agent Theory: A formal theory of consciousness

Prakash Chetan
Mathematics, California State University, San Bernardino, USA
Hoffman Donald
Cognitive Sciences, University of California, Irvine, USA

Conscious states beyond physical and linguistic forms.

The current epoch of the 21st can be described as a material heaven, where materialism has slowly but surely overtaken
different branches of disciplines, such progression of humanity subsequently manifesting in over prioritizing material expla-
nations of metaphysical and unknown matters, mysteries of consciousness being one of them. Conscious states and physical
states are simultaneous and identical, thus conscious states are nothing more than a material, physical state - is an argument
brought forward by materialist philosophers grandly dismissing the subjective, phenomenological sides to it. Neither it
brings humanity closer to understanding the phenomenon in more depth and its role in human action, but further it brings
an abrupt end of metaphysical discussion reaching intuitively unsatisfactory conclusions and stagnation of further evolution
of understanding the mind. In order to get closer to understanding consciousness, mere analysis of it is not enough, preced-
ing states of consciousness such as sub-conscious and unconscious through paths beyond empirical facts and evidence are
in need of rediscovery. Facts give information, upon which Materialism bases its doctrine, yet no knowledge or understand-
ing of the subject of consciousness occurs. Should one follow material philosophy till the end, it is inevitable to reach a
conclusion that different bodies, in identical physical surroundings make identical reactions in agents’ consciousness, ulti-
mately disregarding with individuality. Thus this paper will proceed by over viewing the historical development of different
intellectual attitudes towards consciousness, bringing to attention early modern philosophers including Descartes, Leibniz
and Locke in discussing what consciousness is. It will further proceed by outlining the rise of Materialism and where the
break in history occurred allowing the rise of Materialism using many of Nietzsche’s arguments and analysis, simultaneously
working as a reflection of society’s loss of contact with the non-material condition overall arguing that Materialism is only a
temporary doctrine of consciousness and not a timeless philosophy. Further it will explain what materialism is and bring its
main incoherent conceptions to the surface arguing that physical conscious states do exist, but they are not the only states
of consciousness. Equating all states of consciousness to physical actions and reactions, without accepting non-reactionary,
non-material states of consciousness is redundant, predominantly counter-arguing Materialism’s choice of basing its utter
perception of consciousness on empirical information. Lastly, the paper will attempt to present an alternative approach to

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consciousness, promoting rediscovery of intuition and inner communication with non-material conscious states beyond the
linguistic and factual prison, incorporating the discussion on the relationship between art and consciousness.

68 Fundamentality Physicalism and the Intelligibility Constraint

Rabin Gabriel
Philosophy, ANU; New York University in Abu Dhabi, Canberra, AUSTRALIA

Physicalism says that the fundamental features of our world are purely physical. At rock bottom, it’s just bosons, quarks,
gravity, and the like. A prominent line of argument due to David Chalmers uses the famous explanatory gap to challenge
physicalism. If physical fundamentalia generate consciousness, there must be an intelligible epistemic route from the physi-
cal to consciousness. There is no such route. Therefore, there is more to the fundamental than the physical.
The intelligibility constraint says that if the fundamental level is composed purely of Fs, then it must be intelligible how
the Fs could generate the rest of reality: the cars, coffees, koalas, and consciousness. In my talk, I discuss this constraint in
detail. But for now let’s focus on Chalmers’ argument for the impossibility of an intelligible route from the physical to con-
sciousness.
(P1) Intelligibility is a priori scrutability: If there is an intelligible route from the Fs to the Ms, then the conditional “If F
then M” is knowable a priori. (Where F and M are complete descriptions of the Fs and Ms).
(P2) No a priori route: The conditional “If P then C” is not knowable a priori, where P and C completely describe the
physical and consciousness facts.
(C) Therefore: There is no intelligible route from the physical to consciousness.
Chalmers’ “master argument” against physicalism, of which the conceivability argument is one version, depends cru-
cially on this reasoning. I deny both premises.
Against (P1). Intelligibility should not be cashed out via a priori scrutability.
In your armchair, you have been told that
the Fs generate the Xs. You a priori reason long and hard, but you just don’t see it. How could the Xs arise from simple
interactions between the Fs? You are then released from the armchair. You empirically interact with the Xs and the Fs. You
watch them, touch them, manipulate them, and observe their behavior. With your increased understanding, you finally get
it. That’s how it goes! How the Fs yield the Xs is now intelligible to you. But you could not have seen this from the armchair.
Sometimes, intelligibility is not a priori.
Against (P2). Our inability to a priori derive consciousness from physical truths does not entail (P2). The “a priori” in
(P2) is highly idealized. If a futuristic scientist with enhanced brain capacity, space alien, or god, can do the a priori reason-
ing, that suffices. (P2) requires a lack of a priori route, and an explanatory gap, at the limit of inquiry, not just today.
Chalmers’ “structure and function” argument takes up the challenge. Physical truths are structural-functional truths.
Consciousness truths are not. Structural-functional truths a priori entail only more structural-functional truths. Therefore,
physical truths can never a priori entail consciousness truths.
I argue that there is no precisification of ‘structural-functional truth’ such that it is simultaneously plausible that (a)
physical truths are structural-functional truths and (b) structural-functional truths are incapable, even in principle, of a pri-
ori entailing consciousness truths. But I’ll save that argument for Helsinki.

69 Compositional subjects: A physicalist approach to the problem of experience

Rangarajan Anand
Computer and Information Science and Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA

Why should any physical event necessarily be accompanied by experience? This hard problem of experience (formulated by
Chalmers) is at the foundation of consciousness studies. The approach taken in this work is to expand physicalism in order
to accommodate experience. Before embarking on this project however, we begin with phenomenology in order to motivate
the common sense intuition that guides our strategy. First, experience exists. Furthermore, we argue (from phenomenology
and van Inwagen, Lowe and Strawson) that experience is always accompanied by a subject of experience. The latter, follow-
ing Strawson, is conceived as a thin subject which is spatially and temporally bounded. Thin subjects should not be confused
with living organisms and may only last a few seconds. Thin subjects exhibit a phenomenal unity with different types of
phenomenal content (sensations, thoughts etc.) occurring during their temporal existence. Next, we begin with the assump-
tion that physicalism is sufficient to explain experience (and thin subjects). Following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of
the true physical as a way to sidestep the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and

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experience. Furthermore, physicalism does not imply (as Hüttemann has shown) that microphysicalism---the thesis that
macro physical properties are determined by micro physical properties--- holds. We invoke this freedom to conceive of thin
subjects as physical compositions with macro properties that are not determined by micro properties. Compositionality has
been intensely studied in the past twenty years. While there is no clear consensus here, we argue, following Koslicki, that a
case can be made for a restricted neo-Aristotelian compositionality principle and that thin subjects are physical composi-
tions of a certain natural kind. It turns out that compositionality requires the notion of an object to be independently mo-
tivated by an appeal to natural kinds---with thin subjects shown to meet the criteria of a natural kind. Finally, the approach
is specialized to a thin subject of sensation. It is worth examining the consequence of failure of each step in this sequence
leading to alternative positions on the hard problem: 1. There is experience: Denied by eliminativists. 2. Experience implies
(thin) subjects of experience: Usually denied by materialists and some panpsychists. 3. Everything is physical or entailed
by the physical: Denied by interactionist dualists.4. Physicalism does not imply microphysicalism: the most controversial
aspect of this approach and denied by many physicalists. 5. Subjects of experience are physical compositions of a certain
natural kind: Denied by idealists and property dualists. We summarize our overall position based on the above discussion.
The problem of experience requires us to posit new psychophysical relations linking physical properties and experience.
Drawing upon phenomenological intuition and driven by the need to avoid proliferation of sui generis relations, we intro-
duced thin compositional physical subjects of experience which are of a certain natural kind. This approach is facilitated by
the failure of microphysicalism to hold. The price of admission is an expansion of the basic furniture of the world to include
compositional subjects---a tolerable expansion due to extreme familiarity with the subject.

70 Panpsychism’s Hard Problem: A Comparative Analysis of Explanatory Gaps

Roelofs Luke
Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, CANADA

I compare three relations which might be thought explanatory: that between consciousness and physics; that between
macro-consciousness and micro-consciousness; that between macro-physics and macro-physics.
Panpsychists, especially constitutive panpsychists, need to claim that the second relation is more like the third than it is
like the first - that there is no explanatory gap between micro-consciousness and macro- consciousness, or at least that any
such gap is relevantly less serious than that between consciousness and physics.
In particular, we can distinguish ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems for panpsychist explanation, paralleling the hard and easy
problems for physicalist explanation. The hard problem is the subject-summing problem: how, in principle, can any facts
about one subject’s consciousness be relevant to a distinct subject’s consciousness? The easy problems pertain to getting
the right sorts of macro-consciousness: what would micro-experience have to be like for human consciousness to have the
various contingent features it actually has? I this paper I focus specifically on the subject-summing problem, arguing that
panpsychism’s explanatory gap is, in this area at least, less serious than physicalism’s.
I argue that we should not frame the question of an explanatory gap as a single yes-no question about success or failure
of a priori entailment. Rather, there is potential for intermediate degrees of success, in particular by achieving one or the
other of what I call ‘explaining-what’ and ‘explaining-that’. Physicalism’s explanatory gap is especially strong in that physi-
cal facts fail on both points. Moreover, when deciding how problematic an explanatory gap is, we need to attend to what
panpsychists take to motivate their theory over non-panpsychist forms of strong emergentism. Emergentists accept an ex-
planatory gap and supply irreducibly cross-level laws to bridge it, and panpsychists are often quick to point out the theoreti-
cal costs of this move, primarily i) a potentially very large loss of parsimony, and ii) the threat of causal competition between
micro-consciousness and macro-consciousness. Panpsychists who countenance any sort of explanatory gap need to show
that it does not lead to similar costs.
I define a version of constitutive panpsychism designed to be as simple as possible, to match the structure of physical
combination as closely as possible, and to secure the tightest metaphysical relation between macroexperiences and microex-
periences. I call this ‘inheritance panpsychism’: its central claim is that token experiences can belong simultaneously to both
whole and part, each belonging to the whole simply in virtue of the part having that experience and being appropriately
related to all other parts of the whole.
I argue that inheritance panpsychism is well-placed to close, or at least mitigate, the explanatory gap suggested by the
subject-summing problem. Firstly, it can succeed at ‘explaining-what’ even if it fails at ‘explaining-that’. Secondly, it avoids
causal competition and loss of parsimony even if forced to postulate cross- level laws. Finally, I sketch a disjunctive way to
argue, given certain metaphysical premises, that inheritance panpsychism completely resolves the subject-summing prob-
lem, and indicate the further work necessary to substantiate this claim.

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71 Locke and Stickgold on Activity of Mind in Dreaming

Roinila Markku
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

A prominent psychologist Robert Stickgold has developed a theory on fragmentative nature of dreams in his article “Dream
Splicing: A New Technique For Assessing Thematic Coherence In Subjective Reports Of Mental Activity” (1994). Stick-
gold and his colleagues performed an experiment where ten dream reports were spliced by scissors at points where there
were dramatic scene shifts in the plots and they were compared by judges to ten intact dream reports. It turned out that
none of the judges could make a clear distinction between the intact dream reports and the spliced ones. The results makes
us doubt that there is any thematical continuity in dreams in contrast to Freud who argued that the continuity in our dreams
can last the whole night.
In my paper I will show that there are interesting connections between Stickgold’s theory of spliced dreams and ac-
counts on dreams by John Locke (1632-1704). Locke followed Descartes in saying that dreams are a pure product of imagi-
nation and mostly extravagant and incoherent. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding II, 1, §16-17 (1689) Locke
says that we have instances of perception when we are asleep and retain the memory of the thoughts we have thought when
we are awake. Thus the dreams of sleeping men are all made up of the waking man’s ideas although oddly put together.
Locke’s view is related to his criticism of Descartes: the soul does not think when we are asleep and it cannot have any
feelings of pleasure and pain (II, 1, §11). If it had, the material in the dreams would be affected by the thoughts of a sleeping
man, but as dreams are so wild and incoherent this is clearly not the case, although sounds, odours etc. can affect the sleep-
ing man. Locke goes as far as to claim that the waking man and the sleeping man are two different persons.
The foundation for Locke’s theory is in his view that different sensations produce memory traces of various vividness
and our dreams are build up from the most powerful mind-images in the memory. Although Locke is clear that the mind
does think while asleep I would like to argue that the mind must be somehow active in stimulating the memory traces - the
fragments of waking life in the memory compose a kind of puzzle which should require some kind of organizing. If I am
right, Locke’s theory can be seen as an anticipation of Stickgold’s theory where during the REM-phase of the sleep the brains
are activated to process and organize the “dream-stuff ”, that is, fragmented material from the waking life. Although the the-
matic continuity of the dreams is not evident, the brains are still activated when we dream.

72 The Biodynamic Breakthrough Model: An Elegant Framework for Non-Linear

Creativity in a Conscious Universe
Seneca Jankel Nick
n/a, Individual, Lewes, UNITED KINGDOM

I present a diagrammatic model (attached) that seeks to answer the simple, but endlessly beguiling, question: How does
authentic novelty emerge in physical and human systems; and, in particular, how does non-linear, or ‘breakthrough’, change
occur in consciousness and matter?
Computational and mechanistic explanations of both physical and neuronal systems fail to explain the ‘discontinuities’
seen in both evolutionary biology (cf. Extended synthesis) and human culture (cf. epistemes, creative destruction, disrup-
tion). Instead, I propose a ‘dual-aspect monism’ represented by a J-shaped curve which ‘fractally’ appears in discontinuous,
non-linear change: exothermic reactions, bifurcations to chaos in dynamic non-equilibrium, enzyme catalysis, seed germi-
nation, mammalian birth, neuronal activity, child developmental stages, learning curves, narrative structure, scientific revo-
lutions, business start-ups, regime change and, possibly, the death and birth of universes within a Many Worlds interpreta-
tion.
The curve separates the Actual World (explicate) from the Possible World (implicate), although The former is the the
realm of classical, linear mechanics. The latter, the sphere of entangled, acausal phenomena. Emptiness becomes form; form,
emptiness. All is Mind, ‘tawhid’, consciousness. As we move through time, entropy and ‘syntropy’ occur; causation from the
past and ‘future’. This might account for the mysteries of abiogenesis, OBEs and other ‘uncanny’ phenomena. The line itself
is the locus of enmeshment between physical laws and “partial lawlessness”. Here lies the legacy of Godel’s Theorem and Tu-
ring: A ‘gap’ where novelty can burst forth. Trickster appears to subvert the ruling narrative / schema and allow for genuine
newness.
As humans, we access empirical, observational sense data from the Actual environment; and embodied intelligence
from the Possible ‘invironment’. Both are valuable sources of information, but each tells of only one aspect of consciousness.
We experience both free will (Possible) and habitual ‘determined’ behaviour as neurones fire (Actual). We sit right on the

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 1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

curve. With creativity, do we ‘channel’ information from Possible to Actual? The microtubule theory provides a plausible
location for the interchange.
As human systems move through non-linear breakthrough, they reach a higher state of order or “fittedness”. Wher-
ever there is a ‘mismatch’, there is dis-ease (diabetes, IBS, depression etc). The fit, survive. The fitted, thrive. When we are
thriving, we live at the ‘edge of chaos’, poised elegantly between Actual and Possible, able to work with both. The perennial
path of ‘enlightenment’ involves awakening to the Possible World within a convincing experience of a disconnected Actual
World.
In ‘moksha’ or ‘satori’, we liberate ourselves from rule by causal mechanics, consolidated memories and conditioned
responses alone. We become able to engage in the acuasal, appropriate-to-the-moment being-in- the-world described as ‘ac-
tionless action’ (Bhagavad Gita) or ‘wei wu wei’ (Tao Te Ching). The Taoist Zhenren, the Stoic Sage and the ‘Ubermensch’
are all able to thrive in the ‘chaordic’ region between creative source and historical habit.

73 Not Your Father’s Modesty: Empiricism, Consciousness, and the A Priori- A

Reply to Funkhouser
Stepanenko Walter
Philosophy, The University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA

This paper responds to Erik Funkhouser’s “A Call for Modesty: A Priori Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem,” in which
Funkhouser petitions philosophers to use more restraint in the kinds of conclusions they draw from a priori arguments.
More precisely, this paper focuses on Funkhouser’s treatment of David Chalmers’ “Zombie Argument” and argues that
Funkhouser’s treatment, if successful, is not successful solely on empirical grounds, but involves the use of significant a pri-
ori principles. The paper argues that Funkhouser must either give up his call for modesty in a priori argumentation or give
up his strategy for dealing with the “Zombie Argument.”

74 Towards a Holistic Conception of Phenomenal Consciousness

Thiel Holger
Philosophy, Central European University Budapest, Berlin, GERMANY

A holistic approach to phenomenal consciousness exhibits explanatory merits over atomism regarding facts about percep-
tual experiences like feature binding, inter-sensory integration and its unity.1 Yet, a metaphysically informative and precise
elaboration of a holistic conception of phenomenal consciousness still remains a desideratum. In my research, I attempt to
rectify this predicament.
Based on Schafer’s metaphysical machinery, the overall argumentation for a holistic conception of
phenomenal consciousness runs from internal relatedness to holism.2 In general metaphysical terms, internal relatedness
among the parts renders them interdependent. Interdependence among the parts results in the priority of the whole. And
whole-priority is equivalent to holism. Specifcally regarding phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal parts are perceptual
experiences or single phenomenal states that instantiate phenomenal properties. The cornerstone of my argumentation is to
provide evidence that the relations of relative similarity or diference that obtain between the phenomenal properties of per-
ceptual experiences are internal relations. The evidence consists in, frst, accounts by Carnap, Goodman, Rosenthal, Church-
land, Shoemaker and Clark of similarity and diference relations within the order of phenomenal properties, called a qual-
ity space, and, second, the claim that this kind of relations are internal relations as suggested by Armstrong, Clark, Hardin
and Johnston.3 From the internal relatedness of the phenomenal properties I infer the interdependence of the phenomenal
parts to the efect that the phenomenal whole is basic and thus prior to its parts. The priority of the phenomenal whole is
equivalent to a holistic conception of phenomenal consciousness.
Two further views are concerned with the relatedness of
phenomenal states. Dainton posits a co- consciousness relation and Bayne/Chalmers a subsumption relation among them.4
The holistic conception of phenomenal consciousness suggested in my project is more parsimonious than the former and
provides a stronger form of interdependence among the phenomenal parts than the latter, or so I argue.

Notes:
1 Bayne, T. (2012), The Unity of Consciousness, OUP, p.244/5. Also see Bayne, T./Chalmers, D.
(2003), „What is the Unity of Consciousness?“, in: Cleeremans, A. (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness: Binding,
Integration, Dissociation, OUP, p.39.
2 Mainly from his papers Schafer, J. (2010), „Monism: The Priority of the
Whole“, in: Philosophical Review 119, No.1 and Schafer, J. (2010), „The Internal Relatedness of All Things“,

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1 . 2 . Metaphysics of consciousness

in: Mind 119.
3 Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, §80; Goodman, N. (1977), The Structure of Ap-
pearance, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (Book 53), p.201; Rosenthal, D. (2005),
Consciousness and Mind, OUP; Churchland, P. (1995), The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul, Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, p.23. Shoemaker, S. (1975), „Functionalism and Qualia“, in: Philosophical Studies
27; Hayek, F. (1999), The Sensory Order, Chicago, University Of Chicago Press; Clark, A. (1996 ), Sensory
Qualities, OUP; Armstrong, D. (1989), Universals, Westview, p.42/3, Johnston, M. (1992), „How to Speak
of the Colors“, in: Philosophical Studies 68/3; Hardin, C. L. (1997), „Reinverting the Spectrum“, in: Readings
on Color (ed. Alex Byrne and David Hilbert), Vol.I, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 289–301).
4 Dainton, B.
(2010), „Phenomenal Holism“, in: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67), p.134/5 and Dainton,
B. (2005), ?Stream of Consciousnes:s Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, Taylor & Francis. And
Bayne/Chalmers, „What is the Unity of Consciousness?“, p.32.
?

75 Degrees of Consciousness - Implications for Autonomy

Frammartino Wilks Anna
Philosophy, Acadia University, Wolfville NS, CANADA

This paper examines the implications for autonomy of maintaining that consciousness admits of degrees.
Specifically, it investigates the view of some contemporary biologists and cognitive theorists who maintain that a) con-
sciousness is not merely a necessary but also a sufficient condition for autonomy and b) the degree of autonomy is directly
proportional to the degree of consciousness. The consequence of this position is that it necessitates attributing autonomy to
beings that we would not normally conceive of as autonomous. Given that this view poses some serious challenges to com-
mon sense conceptions of autonomy, I think it merits careful consideration.
The view outlined above takes an extreme form in the naturalistic account of autonomy defended by proponents of the
Autopoesis school such as H. Maturana and F. Varela (1980, 2002). They maintain that cognition, and therefore conscious-
ness, asserts itself at the cellular level of living organisms, in the organism’s subjective perspective on the world with which it
interacts (Weber and Varela, 2002). From this subjective perspective, the organism autonomously determines a materially
embodied, individual identity.
Another contemporary variation of the “degrees of consciousness view” takes an even more radical approach. This is
the view defended by thinkers such as G. Tononi in his account of consciousness as integrated information. Tononi argues
that there is a correspondence between the degree of consciousness and the amount of integrated information that is pro-
duced by a set of elements. Moreover, Tononi does not think that minimal consciousness asserts itself at the cellular level,
but rather, that it can be achieved at a much more basic level. Specifically, he argues that consciousness is present whenever
there is an amount of integrated information produced by a complex of items that is “above and beyond” the information
that could be produced by any of the parts of that complex (G. Tononi, 2008). What this view entails is that, constrained
by the above conditions, even non-living beings may possess consciousness. The precise degree of consciousness that they
possess will be determined by the amount of integrated information that the complex is able to generate. On the view that
consciousness is inextricably linked with the capacity for autonomy, Tononi’s view seems to entail that some non-living be-
ings may be autonomous.
My aim is to examine the legitimacy of extending the notion of autonomy to beings possessing such basic levels of
consciousness. I shall argue that we may be guided in this examination by the central precepts defended by I. Kant (1787)
concerning consciousness and autonomy. The importance of these features of Kant’s account has been noted by some phi-
losophers (A. Brook 1994, and K. Ameriks 2000), but has not been adequately appreciated by cognitive theorists. I hope to
remedy this neglect somewhat in my brief treatment of these issues.

76 Emergent Materialism: An Inflationary Defense

Woodward Philip
Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA

According to ontological emergentism about phenomenal properties, the experiential features of consciousness are not
identical to, constituted by or grounded in any physical features of the entities that instantiate them, but rather are them-
selves fundamental features of reality; nevertheless they depend, in a roughly lawlike way, on the physical features of sys-
tems that give rise to them. Ontological emergentism about phenomenal properties takes two forms (which are ordinar-

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ily thought to differ dramatically in the degree of ontological profligacy they require): emergent materialism, according to
which the bearers of phenomenal properties are physical composites, and emergent dualism, according to which the bear-
ers of phenomenal properties are ontologically emergent, non-physical simples. Recently several philosophers have argued
that emergent materialism is an unstable position and hence that all ontological emergentists ought to be emergent dualists.
In this paper I take up two such challenges: (a) Dean Zimmerman’s argument from vagueness: physical objects that are
good candidates for being the bearers of phenomenal properties (e.g. brains, nervous systems, whole organisms, etc.) are all
vague, but laws governing the emergence of phenomenal properties are fundamental laws and hence won’t make mention of
vague objects. (b) William Hasker’s argument from compositeness: physical objects that are good candidates for being the
bearers of phenomenal properties are composite, whereas phenomenal states are fundamentally unified; composite objects
could only instantiate such states if those states are wholly present in each part of the object, or if they are present in a mate-
rial composite as such and not in any of its parts and not in virtue of the states of any of its parts—and we can make sense
of neither option. I argue that emergent materialism has the resources to respond to these objections, on a powers-based
metaphysics of ontological emergence (or PBE), as follows: physical systems that give rise to consciousness are composed
of parts that have causal powers aimed at joint causal generation of phenomenal states. (On the simplest version of this view,
these parts are the ultimate material constituents of physical systems, whatever those constituents turn out to be.) Such joint
causal generation can be understood on analogy with the generation of social institutions by the participants in those insti-
tutions. PBE can respond to the argument from vagueness by identifying the bearer of a phenomenal state at a time with the
non-vague composite made of all and only those items whose phenomenality-generating powers are jointly responsible for
the generation that phenomenal state at that time. PBE can respond to the argument from compositeness by treating this
non- vague composite not as a mere aggregate but as a bona fide substance, an addition to the inventory of the universe. The
cost of making this last move, however, is to sacrifice some of the ontological conservation that gives emergent materialism
its initial appeal. The upshot is that emergent materialism is a viable view, but that the payoff (in terms of ontological conser-
vation) of opting for materialism over dualism is much smaller than is ordinarily supposed.

77 How to mathematically define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as

physics quantities?
Xiu Rulin
Research Department, Institute of Soul Mind Body Science, Keaau, USA

Sha Zhi Gang
Research Department, Institute of Soul Mind Body Science, Keaau, USA

How to mathematically define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as physics quantities?
More than three centuries ago, physics could not progress until Isaac Newton transformed words and concepts that
were ancient and vague: force, mass, motion, and even time. He defined these concepts as physical quantities. In this way,
he could study them mathematically. Only then could Newton formulate his laws of motion and universal gravitation and
complete the scientific revolution initiated by Copernicus a century-and-a- half earlier.
In the nineteenth century, physicists further gave concepts such as “vigor” and “intensity” a mathematical definition as
physical quantities, namely, energy. The mathematical definition of energy has led to the Industrial Revolution.
In 1948, Claude E. Shannon’s mathematical definition of information led to the invention of information theory, which
in turn propelled the information revolution and helped launch the Information Age.
In this presentation, we explore how to mathematically define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as physics quanti-
ties.
We believe that only when we can define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as physical quantities, can the unifica-
tion of science and spirituality be complete. This unification will play a vital role in establishing peace and harmony among
different peoples, cultures, and traditions. It holds the key to understand our existence and reality at a deeper level.
We find that we can define spirit, heart, mind, and consciousness as physical quantities using quantum physics. Spirit is
the vibrational field that everything and everyone is made of, as discovered by quantum physics. Spirit can be mathemati-
cally defined by wave function in quantum physics. Wave function expresses what kinds of vibrations inside an object or
system and the possibility of the object or system to be at certain vibrations.
In this presentation, we will show that wave function provides the scientific and mathematical explanation of spiritual
phenomena such as direct knowing, telepathy, clairvoyance, distant and instant healing, and more. We will also demonstrate
that wave function provides a way to mathematically derive and express karma law. Because of this and other reasons, we
conclude that wave function is the mathematic expression of spirit.

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We further give mathematical definition for heart, mind, and consciousness. We find the manifestation process starts at
the spiritual level. Heart receives the vibrations of spirit. The vibrations received from the heart activate the mind. Our mind
processes these vibrations, which contains information, energy, and matter. Mind directs where energy goes. Energy moves
matter. Matter is the manifestation of spirit through heart and mind.
Our study demonstrates that a science of mind-body-spirit is possible. It can unify spirituality and science at a funda-
mental level. It can also help understand quantum physics from a higher point of view. It can take science as well as spiritual-
ity to a higher level.
The mind body spirit science presented here (also called the Soul Mind Body Science) has profound and powerful ap-
plications for healing, rejuvenation, life-transformation, and for unleashing untapped human potentials.

1.3 Materialism and Dualism

78 Beliefs in dualism and personal values

Grankvist Gunne
Department for Social and Behavioral Studies, University West, Trollhattan, SWEDEN

Whether or not the brain and consciousness are basically indistinguishable (and maybe even the same thing), or whether
they are somehow different and distinct, has been debated by philosophers for centuries. The dualistic position can be sum-
marized by saying that consciousness is, in a fundamental sense, distinct and different from the brain itself.
In the current study, 127 students in a Human Resource program at University West in Sweden answered survey ques-
tions about the degree to which they hold dualistic beliefs. Examples of statements they evaluated include the following:
“Consciousness is the same as the brain,” “Consciousness is something non-physical,” and “Consciousness interacts with the
brain, but the mind is separate from the brain”. The respondents also answered questions that measured how much weight
they attached to different personal values found in Schwartz’s circular value model.
The axes, or dimensions, should be interpreted so that individuals who rate values that belong to one of the endpoints
as highly important also place less emphasis on values that belong to the opposite endpoint. Another central characteristic is
that these axes are independent of one another. Both properties of the model have significant empirical support.
We found that those with stronger dualistic beliefs rated universalism as more important and power as less important.
The former value is defined as believing it is important to strive for understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection
for the welfare of all people and for nature. The latter value is defined as believing it is important to strive for social status and
prestige, as well as control or dominance over people and resources. The vertical axis in the model, with universalism near
the self-transcendence endpoint and power near the self- enhancement endpoint, should be understood as a dimension in
which different individuals, to a different extent, strive either to transcend personal and individual interests and instead work
to be of benefit for others, or to primarily strive to promote their own personal interests.
Our results furthermore indicate that psychology and importance attached to personal values could be of importance
for in what degree an individual holds dualistic beliefs about the brain and consciousness relationship.

79 Consciousness as information in philosophy and neuroscience: Double-

Aspect and Integrated Information Theory compared
Grasso Matteo
Philosophy, Communication and Media Studies, Roma Tre University, Rome, ITALY

From his famous formulation of the hard problem of consciousness, David Chalmers remains one of the main critics of mate-
rialistic accounts of consciousness. Coherently, Chalmers has proposed his own solution to the hard problem in the form of a
non-reductive theory of consciousness, the Double-Aspect Theory (DAT), which equates consciousness with information and
puts it at the fundamental level of reality (Chalmers 1996). DAT individuates two psychophysical principles, namely struc-
tural coherence and organizational invariance, which according to Chalmers should be met by a theory in order to overcome
the hard problem of consciousness. However, DAT is still a sketchy theory and lacks a formulation of its principles in terms

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compatible with neuroscience. One of the actual leading neuroscientific accounts of consciousness, the Integrated Information
Theory (IIT) proposed by Giulio Tononi (Tononi 2012, Oizumi et al 2014), has strong theoretical analogies with DAT. In
this talk I will claim that a joint analysis is required for two reasons: firstly, because DAT individuates the criteria that a theory
should satisfy in order to face up to the hard problem of consciousness, secondly because IIT is the only neuroscientific theory
which explicitly proposes a scientific account of the phenomenal aspects of consciousness and, as I will suggest, which meets
these two criteria. I will therefore present a comparison between DAT and IIT. I will show that they present various similari-
ties (such as the identification of consciousness as (a form of) information, the assumption of consciousness as a fundamen-
tal entity, the account of phenomenal consciousness in terms of informational relationships, and the entailment of a form of
panpsychism) and I will show that IIT satisfies DAT’s principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, hence
being a potential candidate as a solution to the hard problem. On the other hand, I will highlight the differences between the
two approaches (such as the different concepts of information and the respective position about pan(proto)psychism), I will
discuss the question that remains unanswered and the future direction that the joint analysis of these two theories should take.

80 Zombie Worlds and the Conditional Analysis Strategy

Haukioja Jussi
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, NTNU Trondheim, Trondheim, NORWAY

One strategy for responding to the zombie argument against materialism (ZA) is the Conditional Analysis Strategy (CAS)
suggested, independently, by Braddon-Mitchell and Hawthorne. CAS claims that phenomenal concepts have a conditional
structure, such that the following is a priori:
(CA1) If the actual world contains spooky states, then our phenomenal concepts refer (rigidly) to those states.
(CA2) If the world is merely physical, then our phenomenal concepts refer (rigidly) to physical states that play the right
sort of functional role.
CAS explains why zombies are conceivable: we cannot know a priori whether the actual world is merely physical or
not, and if it isn’t, then there is no incoherence in the supposition that there are zombies. But it doesn’t follow that zombies
are possible: if the actual world is merely physical, zombies are not possible. Since we cannot know a priori which kind of a
world we inhabit, we cannot infer the possibility of zombies from their conceivability, and ZA fails.
In this paper I look at two objections against CAS. The first of these (Chalmers, Alter, Yetter-Chappell, Han) is that CAS
delivers the “wrong” zombie intuition. The “right” zombie intuition, according to the critics, is that “full zombie worlds”
are directly conceivable. But directly conceiving of a full zombie world would involve conceiving of myself as lacking phe-
nomenal consciousness. The critics claim that zombie worlds are directly conceivable, because my knowledge of my own
phenomenal states is a posteriori. I respond as follows. A posteriori evidence is needed to acquire phenomenal concepts. But
once one has acquired them, one can know a priori that one has (had) phenomenal states: it is in the nature of phenomenal
concepts that they are epistemically guaranteed to refer, though we do not know, merely on the basis of possessing the con-
cepts, what kinds of states they refer to. Once I’ve acquired a phenomenal concept, I cannot coherently entertain the pos-
sibility that there are no phenomenal states.
The second objection is by Yetter-Chappell: she claims that once the analysis is fleshed out in sufficient detail, it will
turn out to be either circular, or committed to analytic functionalism. I will argue that even if she is right, this does not make
CAS void of interest: it will merely suggest rethinking the dialectics around CAS. Yetter- Chappell points out herself that,
for example, Papineau and Balog’s constitutional theory of phenomenal concepts will also entail a conditional structure like
(CA1) and (CA2), but at the metasemantic rather than the semantic level. The crucial thing to notice is that it doesn’t mat-
ter for the CAS, as an answer to ZA, whether the conditional structure follows from the semantics or the meta-semantics.
What matters is that (CA1) and (CA2) are a priori. If one thinks of meta-semantics as a priori, then one can use the CAS to
give a quick and elegant response to the zombie argument, while denying that our phenomenal concepts strictly speaking
have a conditional analysis.

81 An Apple a Day Keeps the Dualist Away

Hirvonen Ilmari
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

This paper has two main theses. Firstly, it is argued that ontological dualism is based on a mistaken conflation of ontology
and epistemology. Secondly, it is claimed that merely conceptual arguments – especially the kind used in the philosophy

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of mind – do not suffice to justify ontological conclusions. These theses are illustrated with an analogy derived from Moly-
neux’s problem.
William Molyneux asked John Locke whether someone born blind could distinguish a sphere form a cube merely by
sight, if this person would gain the ability to see. Modern empirical research seems to indicate that the answer is “no” (e.g.
Held et al. 2011, Ostrovsky et al. 2006).
If the scientists are right, then there is no necessary epistemological connection between what – for instance – an apple
tastes, looks, smells, or feels like. Thus, one cannot derive the visual appearance of an apple from its taste. Yet, most likely the
majority of people would say that there is only one relatively uniform object, the apple in question, behind this manifold of
sensory input.
This seems to be in conflict with the primary motivation for ontological dualism. Ontological dualists highlight the epis-
temic difference between the neurological and bodily reactions of a person perceiving an apple, on the one hand, and how
she experiences the apple, on the other. It is also often emphasised that the relation between bodily processes and mental
states is epistemologically contingent in the sense that one cannot deduce with necessity someone’s mental state from her
bodily state.
If the mere epistemological difference would be enough to justify an ontological difference, then, by similar logic, mun-
dane objects like apples should not be assumed to be ontologically uniform wholes. If mind and body are separate sub-
stances because of their different epistemological properties, then why would not the hardness of an apple be a property of
one substance and its colourfulness a property of another?
There is also some indication that Molyneux’s problem supports the thesis that concepts are primarily connected to
epistemology instead of ontology. A blind person cannot fully master colour or other visual concepts because of her epis-
temic disability. This is why she cannot recognise an apple merely by sight in the situation described by Molyneux.
It might be argued that Molyneux’s problem actually gives an argument for property dualism. This may be so, but then,
by the same token, it also provides an argument for property pluralism. Moreover, it can only be an argument for epistemic
property pluralism, which is trivially true. No ontological conclusions may be justifiably drawn form it, unless one is ready
to accept that there is an ontologically interesting explanatory gap between, say, the colour of an apple and its tangible shape.
If the conclusions of this paper are correct, then conceptual analysis alone is unable to solve metaphysical issues. It is
suggested, therefore, that in the philosophical and scientific study of the mind we should be looking for a causal explanation
instead of a conceptual one.

82 Measuring mind-matter interactions using single-trial EEG decoding

Joli Jacob j
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS
Lieze Boshoff
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS

If an observer measures a quantum system in superposition, let us say a qubit, this measurement will reduce the qubit to
either 0 or 1. But what causes this collapse? According to the controversial Von Neumann-Wigner (VN-W) interpretation,
it is the observer’s conscious experience that triggers the collapse. Here, we present two experiments in which we investigate
the role of sensory experience in wave function collapse. In both experiments, we let participants do a face detection task,
in which presence or absence of faces embedded in noise was triggered by means of either a quantum event or pseudo-
randomly generated event.
In its most extreme interpretation, the VN-W interpretation predicts that the observer’s sensory experience of the
measurement determines the outcome of the quantum measurement (face present or absent), irrespective of what is on the
screen. This is of course a paradoxical situation – technically, it should never occur that an observer is wrong, because if it
is the observer’s sensory experience that determines the wave function collapse, there should be a one-on-one relation be-
tween sensory experience and the outcome of the measurement. However, sensory experience and report are not perfectly
correlated, and participants will make errors. These errors can be attributed to motor errors, decision errors or just random
noise, but recently we have shown that a subset of errors is caused by true misperceptions, and that we can identify trials in
which participants had a true sensory experience that was not in line with physical stimulation using an online single- trial
EEG classifier. However, if the VN-W interpretation is correct, this latter class of errors should not occur for quantum gener-
ated stimuli.
This allows us to make a very specific prediction: error rates for quantum generated stimuli should be lower than for
pseudo-randomly generated stimuli. In Experiment 1 (N?39) we show this indeed to be the case: we found less perceptual

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errors for quantum generated than for pseudo-randomly generated trials, as indexed by both behavioral data and single-trial
EEG.
In Experiment 2, we put this idea even further to the test: we gave a highly hypnotizable participant the post- hypnotic
suggestion that she would see only faces during the experiment. According to the VN-W interpretation, this manipulation
should fail for quantum generated faces, but not for pseudo-randomly generated faces. Preliminary data shows this indeed
to be the case – false alarm rate for pseudo-randomly generated trials increased from 5% to 33%, whereas the false alarm rate
for quantum generated trials only increased from 5% to 8%.
Together, these findings do suggest that the perceptual experience of an observer does affect the outcome of a quantum
measurement. The implications of these findings for the study of consciousness will be discussed.

83 The mind-body problem and human-technology interaction research

Karvonen Hannu
Department of Computer Science, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND
Kauppinen Tommi
Helsinki, FINLAND

One of the important unanswered questions for Cartesian dualism is the nature of the interaction between mind and matter.
Partly because of this so-called mind-body problem, several approaches in philosophy and psychology have challenged the
traditional Cartesian dualist way of thinking. For example, phenomenology (e.g., by Husserl), pragmatism (e.g., by Peirce),
and radical empiricism (e.g., by James) are more interested in the way interactions between the human and the environment
shape the human mind and vice versa. Therefore, the proponents of these approaches object focusing solely on what is hap-
pening inside the mind, apart from the outside world, as is traditionally thought for example in cognitive psychology and
cognitive science (e.g., in the CRUM[BS] model by Thagard).
Human-technology interaction (HTI) research, on the other hand, studies the relationship between people and tech-
nology in order to inform the human-centred design of (information) technology. The Cartesian dualism has formed also
the dominant basis of thinking in mainstream HTI research, based especially on the classic human processor model by
Card, Moran, and Newell. Nevertheless, recent HTI research (such as ‘embodied interaction’ research by Dourish) has taken
influences from different alternative approaches, like ecological psychology (e.g., by Gibson), embodied cognition (e.g., by
Lakoff and Johnson), and situated action (e.g., by Suchman), which have challenged the dualist way of thinking. In addition,
approaches such as distributed cognition (e.g., by Hutchins), cultural historical activity theory (e.g., by Vygotsky), and natu-
ralistic decision making (e.g., by Klein) have influenced non-mainstream contemporary HTI research to move away from
the traditional mindset. HTI research influenced by these approaches sees the human’s interaction with technology as, for
example, embodied, situated and social. In this paper, we investigate these approaches and, based on them, give recommen-
dations for further work in human-technology interaction research.
As a conclusion, we suggest that future HTI research has to change its thinking about the human mind to see it more as
an embodied processor, which is in constant interaction with a changing and social world. This does not exclude the dualist
ontology, but addresses the need for developing the argumentation. Therefore, we see that more work is required to inte-
grate all the relevant aspects from the above-mentioned alternative approaches into HTI research in order for it to provide a
unified and coherent view of the relationship between human and technology and to inform the design of technological ar-
tefacts better. This paper provides an overview of the current state of research in the area and works as an initial step towards
a more integral perspective.

84 How can chaos theory help to explain existence of qualia?

Lisowski Grzegorz
Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, POLAND

The notion of qualia, traditionally understood as a private conscious quality is commonly used by dualistically oriented ana-
lytical philosophers of mind (e.g. Nagel 1974, Jackson 1986). They criticize reductionist’s thesis that mental states reduce to
neural processes. In my talk, I will argue that it is plausible to claim coherently that qualia exist and that all mental states are
physical.
My thesis goes as follows: there is at least one method of explanation of existence of qualia in terms of physicalism

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without falling into contradiction. To prove it I will provide a precise definition of quale. As there is no canonical definition
of this term, I will propose to define quale as a common part of Daniel Dennett’s (Dennett, 1988), Clarence Lewis’s (Lewis,
1991) and Witold Hensel’s (Hensel, 2003) definitions: quale is a conscious cognitive property, which is uncommunicable,
private and directly apprehensible in consciousness.
The main assumption of my argument is inspired by Freemans’ dynamic perception theory (Freeman, 1986), especially
by his research on chaotic reactions in the neural system and J.J.C Smart’s approach to theory of identity (Smart, 1959),
which is a specific method of characterization of mind in terms of physicalism. Following Freeman’s example of olfactory
perception, I will show how a model of proceeding sensory perception implies that a brain as a whole (and not a particular
part of it) is involved in processing of such perceptions.
The argumentation presented consists of four main parts. Firstly, I will show that it is possible to postulate any physical
conscious properties; secondly, I will argue that some of them are private, thirdly, that they can also be given directly in con-
sciousness. Finally, I will show that they can also be uncommunicable. This argumentation shows that assuming physicalism
is not enough to reject existence of qualia.

References: 1. Dennett D.C., 1988, Quining qualia, in: Marcel A. and Bisiach E. (eds), „Consciousness in Mod-
ern Science”, Oxford University Press
2. Freeman. W., 1986, How brains make chaos in order to make sense
of the world,”Behavioral and brain science” p. 161-195 3. Hensel Witold, 2003, In search for qualia, „Przeglad
filozoficzno-literacki”, 6/2003, p. 15-31 4. Jackson. F., 1986, What Mary didn’t know, “Journal of philosophy” 8
p. 291-295
5. Lewis C. I., 1991, Mind and world-order, New York: Dover Publications
6. Nagel Thomas, 1974,
What is it like to be a bat?, “Philosophical review”, p. 435-450 7. Smart, J.J.C., 1959, Sensations and Brain Pro-
cesses, “Philosophical Review” 68 p. 141–156.

85 Is Computation a Physically Real Basis for Consciousness?

McKenty Adam
N/A, Independent scholar, Mansons Landing, CANADA
Sundin Per
Physics, Milano-Bicocca University, Milano, ITALY

In many areas of cognitive science and consciousness studies, it is widely believed that neural computation is the basis of
consciousness, and that were the same computation to be performed outside a human nervous system (for example in an
emulation run on a digital computer), the computation would generate the same conscious experience.
It is also a widely-held belief that the physical world is causally closed, and that consciousness is strictly a product of
physical processes, and does not have causal power, but is instead an epiphenomenon. Variants of this view are known as
materialism or physicalism, and are a dominant tenet in much of the natural sciences.
Although these two views — abstract computationalism and causal physicalism — are widespread, there are aspects of
each that when examined carefully reveal difficulties in logically connecting the two. Specifically, physicalism requires that for
a natural phenomenon such as consciousness to exist there must be a physical process by which it is generated and specified;
yet, abstract computation seems to be, almost by definition, independent of any well-defined fundamental physical process.
In this paper we examine the question of whether a computational account of consciousness is compatible with the
physicalism. To do this, we define causal physicalism (CP) as the assertion that for any conscious experience E, there is a
physical process P that is necessary and sufficient for its existence, and by which it is completely specified. We similarly de-
fine abstract computationalism (AC) as the assertion that for any conscious experience E there is an abstract computation C
that is necessary and sufficient for its existence, and by which it is completely specified.
Assuming AC and CP are compatible, we can combine their definitions, such that computation C is a description of the
causal connection between P and E. We can express this relationship as P → C → E.
In order for AC and CP to both be true, there has to be some definable physical process that exists in all implementa-
tions of C and is at the same time fundamental enough to be a plausible cause of a basic natural phenomenon such as con-
sciousness.
We examine the many physical dimensions of computation in an attempt to identify possible substrate- independent
physical processes that underlie it, and provide an interpretation-independent, physically real basis for computational con-
sciousness.
We find that no such physical process seems to exist, and therefor suggest that an abstract computational account of
consciousness is incompatible with physicalism.

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We then consider some objections to these conclusions, with a focus on computation as causal topology as defined in
Chalmers (2011). Finally, we examine the alternative options if we consider physicalism to be true and computationalism
false, computationalism to be true and physicalism false, or both computationalism and physicalism to be false.

86 One-Dimensional versus Two-Dimensional Zombies

Michels Robert
Department of philosophy, University of Geneva, Genève, SWITZERLAND

One of the most important philosophical argument against materialism is Chalmers’s Zombie Argument. (See Chalmers
2009.) The Zombie Argument is a conceivability argument, which means that it involves an inference from conceivability to
metaphysical possibility. In classical conceivability arguments, this inference involves two premises (See e.g. Gendler Szabó
& Hawthorne 2002):
1. p is conceivable.
2. If p is conceivable, p is metaphysically possible.
The Zombie Argument instead relies on the framework of two-dimensional semantics and in particular on the distinc-
tion between 1- and 2-possibility, where 1-possibility is an epistemic and 2-possibility a metaphysical modality. The crucial
inference from conceivability hence requires three instead of two premises:
1’. p is conceivable.
2’. If p is conceivable, p is 1-possible. 3’. If p is 1-possible, p is 2-possible.
Classical conceivability arguments are widely rejected, since most philosophers adhere to the Kripkean view that con-
ceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility. (See Kripke 1989.) In contrast, two-dimensional conceivability argu-
ments such as the Zombie argument are taken seriously and there is an ongoing discussion about their soundness.
This suggests that in the context of conceivability arguments, “going two-dimensional” amounts to a real improvement.
In this talk, I will argue that this is not the case.
One of two arguments for the same conclusion clearly improves on the other, if it is sound whereas the other argument
is not. Assuming that both arguments are logically valid, this means that the premises of the improved argument have to be
more easily made true than those of the argument it improves on. Drawing on the fact that premise 3’ of the Zombie Argu-
ment can only be true if all concepts involved in p have identical 1- and 2-intensions (see Chalmers 2009, Walde 2005), I
will argue that the inference from conceivability to 2- possibility in a two-dimensional conceivability argument is a sound
sub-argument if, and only if, the corresponding inference in a classical conceivability argument for the same conclusion is,
too. I draw the conclusion that two-dimensional conceivability arguments and, in particular, the two-dimensional argument
against materialism do not improve on their classical counterparts.
After arguing for my main thesis, I will discuss the effects on Chalmers’s modified Zombie Argument, which aims to
establish the disjunctive conclusion that materialism is false or Russellian Monism is true, rather than just that materialism
is false.

Bibliography: Chalmers, David J. (2009). The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism. In McLaugh-
lin, B. P. & Walter, S. (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. Gendler
Szabó, Tamar & Hawthorne, John (2002). Introduction: Conceivability and possibility. In Szabó Gendler, T. &
Hawthorne, J. (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming
and Necessity. Harvard University Press. Walde, Bettina (2005). On epistemic and ontological aspects of con-
sciousness: Modal arguments and their possible implications. Mind and Matter 3 (2):103-115.

87 The illusory dualism of consciousness as wanting

Nielsen Merin
Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA

Further to Predictive Brain theories, I argue that all conscious attention is of sensory objects, and is driven by a form of
wanting. ‘Wanting’ is abstractly defined as a cognitive creature seeking ‘conceptually’ to resolve its internal states of disequi-
librium. Here, each instance of conscious attention is an active attempt to glean data of relevance to the resolution of some
disequilibrium state, and potentially expedite this. Establishing relevance involves appealing to associations of past experi-
ence with the resolution of similar states of disequilibria – registered in long-term memory as ‘resolution pathways’. Many of
these may be connected to any state of disequilibrium, and conversely. Each resolution pathway is contingently labelled by
a contextually relevant bundle of concepts, but ‘meaning’ is designated by the resolution pathway, not its conceptual label.

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Pre-established resolution pathways together link states of disequilibrium to conscious attention. In this model, any
concept is essentially just a symbolic representation of a particular set of sensory experiences. Each resolution pathway
also sits in a causal chain as follows. (1) Tracking of the creature’s situation. (2) Representations of the situation engage
with disequilibria that are potentially activated in the context; and disposed to resolution by applying contextually available
data. This primes otherwise dormant resolution pathways to be triggered by the activation of their disequilibrium states. (3)
Some of these are activated, and their priorities compete for the services of conscious attention to glean data of relevance
to their respective resolution pathways. (4) The bundle of concepts that labels the top-priority resolution pathway, within
long-term memory, generates a prediction of imminent sensory objects, focusing senses relevant to that bundle. (5) Sensory
objects are consciously attended; compared with the prediction in terms of no-match or match. Either way, subsequent pre-
dictions may be made until matching and/or more detailed matching occurs.
This model portrays conscious attention as actively driven by the advantages of data-gleaning to expedite the resolu-
tion of wants and needs, maintaining system homeostasis. Reliable comparison of any prediction with relevant sensory
objects, however, requires the prediction to simulate them ‘objectively’. Long-term memory motivates conscious attention,
but it must afford a reliable distinction between itself and its simulations. It removes itself from the picture; conceptually
divorcing each prediction from its originating disequilibrium, so that it seems distinct from both the world and the creature.
Conscious attention clearly results in feeling – either new disequilibria emerging to be resolved, or states associated with
resolving them. But it also results ‘from’ feeling as internal disequilibria, which are physical in the realm of biochemistry.
We are conscious ‘by’ the driving forces of disequilibria, but conscious ‘of ’ only concepts. Thus, feeling seems to arise out
of nowhere. Awareness of consciousness omits the relevant wanting that connects the representation to our physical real-
ity. Consciousness seems to float free of objective reality. Its means and impetus do not appear among represented objects.
Therefore we give it another label, the subject, corresponding to the illusion of dualism.

88 Rationality and the Privacy of the Self

Pearson Francis
Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

One current view of reasons for action is that they are complexes of intentional states, and one current view of rationality is
that it consists in one’s beliefs and intentions forming certain patterns (cf. Davidson 2001 and Broome 1999 respectively).
For example, when one wants x and believes one must do y to get x, then one forms an intention to y. Recently these views
are losing ground to the idea that reasons for action are facts, and that rationality consists in responding appropriately to
these reasons (cf. Alvarez 2010). For example, the fact that a speeding car is approaching one is a reason to step out of the
road, and one is rational if one is motivated by that reason to step out of the road.
Perry’s arguments for the essential indexical have shown that certain actions require their agents to have first- personal
beliefs (cf. Perry 1979). For example, Perry only stops spreading sugar around the supermarket when he believes something
like ‘I am making a mess’ (he might believe ‘Perry is making a mess’ but won’t stop unless he believes ‘I am Perry’). A more
careful examination of such cases shows that the first-personal belief is in fact necessary for the action to be rational. Perry
could stop without a first-personal belief if his stopping was irrational or non-rational.
If acting rationally consists in responding appropriately to reasons, then the extent to which it requires beliefs is that it
requires an awareness of reasons to perform those actions. It follows that if a first-personal belief is required for an action to be
rational, then that belief must capture a reason, a fact, not captured by any other belief. The implication is that first- personal
beliefs capture something about the world that third- or second- personal ones do not. In short, modern theories of rationality,
combined with the phenomenon of essential indexicality, imply the existence of something captured by first-personal beliefs, a
self, not captured by traditional third-personal description, nor hence by the traditional objective descriptions of science.
One virtue of this argument is that it side-steps issues of opacity and of meaning, relying only on the idea that beliefs are
states of awareness through which agents can respond to the world. In this paper I will flesh out this argument, giving some
motivation for the recent move in theories of rationality, however, the conclusion of the paper will not be that there are
private selves, but the more modest claim that these theories of rationality could have wider implications than have hitherto
been recognised.

Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Broome, J. (1999). Normative Requirements. Ratio 12: 398 – 419. Davidson, D. (2001). Actions, Reasons, and
Causes. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 3 – 19. Perry, J. (1979). The problem
of the Essential Indexical. Nous 13: 3 – 21.

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89 Pineal Gland 2.0

Spector Shirtz Aviv
History and Philosophy of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, jerusalem, ISRAEL

Descartes was wrong in numerous ways, but he got at least one thing right- if we wish to keep a dualist ontology and retain
causal relations between the mind realm and the extended, physical, realm, we are in need of a pineal gland; or at least a sub-
stitute which preforms the same function of a bridge between both realms.
As the history of science demonstrates, ontology expansion is a routine and natural measure in the face of an over-
whelming obstacle. Black matter, Antimatter, Tachyons, and even consciousness itself as David Chalmers suggested, are only
few examples of occasions in which philosophers and scientists abandoned hope to solve a problem using the inventory of
accepted and established entities, and chose to expand our ontology by adding an extra ingredient which is supposed to fill
the gap and solve the puzzle . The mind- body problem might be considered as the pinnacle of philosophical and scientific
problems, therefore it warrants an extreme solution such as ontology expansion.
Here I wish to suggest the existence of a yet unknown and unrecognized substance in the universe. Its function is to
function as a bridge between the three dimensional spatial realm, in which the extended resides, and the extra spatial realm,
in which consciousness resides. This matter, let us call it Ilonium, has both spatial (extended) properties and mind (extra
spatial) properties; it is both Res extensa and Res cogitans. Ilonium’s existence is not an emergent property of the brain, but
is completely independent. In some point of brains’ evolution, certain mechanism in the brain was developed and was able
to connect the brain to the spatial properties of Ilonium, and thus was able to establish a connection between the spatial and
the non-spatial.
This extra ingredient is necessary if we wish upon a connection between the body and the mind. If we accept that the
physical has no mind-like properties, and the mind has no physical properties, and we wish to retain the causal closure of the
physical, we are in need of a newer, better, pineal gland; something which possesses both spatial and non-spatial properties,
such as Ilonium.

90 The Vulgar Notion of Matter: the Common Denominator of Materialism and

Dualism
Uygun Tunç Duygu
Philosophy, Bogaziçi University, Istanbul, TURKEY

I will argue that despite the ground-breaking paradigm shifts in sciences, the notion of matter endorsed in philosophy of
mind is still tainted with the baggages of previous scientific paradigms and with some philosophical legacies that entrap the
discipline within futile schisms.
The main claim of the paper is that materialism and dualism are not two fundamentally dif-
ferent positions within philosophy of mind; that there is a basic dualism which reduces a complex reality into two artificially
constructed aspects, and there are different positions only with respect to whether they choose and take either one or both
of the reduced aspects. Thus no matter physicalist, eliminativist, qualia-theorist or even pansychist, we can see the same con-
ception of matter implicit within their premisses.
I will refer to this reduced notion as the vulgar notion of matter (VNM), and argue that as long as it survives it is bound
to proliferate and perpetuate futile schisms between ontological positions. The locomotive of the ongoing schisms, I will
argue, is the very fact that rival camps share the same VNM; and for this reason the ongoing theoretical clashes between ma-
terialist and non- or anti-materialistic positions help only in perpetuating the opposition by creating a feedback loop.
The allegedly anti-reductionistic positions can never achieve what they claim to be as long as they do not radically break
free from VNM; since it conditions and obscures not only material reality but also what they take to be irreducable to the
material. Materialist position, on the other hand, will not have the means to claim to account for the totality of reality on ma-
terialistic grounds as long as it does not free itself from the basic dualism generated by the first reduction.
I will analyse the conceptual content, and to a minimal extent the historical background of VNM under three titles:
inert/ pathological, atomistic and stable matter.
The first will deal with the assumption that matter cannot originate motion
by itself; it can only transmit what it receives. All moving causes, such as thought, intentionality, life, are of a different sort
than matter, and must come from outside to put matter into motion.
The second will discuss the idenification of matter with what are taken to be building blocks, not the relations and or-
ganization, and the resulting assumption that what is material are the parts and organization is something supramaterial.
The third will examine the false dichotomy of stability/instability in connection with the notions of energy levels, struc-
turation and potential, and discuss the notion of meta-stability.

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I will also propose a diagnosis of the dualism creating mode of approach to natural phenomena in terms of
(i) inability
to take into account bottom-up and top-down processes, background and foreground characteristics at the same time; one-
sided thinking
(ii) tendency to separate causes from effects ontologically, and inability to grasp circularity in causality; linear
thinking
(iii) underlying substantialism whether in the form of atomism or formism, that demands conceptualisation of the
involving factors as separate, independent, closed upon themselves; conceiving relations as secondary, dependent realities.

1.4 Qualia

91 The Hard Problem of Temporal Qualia: Undercutting the Illusion of Temporal

Flow
Barker Stephen
Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UNITED KINGDOM

We experience time as somehow flowing. B-theorists about time—let’s call them four-dimensionalists— standardly argue
that this sense of time’s flow is an illusion, since, they claim, the universe is a 4-dimensional eternal block in which nothing
flows. I argue that the flow-illusion thesis of the 4-dimensionalist is untenable. The 4-dimensionalist—in maintaining their
illusion thesis—faces a form of the hard problem in relation to temporal qualia. The form of the problem is this: the very
content of the illusion that conscious beings are meant to suffer according to the 4-dimensionalist is one that such conscious
beings cannot in fact grasp in a 4- dimensional world. The argument for this conclusion proceeds as follows. Perceptual illu-
sions involve dispositions to misapply concepts, where the dispositions are generated by cognitive/perceptual mechanisms.
If so, the 4-dimensionalist’s thesis that our sense of flow us an illusion faces two questions. The first is a mechanism ques-
tion: What are the cognitive/perceptual mechanisms that explain how conscious beings in a 4- dimensional world have the
illusion? The second is a content question: What exactly is the content of the illusion, that is, the phenomenal concept of
flow or change, that is misapplied, and how can it be acquired in a 4-dimensional world? Typically, 4-dimensionalists focus
on the mechanism question. They often compare the flow illusion to the illusion of apparent motion, the illusion in which
subjects shown a series of static dots have the impression that there is a moving dot across a screen. So, just as a theory of
perceptual processing might explain the apparent-motion illusion, it seems a very similar explanation can be developed for
the flow illusion. What, however, of the content question? In the apparent-motion illusion the content of the illusion is:
persisting- dot-moving-across-a-screen. You might think this content just involves ordinary folk concepts of persistence and
movement, misapplied in the screen case, but applied correctly elsewhere. Similarly, one might think the content of the flow
illusion, the-now-is-constantly-changing, involves misapplication of concepts correctly applied elsewhere in the 4-dimen-
sional world. Perhaps. But what is the concept of change misapplied in the flow-illusion? The 4-dimensionalist must claim it
is one definable in their terms, something like: x changes iff x has different properties at different times—change is a certain
pattern in temporal states. I argue this functional concept of change cannot be our folk concept, and certainly not the one
misapplied in the flow illusion. The argument is based on three distinct considerations: our intuitive 3-dimensionalism; our
phenomenal grasp of the direction of change; our intuitive response to Zeno’s paradoxes. If our folk-concept of change is not
the functional concept, what is? I briefly sketch an alternative ‘flow’ concept that explains the content of the flow illusion.
But the result won’t please the 4-dimensionalist, since, I argue, they cannot explain how we can grasp this concept of change
in a 4-dimensional world. The flow concept cannot be defined in terms of concepts that make any contact whatsoever with a
4-dimensional reality devoid of flow.

92 A Place for Phenomenal Consciousness in the Extended Mind Outlook

Buller Tom
Philosophy, Illinois State University, Normal, USA

Horgan and Kriegel (2008) have argued that the Extended Mind Hypothesis – the view that some mental states can be
constituted by features of the environment – is “much ado about relatively little,” for one can accept this hypothesis without
having to accept the Extended Mind Outlook which maintains that “there is nothing special about skin and skull that makes

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them delineate a distinction central to the nature of mind.” Horgan and Kriegel argue that the EM hypothesis can be accom-
modated by the type of internalist theory that they themselves defend, namely, the Phenomenally Intentional Mark Thesis
(PIM). According to the thesis, phenomenal intentional states are the only states that are “uncontroversially, unquestion-
ably, paradigmatically, prototypically mental”; and phenomenal intentionality captures the core of mentality and is crucial to
the mark of the mental. Horgan and Kriegel grant that there is nothing special about the skin and skull, but they argue that
what it special is the internal tokening, the neural correlates, of the PI states; in other words, there is a “clear interiority” that
defines the scope of mentality.
In this paper I argue that the proximity between PIM (and the broader Phenomenal Intentionality Outlook) and the
EM hypothesis cuts both ways, for a supporter of the EM hypothesis can argue that this hypothesis (and the broader Ex-
tended Mind Outlook) can accommodate PIM. My argument is based upon consideration of the following claims:
1. The EM hypothesis claims that some mental states can be constituted by features of the environment and accepts that
other types of mental states, particularly phenomenal states will be defined in terms of neural tokening.
2. PIM and the broader PI outlook maintain that mental states commonly cited as paradigmatically intentional (e.g. be-
liefs) when conscious have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content. Extended mental states
are generally understood to be dispositional, non-conscious states; however if they were to become conscious there is no
reason to claim that they would lack phenomenal character
3. PIM allows mental states to be of one of two kinds: (a) phenomenally intentional states and (b) states suitably con-
nected to phenomenally intentional states. There are good reasons to claim that dispositional, non- conscious states whose
vehicles are part of a reliable coupled system are “suitably connected.”
It can be objected that the EM position cannot accept a core aspect of PIM, namely that phenomenal intentionality
“captures a core of mentality and is crucial to the mark of the mental” for EM appears to deny that there is any such mark
about from functional role. However in response a supporter of EM can argue that the notion of “suitable connection” is
relevant here: a state can be a mental state if it is suitably connected to phenomenal intentional states.
The conclusion I draw is that if the EM hypothesis is “much ado about relatively little,” then so is PIM.

(Horgan, T. and Uriah Kriegel, 2008. “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind,” The Monist, 91,
347-373).

93 Phenomenal Concepts and Language

Byrne Darragh
Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UNITED KINGDOM

Phenomenal concepts are concepts of what it is like, which conscious thinkers acquire through introspection, and which
various contemporary philosophers of mind claim to exhibit distinctive semantic and constitutive characteristics relevant to
the assessment of influential anti-physicalist arguments. Michael Tye and Derek Ball have (independently) recently argued
that none of our concepts of phenomenal qualities exhibit the characteristics claimed for these concepts. Their argument
exploits a Burgean social externalist thesis according to which concepts expressed by terms such as ‘pain’ and ‘red’ are, like
concepts in general, deferential: a thinker can count as misapplying such a concept if the application is out of accord with
those of experts to whom s/he is disposed to defer. I explore several ways in which advocates of phenomenal concepts can
respond to this, but I direct most of my attention to the rather blunt response which denies that phenomenal concepts are
expressed by terms of natural languages. If, as I argue is plausible, a concept can be deferential only if it is expressed in a pub-
lic language, this suggestion provides an elegant way to sidestep the Burgean challenge.
And I argue it is plausible in any case to think that phenomenal concepts are neither deferential nor expressed in public
languages. On the one hand there is good reason to insist that a thinker’s phenomenal concepts are specifically about what
things are like for her, and so will not be deferential. On the other there is good reason to allow that people who have not
experienced pain or perceived anything red express the same concepts as those who have had these experiences when they
use the terms, ‘pain’ and ‘red’; so there is reason to doubt that words like those express phenomenal concepts. I attempt fur-
ther to demystify or domesticate my contention that phenomenal concepts are not expressed by terms of public language by
arguing that we can account for the role of phenomenal concepts in our thinking without assuming that they are expressed
by terms of public language; and by pointing out that my contention does not compromise our ability to use public language
to talk about phenomenal qualities (or for that matter, phenomenal concepts).
I conclude by tentatively considering two more concessive positions. According to the first of these, phenomenal con-
tents are not semantically expressed by natural language terms, but are pragmatically conveyed by them. The second is a

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kind of contextualism according to which different people express different (indexical-like) contents with certain natural
language expressions associated with phenomenology.

94 Inverse Zombies and the Hard Problem of Unconsciousness

Cavalcante Felix Francisco Helio
Departament of Philosophy, Universidade Federal do Ceara, Fortaleza, BRAZIL

The problem concerning consciousness and its nature has been a motivation for numerous discussions in the Philosophy
of Mind. It has also had a huge repercussion in various areas of knowledge giving place to some interesting intellectual
constructions to emerge. David Chalmers, for instance, assumes the distinction between two kinds of problems related to
consciousness: the soft problems and the (unique) hard problem. The formers would concern the cognitive functions or
abilities that already were or are going to be explained by science and the last one refers to the very subjective aspect of
experience that comes along with these upper cognitive functions. This last point mainly concerns the qualitative aspect of
consciousness experience, also known as “qualia”. With the aim of increasing the consciousness approach and fight against
strict materialistic points of view, Chalmers created the “zombie” mental experiment. In this model, these “philosophical
zombies” would be physically and functionally identical to human beings, but without the capacity of having a subjective
conscious experience. In other words, human beings without “qualia”. For him, the simple existence of logical coherence
in this intellectual construction would destroy the strict materialistic approach and could only be challenged by a logical
argument. In 2008, LaRock and Mashour tried to empirically enrich the zombie mental experiment creating the so-called
“Inverse Zombie” (i-zombie), with inverted properties in comparison with Chalmer’s zombie. This would be a creature that
seems to be unconscious when it is actually conscious. The authors explicitly defend that patients that experienced “anes-
thesia awareness” during general anesthesia could be such an example of inverse zombies. This empirical fact could then
increase the approach of the hard problem of consciousness, helping to develop a reliable detection of conscious states as
well as changing the usual definitions of consciousness itself and even of brain death and vegetative states. Nevertheless, the
inverse zombie construction and its strong dependence on an empirical component gives rise to huge challenges that defy
its own coherence, both empirical and logical. In fact, this thought experiment shows incongruent elements, since it does
not fit the heterogeneity of concrete possibilities that are described for “anesthesia awareness” in medical practice. The cur-
rent classifications of this clinical state can not be used in an unequivocal way as a parameter to define wich specific situation
or wich brain or mental state clearly represent consciousness. The consciousness detection is therefore impossible under
this specific approach. So the “inverse zombies”, at least as described by its creators, can not be properly considered as a use-
ful tool for approaching the hard problem of consciousness and, besides, does not seem to actually be a step forward on this
important discussion.

95 Does Prediction Error Minimization framework endorse David Chalmers’

representational theory of phenomenal content?
Dolega Krzysztof
Philosophy II, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY

Prediction Error Minimization (henceforth PEM) is a new, exciting framework emerging at the crossroads of cognitive sci-
ence, statistical modeling and philosophy of mind (Hohwy, 2013). Informed by the recent developments in computational
neuroscience and hierarchical Bayesian modeling (see Clark, 2013 for overview) it offers a paradigm shifting approach to
modeling cognition and interpreting the architecture of the brain.
In his recent work, Jakob Hohwy (2012, 2013) has explained how PEM can offer an account for conscious and uncon-
scious perception by postulating a unified mechanism for attention. He has also argued for the frameworks’ commitment to
a representational view of mental content.
The aim of this paper is to expand on Hohwy’s work by examining the relation-
ship between his view on the role of representations in the PEM framework and first-order representational theories of con-
sciousness. In particular, I will try to show that PEM supports what David Chalmers’ defined as an impure representational-
ism about phenomenal content (Chalmers, 2004).

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96 Phenomenal sorites: A mystery of consciousness? CANCELLED

Dzhafarov Ehtibar
Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

Dzhafarov Damir
U of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Perry Lacey
Purdue University, West Lafayette IN, USA

Phenomenal sorites is viewed as a mysterious phenomenon of consciousness: very small changes in stimuli are “obviously”
insensible, but they add to arbitrarily large and clearly perceived differences. Sorites has two forms: classificatory and com-
parative. In the former, stimuli are considered one at a time, and our “common sense” and “experience” tell us that suffi-
ciently close stimuli have indistinguishable percepts. In the comparative version, the stimuli are considered in paris, and the
same “common sense” and “experience” tell us that sufficiently close stimuli are perceived as “the same.” A detailed psycho-
physical analysis of both these varieties of sorites shows, however, that their “obvious” premisses have neither logical nor
factual basis. What our “common sense” and “experience” tell us are merely unfounded prejudices. Of the three premisses
of soritical “paradoxes,” supervenience of percepts on stimuli, tolerance of percepts to small changes, and connectedness of
stimulus space, at least one does not hold, and, as a rule, it is the main one, supervenience. When supervenience is restored,
e.g., by redefining the “sameness” of percepts in probabilistic terms, it is inevitable that either tolerance or connectedness as-
sumptions are violated ––– in agreement with our “common sense” and outside the reach of our “experience.”

97 Fish are blind: further insights into phenomenal consciousness

Key Brian
School of Biomedical Sciences, University of Queensland, Brisbane, AUSTRALIA

Visual awareness or phenomenal consciousness (colloquially referred to as the “mind’s eye”) is often extended to vertebrate
animals when they exhibit functionally appropriate behaviour to visual stimuli. However, blindsight in humans has revealed
that behaviour can be mediated by nonconscious visual processing arising from extrastriate neural pathways. In some mam-
malian species this nonconscious (or so-called “blind”) vision is capable of discriminatory behaviour and is dependent on
the midbrain superior colliculus. Here I argue that visual behaviours in fish are primarily subpallial and centred about the
midbrain, particularly the optic tectum (homologous to superior colliculus). Fish can navigate, capture prey, localise food
pellets and exhibit conditioned learning in response to visual stimuli following ablation of the telencephalon. At least prey
capture and food pellet localisation is extinguished with ablation of the tectum alone. Interestingly, as I have previously
reported, the telencephalon is also not necessary for fish to respond behaviourally to electrical shock (Biol. Philos. doi:
10.1007/s10539-014-9469-4). Together, these observations suggest that fish do not experience phenomenal consciousness
associated with either visual or somatosensory stimuli. Based on comparative vertebrate neuroanatomy, I propose that vis-
ual awareness requires, at least, local canonical laminar microcircuitry that has excitatory feedforward and strong inhibitory
feedback involving both intra- and inter- laminar connectivity as well as higher-order modulation.

98 Pain as a mode of presentation

Lemaires Stephane
Philosophy, University of Rennes 1, Rennes, FRANCE

On what we may call the evaluative representational theory of pain, an experience of pain represents a body part as undergo-
ing an event that is bad in a way distinct from being painful (Cutter&Tye 2011, Bain 2013). However, representationalists
face the manifest image problem. If experience of object as colored represent them as colored, this is certainly not as having
some reflectance or microphysical properties.
Similarly, if my toe hurts, it seems wrong to say that I only experience my toe as undergoing something bad rather than
merely as being painful. Indeed, Fulkerson and Aydede (2014) have raised the following objection against the evaluativ-
ist representationalist : First, insofar as the representationalist is committed to the transparency thesis, she is committed to
claim that the only qualification than we should be able to offer of experience of pain would be as experience of body dam-

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age as bad. However, it is a fact that we describe these experiences using the concept ‘painful’. Thus, there is something that
the representationalist cannot explain. A solution would be that ‘painfull’ means analytically ‘represent badness’. But this is
certainly not true.
Does this show that a representational approach to pain cannot be defended and that we should prefer instead a subjec-
tive conception of pain. No, on my view, the initial sin of the representationalist is to say both that pain represents some kind
of badness and that this content is available as such in our pain experience for perceptual judgments for instance. On the
contrary, I suggest that pain experience does not make available something bad as such although this badness is represented.
The key move is to argue that the badness of the situation is made available under a mode of presentation that does not allow
to conceptualize what is represented as bad, but only as painful.
To defend this view, I rely on Kulvicki’s (2007) distinction within informational theory of representation between a
property that is represented and the mode under which it is represented. By the latter, he means the set of properties that are
also represented when the first property is represented. The crucial interest of this understanding of modes of presentation
is to give an informational account of the way in which the property represented is available to the subject herself. Indeed,
the understanding of a property represented becomes more discriminate insofar as the mode of presentation gets larger.
Kulvicki also argues that the phenomenal character of experience must be identified to the mode of presentation of the rep-
resented properties.
Building on this account, I contend that the mode of presentation of pain contains only one property which is the prop-
erty represented : some kind of badness. Therefore, insofar as this mode of presentation is extremely poor (as poor as the
mode of presentation of heat), the property represented can only be discriminated along one dimension which happens to
be the dimension of painfulness.
I finally offer a new explanation of why the common sense sees pain as a subjective property and why it raises no diffi-
culty for the claim that experience of pain are metaphysically analog to experience of color or heat.

References
Aydede, M., & Fulkerson, M. (2014). Affect: representationalists’ headache. Philosophical Studies
170(2), 175- 198.
Bain, D. (2013). What makes pain unpleasant. Philosophical Studies166(1), 69-89.
Cutter, B., &
Tye, M. (2011). Tracking representationalism and the painfulness of pain. Philosophical Issues, 21(1), 90-109.
Kul-
vicki, J. (2007). What is what it’s like? Introducing perceptual modes of presentation. Synthese, 156(2), 205- 229.

99 Illusions of Affection
Mihailis Diamantis
Philosophy, New York University, New York, NY, USA

This paper challenges the orthodox position that sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant in themselves. It presents the
possibility that the affective components of our sensations are hyper-illusions. Under this alternative picture, though sensa-
tions themselves have no affective component, they may seem to be inherently affective. Since the way our sensations seem
to us (second-order) differs from the way they are (first-order), our experience of sensations as affective is what I call a
hyper-illusion. I distinguish different types of hyper-illusion. In one type, the content of the second-order seeming conflicts
with the content of the first- order seeming. I argue that this type of hyper-illusion incoherent. In a different type of hyper
illusion, the second-order seeming supplements the first-order seeming, presenting the first-order seeming as having addi-
tional content that does not conflict with the content it actually has. This type of hyper-illusion, I argue, is possible, and our
hyper-illusions of the affective component of our sensations are of this type. I close the paper by discussing two case studies:
unpleasant scents and painful touch. I argue that the psychological evidence we have about these cases is consistent with a
hyper-illusory account of their affective components.

100 What one can and cannot show by appealing to the ’transparency’ of
experience
Sundström Pär
Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Umeå University, Umeå, SWEDEN

In recent philosophy, many attempts have been made to draw substantial conclusions about consciousness on the basis of
the claim that conscious experience is “transparent”. I shall distinguish and partly assess three such argumentative strate-

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gies, each of which draws on a different “transparency claim”. Two of these strategies seek to reject the view, embraced
by a long tradition in science and philosophy, that colours are properties of the mind. The first of these two strategies
(TS1) appeals for this purpose to the “transparency” claim that colours are *experienced as* properties of external ob-
jects but not as properties of the mind (cf. Harman 1990, 39; Tye 2000, 46). It is clear that this transparency claim does
not by itself refute the view that colours *are* properties of the mind. For one can consistent maintain that colours are
*experienced* as properties of external objects and of nothing else, but nevertheless *are* mental properties; things are
sometimes different from how they seem. To refute the view that colours are mental properties, TS1 one must therefore
supplement its transparency claim with some further premise. One premise often appealed to in this context is the “char-
ity” claim that experience can be trusted to not be systematically misleading about the location of colours (Tye 2000,
46). The force of TS1 depends on this, or some equally substantive additional premise. The second transparency-based
strategy (TS2) seeks to reject the view that colours are mental properties by appealing to the claim that, when we try to
introspect our experiences, we find only properties that are properties external objects if properties of anything at all (cf
Harman 1990, 39; Tye 1995, 30). I will argue that – whether or not we should ultimately accept this “transparency” claim
– this strategy is completely ineffective. For there is reason to accept the relevant transparency claim only if one already
has *independent* grounds for accepting the sought-for conclusion, that colours are not mental properties. A third trans-
parency based strategy (TS3) aims for a different conclusion. It takes as *given* (on one ground or other) that (a) colours
(and other sensory qualities) are not properties of the mind, and then makes the transparency claim that (b) when we try
to introspect our experiences, we find only colours and other sensory qualities. On the basis of (a) and (b) one can seek
to argue for different claims, e.g., that what-it’s-like properties are exhausted by representational properties. A noteworthy
feature of TS3 is that its central claims (a) and (b) are independent: many theorists accept (a) but not (b), and someone
who thinks colours are mental properties can accept (b) but not (a)). I shall argue that TS3 is an interesting strategy
and that it is best pursued independently of other transparency strategies. While one can try support premise (a) by the
transparency strategy TS1, the strongest arguments for (a) do not appeal to any transparency claim. And the transparency
claim (b) is, I will argue, plausible or at least worth taking seriously.

101 From a sensorimotor account of conscious quality, to a sensorimotor

account of phenomenal consciousness tout court
Silverman David
Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Paris Descartes University, Paris, FRANCE

The sensorimotor theory (Hurley, 1998; O’Regan and Noe, 2001; Noe, 2004; O’Regan, 2011) claims that we can make
strides toward dissolving the mysteries of consciousness if we conceive of experience as a kind of bodily engagement with
the environment rather than something that happens only in the brain. It attempts to explain phenomenal consciousness
by appealing to subjects’ implicit bodily mastery of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs), the pattern-like ways that sensory
inputs change in line with movement.
SMCs are held to account naturalistically for phenomenal qualities or “qualia”, the raw feels of phenomenal conscious-
ness. Thus the theory already offers a promising way to explain why individual conscious experiences feel the way they do.
However, it is possible to exercise mastery of SMCs even in the absence of conscious experience, as with a guided missile, or
a car driver who successfully responds to the colour of a traffic light even though her attention is directed at a conversation
with the passenger sitting next to her. Sensorimotor mastery is not, therefore, always sufficient for consciousness.
O’Regan (2011), expressing guarded sympathy with “Higher Order” theories of consciousness (e.g., Rosenthal, 1986),
claims that consciousness depends on the subject or her brain engaging in higher-order “cognitive access” to the exercise, at
a lower-order, of sensorimotor mastery. Block (O’Regan and Block, 2012) has argued that this smuggles in the very notion
the theory is supposed to explain, since it now appears to be higher-order cognising rather than sensorimotor mastery doing
the heavy lifting in the theory’s explanation for the existence and phenomenal character of conscious experience.
I argue that once we appreciate the limitations of the contribution that appeals to internal states, including represen-
tations, can make toward accounting for phenomenal qualities, the worry that an appeal to Higher Order representation
would make the theory’s account of phenomenal qualities depend primarily on neural states instead of SMCs is not a seri-
ous obstacle. However, I suggest that Higher Order theories are unable to do the work necessary to account for the very
existence of phenomenal consciousness, because they entail an abandonment of the sensorimotor theory’s necessary insight
that experience should be considered an embodied activity. I claim, therefore, that the sensorimotor theory should construe
cognitive access along quite different lines.
I argue that consciousness depends constitutively on the possession and exercise of appropriate higher-order bodily ca-

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1 . 4 Q ua l ia

pacities, and that considered on their own, neural states, which I allow for the sake of argument may include representations,
play a causal but not constitutive role in yielding these capacities and so consciousness. With reference to embodied and em-
bedded non-representational accounts of higher-level cognitive processes such as language elsewhere in the literature (e.g.,
Maturana, 1978), I offer in outline an embodied approach to distinguishing unconscious from conscious mastery of SMCs.
This promises to allow the sensorimotor theory to account not only for individual conscious qualities, but for phenomenal
consciousness tout court.

Hurley, S.L, 1998, Consciousness in Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Maturana, H.R., 1978, ‘Biology of
Language: The Epistemology of Reality’, Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of
Eric Lenneberg, Miller, G., & Lenneberg, E. (eds.), New York: Academic Press, pp. 27-63
Noë, A., 2004, Action
in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
O’Regan, J.K., 2011, Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
O’Regan, J.K. and A. Block, 2012, “Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s Why Red Doesn’t
Sound Like a Bell,” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1-20
O’Regan, J.K. and A. Noë, 2001, “A sensorimo-
tor account of vision and visual consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25 (4): 883–975.
Rosenthal, D.,
1986. ‘Two concepts of consciousness,’ Philosophical Studies, 49: 329–359.

102 Prospects for a science of panpsychism

Sterrantino Giuliano
Philosophy, University of Sydney, Sydney, AUSTRALIA

Any mature science of consciousness would arguably include a normative basis for distinguishing subjects from objects. It
would deliver a justifiable basis for attributions of subjective experience, one that would ideally be capable of generalising
beyond the limits of our particular form of life, but – logically – never beyond the boundaries of our conceptual capacity.
It
would need to achieve this in spite of the apparent fact that our form of life exclusively limits subjective, self- conscious
experience to a first-person context. This ‘problem of other minds’ effectively results in a scenario where only the fact of the
subjective experience of the individual contemplating their own case can be deduced. The subjective experience of others
can only ever be induced, therefore, based upon evidence that becomes ever more problematic with our increasing ability
to produce artificial systems capable of demonstrating apparent behaviours that have been traditionally associated with a
subjective ‘inner life’. Although such a normative basis may lie some distance into the future, it is possible to ask what a
research programme capable of producing such an outcome might entail. Specifically, two related stories are suggested. Al-
though each is fraught with well-established problems – which cast doubt upon the plausibility of the goal in question – it
is arguably possible to distinguish between potential variations on these two stories to reconsider aspects of the concept of
subjectivity.
The first – a metaphysical story – would involve the grounds for the capacity, opportunity, and actualisation
of something that satisfies some general, non-contradictory account of consciousness. Such a combination of potentiality
and realisation, instantiated in some empirical context (e.g. a physical body in a world) may conceivably provide a basis for
something approaching a general test, or at least a clearer understanding of the relationship between subjective experience
and aspects of that world.
The second – an epistemological story – would deal with whatever means of identifying subjectiv-
ity is still considered worthwhile in the asymmetrical aftermath of the problem of other minds. Although first-order obser-
vations of external behaviour could never amount to more than evidence (and would always fall short of a proof) of subjec-
tivity beyond the first-person, it may also be that distinguishable internal states of affairs – those apparently operating at a
level more fundamental than conscious awareness – would not help, either. Even consistently-identifiable relations between
external and internal states of affairs may still only serve as evidence of a correlate, rather than a cause.
The significance of
such a research programme would shift, however, if evidence should emerge that something like panpsychism obtains in the
world, as has been suggested by certain thinkers and researchers. If panpsychism is true, then all material objects are either
unrecognised subjects, or potential ones.
A thought experiment involving variations upon possible worlds that manifest dis-
tinguishable variants of panpsychism arguably illuminates questions about the identification of subjectivity beyond the first-
person, even when intersected with issues raised by the problem of other minds.

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103 A Naturalistic Qualia Model: The Function, Neural Correlates and Evolution
of Qualia
Westerlund Joakim
Stockholm university, Psychology department, Stockholm, SWEDEN
Lindström Jonathan
Stockholm SWEDEN
Dalkvist Jan
Stockholm, SWEDEN

Our poster presents a concrete, naturalistic qualia model. Given that qualia are the only phenomena we have direct knowl-
edge of, their existence is taken for granted. Our model refutes the notion that qualia are epiphenomenal in character, that is,
lacking in causal efficacy. This is a controversial stance, because it implies that the known physical world is not causally closed.
It is supported, however, by at least one very strong argument: qualia are sorted in a functionally meaningful way. For exam-
ple, pleasurable emotions tend to be associated with life-sustaining and negative emotions with life-threating behaviours.
Two major types of qualia are distinguished: Model qualia are the building blocks of an inner model of the physical
world, including the individuals own body. Emotional qualia, by contrast, inform the individual about its own current state
rather than the physical world; a major dimension of emotional qualia is pleasure vs. displeasure, which drives the individual
to seek out pleasant and avoid unpleasant states. Both types of qualia are assumed to have critical evolutionary advantages ?
model qualia by providing the individual with relevant veridical information about the physical world and emotional qualia
by motivating the individual to choose life- sustaining and avoid life-threatening behaviours.
Any non-epiphenomenal consciousness model would seem to require a neural correlate that can both produce a particu-
lar type of quale and be causally affected by the same type of quale. Moreover, as many qualia appear to be smooth rather than
granular, a consciousness correlate should possess field properties. One obvious candidate is the electro-magnetic field. How-
ever, as it is currently understood, this field does not seem to be sufficiently qualitatively complex to match the large number
of qualitatively different basic qualia? and would even make qualia functionally superfluous. But an electro-magnetic-like, and
more complex, field would suffice.
Based on our knowledge of evolutionary science, we assume that such fields are generated within perceptual or emo-
tional brain centres (the visual centre, the auditory centre, amygdala, etc.), rather than within any higher order system. We
have worked out, in some detail, a prototypical field model of the visual system. Specifically, we suggest that a field-like neural
correlate of the visual field is located in Layer 1 of V1, where the most qualitatively and quantitatively elaborated information
is accumulated after lower-level information has been processed (unconsciously according to the model) in V4 (colour) and
V5 (movement).
Finally, we have outlined an evolutionary model of consciousness. According to our model, synapse-like structures gave
rise to “grains” of qualia, which later on? after perceptual and motor activity were gradually connected through intermediate
structures (perhaps, e.g., among cnidarians during the late Precambrian era)? were utilized by evolutionary mechanisms to
improve the organism’s survival potential. This was, according to our model, followed by the development of an increasingly
sophisticated inner world made up of model qualia (as defined above).

1.5 Machine Consciousness

104 Projective Simulation and the Taxonomy of Agency

Homeyer Léon
Philosophy, University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, GERMANY
Lini Giacomo
University of Stuttgart, Stuttgart, GERMANY

In this paper we focus on behaviourism and materialism as theory-driven approaches on the classification of AI and agency
in general. We present them, as a connection to the role model of human intelligence and a basis of assessment for successful

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AI (behaviourism) and as a proposal for finding higher order function in physical structures (materialism). We argue then
for the fact that none of them can provide a full blown account of agency and intelligence.
Our next step is to analyse the ps model, a form of utility-based agent recently developed in the field of embodied cogni-
tive science. Its internal working structure as a stochastic network of so-called “clips” step-wise updated, allows us to indi-
viduate its main features: composition and the possibility to take future possible experiences as its main argument. We spot
in its capability to perform projections its main characteristic.
We show that none of the two theory-driven approaches to AI is able to account for this feature, and we suggest that
projection is a functional link, namely a distinct feature which we cannot account for according to the separate views, but
which is, at the same time, necessary in order to bridge together behaviourism and materialism. We show in fact that for a
full blown characterisation of agency we must refer both to behaviouristic elements (the agent-environment interactions)
and materialistic ones (internal processes which may not be manifest as a change in the agent’s behavior). This idea provides
a broader view of the concept of agency, since it allow us to keep projection, as a functional-link, at the centre of the scene.
This analysis allows us to present a feature-driven (or reversed) taxonomy of the concept of agency. Instead of suggest-
ing a top-down approach, we individuate a central feature which guarantees a richer view of the problem. We sketch the
main characteristics of our taxonomy and we show that it allows a comparison of different agents, based on the individuated
functional-link of projection, which is richer than the solely behaviouristic and materialistic approaches. The reason for that
lies precisely in the fact that we have reversed the approach on agency from a theory-driven stance to a process-driven one.

105 Conscienceness – the correlation between Machine Ethics and Machine

Consciousness
Komuda Radoslaw
Graduate School of Information Sci. and Technology, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN
Rzepka Rafal
Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN , Kenji Araki, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN

This research’s main focus is to highlight the correlation between Machine Ethics (ME) and Machine Consciousness
(MC). Since the very beginning of Machine Ethics as a field of science authors like Michael and Susan Leigh Anderson
argued that “from family cars that drive themselves (...) to fully autonomous robotic entities (...) it is clear that machines
such as these will be capable of causing harm to human beings unless this is prevented by adding an ethical component
to them”. This statement supports “Frankenstein complex”, the human fear of creation bringing destruction down upon
its creator. One hundred years ago in Karel Capek’s renewal of this idea in his “R.U.R.” we found the word “robot” which
got immediately linked to a hostile robot rebellion leading to the extinction of the human race. Picked up by Isaac Asi-
mov, the idea developed into creation of The Three Laws of Robotics. But was this invention really needed? Would not
a “do not crash” rule be enough for an AI-driven car instead of a “do not crash because it is wrong” one? In my approach
I call it an “AI Ockham razor” approach which I define as “omitting AI-based solution when- and wherever it is possible”.
What does not imply that we should withdraw developing AI research. Humans morality operates on two basic level:
moral intelligence allowing us to differ good from wrong and moral competence making us do the right thing despite
the circumstances. For an Artificial Moral Agent it will always be a socratic approach: to know good is to do good. That
is why Machine Ethics research focuses on the former. On the other hand, there actually may never be Machine “Ethics”
as long as Machine Consciousness research gets left behind and at least a poor substitute for a free will is not provided.
The question is, should we really pursue creating a potentially unethical Agent? The answer – not so simple. This research
advocates MC concept based on a triple awareness model consisting of: environment-awareness in both passive (being an
object to interact with) and active (having an impact on other objects, e.g. pushing a mug of a shelf) way, a finitude aware-
ness including categories of damaging (a broken mug handle), destroying (a mug shattered into pieces) and killing a thing
or a person, and an objects’ hierarchy scale awareness (putting agent’s existence above mug’s but never – human’s). All of
these factors taken by the Agent into consideration should make its environment functioning and HCI experience more
natural and substantive, and that is this approach’s main goal.

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106 Definition of the Consciousness Concept as Pattern Recognition Properties

of Cognitive System Sets
de Paiva Gilberto
Curso Sup. Tecnológico em Manutenção Industrial, Fatec Osaco, Prefeito Hirant Sanazar, São Paulo, BRAZIL

One open question in cognitive science is how to define the concept of consciousness as a function of cognitive systems
properties, more specifically as a function of properties of physical systems, mainly neural (connectionist) and computa-
tional systems. Various functions and properties of cognitive systems (complexity, emergence, integration, etc) were inten-
sively discussed as an attempt to solve this problem with little agreement. This paper proposes one definition of the con-
sciousness concept as simple pattern recognition mechanisms and properties of system-subsystems cognitive structures.
To
explain the ideas proposed in this work, and to overcome some existing controversy, we discuss the concepts of physical sys-
tems, cognitive systems, physical pattern recognition and cognitive pattern recognition. To clarify their differences a physical
then a cognitive description and interpretation of these concepts are exemplified with physical interactions properties and
examples, computational and neural-connectionist properties and examples.
Then this paper proposes one definition of the
consciousness concept as a pattern recognition mechanism of cognitive systems sets. We justify why this definition accounts
to the general notion of “cognitive awareness” of a physical system, and we discuss the specific uses of the consciousness
term in philosophy, artificial intelligence, animal and human context.
Some key solutions this definition gives to some prob-
lems associated to the consciousness word are:
1) a clear distinction of a conscious and unconscious processing concept.
2)
a clear description of the self-consciousness concept.
3) a clear description of the self-cognitive-consciousness concept, the
concept that a cognitive system can have consciousness of its own mind.
4) an uniform description of machine, animal and
human consciousness concept.
All this are exemplified in detail on how a machine can have conscious processing of a set of patterns, and how a ma-
chine cannot have conscious processing (is unconscious) of other set of patterns. Also how a machine can be conscious of
some patterns of itself and have self-consciousness. This is easily applied to explain animal and human consciousness.
One simple example is the operational system and application programs of the standard computer architectures. The
definitions proposed here shows how an operational system can be conscious of some computer data and processing activ-
ity of a computer, and unconscious of others.

107 Reviewing Tests for Machine Consciousness

Raoult Aida
Computational Institute, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Yampolskiy Roman
Computer Engineering and Computer Science, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA

The accelerating advances in the fields of neurobiology, artificial intelligence, and robotics have been reviving interest and
raising new philosophical, ethical or practical questions that depend on whether or not there may exist a scientific method
of probing consciousness in machines. This paper provides an analytic review of the existing tests for machine consciousness
proposed in the scientific literature over the past decade. We also offer an overview of the diverse scientific communities
involved in this enterprise and relate the background of scientists to the type of approach they offer. Our results show that
while the authors implicated in the field come from various academic backgrounds (computer science, linguistics, neurosci-
ence, philosophy, religious studies, physics...), the tests put forward in their work fall under one of two categories. The first
category is model testing. These papers are characteristically based on a specific model of consciousness built with the inten-
tion of fitting neuroscientific data with the inclusion of mental illnesses, disorders resulting from a brain injury, and altered
states of consciousness (through dreams, drugs, or meditation). The presence of consciousness is then typically inferred
from the correct implementation of a relevant architecture. The second category comprises different variants of Turing tests.
These tests will basically rely on at least one of the two following skills: communication, which is traditionally assessed ver-
bally, or human judgment. Each category of test has its strengths and weaknesses, and while the first category of tests may
seem limited, the second may lack in robustness and reproducibility. How those approaches complete each other is then
discussed in details and the precise features of consciousness claimed to be tested in machines by the designers of such tests
are carefully examined. Finally we show how particularly qualia and self are getting an increasing attention in recent years
and reflect on what it may mean for the future.

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108 Language-Centered World Simulator for Testing Various Approaches to

Machine Consciousness
Rzepka Rafal
Graduate School of Information Sci. and Technology, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JAPAN
Araki Kenji
Hokkaido University, JAPAN

Most of current theories of consciousness underline the importance of embodiment as the base of any kind of first-person
experience. However, we assume that a hypothetical person with all senses disabled who communicates with the outside
world through a neurological input/output natural language device would be able to reason about the outside world and
to keep her/his free will. It would be easy to manipulate such person if all the communication is through third persons but
with more sophisticated I/O devices she/he could also receive visual, haptic or audio inputs and be able to confirm if e.g.
requests were fulfilled or not. We assume that majority of population would consider such person as a conscious being,
especially in the “cyborg” phase, when the dysfunctional biological sensors are replaced with artificial ones. With this as-
sumption (cyborgs are not zombies) in mind, we propose a real world simulator that is built (by now) only with natural lan-
guage, a proving ground that could be used as the first phase for a Turing test for consciousness. Reasoning behind the idea:
1) because technology is not ready for the human-level cognition, engineers struggle to test or compare their algorithms
when it comes to natural, responsible or moral decision making; 2) to make their reasoning understandable for humans,
machines need to explain their motivations and decisions in natural language - the textual simulator requires language input
and output which is easy to process and simplifies comparison between participating systems; 3) built automatically from
the Internet resources, the simulated worlds can differ (e.g. depending on language) or be randomly chosen without loosing
statistically general character. The proposed World Simulator, currently used for learning different experiences by artificial
agents to provide variety of artificial personalities, consists of following components: a) environment builder which uses
web-mining to gather data about places and to place objects and persons inside; b) five senses classifier represented by ad-
jective groups related to a given sense (e.g. hard, soft, wet, dry, etc. for “touch”), which allows an agent to perceive objects
“as already grounded” in natural language instead of raw signals from real sensors; c) physical situation builder which calcu-
lates possible changes of objects’ positions or characteristics; d) social situation builder which retrieves possible scenarios
of human / animal behavior and their consequences. Builders utilize common sense processing and are prone to errors, but
a tested agent should be able to recognize not only abnormalities inside itself but also cognition errors and possibilities of
positive or negative influences / consequences outside. Decisions made inside such simple virtual world are safer than ones
in the real world, and easier to judge by people because the situations are taken from the real world descriptions, not simple
game scenarios usually used for testing cognitive architectures. Although the simulator unifies ununifiable qualia (redness
is one adjective “red”), language-centered approach should simplify comparing human and non-human conscious behavior
with what Steel calls “inner voice” on both human’s and machine’s sides.

109 Subjectivity, Objectivity, Feelings, and Vision.

StrozierJohn A.
Science, Mathematics & Technology, SUNY/Empire State College, Sedona, AZ, USA

If Physicalism is a viable approach to consciousness, we must address two basic problems: 1) the relationship between first-
person subjective experience and third-person objective description; and 2) the source of subjective ‘feelings’ such as pain,
touch, etc. and even visual experience. In particular, we argue that: 1) Reported first-person and third-person viewpoints of
an object can be analytically described in terms of one another in the limit that the third-person viewpoint is constructed of
a sufficient number of first-person reported viewpoints; and 2) Subjective ‘feelings’ can be analogously described in terms
of off-sets between current sensory data and built-in set-points that are constitutive of a Very Clever Robot (VCR). For
conscious beings, we suggest that ‘feelings’ are ‘off-sets’ that have overflowed into access conscious states (Block (2011)) via
a Reflection Principle (described below) operating on input sensory data. Thus they can be reported and acting on. Finally,
as an example, we apply our conclusions to subjective visual experience for which ‘feeling’ is of different character than the
feeling of pain, touch. The Reflection Principle: a) Inputs to the senses from the external/internal world (eye, tactile, etc.)
are encoded into neural spikes that feed ingoing into the brain through many serial and parallel modules. These modules
process the neural signals and build various neural representations of the world. For each sense, there might be many repre-
sentations, each representing some aspect of the input sensory data - what, where, color, location, etc.; b) Neural projection

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 1 . 6 Menta l C ausation and the F unction of C onsciousness

operators operating on the various model representations, generate outgoing neural signals. Basically these neural signals are
reflections analogous to a generalized optical reciprocity theorem (Rayleigh (1900)) of the incoming neural signals used to
build the internal brain models (representations). The reflected neural signals move outward creating the illusion of ‘what
it is like’ (Nagel (1974)) by scanning the object/process of the experience -- looking at it, touching it; in general interact-
ing with it by ‘reaching out’ in a subjective, first-person mode. Note that the projected neural signals do not travel outside
the body; but, depending on their modality, travel either to the affected areas (pain, touch) or other parts of the brain (vi-
sion, audition, olfaction); c) The outgoing projected neural signals interact in the brain with incoming neural sense data to
generate differences for feedback to the representations (world models). In particular the differences are input for negative
feedback to correct the models, and for positive feedback to enlarge those model objects/processes that need immediate
attention. The ideas above are used in a discussion of the connections between perception, awareness, attention, reporting,
phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, cognition, and other functions of the brain that direct action on the en-
vironment initiated by inputs to the brain from the environment, both external and internal. In particular, we discuss those
“feelings” where feedback between the environment and the brain is essential; and how those “feelings” might differentiate
biological conscious feelings from VCR computer computation analogous “feelings” via set-points, offsets, and feedback.

110 Affordances and Machine Consciousness

Vatrap Ravi
IT Management, Copenhagen Businness School, Frederiksberg, DENMARK

This paper presents a systematic review of the theory of affordances from its origin and subsequent developments in eco-
logical psychology, enactive approach in the philosophy of mind, and evolutionary psychology. Affordances are defined as
“meaning-making opportunities and action-taking possibilities in an actor-environment system relative to actor competen-
cies, system capabilities, and ecological It then discusses applied research in psychology and human-computer interaction
that utilizes the concept of affordances. Particular attention is paid to seminal work that linked affordances, cognitive archi-
tectures, and theory of computation. Finally, a computational framework is outlined and an empirical study is proposed to
investigate propositions on machine consciousness derived from the theory of affordances.

1.6 Mental Causation and the Function of

Consciousness

111 Parts of Consciousness

Bosinski Cameron
Biology, University of Hartford, West Hartford, USA

Consciousness is the awareness of sensation. Without sensation, consciousness would not be possible. Consciousness is not
an all-no-none phenomenon, nor does it exist on a continuum. Consciousness is discrete and only exists in quantized units.
The parts of consciousness, with humans as an example, will be discussed. The first is the activation of a single neuron in
isolation. This does not produce experience and is therefore termed “pre-sensation.” The integration of multiple sensory
neurons can activate a neuron in the primary sensory cortex and produce a “sensation.” Importantly, without other sensa-
tions available for comparison, the sensation remains purely a “potential sensation. ” A potential sensation is a sensation
that does not enter consciousness, but is able to affect behavior. Organisms with fewer parts of consciousness only have
potential sensations and as a result, do not have conscious experience, yet are still influenced by their environment. Each
part of consciousness depends on the integration of lower parts of consciousness and exists in a hierarchy. The highest level
of consciousness that an organism possesses affects the behavior of the organism, but is outside of awareness. This will apply
regardless of which level in the hierarchy is the highest. So far in humans, pre-sensations can be integrated into sensations,
but what comes next? Sensations are integrated by unimodal neurons to produce “categories.” Categories are formed by in-
tegrating multiple sensations, such as red and green into color. In order for categories to exist, memory of past sensations
must exist. Comparison of past sensations to present sensations allows for the creation of a group of sensations. Compari-

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son and integration of multiple categories by multimodal neurons allows for predictions to be made. In order to predict
whether Boston will be cold in December, one must have formed categories about Boston, cold and December and be able
to integrate them. Without this level of consciousness, an organism would not be aware of the future, only the past and the
present. Now, what is a group of predictions? When a mirror neuron integrates multiple multimodal neurons, this allows for
the creation of a perspective. Without this ability, social hierarchies cannot be formed, as it would be impossible to predict
the actions of others. The last stage for humans ends with an “interpreter neuron” integrating multiple mirror neurons. An
interpreter neuron is the neuron that accounts for the discovery that language and our conscious awareness is limited to the
left hemisphere, although information in our right hemisphere still affects our behavior. The integration of multiple perspec-
tives ends with the creation of the self. But as before, while perspectives are knowledge of the past, the self is awareness of
the future. Saying, “I was not acting like myself,” more explicitly means that my prediction of what I would do, conflicts with
what I actually did. This conceptual framework when applied to living organisms might provide a method for determining
the most basic nervous system, from which all others can be derived, including one that is more complicated than our own.

112 Mind as Brain and Brain as Mind: A Double Face View on Mental Causation
Goncalves Coelho Jonas
Human Sciences, University of Sao Paulo State, Bauru, BRAZIL

I propose a physicalist non-reductive account of the mind-brain relationship, from which the criticism of unintelligibility
often attributed to the notion of mental causation is considered. For those who believe that the mind is a property of the
brain and that it is, or could be described, as something non-physical or non-material, the question to be answered is: “how
mental events, being the result of brain activity, can cause brain events?” Assuming that consciousness is the essential prop-
erty of the mind and that one of the main criticisms of the notion of mental causation is proposed by Jaegwon Kim in his
remarks on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I will take his arguments, showing his vulnerable point and offering a
view within which the notion of mental causation could make sense. In his paradigmatic formulation of criticism generally
addressed to physicalist non-reductive views of mind-brain relationship, Kim leads us to think about the mind as a thing,
not only distinct from the brain, but also independent from it, although this is not what the proponents of the theory of
supervenience mind-body believe. Instead of asking, “how the mind acts causally on the brain?”, as if the mind were some-
thing independent of the brain, we should ask “how the brain, via its property mind, acts causally on the brain?”. To support
this last formulation of the question of mental causation I propose to consider the two inseparable faces of the mind-brain
relationship: the mind as brain and the brain as mind. On the one hand, mind as brain, the idea is that all aspects of the mind
should be first considered from the structure and functioning of the brain in its relationship with the body and environment.
Besides research involving brain damages and changes in cognitive and emotional capacities, there are countless studies,
most of them published in the last 30 years, involving technologies that allow to inspect the normal and abnormal brain
working during cognitive and affective tasks. This sort of research has fostered the development of therapeutic practices
targeting cognitive and affective dysfunctions, which consist in manipulating the brain, changing its microphysical anatomy
and functionality. On the other hand, brain as mind, contemporary research in neuroscience and psychology has also shown
that the brain, besides being embodied and situated physically, is also embodied and situated mentally. It means that it is as
mind, though not exclusively, that the brain interacts with both, the body and the environment in which it is embedded, the
physical and, especially, the cultural environment, whose existence would be unintelligible in a world without minds. What
I am trying to emphasize here is the ability of the brain to interact mentally with the physical and cultural stimuli created by
itself through its property mind. What the brain is and what the brain makes is inseparable from it structural and functional
architecture both genetically programmed and resultant of its interactions with the physical and cultural environment.

113 Consciousness and the causal efficacy of semantics. On automaton theory,

grammar, and the notion that all mental causes are syntactic.
Hermoso-Duran Juan
Psychology, Colegio Universitario Cardenal Cisneros, Madrid, SPAIN

The boundless diversity of beliefs and desires that we can harbour, together with the fact that holding some of them seems
to require from us the ability to hold some others –i.e., the productivity and systematicity that propositional attitudes share
with language–, have been among the most impelling reasons to think about mental states in linguistic terms –other reasons

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including the plausibility of assimilating the opacity of the mental to the intensionality of some linguistic expressions, or its
subjectivity to the role of indexical elements in language.
Of course, thinking about the mind under the prism of language makes it only more peremptory to face the question of
the task that the semantic content of mental states is to be assigned in psychological explanation. The formality condition
that Fodor (1980) imposed on his conception of the language of thought made it patent that if syntax was to be the link
between semantics and causality, the causal efficacy of semantics would remain vicarious, and this view soon became almost
hegemonic in cognitive science.
The notions of syntax and semantics employed by Fodor had flourished in the field of proof theory, and they amal-
gamated in automaton theory with the notion of causality that underlay the work of engineers attempting to imitate the
behaviour of organisms. Quite some time before Fodor coined the formality condition, the same idea could easily be found
in the works of Newell, Simon and Shaw, or Minsky; its counterpart in terms of teleological and mechanical explanation is
widespread in the reflections of Loeb, Jennings, Perry, Rashevsky, Lotka and Craik, and reaches into the work of Tolman and
Hull.
On the other hand, long before the notions of syntax and semantics were developed in automaton theory, they had
permeated the study of natural language. While the search takes place within natural language, it is easy to find semantic dif-
ferences that do not condense into syntax. But an argument for the efficacy of the semantics of mental states could not pos-
sibly be framed upon such findings: we should direct our search to the rather more elusive realm of the lingua mentis. That
is certainly a harder endeavour, but the difficulties are partly specious: a scrutiny of the differences between the linguistic
notions of syntax and semantics that impregnate our reflections about psychological explanation and those that psychology
inherited from automaton theory promptly shows that the inertness of semantics is in fact stipulative.
Insofar as it is tied to stipulative arguments about the local character of causality and the causal inefficacy of semantics,
the primacy of syntax becomes an ill-founded canon. The question, then, is whether or not the explanatory vocabulary of
psychology entails a commitment to causally efficacious semantic properties of mental states in a sense which turns out
to be irreconcilable with any deflationist ontology –epiphenomenal, instrumentalist, or eliminative. A further question is
whether such causally efficacious semantic properties of mental states could shed some light on our understanding of con-
sciousness: it will be argued that they can.

114 Could be Quantum Consciousness the purpose of the whole universe to

achieve self-awareness? An inextricable machine to identify the “Propositum” of
each particle.
Muñoz-Jiménez Daniel
Neurophilosophy, University La Salle, México City, MEXICO
Muñoz-Jiménez Gerardo
Plastic Surgery, General Hospital Dr. Manuel Gea González, Mexico City, MEXICO
C. Tena-Calderon Brandia
Care Quality comition, Volcare/Crossroads Care, Canterbury, UNITED KINGDOM

As it is known, the behaviour of matter change depending the scale in which is measured, such as in the quantum scale, in
which acquire the possibility to propagate or spread in all directions until its wave function collapses (reduction of quan-
tum state or R). The surcease of the wave function may be elicited by means of accumulating enough amount of matter
in quantum superposition to become unstable and then collapse into a defined momentum. Moreover, the reduction of
quantum state may be reached through the measure or observation of matter. Such process is in continuum pursuance over
the entire universe, as well as in the brain throughout the microtubules isolating the superposed matter, thus objecting R
(OR), orchestrated by synaptic inputs (Orch OR). In the “Copenhagen Interpretation” was established that because of the
“Uncertainty principle” it could not be possible to calculate the momentum and the position (Propositum) of any particle.
On the other hand, the brain is capable to sense the environment and even create a representation of it through inextricable
neural networks, being able to collapse the wave function because of the phenomenon of observation, not only outside the
brain but also inside and during the same time and location of the environment and mental representation of it, a unique
moment in which is thought that consciousness arises working as an apparatus to identify the “Propositum” of the whole
universe. Every machine created to identify objects, process the information of their location as the brain does, and trans-
mits this to a screen where it can be perceived by some system not related with such machinery. Therefore, (Underpinned
by incompleteness theorems) the consciousness might need an extra-material or extra-existence place to convey and make

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known or disclose the information picked up about every “Propositum” perceived. Ergo, by means of Quantum Conscious-
ness, each conscious being could serve to know and convey the “Propositum” of every single particle of the Universe to
some extra-universal place as a unified consciousness, working as a screen, thus allowing the Universe to have self-awareness
and understand himself.

115 Consciousness from an Analogue Representation of Space

Worden Robert
Neuroscience, Open Mapping Software, Ely, UNITED KINGDOM

This poster describes a theory of consciousness, in which consciousness arises from an extended physical field in the brain.
This field represents the positions of objects in local space, in an analogue representation. The physical nature of the field is
not yet identified.
Many theories of consciousness assume that it emerges from neurons, communicating only though syn-
apses and representing all information symbolically by firing rates. In those theories, it is hard to account for the rich spatial
structure of consciousness.
The alternative is analogue representation in the brain, which is physically constrained to obey the same equations as the
things represented. Analogue representations are more restricted in scope than symbolic representations, but within their
domains have advantages of efficiency and accuracy. An analogue representation in the brain of local 3-D space could have
fitness benefits over neural symbolic representations: (1) Faithful representation of the estimated spatial locations of stimuli
(2) Binding of sense data of different modalities, through their shared locations
(3) Direct representation of the con-
straints of 3-D Euclidean geometry
(4) Direct readout of the relative locations of stimuli, as required for object recognition
and the planning of movements
(5) Very short-term memory for the locations of objects.
Such an analogue representation could be stored in an extended three-dimensional field in the brain. We have not yet
looked for such fields with sufficient sensitivity to rule them out; nor have we searched experimentally for the many types of
physical fields - possibly similar to the quantised excitations known in solids - which might couple to neurons to support a
representation of space.
Several lines of evidence suggest that a physical field, supporting an analogue representation of space, is stored in the
thalamus:
(1) The thalamus is involved in the routing of sense data of any modality whose sources have identifiable loca-
tions (such as vision, hearing, and touch)
(2) Notably, the thalamus is not involved in the routing of olfactory data which has no easily-defined source location
(3)
There are feedback loops between the thalamus and many cortical regions; these loops may compute the locations of stimuli.
(4) The thalamus is strongly implicated in consciousness, which has important spatial properties
(5) Two anomalies in
the neuro-anatomy of the thalamus do not fit with a purely neural synaptic account; they suggest there may also be a physi-
cal field in the thalamus, with the TRN acting as transmitter, and other thalamic nuclei acting as receivers.
A theory of consciousness is described in which an extended physical field in the thalamus supports analogue storage of
spatial information. The field obeys the same geometric constraints as local physical space, and is linked to consciousness by
a simple mathematical bridging law (a Fourier transform).
This theory, unlike other current theories of consciousness, pre-
dicts the rich geometric properties of consciousness through a simple mathematical equation. Its predictions agree well with
the geometric properties and other properties of consciousness.

116 The Emotional Function of Bodily Perceptions

Shargel Daniel
Humanities, Social Sciences and Communications, Lawrence Technological University, Southfield, USA

Emotion has often been compared unfavorably to reason in part because emotions have diffuse motivational effects. Regard-
less of the source, once we are disgusted we find a wide range of things repulsive, and when we are sad, we respond with less
enthusiasm to all sorts of opportunities. It is easy to think of examples that illustrate this phenomenon regarding many, and
perhaps all types of emotions. These effects seem to be entirely counter-productive, and contrary to both the norms and
operations of reason.
I will argue that the key to understanding the diffuseness of emotional motivation lies in an understanding of emotional em-
bodiment, and specifically, the role of emotional phenomenology. Our physiology changes in a variety of ways during emotional
episodes. Each type of emotion helps us cope with a different type of challenge or opportunity, and these bodily changes pre-
pare us for the actions that these challenges and opportunities demand. While these bodily changes may be elicited in response

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to perception, thought or imagination concerning one specific situation, the mere fact that our body has changed should alter
our decision-making process, since all bodily changes facilitate some types of actions and interfere with others. For example, a
set of bodily changes that were initially elicited to support an aggressive confrontation with a source of injustice might also help
for quickly finishing up some house-work. When we are angry, particularly when there is no effective response to the source of
that anger that demands vigorous action, we should pursue actions that use our mobilized energy to accomplish other goals. A
rational integration of the body into our cognitive processes requires that we take advantage of that sort of happy coincidence.
William James and Carl Lange argued that emotional phenomenology just is the perception of bodily changes. While
that thesis is quite controversial, bodily perceptions are at least a significant constituent of emotional phenomenology. I will
argue that these bodily perceptions are critical for integrating our motivational state with the bodily changes that occur dur-
ing emotional episodes, and the need for this integration explains why bodily emotional phenomenology produces distinc-
tive motivational effects. Bodily feedback allows our motivations to not only reflect our interests, but also to dynamically
reflect our ability to support those interests.

117 The myth of reductive materialism: a critique of Jaegwon Kim

Skoghol Christoffer t
Faculty of Theology, Faith- and worldview studies, Uppsala, SWEDEN

Jaegwon Kim argues against “nonreductive materialism” on the grounds that it cannot make room for mental causation
without violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain. (Kim, 1989, 1998 and 2005.)
In this paper I will argue that Kim does not succeed in saving mental causation by reducing mental properties to physi-
cal properties, since he is effectively eliminating them.
Kim’s goal is to save mental causation qua mental by which he means:
“that an event, in virtue of its mental property, causes another event to have a certain physical property” (Kim, 1989 p. 43
italics in original). He wants to do so within the bounds of physicalism, which for Kim means that he must abide to the
principle of causal closure of the physical domain: “If a physical event has a cause that occurs at t, it has a physical cause at t.”
(Kim (2005) p. 43) The basic problem with non-reductive materialism (according to Kim) is that since mental properties
are not identical to physical properties, they must either be causally impotent or (if they are causally efficacious) imply a vio-
lation of the principle of causal closure (thus an abandonment of “serious” physicalism).
The only option for the “serious” physicalist who affirms mental causation, Kim argues, is to reduce mental properties
to physical properties so as to make the causally efficacious mental property identical with some physical property. However
if this is going to be a reduction in which mental causation is saved, these mental properties cannot be eliminated in favor of
physical properties. If they were, it is not in virtue of any mental properties that mental events are causally efficacious.
Kim proposes a “functional reduction” of mental properties in which having a mental property is defined as having cer-
tain physical properties that perform a certain causal task:
‘“Having M: def. having some property or other P (in the reduc-
tion base domain) such that P performs causal task C.” (Kim, 2005 p. 102)
The problem is that this redefinition is not a statement in more technical form of what we mean by mental properties; it
involves a loss of meaning of precisely that which makes it “mental”. I cannot define conscious properties as non-conscious
properties (although they may well be caused by such) and preserve their nature as conscious.
In this Kim does not seem to be sufficiently aware of the difference between ontological and causal reduction. An ontologi-
cal reduction of x to y means that x is identifiable with y and (since identities are symmetrical) it will either imply an expansion
of one’s understand of “y” so as to include those properties said to belong to x, or it will imply an elimination of some of the
properties thought to belong x (but not to y) so that x can be fully defined in terms of y. When Kim ontologically reduces mental
properties to non-mental properties he is not able to save mental causation, for what is causally active is not something mental.

118 The Physics of Value: Consciousness as modulator of the Bohmian

Quantum Potential to achieve biologically advantageous resource allocation
Steen Francis
Comm Studies, UCLA, Los Angeles, USA

A central challenge to science is the ontology of value, or the expression of a preference. Consciousness is a marker of ethical
value: it is commonly assumed that conscious beings deserve ethical treatment, although we have no coherent way of think-
ing about the meaning of this intuition in scientific terms.

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In describing the role of quantum tunneling in photosynthesis, Engel et al. (2007) and Scholes (2010) both adopt the
Copenhagen Interpretation, in which a superposition of states is said to eventuate in a collapse of the Schroedinger wave
function. In the case of photosynthesis, this collapse is said to consistently select a biologically favorable outcome, indicating
a regulatory process. While Bohr insisted that there was no ‘hidden variable’ capable of controlling the collapse, Bohm &
Hiley (1993) present a model of a Quantum Potential described by the wave function, a development of de Broglie’s “pilot
wave” theory. This casual interpretation makes it in principle possible to control the trajectory of a particle; however, in equi-
librium structures, the two models make the same predictions.
Hiley & Pylkkänen (2005) describe a quantum neurodynamics model of exocytosis as a quantum tunneling event, in
which a mind field modulates the Quantum Potential. In this talk, I generalize this hypothesis, extending it to evolutionarily
ancient forms of information processing in sea sponges, and using it to propose a way to integrate value into physics.

119 The Effective Power of the Illusion of Conscious Will

Stockdale Bradford
Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA

Many scientists, prominent among them Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner, interpret the neuroscience of the day as evi-
dence that human consciousness is not as causally efficacious as most believe it to be. Wegner, using Libet’s experiments,
appears to hold that consciousness is epiphenomenal, meaning that it plays no causal role in the production of our actions.
However, I argue that we can disregard Wegner’s claim in as much as it relies on Libet’s study and any studies that use re-
ports of the subjects’ awareness of their intentions.
I explain Libet’s famous experiment, and Wegner’s conclusion that this experiment shows that consciousness is epiphe-
nomenal. I argue that if W-times, the time the subject believes herself to be aware of the intention to flex in Libet’s experi-
ment, are indeed used as Libet indicates, then the experimental set up employs consciousness in a causal role. My objection
can be formed as a dilemma. If Wegner’s claim is correct about consciousness being inefficacious, then the conscious aware-
ness of the intention to flex doesn’t influence the report, in which case Libet wouldn’t be measuring awareness times. How-
ever, if the experiment does measure awareness of intention, then the conscious awareness of the intention does influence
the action of reporting, in which case it wouldn’t be epiphenomenal. I consider both horns of the dilemma concluding that
in order for the experiment to be testing what it claims to be testing, consciousness of the urge must cause the report of the
location of the spot of light on the oscilloscope.
The experiment relies on the assumption that conscious awareness of the urge to flex isn’t epiphenomenal. As used in
Libet’s study, the awareness of the intention to flex is what appears to cause the subject to report a certain position of light
on the oscilloscope. The role that W-times play in Libet’s study makes what happens at a W-time, the event of becoming
conscious of an intention, non-epiphenomenal. I then consider an objection on behalf of Wegner that W–times too are the
result of some unconscious processes, as he believes the action of flexing the wrist is, however it seems that even the uncon-
scious processes in this scenario would have to be influenced by the awareness of the intention. Ultimately, I conclude that
Wegner’s epiphenomenalism cannot be justified based on Libet-style experiments in which W-times are employed in the
methodology.

120 The Spatial Properties of Consciousness

Worden Robert
Neuroscience, Open Mapping Software, ely, UNITED KINGDOM

This paper addresses the spatial properties of consciousness, and their implications for theories of consciousness. Any
theory based only on neural synaptic computing has difficulty in accounting for the spatial properties of consciousness.
However, if the brain contains an analogue representation of local space, that representation could be simply related to con-
sciousness.
Conscious sensations (qualia) are located, in a mental model of local space. This model is geometrically faithful to ex-
ternal reality, as far as sense data allow. This is a remarkable and distinctive experimental fact. Any theory of consciousness
should account not just for the existence of consciousness - as many attempt to do - but should also account for its remark-
able spatial properties.
Following David Chalmers, we assert that some new law of nature - a bridging law - is required to link phenomenal
consciousness to neural events in the brain. That bridging law must be mathematical, in order to predict the spatial distribu-

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tion of conscious sensations. Some existing laws of nature (e.g. those for gravitation, or electromagnetism) predict complex
spatial distributions as their outputs, through simple mathematical relations. They do so only by having complex spatial dis-
tributions (e.g. of matter, or charge) amongst their inputs. Without an input spatial distribution, there can be no simple
mathematical relation between inputs and outputs.
We propose that the same constraint applies to the bridging law for consciousness. With no spatial distribution amongst
its inputs, the law cannot predict the spatial distribution of conscious sensations as an output.
Most current theories of brain function and consciousness (such as the Global Workspace Theory) assume that neural
communication occurs only through synapses. In those theories, cognition has little dependence on the locations of neu-
rons or synapses. There is then no spatial distribution in the brain to serve as input to a bridging law for consciousness. It is
difficult or impossible for such theories to account mathematically for the spatial properties of consciousness.
If , however, neurons also communicate through some spatial field in the brain - which serves as an analogue representa-
tion of local space - then there could be a simple mathematical relation between that spatial field and the spatial properties of
consciousness, embodied in a bridging law for consciousness.
There is currently little evidence for any spatial field in the brain playing a role in cognition. Equally, there is little evi-
dence against it. We have not yet searched experimentally for such fields in the brain with sufficient sensitivity to rule them
out; and the neural synaptic model of cognition is not yet so complete as to rule out any other elements. Two lines of evi-
dence suggest there may be such a field in the brain: (a) an analogue representation of local space may have computational
advantages over a purely neural/synaptic representation; (b) two anomalies in the anatomy of the thalamus may point to the
existence of a spatial field there.

121 Functionalism and Teleology

Yang Kai-Chung
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN

“Realization” is an idea borrowed from computer science. Before using it to construct a philosophical theory (i.e. Function-
alism), we should take a strict look at how this idea used originally.
In computer science, especially in programming lan-
guage, “realization” is always associated with a “purpose” or goal. The normal situation is: first we have a purpose (no matter
where it comes from), then according to the purpose, we have a realization. When a computer scientist judges whether a re-
alization is appropriate or correct, they usually look back at the purpose. In other words, the purpose is not only the criteria
of evaluating a realization but also the only way we can truly understand what the realization is.
Therefore, I hold an assertion here: every realization presumes a purpose. In this point of view, it is more precise to say
that realization describes purpose rather than realization describes function.
Now we turn back to philosophy of mind, dis-
cussions on functionalism typically do not focus on teleological aspect. Some hard questions arise in functionalism because
we cannot obtain purpose from realization itself. On the other hand, we also cannot infer purpose from realization because
all purposes are independent from realization.
Finally, I will discuss if there are still some problems given that we understand functionalism as a realization of purpose.

1.7. The ‘hard-problem’ and the explanatory gap

122 The Peircean foundations of the Integrated Information Theory of

Consciousness
Arnold John
Humanities, Shimer College, Chicago, USA

Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness holds great promise as a mathematical formalism for enabling
more precise studies of consciousness, however, it has been repeatedly objected by critics (Searle 2013, Aaronson 2014)
that the IIT lacks a solid justification for its claim that the value is directly measuring consciousness, rather than being some

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variable which is merely associated with many conscious systems. This poster will argue that there are good grounds for
believing that is not a mere correlate of conscious systems but instead really does measure consciousness, and that such
grounds are to be found in the semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce. In particular, Peirce’s account of the index, that is,
the sign which “stands for its object by virtue of a real connection with it,” provides a basis for clearer articulation as to why
the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness is indeed a measurement of consciousness. The poster will present the
brain as a Peircean index of its own past and future states, where the details of how exactly the present state of the brain sig-
nifies the past and future states is outlined by the calculations prescribed by the IIT. The poster will then continue to explain
how considering the brain as a Peircean index contributes to closing the explanatory gap in the hard problem of conscious-
ness by examining how the Peircean notion of indices as mediators of secondness, that is, indices as things which continu-
ously confront reaction, can help elaborate the “bootstrapping” of consciousness from bare matter.

123 The phenomenal world of the sleeping brain: merging Predictive Processing
and Integrated Information Theory
Bucci Alessio
Philosophy, University of Edinburgh alumnus (independent), Venezia, ITALY
Grasso Matteo
Philosophy, Roma 3 University, Roma, ITALY

Predictive Processing (PP) is an emerging theoretical framework in cognitive science which aims to unify perception, action
and cognition under a single mechanism (Clark 2013, in press; Hohwy 2013). The core idea is that brains are predictive
machines with a hierarchical structure, continuously in the business of predicting their own sensory inputs. This is achieved
through Bayesian statistical inferences based on a generative model of the causal structure of the world. One form of PP
has been recently applied to the study of dreaming (Hobson & Friston 2012, Hobson, Hong & Friston 2014). This applica-
tion highlights the continuity and the differences of dreaming with other waking mental states, grounding them on the very
same cognitive architecture. However, many doubts still remain with regard to the phenomenal aspects of dreaming and
how we come to experience anything in the first place (the “hard problem” of consciousness). It is critical to explain dream
consciousness in particular because (1) we have no precise mapping of the phenomenal aspects of dreaming onto the neural
activity of the sleeping brain and (2) sleep mentation seems to lack a solid evolutionary explanation.
In order to address
these problems we propose to integrate PP with a leading theory of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory (IIT),
as proposed by Tononi (2012) and Oizumi, Albantakis & Tononi (2014). IIT proposes an explicit account of phenomenal
consciousness, defined as integrated information. According to IIT the quantity of consciousness of a system is equal to the
amount of integrated information MAX) generated by its elements, while the quality of experience is defined in relation to
maximally irreducible conceptual structures (MICS), i.e. constellation of concepts in the “qualia space”. Phenomenal con-
sciousness is hence defined on the basis of the informational relationships generated by the system’s repertoire of internal
states, which characterizes conscious experience in both the waking and dreaming state.
After the introduction of PP, IIT
and the specific issues surrounding dreaming, we procede to explain how PP and IIT can be merged in order to explain the
cognitive mechanism behind the emergence of dream phenomenology. We highlight the conceptual similarity in the two
theories’ vocabularies and argue that, if IIT proves to be efficient in explaining the phenomenal aspect of dreaming, then PP
could be integrated with it for a more comprehensive explanation of cognition. We then move on to illustrate a few critical
points in this merging operation. In conclusion, we speculate that if dreaming consciousness is a positive case study for the
integration of PP and IIT, it can also be a springboard for a more general merging of the theories, in which IIT is comple-
mentary to PP in explaining consciousness as well as cognition.

References: - Clark, A. (2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive
science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 181-204.
- Clark, A. (in press). Surfing Uncertainty: Predic-
tion, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford University Press. - Hobson, A., & Friston, K. (2012). Waking
and dreaming consciousness: Neurobiological and functional considerations. Progress in neurobiology, 98(1),
82-98.
- Hobson, A., Hong, C. C. H., & Friston, K. (2014). Virtual reality in waking and dreaming conscious-
ness. Cognitive Science, 5, 1133.
- Hohwy, J. (2013). The predictive mind. Oxford University Press.
- Oizumi,
M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Inte-
grated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS computational biology, 10(5), e1003588.
- Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated
information theory of consciousness: an updated account. Archives italiennes de biologie, 150(2-3), 56-90.

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124 Out of Left Field: A Transcendental Understanding of the Hard Problem

Davies Kim
Philosophy, University of Durham , Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

1 This paper offers a genuinely new approach to the ‘Hard Problem’ (HP) of consciousness. It takes the primary causes of
the intractability of the issues around the HP to be the lack of clarity on the key notion of the physical, the lack of under-
standing of the necessary conditions of the possibility of that concept, and the ontological primacy attributed to the physical
realm by most disputants (cf. Chalmers, who divides the most important views on the metaphysics of consciousness into
those which require no expansion of a physical ontology, and those which require expansion or reconception of a physical
ontology). This paper presents a transcendental argument addressing those causes and indicating a more fruitful approach
to the HP and the relationship between the physical and the mental.
2 The paper reviews and criticises current attempts
(theory-based, object-based, and via negativa) to explain the notion of the physical, and then elucidates the concept of the
physical necessarily presupposed by the standard formulations of the HP. This elucidation serves as the starting point for the
argument: it includes the grasp of things in the world as manipulable and publicly observable, and the more specific pre-the-
oretic understanding of the physical which addresses things only in respect of those properties which exist independently
of the subjects which come to know them and which can be objectively identified and quantified, such as mass, location,
extension. Physical science does not concern itself with those properties whose existence depends essentially on subjectiv-
ity (or intersubjectivity) and which cannot be objectively identified and measured, such as meanings, values, purposes, and
sense-qualities.
3 The paper then analyses the necessary conditions of the possibility of this understanding of the physical.
These include that the physical, and the mental, are necessarily grasped as abstractions from the totality of an agent engaged
in the life world, through reflection on disruption in the normal processes by which agents pursue their purposes in their
environment. Our understanding of what it means to be physical is thus shown to be possible only through reflective ab-
straction from that richer world of meanings, purposes, and values whose existence is therefore necessarily presupposed,
although not explored by physical science itself. The physical (entities, events, properties) is shown to be always only one
aspect of the world.
4 By exploring the necessary conditions of being an agent purposefully engaged in its life-world the
paper provides a transcendental account of the interiority and exteriority of the agent, and an underpinning to recent enac-
tive and embodied theories of mind, with a recasting of the HP. It provides a new retrospective and privative account of the
diachronic emergence of consciousness, and a new understanding of the relationship between the physical and the mental.
The paper deals with the objection that the argument confuses epistemological requirements with metaphysical ones, and
shows how the argument undercuts key assumptions made by physicalists, dualists and panpsychists.

125 Occipital and left temporal EEG correlates of phenomenal consciousness

Dinis Pereira Vitor Manuel
Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group, University of Lisbon, Lisboa, PORTUGAL

If there are occipital and temporal correlates of a stimulus about which we have no consciousness, our unconsciousness will
be not only not having access but also not having phenomenal experience (Block 2005), in despite that there is electrical
activity in the occipital and temporal lobes co-occurring with these stimuli.
The occipital and temporal electrical activity co-occurring with our visual experience of a stimulus will need co- occur-
ring with consciousness, but an explanation of a contrast in access (e. g., correct and incorrect responses, namely the interval
between the termination of a target and of a mask), does not explain a contrast in phenomenology (e. g., degrees of visibil-
ity) and occipital and temporal electrical activity co-occurring with a stimulus about which we have no consciousness (if
any) will have to be distinguished from access and from phenomenal consciousness.
In the first section, we present our experimental design.
In the second section, we characterize the grand average occipi-
tal and temporal electrical activity correlated with a contrast in access.
In the third section, we characterize the grand aver-
age occipital and temporal electrical activity correlated with a contrast in phenomenology and conclude characterizing the
grand average occipital and temporal electrical activity co-occurring with unconsciousness.

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126 Four conceptions of the hard problem of consciousness CANCELLED

Dorsey Jonathan
Philosophy, Texas Tech, Lubbock, USA

Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that
not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the
hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against
each of the four conceptions without passing final judgment on any of them. A bit more specifically, I open by presenting
Chalmers’s classic statement of the hard problem and by linking it with some of its historical precursors, going back as far as
Leibniz’s 1714 mill thought experiment. I then provide some of the more recent historical context in which the hard prob-
lem not only reemerged but also reached its current level of a full on crisis in philosophy of mind. With this background in
place, I identify a settled core of facts about the hard problem. This settled core of facts, however, does not determine which
of four distinct conceptions of the hard problem is the correct one. The conceptions range from a very narrow one, which es-
sentially equates the hard problem with the explanatory gap, to a very broad one, which essentially tries to pull every theory
of mind into the fray. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of these four conceptions without
passing final judgment on any of them. If we theorists hope to make progress on the so-called hard problem, though, we
would do well to reach some sort of consensus on which of the four conceptions is correct.

127 Quantum Bayesianism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Shiroman Prakash
Physics, Dayalbagh Educational Institute , Agra, INDIA

About one century ago, physicists realized that the realist worldview of classical mechanics is incorrect. The new worldview,
which successfully describes every experiment performed by mankind to date is based on quantum mechanics. While the
interpretation of quantum mechanics is a subject of much debate; a precise and pragmatic interpretation of quantum me-
chanics known as Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is rapidly gaining popularity.
One of QBism’s leading proponents, David Mermin, argues that the central feature of quantum mechanics is that the
scientist (or observer) cannot be totally eliminated from the scientific process. David Mermin allegedly also optimistically
claims that in about 25 years everyone will accept QBism, and the field of quantum foundations will disappear.
Some may argue that Quantum Bayesianism is essentially a philosophically precise and appealing restatement of ortho-
dox Copenhagen interpretation/von Neumann’s formulation of quantum mechanics, and ties in closely with the work of
Henry Stapp. Whether or not QBism is complete, or different from the Copenhagen interpretation, it is certainly a precise
statement of how quantum mechanics is used in practice by working physicists, and as such represents the state of the art in
the modern scientific worldview.
In this talk, (as a working hypothesis) we will accept QBism as true, and ask, what is precise statement of the hard prob-
lem of consciousness in the worldview of QBism? Indeed, QBism is an intrinsically subjective theory that is best stated in
“first-person”, or one must presuppose the existence of a logically primitive observer (or “agent”) with a logically primitive
form of free will. Hence, the problem of consciousness is very different – rather than explain the existence of consciousness
from the collisions of atoms in the void, we have to presuppose the existence of our own consciousness. The challenge is
then to explain how (or why) our consciousness (and our apparent free will) is correlated with the external world which we
can only imperfectly perceive through the veil of quantum uncertainty.

128 Ignorance of Color: An Intentionalist Look at Mary The Color Scientist

Sarihan Isik
Philosophy, Central European University & Uni. Fribourg, Fribourg, SWITZERLAND

It has been more than thirty years since Frank Jackson put forward his thought experiment “Mary the Color Scientist” (also
known as “The Knowledge Argument”) to challenge physicalism. Mary is an imaginary scientist who has lived all her life in
a black-and-white room, who learns about all the facts about color and color vision that can be acquired from books which
carry all the information coming from a completed and perfect science of physics and neurobiology; but when she goes out of
the room one day, coming across a red object and having an experience of red for the first time, she learns something new. She

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learns about “what it is like to see red”, and from this Jackson concludes that physicalism is false, as there are psychological
facts (facts about visual experiences) that cannot be obtained from such books of physical sciences. Most people have chal-
lenged Jackson’s argument by claiming either that Mary wouldn’t learn anything new upon experiencing her first red object,
or that she merely acquires a new concept that provides information about a fact she already knew. Equal attention has not
been given to challenging a hidden premise of Jackson’s argument, the premise that one can acquire knowledge of all physical
facts through a propositional, non-experiential format. I will challenge that premise from an intentionalist (or “representa-
tionalist”) point-of-view: Mary does indeed lack some knowledge of experiencing red, but this is merely because she lacks
knowledge of the intentional object of the state, the intentional object being the color quality represented by the experience,
a quality that cannot be directly represented in a propositional or conceptual form. It is not an ignorance of a mental property
like “qualia” or “what-it-is-likeness”. However, this analysis implies that the color red is not identical to the micro- physical
properties referred to in physics books, and one has to choose between an eliminativist or emergentist view of color. I will
argue in favor of the second option. The emergentist view of color implies that colors (and other perceptible qualities like
smell and sound) cannot be reduced and are not fully explained by the micro- physical properties of objects. Even though
the position initially seems to create more problems for physicalism, it actually gives us a more intuitively acceptable picture
of the world compared to the mind-body dualism we are forced to accept by the Knowledge Argument: It is a picture where
there is no special problem of emergence about psychology: Emergence of qualities is everywhere in the physical world, and
since it is everywhere, it is most probably a matter of our systematic failure in forming explanatory links between things that
we know through experience and things that we know propositionally, rather than being a matter of an ontological gap in the
world itself. Also, even if qualities cannot be reduced to micro-physical properties, they still qualify as “physical” according to
a common-sensical meaning of the term, as they are, conceptually, prototypical physical properties of physical objects.

129 On a Confusion about which Intuition to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a
Not Easy One.
Sebastián Miguel Ángel
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, Mexico DF, MEXICO

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard
Problem. I will show that these arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between
appearances and reality in the case of consciousness and then argue that this intuition rests on the overlook of a distinction
between cognitive access and consciousness, a distinction that seems to be conceptually sound (Block 1995) and empiri-
cally supported. This will undermine the conceivability argument and the Hard Problem with it. I will conclude that, if con-
sciousness can be disentangled from cognitive access, we would be left with a “not easy problem”.
The argument in a nutshell is the following. Let WT be the claim that the primary intension of a phenomenal truth en-
tails the truth of its secondary intension. I will argue that conceivability arguments depend on premise 1
and defend the other premises.
1. WT is necessarily true.
2. Cognitive access can be (at least conceptually) dissociated from consciousness.
3. It is possible that consciousness and cognitive access can be completely dissociated (some empirical cases suggest
that this happens even in the actual world). From 2
4. It is possible that the primary intension of a phenomenal truth depends constitutively on the cognitive access we have
to our own experiences and only causally on the experience itself: the primary intension of ‘X is in pain’ might depend on X
having cognitive access to her pain experience.
5. It is possible that WT is false
(a) The primary intension of ‘X is not in pain’ might be true, in spite of the fact that X is in pain (from 3 and 4)
(b) The primary intension of ‘X is in pain’ might be true, in spite of the fact that X is not in pain (from 3 and 4)
______________
WT is false From 1 and 5.
I consider a possible objection based on the constitutive view of phenomenal concepts, according to which the experi-
ence is, someway or other, constitutive of the corresponding phenomenal concept. This would undermine premise 4 of the
argument. In reply, I argue that this view on phenomenal concepts presupposes the Kripkean intuition and hence begs the
question in the current discussion.
I conclude by discussing the problems derived from accepting the possibility of a complete dissentaglement between
cognitive access and consciousness: under which the subjects reports can be trusted (if at all)? What kind of considerations

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should we follow in order to ground our answers? Equally significant are other questions in the vicinity like whether the
process of cognitively accessing the experience modifies (and to what extent) its content or how we are to determine at what
level of information processing consciousness arises. A “not easy problem”.

130 Will our concept of “phenomenal consciousness” change?

Schomaecker Astrid
Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt Universität Berlin, Berin, GERMANY

In the classical debate on the explanatory gap (or the hard problem of consciousness) there are two most prominent po-
sitions: On the one side are those who say that because of the gap there will never be a naturalistic explanation of how
phenomenal consciousness (qualia) evolves (e.g. David Chalmers, Joseph Levine). On the other side thinkers assume that
there is no gap in the first place and that the explanation of the qualitative aspects of our experiences is no harder problem
than the explanation of any other feature of the mind (e.g. Daniel Dennett). I want to argue that considering a factor, which
is given little attention in the debate, might influence this dichotomy: the possibility of conceptual development. If we con-
sider our concept of phenomenal consciousness to be open to change, we can accept the explanatory gap as a real problem,
but still assume that it can be overcome.
At the core of the debate is the question whether there are independent concepts of phenomenal and psychological fea-
tures of consciousness, i.e. whether an a priori distinction between the qualitative experiences and any behavioral or func-
tional effect of them can be drawn. This question is important because arguably an explanation of the phenomenal features
presupposes a functional description of it, which in turn can be used to perform an explanatory reduction. If the phenom-
enal features of consciousness are conceptually independent from any functionally describable features, no such description
and hence no explanatory reduction could ever be given.
Thinkers like Dennett usually claim that this distinction is misleading and that phenomenal features are nothing but
functional features. The advocates of the explanatory gap consider any functional explanation to be necessarily a fraud,
because what it might be able to explain is not phenomenal consciousness but some kind of substitute. The disagreement
seems to be the question whether a functional description of phenomenal consciousness could be given which would be in
line with our intuitions of what phenomenal features are. However, both usually the question is treated as time-independent
and it is assumed that no empirical evidence about the conscious mind will change the philosophical arguments. What is left
out is the fact that, while the scientific investigation of consciousness can never answer conceptual problems directly, scien-
tific progress might influence our intuitions and our concepts themselves. As a consequence the appearance of the problem
might be very different.
To investigate whether such a conceptual development might be possible I will first shed some light on the question
whether the concept referring to phenomenal consciousness are different from usual scientific concepts. Here I will discuss
strategies like Chalmers’ two-dimensionalim or the phenomenal concept strategy which are for a special status of phenom-
enal concepts. I will then compare their features to examples of conceptual change in the natural sciences. This will show
whether it is plausible to expect the concept of phenomenal consciousness to change in a way that will help to overcome the
explanatory gap.

131 Consciousness: A by-product of two mirroring processes

Turjman Odeh
Music Therapy, Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development, Jerusalem, PALESTINE

Until recently, consciousness was considered as inaccessible to scientific research. However, with the increasing availability
of functional brain imaging and other techniques, a new field of neuroscience has developed to study what is referred to as
the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’. This approach, nevertheless, did not go without criticism. The counter argument
made is that such an approach leaves out an important aspect of consciousness, namely, the subjective inner world of mental
imagery, emotions and sensations. Proponents of this counter argument, such as David Chalmers, assume an unbridgeable
‘explanatory gap’ between neural-physical processes and conscious experience (coined by Chalmers as the ‘hard problem’).
According to this view, consciousness is regarded as a fundamental quality of the universe, rather than a quality of the brain.
In light of the above, this paper aims to demonstrate that the experience of consciousness is not a quality of the universe,
as the proponents of this view claim, but rather the by-product of two mirroring processes sustained by what neuroscientists
refer to as the ‘mirror neuron system’. Although there is much speculation about the role that mirroring processes play, the paper

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argues, based on personal experience of the author and available research, that these processes are mainly involved in the inter-
nal mirroring of one’s own facial and vocal gestures, what I term the ‘I-face’ mirror and the ‘I-voice’ mirror. Both mirrors entail
a continuous self- recognition process and, thus, an ‘I’-awareness (generated by the uninterrupted simulation of the self-face
and self-voice identities, respectively) and a sense of ‘self ’. From the analysis follows, that the ‘I-self ’ perpetuated by the ‘I-face’
mirror is that of a seemingly ‘self-aware’ and invariant ‘watcher’ that- because of lack of attention- is experienced as a ‘feeling’
rather than a visual mental image. As for the ‘I-self ’ maintained by the ‘I-voice’ mirror, it is enabled by two neural systems (a core
mirror system and an extended multisensory system) the interaction of which gives rise to and sustains the continuity of what
we experience as ‘self-consciousness’. Without the role that the ‘I-voice’ mirror plays in simulating the vocal gestures (i.e. spoken
words) and the corresponding multisensory past events associated with the current perceptions, it would be impossible to ‘self-
consciously’ recognize, and hence experience, even the things that are taken for granted such as the taste of food, colours, smells,
touch, the depth in a visual field, the sounds of music, or one’s own ‘body’. In conclusion, what we experience as a unitary sense
of consciousness is actually sustained by two dissociable mirroring processes that give rise to two distinct and unrelated ‘I-self ’
experiences. Nonetheless, given that the ‘I-self ’ perpetuated by the ‘I-face’ mirror is experienced as a ‘feeling’ of ‘self-awareness’
rather than a visual mental image, what happens when this feeling is experienced in association with the ‘self-consciousness’
maintained by the ‘I-voice’ mirror is that it gives us the illusory sense that we are ‘self-aware’ of being ‘self-conscious’.

132 How Can Predictive Processing Address the Hard Problem?

Ward Dave
Philosophy, University Of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM

According to an influential model in cognitive neuroscience, perceiving the world consists in the brain’s successfully antici-
pating the way its sensory states will unfold (Friston (2009), Clark (2013), Hohwy (2013)). Visual processing consists in the
deployment of a multilayered generative model, each stage of which attempts to predict the incoming signal from the layer
below. Can this approach address the Hard Problem of consciousness (henceforth ‘HP’)? I argue that combining the predic-
tive processing framework with existing naïve realist and enactivist treatments of HP shows that it can. Fish (2009) argues
that a naïve realist conception of perceptual experience makes inroads on HP. The phenomenal qualities of veridical experi-
ences are simply the perceptible properties of objects to which our experience relates us. But this view faces at least two seri-
ous problems. First, it appears to offer only resources to address a ‘comparative’ version of HP: the problem of explaining why
an experience has one phenomenal quality rather than another. However, I argue, we have reason to think a view addresses
the ‘comparative’ HP only if it addresses the ‘absolute’ version of HP: the problem of explaining why a perceptual encounter
has some phenomenal character rather than none. Second, the view lacks resources to explain the phenomenal commonality
between veridical perceptual experiences and appropriate illusions and hallucinations. Clark (2000) argues that the phenom-
enal differences between sensory episodes might be explained via appeal to the perceiver’s patterns of limited, non-inferential
access to the non-phenomenal properties in virtue of which the sensory episodes differ – for example, the perceiver’s implicit
grasp of the fact that their sensory contact with the world is currently mediated by one set of sensorimotor contingencies
rather than another (hence the view’s ‘enactivist’ credentials). This enactivist view also faces problems. First, it stands in need
of empirically-informed elaboration and confirmation. Second, it has been objected that the view misses its explanatory tar-
get – it can explain features of our judgments about phenomenal qualities, but not the presence or absence of the qualities
that make those judgments true. These views can work together to overcome their problems. The enactivist can show the
naïve realist why we sincerely judge that there’s ‘something-it’s-like’ to be related to the perceptible properties of an object
in experience. Naïve realism can show the enactivist why those judgments are, in the case of veridical experiences, true: they
are made true by the perceived qualities of the objects of experience. The predictive processing model of perception gives the
enactivist resources to flesh out and support their view: our access to the non-phenomenal properties in virtue of which sen-
sory episodes differ consists in our practical grasp of the way interrelations between motor output and sensory input vary ac-
cording to the property perceived. And, coupled with the enactivist view, it allows the naïve realist to explain the experienced
commonality between veridical experiences and appropriate illusions and hallucinations. The upshot is a naturalistic and em-
pirically- informed conception of the way phenomenal qualities figure in our relation to the objects of perceptual experience.

References: Clark, A. (2000) ‘A case where access implies qualia?’ Analysis 60(1), 30-37; Clark, A. (2012)
‘Dreaming the whole cat: Generative models, predictive processing, and the enactivist conception of perceptual
experience’ Mind 121 (483), 753-771; Clark, A. (2013) ‘Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and
the future of cognitive science’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03), 181-204; Fish, W. (2009) Perception, hal-
lucination, and illusion. Oxford University Press; Hohwy, J. (2013) The predictive mind. Oxford University Press.

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1.8 Emergence and Consciousness

133 Teleology does not emerge from complexity

García-Valdecasas Miguel
Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra, Pamplona, SPAIN
Barrett Nathaniel
Institute for Culture and Society, University of Navarra, Pamplona, SPAIN
Sánchez Caviares Javier
University of Navarra, Pamplona, SPAIN

Complexity has emerged in recent decades as a central topic in scientific and philosophical discussions of living and con-
scious systems. Despite the lack of a standard definition or measurement of complexity, it is widely believed that living and
conscious systems are marked by relatively high degrees of complexity (in comparison to non-living and non-conscious
systems) and that improved understanding of this complexity will help to explain the emergence of allegedly unique traits
such as subjectivity, agency, intelligence, and teleology. In this paper, we focus on the question of whether teleology can be
explained as an emergent property of living and/or conscious systems considered as “self-organized” complex adaptive sys-
tems (CAS).
The first part of the paper discusses relevant views of complexity in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, including
those of Alicia Juarrero (1999), Evan Thompson (2007), Terrence Deacon (2012). Despite important differences, these
and other viewpoints share the assumption that causality is non-teleological below a certain threshold of complexity. Such
threshold arguments are important for consciousness studies insofar as they reduce the apparent gap between conscious-
ness and the rest of nature by breaking it down into several key transitions in system dynamics. If teleology can be shown
to be operative in all living systems by virtue of some basic dynamic-organizational transition, the explanatory burden for a
science of consciousness is thereby reduced.
However, we wish to question the idea that genuine teleology can emerge from complexity, that is, from any dynamic-
organizational transition. Of course, part of the problem is that both teleology and complexity are variously interpreted, so
that the exact nature of the contribution of complexity to an emergentist account of teleology is difficult to pin down. Ac-
cordingly, in the second part of the paper, we propose two clarifications. The first is to point out that teleology as found in
consciousness includes not just end-directed behavior, i.e. teleonomy, but a choice of ends such that conscious activity can
be considered as self-determined. The second is to offer a straightforward physical description of a complex system, focusing
on its microstates and macrostates, degrees of freedom, and constraints. With this description it can be shown that the “self-
organization” of new constraints in no way requires a self-determining choice.
From this analysis it can be concluded that complexity yields nothing more than elaborate forms of teleonomy. Thus
it seems that the ordinary understanding of physical microstates as “blindly determined,” if left in place, belies the assump-
tion that genuine teleology—that is, self-determination through choice of ends—can emerge from some minimum level of
complexity. Note that the issue is not just determinism but also the nature of teleological causality as a kind of “self-caused
cause.” We argue that such causes cannot emerge from complexity.

134 The Non-Causal Account of Spontaneous Emergence of Phenomenal

Consciousness
Guta Mihretu
Philosophy, Durham University , Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

In this paper, I will give a three-stage analysis of the origin of phenomenal consciousness. The first one has to do with a
non-causal stage. The second one has to do with a causal stage. The third one has to do with a correlation stage. This paper
is divided into three sections. In section I, I will discuss a non-causal stage which focuses on finite consciousness as an ir-
reducible emergent property—i.e., a simple non-structural property that is unique to the “emergent” level of reality (e.g.,
Moreland 2008; Chalmers 1996). I will examine currently dominant accounts of the emergence of phenomenal conscious-
ness—which require consciousness to have some sort of causal link to its base level (e.g., Chalmers in Clayton and Davies,

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eds., 2006: 244; O’Connor 2000; Sperry 1969). Those who think of the emergence of consciousness in casual terms, often
have in mind, brain complexity as a source of such causality (Searle 1992). However, the causal proposal faces two serious
empirically supported objections, namely: the gametes problem and the complexity problem, respectively. The first objec-
tion deals with conception (i.e., fertilization) and the impossibility of tracking down/spotting the origin of consciousness
at any point during the process of the development of a foetus. The second objection focuses on demonstrating that, no
amount of analysis of the physical basis of complex brain will unfold anything substantial about the origin of consciousness
(cf. McGinn 1999; Chalmers 1996). Both of these two objections show why the diachronic account of the origin of the phe-
nomenal consciousness is hard to come by. In section II, I will discuss a causal stage which focuses on, how once it emerges,
consciousness enters into the domain of causal interaction with brain states. This is the stage where we come across both
‘the explanatory gap problem’ (Levine 1983; 2001); and ‘the hard problem of consciousness’ (Block 2007; Chalmers 1996;
Nagel 1974). In section III, I will discuss the correlation stage which focuses on the manner in which phenomenal con-
sciousness continues to co-exist with its physical base (e.g., brain). To show this, I will discuss the notion of correlation and
its relation to causation (Maudlin 1994/2002). The upshot of my discussion in the above three sections will constitute the
view I call: the non-causal spontaneous emergence of phenomenal consciousness. According to the view I am proposing,
there is no causal-link between strongly emergent property (in this case, consciousness) and its base level—although the
base level (as far as we know) serves as a sufficient condition (but not as a necessary condition) for its emergence. In light of
this, I conclude this paper by claiming that phenomenal consciousness is a strongly emergent property.

135 Language and Ontological Emergence: Evidence for Ontological Emergence

from Linguistics
Miller James
Philosophy, Durham University, Durham , UNITED KINGDOM

Language is increasingly considered to be of crucial importance to questions about the nature and structure of the mind. It
is therefore surprising to find such a large lacuna concerning language within the literature on possible emergence of con-
sciousness. In this paper I propose that empirical evidence from linguistics supports the existence of ontologically emer-
gent properties within language. If this claim is correct, then it could have significant consequences for traditional debates
within the consciousness literature as it would provide an instance of ontological emergence that is (solely) located within
the mind.
‘Phase Theory’ has been adopted within current versions of the Generative Grammar Programme begun by Chomsky
in the 1950s. This theory holds that that sentence derivation “proceed[s] in incremental chunks, called phases” with each
phase built from a set of lexical items (Boeckx and Grohmann 2007:205). The phases are occur at the verbal phase and the
sentential phase. Only through the combination of this phase with a further lexical subarray can new grammatical catego-
ries be formed. MERGE, the fundamental and by hypothesis simple set building operation underlying all parts of linguistic
derivations, forms a new linguistic entity from the phase edge, and the head of the higher phase – that is to say that new sets
are formed from the lexical array which form novel grammatical categories. This new entity is of a new grammatical category
which cannot exist within the grammatical categories or properties of the lower level lexical-semantic base.
Importantly, the increasing grammatical complexity within a linguistic derivation leads to the instantiation of novel
properties by that sentence or utterance. For example, propositionality and truth evaluability only appear once a certain
level of grammatical complexity is reached – once the derivation proceeds to the CP phase (complementizer phrase). With-
out this complexity, sentences cannot have these properties. This is because these properties cannot be found at the lower
lexical-semantic level, nor can occur without the requisite grammatical complexity.
Furthermore, these properties would seem to provide instances of downward influence in that the semantic content
ascribed to each lexical item within a sentence, and indeed the sentence as a whole, will be directly affected by the existence
of properties emerging from a more complex linguistic derivation. This paper will explore whether such influence may be
considered causal.
This evidence from linguistics provides empirically justified examples of ontological or strong emergence in line with
well-supported definitions of emergence (as novel causal powers, and as instances of downward causation). This paper
therefore concludes that either we should accept that linguistics provides examples of emergence, or our definitions of
emergence must be adjusted, in a non-ad hoc manner, to rule out this evidence as evidence of the existence of ontologically
emergent properties. If we accept this as an instance of ontologically emergent properties, then this would suggest that lin-
guistics and language would be a profitable line of research for study of the mind and consciousness.

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136 Brute Experience, Embedded Cognition and Extended Mind

Ray Rajib
Department of Philosophy, Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi, Delhi, INDIA

Panda Ranjan
Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Insitute of Technology, Mumbai, INDIA

John Searle argues for structure of experience that forms intentional mental states. The constituting properties of these
structured mental states seem to be intrinsic to consciousness. This thesis can be critiqued with reference the notion of
brute experience put forward by Peter Carruthers and neural reductionism argued by Jaegwon Kim. The brute experience
thesis suggests there are nonconscious experiences which may help to control behaviour. This thesis could be strengthened
by Daniel Dennett’s notion of sub-personal cognitive psychology. Both Carruthers and Dennett bring in the significance
of the causal power of the brain processes. Kim’s supervenience theory that argues in favour of neural reductionism is also
based on the efficacy of the causal power of the brain. So far as the causation and realisation of mental states are concerned
the Searlean theorization of structure of experience does not disown the causal function of the brain. The paper argues out
whether the Searlean account of the structure of experience helps in retaining its constitutive properties of the intentional
states without draining them to the neural states. It shows that Searle’s viewpoint is akin to the notion of an embedded cog-
nition and extended mind.

1.9 Higher Order Thought

137 An Ecological Account of Self-Consciousness

Dilek Caglan Cinar
Central European University, TURKEY

This paper tries to build the foundations of a theory of Self and Consciousness on an ecological account of perception and
action. The alternatives to be criticized are ontological accounts, which analyze self- consciousness through its necessary and
sufficient conditions, as if it is an abstract and isolated entity; and the Higher-Order Theories, which consider self-conscious-
ness as a complex and later emergent entity, occurring later (and only) in human life. I go along with the phenomenological
approach that the self is experiential and pre-reflective and thus it is not proper to explain it through a Representational
Theory. The self should be primarily investigated in its more fundamental experiential levels and before considering the ef-
fect of language and conceptual capacities on the constitution of self-consciousness. Although self-consciousness is taken to
be essentially reflexive, most of the research on it tried to show how that kind of self-reflexivity is possible: Higher- Order
Thought/Perception Theories, Self-Representational Theories, theories trying to explain the capacity to use indexicals and
theories coming from the Cartesian tradition that ‘I’ is essentially mental. However, if we accept that self-consciousness is es-
sentially experiential, we can see that it is more proper to understand this phenomenon by shifting the focus from reflexivity
and reflectivity to experience and subjectivity. This includes but is not limited to analyze how the self is experienced through
our body. The self comes in degrees and has many faces (Zahavi) and the mental self does not constitute the essential as-
pect in this picture, but rather we need an ecological perspective, which focuses on the embodied and embedded interper-
sonal self (Butterworth). The self cannot be detached from its environment and considered in isolation. A classical analytical
methodology fo an analysis through necessary and sufficient conditions is also not suitable for self- consciousness; our ap-
proach should be rather developmental ( Jacob).
In this direction, the self can only be understood through the analysis and integration of an account of subjectivity,
joint-action, perception and action. Firstly, we need an account of subjectivity, because we are primarily subjects having ex-
perience and first-person perspective. Secondly, we need an account of joint- action, because the encounter with the other
is the first experience we have in our lifes. The cartesian problem of other minds occur only with the assumption that con-
sciousness is inside and the world is outside (Neisser). We do not make inferences to understand that some objects in the
world are actually subjects. We are already able to distinguish subjects, objects and ourselves. Thirdly, we need an account of
perception, because we are primarily world-directed beings and it is more proper to understand self-consciousness through
investigating its relation to the world, rather than analyzing its relation to itself. In this direction, I will use ideas from Mer-

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lau- Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Gibson’s Ecological Theory of Visual Perception. Lastly, we need a proper the-
ory of action, which does not take the self as the action-centre of a computational system but as a part of a dynamical system.

138 Can We Make Folk-Psychological Sense of Animal Reasons for Acting?

Hamblin Caitlin
Philosophy, Psychology, and Embodied Cognition, University of Edinburgh, Edinbugh, UNITED KINGDOM

Susan Hurley maintained that animals occupy ‘islands of practical reason’ within which their actions can be properly un-
derstood as intentional. Hurley understands animal reasons for acting within these ‘islands’ as intentional actions “at the
personal level, folk-psychologically, in terms of holistically and normatively constrained mental states” (Hurley 2003b, 273).
Peter Godfrey-Smith has recently argued that Hurley’s folk- psychological account can be used to describe either (a) inter-
pretive facts: facts about how our interpretive framework map onto the animal’s behavioural features or (b) real architectural
facts concerning how the animal mind as a system operates in the world. In this paper I will argue that applying folk-psychol-
ogy to animal minds stretches the interpretive framework far from its intended domain of use and cannot be used to explain
either set of facts. My objections against Hurley’s philosophically refined version of folk-psychology only hold if we are hard-
core realists. At the end of this paper I will suggest that Hurley may be endorsing a type of human- centric realism (or what
some may call a kind of idealism) which may avoid the problems I raise in this paper. I will however leave open the question
of whether one can consistently endorse a type of idealism while making scientific claims.

139 A proposed mathematical model based on neuro fuzzy system for human
consciousness
Swami Sahni Pooja
NRCVEE , Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Sahni Prakash
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

This paper proposes a mathematical model based on the extrinsic, intrinsic and relational domains of human consciousness.
Inputs from all five senses, processes the information in perceptual, cognitive and sensomotoric systems. This extrinsic do-
main or conscious experience due to the sensory stimuli is the simplest perceptual experience - basis for any further sensory
processing (Lafunte & Romo, 2005). The intrinsic and relational domains – higher and deeper order conscious experiences
are expressed using the principle of psychophysical isomorphism which states that– there exists a correlation between cer-
ebral activity and conscious experience and that the mind and matter both emerge from an implicate order (Bohm , Hiley
and Pylkkänen,2001) neural fuzzy System.
The paper also discusses the future direction of the proposed model and the conformation route.

1.10 Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

140 Logical Patterns in the Life Cycle of Optimal and Self-Regulationg Systems:
Principles of Hexalogic Dialectics
Cavaller Victor
Information and Communication Sciences, UOC, Barcelona, SPAIN

A comparative analysis of discernible regularities in the life cycle of optimal and self-regulating systems, taken from different
scientific fields (natural, mind, social, etc), leads to identify the existence of a common logical relation which acting as causal
link produces homogeneous functional sequences.

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The continuous evolutionary process of systems can be understood as a progressive acquisition of different kind of char-
acteristics: sufficient conditions for the survival and necessary conditions to guarantee that these systems are in the pathway
that leads to self-regulation. Based on this assumption, this article is focused on the definition of the logical patterns in the
life cycle of succesful systems considering the scale, scope and nature of the progressive achievements and the proportional
duration, order and sequence of the phases.
The main finding of this research provides an universal definition of the life cycle of systems, structured in six phases
based on two opposite factors, one mathematical-universal factor as external principle and another dialogic-diversal factor
as internal principle.
The article then focuses on the main meta-concepts from the philosophical debate: nature, mind, selfawareness, rational
world, reality and being as common scientific subjects. From a life cycle perspective the fragmentation of the scientific disci-
plines is shown as a consequence of a critical lack of global understanding of the evolutionary nature of science.
Different scientific approaches must be based on objective criteria that define their quality and scope. Setting the crite-
ria for the deduction and the characterization of scientific subjects, the article leads to a reflection about their relation not
only as subjects but also as real entities in the life cycle of the Being.
The article ends up with a proposal of a classification of scientific subjects, sciences and meta-sciences from a point of
view based on the life cycle of being, considering mind phenomena as an element resulting from nature and as a basic factor
of awareness.

141 Inference and Consciousness

Chevalier Jean-Marie
Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Paris, FRANCE

Is inferring a conscious or unconscious process? It is often said that there are two kinds of inference, conscious and uncon-
scious ones. If it is the case, the difference between them should shed some light on what it is to be conscious, and hopefully
on consciousness itself.
Inferring is often described as a process of rule following. But such a view might entail a vicious
circle: if an inference states a rule of action from the start, another rule will not provide a good account for it. A strategy
for blocking this regression is to place the explanation on a sub-personal level. Inferential reasoning would be founded on
mechanisms which cannot be reached by a conscious subject. A blind algorithm would process the task. Paul Boghossian
and Timothy Williamson discussed the issue in a 2003 joint work.
The problem is that “blind reasoning” seems to miss the matter, Boghossian argues: reasoning consists in applying a rule
which is present to the mind of a person or is at least accessible to her. If conclusions did pop up in our minds as results of
unconscious procedures, it would not be rational to adopt them without any justification. Providing a justification would in
turn require to make sub-personal rules explicit at a conscious level.
I argue for a different conclusion: inferences may be unconscious while their justification is conscious, without resorting
to any conscious rule. It takes a faculty of self-control examining if our conclusions share some “normative requirements”
(according to John Broome’s phrase). Thus, inferring would be unconscious, but we would consciously tell good from bad
inferences according to criteria that can be made explicit.
Was does it teach us on the nature of consciousness? It provides a dynamical picture of consciousness, as a faculty rather
than a passive receptacle of impressions and sensations. What is often seen as the content of our consciousness (things pre-
sent to our mind, objects of perception and of thought, like inferences) rather belongs to bodily behaviors, circumstances
and acts we are not aware of. Being conscious implies to the contrary that we have an active, rational, self-controlled grasp
on them. It could even be claimed – a bit emphatically – that consciousness starts just where there possibly is a distinction
between correct or incorrect, good and bad, that is, that consciousness intrinsically implies a normative dimension.

142 Clarifying Bandyopadhyay’s microtubule research claims: Experiments,

Instruments, Theoretical Interpretations
Keys Cameron
Center for Nanotechnology in Society, Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

Findings from five years of US Air Force-funded experiments testing the electrical and mechanical properties of micro-
tubules at the National Institute for Materials Science in Japan have yet to circulate widely through mainstream neurosci-

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ence and structural biology communities. To facilitate the circulation and evaluation of these knowledge claims, I deploy
analytic tools from the history and philosophy of science to clarify characteristic features of these microtubule experiments,
the instruments used, and various theoretical interpretations of the findings currently on offer. I place these claims within
the larger sphere of international neuroscience research through analyses of 100 hours of interviews with members of the
NIMS laboratory, patent documents, published and unpublished manuscripts, and technical documents released by the EU
Human Brain Project and US BRAIN Initiative.

143 Ideality, symbolic mediation and scientific representation

Kilakos Dimitris
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, Athens, GREECE

Process of abstraction (and/or idealization) is generally considered as constituent of scientific representation. This appeal
to abstraction triggers serious issues, regarding the metaphysical and epistemological status of scientific representations. In-
deed, on the ongoing discussion on scientific representations several approaches have been proposed, from those invoking
fictionalism (i.e. Frigg 2010) to attempts to rescue realism (i.e. Psillos 2011).
I argue that we can account for neither their explanatory nor their predictive success if we do not indicate why and how
the outcomes of abstraction which are included in scientific representations are real. This is a prerequisite to understand
how scientific representations can be correlated, compared, contrasted etc. with things that are real and concrete. The suc-
cess of such an attempt, which is typical in science, shows that representations act as rational surrogates for what is repre-
sented by them.
I propose that E.V. Ilyenkov’s elaboration of the concept of the ‘ideal’ can provide us an appropriate context for an ac-
count following these lines. Ilyenkov treats ideal phenomena as having a special kind of objectivity that fundamentally dif-
fers from the objectivity of things being empirically perceived by the individual: ideal is objective, part of objective reality,
since it is something that is objectified in our various activities. The ideal is the reflection of things emerging in objective,
reality-transforming activity
Ilyenkov contends that ideal’s existence and functioning as a symbol does not belong to it as such, but to the system
within which it has acquired its properties. The symbol is the objective form of existence of an ideal form or ideal image. It
is ideal because, within the dynamic of the system, it acts as the form not of itself but of something else which it represents,
reflects, or whose place it takes.
Therefore, according to Ilyenkov, ideality is a feature of reified, objectified images of historically formed modes of
human social life, which confront the conscious agent as a special kind of objective reality, as special objects comparable
with material reality.
I contend that in this context we can understand how the objective aspects of the represented object
or process, emerging via abstraction, are incorporated in its representation, enabling us to utilize it in our scientific inquiries
as its mediating symbol. It is each specific scientific representation’s function us such that determines the dynamics of the
inquiry and not vice-versa. On these grounds, we can account for their role and function within our scientific inquiries.

144 The Self-Perception Theory 40 Years Later (More or Less)

Lo Dico Giuseppe
Psychology, Catholic University , Milan, ITALY

The so-called ‘Introspection Illusion’ is a supposed cognitive bias in which people are erroneously convinced to have a direct
access to the wellsprings of their thoughts and behaviours. Although this formulation is rather recent, the arguments in its
favour can be traced back to the ‘golden age’ of cognitivistic-oriented social psychology between 1960 and 1980. A funda-
mental paper of this period is certainly Bem 1972 in which the author proposes his ‘Self-Perception Theory.’ According to
this theory, people come to know their own mental states in the same way they come to know those of the others: They
infer them from the observation of their own overt behaviour and the circumstances in which such a behaviour takes place.
Although highly controversial, such a theory can be considered a milestone of the post-behaviouristic and cognitivistic anti-
introspectionistic approaches to psychology and continues to influence the methodological assumptions of most recent re-
search.
Although Bem’s position appears to be radically anti-introspectionistic (and this is stressed also by its declared adher-
ence to the ideas of Skinner and Ryle and to the principles of functional analysis), he points out that people infer their men-
tal states by observing their overt behaviour only “(...) to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or un-interpret-

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able” (Bem 1972, p. 2). Further, at the pages 40-42 of his paper, Bem individuates four ways in which the self-attributions
and the interpersonal attributions can differ, that is, ‘Insider vs. Outsider’ difference, ‘Intimate vs. Stranger’ difference, ‘Self
vs. Other’ difference and ‘Actor vs. Observer’ difference. These points have led many commentators to argue that, at last,
Bem leaves open the possibility for introspection (although he does not provide any account of it). This can be considered
the mainstream interpretation of Self-Perception Theory today, that is to say, as a perspective that does not rule out a priori
the possibility of an introspective and conscious access to mind (Schwitzgebel 2010).
In this talk I’ll discuss Self-Perception Theory in the light of recent cognitive and social psychological and philosophical
literature and I’ll show its influence over the research on the Introspection Illusion. Against the widespread interpretation
of Bem’s proposal, I’ll argue that Self-Perception Theory does not seem to open the possibility for an introspective access
because of its radical behaviouristic outlook. In fact, such an outlook actually aims at providing an account of the weak,
ambiguous and difficult to interpret ‘internal cues’ and of the four differences between self-attributions and interpersonal at-
tributions that de facto excludes a conscious and introspective access to mind. Finally, I’ll try to show how such a behaviour-
istic perspective is so entrenched in the theories of the supporters of the Introspection Illusion to prevent the development
of a reliable science of consciousness.

References: Bem D.J. (1972). Self-Perception Theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, Vol. 6. New York: Academic Press (pp. 1-62). Schwitzgebel, E. (2010). Introspection. In E. N.
Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
introspection/

145 First-, Second- and Third-Person Perspectives in Science and Contemplative

Traditions: Neurophenomenology, Buddhism and General Semantics
Lukas Wolfgang
Institute for Astro- and Particle Physics, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, AUSTRIA

Human perception, experience and evaluation are being found to consist of self-reflexive feedback mechanisms that inher-
ently involve observer biases and hidden assumptions. As a result, it becomes impossible to adopt a purely objective third-
person view without taking into account first- and second-person perspectives. This has far-reaching consequences for sci-
ence and our understanding of the world, and calls for practical methods to increase our awareness and accuracy of first- and
second-person evaluations.
Neurophenomenology provides a template for a new stance that accounts for the first-, second- and third- person per-
spectives in theory-and-practice. It advocates the mutually informing application of introspection- and-dialogue-based phe-
nomenological approaches and the precise methods of experimental science, suggesting that our systematic biases can be
reduced by contemplative and/or secular training methods which emphasize direct first-person experience, introspection,
metacognition and evaluation processes. For this purpose, two practical systems with different origins and striking parallels
are identified:
(1) Buddhist philosophy-and-practice, which can be understood as a 2500-year-old “mind science” due to its pragmatic
and theoretical refinement. The self-reflexive nature of experience is highlighted in “dependent co- arising” (paticca samup-
pada), a complex non-linear system with nested causal feedback loops that facilitates the deconstruction of systems, causal-
ity, and even its own conceptual representation. Practitioners are advised to attend directly to processes and causal relations,
impermanence and non-identity, thereby reducing habitual reification (papañca).
(2) General Semantics, introduced in 1933 as a secular, practical, self-updating, interdisciplinary “non- Aristotelian”
system which applies modern scientific thinking to human evaluation, emphasizing unique features of human abstracting
processes and immediate interactions of the organism-as-a-whole-in-its-environment. Key principles include non-identity
(“the map is not the territory”, covers not all territory, is self-reflexive), semantic reactions, consciousness of abstracting,
etc.; Practical training enhances verbal, sensory and behavioral awareness.
We show that the conceptual and practical parallels between General Semantics and Buddhist philosophy-and- practice
have a common denominator in their scientific orientation, calling for a detailed investigation to understand (a) whether
both systems provide similar and/or complementary routes towards enhanced verbal and sensory awareness of mental and
physiological processes, and (b) how they can be applied together for mutual benefit. To launch this investigation, we pro-
pose a roadmap for studies comparing the effects of General Semantics practice and Buddhist mindfulness practice, includ-
ing neuroimaging (e.g. default / executive networks), psychology (e.g. attention, perception, mind-wandering) and physiol-
ogy, using principles and techniques from Neurophenomenology.

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We further explain how these systems extend beyond the currently prevailing scientific third-person paradigm by natu-
rally integrating the first-second-and-third-person perspectives, thus providing a route towards an essential meta-paradigm
shift in which the sciences, contemplative traditions, humanities, etc. no longer need to be treated as necessarily “separate
magisteria”. When this potential becomes fully realized, our worldviews, evaluations and experiences co-evolve alongside
the new integrating stance as we progress towards our own systematic disillusionment.

146 The Table of Consciousness Researchers

McKenty Adam
N/A, Independent scholar, Mansons Landing, CANADA

One challenge faced by students in the field of consciousness studies is that there is a plethora of theories and theorists with
partially-overlapping views on consciousness. It can be difficult to sort out which theories have what implications according
to their proponents, or even what, if any, difference there is between two expert opinions. This is exacerbated by the cross-
disciplinary nature of consciousness studies and the fact that its literature is heavily populated with terminology from at least
four or five major scientific disciplines.
To help sort all of this out, I will present a table with prominent consciousness theorists on one axis, and a series of yes/
no questions along the other axis. Then, extracted from these theorists writings or, as necessary, from direct surveys and
personal communication, I will populate this table with answers which, taken together, help define and group the theorists’
varying view points on consciousness.
This table will be presented in poster format, and will also be available online, along with source citations and a variety
of data-viewing formats. Also online will be an interactive survey in which web site visitors can answer the survey questions
and thereby place their views on consciousness amongst the experts in the field.
This poster will not directly forward our understanding of consciousness in any way. It will, however, help to make sense
of a rapidly changing and often confusing field.

147 A Critical Look at Quantum Cognition

Pättiniemi Ilkka
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

Quantum Cognition is a field of research that applies the formal features of Quantum Mechanics to the study of cognition
(cf. Wang, Busemeyer, Atmaspacher & Pothos 2013, Topics in Cognitive Sciences 5, 672-688). In this paper I critically ex-
amine, and find wanting, the basis for applying quantum mechanical principles to cognitive studies.
The case for Quantum Cognition is founded on several analogies its proponents see between Quantum Mechanical and
cognitive phenomena: (i) Quantum superpositions are seen as analogous to ambiguities and uncertainties people experi-
ence – thus people’s cognitive states should be represented as superpositions that only ‘collapse’ upon measurement. (ii)
Relatedly, just as Quantum Mechanical systems are sensitive to measurements, so are cognitive ones – the experimental
setup influences the results of a study i.e. responses to questions posed. (iii) Non-commutativity of observables in Quantum
Mechanics is seen as analogous to order effects in cognitive measurements. (iv) Just as entangled systems violate classical
(boolean) probability calculus, many psychological experiments are claimed to violate classical probability. Here quantum
logic is seen as a needed addition to cognitive studies. (v) Entanglement shows that quantum systems are holistic and analo-
gously cognitive processes are not decomposable to constitutive components.
For (i), I point out that quantum superpositions are not to do with our lack of knowledge of the system – the state
function is all that can be known. Also people’s reports about their cognitive state should not be taken as authoritative. For
(ii), I will show that also for classical systems, in practice if not in theory, measurements alter the state of the system. For
(iii) I point out that building a house is non-commutative – one lays the foundation before the walls, but there is no need
for Quantum Construction. (iv) is put under strain by differing interpretations of the results that are said to call for a move
from classical probability. Also quantum logic is highly controversial in the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Finally,
for (v) I note that there are several ways to deal with holism in psychology and linguistics, and most of these do not require
a quantum approach.

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148 A unified account of self-knowledge

Schwengerer Lukas
Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM

I argue for an original account of self-knowledge regarding propositional attitudes. The core claim is that every time a first-
order attitude is produced, a dispositional second-order belief is also formed. Both attitudes share parts of their production,
which ensures reliability while still keeping fallibility.
Consider this example: You look with full awareness, and under normal conditions, at a nearby red car. The process of per-
ception causes you to believe that there is a red car. Now, if I am correct, the very same process also partially causes the second-
order belief that you believe there is a red car. It is, in a sense, correct to claim that perception produced this second-order belief,
and that it was caused by a complex of whatever is part of the process: the car, light, visual organ, neural activity, etc. Suppose
that a friend asks you whether you believe there is a red car nearby while you are still looking at it. You instantly affirm that you
do. This can be explained by you having the second-order belief about the first-order belief regarding the car, simply from look-
ing at the car. There is no need for additional monitoring or inference to obtain this second-order belief, because it was already
formed as soon as you looked at the car. Even more so, you will probably be startled when your friend asks you this while you
are still looking at the car. This would certainly be a very strange question in everyday speech, but why? This is because the an-
swer to the question seems to be so obvious. And I think that this indicates a direct connection of believing to have a perceptual
belief about the red car and having a perceptual belief about the red car, i.e., the connection of the second-order attitude and the
first-order attitude. I propose that this connection can be best explained by the attitudes’ shared formation processes.
I show how this basic model explains privileged access, reliability, and the possibility of self-deception. Furthermore,
the model is applicable to all propositional attitudes, which is an explanatory advantage compared to other accounts of self-
knowledge.

149 Agentive experience and knowledge of action

Shepherd Joshua
Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM

Following Elizabeth Anscombe’s pioneering book Intention, many have insisted that the knowledge an agent possesses of
her action as it unfolds is in many senses special. Anscombe and those writing in her wake have variously emphasized at least
five ways, which we might consider desiderata for an Anscombian account of knowledge of action. Let us say that on a fully
Anscombian account, an agent’s knowledge of her action is: (1) in some sense necessary for or constitutive of intentional
action (2) in some sense practical as opposed to theoretical or speculative (3) in some sense non-observational (4) in some
sense non-inferential (5) in some sense immediate, in that the knowledge is not based in prior evidence.
In this paper I offer an account of an agent’s knowledge of action that emphasizes the conscious experience of trying, as
well as the conscious experience of acting (Shepherd forthcoming). I argue that by focusing of certain features of the experi-
ence of acting, we can better understand the latter four Anscombian desiderata. Further, by emphasizing certain actional
aspects of experience, we can better explain two interesting features of knowledge of action: first, how an agent’s knowledge
of action ‘keeps near perfect time’ with an agent’s action (Pickard 2004), and second, the role of perceptual experience for
knowledge of action.

References
Anscombe, G.E.M. (2000). Intention. 2nd Edition. Harvard University Press.
Pickard, H. (2004).
Knowledge of Action Without Observation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104(1): 205-230.
Shep-
herd, J. (forthcoming). Conscious action/Zombie action. Noûs.

150 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Role of Consciousness in

Understanding
Sterpetti Fabio
Philosophy, Sapienza University of Rome, Roma, ITALY

The role of consciousness in human knowledge may be challenged by an Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA), i.e. an
argument “that appeal[s] to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification” (Kahane 2011,

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p. 103).
In fact, if understanding is necessary for explanation (Faye 2012), and explanatory considerations are necessary to
assess the truth of the scientific hypotheses (Lipton 2004), and if consciousness is necessary for understanding (Campbell
2011), then consciousness is necessary for attaining the truth. But given that, according to science, our sense of understand-
ing is so deeply biased (Trout 2002), and that it may be accounted for in evolutionary terms, i.e. our sense of understanding
could have been selected for due to some adaptive advantage it gives us having such a sense independently (or at least partly
independently) to its ability in tracking the truth (Gopnik 1998; Trout 2007; Stich 2011), it follows that consciousness may
not be reliable in attaining the truth. Moreover, along this line the very concept of truth may be challenged by the same kind
of evolutionary considerations, at least inasmuch as our conception of truth rests in ultimate analysis on some sort of ‘philo-
sophical intuition’ (Nozick 2001).
Thus, the traditional views on the relation of consciousness, knowledge, and truth risk to be debunked.
But such a posi-
tion, being based on an EDA, may be accused of being self-defeating. In fact, recently Helen De Cruz and her co-authors
supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating (De Cruz et al. 2011). De Cruz’s objection to EDAs can be stated as fol-
lows: if human knowledge is not reliable because human reasoning is not truth-tracking, then even evolutionary theory,
which is a product of human reasoning, is not reliable; given that “EDAs themselves are based on scientific theories, notably
evolutionary theory, and philosophical reflection” (Ibidem, p. 525), then EDAs themselves are not reliable, nor truth-track-
ing, and so are self- defeating.
This objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim
that given that, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation
for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. Indeed, Hersh’s objection runs
as follows: “If mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain, then Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, being a
mathematical result, cannot be said to be absolutely certain. But the claim that mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely
certain is based on Gödel’s result. Then this claim too cannot be said to be absolutely certain. Therefore, the claim that, by
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain, is self-defeating” (Cellucci
2013, p. 7).
The response given by Carlo Cellucci (Ibidem, p.8) to Hersh’s objection shows that such claim about mathemat-
ics is not self-defeating.
Such kind of response will be adopted here in a twofold sense to show that EDAs related to the role
of consciousness in understanding are not self-defeating as well.

References: Campbell, J. (2011): Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of Consciousness, in Mole, C.; Smith-
ies, D.; Wu, W. (eds.): Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
323–341. Cellucci, C. (2013): Rethinking Logic. Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evolution, and Method,
Dordrecht, Springer. De Cruz, H.; Boudry, M.; De Smedt, J.; Blancke, S. (2011): Evolutionary Approaches to
Epistemic Justification, Dialectica, 65, 517–535. Faye, J. (2012): Scientific Understanding, Representation, and
Explanation, Epistemologia, 35, 183–196. Gopnik, A. (1998): Explanation as Orgasm, Minds and Machines, 8,
101–18.
Kahane, G. (2011): Evolutionary Debunking Arguments, Noûs, 45, 103–125.
Lipton, P. (2004): Infer-
ence to the Best Explanation (2nd ed.), London, Routledge. Nozick, R. (2001): Invariances, Cambridge (MA),
Harvard University Press.
Stich, S. (2011): Collected papers. Volume 1, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Trout,
J.D. (2007): The Psychology of Scientific Explanation, Philosophy Compass, 2-3, 564–591.
—— (2002): Sci-
entific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding, Philosophy of Science, 69, 213–233.

151 Looking for the Mechanisms of the Contents of Consciousness

Vernazzani Alfredo
Institut für Philosophie, Universität Bonn, Bonn, GERMANY

The search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) there are two dominant methodological approaches. One ap-
proach is directed at finding the neural correlates of organism’s overall state of consciousness. The other approach is directed
at specific conscious contents (content NCC) (Chalmers 2000; Bayne 2007; Hohwy 2009). In this talk, I will only discuss
the latter.
According to some researchers, there would be a correspondence between the representational contents of conscious-
ness and the contents represented in the neural system (Chalmers 2000). This thesis is known as the “Matching Content
Doctrine” (MCD). There is however virtually no consensus about how we should understand the MCD, and some research-
ers reject it altogether (Metzinger 2004; Noë & Thompson 2004; Neisser 2012). In this talk, I set out to shed light on the
search for the content NCC and the MCD.
In the first part of my talk I will clarify the notion of consciousness at stake. I introduce the distinction between rep-
resentational and phenomenal properties, and show that the search for content NCC focuses only on the representational

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character of experience. Since only the representational content is concerned, and phenomenal properties are left out, there
is no explanatory gap problem (Chalmers 1996; Levine 1983), and therefore there is no principal conceptual issue in ex-
plaining the contents of consciousness.
I will then challenge Chalmers’s (2000) definition of content NCC. It suggests that there should be a matching between
conscious representational content and neural representational content. Although it captures an important aspect of the
content NCC research, this definition is somewhat misleading because it suggests the presence of two representational sys-
tems. I therefore propose to conceptualize the underlying neural activity as the vehicle and the contents of consciousness as
the representational content.
In the second part of the talk, I put forward an alternative framework for discussing the content NCCs. I agree with
Neisser’s (2012) mechanistic reconceptualization of the NCC research, and sketch out the outline of a mechanistic ap-
proach to the content NCC (Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008). The mechanistic model has several advantages: it captures the
way neuroscientists’ work and offers a better account of interfield relations. It is argued that the representational content of
experience should be understood as the function of some underlying neural mechanism.
I then try to explore the MCD in light of the mechanistic standpoint, and show that the correspondence holds between
representational content and some neural activity at some level of abstraction. This correspondence might be elemental (in-
jection, bijection) or structural (monomorphism, isomorphism). This is in contrast with Neisser’s (2012) rejection of the
MCD.
I conclude with some prospect for further research. I briefly dwell on the mechanistic research strategies and their pos-
sible role for content NCC research (Darden 2006; Darden & Craver 2013; Bechtel & Richardson 2010). Finally, given that
mechanisms are individuated by their functions, I show that the phenomenological studies fit well within the mechanistic
framework.

152 The Detection and Reference of Mental Disorders

Vesterinen Tuomas
Theoretical philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

In this paper I argue that a hybrid theory of reference can explain the semantics of mental disorders and partly dissolve the
dispute between realism and constructivism. In addition I argue that serious mental disorders are intuitively detected dys-
functional “black boxes” that are realized by multitude of social and biological causal mechanisms. As a case study, I analyze
the Malaysian disorder latah.
There is a dispute whether latah is a unique culture-bound condition or a transcultural condition. According to Simons
(1996) latah is a culture-specific variant of the neurological startle-matching syndrome that may include Tourette’s and
some other culture specific conditions in the Middle-East, Asia and Lapland. Instead, Winzeler (1995) claims that latah
is an adaptation to Malay culture, giving lower-status individuals a means to subvert hierarchies. Simons can be thought
of using a causal theory of reference to explain the possible common neurological cause of latah and Tourette’s. A causal
theory of reference can explain the co-reference of a term since it cuts off the link between descriptions people associate
with the term from its reference. On the other hand, Winzeler is implicitly using a descriptive theory to account for the folk-
psychological conceptions of latah, hence rendering it a unique disorder. A descriptive theory of reference does not allow
contradicting descriptions to be attached to the same referent.
Boyer (2011) argues that when some mental functions are not working properly they are intuitively detected and
deemed as mental disorders the world over. I claim that we also fix reference to mental disorders intuitively. Therefore the
reference of some mental disorder terms do not depend on the folk-psychological descriptions associated with them. On the
other hand, some mental disorders are upheld by cultural and social forces and depend on the folk-psychological descrip-
tions associated with them. Neurobiological pathology may have been the origin of latah, but cultural copying has possibly
been the main cause of it ever since. Therefore a member of a linguistic community is not necessarily aware how her term
has been fixed and to what it refers. Thus a hybrid theory of reference is needed to account for the use of disorder terms.
The upshot of the semantic analysis is that psychiatry looks for the true referents of folk-psychological disorder terms.
The aim is to open the dysfunctional “black boxes” and replace folk descriptions with causal explanations. I argue that the
“black boxes” are placeholders for clusters of properties and homeostatic causal mechanisms (cf. Boyd 1991).

REFERENCES: Boyd, Richard 1991: Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Phil-
osophical Studies, 61, 127-148. Boyer, Pascal 2010: Intuitive expectations and the detection of mental disor-
der. Philosophical Psychology, 24, 95-118. Mallon, R. & Stich, S. 2000: The Odd Couple: The Compatibility of

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Social Construction and Evolutionary Psychology. Philosophy of Science, 67, 133-154. Simons, R. 1996: Boo:
Culture, Experience, and the Startle Reflex. New York: Oxford University Press. Winzeler, R. 1995: Latah in
Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1.11 Personal Identity and the Self

153 Ontological Commitment to the Self as a non-physical entity in

Contemporary Psychology
Bleau Renee
Education, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UNITED KINGDOM

Janssen-Lauret Frederique
Dept of Philosophy, University of Campinas, Sao Paulo, BRAZIL

The most rigorous philosophical method for discovering the posits of a scientific theory is Quine’s Method of Ontological
Commitment (Quine, 1948). The criterion of ontological commitment allows us to settle whether a theory relies on the ex-
istence of an entity and under which circumstances there is good evidence for assuming the existence of an entity. In general,
we can say that a theory assumes the existence of some entity if it invokes the entity in its explanations, either by mentioning
it explicitly or by tacitly assuming it, relying on its presence in order for its explanations and predictions to come out true.
Furthermore, to avoid ontological commitment, we can do so by elimination (by showing that we don’t need to rely on the
putative entities to explain anything) or by reduction (by showing that talk of the putative entities is a mere façon de parler).
We assert that contemporary psychologists in their use of current psychological methods are best understood as assum-
ing the existence of non-physical substances, which in the singular, is the referent of the term “I”. Albeit that many psycholo-
gists may believe themselves implicitly to be physicalists: that is, they believe that everything there is, ultimately is physical
or biological, this belief is not obviously compatible with current psychological academic or applied practice. For, to avoid
contradicting themselves, physicalists must be able to state all their theories in strictly physical (or biological) language. And
if any of their explanations rely on the existence of entities that cannot be described using only such vocabulary, they cannot
maintain their physicalism unless and until they can demonstrate that such entities can be “explained away” in wholly non
non-physical/biological terms.
Still, if we take a closer look at the methods used in contemporary psychology we see that psychological explanation
cannot meet the demand of using only strictly physical/biological language. Using Quine’s Method of Ontological Com-
mitment we argue that current research in psychology is best understood as relying on the existence of selves, or agents,
conceived as irreducibly non-physical substances, in two distinct ways. Firstly, most psychologists now reject the behaviour-
ist paradigm that all methodology must be third-personal and for some time also, many psychological studies make use of
introspective and irreducibly first-personal methods, ascribing to the self distinctively psychological properties. Secondly,
advances in social and developmental psychology, such as findings based in self-regulation and social identity theories
(Baumeister, 2010, Haslam, et al, 2009) and attachment theory (Bowlby, 1988, Fonagy & Target, 1997) make frequent ref-
erence to the self, understood as the referent of the first-person pronoun, ascribing to it uniquely psychological, social and
interpersonal, as well as physical properties, incapable of being described in exclusively physical/biological terms. Thus we
do conclude that the referent of the first-person pronoun “I” is best understood as a fully- fledged entity, a posit of our best
contemporary psychological theories: a Self.

Baumeister, R. (2010) The Self. In R. Baumeister & E. Finkel, eds. Advanced social psychology: the state of
the science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp 139-175. Bowlby, J. (1988) A secure base: parent-child attach-
ment and healthy human development. London: Routledge. Fonagy, P. & Target, M. (1997) Attachment and
reflective function: their role in self-organization. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 679-700. Haslam, S.A.,
Jetten, J., Postmes, T. & Haslam, C. (2009) Social Identity, health and well-being: an emerging agenda for ap-
plied psychology, Applied Psychology, 58, 1-23. Quine, W.V.O. (1948) On what there is. Review of Metaphysics,
2, 21-38.

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154 Specifically human? Agency and the limitations of a Neo-Kantian picture of

self-consciousness.
Bucelli Irene
Philosophy, King’s College London, LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM

In the picture of agency given us by Neo-Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman, it is crucial for defining
agency that we distinguish between two levels of selfhood. Both philosophers allow that we can sometimes act in a way that
is animal-like. When behaving in this sort of way, we are able to recognize
that we are the cause of that behavior, however,
this behavior does not count as a “full blown” action: it is not owned at what Korsgaard calls “a deeper level”, the level that
matters for human self-governance and that exhibits the distinctiveness of human self-consciousness. The ‘two levels of self-
hood thesis’ claims that one’s objective self-conception (understood by Korsgaard and Velleman respectively in terms of
practical identities or self narratives) is distinctive of human subjectivity and human agency, rather than mere first-personal
awareness. And this makes it a condition for this distinctive sense of ownership and authorship. Both authors consider it
necessary to move from a pure, animal-like, first-personal perspective to an objective self- conception for two reasons: firstly,
they claim that only the high level of self-consciousness so described places behaviour at the level of reason. Secondly, they
also claim that only this level defines the specificity of human self-consciousness as opposed to the basic form we can credit
some other animals with. I question both these points: I will claim that this model of selfhood mischaracterizes the specific-
ity of minimal human reflexivity and assimilates it with a generic “egocentric framework”. Because they overlook this aspect,
both Korsgaard and Velleman push the threshold of the specificity of human self-consciousness up to an extremely high
level of complexity. I argue that this level of complexity is unnecessary both to establish the specificity of human self- con-
sciousness and to place human behaviour within the domain of reason. I claim that this picture is wrong in understanding
the capacity for self-consciousness simply as added on a first-personal perspective we can associate with other animals ca-
pable of consciousness. Instead, a realistic view of self-consciousness needs to account for the fact that our rational and self-
conscious capacities thoroughly modify that first-personal perspective altogether and that such first-personal perspective is
already specific to human self-consciousness.

155 Is this still Julie? Study participant’s use of proper names is not indicative of
their intuitions about personal identity
Dranseika Vilius
Dept. of Logic and History of Philosophy, Vilnius University, Vilnius, LITHUANIA

In a typical empirical study on folk intuitions about identity of persons (both in Psychology and in Experimental Philoso-
phy), study participants are provided with a hypothetical case of transformation (e.g. teleportation, amnesia, brain trans-
plantation) and then it is measured whether they use the same proper name for both pre- and post-transformation indi-
vidual. Participant’s use of proper names is then treated as indicative of their judgments about (A) numerical identity of
individuals. For example Rips, Blok, and Newman (2006) write: “We assume, along with Liittschwager (1995) and others,
that proper names like Jim are rigid designators that always refer to the same individual across situations or possible worlds;
see Kripke (1972). Participants who state that the transplant recipient is no longer Jim are, therefore, affirming that the re-
cipient is no longer the same individual.” The same idea can be found in Johnson (1990); Blok, Newman, Behr, and Rips
(2001); Rhemtulla (2005). Some scholars go further and interpret the use of proper names not only as indicative of (A)
numerical identity judgments, but, in addition to that, of (B) personal identity judgments (e.g. Nichols and Bruno (2010);
Strohminger and Nichols (2014)).
In this paper I challenge this reliance on study participant’s use of proper names.
First (against B), a number of studies
show that proper names can be used even if the post-transformation individual is no longer judged to be a person. For ex-
ample, Blok, Newman, & Rips (2005) report a study where “participants are more apt to agree that the creature is Jim than
that the creature is a person”. See also Author (in press). This suggests that even if use of proper names is indicative of some
sort of identity judgments, these judgments are not personal identity judgments.
Second (against both A and B), personal
names are sometimes used as means to shorten a more complex expression. As Jean Liittschwager (1994; p. 83) notes: “For
instance, one might say that ‘Uncle Ralph’ was in the urn on the mantel (if his cremated remains were contained there),
but one would be unlikely to claim that ‘the person’ was in the urn.” It seems natural to interpret words ‘Uncle Ralph’ as a
‘stand-in’ for some longer phrase, such as ‘remains of Uncle Ralph’. Arguably, the more radical transformation is portrayed in
a hypothetical case, the more it is likely that the name will be used in this manner.
Third (against A), proper names are some-

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times used in ‘qualitative’ sense. For example, in “But now Vegas is no longer Vegas, It’s Disneyland gone horribly wrong”
the second token of ‘Vegas’ is an evaluative category rather than pure toponym. Similarly, if participants deny that relevant
proper name applies in a given situation (e.g. ‘the patient is no longer Jim’), this may mean that qualitative rather than nu-
merical identity is denied.

156 Whole Genome Transformation of Human Identity

Dunston G
Microbiology/National Human Genome Center, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA
Kurian P
National Human Genome Center/Physics and Astronomy, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA

The completion of the Human Genome Project (HGP) in 2003 opened new vistas for interrogating the biology of health
and disease in the whole person. Overwhelming data from the HGP and research on human genome variation show that
more than 99.9% of the genomes from any two persons randomly selected from our planet is essentially the same. The 2012
treasure trove of papers from the Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE) project highlights that a significant amount
of whole-genome biology resides in complex systems of non- protein-coding sequences that function in the control and
regulation of protein-coding sequences, the products of which are used classically to define human identity based on vis-
ible phenotypes. By assigning biochemical functionality to the vast majority of DNA in non-protein-coding sequences, EN-
CODE data challenges earlier thinking on “junk DNA,” which regarded as superfluous large swaths of DNA not known
at the time to play a functional role in development or physiology. The emergence of personalized genomic medicine in
the post- HGP era is shifting the focus of human identity from the external phenotype to the internal genotype, which re-
quires adjustments in how we define common alleles, diagnose disease, and treat patients. The advent of affordable, large-
scale genome sequencing offers the possibility that a person’s genotype can now be used in our fundamental understanding
of human biology, personal identity, and population diversity. The question we are revisiting today from a whole-genome
perspective is this: How can we define human identity and population diversity without the use of familiar and ingrained
prescriptions, which are based largely on what is seen, the external products of protein-coding sequences that represent less
than 0.1% of our total genome inheritance? In 2014, two decades since the publication of Francis Crick’s book The Aston-
ishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul, it is now time to reassess information on the biology of whole-genome
identity and how it applies to questions of self-awareness, whole-person consciousness, and the soul. Our group has applied
first principles of statistical physics in studying the informatics of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), as dynamic sites
of common variation widely distributed in the human genome. Information encoded in the population structure of multi-
SNP haplotype blocks can be characterized through their normalized information content. We developed “genodynamics”
as the analogous thermodynamics characterizing the state variables for genomic populations that are stable under stochastic
environmental stresses. Using our defined measures of genomic information, we interrogated the interaction of maintained
statistical variations with the environments within which stable populations exist. The use of these whole- genome-based
tools and technologies enables our quest to define human identity, individually and collectively, on the basis of the totality-
-rather than a miniscule portion--of our genome inheritance. As with Crick’s search for the soul, we believe that our identifi-
cation with a whole-genome consciousness has revealed one incredibly diverse, inextricably whole human family, purposed
to experience the fullness of life.

157 Collective Through Our Soft Anatomy

Garcia Armando
N/A, Austin, USA

Our species has failed to recognize the duality of the Self: The Automatic Self vs The Ideal Self. It is this failure of recognition
which accelerates our suffering. By acknowledging our Soft Anatomy, we will become aware of the battle within; the battle
for which Self gets to hold on to the steering wheel of our life. Our Soft Anatomy is functionality that our species must learn
to wield effectively to achieve a Moral and Ethical life: The Outer Path, The Inner Path, and our Mind. Stimuli interpreted
within the the Outer and Inner paths lead to the generation of Automatic Responses, and more importantly Automatic
Emotional Responses, which we cannot prevent from being delivered within our vessel. Our Entitlement to the Psycho-
logical component of these Automatic Emotional Responses can lead to Destructive Emotions. These Emotional Responses

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allow for actions that trigger harm directed towards our Self or someone else. The Inner Path, through the use of the Inner
Eye and Inner Voice, and acknowledgement of the Current Goal, allows our Mind, while in the Aware Region, to modify our
interpretations. Through this mechanism we can learn to overcome the Entitlement to our Emotional Responses. The Ideal
Self is the Self that can overcome Entitlement while our Mind operates in the Aware Region. The Automatic Self accepts and
acts according to the Entitlement of our Emotional Responses, without hesitation, while our Mind operates in the Unaware
or Emotional Regions. Through a Collective of our Soft Anatomy we will achieve happiness together, minimize our suffer-
ing, and that suffering we inflict upon another.

158 The Person or ‘spiritulo’ in philosophical practice and psychiatric

rehabilitation
Heinänen Hannu
Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, FINLAND

The central question of philosophical practice, meaningful life, becomes significant in psychiatric rehabilitation from a psy-
chic disorder of Person. The conception ‘psychic’ comes near to the autonomy of Person, his affects and emotions, his think-
ing and knowledge. The autonomy of the patient is a central virtue or value in psychiatric treatment and rehabilitation. Is it
enough for the autonomy of a patient as Person to control symptoms of psychic disorder or directly the disorder itself? The
meaningful life becomes significant in the case of psychic disorder, but how the knowledge of psychopathology relates to the
question of the meaning of life?
In rehabilitation the general or universal dimension of philosophy can offer a counterbalance to the expertise of psycho-
pathology for a better understanding of Person. So such philosophical conceptions as Person and World become essential
also in rehabilitation. I write ‘Person’ with capital letter referring to the Finnish word ‘henkilö’, because ‘henkilö’ comes from
the conception of ‘henki’ or ‘spirit’ and it refers not only to an egocentric ‘person’, but has also a wider philosophical mean-
ing. We can also translate ‘henkilö’ as ‘spiritulo’ (en internacia planlingvo Esperanto ni povas parli pri ‘spiritulo’). Also the
World has interesting philosophical dimensions in relation with the Person or spiritulo.
The advantage in philosophical practice, applied in rehabilitation, is that it replaces the asymmetric power relation of exper-
tise of knowledge with the shared and equal search of knowledge. When in rehabilitation the Person cannot be encountered as a
mere representative of a psychic disorder, then philosophy can clarify the positive goals and ideas of the rehabilitation of Person.

159 Being No One Else. On Barry Dainton’s Concept of the Person in “The
Phenomenal Self”
Jaskolla Ludwig
Philosophy, Munich School of Philosophy, Munich, GERMANY
Gierstl Ludwig
Munich School of Philosophy, Munich, GERMANY

The synchronic and diachronic identity conditions of persons are among the most complex and relevant problems in mod-
ern philosophy. Among other factors, this is certainly due to the fact that those questions are of immediate importance to
our self-conception as agents within various normative, cultural, and personal contexts. Our present talk addresses one of
these questions: Is it possible to be another person?
We will give a negative answer to this question, and we will substantiate
this answer within a four-step argument: (1) Based on Barry Dainton’s thought experiment on ‘Virtual Reality Machines’ in
“The Phenomenal Self ” we are going to provide a systematic interpretation and a formal model (2) which help to carve out
the central characteristics of the question whether we can be other persons. We are going to argue that the having of a cer-
tain of phenomenal perspective unto the world is characteristic for persons. Then we develop two arguments showing that
Dainton’s most radical virtual reality machine (VR4) is indeed incoherent:
(3) The first argument shows that the phenom-
enological character of persons fixes the modal properties of persons in such a way that the machine VR4 is not conceivable.
(4) The second argument presents a linguistic analysis of the personal pronoun singular within cases of VR4: We show that
despite its everyday usage the personal pronoun’s reference cannot be univocal in VR4. We conclude that those arguments
substantiate the claim that it is indeed not possible to be another person.

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160 The priority of third-person mentalization: Implications for the theory of

attachment
Meini Cristina
Philosophy, Univ. Piemonte Orientale, Univ. S. Raffaele, Vercelli, ITALY
Marraffa Massimo
Università Roma Tre, Rome, ITALY

Recently, Carruthers (2011) has made a strong case for the claim that third-person mindreading (3PMindreading) has a
functional and evolutionary priority over first-person mindreading (1PMindreading). However, Carruthers’ model of self-
knowledge does not predict that 3PMindreading is developmentally prior to 1PMindreading. In this article we shall argue
that there are good reasons for thinking that the child’s
mentalistic self-description (or subjective identity) develops through
the act of turning on oneself the capacity to mindread other minds; and that this occurs through that socio-communicative
interaction which is
the subject of attachment theory.
This claim puts strong constraints on theorizing about the relation
between attachment and mentalization. We argue that the implicit-automatic ability to mindread other minds is not a devel-
opmental
achievement, but “an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation implemented by a specialized and prewired
mindreading mechanism” (Gergely, Unoka, 2008). An adaptation, therefore, independent of the attachment instinct system;
this is tantamount to a refutation of the hypothesis of a direct ontogenetic causaland functional link between the quality of
early infant attachment on the one hand, and the development of
the ability for 3PMindreading on the other.
When we con-
sider 1PMindreading, however, the relationship between attachment and mentalization is no longer a “facilitating” one: the
child’s socio-communicative interaction with the caregiver becomes a
necessary condition of the act of turning on oneself
the capacity to mindread other minds. The approach to 1PMindreading is then more markedly socio-constructivist com-
pared with the ability for 3PMindreading. Self-consciousness as introspective recognition of the presence of the virtual inner
space of the mind, separated from the other two primary experiential spaces (i.e. the corporeal and extracorporeal spaces) is
less neurocognitively guaranteed, if we may say so.
Thus the subject constructs itself as psychologically self-conscious (and
not only as physically selfconscious)in an interplay of mindreading, autobiographical memory, and socio-communicative
capacities
modulated by socio-cultural variables. The child who at 2-4 years of age turns his 3PMindreading capacities upon
himself under the influence of caregivers’ mind-related talk, at around 4-5 years begins to grasp his subjective identity as
rationalized in terms of autobiography. In this process there is an essential psychodynamic ingredient: affective growth and
construction of identity cannot be separated; the description
of the self that from 2-3 years the child feverishly pursues is
an “accepting description”, i.e., a description
that is indissolubly cognitive (as definition of self) and emotional-affective (as
acceptance of self). The child needs a clear and consistent capacity to describe itself, fully legitimized by the caregiver and
socially valid.
We conclude, therefore, that it is here that the idea of a direct ontogenetic causal and functional link
between
attachment and mentalization finally finds its cogency.

Essential bibliography
Carruthers, P. (2011). The opacity of mind: The cognitive science of self-knowledge. Oxford,
OUP Gergely, G., Unoka, Z. (2008). Attachment, affect-regulation and mentalization. In E.L. Jurist, A. Sade, & S.
Bergner (Eds.), Mind to mind: Infant research, neuroscience and psychoanalysis (pp. 50-87). NY: Other Press.

161 The Identity of a Person: a Compatibilist Argument

Swiatek Krzysztof
Humanities and Social Sciences, Athabasca University, Edmonton, CANADA

The free will problem is a dilemma of choice between one’s freedom to act as a metaphysical condition of personhood and
moral responsibility, and determinism of the agent’s acts which is imposed by the causal closure of all events. Adjudicating
the conflicting claims of the agent’s subjective sense of freedom and deterministic necessitation results in three standard
positions: the incompatibilist propositions of hard determinism, which denies the existence of free will, and libertarianism,
which allows for acts free of causal determination, and compatibilism, which asserts that free will is possible even though de-
terminism holds true. Standard arguments for hard determinism are based in the fundamental premise that free will requires
the ability to have done otherwise (Classical Incompatibilist Argument) or that the agent must be the ultimate source of his
acts (Source Incompatibilist Argument) (cf. McKenna 2009). Since neither claim is seemingly compatible with determin-
ism, no one can act of his own free will.

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In this paper I am going to present a case for compatibilism which attacks the fundamental premises of both arguments.
My argument will be based on the concept of agent as a person who makes value-based choices for which he is accountable.
Even though the concept of free will is typically seen as closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility, the debate
over freedom of the will has most often ignored its axiological aspect. An emphasis on morally responsible agency and val-
ues represents a relatively new trend in compatibilist position (cf. Bratman 1997, 2003, 2004, 2007; Wolf 1980, 1987, 1990),
drawing from the classical arguments of Frankfurt (1971, but also 1988, 1994) and Watson (1975).
My own argument will stem from the concept of situated freedom: freedom of the will conceived not in an abstract
Cartesian way as an ability to assert or deny a proposition but determined through one’s physical environment, natural laws,
social relations, family ties and valuations. The conditions of my situatedness individuate me as a person in my values and
norms and causally determine my will. The causal determination of my will does not however imply the negation of free
will: if they were to change, the agent who makes a decision wouldn’t be me any longer but rather a different person. The
concept of freedom of the will makes sense only as a situated notion; in abstraction from the agent’s determinants his acts
become utterly meaningless and unchosen. Causal determinism of the agent’s will is then perfectly compatible with its free-
dom; in fact, it constitutes its transcendental condition of possibility. Since causal determination is allowed in the action
performed and its origin alike, this argument questions the fundamental premises of both incompatibilist arguments.
Obviously, I am not ready to claim that all acts of one’s will are free. Freedom of the will is exemplified and proven only
in morally significant situations where a decision to act otherwise would undermine one’s identity as a person. In line with
the positions of Frankfurt, Watson and Bratman, the concept of free will is tied with personal identity, the will being free
only when it answers to the agent’s values and norms, no matter how caused.

Selected bibliography: Bratman, Michael, 2007. Structures of Agency. New York: Oxford.
-----, 2004. “Three
Theories of Self-governance,” Philosophical Topics 32: 21-46.
----, 2003. “A Desire of One’s Own,” Journal of
Philosophy, 100 (5): 221-42.
----, 1997. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry, 1994. “Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,” in Fulda and
Horstman Eds.), 1994.
----, 1988. The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
----, 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5-20.

162 Three Versions of Ontological Commitment to the Concept of Free Will

Szymanska-Swiatek Elzbieta
Humanities and Social Sciences, Athabasca University, Edmonton, CANADA

Contemporary theorizing about human agency and the ontological commitments of moral claims mostly dominated by
moral realists, on the one hand and moral constructivists on the other , may be enriched by taking into account the argu-
ment of indispensability of our beliefs in self, personhood and free will proposed by Chris Kaposy(2009) . Kaposy chal-
lenges the arguments proposed by some neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists alike that our concepts of free will, a
metaphysical self and personhood lack scientific credibility and as such should be abandoned. Quite contrary, Kaposy ar-
gues that the contested concepts are presupposed by our commitment to follow rational norms and they have a significant
value, being cornerstones of our moral world view whose protection requires a rational refusal to believe what neuroscience
is telling about them.
This paper argues that the view that we are ‘condemned’ to believe in something (even if we know it might not be true)
is obviously not peculiar to Kaposy himself. As Quine (1976, 1980, 1981) and Putnam (1979) have famously argued that
the indispensability of mathematics to empirical sciences provides a reason to believe in the existence of mathematical enti-
ties, Minsky (1986) argued that although in cognitive science there is no room for the self, we cannot give up our conviction
in it, and Jackendoff (1987) insisted that “(c)onsciousness seems too important to one’s life—too much fun—to conceive it
as useless.” However, Kaposy’s argument’s ethical implications go much beyond Minsky’s and Jackendoff ’s relatively neutral
claims. This is because Kaposy’s argument strongly stands against the current efforts to judge ethical modes of reasoning
by neuroscientific standards. As such it clearly counters Green’s and Cohen’s (2004) claims that policymakers should tailor
their beliefs to the findings of neuroscience, or Farah’s and Heberlein’s (2007) view that despite the fact that ordinary people
are not obligated to change their beliefs about personhood, ethicists and philosophers are subjected to this obligation. On
the other hand, Kaposy’s argument is able to show that contrary to some claims (Wilson 2011) we are not forced to reject
any of the popular forms of moral realism and as such it is compatible with both moral realism and constructivism. Fur-
themore, I maintain that there is a variety of routes to distinguish decision-procedures in ethics that counsel us about the
indispensability of our concepts of free will, the self and personhood, and the availability of these procedures themselves

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provide us with the additional reason to believe the concepts are real. These procedures, as postulated, were supposed to
“construct a minimal theory of mind” (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013) yet in my understanding they are also suitable to track
down our decision-procedures in ethics.

163 Coalescing Minds and Personal Identity

Valpola Harri
ZenRobotics Ltd, , FINLAND

Sotala Kaj
Machine Intelligence Research Institute, Helsinki, FINLAND

Recent work has discussed the possibility of merging human consciousnesses together by artificial means. Hirstein (2012;
Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind’s Privacy) argued that it is possible in principle for the subjec-
tive experience of one person to be experienced by another, and Grau et al. (2014; Conscious Brain-to-Brain Communica-
tion in Humans Using Non-Invasive Technologies. PLoS ONE) demonstrated a simple case of direct brain-to-brain com-
munication over a great distance.
We focus on elaborating on Sotala & Valpola (2012; Coalescing minds: brain uploading-related group mind scenarios.
International Journal of Machine Consciousness), who argued for the possibility for melding two consciousnesses together
in a “reverse split-brain operation”. They started by reviewing evidence for three properties of the brain that are related to
consciousness:
1. to first approximation, the whole human neocortex is based on the same underlying algorithm which can learn to
process many different kinds of input
2. global attention emerges from and the contents of consciousness is determined by
biased competition, a distributed process in which representations compete locally for the right to broadcast information to
other parts of the brain and where the competition in each area is biased according to information received from other areas
3. the cortical algorithm has an inbuilt ability to transfer information such as memories between cortical areas
From these premises, they proposed an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the brain which employed the general corti-
cal algorithm and which would integrate with a user’s existing brain by using the same kinds of rules of biased competition
and cortical memory transfer. Critically, the exocortex could then interface with other exocortices, connecting several brains
together.
These could either meld together into a single mind with single conscious process, or have the exocortex filter the con-
nections, so that both biological brains maintained their own global workspace (and thus consciousness) while still sharing
information. Although the consciousnesses might not be capable of directly communicating with each other, memory for-
mation would still work normally. In several mammal species, one of the cortical hemispheres is capable of sleeping while
the other is awake, and the memories of what happened while the other hemisphere was asleep become available when both
hemispheres are awake at the same time. As both conscious processes could have access to the synaptic weights storing the
different memories, both could make use of the memories of what either processes had done earlier.
An exocortex would give rise to a number of scenarios touching upon personal identity, which had so far remained mere
thought experiments. Two previously separate people could merge into a single consciousness for a while, then disconnect
and split back into two. Possibly the more interesting question, however, would be the identity of a connected mind that
shared two separate consciousnesses that could access each other’s knowledge and memories, but would still remain some-
what separate. In a world with exocortices, individuality would become (even more of a) matter of degree, with two or more
people having the possibility to meld themselves to varying extents.

164 Conscious Agency and the Preconscious/Unconscious Self

Velmans Max
Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UNITED KINGDOM

We habitually think of our Self as a conscious agent operating largely in terms of how we consciously experience those op-
erations. However, psychological and neuroscientific findings suggest that mental operations that seem to be initiated by the
conscious Self are largely preconscious or unconscious. In this paper I examine how these aspects of the Self and its opera-
tions combine in the exercise of free will—and suggest that the conscious wishes, choices and decisions that we normally
associate with “conscious free will” result from preconscious processes that provide a form of “preconscious free will”. The

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conscious experiences associated with other so-called “conscious processing” in complex tasks such as speech perception
and production, reading and thinking, also result from preconscious processing—which requires a more nuanced analysis
of how conscious experiences relate to the processes with which they are most closely associated. We need to distinguish
processes that are conscious a) in the sense that we are conscious of them, b) in the sense that they result in a conscious
experience, and c) in the sense that consciousness plays a causal role in those processes. We also examine how consciousness
enables real-ization: it is only when one experiences something for oneself that it becomes subjectively real. Together, these
findings suggest that Self has a deeper architecture. Although the real-ized aspects of the Self are the consciously experi-
enced aspects, these are just the visible “tip” of a far more complex, embedding preconscious/unconscious ground.

1.12 Free Will and Agency

165 Free Will and Consciousness

Arikan Sandikcioglu Pakize
Sociology, Nevsehir Haci Bektas Veli University, Nevsehir, TURKEY

The problem of free will can be roughly defined as the tension between our firm belief that we are free agents who are able to
consciously decide, deliberate and make choice between different alternatives and the equally strong belief that we are part of
the natural world that is bound by natural laws. However, no matter how theoretically well grounded the claim “free will does
not exist” seems to be, the feeling of freedom usually tends to outweigh this claim. This tendency is one of the most important
motivations for arguing in favor of libertarian free will. Samuel Johnson’s words “all theory is against freedom of the will: all ex-
perience for it”, besides stressing the tension between determinism and free will, also highlight the role experience is supposed
to have in arguing for the existence of free will. According to many libertarian philosophers, the fact that we do experience
free will consciously constitutes strong evidence that free will exists, unless the experience is explained away as illusory. In this
work, it will be suggested that, while it is true that theoretical arguments are against the existence of free will, introspection or
phenomenology of experiences constitutes no direct evidence for the existence of it. This suggestion, however, would differ
from the idea that the experience of free will is illusory; it would rather express that experience by itself, veridical or not, does
not reveal anything about the existence of free will. In other words, we do not experience free will, even illusorily. No matter
how carefully we examine and contemplate upon our experience while performing an action, we will not be able to find and
characterize a direct evidence of freedom. Actions that are characterized as being free, besides having their own distinctive
phenomenology (such as the phenomenology of doing, the phenomenology of bodily movement etc.), do not possess a phe-
nomenological aspect that comprises or implies the feeling of freedom. The belief that we experience free will is not directly
based upon the phenomenology of experience, but rather is illegitimately derived on the basis of experience in virtue of our
background beliefs, assumptions or conceptions about ourselves. That is to say, experience by itself is silent about whether free
will exists or not. Therefore, whether it is illusory or not has no direct relevance for the problem of free will. However, if we are
to claim that we do not experience free will, we are also supposed to explain why we cannot give up the belief in free will de-
spite strong theoretical reasons to deny its existence. I claim that the reason for believing in free will is not merely based upon a
simple ignorance of the causal chain that leads to decision and action, but rather is based upon a permanent ignorance or lack
of understanding that is closely connected to our indestructible dualist intuitions about consciousness.

166 Neural dynamics of free intentional action: a high-density EEG study

Becev Ondrej
Faculty of Medicine, Masaryk University, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
Brázdil Milan
Behavioral and Social Neuroscience, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC
Lamoš Martin
Multimodal and Functional Neuroimaging, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC

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Marecek Radek
Multimodal and Functional Neuroimaging, Central European Institute of Technology, Brno, CZECH REPUBLIC

The research in recent years has shown that the process of forming the motor intention in the brain is more than just an
atomic moment, but has the complex internal structure of its own. The intention to act doesn’t rise at once, like when the
light fills the room after we turn on the switch, but it comes through multiple stages. The current evidence suggests that each
of the stages of the action planning specifies certain aspect of the action. The view currently predominating works presumes
the what, when and whether phases (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Several studies have been conducted, aimed on unveiling the
temporal and spatial aspects of the free motor agency (Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008).
Our study
The study uses an unique high-density EEG technology (hdEEG) that combines very good temporal resolu-
tion with good source localization. This allows to overcome major limitations of the older studies and to create a reliable
and precise model of the brain dynamics responsible for motor intentions and motor agency.
In contrast to previous studies
(Soon et al., 2008) hdEEG allows to observe the fine-grained temporal aspect. The greatest advantage, however, is the po-
tential in source localization, greatly beyond the capabilities of classical EEG.
Goals
The goals of the study are following:
1) To replicate Libet’s design with the aim to evaluate the assumed chrono-
logical order of the centers involved in the preparation and execution of intentional motor action, based on the body of
the literature.
2) To evaluate the anatomical extent of the brain activity in given stages of the motor planning.
3) To verify,
whether high gamma (60 – 150 Hz) oscilations in IPL (infero-parietal sulcus) correspond better with the moment of con-
scious experience of intention (Libet’s W) than conventional Readiness Potential, as proposed by (Guggisberg & Mottaz,
2013).
Results
The data collecting is currently running. The results will be available for the TSC 2015 conference.

References
Brass, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). The what, when, whether model of intentional action. The
Neuroscientist?: A Review Journal Bringing Neurobiology, Neurology and Psychiatry, 14(4), 319–25.
doi:10.1177/1073858408317417 Guggisberg, A. G., & Mottaz, A. (2013). Timing and awareness of move-
ment decisions: does consciousness really come too late? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7( July), 385.
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00385 Soon, C. S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.-J., & Haynes, J.-D. (2008). Unconscious de-
terminants of free decisions in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience, 11(5), 543–5. doi:10.1038/nn.2112

167 A Compatibilist Strategy for Responding to the Manipulation Arguments

Besedin Artem
Faculty of Philosophy, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Many types of compatibilism face problems with the manipulation arguments. They are used against both compatibilism
about free will and about moral responsibility. But there is a strategy which can protect at least source compatibilism from
these arguments. Let’s take Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument (FCA) (“Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life”, 2014, pp.
74-82) as an example: FCA is a very representative and persuasive sample of the manipulation reasoning.
FCA must demonstrate that, if determinism is true, nobody can be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, and
nobody can have free will in the corresponding sense. Also FCA says that there is no difference between the cases that would
justify that Plum is not responsible in one case but is in another. In particular, there is no difference between manipulation
and causal determinism.
Let’s clarify what an FCA proponent understands under manipulation. Manipulation presupposes two things: the ma-
nipulated agent (MA) and the manipulating factor (MF). There is a necessary condition of manipulation (NCM): an agent
A in the world W1 is compelled by the factor F to do X. It’s a case of manipulation, if in the alternative world W2, which
lacks the factor F, in the same circumstances, agent A would not do X. Pereboom introduces NMC in the description of the
first case: “Plum would not have killed White had the neuroscientists not intervened” (2014, pp. 76-77). NCM is crucial for
all four cases FCA. It can be shown that, if NCM is not accepted, FCA collapses.
But do all four cases meet NCM? In all cases, Plum is the MA, but the MFs are different. In first two cases the MFs are
the actions of the neuroscientists. In the third case, MF is the effect of the training practices of Plum’s community. First three
cases can meet the NCM: Plum (MA) is determined to kill White by the actions of neuroscientists or the effects of his train-
ing (MFs); but in the alternative worlds, lacking these MFs, Plum would not kill White. Thus, Plum is manipulated in the
first three cases.
But the fourth case doesn’t meet NCM. In this case, determinism is the MF. According to the NCM, there must be

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an alternative world W2, which lacks the MF. So, W2 must be an indeterminitic world. But in W2 Plum may as kill, as not
kill White. The NCM is not met.
If there is a possibility that in W2 Plum, nevertheless, does kill White, we get a possible
Frankfurt case: an MA is determined by an MF to do X; the MF is removed, but MA probably does X. Source compatibilists
believe that an agent can have compatibilistic free will and be morally responsible in the Frankfurt cases. There is a possibil-
ity of a Frankfurt case situation in the fourth case. Thus, it’s possible that somebody can have compatibilistic free will and be
morally responsible in a deterministic world, and FCA is undermined. This strategy may be used against various manipula-
tion arguments.

168 The Chaotic Brain: A Case for Compatibilism

Grygiel Wojciech
Philosophy, The Pontifical University of John Paul II, Kraków, POLAND

The nature of the human brain is most widely studied from the perspective of neurobiology and psychology. Inasmuch as
these sciences lead to the most precise characterisation of brain’s activity, it seems worthwhile to allow the speculation on the
possible shape of the most fundamental theory of the brain. Especially this comes to the fore as one attempts to engage the
alleged indeterminism of quantum theory into the explanations of the volitional acts. This approach leads to two major dif-
ficulties: (1) if the measurement is not performed, the theory is stricly deterministic, (2) the macroscopic character of mental
states as well as their surrounding tissue most likely lead to the immediate the decoherence of the quantum phenomena. The
reconciliation of the existence of the free will with the deterministic brain frequently named as compatibilism can be justified
by assuming that the fundamental processes in the human brain exhibit chaotic behavior whereby the information on the
past events is inaccessible leading to the interruption of the past/future causal connections. Neurobiological data indicate
that chaotic processes occur at all of the organisational levels of the nervous system from the transduction of the electrical
charge in the single neuronal cells to the dynamics of the cortical tissue (neurochaos). The arisinfg difficulty is that the studies
of the neuronal networks of higher compexity lead to the difficulties in the statistical analysis of the obtained data. The sup-
port for the compatibilistic standpoint in regards to the status of the free will is of great philosophical import. For instance,
this standpoint is supported by the famous philosopher of mind, Daniel Dennett. It allows for the integration of the natural
sciences with the classical philosophical discourse in which the notion of the free will is central. Its centrality in turn lies at
the foundations of the Western civilisation and warrants the purposefulness of the entire legal system. Eventually, the brain
can be envisioned as a non-equilibrium dissipative device which by drawing copious amounts of energy from the environ-
ment enhances the stability of ordered neuronal networks responsible for the highly abstract capacities of the human brain.

169 On an interlocking view of motor representation and intention CANCELLED

Kanellou Aspasia
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, Athens, GREECE

Butterfill and sinigaglia offer an “interlocking”view of intention and motor representation. On their approach though in-
tention and motor representation are characterised by some commonalities, they are distinct kinds of representation with
different format. Both represent action-outcomes and co-ordinate actions. Yet intention plays a role in practical reasoning,
featuring in its premises and conclusion and has a kind of propositional format. Motor representation, on the other hand,
facilitates the planning and monitoring of actions and has a cartographic format. I sketch how this approach deals with this
interface problem without positing content respecting causation or translations between the formats. On this view motor
representation and intention interlock because some intentions defer to motor representations for the specification of action
outcomes.One objection to this proposal is that it cannot account for the particularity of the content of intention, how I can
intend something specific.

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170 A graded approach to free–will

Kant Pratul
Assoc. of Alumni and Friends of Dayalbagh Ed. Inst, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Fremont, USA
Sudhish Prem Sewak
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Free–will, defined succinctly, is the capacity of rational agents to choose or determine a course of action, making a decision
among various alternatives. The standard argument against the concept of free–will generally mentions two logical posi-
tons – determinism and indeterminism. A deterministic approach assumes that every event is caused by the inevitable and
necessary consequences of prior events with just one possible future while on the contrary, indeterminism assumes random
events in a world of possible futures and they occur without a tightly coupled relationships or affecting the possibility of
action on other events. The standard argument is viewed as seriously flawed by many philosophers, but it provides a very
simple logical and philosophical framework that allows for the absence of freedom of choice in both scenarios, whether the
determinism or the indeterminism argument is true.
In this paper we propose a model for free–will that goes beyond the two simple logical possibilities, without constrain-
ing it by the presence or absence of the logical possibilities under the classification of determinism or indeterminism. We
present a model that combines the present understanding of the non–local phenomenon of consciousness and of the con-
scious mind; integrating consciousness, conscious states and degree of awareness of a rational agent to the degree of free
will it can exercise. While considering the attempt by Peter Voss to describe the degrees and scope of free–will and average
relative influences of other factors, viz, nature, nurture, subconscious thought, and random events versus free–will in human
choices, we argue for extending the understanding of free–will beyond a two state system or getting influenced by simple
physical, environmental or psychological events of human experience or brain. We attempt to show the relationship and
synergy between the current understandings of the theory of consciousness and free–will by fusing a graded approach to
free–will as a continuous function of this non-local phenomena that can describes the degrees in free–will and is consistent
with actual human experience.

171 A Study of Predictability of Mind

Ken Zhi Abraham Lim
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN

Whether we have free will is often a problem connected with problems of whether free will is compatible with determinism
and whether the world we live in is a deterministic world. For incompatibilist, if our mind is deterministic then we don’t have
free will. If our mind is predictable by some physical law, then our mind is certainly deterministic, yet the converse is false.
If we can show that mind being deterministic is impossible, then the debate between compatibilism and incompatibi-
lism will automatically be resolved. In this paper I do not attempt to show that it is impossible for mind to be deterministic.
Rather, I would attempt to show that it is impossible for mind to be predictable by physical law. Doing so cannot defeat fully
that mind is deterministic, but will at least undermine or weaken the possibility of mind being deterministic.
I will examine three scenarios presupposing predictability. The first scenario is developed by Stefan Rummens and Ste-
faan E. Cuypers whose aim was to show that the general notion of predictability is self-defeating by indicating that there is a
paradox in this scenario. I will point out that some restrictions must be made for the paradox to hold.
By analyzing the second scenario, I will introduce my own argument to show that, if actualized, the predictability of
mind would contradict our two common senses. The first one is that every known mathematical theorem is discovered by
someone or some subject. The second one is that the first person to know a mathematical theorem is also the discoverer of
that theorem. Both these two common senses have significant epistemic aspects. To analyze the second scenario, I will have
to give a detailed elaboration on the difference between knowing a theorem and discovering a theorem.
The third scenario will show that, if actualized, predictability of mind would yield some oddity. I will also discuss how
the predictability of mind would meet the problem of individuating thoughts. And I will also analyze the relation between
determinism and predictability, and show that determinism in Laplace’s vision is a circular notion.

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172 On Free Will and the Evolutionary Function of Qualia

LeBlanc Andre
History, John Abbott College, Montreal, CANADA

T. H. Huxley (1874) famously held that just as steam escaping from a steam whistle plays no role in the workings of the steam
engine, so consciousness plays no causally efficacious role in the inner workings of the brain. For Huxley consciousness is a
mere epiphenomenon and our sense of free will, an illusion. Just as famously, William James (1879) countered Huxley’s the-
sis with an argument based on the theory of evolution. James asked: if consciousness has no causal power in the brain, then
why did it evolve? Feelings, thoughts, and sensations are generated by material processes in the brain, and these processes
exist and function as they do presumably because they conferred a selective advantage to the organisms that possessed them.
It follows, as Cairns-Smith (1999) pointed out, that qualia must exist in the physical world and they must have real effects
within it. Assuming James and Cairns-Smith are correct, how then do qualia produce these physical effects? Without hop-
ing to provide a complete answer to this complex question, I will limit my analysis to the relationship between simple qualia,
such as pain and pleasure, and the hypothetical existence of free will. Consider, for example, the nature of pain. It is clear that
pain does not function in the same way as other biological processes do. When kidneys filter urine or when mitochondria
convert sugar into ATP, the biochemical processes involved function in regular, law-like ways. Pain, on the other hand, func-
tions not by physically causing certain outcomes, but rather by psychologically encouraging them. If the function of qualia
such as pain or pleasure is not to force, but to urge or incline an organism to behave in one way rather than another, then any
organism equipped with such qualia must also have the capacity to choose if and when to act on them. By their very nature,
in other words, pain and pleasure function, among other things, as instruments of sensory persuasion, and this implies that all
sensate beings must be able to exercise choice because only things able to choose are susceptible to persuasion.
I first discovered a variant of this argument in an obscure work by the Belgian philosopher, psychologist, and mathema-
tician, Joseph Delboeuf (1882). Although it so happens Delboeuf and James were friends and corresponded on free will
and related topics, James never seems to have commented on his friend’s argument, nor has any one since. Indeed, to my
knowledge, no one has ever proposed an argument like it. My goal in this presentation will be to discuss the significance of
Delboeuf ’s argument for epiphenomenalism and for what Glynn (1993 & 1997) called “James’ unresolved evolutionary
problem”. I will also consider reflections by Libet (2000) on conscious volitional acts and by Chomsky (1987 & 1999) on
the difference between minds and machines.

173 A neurodynamic perspective on free will, decision making and downward

causation
Liljenström Hans
The Sigtuna Foundation, Agora for Biosystems, Sigtuna, SWEDEN

Current science cannot explain consciousness or free will, which yet are considered fundamental for human nature. Indeed,
various scientists and philosophers consider these phenomena to be illusions. Neuroscience even seems to have demon-
strated that conscious will is epiphenomenal, since experimental results indicate that our actions are governed by neural
events and processes prior to our experience of a willful act. Hence, conscious will would have no causative effect. There are,
however, alternative ways of interpreting the results that these conclusions are based on, and in this paper I will scrutinize
the scientific arguments and experiments regarding conscious will. I will argue that there is no empirical support for epiphe-
nomenal conscious will, and that the alternative hypothesis, that conscious will is causative, is also consistent with experi-
mental data. The problem will be discussed in the context of decision making and its neural basis.
Decision making, which can be both conscious and unconscious, precedes our actions. Together with information re-
ceived from the environment, modulated by our internal state and learnt experience, decision making provides the basis
for our behaviors. Psychologically, this process can be categorized into three phases. Initially, the prevailing alternatives are
emotionally evaluated and prioritized. In the second phase, there is a cognitive assessment of the options and the selection
of actions. Finally, the execution of an action and evaluation of the resulting actual value allow for a comparison between the
actual and the expected value. If a decision to act is conscious, we propose that it is also an act of free will.
Further, if we believe that consciousness and free will are causative, this would represent downward causation in the
nervous system. Traditionally, reductionist science considers only upward causation, where in the case of the nervous sys-
tem, events and processes at the macro-scale of the brain are totally determined by events and processes at the micro-scale of
neurons. However, it seems reasonable to assume that interactions between different spatial and temporal scales in the nerv-
ous system are both bottom-up and top-down, where the priority of causal direction may vary.

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While believing consciousness is non-computable, we use computational models to explore relations between different
spatial and temporal scales of the nervous system. In this paper, we use a neural network model representing the neurody-
namics of decision making. We model the population dynamics of the three main neural structures significant in the deci-
sion making process: amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), as well as their
interaction. In our model, amygdala and OFC represent the neural correlates of secondary emotion, while the firing rate of
OFC neural populations represents the outcome expectancy of alternatives, and the cognitive aspect of decision making is
controlled by LPFC. The results may have implications for how we make decisions for our individual actions, as well as for
societal choices, where free will is more or less presupposed.

174 Rethinking libertarianism: Looking for free will in all the wrong places
Parthemore Joel
Dept. of Neuroscience and Philosophy, University of Skövde, Skövde, SWEDEN

Roughly speaking, libertarianism describes any position whereby (1) determinism is incompatible with free will and (2)
human and human-like agents really do have free will: they make choices that change the course of events such that they
could have chosen otherwise, given no other changes in the physical universe. The universe is, in some substantive way, non-
deterministic.
Libertarians reject the free will of compatibilists as not just very different from what most people understand by free will
– thus requiring a different name – but badly motivated and ultimately wrong. The problem with determinism lies in part,
they would say, in an overly simplistic view of the nature of causation and, in particular, a naive assumption of a straight-
forward causal chain whereby a particular set of preconditions mandates a particular set of outcomes: a view that quantum
mechanics may be seen to challenge.
I argue for a form of libertarianism that is, so far as I know, original and distinct, as well as – given certain metaphysical
assumptions – fully consistent with observations of the physical universe and (thinking of e.g. Libet’s experiments) human
decision making – in part by viewing the causal relationship between subpersonal brain processes and conscious decisions
not as linear but circular. In many if not most contexts in which agents believe themselves to have free will, their actions are
sufficiently constrained as to approximate (though, pace the typical compatibilist, never quite equate) to the determinis-
tic model. Through propagation of constraints, previous actions and events constrain present actions to the point where
choices, though real, are extremely limited, and only one “choice” may, practically speaking, be possible.
Nevertheless, human beings do have free will in a strong libertarian sense; the problem is only that they mis- locate it. That
is, they think they have a great deal of free will, in the libertarian sense, in areas where they do not, and fail to see it where they do.
Contemporary libertarian and compatibilist accounts alike compound the problem: compatibilists by equating free will
with the ability to act in accordance with one’s intentions (even if those intentions are fully neurally predetermined); lib-
ertarians by failing to take note of just how significantly most conscious decisions are constrained, both at the neural level
and by social and physical environment; compatibilists and libertarians alike by failing to distinguish between pre-reflective
consciousness, where most conscious decisions may be made, and fully reflective self consciousness.
Although my account does allow that, at least in certain circumstances, human beings and similar agents do have multi-
ple sensorimotor engagements to choose among – in a way that is not physically predetermined – nevertheless the heart of
free will lies elsewhere, in the capacity to choose one’s perspective on oneself and one’s surroundings. Both the importance
and the power of perspective get overlooked: more than most other conscious mental processes, perspective is, I claim, sub-
stantially causally less constrained or predetermined. By selecting among different perspectives on the same circumstances,
agents with free will really do change their world -- potentially in profound ways.

175 Two ways of sharing goals

Salice Alessandro
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen S, DENMARK
Satne Glenda
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen S, DENMARK

What does it mean to intend to do something together and, eventually, to do things together? According to what nowadays
became a standard approach to shared intentions, the answer to this question is univocal. Some accounts of collective inten-

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tions hold that an intention to do something together is the intention of a plural subject (Gilbert, Schmid), others that it
is an individual we-intention (Searle) and yet others that it is a complex structure of coordinated and matching individual
intentions (Bratman). Regardless of this disagreement, all these views subscribe to what could be called “the mutual exclu-
sivity thesis,” i.e., to the idea that only one of these options is the correct account of shared intentions.
In this talk we want to resist the mutual exclusivity thesis and argue that shared intentions come in, at least, two different
kinds. To do so, we choose Bratman’s account as case study. We begin by introducing a first example in which Bratman’s con-
ditions for shared intentions are fulfilled altogether. We then discuss a second example that fulfils all conditions of Bratman,
but argue that they are still insufficient to capture the kind of intentions individuals have in this scenario. Whereas in the
first case the individuals are pursuing the shared goal in pursuing an individual goal, in the second case the goal pursued in
common is a goal that the individuals do not have independently of sharing it. We claim that, to conceptualize this scenario,
the idea of genuinely collective goals – i.e., of goals intended by a we – has to be introduced and that this idea is missed in
Bratman’s account.
If this is on the right track, it suggests that the mutual exclusivity thesis has to be dropped and that the locution “shared
intention” expresses at least two different notions. The first is the idea of distributive agency, captured by Bratman’s analysis.
The second presupposes the intenders conceiving of themselves as members of a we. In the last part, we push our point even
further, by recurring to some empirical studies from developmental psychology. In particular, we discuss some studies on
the development of children engagement and understanding of shared activities – developed by Tomasello and others – and
contend that these activities are better understood as examples of genuinely collective goals intended by the individuals as a
we. We end with some further thoughts about the necessity of the planning structure that characterizes Bratman’s account of
shared intentionality, putting forward the claim that genuinely collective intentions can but need not to be accompanied by
such a structure. If this is true, perhaps genuinely collective intentionality can help us explaining early forms of joint activity
in children’s development.

176 Surfing the waves of the slow cortical potentials – new aspects in the
neurophysiological study of free will
Schmidt Stefan
Dept. Psychosomatic Medicine, University Medical Center Freiburg, Freiburg, GERMANY
Jo Han-Gue
University Medical Center Freiburg, Freiburg, GERMANY ,
Wittmann Marc
Institute for Frontier Sciences, Freiburg, GERMANY
Hinterberger Thilo
University Medical Center Regensburg, Regensburg, GERMANY

In the famous Libet experiment it is demonstrated that an indicator of motor preparation, i.e. the readiness potential, is
starting earlier than the subjective decision to act in a self-initiated movement paradigm. This finding was often used to
argue that there is no free will from a neuroscience perspective, since the brain reacts before conscious experience. How-
ever, this interpretation relies crucially on the fact that the readiness potential is really an indicator of motor preparation.
Recent findings cast a doubt on this interpretation. Especially the early readiness potential ranging from approximately
-1,500 ms to -400 ms before the self- initiated movement seems to be susceptible to many factors not related to motor
preparation. In 2012 a theoretical contribution by Schurger et al. (PNAS 109(42), E2904–E2913) argued that the early
readiness potential could be a product of averaging trials in which participants initiated their movements systematically
at time points in which the slow cortical potential (SCP), a global slow changing potential in the brain, changed towards
negativity. This makes sense as a negative SCP is associated with a lower firing threshold for pyramidal cells. So far the read-
iness potential was always displayed as an averaged signal over many single trials due to the low signal-to-noise ratio. In our
first study (Exp Brain Res 2013, 231(4), 495–500) we assessed the hypothesis by Schurger et al. empirically by analyzing
the single trials of a Libet experiment and sorting them to their overall slope. We could demonstrate that the readiness po-
tential is not present in all trials but stems from an unequal distribution of trials with negative and positive slope. In a con-
trol condition where participants had to listen to a tone no such uneven distribution was found. We performed a second
study (Consc Cog 2014, 26, 105–116) in which an experienced meditator was asked repeatedly for introspective reports
of the very moment of movement initiation in the Libet experiment. He reported an ‘upcoming urge’ which was related

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to changes in SCP. Several trials in which he either ignored this urge or withheld it for some seconds could demonstrate
meaningful changes in the readiness potential. Based on these studies we conclude that the early readiness potential is not
an indicator of motor preparation but a product of participants starting more likely a self-initiated movement in moments
of a negative SCP. This finding sheds new light on the interpretation of the Libet experiment. By the continuous change of
the SCP the brain provides periodically periods of higher and lower reactivity. This allows for a random process within a
deterministic framework. The fact that some people are able to influence the SCP by the means of neurofeedback demon-
strates also the existence of a conscious feedback circle on this system.

177 Do Patients with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Have Free Will?

Ueng Yunn
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang-Ming University , Taipei, TAIWAN

Patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) often have recurring obsessive thoughts and repetitive compulsive be-
haviors in response to these thoughts. They often have an overwhelming urge to wash their hands, to count their footsteps,
or to do some other actions. They usually indicate that they wish to get rid of those repetitive behaviors, but cannot stop
themselves from doing them. In view of this condition, it seems natural to think that OCD patients have no free will with
respect to their compulsive behaviors, because they are not behaving according to their will.
By contrast, OCD patients do have free will if one evaluates the compulsive behaviors of OCD patients according to the
compatibilists’ definitions of free will. The core idea of these different definitions is that if one has the possibility to choose
or the relevant capacity to choose, then one still has free will in this sense. OCD patients may fail in executing the desirable
behaviors, but they still have the possibility or the capacity to choose what is desirable.
In this paper, I argue that these two claims about OCD patients are not contradictory if one brings in a further factor—
the point of view by which a claim is asserted. That is, one claim is asserted from a first-person point of view and the other
claim is asserted from a third-person point of view. I will show that the conditions for evaluating the truth of the two claims
about OCD patients are different and the two claims are not contradictory.

1.13 Intentionality and Representation

178 Can The Naive Realist Explain Sensory Integration

Cavedon-Taylor Daniel
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Antwerp, Antwerp, BELGIUM

I develop an argument for perceptual experience’s having representational content. The argument takes the form of an in-
ference to the best explanation. The explanandum is the phenomenon of sensory integration. Sensory integration takes a
number of forms, including: make-perceive, cognitive penetration, perceptual learning and absence perception. In each, per-
ceptual experiences are influenced by (and in some cases combine with) mental states that are representational: sensory im-
aginings, beliefs, concepts and memories, respectively. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is
a framework within which to explain the confluence of such states with perception. Purely relational accounts of perception,
like naïve realism, leave sensory integration mysterious, even when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’

179 Does visual experience overflow intermediate-level processing?

Clarke Sam
Philosophy, The University of Wawick, Coventry, UNITED KINGDOM

Following the seminal work of David Marr, many have found it useful to think of visual processing as proceeding in three
distinct stages. Proponents of the intermediate-level theory of consciousness (ITC) endorse this functional trichotomy and

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argue that visual consciousness only ever presents subjects with content found at the intermediate-stage of this proposed
processing hierarchy; content that is entirely vantage point specific.
I argue that this may be a mistake. In order to account for the phenomenal character of visual-experience we ought to
acknowledge a non-trivial role for content represented only in high-level areas of visual processing; content that is vantage
point invariant. To see this, I will begin by introducing Marr’s hierarchical account of visual processing, consider why neu-
roscientific work has been taken to vindicate the account on key points of relevance, and then consider a basic argument
that Prinz (2012) provides for thinking that visual-experience corresponds only to content processed at the intermediate-
level in the hierarchy. I then provide reasons to think that this gets the phenomenology of visual-experience wrong. Prinz’s
argument rests on a hidden premise; namely, that there is only one way in which content can enter into and affect visual
experience. But, by considering examples of amodal completion we find that this is incorrect; content can enter into and
affect visual phenomenology in at least two different ways. This allows me to propose that there is a vantage point specific
(intermediate-level) and a vantage point invariant (high-level) aspect to our visual experiences of objects; something that
proponents of ITC fail to provide compelling reason to reject. I say this because, phenomenologically, we tend to see solid
three-dimensional objects as solid three-dimensional objects and this is importantly different from merely seeing them as
front-facing surfaces. But, pace Prinz, this phenomenological seeming is not the result of our mistaking knowledge of ob-
jects’ voluminous form for our visual experience of them. Why? Because even when we know this not to be the case (as
when knowingly perceiving a trompe l’oeil painting) we can continue to perceptually experience ‘objects’ as voluminous,
three- dimensional objects. As such, the onus is on proponents of ITC to give us stronger reasons to reject the phenomeno-
logical claims just presented.
In response to this one might argue that the intermediate-level hypothesis can somehow accommodate the phenome-
nological findings presented above. I’m sceptical. One way that proponents of ITC have recently tried to accommodate such
findings is by pointing out that the visual hierarchy projects information bidirectionally; i.e. that content from high-level
areas is sometimes projected down into intermediate-level areas thereby affecting visual phenomenology. But this is unlikely
to help matters. It is not enough for vantage-point invariant to affect vantage point specific content since we need to account
for the apparent presence of vantage point invariant content in visual experience. Conversely, if proponents of ITC wish to
claim that vantage point invariant content is present at the intermediate level then this seems in conflict with the neuroscien-
tific data vindicating Marr’s trichotomy in the first place.

180 Structural Representation and the Problem of Liberality

Coelho Mollo Dimitri
Philosophy, King’s College London/Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, GERMANY

In recent years, efforts have been made to develop a theory of mental content that sees structural resemblance between rep-
resentation and what is represented as the relation that determines representational content (Cummins, 1996; O’Brien and
Opie, 2004; Bartels, 2006; Isaac, 2012). Theories of this sort are what I refer to as structural representation theories and are
based on the idea that representations model what they represent by sharing its relational structure. Resemblance-based the-
ories of representational content have been heavily undermined by criticisms moved especially by Goodman (1976), and
which have recently been further explored by Suárez (2003). When applied to structural representation, the main thrust of
such criticisms stems from a property of structural resemblance that threatens to make it unsuitable for grounding represen-
tational content, namely its liberality. Structural resemblance comes, so to speak, cheap. Each structure can be in a relation
of structural resemblance to many others. This leads immediately to a problem for a theory that wants to account for repre-
sentational content in terms of structural resemblance, for content becomes wildly non- unique. This in turn risks to deprive
appeal to mental representations of its role in explaining organisms’ behaviour.
In past years, theorists have tried to curb the liberality problem by appealing to additional constraints on a theory of
structural representation, such as causal mechanisms (Bartels, 2006; Isaac, 2012) and cognitive exploitation (Shea, 2014).
I believe that these attempts, though valuable, fail to be completely satisfying as they stand. However, a partial combina-
tion of these proposals may, I argue, have better chances of success. The aim of the foregoing is thus to put forward a theory
of structural representation which, by having recourse to both causal mechanisms and cognitive exploitability, manages to
sufficiently curb non-uniqueness of content while avoiding the problems presented when only one of the two factors is re-
sorted to. In this way, I argue, the explanatory role of appealing to mental representations is preserved, making structural
representation a suitable candidate at least for an account of lower-level contentful states.
First, I briefly present the basics of the structural representation account, focusing especially on the content- fixing rela-
tion, i.e. some form of structural resemblance. I then spell out the problem of liberality that the account must face. Following

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that, I present and analyse Isaac’s (2012) proposed solution to the problem, which appeals to causal mechanisms. I argue
that it fails to sufficiently curb the liberality of structural resemblance, keeping hence a pernicious degree of non-uniqueness.
Next, I propose a further constraint, introduced by Shea (2014), that comes to complement Isaac’s picture: cognitive ex-
ploitability. I propose that by combining a causal constraint with a cognitive exploitability constraint, it is possible to ad-
equately avoid the excessive liberality that follows from appeal to causal relations alone.

181 Intermediacy as a Feature of Perceptual Constancy

Daoust Louise
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA

In this paper, I argue that perception is “constant” in that it tracks the stable properties of stimulus objects more closely than
it tracks their varying impressions on the sense organs. Long of interest to physiological opticians and psychologists, per-
ceptual constancy has recently received attention in philosophical work concerning the objectivity of perceptual states. Ac-
counts of perception that turn to constancy as a key feature of the mind- world relation (for example, Smith 2002, and Burge
2010) are well motivated, and they boast straightforward conceptions of objectivity and accuracy in perception. Philosophi-
cally, however, constancy has been tasked with too significant a chore: to explain the supposed ability of perceptual systems
to represent the physical world as it in fact is. If constancy is to help us explain objectivity, then we must pay attention to the
conception of constancy to which we’re appealing, and to whether it’s the best conception available.
I begin by offering a historico-conceptual analysis of the notion of constancy. In particular, I extract from neglected tra-
ditions in the history of experimental psychology a number of competing conceptions of constancy. This in itself threatens
the assumed consensus around the meaning of the term in recent philosophical debates. A more substantive finding is that
apparent values tend to be intermediate between real physical values and retinal values. This intermediacy is most straight-
forwardly illustrated in the case of human size perception. The apparent size of an object at some distance, say, 15 feet, will
be of a size value intermediate between the object’s real, physical size value and the linear size value corresponding to the
object’s retinal projection. Embedded in several of the conceptions of constancy on which I focus, including the concep-
tion widely endorsed in philosophy of mind today, is at least implicit commitment to interpreting intermediacy as involving
some degree of representational failure. This result carries undesirable repercussions for the degree to which human percep-
tion is understood as accurate.
I defend intermediacy as a feature, rather than a failing, of representation in human perception by appealing to the abil-
ity of a competing conception of constancy to illuminate new evidence from perceptual psychology. Moreover, there are
often strong ecological reasons for an organism to prefer “imperfect” constancy. Thus, I endorse a particular conception of
constancy as historically legitimate, and as better suited to our theoretical goals. In conclusion, I offer some brief remarks
about the legitimacy of the notions of objectivity and representational accuracy available to a view that embraces the alter-
native conception of constancy I defend.

References: Burge, Tyler. 2010. Origins of Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. D.. 2002. The
Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

182 The Nature of Primitive Intentionality

Engelen Eva-Maria
Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, GERMANY

Being phenomenally conscious is characterized by the concept of primitive intentionality in several of Martine Nida-Rüme-
lin’s papers. This primitive kind of intentionality is not representing anything for her and it is not relating two phenomena,
namely phenomenal consciousness and awareness of basic intentionality, either. Nida-Rümelin does not think that it is re-
lating anything and that it is to be called a relation at all. But what is it then? “What is the nature of the ‘relation’ between
that subject to whom something is phenomenally present and the ‘object’ or content of the experience, which is in that way
phenomenally present?” is she asking herself.
This question is not only a relevant one in itself but also because one can simply not avoid to speak as if basic intention-
ality were a relation, when one analyses basic phenomenality. If a subject has a specific experiential property, something is
given to that subject and we have the impression that our consciousness somehow refers to the property that is experienced.
We can hardly avoid to say “something is present to the experiencing subject”.

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What I would like to analyse in my paper is not the question whether this “something” is an object or an “experiential
quasi-object” although this would also be an interesting discussion. I will rather concentrate on the question whether there
is something as a relation between the experiencing subject and what is phenomenally present to the subject. If experience
has a structure that is called basic intentionality we have to make clear what this structure consists in. Nida-Rümelin is argu-
ing that the structure is an intrinsic, non-relational property. In difference to this I will argue that this structure has to be
considered to be an internal relation.
It is to be thought of as an internal relation between an experience, held by a subject,
and its “object” while the objective, world directed aspect has a representational content. Conscious phenomenal experience
presents an internal relation between an experience and its (inner) “object” to the subject and it represents properties of
something in the world. Whereas in the case of the world directed aspect there is an external reference at work, there is an
internal one at work in the case of the subjective aspect. We are acquainted with our experience of red for example and this
acquaintance does present the property, not merely represents it. This kind of presence involves an internal intentionality
and not (or not only) an external reference that comes along with the world directed aspect.


Literature:
Levine, Joseph (2009). “Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint”, in Phenomenal Con-
cepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, edited by Torin Alter and
Sven Walter, 145–166. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
Loar, Brian (2003). “Phenomenal Inten-
tionality as the Basis of Mental Content”, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge,
edited by Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg, 229-258. Cambridge Mass./London: Bradford Books/The MIT
Press.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2014). “Basic Intentionality, Primitive Awareness, and Awareness of Oneself ”,
in Mind, Values, and Metaphysics Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan - Volume 2, ed. by Anne
Reboul, Heidelberg/New York: Springer, pp. 261-290.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2011). “Phenomenal Presence
and Perceptual Awareness. A Subjectivist Account of Perceptual Openness to the World”, in Philosophical Issues
21(1), pp. 352–383.
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2004). “Grasping Phenomenal Properties”, in: Phenomenal Belief
and Phenomenal Concepts, ed. by Torin Alter & Sven Walter, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 307-338.

183 Bodily Awareness and Reflection: The Phenomenology of Dance

Foultier Petronella
Philosophy, Stockholm University, Stockholm, SWEDEN

In the field of dance research, the belief has been prevalent that the phenomenological method, although fruitful at the out-
set, is questionable due to the reifying tendency of reflection. For this reason, we risk misunderstanding the pre-reflective
level of dance and movement (see e.g. Legrand and Ravn 2009, Ravn 2009, Rothfield 2005, Sheets-Johnstone 1979). In fact,
this presupposition seems to go hand in hand with the “maxim” identified by Barbara Montero (2010, 2013), according to
which “bodily awareness tends to hinder highly accomplished bodily skills” (Montero 2010, 106). In other words, reflection
is presumed to be an obstacle both to the performance and the theoretical clarification of dance. I will argue in this paper
that there is undoubtedly a form of phenomenological reflection that is not necessarily reifying, and that does not go against
a theoretical understanding of the particular bodily awareness that is at play in dance and movement. Especially in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy a bodily reflection of sorts can be identified, for example in the well- known figure of the right hand
trying to capture the very perceiving of the left hand – drawn from Husserl (1952, 1973) but in certain important respects
differing from the German phenomenologist’s understanding (Merleau- Ponty 1960, 1964). If this phenomenon is put in
relation to Merleau-Ponty’s “fluid” notions of motor intentionality and corporeal schema (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 1988), de-
rived in part from contemporary neurology, physiology and psychiatry, it can be of great utility for the development of a
phenomenology of dance disembarrassed of the dualistic tendencies still at work in dance research.

References: Husserl, Edmund. 1952. Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philos-
ophie. Zweites Buch, Hua IV, ed. Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952
––––. Cartesianische Medi-
tationen und Pariser Vorträge, Hua I, ed. S. Strasser, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Legrand, Dorothée
and Susanne Ravn. 2009. “Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers”, Phenomenology
and Cognitive Science 8 (389–408).
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris:
Gallimard.
––––. 1960. Signes, Paris: Gallimard. ––––. 1964. Le visible et l’invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, Paris:
Gallimard.
Montero, Barbara. 2010. “Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement?”, Inquiry
53:2 (105–122).
––––. 2013. “A Dancer Reflects”, in Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell–
Dreyfus Debate, ed. Joseph K. Schear, Oxon/New York: Routledge.
Ravn, Susanne. 2009. “Sensing Weight: To-

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pographies of Proprioceptive-Kinesthetic Sensations”, Proceedings 32, Society of Dance History Scholars (185–
191).
Rothfield, Philippa. 2005. “Differentiating Phenomenology and Dance”, Topoi 24 (43–
Sheets-Johnstone,
Maxine. 1979. The Phenomenology of Dance, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. ––––. 1999/2011. The
Primacy of Movement, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

184 How can we account for the badness of pain?

Hayward Max
Philosophy, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA

In this paper I argue that the evaluative features of pain present a challenge for the naturalistic philosopher of mind, which
traditional representationalist theories of pain cannot accommodate. Imperatival theories have the resources to account for
the troublesome features of pain, and I show how extant theories can be modified to do this.
Pains are experienced as bad. Naturalists have a hard time explaining how features of the world can make normative
demands upon us, in the sense of demanding motivation. But this is exactly the sense in which pains feel bad - they are expe-
rienced as intrinsically motivational. If pains have this feature, then can we account for the phenomenology of pain without
appeal to sui generis normative properties?
Various philosophers have claimed that we do not have to build this story into our account of the phenomenology of
pains. The disvalue of pains is just a matter of us disliking them. I argue that there is no convincing empirical evidence that
it is possible to have the very same phenomenal pain-feelings as us and not be motivated by them. Lobotomised subjects,
masochists, and pain-asymbolics are not counterexamples to the thesis that the phenomenology of pain is intrinsically moti-
vating - in all cases, either other features explain their motivational abnormalities, or there is insufficient evidence that these
people have the same phenomenology as us. We do dislike pains, but we do so because they feel bad.
Representationalism provides an account of phenomenal character by equating the latter with representational content.
Traditionally, representational content is construed as representation that something is the case. Representational theories
of pain say that pain is a representation that tissue damage is occurring, which represents damage as bad. But unless repre-
sentationalists assume pains attribute sui generis normative properties to tissue damage, they cannot explain what it is to
represent damage as bad whilst retaining the connection between pain and motivation. More worryingly, the connection be-
tween pain and damage can be broken. Experiments conducted with lepers show that when subjects have a choice between
ending pain and ending the damage that reliably causes the pain, they choose the former. When we feel pain, it is the pain
that is felt as bad, not the damage.
The representationalist is right to tie phenomenal character to the meaning or significance of mental states. But rep-
resentations-that are not the only meaningful contents. Pains do not represent something to us, they command us. Extant
imperative theories have assumed the command is an imperative to perform a bodily action. This is empirically untenable
- in many cases, we cannot specify an action that the pain commands us to perform. But the theory can be saved by changing
the content of the command. Pains are self-referential imperatives. They say “Have no more of this feeling.” This answer ac-
counts for the fact that it is pain itself against which we are motivated, without invoking non-natural properties.

185 Conscious Intentionality and its First-Person Knowledge

Horowitz Amir
History, Philosophy, and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel, R’anana, ISRAEL

There are various views (or families of views) regarding the connections between consciousness and intentionality. On the
one hand, there are views that attempt to reduce consciousness to (either first-order or second-order) intentionality. On the
other hand, there are views that take consciousness to be essential to intentionality. This talk will be concerned with views
of the latter kind. I will distinguish several such views:
1. The view that although consciousness is conceptually distinct from
intentionality, real (underived) intentional states involve “presence to the subject” or “inward looking face”, and the occur-
rence of “presence to the subject” is part of the truth conditions of ascriptions of (underived) intentionality .
2. The view
that conscious intentional states are padigmatic cases of intentional states.
3. The view that “presence to the subject” is essen-
tial to intentionality.
4. The view that some aspect of consciousness is essential to the having of specific contents (e.g., those
of secondary qualities) or to the having of determinate contents.
I will explicate these views and their differences. I will argue that (1) and (2) are plausible, but that (3) and (4) are not.
Intentionality, I’ll argue – even when understood as merely “purport to represent” – transcends its bearer and is a third-

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person feature, whereas consciousness cannot transcend itself and hook up to the world. All views on which it does either
do not in fact account for the intentional relation that glues content to experiences or other entities, or leave an unbridgeable
gap between this relation and consciousness.
Since intentionality is not a first-person feature, introspection of experiences (or other conscious mental states) cannot
be a source of evidence for intentionality. At the same time, I accept the claim that we are situated in a privileged position
for knowing the contents of our conscious intentional states. Can these two claims be reconciled? I will suggest a model of
first-person knowledge of intentionality which reconcile the – the “double- agent model”. On this model, knowledge of con-
tent (whether first-person or third-person) involves two components: knowledge of the representation and knowledge of
the intentional function (the representing function). Subjects have privilege access to some of their mental representations,
but the knowledge they gain regarding them – indeed, any knowledge gainable from the first-person perspective – does not
suffice for knowledge of intentionality, since content ascriptions – such as the one that S thinks of x – presupposes a seman-
tic access to x that is different from and independent of the access of the ascribed mental state. So first- person knowledge
of intentionality on behalf of one requires one to act as a double agent: to introspect one’s conscious state, and to relate it
to its content by the third-person accessible intentional function (i.e., ascribe content in accord with a practice of content
ascriptions). Third-person knowledge of intentionality differs regarding the first component. (Nothing said here means that
subjects consciously employ two components.)

186 The conceptuality of intuition according to Hegel

Ikaheimo Heikki
School of Humanities and languages, UNSW Australia, Sydney, AUSTRALIA

Hegel’s philosophy of mind is one of the worst known areas of his thought. Only very recently has broader attention been
paid to the part of Hegel’s system where the mind is his topic, namely the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in his Encyclopae-
dia of Philosophical Sciences. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this neglect of what Hegel actually wrote about the mind has
not prevented scholars from debating his views concerning the mind and its relation to the world. Since McDowell’s Mind
and World, one of the most widely debated issues in this respect has been the question whether intuition (in the Kantian
sense of the term) according to Hegel is throughout conceptually laden, or whether he thinks there is non-conceptual(ized)
intuition.
This question can only really be answered by taking a close look at what Hegel actually writes about intuition in his Phi-
losophy of Subjective Spirit. The relevant section in the text—‘Intuition’ in the main section ‘Psychology’—is however fairly
abstract and difficult to draw conclusions from without understanding its relation to several thematically related parts of the
text, most relevantly ‘Sensuous consciousness’ in the main section ‘Phenomenology’, and without understanding the overall
argumentative structure of Philosophy of Subjective Spirit.
In this presentation I will show that Hegel’s real answer to the question concerning the conceptuality or lack thereof of
intuition is nuanced, allowing development from only rudimentarily conceptualized intuition (in human infants and non-
human animals) to ideally conceptualized intuition (in scientifically and philosophically cultivated adults). I will also briefly
discuss the relation of intentional consciousness (intuition) to pre-intentional consciousness (feeling), as well as the role
of intersubjectivity and sociality in the development of the conceptualization of intuition in the Philosophy of Subjective
Spirit.

187 Mental Imagery as a sign system?

Issajeva Jelena
Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, ESTONIA

The query on the nature of mental imagery (MI) is one of the most controversial and yet important questions for cognitive
science to solve. Two dominant rival theories were proposed – quasi-pictorial/analog (S. Kosslyn 1988, 1994, Kosslyn et
al. 2006) and descriptive/propositional (Z. Pylyshyn 2002, 2004) – to account for mental imagery phenomenon. The con-
troversy between the two constituted well-known Mental Imagery Debate, which yet has not been solved. So, what mental
images really are – a pictures in one’s Mind or rather a verbal string of thoughts?
Instead of choosing a particular format (either pictorial or verbal) of mental images, I propose to account for mental
imagery as a sign system, which consists of various types of signs (indices, icons, symbols). Along these lines, a particular
mental image can be of both depictive and descriptive format or contain both pictorial (iconic) and propositional (sym-

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bolic) elements in itself as parts of the complex sign. The exact structure of a mental image, I believe, depends on a particular
cognitive task that it is employed to solve. So, dependent on the task, MI might employ both iconic signs (ex. picutres) and
symbolic signs (ex. verbal language) in a peculiar combination of them to achieve a more economical and faster solution of
the task.
I find the approach to the explanation of the nature of MI in terms of sign system as the most beneficial, since it implies
the unification of rival theories about MI and thus can better explain the divergent empirical data on the issue.

188 Enacting Abstractness and Concreteness: A Naturalistic and

Phenomenological Approach.
Jeuk Alexander
Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA

I propose an Enactivist Conception (EC) of the conscious awareness of the phenomena pertaining to abstractness and con-
creteness. EC grounds the phenomena ‘abstractness’ and ‘concreteness’ in a particular experience of action and perception
in relation to the world, and their scientific explanation in the embodied systems that constitute this particular experience.
EC states:
Concreteness and abstractness are phenomenal modes of appearance that certain objects have for certain organisms.
The mode of appearance [concreteness] renders an object concrete and is characterized by an appearance of exhaustible
object presence. The mode of appearance [abstractness] renders an object abstract and is accompanied by an appearance of
partial object absence.
Modes of appearance are emergent on the relationship between the body specific organismic abilities of an organism
and the particular spatiotemporal profile of an object of engagement. Organismic abilities are basic sensorimotor abilities.
For instance, the ability to explore motorically and perceptually an environment. The use of concepts is another organismic
ability. The spatiotemporal profile of an object is its distribution in space and its unfolding in time.
The spatiotemporal complexity of an object is constituted by its graspability in a situation, which is a function of the
organismic abilities brought to bear on it and its spatiotemporal profile. Graspability in a situation is a temporally graded
phenomenal attitude. It is dependent on the number of aspects of an object, that constitute the object according to a con-
cept, that are perceived by an organism – according to its sensorimotor abilities with regard to the spatiotemporal profile of
an object – in a situation. A situation is a temporally constrained and salient episode in which an organism enacts an object.
Accordingly:
If the aspects of an object x that are sufficient to subsume x under the concept of x are exhaustively graspable in a situa-
tion, then x is presented in [concreteness] and x appears completely present.
If the aspects of an object x that are sufficient to subsume x under the concept of x are not exhaustively graspable in a
situation, then x is presented in [abstractness] and x appears partially absent.
Contrary to many conceptions of abstractness and concreteness, EC conceives of both using only naturalistically ad-
equate terms, while circumventing naturalistically dubious terms like ‘reference’ or ‘abstracta’.

189 Consciousness as representation formation from a neural Darwinian

perspective
Kocsis Anna
Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, CROATIA

Keric Vjeran
Psychology and Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, BULGARIA

The claim that consciousness facilitates adaptive behavior is fairly uncontroversial. Responsiveness to exogenous stimuli is
inexorably dependent on learning. Reinforced learning is a basic mechanism that allows organisms to learn from experience
in a trial and error manner. The relation between consciousness and learning is a much debated topic. In line with other
authors (Cleeremans 2007, Edelman 1993) we present an understanding of consciousness in terms of representation forma-
tion accomplished through memory and learning. Edelman (1978) puts forward an account of the underlying biological
and psychological functioning of the brain which he labeled „neural Darwinism“. The bold hypothesis of his approach is
that neurons in the brain are organized in groups whose interaction can be likened to natural selection. In this framework,

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survival of the fittest means that the „strongest“ representation is the one that has the largest influence on overall mental
processing. More recently Izhikevich (2005) developed this approach further using polychronous computation and spike-
timing dependent plasticity (STDP). He was able to demonstrate the formation of neuronal groups and their STDP-driven
behavior on a model neural network of 1000 randomly connected excitatory and inhibitory neurons. In this model, inhibi-
tory interneurons facilitated rate to spike-time conversion. The activation of each neuronal group produces a small oscilla-
tion in the local field potential (LFP). When groups activate in a polychronous manner, the changes in their LFP add up
resulting in increased synchrony. How does the question of synchronization translate to the problems of learning and con-
sciousness? We suggest two possible lines of investigation. Firstly, the influence of noradrenergic fluctuations on learning
capacities. There is accumulating evidence that NE release from locus coeruelus boosts thalamocortical processing which in
turn heightens bottom-up sensory input processing and facilitates learning (Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Secondly, the function of
dopaminergic modulation in the cortex. Dopamine release is the biological mechanism by which STDP takes place (Izhik-
evich, 2007) allowing for selection of neuronal groups, updating of mental maps and representation formation. We suggest
that this is the process by which, through increased synchronization, the single object of perception gets filtrated from the
neuronal noise in the background. From this perspective, consciousness amounts to neuronal activity in which some groups
have heightened expressions compared to other electrochemical signaling taking place at the same time.

190 Singular mental files

Lara Juan Jose
Philosophy, IES. Tirant lo Blanc, Elche, SPAIN

A mental file is a bundle of information we take to be about a particular object or a group of objects. I will outline a tax-
onomy of mental files that, hopefully, will shed some light on the issue of singular thought.
Mental files, as said, embed information. Now, this information may be in the form of a general description – “an F” – or
a definite description – “the F”. Our file for, say, cats is a general file, since it contains information in the form of “an object
that is such and such”. In contrast, our file for Marilyn Monroe is a particular one, since the embedded information is of the
form “the object that is such and such”.
Now, particular files are of two kinds. They may be empty or non-empty. Our files for Spiderman and for Barack Obama
are indistinguishable with regard to their form – both embed information of the “the F”-kind – but the former does not pick
up any object while the latter does.
A further distinction must be made. Some particular files refer to the object that they have been coined to refer to, re-
gardless of whether the information is true of the object or not. Others refer to whatever object happens to satisfy the em-
bedded description.
Now, adopting Bach’s terminology (1987, p. 12), the object of a singular thought is determined relationally, while the
object of a non-singular one is determined satisfactionally. My point, then, is this: only the first kind of files I mentioned
in the previous paragraph are to be considered singular files – only when we think about an object via one of these files is
our thought to be deemed singular. My argument is as follows. Singular thought is supposed to represent an object in the
thinker’s mind. It is built into the concept of representation that the object may be misrepresented. So, neither general files,
nor vacuous ones, or files that refer satisfactionally may be considered to represent a particular object. In the case of vacu-
ous files, or the files that refer satisfactionally, we may speak, at most, of singularity as regards their form. Still, “singular” is
the label for the thought that can be coherently said to present an object to the thinker’s mind and, arguably, it is debatable
whether it is convenient to speak about singularity at all while rejecting that the thought in question is fit to do so.
Admittedly, I am swimming against the current tide. The list of authors that endorse the possibility of empty singular
thought include Crane (2013, 138ff), and Azzouni (2010, 36ff). The main advocates of the possibility of singular thought
via stipulative definitions comprise Jeshion (2004, 2010), and Hawthorne and Manley (2013). (Word count: 463)

References
Azzouni, J. (2012). Talking about nothing. Numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. Oxford, NY: Ox-
ford University Press.
Bach, K. (1987). Thought and reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Crane, T. (2013). The
objects of thought. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Hawthorne, J. and Manley, D. (2012), The reference
book. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Jeshion, R. (2004). “Descriptive descriptive names”. In M. Reimer
and A. Bezuidenhout (Eds.), Descriptions and beyond, 591-612. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2010).
“Singular thought: Acquaintance, semantic instrumentalism, and cognitivism”. In R. Jeshion (Ed.), New essays
on singular thought, 105-140. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, K. A. (2010). “On singularity”, in R.
Jeshion (Ed.), New essays on singular thought, 77-102. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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191 Explicit and implicit understanding of other’s behaviors and goals

Martens Judith
Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY

Experiments by Bahrami et al. (2010) and Faivre et al. (2014) concerning metacognitive processes (cognition about cog-
nition) have shown two things. First, a differentiation between two kinds of metacognition: conscious and unconscious.
Other scholars have used different terms: metacognition on the subpersonal and personal level (Logan and Crump, 2010),
and implicit and explicit metacognition (Frith, 2014). Second, and consequentially, that there are differences in actions
based on these differing metacognitive processes. Unconscious or implicit metacognition is the unconscious monitoring
of one’s own actions, whereas conscious or explicit metacognition involves one’s knowledge of one’s reasons, strategies, mo-
tives and results (although it often is more a confabulation than a true depiction).
Frith argues that while implicit metacognition is most often used while acting, one of the functions of explicit meta-
cognition is to communicate with others (Frith 2014??). Thus, explicit metacognition is functional in shared action and in
carrying out shared tasks (see also Bahrami et al. 2010). One can consciously give another person explicit (e.g. verbal) infor-
mation about one’s goals, intentions, and the progress one has made in reaching those goals.
However, recognition of the other’s intentions, goals, and progress and estimating whether or not they are making er-
rors, is not only thought to occur consciously or explicitly, as described above, but also unconsciously, or implicitly. Move-
ments, for example, could be described as giving (also) implicit input about the other’s intentions.
It is often suggested that mirror neurons allow us to directly understand the goals and intentions of others based on their be-
havior. It is also claimed that mirror neurons can help us recognize higher order goals and intentions of other persons (see Cook
et al. 2014 for an overview). This leads to important questions. Do mirror neurons provide implicit or explicit information?
Should we understand the process of understanding others through mirror neurons as being unconscious/implicit, conscious/
explicit, or otherwise? Can we apply Frith’s distinction between first person implicit/unconscious and explicit/conscious meta-
cognition to two different kinds of recognizing other person’s behavior and the goals and intentions behind it or not?
I will use Frith’s notion of implicit and explicit metacognition (and the kind of results they bring) and see how this fits
to the functionality that is ascribed to mirror neurons in the very recent and flexible understanding of mirror neurons as
described by Cook et al. (2014).

References
Bahrami, B., Olsen, K., Latham, P. E., Roepstorff, A., Rees, G., Frith, C. D. (2010). Optimally Inter-
acting Minds. Science 329(5995), 1081-1085.
Cook, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C. Press, C.,& Heyes, C. (Forthcom-
ing). Mirror Neurons: From origin to function. Behavior Brain and Science.
Faivre, N., Mudrik, L., Schwartz, N.,
& Koch, C. (2014) Multisensory Integration in Complete Unawareness: Evidence from Audiovisual Congru-
ency Priming. Psychological Science, 1-11.
Frith, C. Jean Nicod Lectures 2014, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
Logan,
G. D., & Crump, M. J. C. (2010). Cognitive illusions of authorship reveal hierarchical error detection in skilled
typists. Science, 330, 683-686.

192 Constancies: Towards an Integrated Perspective

Morgan Alexander
Center for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, GERMANY

Intentionality was traditionally viewed as an essentially mentalistic phenomenon, whereby the consciousness of a subject
is directed at a world of apparently objective entities. This view finds influential expression in Brentano’s Thesis that inten-
tionality is the mark of the mental. In the latter half of the twentieth century, analytic philosophers repudiated Brentano’s
Thesis because they interpreted it as the view that intentionality is not only distinctively mental, but irreducibly so. Seeking
to avoid what they took to be the dualist implications of the traditional view, they developed ‘naturalistic’ theories of inten-
tionality, according to which intentionality is fundamentally a species of causal relation between an internal representational
state and a distal represented entity. These ‘tracking theories’ of intentionality were invariably deflationary, in the sense that
they encompassed states of all sorts of mindless systems, such as thermostats or plants. Indeed, proponents of tracking theo-
ries often embraced the deflationary implications of their views, thinking that in order to naturalize intentionality one must
show that intentionality is exhibited by mindless systems. But this motivation for denying that intentionality is distinctively
mental is misguided; one doesn’t naturalize intentionality by showing that it is exhibited by mindless systems any more than
one naturalizes life by showing that it is exhibited by inorganic systems.
Out of a sense that tracking theorists lost track of the phenomenon they were attempting to naturalize, philosophers

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have recently refocussed on the essentially mentalistic nature of intentionality. For example, Tyler Burge (2010) argues that
the most fundamental form of intentionality is to be found in perceptual constancies, which, in his view, ground an irreduc-
ibly psychological kind of state, a kind that is constituted by ‘non-trivial’ accuracy conditions. In this talk I argue that Burge’s
constancy-based account of intentionality ends up being deflationary in precisely the same way, and for precisely the same
basic reasons, as the tracking accounts he rejects. I point out that there’s nothing distinctively mental about constancies, for
they’re to be found in all sorts of mindless systems such as cameras. I then argue that this deflationary consequence is symp-
tomatic of the fact that Burge’s account embodies the same basic conception of intentionality as tracking accounts; indeed,
his account just is a tracking account. Burge, like other tracking theorists, conceptualizes intentionality in terms of a relation
between a representational vehicle and an objective entity, which grounds conditions for accurately representing the objec-
tive entity. I argue, contra Burge, that there’s nothing distinctively mental or psychological about accuracy conditions, since,
for example, explanations of plant behavior crucially appeal to such conditions. Burge and other tracking theorists are inevi-
tably led to deflationism, I suggest, because they focus on fixing accuracy conditions for intentional states, while ignoring
the question of what it takes for intentional states to count as states of intentional systems, viz. subjects. I suggest a tentative
answer to this latter question by sketching an account of how the outputs of constancy mechanisms in different modalities
are bound, via predictive processing, into an egocentric perspective.

193 Intentionality as the mark of the mental in philosophical naturalism

Määttänen Pentti
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

Franz Brentano made an analogy between language and mind. Mental states are intentional units that refer to their objects
like words. Intentionality is the criterion of making a difference between mental and physiological states. Philosophical nat-
uralism, which attributes cognitive capacities to the brain, faces the problem of how to give an account of intentionality (rep-
resentational power) of internal brain states.
Naturalism does not entail that brain processes are the only causal processes involved in cognition. Organisms are in
constant interaction with their environment. Enactivism and dynamical systems theory, for example, take the interaction to
be the correct unit of analysis. The pragmatism of Charles Peirce gives a further alternative. Interaction consists of percep-
tion and action. According to Peirce, in perception the effect of the world on us is bigger than our effect on the world, while
in action it is the other way round. This loop of perception and action also takes the organism environment interaction as
the unit of analysis.
The account of intentionality is here based on Peirce’s notion of habit of action. Habits are formed when similar action
is repeated in similar circumstances. Once formed, habits are vehicles for anticipation. In facing similar circumstances again,
one can anticipate that similar action leads to similar consequences as earlier. All that is required is that the circumstances
and the acting agent are relatively stable. This makes habit a teleological concept. According to Peirce, it is correct to say that
(anticipated) future can have on effect on the present but not on the past. There are usually several alternatives of habitual
action, and the anticipation of probable consequences can be used in deciding how to act. Anticipated experiences are com-
pared with present needs. Intentionality of action is based on the capacity of anticipation.
For Peirce habits are meanings: what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. Any object of perception may be
associated with habitual action. The habit involved helps to anticipate probable consequences of employing that habit. The
object functions thus as a sign-vehicle that refers to the anticipated consequences. Therefore it is an intentional unit, a rep-
resentation. Intentionality of external representations is derivative of intentionality of action. Intentionality as mark of the
mental is a property of the loop of perception and action, or mental loop, for short.
Brain states as internal correlates of external things (revealed by brain imaging and other methods) are not internal rep-
resentations. They function as elements in internal anticipatory mechanisms. Mirror neurons may well have this function
also. The association of these internal correlates is based on the pragmatist law of association. Those correlates are associated
with each other that a) follow each other in the course of action during habit formation and b) are relevant for the success
of action. They reflect the objective conditions of action to which activity is accommodated. Due to the latter condition the
pragmatist law of association is not included in Humean principles of association.

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194 Color experience in newborn babies: A problem for representationalism?

Passos Claudia
Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL

Recent advances in developmental psychology can help us to address important metaphysical questions about the nature of
the early stages of consciousness. What is the character of a newborn baby’s consciousness? How does their consciousness
relate to the external world? What if anything do they represent? Traditionally, early conscious states were conceived as un-
differentiated, disorganized and passive. Newborns’ experiences were reduced to an early sensory experience, as blob of cha-
otic sensations, what James (1980) famously claimed as ‘a blooming, buzzing, confusion’. This picture has been greatly re-
vised by recent developmental research, according to which newborns’ conscious experiences have a much richer structure.
These issues about the development of consciousness are of strong theoretical relevance for metaphysical issues in
the philosophy of mind. The question of whether newborns have representational conscious experiences is a crucial test
case for the thesis that all experiences have representational content. That thesis is itself crucial for metaphysical theories of
consciousness such as representationalism, which holds that all conscious experiences have a constitutive representational
structure.
In this paper I use color and spatial experience in newborn babies to make a case against tracking representationalism.
Tracking representationalism is the view (developed by Lycan (1996), Dretske (1995) and Tye (2000)) on which phenom-
enal experiences represent external properties that have previously been causally connected to the associated brain states.
If tracking representationalism is true, then newborns have experiences of colors only if their associated states have been
causally connected to colors. I will present empirical data – mainly research on multisensory development and neonatal syn-
aesthesia – suggesting newborns have experience of color and that they have these experience before their brains have been
causally connected to colors. I will use this developmental data to reject tracking representationalism.

195 Phenomenology Is Contingently Representational

Shahmoradi Ayoob
Philosophy, Sydney University, Sydney, AUSTRALIA

Standard forms of representationalism defended by, inter alia, Chalmers (2004), Siegel (2010), and Schellenberg (2010) take
perceptual phenomenology to be intrinsically representational. But Charles Travis (2004 & 2014) argues that perceptual ex-
perience could not be representational, and instead puts forward a naïve realist account of perception. In this paper, I first
present Travis’ anti-content argument.Then, I build up my defense of perceptual content. I begin by looking at Travis’ treat-
ment of perceptual error which could be understood in two different ways. While one of these understandings is obviously
untenable, the other, more plausible one is at odd with naïve realism and opens up a way for representational content. In the
next section, I argue that perceptual error is a serious challenge not only for Travis’ treatment of perceptual error, but also for
naïve realism in general. Finally, I conclude that, (a) although Travis is very successful at showing that phenomenology is not
intrinsically representational, he falls short of showing that it is not, as a matter of contingent fact, representational; (b) given
the explanatory role of representational content, perceptual experience needs to be, at least partially, representational.

196 How does a hybrid account of the dynamical and embodied approaches
in cognitive science interpret the notion of constitution of the visual perceptual
content
Tsakiri Amalia
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, GREECE
Vinos Michael
Department of Philosophy and History of Science, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, GREECE

An attempt to answer the question, how does the perceptual object contribute in the formation of the perceptual content
has serious consequences in the subject of mind–world relation. The traditional scientific accounts for visual perception
turn out in an internalistic view of the perceptual content, namely the contribution of the external object is reduced in pro-
viding a proximal stimulus in the retina of the observer and thereafter all the perceptual operation is conducted inside the

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head. In the best case, the most that one can tell about the content-object relation is that there can be a content as long as an
object exist but not necessary in a causal relation in the perceiver’s environment. This thesis corresponds to the weak exter-
nalism about perceptual content.
The aforementioned consideration is opposite to the strong externalism thesis about the perceptual content. Accord-
ing to the latter, an illusory and a veridical perceptual state differ radically given that in the veridical case the external world
contributes constitutively in the content: the perceptual object partly constitutes the perceptual content. Of great interest is
the notion of constitution. Presented in the first place as an ontology question, qua material constitution, it attempts to give
an account for the ontological status of the objects that we encounter in our everyday association with the world, “the meta-
physical glue, so to speak, of the material world” in Lynne Rudder Baker’s (2007) words. The concept of constitution will be
extended in the mental realm in order to illustrate which are the parts that constitute the whole, where the whole is a mental
state, a perceptual content in particular.
An application of this notion in the frame of a hybrid dynamical-embodied cognitive science will be attempted. Accord-
ing to the Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (Van Gelder, 1997), a mental phenomenon is a dynamical system
instantiated in a cognitive agent but the variables of the system are not necessarily inside the physical boundary of the cogni-
tive agent and the whole state of the system depicts the states of all its variables in a certain moment. The whole system is
necessary for the individuation of a perceptual state given that the state is the system. The embodied approach in cognitive
science states that cognition interacts continuously and under time pressure with the related environmental objects, even
when it is or seems to be decoupled from them and in a way that the environment is a part of the cognitive system along
with the sensorimotor features of the cognitive agent. Those two views point out the active role of the perceiver in a dynami-
cal notion of perception where the role of internal representation is disputed as the actual environment is actively explored
and not imprinted in a neural pattern.
The aims of this study are: 1). To give an account of the concept of constitution which can be applied in the realm of
cognitive phenomena. 2). To construe this account in a dynamical and embodied cognitive science framework.

197 The Computer Person Revisited: Conscious Representation and Control in

Learning a Control Task
Wilson Thomas
Psychology, Bellarmine University, Louisville, USA

Dulany Donelson
Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, USA

In 1988 Hayes and Broadbent reported their findings from the cognitive laboratory in which participants interacted with
a “computer person” under either explicit or implicit learning modes. The selective impairment of learning by a second-
ary resource-depleting task in the explicit mode was much cited as evidence for learning a control task without awareness.
Soon thereafter, an attempt to replicate the evidence for superiority of implicit learning failed (Green & Shanks, 1993);
however, whether learning to control a computer algorithm is more successful in either explicit or implicit modes, these
studies beg a fundamental question for a science of consciousness within theoretical psychology: What can we say of the
symbolic representations humans use to learning control tasks and other abstractions? Are they conscious or unconscious,
or perhaps both? This paper reports a further attempt at replication of these 25 year old findings with a more ambitious goal
for modern cognitivism. Our work provides insights into the status of the symbolic representations that are learned and
used in performing such tasks by taking advantage of retrospective and prospective reporting from awareness and quantify-
ing their validity with respect to what constitutes control (i.e., a target hit along a 12- point scale of interpersonal interaction
with the computer). Experimental conditions were manipulated by the computer’s algorithm, either lagged by one trial (im-
plicit) or current with the response (explicit), and either with or without a secondary task, as in the Hayes and Broadbent
(1988) methodology. In contrast, for the present study participants reported a rule or rules for hit performance. Findings
demonstrated equally fewer hits in the current and lagged conditions when also performing a secondary task. The validities
of the reported rules equally predicted performance in all conditions, and without reliable under-prediction. Furthermore,
a model of deliberative strategy fitted performance on the task with increasing accuracy over learning trials and in all condi-
tions. Hits increased over non-strategy trials as well while performance was impaired in the lagged mode only on those trials
in which participants used the strategy they reported from awareness. During an algorithm reversal (transfer) phase, adjust-
ment was better on strategy trials in all conditions. Taken together the results support the hypothesis that learning the com-
puter person task is both deliberative explicit and evocative implicit, with consciousness controlling in both. The research
exemplifies useful experimental strategies for observing consciousness contents and we argue that, rather than distinguish-

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ing explicit and implicit learning as either in or outside of awareness, mental representations are exclusive to consciousness.
The evidence supports the view that control task learning is best characterized by the nature of the conscious contents and
the forms of nonconscious mental operations that interrelate them.

1.14 Miscellaneous (Philosophy)

198 A Model for Simulation of Consciousness

Akula Chandramouli
Project Management, Tech Mahindra Ltd, PUNE, INDIA

It is widely understood that Consciousness is the substratum / plenum of this cosmos / universe. All the human beings are
conscious beings. They are self-aware and operate intelligently. To some extent, it is considered that human conscious beings
are fragments of the Consciousness and will merge with it at the end.
Studying human conscious operation will give an idea
of how Consciousness operates. So, from that perspective, in this paper, author attempts to develop a novel Model for Simu-
lation of Consciousness (MSC). This model is an extension of “Knowledge Automaton”.
For the purpose of the paper, Consciousness is defined as layered one and operates from one layer to the other. It has
four layers viz. 1) Operation / Performance / Environment Layer 2) Knowledge / Learning Layer 3) Design Layer 4) Cosmic
(Conscious) Layer - with corresponding components. These are the minimum that explain Consciousness functioning and
are related to Neural / Mental / Spiritual Correlates.
This model for Simulation of Consciousness has four parts viz.1) Con-
scious Automaton (CA); 2) Design Automaton (DA); 3) Knowledge Automaton (KA) and 4) Global Environment (GE). All
these parts interact in a feedback loop. KA consists of Knowledge Base (KB) and Learning Element (LE). GE is made up of
Performing Element (PE) and corresponding Environment (ENV).
The Operation of MSC starts with an energy surge from
CA. This surge happens through the Random Cosmic / Conscious Energy Function. This energy surge gets encoded as per
the structure of MSC, i.e. DA, KA (KB & LE) and GE (ENV & PE). The encoded energy is provided as design energy inputs
and environment energy inputs.
DA selects its own functionality based on the Random Design function and then decodes the
design energy inputs received from CA. After decoding the CA energy inputs, DA provides the Deign Knowledge Inputs to
KB, Design Knowledge Learning Inputs to LE of KA and Design Environment Inputs to ENV of GE.
Once the energy inputs
from CA and Design inputs from DA are triggered, the MSC at layer2 and layer1 operates in one of the two ways. Based on the
initialization of the MSC it operates either KA driven or GE driven. However, even it is KA driven; it turns out to be GE driven
once the initial cycle is completed with the feedback received from ENV, DA and CA.
The simulation model of Consciousness
is described in the paper with mathematical equations for various functional mapping.
• Environment Random Distribution
Function
• Learning Transfer Function
• Environment Decoding Function
• Performance Updating Scheme
• Learning Strat-
egy Modifier
• Random Distribution Function of Knowledge
• Performing Knowledge Function
• Design Knowledge Enu-
meration Function
• Random Design Function
• Design Decoding Function
• Random Cosmic / Conscious Energy Func-
tion
• Encoding Function
These functions are responsible for the dynamism, variety and complexity of Consciousness Opera-
tion. Paper further includes Operation and Behavior of MSC that explains evolution / levels of Consciousness from local com-
ponent level, self-awareness, global understanding, etc. See the figure below depicting the components and their interaction.
Key Words: Consciousness Automaton, Design Automaton, Knowledge Automaton

199 Money as Taboo and Postmoney – new way of changing consciousness

Ivantchev Boyan
Finance, VUZF University, Sofia, BULGARIA

We propose our own theory “Money as Taboo and Postmoney –new way of changing consciousness”. This is an interdisci-
plinary approach and logic to explain the role of money and the way in which money becomes Postmoney and aim per se.
Theory assumes that functions of the money as - medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account - are frozen in the
past, isolated from the development of human society, and not mirroring anymore real economical and socio-cultural inter-
actions between money and human beings. These processes are leading to evolution or maybe involution of consciousness.

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Decoupling between physical and nominal value of money and globalization of the world financial system, led to a de-
materialization of money and the usage of: electronic payments, plastic money, internet and mobile payments, E-money and
virtualization of money (Second Life game and bitcoins).
Since Karl Simmel’s “The Philosophy of Money” new developments of the money were not perceived in line with the
changes in societies and commons, consumerism and changes in people’s consciousness.
The humans consciousness and perception about real values is hardly attacked causing that we are forgetting the pri-
mary function of money.
Researches in the field of sexology, psychology and wellbeing affirm, that quantity of money is not leading necessarily
to more pleasure and happiness. Moreover some findings clearly shows that money issue is directly connected with negative
effects on human psyche causing disorders as “Money sickness syndrome”. However the myth of having money, hence hap-
piness, is more than alive and “relation “money-consciousness” is still neglected by the human sciences.

200 Explanatory Unification in Consciousness Studies: The Case of Neural Synchrony

Kasperbauer T.J.
Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, DENMARK

Philip Kitcher’s influential account of unification in science claims that all scientific disciplines gravitate toward simple ex-
planations that progressively account for more and more of the phenomena they are attempting to explain. Unification is
achieved in a discipline as the phenomena needing explanation are subsumed under ever-simpler explanations. The theory
of natural selection in biology, for example, is both simple and accounts for a great deal of biological phenomena. It would
thus appear to be a good candidate for a unifier in biology.
This paper proposes that neural synchrony serves as a source of unification in explanations of consciousness. First I outline
what types of explanatory structures in cognitive science best satisfy Kitcher’s account of unification. I argue that unified ex-
planations in cognitive science will likely be mechanistic and representational. Mechanistic and representational explanations
provide details about the causal flow of information within cognitive systems. In short, these satisfy Kitcher’s account because
they best systematize the explanations offered for a wide variety of psychological phenomena, including consciousness.
I then show how neural synchrony is used to provide mechanistic and representational explanations of psychological
phenomena. I review evidence indicating that interactions between neurons, particularly between distant groups of neu-
rons, depend on synchronous firing between each group, and discuss how this neural phenomenon has been used to explain
many higher order cognitive functions. I focus in particular on recent studies showing that neural synchrony in the gamma
range (26-70 Hz) is correlated with a wide variety of psychological phenomena indicating the presence of consciousness,
including conscious attention, visual search, perceptual intensity, stimulus selection in binocular rivalry, dream sleep, and
many others. Neural synchrony can thus account for the causal flow of information in different types of cognition, and pro-
vides a distinctive—and simple—explanation for a variety of conscious states.

201 On the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness

Laitinen Arto
School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tampere, University of Tampere, FINLAND

On the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness: some Hegelian claims for contemporary use
This paper outlines a view concerning the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness following Hegel’s philoso-
phy of subjective mind. Hegel suffers from the mistaken reputation of believing in free-floating collective minds, which over-
looks Hegel’s radical anti-dualism and his “principle of embodiment”: for Hegel, everything mental is always embodied and
presupposes natural processes.
The paper explains the following claims, and defends their relevance, if true, to contemporary debates:
First, the primary
bearer of “consciousness” and “self-consciousness” is a subject, not an isolated mental state.
However, at the most rudimentary level, the distinction between a subject and its mental state emerges only when the
subject persists and has at least two different mental states. When that happens, the structure is that of i) a subject ii) having
a sensation (not yet necessarily “of ” anything – it is merely an element in the stream of phenomenal consciousness).
Second,
intentional consciousness has the structure of i) a subject, ii) being conscious of, iii) an object. The structure has two “poles”,
the subject-pole and an object-pole, and they are at least structurally distinguished: even when someone is conscious of
an object that happens to be itself, it is conscious of itself “as an object”. The object-pole is very flexible and can be further

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distinguished in many ways (the consciousness may perceive “things” and their “properties”, and may come to understand
there to be “forces” and their “expressions”, may perceive salient features in light of its interests, in light of culturally shared
significances etc.)
Third, the structure of self-consciousness is: i) a subject ii) is conscious of both iii) itself (as a subject)
and iv) something in the world (but possibly something in which it sees itself, for example its own work, or something
related to itself, for example an object of its desire, or something to which it stands in a complex social relation such as an-
other self-consciousness).
Fourth, Hegel claims for example that (full fledged) self-consciousness involves two subjects of
self- consciousness recognizing each other as self-conscious (seeing themselves in the mirror of the other).
i) subject A ii) is
conscious iii) of itself (A) as a subject and iv) of something (the world W including A and B) as an object, and thus possibly
of itself as an object in the world, and of B as another object in the world; and v) of someone else (B) as another subject and
vi) of B’s actual or possible attitudes towards A, and thus of itself (A) as a target of B’s consciousness. Similarly for B.
Fifth,
the subjects may take part in the collective processes, and the subject-pole may have the structure of an “I that is a we, or a
we that is an I”.
Sixth, ultimately the conscious subject may come to understand subjectivity as an aspect of the world, so that
the world is (partially) self-conscious via the subject (or the collective process).

202 Conscious states beyond physical and linguistic forms.

Megvinyte Marija
Philosophy, King’s College London, London, UNITED KINGDOM

The current epoch of the 21st can be described as a material heaven, where materialism has slowly but surely overtaken dif-
ferent branches of disciplines, such progression of humanity subsequently manifesting in over prioritizing material explana-
tions of metaphysical and unknown matters, mysteries of consciousness being one of them. Conscious states and physical
states are simultaneous and identical, thus conscious states are nothing more than a material, physical state - is an argument
brought forward by materialist philosophers grandly dismissing the subjective, phenomenological sides to it. Neither it
brings humanity closer to understanding the phenomenon in more depth and its role in human action, but further it brings
an abrupt end of metaphysical discussion reaching intuitively unsatisfactory conclusions and stagnation of further evolution
of understanding the mind. In order to get closer to understanding consciousness, mere analysis of it is not enough, preced-
ing states of consciousness such as sub-conscious and unconscious through paths beyond empirical facts and evidence are
in need of rediscovery. Facts give information, upon which Materialism bases its doctrine, yet no knowledge or understand-
ing of the subject of consciousness occurs. Should one follow material philosophy till the end, it is inevitable to reach a
conclusion that different bodies, in identical physical surroundings make identical reactions in agents’ consciousness, ulti-
mately disregarding with individuality. Thus this paper will proceed by over viewing the historical development of different
intellectual attitudes towards consciousness, bringing to attention early modern philosophers including Descartes, Leibniz
and Locke in discussing what consciousness is. It will further proceed by outlining the rise of Materialism and where the
break in history occurred allowing the rise of Materialism using many of Nietzsche’s arguments and analysis, simultaneously
working as a reflection of society’s loss of contact with the non-material condition overall arguing that Materialism is only a
temporary doctrine of consciousness and not a timeless philosophy. Further it will explain what materialism is and bring its
main incoherent conceptions to the surface arguing that physical conscious states do exist, but they are not the only states
of consciousness. Equating all states of consciousness to physical actions and reactions, without accepting non-reactionary,
non-material states of consciousness is redundant, predominantly counter-arguing Materialism’s choice of basing its utter
perception of consciousness on empirical information. Lastly, the paper will attempt to present an alternative approach to
consciousness, promoting rediscovery of intuition and inner communication with non-material conscious states beyond the
linguistic and factual prison, incorporating the discussion on the relationship between art and consciousness.

203 Seeing happiness CANCELLED

Smortchkova Joulia
Philosophy, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Bochum, GERMANY

Can we experience emotions in another person’s face and body via perception or do we always infer their emotional state
on the basis of low-level visual information about their expression and behavior? How should we understand perceptual
experience and which theory of emotion (if any) would we have to accept, in order for the perceptual hypothesis to come
out (non-trivially) true?
In my presentation I will argue that there are some emotions (called basic emotions, following Ekman, 1992) that can

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literally be perceived. More specifically, drawing on Dretske’s 1969 famous distinction between two different kinds of see-
ing, I will argue that instances of emotion perception are not instances of epistemic seeing (as in “I see that the keys are on
the table”), where the visual state is not pure, but intertwined with beliefs, but rather instances of simple seeing (as in “seeing
the table”), where no belief is required for seeing.
I will support the claim that we can simply see some emotions by appealing to two sorts of arguments: a) the presence
of a distinctive perceptual (and not cognitive) phenomenal experience of seeing basic emotions and b) psychological and
neurological data on perception that seem to point in the direction of emotion perception. Taken singularly, these sources
of evidence are not enough to conclusively establish the thesis of emotion perception, but taken together they are sufficient
to make a solid case for there being at least some cases in which emotion is perceptually experienced rather than inferred.
Finally, I will disentangle my proposal from neighboring issues, and respond to some objections. First of all, the claim
that we can perceive some emotions is not to be construed as an answer to the epistemic problem of Other Minds. Nonethe-
less, one objection to my view can be put in the form of a challenge related to that problem, which concerns the intrinsically
hidden nature of others’ mental states. To respond to this objection, I will argue that consideration of such issues suggests
we have to distinguish between the folk psychological concepts we have for emotions, which we apply in a variety of situa-
tions, and our non-conceptual perceptual experiences of some emotional states.
A second objection involves the claim that we use contextual cues in order to make the correct attribution of emotions:
therefore, it is claimed, we are not able to “read off ” emotions from someone’s face, but must also inferentially integrate in-
formation from their body and their surroundings. I will argue that this is just a special instance of the familiar phenomenon
of contextual perception, studied by Gestalt psychology, and hence does not rebut my thesis.

204 ‘Consciousness and Spiritual Intelligence
(SQ): an Incorporated Move

towards Global Peace’
Srivastava Savita
Foundationas of Education, Faculty of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institution, Agra, INDIA

The history of the development of our knowledge about intelligence is fascinating. Alfred Binet and his associates discussed
and elaborated the term IQ around the year 1900 and objective – empirical studies with regard to ‘Emotional Intelligence’
dates back to 1990. The Publication of Danah Zohar & Ian Marshall’s book ‘SQ: Connecting with our Spiritual Intelligence’
in the year 2000 brought the notion of ‘Spiritual Intelligence’ into the realm of objective empirical investigations.
It is important to mention here that three major academic happenings during the twentieth century paved the path of
the inclusion of ‘Spiritual Intelligence’ (in the form of ‘Learning to be’) as one of the four pillars of education for 21st cen-
tury. Way Back in the year 1954 the great humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow announced his ‘Hierarchy of Needs’
and classified all the human needs into two broad categories namely ‘Deficiency Needs’ and ‘Growth or Being Needs’. Spir-
itual Intelligence may be assumed to be involved in the fulfillment of the first of the ‘Being Needs’ i.e. self-actualization. The
second major academic event occurred in the year 1956 when Benjamin S. Bloom and his associates presented and elabo-
rated the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives and classified these objectives into three domains viz. Cognitive Domain,
Psychomotor Domain and Affective Domain.
The third academic event took place in the year 1996 when UNESCO published Delors Report under the title “Learn-
ing: The Treasure Within”. In this report four pillars of education has been identified as the basic framework of global cur-
riculum. the first two pillars namely ‘Learning to know’ and ‘Learning to do’ are undoubtedly concerned with IQ (Academic
Intelligence), the third Pillar namely ‘Learning to live together’, unequivocally involves Emotional Intelligence (EQ) and the
fourth pillar namely ‘Learning to be’ includes Spiritual Intelligence (SQ).
A proper coordination of 3Hs i.e. Head, Heart and Hand is vital for psychological well-being. For centuries, attempts
have been made to distinguish people who are intelligent from those who are less intelligent. SQ is the soul’s intelligence. It
is the intelligence with which we heal ourselves and with which we make ourselves whole. SQ is the intelligence that rests in
that deep part of the self that is connected to wisdom from beyond the ego, or conscious mind. It is not culture-dependent
or value-dependent. It is our deep, intuitive sense of meaning and value; it is our guide at the edge, our conscience. Con-
sciousness is the state of being conscious; awareness of one’s own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings, etc. Eve-
rything we know about the world comes to us through our brain. Yet for each of us our own conscious mental world of
thoughts and feelings is isolated and private. Like every other aspect of nature, Consciousness, also, is an infinite, invisible
field- an “ocean” of awareness or intelligence everywhere available- with waves that radiate throughout society. Thus, con-
sciousness along with SQ moves or walk together, miracle happens, ‘A person high in SQ knows that when he harms others
he harms himself ’. This is the spirit and core of human life worldly wise as a human being.

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205 Channelizing Thoughts to Elevate Consciousness

Anubhooti Verma
Theology, Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Bangalore, INDIA
Rahul Mathur
Information Systems, IIM Calcutta, Bangalore, INDIA
Vineeta Mathur
Theology,Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Agra, INDIA

The study of mind and intellect is a branch of metaphysical philosophy called Noetics. “Noesis” is an intentional act of per-
ceiving, judging, or remembering and corresponds to a mental act-process (karma) which becomes directed towards the
intentionally held object or what is thought about.
Studies done in recent years have shown that the mind can receive infor-
mation through extrasensory means and the power of thought or intention can affect and change the world. This is because
at our deepest level, we are all connected. Thoughts directed at targets in the laboratory have been shown capable of altering
machines, cells and even complex organisms like human beings. This mind- over- matter power even seems to traverse time
and space.
The concepts mentioned above are similar to the Philosophy of Radhasoami Faith which involves turning the attention
or directing thought inwards and upwards towards the Original Abode (Paramartha) to achieve higher consciousness levels.
The current of the mind and the spirit would then begin to flow in that direction resulting in comfort, peace joy and true
bliss being gradually achieved during one’s lifetime. By meditational practice of the correct kind one gets entry beyond the
physical universe into the Region of Universal Mind. When the meditationist is in resonance with the concerned frequency
of a particular stage which he is trying to reach inside his own self he adjusts his frequency to match the frequency of the
macrocosm at that level and to gain consciousness about that particular level in the macrocosm. Supreme Consciousness is
highly ordered energy. Experiments done during meditational sessions at the Headquarters of the Radhasoami Faith at DB
showed that four frequencies were repeatedly exhibited by meditationists in the individual sessions as well as group prayer
sessions. The first three seemed to belong to the Region of Universal Mind and the highest frequency seemed to belong to
highest Region of Pure Spiritual Content with no impurities of mind or matter.

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2 N euroscience

2 Neuroscience
2.1 Neural Correlates of Consciousness (general)

206 Where is My Mind? Investigating the Neural Correlates of Mind Wandering

and Meditation
Brandmeyer Tracy
Neuroscience, CNRS, Toulouse, FRANCE
Delorme Arnaud
Neuroscience, CNRS, Toulouse, FRANCE

Research investigating mind wandering (MW ) and task-independent thought has gained considerable attention over the
last 5 years due to its noticeable persistence during waking states, in addition to its unique and highly correlational relation-
ship with default mode network activity (DMN). The DMN consists of a set of midline and lateral cortical brain regions.
The understanding of the DMN and its functional role in cognition has become
one of the most rapidly growing neuroscientific pursuits of the last decade. Abnormal DMN activity remains the hall-
mark indicium for a wide array of cognitive disorders including attention deficit disorder, major depression, autism, schizo-
phrenia, general anxiety disorder, chronic pain, Tourette’s syndrome, Alzheimer’s disease, post- traumatic stress disorder,
in addition to others. Recent research has also suggested an adaptive and functional role of MW and DMN activity, fa-
cilitating the flexible monitoring of both the external environment and internal mentation while concurrently directing
attention to an external task. Given the decoupled nature of MW from conscious experience, the development of nuanced
neuroimaging methods is necessary in order to extend our scientific understanding, and capture these mental states and
phenomena in experimental settings. We recorded 64-channels electroencephalography (EEG) data on 24 practitioners
while engaged in a mantra meditation practice, according to the Himalayan Yoga Tradition(12 novices, and 12 advanced
practitioners). Data was collected at the Swami Rama Sadhaka Grama Ashram, in Rishikesh, Inida. Subjects were probed
approximately every 3 minutes ( range 45 to 300 seconds) with the instructions: “Please rate the depth of your Medita-
tion”, followed by “Please rate your Mind Wandering”, and lastly “Please rate how tired you are”. In all conditions, subjects
evaluated and reported via key press the depth of their internal experience at probe onset on a scale of 0 to 3 (0 reflecting
non-engagement, and 3 reflecting absorption in the state). We observed a significant increase in the event related spectral
power (ERSP) in both frontal midline theta power (4-7hz) and occipital gamma power (25-45), in the advanced practi-
tioner group during meditation trials, as compared to MW trials. To our knowledge this is the first study to directly com-
pare the reported depth of MW and meditative absorption and the neural correlates of these states via experience sampling
and electroencephalography.

207 Is Frontal and Parietal Cortical Activity Necessary for Perceptual

Consciousness?
Farooqui Ausaf
Attention Group, MRC-Cognition & Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM
Manly Tom
Attention Group, MRC-Cognition & Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UNITED KINGDOM

Many studies looking for neural correlates of consciousness have concluded that activity in fronto-parietal regions correlate
with (and perhaps cause) conscious perception. Many influential theories consider these regions as key neural correlates of
consciousness. In nearly all such experimental studies perception of a transiently presented stimulus is modulated by various
means (masking, attention blink etc.) such that it is rendered subliminal on a fraction of trials. The activity elicited by the
stimulus when participants reported a conscious percept is then compared to that when they denied perceiving anything.

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However, such methods are confounded by the requirement to infer heavily degraded sensory information, and conse-
quently, conscious detection coincides with a difficult but successful perceptual inference. Hence, the difference in neural
activity between conscious versus non-conscious perception may be related to successful versus unsuccessful perceptual
in-
ference and not to conscious perception per se. Furthermore, in these studies conscious perception has very different cog-
nitive and
behavioural consequences compared to nonconscious perception e.g. a feeling of ‘yay’ at successfully seeing a
fleeting and difficult to detect stimulus. This again could account for the neural activity attributed to conscious perception.
If above confounds were real, one can expect that attended and consciously visible but cognitively irrelevant stimuli will fail
to elicit fronto-parietal activity. In this study, while participants were awaiting the appearance of a visual target they could ei-
ther pass through a stream of irrelevant alphabets or through a blank screen. Even though irrelevant alphabets were foveally
presented (each for 1 second), attended to and unambiguously visible,they elicited activity only in visual cortices and not
in any frontal or parietal region. Our results provide robust evidence that fronto-parietal region activity is not necessary for
conscious perception.

208 Scientific Understanding of Consciousness in terms of Anatomy and

Physiology
Gedeon Tom
Research School of Computer Science, Australian National University, Acton, AUSTRALIA
L.
Coward Andrew
Research School of Computer Science, Australian National University, Acton, AUSTRALIA

Scientific understanding of consciousness requires causal descriptions of specific cognitive phenomena at a psychological
level, that indicate how one cognitive state generates the next state in the course of the phenomenon. Any part of this cog-
nitive description must be mapable into causal descriptions in terms of activity in major brain structures. Any part of the
major anatomical description must be mapable into causal descriptions in terms of more detailed anatomical structures, and
so on through descriptions in terms of neurons, synapses, and neurochemistry.
For example, in the stream of consciousness, mental images replace each other, one after another. Each image is a fairly
sharp visual and/or verbal construct that after a period in which the mental state is more fuzzy is replaced by a somewhat
related image.
At a major anatomical level, a mental image corresponds with a population of active cortical columns. This population
has recommendation strengths in the striatum in favour of activation of other columns, on the basis of temporally correlated
past activity. Such temporally correlated past activity exists if two columns have often been active at the same time in the
past, or have changed their receptive fields at the same time in the past. The predominant recommendations are determined
by the basal ganglia and implemented by the thalamus, resulting in activation of a second population of columns. This sec-
ond population can then drive activation of a third population and so on. The benefit of this process is that it makes available
a wider range of behavioral recommendation strengths than available from the columns directly activated by sensory inputs.
A problem is that the population tends to become more behaviorally diffuse with each iteration, corresponding with the
period of fuzziness between images. The population is brought into sharper focus using the very strong indirect activation
strengths that exist as a result of speech capabilities. Acceptance of the predominant recommendations of a fuzzy popula-
tion in favour of speech generates subvocal words. Activation in the reverse direction then generates a more sharply focused
visual mental image.
At a more detailed level, the hippocampus identifies the most appropriate columns for receptive field changes in novel
circumstances, and implements the selected changes. As a side effect it records the groups of columns that changed at the
same time. These records can be used to reconstruct the group of columns that were active during specific past experiences,
or to contribute to generation of the next image in a stream of consciousness.
At an even more detailed level, one way to implement cortical neuron receptive field changes uses strong hippocampal
system synapses onto dendritic branches mostly made up of silent synapses from other cortical neurons. If the hippocampal
input is present it may tip the target neuron over to firing. If so, the silent synapses acquire weight and the neuron will fire in
the future without the hippocampal input.
This hierarchical description process can be used to understand any conscious phenomenon in terms of the deeper level
brain processes that support it.

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209 Neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception

Hirvonen Jonni
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Wang Sheng
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Monto Simo
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Palva Matias
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND
Palva Satu
Neuroscience center, University of Helsinki, FINLAND

Introduction: The state of being conscious about something is often probed by a two-choice inquiry – whether the stimulus
was perceived or not. One of the most challenging quests in consciousness studies is to find mechanisms that produce this
seemingly binary switch in a person’s experience. We have previously observed at MEG sensor- level that consciously per-
ceived but not unperceived somatosensory stimuli are associated with large-scale stimulus locking of ongoing cortical brain
activity and alpha (8 – 12 Hz) oscillations in particular (1). However, the exact cortical sources and their mutual interplay
underlying the conscious perception have remained unknown.
Methods: We used constant intensity somatosensory stimuli at the threshold of detection and recorded ongoing MEG
to investigate the cortical origins of conscious sensory perception in 12 subjects. Cortically-constrained minimum- norm
estimates, surface source models based on individual cortical anatomy and a novel fidelity-optimized cortical parcellation
weighting approach (2) were utilized to assess single-trial time series of small cortical parcels for perceived and unperceived
trials. The peri-event neuronal dynamics were quantified by estimating phase-locking to stimulus onset as well as evoked
and induced responses. In addition, cortex-wide phase synchrony analysis was carried out to characterize inter-areal phase
interactions.
Results: Source modeling revealed that the phase locking of ongoing broad-band activity in the contralateral somatosen-
sory areas SI and SII to subsequently perceived stimuli was twice as strong and considerably longer lasting than the phase
locking to unperceived stimuli. In frontal and parietal regions, stimulus locking was observed exclusively for the perceived
stimuli. In the alpha-frequency band, phase-locking in frontal and parietal regions, and particularly in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal and posterior parietal cortices, was observed only for stimuli reaching conscious awareness. These data hence fully
corroborate those presented earlier (1) and reproduce also previous findings of significant cortex-wide divergence in phase
dynamics between perceived and unperceived stimuli being observable already at 30 ms after the stimulus onset both in
phase locking and in evoked responses.
In addition to stimulus locking, perceived and unperceived stimuli were also characterized by differences in pre- and
post-stimulus strength of inter-areal phase synchrony. Before stimulus onset, alpha-band synchronization was stronger for
perceived than for unperceived stimuli. After stimulus onset, inter-areal synchronization in both alpha and gamma (30-60
Hz) frequencies was greater for perceived than unperceived stimuli. At the cortical level, gamma-band synchronization took
place between contralateral somatosensory areas and specifically ipsilateral attentional networks during conscious percep-
tion.
Conclusions: This study implies that stimulus-locking of ongoing cortical activity and especially of alpha-band oscil-
lations in sensory, frontal and parietal areas, long-range alpha synchronization among these regions, and subsequent large-
scale gamma band synchronization are indicators of conscious perception of the threshold-level somatosensory stimuli.

References: 1. Palva, S., Linkenkaer-Hansen, K., Naatanen R., Palva, J.M., (2005), ’ Early neural correlates
of conscious somatosensory perception’, The Journal of Neuroscience, vol. 25, no. 21, pp. 5248–5258.
2. Ko-
rhonen, O., Palva, S., and Palva, J.M., (2014), ’Sparse weightings for collapsing inverse solutions to cortical par-
cellations optimize M/EEG source reconstruction accuracy’. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 226C:147-160.

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210 Single-subject analyses of N400 ERP component: Implications for

consciousness studies
Kallionpää Roosa
Department of Behavioral Sciences and Philosophy, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Scheinin Annalotta
Turku PET Centre, University of Turku, FINLAND
Sandman Nils
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Karvonen Milla
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Kallioinen Minna
Turku University Hospital, Turku, FINLAND
Maksimow Anu
Turku University Hospital, Turku, FINLAND
Revonsuo Antti
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND
Scheinin Harry
Turku PET Centre, University of Turku, FINLAND
Valli Katja
Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Turku, FINLAND

Event-related potential (ERP) techniques are an EEG-based way to assess the neural processes that arise in response to vari-
ous stimuli. The N400 ERP component has been associated with the processing and integration of word meaning and inter-
preted to specifically link to semantic processing. N400 represents higher cognitive processes, and its appearance seems to
require the presence of conscious processing of the stimuli. Thus, N400 effect is a strong candidate to indicate the presence
or absence of conscious processing. Detecting the presence of consciousness is clinically relevant especially in unresponsive
patients who are anesthetized or suffer from disorders of consciousness.
As the low signal-to-noise ratio of EEG signature tends to hinder single-subject ERP analyses, results of individual par-
ticipants are rarely statistically tested in ERP publications. Whenever N400 has been tested in patients with disorders of
consciousness, the results have been based on subjective visual inspection of N400- like waveform. Single-subject ERP stud-
ies require strictly controlled experimental design and sufficient number of trials to reach statistical significance. These types
of experiments and analyses should, however, be conducted in patients with disorders of consciousness, because group level
analyses are inadequate in the context of measuring consciousness.
Cruse et al. (2014, NeuroImage) were the first to present statistically tested single-subject N400 results in healthy par-
ticipants. Here, we extended and improved their experiment. In the present study, the auditory stimuli were composed of
sentences that had either an expected, congruous ending or an unexpected, incongruous ending to evoke the N400 effect.
Congruous and incongruous sentences were matched by controlling for cloze probability, word frequency, and word and
sentence length. The stimuli were presented in two blocks, each consisting of equal number of congruous and incongruous
sentences. In the first block, the participants were asked to indicate with a motor response after each stimulus whether the
sentence was congruous or incongruous (active paradigm), and in the second block, the task was to carefully listen to the
stimuli without responding (passive paradigm). EEG data were collected with NeurOne equipment (Mega Electronics Ltd)
using 64-channel EasyCap Active electrode cap. The ERP stimuli were presented with Presentation stimulus delivery and
experimental control software system. We tested 80 healthy right-handed male participants, aged 20?30 years.
EEGLAB and FieldTrip programs were used to analyze the results. FieldTrip utilizes Monte Carlo -based nonparametric
statistical testing method to solve the multiple comparisons problem. FieldTrip allows testing spatiotemporal data points
across conditions using t-tests and finding statistically significant clusters of adjacent electrodes and time points.
Our preliminary results show that the amplitude and temporal boundaries of N400 effect vary inter-individually, and
the amplitude of N400 effect was typically larger in the active than in the passive condition. This is in agreement with previ-

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ous studies that propose that the amplitude of N400 is attention and task dependent. These results may be later used as a
baseline for N400 recordings in unresponsive states to aid in determining the level of consciousness.

211 New Foundations for the Science of Consciousness CANCELLED

Miller Steven
Perceptual and Clinical Neuroscience Group, Monash University, Melbourne, AUSTRALIA

The science of consciousness is founded on identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. However, it is the neural con-
stitution of consciousness that science really seeks to understand. Moreover, distinguishing which from amongst many neu-
ral correlates are actually constitutive of consciousness presents a hard scientific problem. Over a decade since its proposal,
this correlation/constitution distinction problem is being actively addressed by scientists and philosophers, including in a
recent interdisciplinary two-volume project on the topic and on surrounding empirical and conceptual territory. Here I pre-
sent key elements of recent analysis of the correlation/constitution distinction problem, including: (i) the Jenga analogy,
which illustrates how the neural correlates and neural constitution of consciousness constructs can pick out different neural
activity sets, (ii) the empirical strategies of stepwise neural inhibition and stimulation, noting that although a combination
of such strategies can identify at least some constitutive neural activity, the whole neural constitution of consciousness can-
not be identified and the problem is thus not fully solved, and (iii) the new foundations for consciousness science that arise
from these analyses.

212 The Quintessential Tension: conceptual pluralism and creativity

Robertson Christopher
Philosophy, Independent (formerly Sorbonne Paris IV), Paris, FRANCE

My paper outlines a research axis whose base is a comparison between the cognitive state of plurilingualism and a hypoth-
esised cognitive state of conceptual pluralism within the individual mind. The research develops this comparison in order to
propose a conceptual model for mental creativity which is both descriptive and prescriptive. This model ties novel creative
insights to the tensions emerging spontaneously between elements common to but heterotopic across a plurality of concep-
tual system maps when these are instantiated together in the individual mind, conceived of similarly to how multiple neuro-
linguistic maps are instantiated in bilingual, trilingual, etc., individuals.
The conception and elaboration of this pluridisciplinary research model has its roots in structural anthropology (Lévi-
Strauss’ fonds universel de l’esprit concept), embodied mind (Lakoff & Johnson on the underpinning neural projections of
metaphor as basis for cognition), developmental psychology (e.g. Werker & Tees demonstrations of perceptual narrowing
during infant maturation), neuroscience (Edelman’s work on synaptic pruning; Damasio’s neurobiological contributions to
embodied mind), and also both philosophy and history of science (Feyerabend’s plea for pluralism in education; various
pluralist and pragmatic perspectives from William James to Nietzsche to Putnam; as well as historical case studies, etc.).
The aim of the model is to conceptualise the non-formalised space occurring between conceptual systems whose com-
mon conceptual elements have differing vector properties. Thus, these elements “tug” the pluri- conceptual mind in differ-
ent directions, an action-state implying precisely some kind of mental space between them. It is hypothesised (following
Lakoff & Johnson, and Damasio) that conceptual systems are instantiated through specific, neurobiological maps and that
the between-space in question therefore has some neurobiological correspondent in the (perhaps very subtly) distinct neu-
ral pathways each conceptual system reciprocally instantiates and arises from. Ultimately, the individual should be able to
switch between these distinct conceptual systems, as between languages in the plurilingual mind, and it is this switching that
creates what I call the “quintessential tension” (a nod to Kuhn’s famous “essential tension” creativity speech) between diverse
conceptual systems. This tension, in turn, solicits the mind to formalise the corresponding conceptual space so that it can be
brought into conscious knowledge and language space.
The descriptive element of the model involves perspectives from history of science whereby the pluralism of certain
revolutionary scientists is explored. Einstein, for example, had not only learned and assimilated the contemporary Newto-
nian vision of a mechanist universe but also the Spinozist model of a unified, single- substance, holistic universe. I advance
that the conceptual tension space between these two distinct, instantiated system maps solicited Einstein’s mind for formali-
sation. The result: relativity.
As a prescriptive model, the aim is to demystify the notion of creative genius in science and other domains, revealing an
achievable and ‘concrete’, albeit considerable, undertaking in direction of exciting creativity: the voluntary assimilation and

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instantiation of a plurality of conceptual systems to the point of being able to spontaneously interact with the world through
the medium of any one of them, just as the plurilingual does.

213 Electroencephalographic Coherence and Cortical Acetylcholine During

Ketamine-Induced Unconsciousness
Silverstein Brian
Anesthesiology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Pal Dinesh
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Hambrecht-Wiedbusch Viviane
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
Mashour George
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

There is limited understanding of the changes in cortical neurochemistry and cortical connectivity during ketamine anes-
thesia. We conducted a systematic study to investigate the effects of ketamine on cortical acetylcholine (ACh) and elec-
troencephalographic coherence.
Male Sprague Dawley rats (n=11) were implanted with 1) electrodes to record electroen-
cephalogram from frontal, parietal, and occipital cortices, and 2) a microdialysis guide cannula for simultaneous measure-
ment of ACh levels in prefrontal cortex before, during, and after ketamine anesthesia. Coherence and power spectral density
computed from the electroencephalogram, as well as ACh levels, were statistically compared between conscious and uncon-
scious states.
Ketamine induced unconsciousness caused a significant increase in ACh levels (p=0.01) while producing a profound
depression of electroencephalographic coherence (p=0.04) across a broad frequency range (0.5-250 Hz). Compared to the
unconscious state, recovery of consciousness was marked by significant increases in 1) ACh levels (p=0.0007), 2) power
in theta (4-10 Hz) (p=0.02) and low gamma (25-55 Hz) (p=0.0004) band, and 3) coherence (p=0.002) as well as power
(p=0.01) in higher gamma frequencies (65-250 Hz). There was no significant change in the coherence in the theta and low
gamma bands. The ACh levels, coherence, and spectral properties returned to wake levels after a prolonged recovery period.
Contrary to current perception, ketamine-induced unconsciousness is not characterized by dominance of high- fre-
quency power and coherence. Instead, there is a global breakdown of cortical connectivity during the unconscious state
while the recovery period is characterized by increases in high-frequency power, coherence, and ACh levels.

214 Neural Information as the Amount of a Description of Consciousness

Tamori Yoshi
Human Information System laboratory, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, Hakusan- shi/Ishikawa, JAPAN
Kakuda Kanna
Bio/Chemical Science, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, Hakusan-shi/Ishikawa, JAPAN
Uryu Yuko
Bio/Chemical Science, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, Hakusan-shi/Ishikawa, JAPAN

According to integrated information theory (IIT) (Oizumi et al, 2014), qualia is assigned to multidimensional shape of q-
edges which are formed by the boarder referred as single connection called a “q-arrow” of fully connected network. In IIT,
the information is defined by the probability of a physical state assigned to consciousness entity like qualia. Such a way of
theory construction could give us values of information, but is always a lengthy way of ‘naming’. A single concept emerged in
our mind at least has a description by the brain activity. Appropriate expression of the information for consciousness should
be descriptive complexity. Shannon type information describes a capacity of a container or a transportation, but not the
amount of the description. We measured the descriptive complexity of the brain activity by the number of existing informa-
tional connections among cortical unit activities in brain space-time. Preparatory, we have to measure how large the size of
the activity unit which we call “informational column” in the cortex. The activity columns are closely related to the unit of
the descriptive complexity of mind entities. We will report the amount of descriptive complexities for several perceptions

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estimated by fMRI and MEG experiment using the irreducible minimum stimuli in the auditory task and the visual task.
The irreducible minimum stimuli have uniform representation on the cortex so that we cannot be aware of the difference
between the minimum stimulus and high-resolution one which are alternatively presented. The amount of descriptive com-
plexity for qualia is considered to be measured by an infinitesimal displacement, which is so-called continuum information.
Though this term is originally included in the formalism of descriptive complexity, it is neglected since it is infinite. This
means simply “qualia is not descriptive”.

215 Resting-state EEG study of hypoxic coma patients; A preliminary report

Yamanoglu Merve
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hanoglu Lutfu
Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Erdogan Cem
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hizarci Burcu
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildiz Sultan
Biophysics, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Tezcan Gunay
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Kizilarslan Deniz
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Canpolat Gamze
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Toprak Guven
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Oz Huseyin
Anesthesia and reanimation, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Helvaci Yilmaz Nesrin
Neurology, Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY

The evaluation of the outcome of hypoxic coma on consciousness is a difficult problem. It is recommended that routine
EEG and related background reactivity should be evaluated in every patient with hypoxic coma. However, in order to pre-
dict the outcome better we need more sensitive analyse methods. The aim of this study was to evaluate the differences in
EEG patterns between surviving and dying patients of hypoxic coma. The current study included 12 patients with hypoxic
coma suffering from cardiac arrest, admitted in Intensive Care Unit at the Medipol University Hospital. Consciousness
states of patients were evaluated by Glasgow Coma scale (GCS). The patients with GCS score below eight were included
to the study. Behavioral assessments were conducted using the Coma-Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R). The resting EEG
was recorded, and the signal was analyzed in the frequency domain. All patients were evaluated with cranial MRI and fol-
lowed up for a seven week of a period. All the EEG and CRS records were undertaken within the one week. The study is still
ongoing, and we have evaluated seven patients. From these patients, four died, and one patient was diagnosed as minimally
consciousness state and the other two patients as a vegetative state. We have found that all patients had prominent sub-delta
EEG activity. Interestingly in compared to dying coma patients, we have found that sub-delta activity was localized more in
the anterior regions in the surviving patients. These findings can give us important information regarding the role of resting
EEG analysis in predicting the outcome of hypoxic brain injury on the consciousness.

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2.2 Vision

216 Level of processing as one of the prerequisites for conscious perception

Derda Monika
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Koculak Marcin
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Binder Marek
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND

Electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness can be operationalized as the difference between the patterns of event-
related potentials (ERPs) evoked by stimuli that enter awareness and stimuli that do not. Studies of Revonsuo group (Railo,
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2011) suggest that early posterior negativity around 200 ms (visual awareness negativity, VAN) is
the earliest correlate of visual consciousness. However, other researchers (e.g. Salti, Bar-Haim & Lamy, 2012) imply that
this difference is most reliably represented by the late positivity in the P3 window. This inconsistency might be the result of
using different types of stimuli: simple (dots, lines) and meaningful (letters, complex objects). We hypothesize that the level
of stimuli processing (LoP) affects how the conscious percepts are formed and this can be observed in the ERP correlates
of conscious perception. Thus the main goal of this study was to investigate how manipulating the level of processing of the
same stimulus will alter the ERP responses of the visual system.
We designed an experiment with the visual backward masking paradigm. In each trial a stimulus (either a line or a letter)
was shown randomly in one of four possible locations. Stimuli, displayed for a fixed short duration, were followed by a fixed
mask. Different levels of visibility were achieved by manipulating the SOA of the mask. Participants were asked to perform
three tasks with varying level of processing assumed: stimulus location detection task; line slope identification task and let-
ter classification task. After each trial participants rated the visibility of stimulus on the PAS scale. Simultaneously, 64-chan-
nel EEG data were acquired for further ERP analysis.
The preliminary results of the study confirm that stimulus visibility, determined by the PAS rating, is reflected by differ-
ences in ERP responses associated with conscious perception (c.a. 300 ms after stimulus onset). However, level of process-
ing influenced this relation by modulating the shape of the components in which the conscious/unconscious contrast was
observed. Detailed analysis of the interplay between ERP responses and LoP will be presented at the meeting.

217 Do we have any inference about early visual representation?

Ebrahimpour Reza
Department of Computer Engineering
Rajaee Shahid
Teacher Training University, Tehran, IRAN
Zabbah Sajjad
School of Cognitive Sciences (SCS), Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, IRAN
Farzmahdi Amirhossein
School of Cognitive Sciences (SCS), Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, IRAN

A question in the biological object vision is whether the brain utilizes representation of different layers in visual stream
(such as edges) as separated sources of information for object recognition. Observing neural activation in Pre-Frontal Cor-
tex (PFC) just after V1 neural responses and before activation of Infero Temporal cortex (IT), Bar and his colleagues have
suggested a connection between V1 and prefrontal cortex (M. Bar et. al. 2005). Since the PFC is involved within decision
making process, ones can conclude that V1 representation is used as a source of information beyond the IT representation

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for object categorization. On the other hand, a study by (R. Quiroga and G. Kreiman 2010) declares that V1 neurons do not
have information for discrimination between absent and present of an object. To shed a light on this debate in the literature
we designed a psychophysics experiment based on ultra-rapid categorization task (M. Thorpe et. al. 1998). Here, we used
images of novel objects in different categories. In control experiment, subjects were trained and evaluated with Gabor fil-
tered images (assumed as V1 representation). In the main experiment, they were asked to categorize them while they had
been trained with unfiltered images (original ones). Results illustrate that although there was more information in unfil-
tered images, categorization performance decrease in the main experiment compare to the control one. This primary result
indicates that extracted information in V1 layer (filtered images) is not used as a separate source of information in training
phase. However, it seems that visual system use the final representation for the learning. These results are in agreement with
(R. Quiroga and G. Kreiman 2010) which showed that V1 do not have categorical information. Finally, we can consider two
types of information, conscious and unconscious, extract in visual stream. Assuming that conscious information can directly
affect the categorization performance we conclude that we are unconscious about early visual information.

218 Hypnotic visual hallucinations: goal directed mental imagery or automatic

conscious experiences?
Kallio Sakari
University of Skövde, SWEDEN, University of Turku, FINLAND

Practically all researchers agree upon that a hypnotic induction followed by suggestions of hallucinations can lead to
changed visual experiences especially in highly hypnotizable (HS) individuals. An unsolved question is, however, the nature
of these changes: are they produced actively by using goal directed mental imagery or do they occur automatically without
any effort and thus resemble true hallucinations. Another related question is weather a hypnotic induction is essential as
part of this procedure or can these visual changes occur as well by e.g. creating expectations or providing helpful strategies.
We created demanding colour naming tasks where it is not possible to use mental imagery but which should, however, be
very easy to do for a person who automatically hallucinates colours. Some of our recent findings support the idea that some
very highly hypnotizable individuals can truly experience automatic visual hallucinations, which resemble form – colour
synaesthesia. Using motivational instructions or providing helpful strategies could not generate these same effects. The last
findings and their implications for studying consciousness are discussed.

2.3 Other Sensory Modalities

219 Effects of Natural Environment on Consciousness: A correlational Study

Sahni Pooja
NRCVEE , Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Kumar Jyoti
IDDC, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA
Singh Kamlesh
HUSS, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, INDIA

It has been seen that interaction with natural environment inevitably yields corresponding states of conscious experiences
through positively affecting our brain/cognition. (Selhub, Eva M and Logan,Alan C.2012). On the other hand, understand-
ing how to optimize and improve the functioning of human consciousness (i.e powers of thinking, understanding, com-
prehension of complexity, creativity and innovation, etc) offers major opportunities to accelerate positive and practical re-
sponses to the sustainable development. In this research paper ,we set to find out whether i) there is a correlation between
one’s consciousness level and the inclination towards environmental issues or sustainability at large. ii) natural environments
could help optimize the functioning of human consciousness and lastly ; iii) to attempt a predictive model based on
empiri-

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 2 . 8 A nesthesia

cal data.his study is exclusive in terms that rarely has there been a research to find out what are the other effects, natural envi-
ronments have on human beings beyond physical well being.This study is also unique in the sense that it delves into deeper
issues of what drives the human consciousness,behavior and actions towards environment or sustainability that could be
moderated. Therefore in the absence of any prior study or available data to validate the hypothesis, we generated the data
(representative sample size of 770) through questionnaire based on standardized tests available to measure the conscious-
ness level and to measure the intensity of inclination towards pro- environment behavior and attitudes through Environ-
mental Consciousness Inventory. The questionnaire data was analyzed using SPSS v20.0. Factor analysis confirmed that the
two constructs, Consciousness Quotient and the pro-Environmental behavior and actions are very highly correlated with
a correlation coefficient of 0.738. The present scope of work entails a detailed confirmatory factor analysis of the given hy-
potheses.

2.8 Anesthesia

220 Non-locality and intuition as the second foundation of knowledge

Frecska Ede
Psychiatry, University of Debrecen, Debrecen, HUNGARY
Luna Luis Eduardo
Wasiwaska Research Center

A two-input model of human information processing with the corresponding biological interfaces is proposed in the pres-
entation. It is argued that dual aspects of nature generally are reflected in the way we relate to it, and may appear on the
different levels humans make representation of the environment. Evidence from neurosciences for two quite distinct forms
of visual perception and the ‘bicameral mind’ concept are presented as existing examples of the argued principle. The local-
nonlocal division of the physical world cuts to the deepest level of information processing resulting in two basically different
but complementary foundations of knowledge. A dual-process approach in the way humans relate to the world emerges
from this analysis, with the ‘perceptual-cognitive’ process (based on local effects) receiving awareness in the ordinary states
of consciousness, while the ‘direct-intuitive’ (based on nonlocal connections) process transpiring mainly in the integrative
forms of altered states of consciousness. The outlined dichotomy of knowledge can explain the differences between scien-
tific and spiritual teachings, and provides ground of interpretation for psi research.

221 Coding for Consciousness: Neurite Branching and Selective Neural Circuit
Activation
Beran Jim
N/A, Redwood Falls, Minnesota, USA

Various proposals link consciousness and information, notably Giulio Tononi’s integrated information theory of conscious-
ness (Oizumi et al. 2014). But precisely where in one’s brain is there information that relates to one’s consciousness? More
specifically, did physiological features evolve the capability to code for consciousness in a way analogous to codings studied
by Claude Shannon (Shannon and Weaver 1949) and other communication/information theorists? One well-publicized
suggestion is that spike timing and synchronization can code information in the brain (Sejnowski and Delbruck 2012). Sev-
eral software simulations and chip architectures have employed spike-based approaches (e.g. Gerstner and Kistler 2002, Seo
et al. 2011). We have not found, however, a persuasive account of how spike-based coding could have evolved a capability to
selectively activate neural circuits that support consciousness. We therefore examine a more promising coding approach that
depends on branches in neurites, including both axons and dendrites (“axon+dendrite branch coding”). We propose a two-
part working hypothesis: (1) Neurites evolved mechanisms that sense information-related cues and respond by branching;
and (2) in some cases where a synapse connects an axon branch and a dendrite branch, the postsynaptic neuron responds
to a specific synapse signal pattern by activating a respective neural circuit--an example of axon+dendrite branch coding.
As a preliminary test of this hypothesis, we compare evidence from neuron evolution: Primitive cnidarians have nervous

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systems with ancient characteristics--the starlet sea anemone Nematostella vectensis, for example, has multifunctional, often
transient neurons that appear to have neurites with few branches (Galliot and Quiquand 2011, Arendt 2008, Watanabe et al.
2009, Nakanishi et al. 2012); in contrast, brains of humans and other mammals include many single function, long-lasting
neurons whose neurites form complex branching patterns. These differences in neurons are compatible with our working
hypothesis. As a further test of our working hypothesis, we examine neurite branching mechanisms. Axon branching in-
volves reorganization of actin and microtubule cytoskeleton (Kalil et al. 2011), and dendrite branching appears to operate
similarly. We therefore study interplay between evolution of neurite branching mechanisms and evolution of cytoskeletal
features. Further, we propose a research program to identify proteins that are involved in neurite branching but that also
mutated in concert with evolution of axon+dendrite branch coding. Among such proteins, we may find at least one whose
evolution extended axon+dendrite branch coding so that it codes for consciousness.

222 DNA Consciousness: From Theory to Science

Grandy John
Medicine, North Country Urgent Care, Watertown, USA

This presentation will be based on my chapter that was published in Ingrid Fredriksson’s book The Mysteries of Conscious-
ness [1]. Prior to bringing the theory of DNA consciousness (also called nucleotide-based consciousness) into a science
and attempting to develop a testable model, two very important paradigms needed to be developed. The first paradigm is the
Three Dynamic Levels of DNA Consciousness which is based on interactions [2, 3]: 1) gene-gene interactions 2) genomic
DNA interactions with other nucleic-based entities 3) interactions with DNA and the external environment. The second
paradigm is the Three Neurogenetic Phases of Human Consciousness which are based on neurogenetic correlates of con-
sciousness (NgCC) [4, 5, 6, and 7]: 1) the emergence of neuron-based consciousness 2) the continuum of neuron-based
consciousness 3) the neurodegeneration of neuron-based consciousness. In this presentation I will discuss the scientific re-
search that supports the underlying fundamentals for both of these paradigms.

1. Fredriksson, Ingrid (forthcoming). Mysteries of Consciousness.
2. Grandy, John (2013). The Three Dy-
namic Levels of DNA Consciousness. International Journal of Arts and Sciences 6 (3): 313-327.
3. Grandy,
John (2012). Alzheimer Disease and DNA Consciousness. Academic Journal of Science 1 (3): 169 -184.
4.
Grandy, John (2014). Neurogenetics and Human Consciousness. Journal of Neurological Disorders 2 (1): 1 -4.
1000e109
5. Grandy, John (2014). The Neurogenetic Substructures of Human Consciousness. Essays in Philos-
ophy 15 (2): 266-278.
6. Grandy, John (2013). The Three Neurogenetic Phases of Human Consciousness. Jour-
nal of Conscious Evolution 9: 1-24.
7. Grandy, John (2013). The Neurogenetic Correlates of Consciousness, in
R.L. Amoroso, L.H. Kauffman, & P. Rowlands (eds.): The Physics of Reality: Space, Time, Matter, Cosmos, 8th
Symposium in honor of Jean- Pierre Vigier Singapore: World Scientific.

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223 Power spectral analysis of EEG signal in Fp1-A1 grid during full
consciousness and general anaesthesia with inhalation anesthetic gas
(Sevorane and Desflurane).
Sániová B.
Drobný M.
Clinic of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Medicine, Slovak Republic
Fischer M.
Clinic of Anaesthesiology and Intensive Medicine, Slovak Republic
Drobná E.
Essenius Faculty of Medicine and University Hospital in Martin, Armed Forces Academy of General MR Štefánik in Liptovský
Mikuláš, Slovak Republic
Hamžík J.
Thoracic Surgery Clinic, Slovak Republic

Introduction: Primary target of general anaesthesia (GA) must achieve three goals: to suppress awareness, to install amne-
sia, and avoid painful experience. Brain monitors provide accurate correlates of anaesthetic depth and state of conscious-
ness. We investigate the patients during general anaesthesia in open thorax surgery and analyze EEG signal by means of
power spectrum and frequency.
Methods for research: Patients group of 17, mean age 63.59 years, 9 male–mean age 65.78y, 8 female–mean age 61.13y,
persons submitted to open thoracic surgery. EEG were performed twice:1st) OP0 =the day before surgery. 2nd) stage
OP1=after premedication before start of operation with closed eyes, stage OP2=surgery onset – skin incision-both sides
lung ventilation, OP 3=surgery in phase with the one-side lung ventilation, stage OP 4=end of surgery – sewing, both sides
ventilation, stage OP 5=end of general anaesthesia (GA), before extubation. We statistically evaluate EEG signal in the left
frontal region Fp1-A1 montage. Following EEG classic visual evaluation, power spectral analysis, colour mapping and then
statistic evaluation of the difference in particular reference grid of the 10-20 system, evaluation also by means of LORETA
preformed program. Preliminary results for Fp1-A1 montage in „system 10-20“are following.
Results: The whole frequency range, e.g. EEG backround, expressed by median values varies since 1 Hz in the OP0 till
5.5 Hz in the stage OP4 (expression by mean value 4 Hz in the stage OP2 till to 6.5 Hz after the stage OP4), but with steep
climb early in the stage OP3; with power spectrum of the whole EEG frequency range expressed by median peaked at stage
OP2 (8μV2 ) and kept it until the stage OP4 (in expressing the mean power spectrum peak in stage OP1).
Gamma rhythm expressed by median in stage OP0 34 Hz (mean value 34.5 Hz) decreased in stage OP2 in median 32
Hz (mean value 32.5 Hz), power spectrum under 0.1μV2 expressed by the median in OP0 till to 0.0μV2 in stage OP2 and it
remains in zero power spectrum till to end of follow-up (like in terms of the mean values).
Delta rhythm expressed in the median or the mean values of frequency has not changed, showed a change in power
spectrum from 12 μV2 to 8 μV2, but its power spectrum expressed in median increased in stage OP2 to 20 μV2 and then
decreased until the end of GA under 10 μV2, but expressed by mean values in the stage OP1 increased up to 58 μV2, its fol-
lowing decline until the end of the GA was steep for up to 8 μV2.
Conclusion: Loss of consciousness should be considered the essential component of general anaesthesia, ensuring am-
nesia. Understanding the mechanism of action of anaesthetic gases may answer scientific and philosophical questions re-
garding consciousness, and vice versa. Consciousness correlates with synchronized conformational activities of neuronal
dendrite proteins in cortex and other brain regions. Within each protein, conformational states are regulated by endogenous
London forces in hydrophobic pockets. By forming exogenous London forces, anaesthetic gases prevent consciousness by
impairing endogenous London forces in hydrophobic pockets of dendrite brain proteins.
This work was supported by project Consciousness and its changes during general anaesthesia in thoracic surgery.
APVV 0223/12. Basic research. Slovak Research and Development Agency.

References: Buzsáki G, Draguhn A (2004): Neuronal Oscillations in Cortical Networks. Science 304, 1926.
Hameroff, SR (2006): The entwined mysteries of anesthesia and consciousness.Anesthesiology 105:400-412.
Marchant N et al (2014): How Electroencephalography Serves the Anaesthesiologist ? Clinical EEG and Neu-
roscience 45 (1) 22–32.

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2 . 1 0 Q uantu m N eurodyna m ics

2.10 Quantum Neurodynamics

224 The Quantum Consciousness and the Social Experience of Cinema.

Is Affective Response Related With a Quantum Coherent State Between
Observers?
Camargo-Perez Luis
Experimental Development, Centro de Investigación Frontera y Filosofía, Mexico, MEXICO
Muñoz-Jimenez Daniel
Facultad Mexicana de Medicina, Universidad La Salle, Mexico, MEXICO

Social cinematic experiences like cinema and other theatrical spectacles are widely known as the major collective phenom-
ena for the civilized human being. Its success over many other individualized ludic experiences is believed to be originated
over the social interaction between the individuals in the theater rather than the cinematic stimuli per se; nevertheless,
previous studies have suggested that simultaneous or synchronic exposure to cinematic stimuli could lead to a quorum-
sensing-like effect where observers display synchronic behaviors and neurological phenomena after this exposure; hence,
it has been proposed that neurological synchronization is a major component of the arousal in alike ludic experiences. This
cognitive synchronization among individuals is commonly attributed to the sensory-perceptual capacity of the subject that
triggers specialized behaviors when certain environmental and social conditions occur. Conversely, we hypothesized, having
the quantum consciousness and ultrastructural neurophysiology novel theories as background, that an increasing quantum
coherent state between individuals which sustain attention over a common source of light (that will randomly deliver entan-
gled photons pairs to a quorum), is paramount to achieve a neurological and cognitive synchronization that will ultimately
lead to a significantly higher affective response of a grouped individuals exposed to a same light source visual stimuli rather
than isolated exposed subjects.
Aiming to challenge this hypothesis, we developed and purpose an experimental procedure to measure the possible role
of quantum coherent state between different observers with behavioral and physiological parameters. A group of healthy
voluntaries will be exposed to standardized movie fragments where the differential affective response will be measured for
each collective exposure among a group subjects where the visual stimuli was synchronized but provided with different pho-
ton sources over same-photonic source groups. Moreover, another group of subjects will be exposed to a same light source
stimuli but having the subjects located in different chambers, and a control group with individually located subjects with dif-
ferent light source visual stimuli. Behavioral and physiological parameters are to be recorded during the exposure to assess
the affective response of each subject after the exposure to the fragment. Significant differences in the perception and affec-
tive response assessed over each photon-source and grouping variables will disguise the possible role of quantum coherence
on collective human behavior after exposure to cinematic stimuli from a common light sources and could mean one of the
first experimental evidences of quantum mechanics of consciousness on human neurophysiology.

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 2 . 1 0 Q uantu m N eurodyna m ics

225 Experimental test of the dissipative many-body model of brain.
Nonlinear

brain dynamics modelling of memories and Bessel Functions in Mass Action
Vitiello Giuseppe
Physics “E.R.Caianiello”, University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY
Freeman Walter
Molecular and Cell Biology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
Capolupo Antonio
Physics “E.R.Caianiello”, University of Salerno, Fisciano (Salerno), ITALY
Kozma Robert
Mathematics, Memphis University, Memphis TN , USA
Olivares del Campo Andrés
The Blackett Laboratory , Imperial College London, London, UNITED KINGDOM

Motivated by the resemblance of functions representing some neurological processes with Bessel functions, as it appears
from Freeman’s observational data[1-3], we study brain dynamics in terms of spherical Bessel equations, thus submitting
the nonlinear dynamics of the dissipative many-body model[4-8] to a further experimental test, obtaining a positive re-
sult[4]. We consider the equivalence, in a specific parameterization, between spherical Bessel equations and two equations,
one for a damped, the other for an amplified oscillator. The root loci of poles and zeros of solutions of Bessel equations are
compared with results obtained using ordinary differential equation techniques and functions fitting averaged evoked poten-
tials from the prepyriform cortex and the ones modelling the axon synapses in the primary olfactory nerve[1,2]. We discuss
them in the presence of stable and unstable limit cycles. Time-reversal symmetry breakdown (the arrow of time) in each
of the damped and amplified oscillators is related with thermodynamic features[2,3]. Observations show that pulses and
wave modes coexist simultaneously in circular causality in the neural dynamics, which thus cannot be understood from ei-
ther wave or pulses alone. By introducing the theorem relating fractal self-similarity to quantum coherence[9], the observed
power laws[2] in brain functioning are described in terms of scale free properties of coherent states[10]. The lifetime of os-
cillation is related with damping coefficients appearing in the fitting functions and depends on state. In the chaotic gas-like
phase, lifetime is determined by the decay rate of the exponential impulse responses, in turn specified by the negative feed-
back gain. In the ordered liquid-like phase, the gain is specified by the distribution of the characteristic frequencies around
the mean value of the carrier frequency. In both cases, the finiteness of lifetime indicates the existence of non-permanent,
constantly changing (unwired) neuronal interactions mediated not only by synaptic connections but by ephapsis[1,2,4,8].

1. W.J.Freeman, Mass Action in the Nervous System (Academic Press, New York 1975/2004) 2. W.J.Freeman
and R.Quian Quiroga, Imaging brain function with EEG (Springer, New York (2013)) 3. W.J.Freeman, Cur-
rent Opinion in Neurobiology 31, in print 4. W.J.Freeman, A.Capolupo, R.Kozma, A.Olivares del Campo,
G.Vitiello, Bessel Functions in Mass Action. Modeling of Memories and Remembrances, submitted for publi-
cation 5. G.Vitiello, My Double Unveiled ( John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2001)
6. W.J.Freeman and G.Vitiello,
Physics of Life Review 3, 93 (2006)
7. W.J.Freeman, R.Livi, M.Obinata and G.Vitiello, Int. J. Mod. Phys.
B 26, 1250035 (2012) 8. A.Capolupo, W.J.Freeman, and G.Vitiello, Physics of Life Review, 10, 85 (2013)
9.
G.Vitiello, Systems, 2, 203 (2014) doi:10.3390/systems2020203
10. G.Vitiello, New Mathematics and Natural
Computing 5, 245 (2009)
11. G.Vitiello, Current Opinion in Neurobiology 31, in print

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2.14 Sleep and Waking

226 The differences and similarities between the consciousness of dream and
wakefulness: A phenomenological and electrophysiological study
Suzgun Eyup
Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Hanoglu Lutfu
Neurology, Medipol University, Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yamanoglu Merve
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildiz Sultan
Biophysics, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Cadirci Fadime
Neuroscience master’s student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Mantar Nagihan
Neuroscience master’s student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Toprak Guven
Neuroscience PhD student, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Helvaci Yilmaz Nesrin
Neurology, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yildirim Erol
Psychology, Medipol University, Istanbul, TURKEY
Yalciner Betul
Neurology, Bayindir Hospital, Istanbul, TURKEY
Agargun Mehmet Yucel
Psychiatry, Medipol University,Faculty of Medicine, Istanbul, TURKEY

There are limited studies comparing the functional brain activity and cognition during the dream and wakefulness. Accord-
ing to Activation-Input Source-Modulation (AIM) theory the nature of the mental activity during the dream significantly
differs from the wakefulness involving especially the high-order cognitive skills (including volition, logical reasoning, and
reflective awareness, are suspended in dreaming, relative to waking). This can be related to electrophysiological and neuro-
biological changes during the REM sleep. However, there are other theories suggesting that dream and wakefulness are both
continuous processes of mental functions. Here we evaluated ten patients through PSG and 19 channel EEG. The patients
were waken up after 5 minutes of the onset of REM sleep and the dream content was recorded. In order to evaluate the
differences between the dream and wakefulness consciousness state, we applied Dream Consciousness Scale (DCS) and
analyzed 21 REM records. u8232 For EEG analysis, we have evaluated a 5 minute long wakefulness/resting EEG record
data before the sleep onset and the 5 minute long record of REM sleep before we woke up the patients.
The data was ana-
lyzed in two ways a) the evaluation of the phenomenological/cognitive differences between the consciousness of sleep and
dream that is identified through DCS where the main difference was the ability to establish a reason-result relation and spa-
tial perception during the dream and b) The evaluation of the electrophysiological correlates of these phenomenological
differences through the analysis of REM-EEG records with the help of coherence analysis where we have also compared
the wakefulness EEG and REM records. As a result, phenomenenological/cognitive features of the consciousness of dream
and wakefulness are similar. However, in a minor part of dreams, the phenomenology of dream consciousness may differ
from the wakefulness that is associated with significant electrophysiological correlates that should be evaluated with further
research in this area.

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2.15 Specific Brain Areas

227 A tDC stimulation protocol for the motor cortex to induce physical and
mental relaxation in untrained participants CANCELLED
Speth Clemens
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM
Speth Jana
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM
Harley Trevor
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM

We present a tDCS protocol developed to induce relaxation and explore its physical and mental components. Many current
clinical, athletic and meditative relaxation techniques are feasible only for a certain group of people, as they require training
and are difficult or even contraindicated with some psychological dispositions such as relaxation-induced anxiety. During
EEG- and EMG-controlled laboratory sessions, healthy participants received anodal and cathodal tDC stimulation (versus
sham tDCS) of their above the C3 scalp position. Changes in frequency band power and muscle tone along with cognitive
and phenomenological markers indicate that our tDCS protocol aids both physical and mental relaxation. We hope that this
study can lay the groundwork for future studies aiming at clinical applications of this technique.

2.16 Miscellaneous (Neuroscience)

228 Indeterminacy in the Central Nervous System

Beal Daniel
Psychiatry, Cincinnati VAMC and the University of Cincinnati, CINCINNATI, USA

Some level of central nervous system determinism is present in all theories suggesting an explicit cause and effect in brain
activity. There are theories, principles, and proofs in physics, combinatorics, mathematics and the theory of computing
which indicate that central nervous system determinism is not possible.
Physicist Walter Elssasser elaborated the idea of immense numbers of possibilities in genetics, which would render pre-
cise prediction of heritability impossible. He suggests a heuristic immense number; suggesting that any system with more
possible states cannot have deterministic future states. The same problem of immense numbers of states exists in the brain
with the same problem of predictability.
Quantum mechanics elaborates the principle of quantum uncertainty. While this principle exists on the sub- micro-
scopic level there are potential connections to macroscopic events. These macroscopic effects can be seen in such phenom-
ena and constructs such as the slit lamp experiment, Schrodinger’s Cat thought experiment, and Bell’s theorem. Alwyn Scott
argues against the effect of quantum mechanics in the brain by arguing (using some of the other principles elaborated here)
that there are non-linear and non-predictable processes at every level in the central nervous system and quantum uncer-
tainty effects are not needed for indeterminacy.
Kurt Gödel proves that mathematics cannot be complete or consistent when based on an axiomatic system (he uses
Russell and Whitehead’s Principia as his exemplar algorithmic system). Alonzo Church proved a generalization of Gödel’s
results for all formal systems, which would include any formal functional description of brain activity.
Alan Turing elaborated the Halting Problem in computer science. The Halting Problem proof establishes that it is im-
possible to predict whether a computer program based on simple repeating rules will ever halt. More generally stated, we
cannot predict the outcome of brain systems defined using iterative models.
Kolmogorov, a Russian mathematician, has elaborated the concept that some data sets cannot be reduced in a way that

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2 . 1 6 Misce l l aneous ( N euroscience )

a simpler or shorter description can characterize the data set. There are many brain states that cannot be described in a sim-
pler way. Gregory Chaitin’s algorithmic information theory approaches the same problem from another point of view.
Roger Penrose takes a neo-Platonist view of mathematical insight, maintaining that any usefully descriptive mathemati-
cal theory must be the product of human intuition accessing mathematical truths. Penrose’s view would require the creative
uncertainty of human intuition to be a component of any algorithm describing brain function.
If any of these principles are true, then any deterministic models of central nervous system predictability cannot be true.
These points will be elaborated and discussed using examples and historical detail.

229 Implicit and explicit processing of facial attractiveness in healthy adult

males and females: high- density ERP study
Mnatsakanian Elena
HHNA lab, IHNA &NP RAS, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

We aimed at studying brain electrical activity underlying the assessment of facial attractiveness in healthy adult volunteers.
Facial attractiveness (FA) is an important social information, so its processing may be fast and automatic. We compared how
brain activity would differ depending on whether FA was processed explicitly or implicitly. Also, we expected to observe the
gender-specificity in FA assessment.
128-channel EEG was recorded while our participants (41 female, 46 male) performed two visual tasks. In the Implicit
task (always first task in this study) the stimuli were monochrome photographs of female faces, butterflies and flowers. The
instruction was to press button 1 for a face and button 2 for an non-face object. In the Explicit task the stimuli were faces
from the first task. The instruction was to press button 1 for an attractive face (WB) and button 2 for a non-attractive face
(WU). To assess the modulation due to FA, we compared the evoked activity and the behavioral parameters for the condi-
tions WB vs. WU in both tasks, for males and females separately.
Motor reaction time (RT) for correct responses in Implicit task was shorter for WB than for WU in both females and
males (p<0.05). In Explicit task, the differences were significant only for males (p < 0.001).
In both tasks, the ERP compo-
nents peaking at 70-80 ms and 120-130 ms were larger for the female than for the male group, and gender differences were
also seen for the latencies longer than 200 ms. The WB-WU differences in Explicit task for both groups were after 300 ms
widespread on the scalp except for the right anterior area. For the shorter latencies, the WB-WU differences were seen in
components at 120 ms and at 70- 80 ms. The topography of the FA-related modulation in 70-200 ms in Implicit task seems
to be more gender- dependent than in Explicit task. In Explicit task the WB-WU differences were in central, centro-frontal,
and occipital regions, and the gender-specificity was mostly in the “size” of the effect (larger in females than in males). Un-
like this, in Implicit task the locations were dramatically different dependent on the group. For the female group, the FA-
related modulation was in the right posterior area and in central and right frontal regions. For the male group, it was in the
left parietal area.
It seems that the implicit processing of FA reveals gender-specificity not seen during the explicit processing of FA dur-
ing the first 200 ms after the picture onset. This may imply distinct mechanisms of automatic FA processing by adult hetero-
sexual males and females.

230 The overflow model of the evolution of consciousness.

Mogi Ken
Fundamental Research Laboratory, Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo, JAPAN

There are continuing debates as to whether sensory overflow exists in a phenomenologically significant sense (e.g. Lau &
Rosenthal 2011, Block 2011). There would be less argument, however, whether sensory overflow exists in the physical
sense. Specifically, given the volume of sensory data coming into the brain from the environment, it is not in general possible
to make a full use of it. Consequently, failures in cognitive process (exemplified in change blindness (Simons & Levin 1997)
and inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock 1998)) would be incurred, posing significant constraints on what the brain
could do computationally.
Independent of the stance one takes as to the nature of phenomenal overflow, there would always be overflow of sen-
sory information in the physical sense. In general, there are more information than could be processed by the brain. The
brain has adapted several strategies (e.g. redundancy reduction (Barlow 2001)) to cope with this situation.

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Seen from the volume of information processed, consciousness can be regarded as a series of cognitive processes in
which there will be gradually less information represented within the system. In the visual system, it is estimated that about
10^10 bits/sec of information is registered at the retina, about 6x10^6 bits/sec of information leaves the retina, and about
10^4 bits/sec of information reaches the layer IV of area V1 (Raichle 2010). It has been estimated that information pro-
cessed in consciousness is about 126 bits per second (Csíkszentmihályi 1956), while having a conversation alone takes
about 40 bits per second. From the computational point of view, the main challenge for consciousness would appear to be
the effective handling of information, as the bandwidth becomes narrow at the higher cognitive processes. The brain has
apparently adapted several strategies, including redundancy reduction and gist perception (Oliva 2005, Cohen et al. 2011),
to cope with the abundance of sensory information.
Here I present a model of the evolution of consciousness based on the
idea that sensory overflow has been one of the key constraints in the emergence of consciousness. The overflow model of
consciousness would provide a common basis for biological information processing from a single cell to the human brain.
It is proposed that various life forms (e.g., paramecium, nematode, and vertebrates) are faced with the common problem of
handling the abundance of information in a robust manner within a limited bandwidth. The conscious process serves as the
last cognitive process prior to action, in which a robust gist representation of the outside world must be somehow formed
from the sensory overflow. I argue that several properties of phenomenal consciousness (e.g. qualia, integrated parallelism)
arose as a result of this adaptation to the overflow of sensory information.
From the overflow perspective, there is a con-
tinuous spectrum of consciousness from a single cell organism to a complex multicellular system like the human brain. Such
a viewpoint would help elucidate the nature of consciousness as a ubiquitous property of biological systems, with several
species-specific additions, e.g. the linguistic functions of the human consciousness.

231 Archaeoacoustic Investigation of a Prehistoric Cave Site: Frequency-

Dependent Sound Amplification and Potential Relevance for Neurotheology
Tessaro Lucas
Human Studies, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Gaona Jose
Faculty of Medicine, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos de Madrid, Madrid, SPAIN
Rouleau Nicolas
Experimental Psychology, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Caswell Joseph
Human Studies, Laurentian University, Sudbury, CANADA
Burke Ryan
Department of Biology, Université de Limoges, Limoges, FRANCE
Schumacher David
PRG Anomalous Research Unit, Red Lion, USA

An archaeoacoustic study was recently conducted within the prehistoric cave system of El Castillo in northern Spain. With
findings dating back at least 40800 years, archaeological studies of this cave have revealed the presence of prehistoric ritual
activity associated with early shamanism. Simulated audio tones of varying frequencies were created and emitted from the
location at which it is thought the shamans would conduct rituals within El Castillo, while the sound was simultaneously re-
corded from the likely location of potential observers or participants. Subsequent analysis identified a frequency-dependent
amplification of recorded sound intensity for frequencies approaching the range of 100 Hz, with the greatest effect observed
for 108 and 110 Hz. These results are markedly consistent with previous research of important or sacred sites which have
shown significant sonic resonance features within this precise range of frequencies. Additional consideration is applied to
the potential effects of 110 Hz physical stimuli on biological systems in the context of neurotheology and the associated bio-
physical analyses in order to demonstrate the potential importance of 110 Hz signals on religious experience and subjective
states of consciousness.

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3 . C o g nitive S ciences and P sycho l o g y

3. Cognitive Sciences and

Psychology

3.1 Attention

232 Effect of Yoga and Meditation on Metacognition and Mind-wandering

Ahuja Sona
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Mind-wandering often leaves few working memory resources as off-task thoughts additionally acquire the resources.
These self-generated and task unrelated thoughts are linked to poor performance on the tasks, cognitive deficits and
multiple psychological disorders such as depression and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. In order to examine and
control cognitive processes, one must possess a meta-cognitive plan. Meta- cognitive skills enable access and control of
mental content thereby enabling preferential attention to conscious content. Once the meta-awareness of mind-wander-
ing is achieved, the attention can be regulated. Meditationists practice selected form of meditation to relax the mind and
regulate their thoughts. To what extent it enables them to have conscious cognizance of their thoughts and how far they
can regulate their thoughts or clear the internal clutter to reduce mind-wandering optimally and achieve the stage of expe-
riencing inner stillness? Can the practice of yoga and meditation alter meta-cognition and mind-wandering?
The present
study is an attempt to seek answers to these questions. In an experimental set-up, the participants practiced meditation
based on Oriental Philosophy of Saints (Radhasoami Santmat), for 20 weeks. Mind- wandering and metacognition of
naïve meditators, intermediate meditators and advanced meditators was compared in experimental and control situation.
The retrospective measures were used to study mind- wandering. Studies using retrospective reports of mind-wandering
after a task has been finished typically find results that are similar to those obtained with thought-sampling during the
task (Mrazek, et.al. 2011). Metacognition was studied through self-reporting. The results reveal that there is significant
difference in metacognition of novice, intermediate and advanced meditators, both at pre-test and post-test. The practice
of yoga and meditation increased the meta-awareness and regulation of thoughts with variation in gain for three different
groups.
There was also significant difference in mind-wandering of three groups at pre-test. The advanced meditators had
lesser task unrelated thoughts before intervention in comparison to other groups. Post intervention, the mind-wandering
of intermediate meditators was reduced to the level of advanced meditators. The mind- wandering of advanced meditators
did not reduce significantly after intervention. This indicates that to a certain extent mind-wandering can be reduced with
regular practice of yoga and meditation within 20 weeks, but to experience permanent inner silence by eliminating task
unrelated thoughts to a greater extent, may require practice of longer duration. This study can be extended to more than
20 weeks to investigate the alteration in mind-wandering for advanced meditators.

233 Attentional attractors and visual awareness

Carmel David
Psychology, University or Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM

The relationship between attention and awareness is hotly debated. In particular, a current controversy revolves around
whether attention is a condition (either necessary or sufficient) for conscious experience. In this presentation I will argue
that the debate itself is misguided, and rooted in an erroneous conception of the way attention functions. Spatial attention
is often likened to a spotlight, but this metaphor is inadequate: It cannot account for the reduced sensitivity at unattended
locations that accompanies perceptual facilitation at attended locations, nor for the flexibility of attention, which can be
divided over several peripheral locations. Here, I will describe recent psychophysical work that systematically explored the

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effects of both the validity and number of peripheral cues. A series of experiments demonstrated that dividing attention
impairs sensitivity at the cued locations, but improves it at uncued locations. These findings are consistent with a model in
which attentional cues act as attractors for spatially-tuned receptive channels: Cueing alters channels’ spatial tuning, increas-
ing their density near a cue and decreasing it elsewhere. Multiple cues pull in different directions, reducing both of these
effects. Attentional attractors thus account for these and various other findings, and offer a viable mechanism for attention’s
effects. Importantly, if attention is simply a change in the spatial tuning of retinotopic channels, then the baseline state is not
inattention but rather an unbiased distribution of channels. Changing the distribution of channels in retinotopic space thus
constitutes attention – and in the absence of a biologically plausible scenario in which all channels are withdrawn from a
specific location, there is no point in talking about a condition in which attention is absent. Instead, I will use the results of a
different recent study demonstrating the independence of attention and emotion in access to awareness to propose that ef-
forts should be focused on defining the causal clusters that lead to conscious perceptual experience.

234 The neurofeedback training affects physiological signals but not behavior
performance of attenion
Chen Yen
Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, TAIWAN
Shiauhua Liu
Department of Counseling and Clinical Psychology, National Dong-Hwa University, Hualien, TAIWAN

Neurofeedback training(NFT) becomes popular and is frequently applied to clinical patients in recent years. Kaiser and
Othmer(2000)found out that the efficacy of using NFT could reach up to 85%. Many researchers are employing Mind-
set, a Brainwave device, in learning and daily living(Crowley, Sliney, Pitt, & Murphy, 2012). However, to the limit of our
knowledge, there is no empirical studies using objective measurement tools to investigate attention training with Mindset.
Therefore, this study aims to investigate:(1)how the NFT effect with Mindset is associated with physiological changes;(2)
if there is an NFT effect on attention performance when asking people practice concentrating or relaxing. We utilized a
neurofeedback tool, Mindset, and Brainwave Visualizer program to conduct NFT and measured physiological states and
brain frequency for participants in NFT process. We also measure the attention performance of participants by Attention
Network Test-Revised (ANT-R), which was established by Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum and Posner(2005). We
recruit 42 normal participants and randomly assign all participants into three groups, concentration, relaxation and control.
The participants joined a 5-week training sessions for twice a week. Results have shown that(1)during the process of NFT,
skin conductance, skin temperature and respiratory rate all changed as expected.(2)the blood volume pulse and the Alpha
frequency in the sixth-week NFT are significantly higher than that in the first- week training.(3)we did not find significant
supporting evidence that NFT could enhance the attention network performance by Attention Network Test-Revised.

235 Attention is the Deployment of Extra Processing Capacity

Fazekas Peter
Philosophy / Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, Aarhus University, Aarhus, DENMARK
Nanay Bence
Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, BELGIUM

Recent empirical and theoretical advances seem to support the interpretation that attention is not a unitary mechanism, but
rather a feature of multiple processes operating at almost all stages of the perceptual-cognitive system. From this perspective,
it becomes a crucial question whether there is a common core function of the many different forms of attention. There are
two general functions often associated with attention: selection and modulation. Traditionally, these two functions are seen
as independent, and selection is claimed to be the more primary: attention modulates the processing of the target informa-
tion only after the target has already been selected from competing options. We challenge this traditional understanding. In
our view, selection is no more primary than modulation: both functions are implemented by the same mechanism, namely
the continuous and flexible re-allocation of processing resources. The features of this mechanism are the common core char-
acteristics of all forms of attention. The notion of ‘resources’ is notoriously left unexplained in most of the relevant literature.
Here we anchor it to representational encoding. By allocating more resources, attention improves the quality of the repre-

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sentations of the target features. Modulatory effects follow straightforwardly from this understanding of attention. Enhanced
sensitivity and acuity are consequences of the allocation of extra processing resources, decreased sensitivity and acuity are
the consequences of the withdrawal of processing resources. Observed automatic negative modulatory effects on low level
processing of unattended stimuli follow from our view given two additional hypotheses: (i) processing resources are of lim-
ited capacity, and (ii) low level sensory subsystems always operate near their capacity limit. We argue that (i) is due to limits
in energy resources required for representational encoding, and (ii) is supported by energy considerations and observations
related to spontaneous activity of the primary sensory areas. Given (i) and (ii), selection effects also follow. The allocation
of extra processing capacity to attended stimuli leads to the withdrawal of processing capacity from unattended stimuli, and
thus to diminished representational encoding of unattended stimuli—i.e. to partial selection. Full-blown selection follows if
attended stimuli consume all processing capacity so that no residual capacity could spill out to unattended stimuli. We argue
that this way of thinking about attention has greater explanatory power, since it proposes a common implementation both
for selection and modulatory effects; it is better in theoretical integration, since it provides a single framework for interpret-
ing the results of different and sometimes competing approaches to attention; and it offers a unificatory perspective on the
workings of perception and cognition. Moreover, this approach re-conceptualises the relationship between attention and
perception. It is an essential feature of perceptual processing that its resources get continuously re-allocated. In the course of
this re-allocation the processing of certain stimuli receive extra capacity making these stimuli the attended ones. Attention,
thus, is not an extra mechanism working on top of perception (as the traditional view claimed it to be), but rather an aspect
of how perception itself works.

236 A science of compassionate care: A new challenge for a science of

consciousness in contemporary neuroethics
Gorjup Rado
Institute for Transdisciplinary Research, SLOVENIA
Gorjup Niko
ITR - Institute for Transdisciplinary Research, SLOVENIA

One of the puzzling phenomena in the field of consciousness that is still waiting to be resolved is the Placebo Effect. Both
the modern medicine and the primitive treatments of our ancestors share the same integral component of the healing pro-
cess: the nonspecific component of the treatment. If we accept that, the history of medicine was more or less the history of
the placebo response than we can assume that the modern medical treatment has evolved from the placebo treatment, or
to put another way, the specific factors have evolved from the nonspecific ones. Furthermore, if the primitive, nonscientific
healing of our ancestors had been so useless, or if nonspecific factors had not played an integral role in the healing process
throughout history, it is very likely that humankind would not have survived those harmful nocebo treatments, and thus
there would have been no modern evidence-based medicine. As we cannot resolve the problem with the same idea that
created the problem it seems wise to make a paradigmatic shift. In this regard, we introduce the new operational placebo
definitions and explicitly show that the human mind (unconscious and conscious) is an inevitable substance involved in
the healing process. The terms “placebo”, “placebo effect”, and “placebo response” are redefined. We explain how there is no
more distinction (duality) such as body–mind, specific– nonspecific or health–disease, which offers new insights for future
directions in contemporary Science of Consciousness. Mind body interactions indicate no differences between pharmaco
- dynamic and psychosocial effects, or to put another way cognitive affective events induced in a psychosocial context can
trigger similar mechanisms as those activated by drugs. If medical society will recognize the opportunity to define both ef-
fects interchangeably, then the art of a healing compassion can become a science - A science of compassionate care. By doing
so the non-specific effect will become specific and the treatment will have the added effect. This effect is “gratis” and should
be regarded in the future as psychosocial evidence based interpretation effect. In the present article, we intentionally bypass
the extensive overview of the Placebo literature. Instead, we introduce the brief history of Placebo definitions to understand
better their metamorphosis and point out some contemporary concepts of this puzzling phenomenon. Finally, we propose
three major premises as the future standards for Contemporary Neuroethics. In conclusions, we discuss that the placebo
phenomena is very real and natural, and that there is nothing supernatural in its process. This opens new horizons towards
the Science of Consciousness in general and neuroethical standards in particular.

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237 Consciousness prefers direct gaze to averted gaze in change detection

Lyyra Pessi
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND
Hietanen Jari K.
Human Information Processing Laboratory, School of Social Sciences and Humanities/Psychology, University of Tampere,
Tampere, FINLAND
Astikainen Piia
Department of Psychology, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

Look at her, and she will notice you: Direct gaze enters consciousness before averted gaze in change detection
Studies of conscious and non-conscious perception have paid surprisingly little attention to how observers become con-
scious of initially implicitly presented stimuli.  Most effectively, this can be studied with continuous flash suppression or
change blindness. Both offer a way to study whether some type of a stimulus enjoys a privileged status in consciousness over
others. One example of this is direct gaze. In the continuous flash suppression (CFS) paradigm, in which conscious percep-
tion of a stimulus is suppressed by presentation of a flashing high-contrast stimulus to the other eye, direct gaze is preferred
so that it breaks through to consciousness faster than averted gaze.
The present studies aimed to investigate whether this holds for change detection in the change blindness paradigm.
In change blindness, immediate consciousness of changes is prevented by a mask inserted before the presentation of the
changes. Either changes can be detected by random top-down search, or they can trigger implicit attentional shifts resulting
in breaking into consciousness.
In three experiments, changes were presented in a S1-S2 change blindness paradigm. Four facial images with laterally
averted or direct gaze, the composition of which was varied across three experiments, were presented around a fixation
cross. Occasionally, the gaze of one face changed from averted to a direct gaze or vice versa.
We found that changes from averted to direct gaze were detected more efficiently than changes from direct to averted
gaze. This held for all distractor face compositions. However, when observer gender was controlled, the results showed that
this effect was confined to female participants in all three experiments. This suggests that among faces, those offering a pos-
sibility to eye contact enjoy a privileged status in consciousness, at least for women.

238 Synesthetic Experience and Attention: An Additional Perspective

Marinova Mila
Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Varna, BULGARIA

Throughout history synesthesia was considered a false perception, an illusion or hallucination, but present day science is far
from the idea that synesthesia is some kind of anomalous condition caused by imagination, metaphorical thinking or false
memories. Today we have empirical evidence that synesthesia has in fact neural and genetic basis. Synesthetic experience
may be considered as a function of specific brain activation, and underlying neurological hyper connectivity, so some synes-
thetic phenomena may appear much faster (or slower) than others. A puzzle that still remains unsolved though is whether
synesthetic experience is pre- attentive (it “pops out”) or whether it requires some amount of attentional resource. Here I
compare the methods and results of recent studies on both sides of this debate and point out their advantages and disad-
vantages. My conclusion is that studies based on the hypothesis that attention modulates the synesthetic experience offer
a more thorough explanation of the phenomena, and a compelling evidence of the existence of that kind of relation, than
those studies which try to prove some “pop-out” effect. Taking into account the result of my comparison, I argue for an
additional theoretical perspective on the influence of memory on attention. There are no approaches to the study of synes-
thesia that I know of, which are devoted to the relation between memory processes and attention. However, recent psycho-
logical experiments and fMRI observation show that memory optimizes attention. Case and group studies on synesthetes
point out the possibility of specific encoding processes and enhanced memory abilities. My main point is that there is a
strong connection between synesthesia and the influence of memory on attention. This perspective may prove to benefit our
knowledge about the role of attention in synesthesia – a phenomenon we do not yet completely understand.

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239 A case of consciousness without attention?

Taylor Henry
Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

In recent years, a particularly exciting project has been to attempt to understand consciousness by appeal to attention. The
interaction between attention and consciousness has generated a colossal amount of debate. The main issue from both a
philosophical and empirical point of view has been the attempt to dissociate them: does attention appear outside of con-
sciousness? And is there consciousness without attention?
Despite huge amounts of empirical data and philosophical argumentation addressing these questions, the answers re-
main extremely unclear. Recently, Ned Block has put forward an especially ingenious argument for the claim that we can be
conscious of something, without even being able to direct attention toward that thing. Block draws upon large amounts of
empirical data from the study of peripheral vision. Particularly, Block bases much of his argument upon the fact that people
have access to a great deal of information about items in their peripheral vision, even though they are unable to pay attention
to them. Block’s view is a particularly extreme one, and it has already generated a slew of responses and counteresponses.
Firstly, I will consider some attacks on Block’s argument by Michael Tye, and argue that Tye’s argument is unsuccessful.
Then I will thoroughly analyse Block’s argument and present two reasons to reject it. The first problem is that there is
good reason to think that the items in question really are subject to some kind of attention. I draw upon some empirical
work performed by Robert Kentridge in order to argue in favour of this claim, and show that Block’s argument is unsuccess-
ful at ruling this out. If this were true, it would destroy Block’s main claim.
The second problem with Block’s argument is that even if we do accept that the item in question was not subject to at-
tention, we still need not accept that the item was conscious. In order to argue for this, I put forward another explanation of
all of the empirical data that Block cites, which has the consequence that items in peripheral vision that escape attention also
escape consciousness. I draw upon recent philosophical work in debates over the content of phenomenal consciousness in
order to argue for this.
This does not, however, give us good reason to think that it is impossible to be conscious of something that we cannot
attend to. In closing, I will consider this more general question, and argue that we need a more theory (rather than evidence)
based approach in order to resolve the issue.

240 How to Integrate Emotions

Thomsen Knud
NUM, Paul Scherrer Insitut, Villigen, SWITZERLAND

Uncounted different definitions, purported mechanisms or functions attributed to affect, feelings and emotions have been
proposed; some consolidation is required. The Ouroboros Model describes a new biologically inspired cognitive architecture
explaining emotions as indispensable constituents of efficient cognition.
In brains, neural assemblies are permanently linked
together when once co-activated in a specific manner; resulting memory entries are organized into schemata. Later activation
of a feature excites the entire selected trace and leads to graded activation for each of the associated attributes. Activation of
part of a schema, according to the Ouroboros Model, biases the whole structure with all relevant slots including ‘empty’ slots,
i.e., concurrently missing features. A self-referential recursive process with alternating phases ensues. Stages of anticipation,
action/perception, evaluation and refined anticipation take turns in an overall cyclic and iterative self-referential process. A
monitor process termed ‘consumption analysis’ checks how well expectations triggered at one point in time fit with succes-
sive activations. Consumption analysis delivers a signal for the goodness of fit between anticipations derived from experience
and the current state of affairs for an agent; such feedback contributes the primary “feeling”-component of emotions.
Consumption analysis as a specific form of appraisal sets the stage for subsequent action. Affects as information and mo-
tivational accounts stressing behavioral dispositions consequently just emphasize different facets of the basic processes in the
Ouroboros Model.
Emotions are tied to particular events, objects or situations; memories comprise “inherited” emo-tional
dimensions. “New” emotions, experienced in conjunction with unfamiliar objects and under novel circumstances, are inte-
grated into schemata as any other attribute. Eventually, they have almost the same status and effects as inborn (re)action pat-
terns. Discrepancies as well as achieve-ments usually evoke emotions and provoke attention and arousal. Heightened arousal,
in turn, boosts emotions; focusing on this latter activation path, one arrives at somatic theories of emotions.
Discrepancies
are advantageously dealt with according to their relevance and weight, and a rather fixed sequence of appraisal dimensions
might be observed because of general similarities between overarching schemata. With some abstraction, basic emotions can
be distilled.
Actors often are not alone; any (feedback) signal useful for oneself certainly is of relevance also to others. This ex-

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plains the communication value of displayed emotions.
Never-seen-before content obtains its first affective qualification from
consumption analysis; in this case, emotions clearly come after some appraisal and (not necessarily conscious) evaluation of
a situation. Upon later (partly) reactivation, not only semantic content but also stored emotional tags are effective.
For previ-
ously encountered schemata the affective components is activated significantly faster than semantic attributes, especially for
strongly marked content; in this case, emotions are evoked directly, fast and before any substantial (new) (cognitive) evalu-
ation.
It is claimed that this explains why it was possible that eminent researcher had fierce arguments over the primacy of
emotions versus cognition; in the light of the Ouroboros Model, they just see different sides of one coin, cutting through
processing cycles at different points; and both sides were right (but only partly, each for their perspective).

3.2 Vision

241 Advaita Vedanta and the Extended Mind Hypothesis: Panpsychism and
Perception an Indo-Analytic Inquiry
Anand Vaidya
Philosophy, San Jose State University, San Jose, USA
Bilimoria Purushottama
University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

The extended mind hypothesis, EMH, defended by Clark and Chalmers (1998), maintains that in some cases the mind
extends beyond the body. In this work we do not primarily engage the question of whether EMH is true. Rather, we en-
gage the comparative philosophical question: Do any of the schools of classical Indian philosophy articulate and defend
the view that the mind extends beyond the body in a style of constructive engagement that pushes forward the debate on
EMH? Using Mark Rowland’s (2010) discussion of EMH and Zed Adams & Chauncey Maher’s (2012) defense of EMH,
we build a framework for critically investigating our question. The framework we build uses Adams and Maher’s analysis
of John Haugeland’s (1995) argument in favor of EMH, as well as their analysis of the problem with Fred Adams and Ken-
neth Aizawa’s (2001, 2010) objection that EMH commits the coupling-constitution fallacy. We maintain, in agreement with
Adams and Maher, that there are two reasonable, though not decisive, conditions on when mind extension occurs. The sys-
tem condition maintains that mind extension occurs in the case of a specific mental state type on a given occasion when
the subject forms a genuine system involving an entity external to the body. The responsibility condition maintains that the
relevant kind of system for mind extension is in place when the subject in the system takes responsibility for the activity of
the system as a whole. Based on these conditions and work on the sanskrit concepts of pratyaksha, jñana, prama, and pra-
mana in Advaita Vedanta we argue that: (i) The Advaita Vedanta School does present an account of perception that satisfies
the system condition, however it fails to satisfy Adams and Maher’s responsibility condition. (ii) Because of the differences
between belief and perception and classical Indian pramana debates (debates over the nature of valid cognition) and con-
temporary philosophy of mind and epistemology, there is an alternative account of the responsibility condition, responsi-
bility* which Advaita Vedanta does articulate. Their own account of perception satisfies responsibility*. And (iii) in light of
the Advaita Vedanta theory of mind we should recognize that there are at least two metaphysical frameworks from which
EMH can be generated: functionalism vs. panpsychism. We close with a comparative discussion of the significance of this
ontological point for the purposes of a cross- cultural constructive engagement, which we believe enhances a comprehensive
understanding of the extended mind hypothesis.

242 Colour layering and colour relationalism

Brown Derek
Philosophy, Brandon University, Brandon, CANADA

Colour layering – experiencing two colours along a line of sight, one opaque colour through a distinct transparent one – un-
dermines a critical source of justification for colour relationalist ontologies of the sort defended by Jonathan Cohen. Layer-
ing involves a contextual interdependency of one’s experience of one of these colours on one’s experience of the other. This

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is consistent with each colour, and one’s experience of each colour, being distinct (interdependency does not entail confla-
tion). Cohen’s relationalism asserts that objective things (e.g., pianos) bear colours, and the relations to other things that
define an object’s colour are vast, including for example the nature of what one looks through to see the object, of objects
next to the object, etc.
Justification for relationalism centers on a uniform interpretation of the ontological significance of the relativities of col-
our perception: the best explanation of each instance of the relativity of colour perception is a colour ontology according to
which colours are relational properties between objective things and the various relata that impact experienced colour in the
above phenomena. To discuss colour layering, the relevant instances of the relativity of colour are Line-of-sight (LOS) rela-
tivities: instances in which the experienced colour of a thing varies as experienced objects in front of or behind the object
vary. These plausibly include colour perceptions through: sunglasses and other transparent films; liquids and other transpar-
ent volumes; the vitreous humour and lenses of one’s eyes; the light illuminating a scene; afterimages and other line of sight
instances of successive contrast; etc.
For simplicity define:
Fusion: the aspects of colour along a line of sight have been fused together and attributed to the
object at the terminal end of that line of sight.
Layering: some aspects of colour along a line of sight belong to a transparent
object and the others belong to a distinct opaque object. One’s experience of each is contextually interdependent on one’s
experience of the other.
Relationalism has a natural though not forced affinity with Fusion. Fusion pushes aspects of colour
that derive from outside the target object into that object’s colour, precisely what relationalists do when they define an ob-
ject’s colour by reference to relations it bears to things other than itself. Via this idea the impact of layering on the justifica-
tion for relationalism becomes apparent.
LOS relativities represent a substantive chunk of the data from which Cohen finds evidence for relationalism. LOS relativ-
ities provide this justification by containing instances of fusion. Conversely, each LOS relativity involving layering diminishes
this justification. Given the large number and kinds of LOS relativities, the potential instances of colour layering is immense,
and thus LOS relativities are, without further scrutiny, unavailable to the relationalist as a source of justification for her view.
Unfortunately, assessing instances of LOS relativities for layering/fusion yields several confounds. I outline five of them
and conclude that to date no one has seriously tried to assess the issue. Thus, at present LOS relativities are unavailable to
the relationalist as evidence for their view.

243 Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder: The Relativity of Visual Experience
Duggins Andrew
Neurology, University of Sydney, Westmead, AUSTRALIA
Zhang Xin
Westmead Hospital, Westmead, AUSTRALIA

Things are not the way they seem. One hundred years ago, Einstein’s relativity characterised this as a divergence of real-
ity from Newtonian laws of mechanics and gravity. But the virtual world of subjective space and time also deviates from a
classical description of objective reality. Specifically, what happens to something that moves seems to last longer than what
happens to something lying still. What is unexpected seems to last longer than what is anticipated. A relativistic formalism
might explain these illusions, and predict well-known distortions of subjective space in clinical neurology. We will assume
that the limiting angular velocity of the vestibulo-ocular reflex when the head is subject to sudden angular acceleration,
about 500 degrees/second, is also the asymptote of perceived angular velocity of fast-moving visual stimuli. When this value
is substituted for the speed of light in Einstein’s Special Relativity the time dilation of an inertial reference frame in relative
motion to the observer is qualitatively similar to the prolongation of perceived duration of a moving stimulus that has been
established by experiment. The model also predicts a distortion of subjective space with perceived angular acceleration of
the head, as occurs in unilateral vestibular stimulation or suppression. The equivalence of this distorted spatial percept to
that of visual hemispatial inattention suggests a general extension of this special theory. Here information takes the place of
mass in Einstein’s relativity. The less predictable a stimulus is to a subject, the more prolonged the neural activity involved
in encoding it and the longer it persists in experience. In a reinterpretation of this experimental literature, we will argue that
both effects are of order 50ms/bit of stimulus information. Length contraction and time dilation within the right visual
hemifield, in a patient with left inattention, are then conceived as a biased prediction that events are likely to occur further
to the right. Qualitatively similar distortions of objective space and time occur in proximity to a massive object, described
by the Schwarzschild metric of General Relativity. We propose that just as gravity is the curvature of objective spacetime by
mass, so is attention the curvature of subjective spacetime by information. We hope that in the next century the physicist’s
core business will extend from a description of objective reality to a theoretical physics of the mind.

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244 Top-down completion in peripheral vision reduces perceptual vagueness

Sayim Bilge
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, BELGIUM
Wagemans Johan
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven, Leuven, BELGIUM

Conscious access to peripheral target signals is compromised when the target is flanked by similar close-by items, a phe-
nomenon known as crowding. Here, we used a drawing method to investigate the influence of meaning on the appearance
of crowded targets. Stimuli consisted of letters and letter-like items that were either meaningful or meaningless. Targets were
presented in the visual periphery and crowded by flankers. Participants were asked to draw the stimuli as accurately as pos-
sible to capture crowded target appearance. Gaze-contingent presentation assured that stimuli were only shown when par-
ticipants fixated on a central fixation dot. The resulting drawings were evaluated in regard to several error types (truncation,
translation, rotation, etc.). Error rates strongly depended on meaning. When targets were meaningless, the error rates were
higher compared to meaningful targets. Our results show that impaired perception of crowded targets makes them suscepti-
ble to top-down influences. We suggest that perceptual vagueness in crowding is reduced by completing fragmentary infor-
mation into meaningful wholes.

245 Subjective Temporal Properties of Voluntary Action

Vuorre Matti
Psychology, Columbia University, New York, USA
Metcalfe Janet
Columbia University, New York, USA

Humans often report experiencing a robust sensation that they are controlling their actions, and through them, outcomes
in the world. This experience—the sense of agency—is sensitive to the temporal relationship between actions and their ef-
fects: The longer the delay from actions to their effects, the less individuals experience sense of agency (Metcalfe & Greene,
2007). It has also been suggested that the brain modulates awareness of the temporal properties of actions and outcomes
in order to enhance the experience of agency: People report that voluntary actions and their outcomes occurred closer to-
gether in time than when they objectively occurred (Intentional binding; Haggard, Clark, and Kalogeras, 2002). To under-
stand if and how this temporal binding illusion contributes to the sense of agency, we must know whether voluntary actions
and their effects are bound together in a memory representation or in conscious perception during the experienced events.
One hypothesis states that voluntary actions reduce the subjective duration between an action and its effect by temporarily
slowing an internal clock, thereby changing conscious perception of the events (Wenke & Haggard, 2009). We tested the
visual perceptual consequences of the “slowed clock” hypothesis by implicitly measuring subjects’ perceptual speed follow-
ing voluntary actions, involuntary actions, and no actions using a visual illusion. If voluntary actions temporarily slow down
an internal clock, two objects separated by an inter- stimulus interval (ISI) should subjectively appear as separated by a
shorter ISI when presented after a voluntary action. We showed subjects two visual stimuli that could—with a short enough
ISI—appear as one moving object (apparent motion; Wertheimer, 1912). Our results are consistent with the slowed clock
hypothesis: Subjects reported more apparent motion when the stimuli were presented after a voluntary action. These results
suggest that voluntary actions might modulate an internal clock, leading to changes in conscious perception, but we are con-
tinuing to test alternative explanations as well.

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246 The influence of visual identification on visual awareness

Wierzchon Michal
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Siedlecka Marta
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Paulewicz Boryslaw
Faculty in Katowice, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Katowice, POLAND

Recent studies on visual awareness often assume, more or less explicitly, that awareness requires two streams of processing:
metacognitive, higher-order processing enabling conscious access and low level processing of a visual stimulus that itself
may not be accessible to conscious awareness. For example, hierarchical models of consciousness postulate that conscious
awareness of a visual stimulus emerges from interaction between low-level representation enabling stimulus identification
and higher-level, metacognitive representation that gives rise to visual awareness. It seems to be a promising theoretical ap-
proach that however requires empirical evidence.
Here, we present four studies aimed to test the relation between visual identification and visual awareness by investigat-
ing whether decision influences subjective awareness ratings. In all the studies, we used perceptual awareness scale in the
context of a visual identification task with Gabor patches either before, or after the identification task decision.
Results of the first two studies clearly showed that awareness ratings strongly predict accuracy, but the overall relation-
ship between awareness ratings and performance was weaker when participants rated their awareness before providing iden-
tification responses. There are two possible explanations of this effect. Either awareness advantages from longer time partici-
pants have to estimate their visual awareness (due to the identification decision) or identification decision itself influences
awareness rating.
Thus, we run two additional studies aimed to test those two contradictory interpretations by separating the two fac-
tors: time available for awareness rating and awareness rating - identification task order. In the third study we manipulated
the amount of time participants had to rate their awareness before the identification decision. In the fourth study we ma-
nipulated the awareness rating - identification task order, but controlled the time participants had to rate their awareness
in both conditions. The data showed both the effect of time and the effect of decision on awareness ratings. The results are
interpreted in line with hierarchical theories of consciousness suggesting that visual awareness is based on low-level visual
identification.

3.3 Other Sensory Modalities

247 Rapid auditory categorization in the right parietal lobe

Fuscà Marco
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY
Levine Seth
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY
Schwarzbach Jens
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY

The ability to distinguish between different classes of objects is at the foundation of consciousness. Our brains make deci-
sions about external percepts, categorizing them rapidly, which allows us to have a seemingly continuous conscious experi-
ence. Perceptual decision making is the cognitive framework whereby the process of categorizing stimuli is carried out.
Perceptual decision making in the neuroimaging literature has largely focused on the visual system in both humans and
monkeys. Relatively little work has investigated perceptual decisions in other sensory modalities, and those that have often
employed paradigms that potentially confounded overt motor acts with categorization.
Building on recent functional magnetic resonance imaging work that disentangled perceptual decisions from overt
motor responses, we also used a delayed match-to-category paradigm, in which participants categorized the direction of

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low-level auditory frequency-modulated (FM) sweeps, while we measured their brains’ electrophysiological responses with
magnetoencephalography (MEG). Analyses were carried out with the novel technique of multivariate pattern analysis im-
plemented via support vector machine (SVM) classification on reconstructed MEG source data in order to look into the
timecourse of auditory perceptual decisions.
Employing a whole-brain, 4-dimensional searchlight (3-D: source-space, 1-D: time), which can localize patterns of
locally distributed category-specific information, the SVM was able to decode representations of the auditory categories
within the right intraparietal sulcus (IPS) as early as ~140 ms after the FM sweep onset and then later within the left inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG).
This whole-brain analysis demonstrated that sensitivity to FM sweep directions in the brain involves firstly the IPS,
which has been implicated in other recent decision making studies. The successful category decoding within this region is
irrespective of physical stimulus properties (i.e., the base frequency at either 250 Hz or 700
Hz and FM sweep speed). These data suggest that within the framework of perceptual decision making, the IPS ab-
stracts away from both the input (sensory modality) and output (effector) channel.

248 Parietal cortex encodes domain-general categories

Levine Seth
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY

Schwarzbach Jens
Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Rovereto, ITALY

Our conscious experience of the world is shaped by categorical perception, the notion that our brains interpret and parcel
continuous aspects of the environment into discrete categories. Perceptual decision making is the cognitive process of con-
verting external stimuli into an abstract format, which allows further cognitive or motor processes to engage appropriately.
Perceptual decisions result in the classification of sensory information into discrete, abstract categories.
Various studies in the field of perceptual decision making have demonstrated some level of category- specificity within
parietal regions of both humans and monkey. However, nearly all of these studies have investigated the matter through the
visual domain, leaving the question of domain-general categorization in parietal cortex open to speculation.
Recent work into non-visual perceptual decisions has employed paradigms containing predictable motor responses.
These studies often implicated regions of the frontal lobe in perceptual decision making. However, due to the confounding
of motor acts with perceptual decisions, one cannot reliably interpret which mechanisms of the perceptual decision making
framework are reflected in such results.
We sought to disentangle overt responses from stimulus categorization by employing a delayed match-to- category para-
digm, in which participants categorized the direction of low-level auditory and tactile frequency- modulated (FM) sweeps
while we measured their blood-oxygenation-level dependent signal using functional magnetic resonance imaging. To detect
cortical representations of FM sweep directions, irrespective of the sensory domain, we used whole-brain multivariate pat-
tern analysis implemented via support vector machine (SVM) classification.
By removing confounds related to higher-level semantics and predictable motor outputs, the SVM was able to decode
categorical representations for both sensory modalities within only the right intraparietal sulcus. These findings offer a new
view that the parietal lobes, rather than frontal regions, play a domain-general role in abstractly representing task-relevant
categories.

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3.4 Memory and Learning

249 Change of irrelevant features in tasks as the condition of appearance of

regular errors
Andriyanova Natalya
Psychology, Sain-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Change of irrelevant features in tasks as the condition of appearance of regular errors
The current study investigated the
ways of prevention and correction of regular errors in the learning process. There are a lot of evidences on regularities of
appearance and repetition of errors in the learning process. However such regularities are usually registered after comple-
tion of learning process and errors tend to consolidate. We assume to asses the influence of irrelevant features in tasks to
the appearance of regular errors. It’s important to determine the confines of the negative choice aftereffect and to find the
conditions which can reduce it. Furthermore investigation of the mechanism of errors correction plays great role in the un-
derstanding of learning process. Originality of this research consists in the search of methods which correct regular errors
and don’t allow their strengthening.
We assume that change of irrelevant features in stimuli exchanges the situation and the
task for person, while the task and the relevant features in stimuli are the same. Therefore we suppose that change of irrel-
evant features in tasks results in reduction of regular errors. There are two experiments in our research aimed at identifying
different but resembling stimuli. We compare the groups with and without change of irrelevant features of the experimental
task. We use color variation of stimuli as irrelevant features. Also we use different types of irrelevant features’ change (regular
and chaotic). It was shown in our both experiments that there were less repeated errors in the group with regular change of
irrelevant features than in groups with chaotic changes and without any changes. Thus, changes of irrelevant features in tasks
led to activation of conscious control, causing reduction of regular errors.

250 Difficulty and processing fluency in visual one-shot learning.

Ishikawa Tetsuo
Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN
Toshima Mayumi
Department of Informatics, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, JAPAN ,
Mogi Ken
Fundamental Research Laboratory, Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo, JAPAN

We encounter a lot of cognitive problems to solve, whether consciously or unconsciously, in our daily lives. From Sunday
crossword puzzle (Wray, 2011) to the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1997), there is a wide spectrum of task
difficulties. The time to reach an answer (reaction time; RT) varies from a few seconds to several years, depends on the
difficulty. Sometimes it seems that we need some kind of epiphany, i.e., insight to get rid of the cognitive obstacles or to
get out of the impasse.
Insight is defined as sudden change in knowledge representation or rapid formation of a new con-
cept, often leading to the solution of a problem (Kounios and Beeman, 2014). At the same time, insight frequently elicits
a burst of emotion, including positive surprise at either the content or way of the realization. This phenomenon is called
“aha! experience” (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995).
In the visual domain, object recognition in cluttered scenes or in partial
occlusion, e.g., finding predator, pray or mate hidden in the bush, is an important task to survive in the natural environment.
Recognition of famous hidden figures such as a “cow” (Dallenbach, 1952) and “Dalmatian” (Gregory, 1970) can be analo-
gous to the ecological task, though survival urgency is relatively low. For the naïve viewer, the hidden figure is meaningless
patterns of collective patches. Once the subject realizes what is hidden in the figure, an “aha” moment comes with pleasant
sensation.
Positive affect accompanying with “aha” experience can reinforce recruiting and allocating attention to detect bio-
logically prioritized object (Ramachandran and Seckel, 2012). Accordingly, conscious awareness of sudden realization in
“aha” experience would be adaptive in the light of evolutionary perspective.
Insight problem solving (with “aha”) has a better
memory advantage than analytic solution (without “aha”) in seeing through magic tricks (Danek, et al. 2012). In addition,
the amygdala activation level associated with induced insight during hidden figure recognition is correlated with memory
performance one week later (Ludmer, et al. 2011).
Preceding the recognition of hidden figures, neural activities synchronize

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in low gamma band (30-45Hz) for a hundred milliseconds (Rodriguez, et al. 1999). High gamma (60-75Hz) activities may
also involve forming the global gestalt (Castelhano, et al. 2013). In either case, subsecond neural activities underpin con-
scious recognition. One of the subjective counterparts of this instantaneous, objective phenomenon is thought be the pro-
cessing fluency. Subjective feelings of fluency in any cognitive process lead to several outcomes including high confidence,
ease of understanding, and positive affect (Oppenheimer, 2008). These features correspond to the characteristics of insight
(Topolinski and Reber, 2010).
Here we employ a dynamic hidden figure paradigm using morphing techniques (Ishikawa
and Mogi, 2011) to dissociate two levels of timescale: RT, which is related to the overall difficulty of a problem, and shorter
timescale of subjective fluency, which determines easiness, suddenness, and positive surprise. We discuss temporal charac-
teristics of balance between unconscious and conscious processes as is evidenced in one- shot learning.

251 Conscious and unconscious components in implicit learning

Ivanchei Ivan
Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The concept of implicit learning was introduced by A. Reber in 1967 and the debates on the nature of this phenomenon
have not ceased since than. The main disputable topics have been the issues of 1) the awareness of knowledge acquired in
typical implicit learning experiments, 2) its abstractness, and 3) the number of different cognitive systems involved in the
learning process.
To date, most of the researchers have accepted that there are both implicit and explicit components in almost every in-
stance of human learning. The question is what cognitive architecture underlies the observed phenomena.
We argue that there are at least two independent cognitive systems which result in conscious and unconscious compo-
nents of acquired knowledge. These systems operate in different ways which can be detected in experiments.
Artificial grammar learning is a classical paradigm for studying implicit learning. It provides complex regularities which
can be learned by participants without their intention to learn it, resulting in tacit, hardly verbalizable knowledge. It allows
to assess both how conscious is the knowledge acquired by participants and what is the form of its representation: rules,
chunks etc.
In our work we provoked different processing strategies during artificial grammar learning and measured such param-
eters as reaction times, classification bias and the determinants of classification decisions. The main effects of high conscious
control that we found were: 1) conservative classification strategy (response bias); 2) reliance on low probable elements
combinations (not frequencies but the violation of rules). These effects are mediated by the complexity of the task. Usually
the easier is the environmental regularity the more explicit is the default processing strategy. So when explicit strategies are
provoked in complex tasks the observed effects are manifested in a greater extent.
We explain the result in a way that observed differences in classification process are the result of the interaction between
two independent cognitive systems. The balance between them depends on the complexity of the environment and explic-
itly set purposes. These variables can be manipulated which allow us to study the properties of suggested components of
human cognitive architecture.

252 Unconscious Learning of Cognitive Structures with Emotional Components

Jurchis Razvan
Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA
Opre Adrian
Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA

The objective of the present study was to investigate whether it is possible to learn unconsciously complex rules that associ-
ate emotionally neutral stimuli with a negative emotion.
For this purpose, we used a modified version of the Artificial Gram-
mar Learning paradigm. In the first phase of the experiment, participants were exposed to 30 different strings of images.
Unknown to them, some of the images were emotionally neutral, but some of them were sadness inducers. Also unknown
to the participants, the place of the neutral and of the sadness-inducing images was determined by a complex, abstract rule
(i.e., an artificial grammar). Importantly, where the artificial grammar requested a sadness-inducing image, one image was
randomly exposed, out of 10 possible sadness-inducing images. This was necessary in order to make sure that participants
would learn the grammar that associated the neutral images with the abstract emotion of sadness, not with a specific image

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that triggers sadness. At the end of this phase, the participants were informed that the strings followed a complex rule. How-
ever, they did not receive any information about the nature or the structure of the rule. In the next phase, the test phase, they
received other strings of images, half generated according to the same rule like the strings seen earlier (grammatical strings)
and half generated according to a new rule (ungrammatical strings). The task of the participants was to decide which strings
were grammatical i.e., followed the rule from the first phase, and which were ungrammatical. If they learned the rule during
the first phase, they would be able to say which strings from the test phase were grammatical and which were ungrammati-
cal, with an accuracy significantly above the chance level, i.e., above 50%. The results of two experiments indicated that the
participants had learned the rule, because their accuracy was significantly above the chance level.
Another important issue was whether they learned the rule consciously or unconsciously. Therefore, after every string
they had classified as grammatical or ungrammatical, they had to report the basis of their classification, choosing from: ran-
dom response, intuition, familiarity, rules, and memory. Because participants had above- chance accuracy for responses
based on feelings of intuition or familiarity, we concluded that they held the rule unconsciously, and that the learning was, at
least in part, implicit. Because they also had above-chance accuracy for responses based on rules and memory, we concluded
that some fragments of the grammar were consciously known.
Also, after every classification, participants had to report how confident they were that their response was correct. In
both experiments, the results indicated that participants had the same amount of confidence when they gave incorrect re-
sponses as when they gave correct responses, showing that there was no relationship between their conscious confidence
and their objective accuracy. This suggests that their above-chance accuracy was mostly sustained by unconscious knowl-
edge.
In sum, the present study shows that it is possible to learn unconsciously complex rules that associate neutral contents
with a negative emotion.

253 Memory access across states of consciousness CANCELLED

Speth Jana
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM
Harley Trevor
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM
Speth Clemens
School of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, UNITED KINGDOM

We present a quantitative linguistic tool to measure memory access in mentation reports from different states of conscious-
ness. In our study, four independent, blind native speaker judges analysed a database of physiologically monitored menta-
tion reports from REM sleep, non-REM sleep, hypnagogia and waking. The grammatical-semantic tool for the analysis bases
on a modification of our linguistic tool for the analysis of simulated motor movement and auditory verbal hallucinations.
Our results confirm strong evidence at the level of brain function suggesting that access to retrospective episodic memory
and prospective memory is limited especially in REM sleep, followed by non-REM sleep. Sleep onset mentation showed a
higher degree of memory access, although still significantly lower than waking mentation. Our preliminary data support the
prevailing physiological hypothesis that memory access is a function of the physiologically distinct states of consciousness.

3.5 Emotion

254 Predictive processing, interoception and emotional experience.

Araya Jose M.
Philosophy, The University Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM

In the ‘interoceptive inference’ view of emotion, the principles of predictive coding (PC) have been extended to account for
emotional experience (Seth, 2013). According to such a view, the experience of discrete emotions arises from interoceptive

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generative models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. In this view, for emotional experience to arise, emotion generative
models need to predictively suppress interoceptive inputs. In this paper, I raise some caveats regarding the assumptions on
which the ‘interoceptive inference’ view of emotion is based. I argue that the ‘interoceptive inference’ view assumes that dis-
crete emotions are individuated by distinctive patterns of physiological or interoceptive states. This Jamesian assumption is
highly problematic. It is not only the case that there is no robust specificity in individual autonomic activity measures across
emotion studies (see, Barrett, 2006), but it has been also quite hard to find patterns of autonomic activity able to distinguish
between discrete emotions. Some studies supposedly show that kind of evidence (e.g., Levenson et al., 1990). However, as
I will argue, in those experiments conceptual knowledge about thread and challenge was implicitly manipulated, giving rise
to autonomic activity relative to thread and challenge behaviors. Tread and challenge cut across discrete emotions. Thus, the
autonomic activity in question does not distinguish between discrete emotions per se.
Considering that it is unlikely that discrete emotions are individuated by distinctive patterns of interoceptive states, it is
also unlikely that emotion generative models are only in the business of suppressing interoceptive afferents. Thus, the exten-
sion of PC to emotional experience should take another, complementary direction to the one proposed by the ‘interocep-
tive inference’ view of emotion. In this respect, I will suggest that embodied versions of cognitivism in emotion theory (e.g.,
Barrett, 2006) look as a promising theoretical basis for the project of understanding how emotional experience arises from
model-based predictions. In this respect, I will suggest that even though suppressing interoceptive afferents via interoceptive
models is certainly key for emotion generation, emotional experience also requires generative models which do not con-
tribute to the suppression of interoceptive data. Such models could be seen as involved in the business of predicting global
features characteristic of the situation in which emotions tend to occur, such as, for example, the actions of other agents, the
dynamics by which events tend to unfold, and relevant features of the physical environment. These models are better seen as
storing long-term statistical regularities relative to those situational aspects of emotion.

References: Barrett, L. (2006). Solving the emotion paradox: Categorization and the experience of emotion.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 20–46. Levenson, R., Ekman, P., & Friesen, W. (1990). Volun-
tary facial action generates emotion-specific autonomic nervous system activity. Psychophysiology, 27, 363-384.
Seth, A.K. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends in Cognitive Science, 17,
565–573.

255 Consciousness of Shame and Perspectival Alternatives

Emerson Phillip
Philosophy, Binghamton University, Binghamton, USA

Shame, as an emotion, has been subject to much controversy. Deonna and Teroni (2011) have deemphasized social as-
pects of it, while Zahavi (2012) has identified sociality as essential to the self to which shame adheres. Tangney and Dearing
(2002) have attempted to create measures of it for experimental and quantitative analysis, and identified defensive reac-
tions to reference to the named emotions of guilt and shame, yet have inadequately addressed that very problem of defense
mechanisms. Gallagher (2011), Hutto (2008) and Perez (2013) have argued that a sub-cognitive second-person experience
is the basis of “folk-psychological” concepts.
I shall place the problem of understanding shame within the context of the above discussion of folk- psychological con-
cepts. I take from the latter authors the intent to complicate simplistic dualities such as first- vs. third-personal accounts by
constructing an alternative. This alternative is both intersubjective and hence shared, yet not objective in the sense that ab-
stractions of third-personal varieties suggest. This alternative construction of point-of-view is especially useful in the resolu-
tion of puzzles that plague the literature on shame.
I argue that the nature of shame is such that attempts to understand it require sophisticated subtlety due to the tendency
on the part of shame-bearers to hide the shame itself, even from themselves. Because of the painfulness of shame, investiga-
tion and understanding of it requires a mixture of first-, third-, and second- personal perspectives. I argue that the kinds of
understandings possible through intimate personal relationships, therapeutic spaces, and literary experiences involve com-
plex shifts in perspective that allow for different ways of allaying of painfulness and permit shame to reveal itself more fully.
I thus set a challenge to philosophers and empirical scientists both, to adjust their instruments of detection and sounding of
this complex emotion.

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256 The Effects of Awe on the Experience of the Bodily Self CANCELLED
Karinen Annika
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS
van Elk Michiel
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS

Amazing nature, impressive art, divine epiphanies and the incomprehensibility of space all have in common their capability to
evoke awe. Awe is an emotion that can shift focus away from oneself toward the outside world, and induce a phenomenological
feeling of smallness. In this study we investigated the effects of awe on body perception, perspective taking and identification
with humankind. We hypothesized that participants who experience awe would estimate their body size smaller, identify more
with humankind and be more prone to spatial perspective taking than those in the control conditions. Participants estimated
their body size before and after viewing either an awe-inducing video or a positive or neutral control video. Participants also
did the Spatial Perspective Taking task, and indicated on the Inclusion of Other in the Self scale how much they identified with
humankind. Absorption proneness was measured to investigate possible individual differences that may contribute to or mod-
erate the effects of awe. We found no effect of awe on body perception, identification with humankind or spatial perspective
taking. However, there was a moderating effect of absorption on the experience of awe: people who scored high on absorption
reported experiencing more awe than those who scored low. Additionally, exploratory analyses revealed that women and those
who scored high on absorption identified more with humankind in general. We conclude that individual differences in absorp-
tion strongly predict the experience of awe and future studies should take this into account. Additionally, future studies should
aim to understand better the effect of absorption proneness on identification with humankind.

257 Metacognition and modification of ephemeral feelings.

Onzo Ayako
Pharmacy, Kinjo Gakuin University, Hadano, JAPAN Ken Mogi, Sony CSL, Tokyo, JAPAN

Feeling of emotions (Damasio 1999) is one of the key components of conscious experience. While emotions as uncon-
scious processes help the subject adapt to uncertainty in life and streamline reward conditions coupled with the dopamin-
ergic system (Schultz 2007), the conscious feeling of emotion gives the subject a metacognitive insight into these crucial
processes. The feeling of emotions is often ephemeral and subtle, and cannot be in general classified into typical emotions
such as joy, sadness, and anger.
Understanding of the significance of a feeling about an event is sometimes time consuming. A subject could find new
significance of an experienced feeling from each time of reflection. The consolidation of human’s memory sometimes co-
occurs with changes in its content (McGaugh 2000). When the memory of the feeling of previous event is intermingled
with the experience of new similar event during the reflection process, there might be a corresponding transformation of the
metacognition of feeling. Such an effect was given literal expression in the novel Flowers for Algernon (Keyes 1966).
In terms of coping, it has been shown that when something negative happened, people who could have a mixed feeling
with (even slight) positive emotion recovered faster (Folkman, S. & Moskowitz JT. 2000). Furthermore, not only the exist-
ence of positive emotion, but also how the positive emotion is going to mix was shown to be important (Braniecka, A. et al.
2014). Human subjects deal with emotions and feelings of emotions both in the ephemeral and prolonged contexts, where
cognitive processes in the time from the emotional onset to a provisional settlement affect the contents in the subjective
experience.
Here we report an experiment in which we present the subject with emotion-evoking video clips. Immediately after
viewing the scene, we ask the subject to rate the feeling that they experienced. In this process, the ephemeral nature of the
feeling is taken note. In addition to the typical categories of emotions (joy, sadness, happiness, anger, sorrow, loneliness
etc.), we ask the subject to quantitatively rate the non-typical and ephemeral aspects of the feelings experienced (stage 1).
The subjects were then asked to reflect on a particular episode from their own life, the recall of the memory of which was
induced by seeing the emotion evoking scenes. Upon reflection, the subjects were requested to describe the nature of the
personal episode, and the feelings evoked (stage 2). Finally, the subjects were asked to rate the feelings evoked after they
recalled the original emotion-evoking video (condition a) or after they were actually presented with the emotion- evoking
video again (condition b).
Based on the result, we discuss the nature of the metacognition of the feeling of emotion, and how they are modified in
the memory consolidation process, especially in the light of related personal memories registered in the process of life.

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 3 . 6 Lan g ua g e


3.6 Language

258 Productive networks of the brain

Laine Pauli
Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

Humans can create new things limitlessly from limited set of things. For example we have only limited set of words, but
we can still everyday produce new sentences that nobody has ever said before. This same productivity is common to many
human abilities, e.g. in music, mathematics, art and use of tools. No other animal show such capabilities. Is this limitless pro-
ductivity derived from one, single source in human cognition and brain like Descartes believed?
Modern brain imaging techniques have identified that many productive abilities activate certain areas in the left frontal
lobe. Especially neural correlates for language are located there. However, there are many other common areas for human
productivity. Here I claim, that rather than single neural source, it is better to describe network of these areas as a potential
source for productivity. We don’t get productive capabilities genetically, this potentiality can only realize under certain cul-
tural activation.
In this paper I introduce the brain areas that are involved in enabling human productivity. These include some areas in
frontal, prefrontal, and parietal lobes, hippocampus, parahippocampus, and some cortical areas. I also introduce hypothesis
how this network processes information and how conscious thinking is expanded with it.

259 The nature and etiology of unsymbolized thinking

Martínez-Manrique Fernando
Philosophy I, University of Granada, Granada, SPAIN

Vicente Agustín
Linguistic and Basque Studies, Ikerbasque, University of the Basque Country, Vitoria, SPAIN

Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sample, Hurlburt et al. reported that people claimed to experience inner epi-
sodes in which they were “thinking a particular, definite thought without the awareness of that thought’s being conveyed
in words, images, or any other symbols” (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008: 802). They labeled those episodes as ‘unsymbolized
thinking’ and argued that they constitute a distinct kind of phenomenon, which is not a feeling, intention, intimation, kin-
esthetic event, or bodily event (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008). However, the precise phenomenal character of unsymbolized
thinking remains unclear. The aim of this paper is to contribute to clarify it and to advance a proposal regarding its etiology.
To this end, we will consider three possible ways to account for its phenomenal nature, developed from proposals on the
phenomenology of propositional thinking and imageless thought.
One account would ground unsymbolized thinking in the experience of comprehension, much in the spirit of Pitt
(2004). In this view, each propositional thought has its own proprietary phenomenology based on the comprehension of
its particular content. Another account would contend that the phenomenological difference between thoughts lies in their
respective attitude types, not their contents. Attitudes could be treated in the same terms as emotions (Klausen, 2007; Prinz
2011), so unsymbolized thinking could be regarded as essentially non-symbolic and yet grounded in some perceptual or
sensory experience. A third account would start from questioning that either particular thoughts or attitudes have a dis-
tinctive phenomenology (Robinson, 2005). However, a possibility that is easily overlooked is that such phenomenology
may pertain to propositional thoughts as a kind. In other words, even if the difference between the thought that P and the
thought that Q did not lie in any phenomenological feature, the kind to which both belong –propositional thinking– could
be phenomenologically distinct from other kinds of mental states.
We will develop a version of this third possibility that also attempts to account for the etiology of unsymbolized think-
ing. The idea is to view this phenomenon as the cognitive activity that initiates a speech act that is aborted even before it
can reach the level of inner speech. So, unlike Robinson, we do not end in assimilating propositional thinking to subvocal
speech. Instead, we regard them as functionally related: they are part of the same mental activity that can terminate at differ-
ent points resulting in different kinds of experiences. We will offer arguments for this view that, we contend, lets us under-
stand unsymbolized thinking in a more unified way without losing its specific quality.

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References: Heavey, C. L. and Hurlburt, R. T. (2008). The phenomena of inner experience, Consciousness and
Cognition 17, 798–810. Hurlburt, R. T. and Akhter, S. A. (2008). Unsymbolized thinking. Consciousness and
Cognition 17, 1364–74. Klausen, S. H. (2008). The phenomenology of propositional attitudes. Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences 7, 445–462. Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to
think that P. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 1–36. Prinz, J. (2011). The sensory basis of cogni-
tive phenomenology. In Cognitive Phenomenology, ed. T. Bayne and M. Montague (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 174–196. Robinson, W. S. (2005). Thoughts without distinctive non-imagistic phenomenology. Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research 70, 534–561.

3.7 Mental Imagery

260 Low-level Features in Mental Images

Martarelli Corinna S.
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND
Mast Fred W.
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, SWITZERLAND

Visual perception includes bottom-up and top-down processes whereas mental imagery does not require a sensory input but
still draws on some of the same mechanisms that are also involved in the process of visual perception. If mental images have
picture-like qualities, they are supposed to contain low-level features. It is known that salient low-level features drive the first
saccades when people inspect a new picture (e.g., Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). We investigate whether low-level prop-
erties of mental images elicit similar eye movements. Twenty-five participants performed a visual imagery task with high vs.
low spatial frequency and high vs. low contrast gratings. The procedure was adapted from Kosslyn, Sukel, and Bly (1999).
The perceptual encoding phase was composed of forty-eight arrays of gratings presented for 6 seconds. Each array contained
four gratings (two contrast levels and two spatial frequencies). After the presentation of each array, participants had to imag-
ine the gratings they just saw (image generation) and then answer to a specific question (image inspection). We determined
visual saliency of the gratings using the algorithm of Harel, Koch, and Perona (2006). The Graph-Based Visual Saliency map
suggests that the low spatial frequency – high contrast grating contains the most salient information. We found that both
during visual perception and during mental imagery the first fixation was more often allocated to the low spatial frequency
– high contrast grating, thus showing that eye movements are influenced not only by physical properties of visual stimuli
but also by its imagined counterpart. Inclusion of the first three fixations instead of only including the first fixation revealed
similar results during perception and imagery (no change in rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis). The last fixations
during the preceding perception condition were not predictive for the first fixations during subsequent image generation.
The results from this study suggest that low-level features elicited specific eye movements not only during the process of per-
ception but also during mental imagery. The findings support the account of imagery as perception-like; pictorial low-level
features are preserved in mental imagery.

Harel, J., Koch, C., & Perona, P. (2006). Graph-Based Visual Saliency. Proceedings of Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NIPS).
Kosslyn, S. M., Sukel, K. E., & Bly, B. M. (1999). Squinting with the mind’s eye: Effects
of stimulus resolution on imaginal and perceptual comparisons. Memory and Cognition, 27(2), 276-287.
Parkhurst, D., Law, K., & Niebur, E. (2002). Modeling the role of salience in the allocation of overt visual atten-
tion. Vision Research, 42(1), 107-123.

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3.8 Implicit ans Explicit Procresses

261 Behavioral Relevance of Consciousness for Human Action: Explorations with

the Simon Task Paradigm
Gök Selvi Elif
Cognitive Science, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY
Hohenberger Annette
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, TURKEY

The present study aims to reveal the behavioral effects of consciousness on a well-known perceptual-motor control task, i.e.
the Simon task. We are investigating whether the connection of visual features of objects and their spatial action effects in an
initial familiarization task leads to a spatial congruency effect in a subsequent Simon task. Importantly, we tried to control
the emergence of awareness via instruction and show that the presence or absence of consciousness of the link between
visual features and action features impacts on subjects’ behavioral patterns in the Simon task. The first part of the study is the
so-called “familiarization
phase” where participants watch a slide show. In each slide an object first appears at the center of
the screen and then moves to the right or left or downwards in accordance with a rule that depends on the color and
shape
of the object. At the beginning of the familiarization phase, all participants are informed about the existence of a rule – but
not which rule. They are also asked to predict aloud where an object will move as
soon as they see the object. To control the
emergence of awareness we formed three different participant the object in addition to predicting the direction. The first
group is supposed to realize the rule easier because they are naming the two relevant dimensions, whereas naming the rule-
irrelevant feature will hinder the instruction. In the second phase participants were to press left or right keys in accordance
with a rule related
to the inside pattern of the same stimuli they had already seen in the familiarization phase. In this phase, each stimulus
was presented at the center of the screen. However, if short-term associations between color and shape of the object and
direction had formed in the familiarization phase, the second phase should be a Simon task for participants. The knowledge
of the participants of the rule (i.e. the regularity between color and shape and movement direction) was assessed via a post-
experimental interview. The manipulation of rule awareness the rule in the first group, and none of the participants could
state the rule in the second group. An analysis of no significant interaction effect in the ANOVA, separate t-tests indicated a
significant spatial congruency effect findings for the role of consciousness in behavioral control tasks will be discussed.

262 Influence of gender, occupation and tolerance to uncertainty on the Iowa

Gambling Task performance
Ivanovskyy Mykola
Psychology, Moscow State University, Moscow , RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Background
The study of implicit learning in decision making under uncertainty was conducted using Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT), a task simulating the process of making decisions in real life. Initially, this method was developed as an empirical
test of the somatic markers hypothesis by Damasio (Bechara et al., 1994). IGT was aimed to measure a level of emotional
learning, commonly referred to as “intuition”. Previous studies suggest that healthy subjects begin preferring the “good”
decks on average after 50 choices (Medvedev, 2013, etc.). It was shown (van den Bos et al. 2013) that women do slightly
worse in IGT. However, the impact of the personality factors on the IGT performance remains unclear. In our study of the
Russian sample, along with the influence of personality factors of tolerance (TU) and intolerance (ITU) of uncertainty,
we took into account the factors of occupation and gender of participants, whereas the earlier studies mostly compared
normal and abnormal populations (Bechara et al., 1999).
Methods
Procedure. A computerized IGT was used. The partici-
pants chose a card from the four decks presented on the screen. With each card, the subject could gain, but could also loose.
There were two “bad” decks (“A”,”B”) with high risk cards which could provide high gains ($100) and rare large losses (up
to $1250). The other two decks were “good” (“C”,”D”), with small gains ($50) and minor losses. For “good” decks the total
gain from ten consecutive cards was $ 250, and for “bad” decks the total loss was $ 250. Participants were instructed to gain
as much as possible, trying to choose cards from the “good” decks. They made 100 choices.
Participants: 90(63 women).

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Partly higher education professionals (not in psychology), partly students and teachers from the department of psychol-
ogy, Moscow State University. In 60 participants from this sample (42 women), TU and ITU were tested using Budner’s
Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale.
Results
1. In the IGT, participants won the $1827 on the average. No significant influences of
gender and occupation on the performance have been identified.
2. Participants showed positive dynamics in their prefer-
ence for the “good” decks in the second half of the session, ??2.968,p?0.007.
3. IGT performance correlated with the TU
and ITU.
a. Subjects with low intolerance (ITU<22,n?15) less frequently used the “bad” deck («?»,«?») ??-10.42,p?0.037,
the effect more pronounced in the later stages of the session. Due to this, they achieved better results- $2290 on the average,
??647($),p?0.028.
b. Subjects with low tolerance of uncertainty (TU<25,n?19) were inclined to a more balanced distribu-
tion of choices.
Conclusions
1. No evidence for the relevance of gender identity or professional factors on the IGT perfor-
mance has been obtained.
2. Relationship between tolerance and intolerance of uncertainty with the IGT results has been
revealed. In particular, subjects with low ITU were significantly more successful in the IGT.
Key words: Iowa gambling task,
“good” and “bad” deck, tolerance of uncertainty, intolerance of uncertainty.

263 The Relationship between Perceived Transgression Wrongness and

Forgiveness when having received Apologies: Moderating Effects of Explicit and
Implicit Self-Esteem
Lim Sung Moon
Psychology, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Ghim Sungchan
Psychology, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Yoo Hyeonjeong
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Lim Jijun
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Lee Seohee
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Choi Yeoul
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA
Shin Nari
Chungbuk National University, Cheongju, SOUTH KOREA

Despite the oft-cited positive effects of an apology on forgiveness, forgiveness does not always follow. The aim of the pre-
sent study was to examine moderating effects of self-esteem when having received apologies in the relationship between
perceived transgression wrongness and forgiveness defined as Worthington and Scherer’s (2004) emotional forgiveness and
decisional forgiveness. We hypothesized that individuals with high self-esteem exhibit more forgiveness than individuals
with low self-esteem (study 1). Recently, researchers have provided increasing evidence that discrepancies between implicit
and explicit self-esteem may affect forgiveness. We hypothesized that individuals with congruent self-esteem exhibit more
forgiveness than individuals with discrepant self-esteem (study 2). For this purpose, explicit self-esteem was measured with
Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale. Implicit self-esteem was measured with Initials and Birthday Number Preference Task. Data
collected from 861 (486 males, 375 females) Korean college students were analyzed with hierarchical multiple regression
analysis. The results were as follows. First, on decisional forgiveness, the two-way interaction effect of perceived transgres-
sion wrongness and self-esteem was significant. And on emotional forgiveness, the two-way interaction effect of perceived
transgression wrongness and self-esteem was significant. The effect of perceived transgression wrongness on emotional and
decisional forgiveness for individuals with high self-esteem is much stronger than its impact for individuals with low self-
esteem. These findings show that self-esteem may play an important role in forgiveness in college students through inter-
actions with perceived transgression wrongness. Second, on emotional forgiveness, the three-way interaction effect of per-
ceived transgression wrongness, explicit self-esteem, and implicit self-esteem was significant. The effect of perceived trans-
gression wrongness on emotional forgiveness for individuals with high explicit self-esteem having high implicit self-esteem
is much stronger than its impact for individuals with low explicit self-esteem having high implicit self-esteem. These findings

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show that discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem are detrimental to emotional forgiveness. But, on deci-
sional forgiveness, the three-way interaction effect of perceived transgression wrongness, explicit self-esteem, and implicit
self-esteem was not significant. Implications and limitations of this study were discussed.

264 Demonstrations that Implicit Social Cognitions Measured by IAT are

Represented in Awareness CANCELLED
Wilson Thomas
Psychology, Bellermine University, Louisville, USA
Pennington Charlotte
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Monk Rebecca
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Qureshi Adam
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Zhou Jin
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM
Heim Derek
Psychology, Edge Hill University, Ormskirk, UNITED KINGDOM

Recently critical attention has been given to the notion of implicit attitudes and their specification, particularly using the
Implicit Association Test (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, 7 Schwartz, 1998). For example, Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, and Blair (2014)
recently reported evidence that people are aware of their implicit attitudes because they could predict before test with good
accuracy the subsequent results of an IAT even with low correlation between an explicit measure of the same attitudes and
the IAT. This poster reports the findings of two studies that replicate the Hahn et al. (2014) predictability of implicit at-
titudes measured by the IAT and go further to test two separate hypotheses: (1) associations that a purported to be implicit
are nevertheless impaired by a secondary resource-depleting cognitive task and (2) individuals are aware of the conscious
contents evoked during IAT trials and their impact on behavior throughout the testing session. That is, while Hahn et al.
(2014) showed awareness of one’s general implicit attitude, the present experiments demonstrate the IAT does not measure
an implicit process in the traditional sense and that individuals are aware of the association products and their immediate
impact on behavior and subsequent conscious contents. In Experiment 1 sixty undergraduates gave a prediction of their
IAT results and then took the test. On half the trials they were subjected to a secondary task in which they had to rehearse
a new five-digit number presented before the IAT trial and then explicitly recalled after. Thus, the secondary task was ma-
nipulated within subjects. In Experiment 2 another forty-eight undergraduates from the same population gave a prediction
of their IAT results and then took the test. On twelve random trials during the session they were interrupted to give one of
three reports: (a) On how many of the last 10 trials did you feel you hesitated? (b) On how many of the next 10 trials to you
predict you will hesitate? and (c) What was the first word that came to mind on presentation of the target? Results of the
first experiment demonstrated much slower performance on incongruent trials, and greater D-scores, when performing the
secondary task. Performance on that task served as a manipulation check. Results of Experiment 2 were inconclusive with
respect to the question of the associative content; however, the number of hesitations remembered by participants reliably
predicted their IAT results regardless of the point in the test when they were interrupted and without significant regression
residual. The findings are taken together as further support of the observation that individuals are aware of the behavioral
impact of the IAT and call into question the presumption that the IAT measures attitudes that are implicit.

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3.9 Unconscious/conscious experience

265 Unconscious cross-modal associative learning: A challenge for integration

theories of consciousness
Chrisley Ron
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, UNITED KINGDOM
Scott Ryan
University of Sussex, Falmer, UNITED KINGDOM
Samaha Jason
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA
Dienes Zoltan
University of Sussex, Falmer, UNITED KINGDOM

Several leading theories of consciousness, including the Global Workspace Theory (Baars 2002), claim that a central func-
tion of consciousness is to permit the integration of information from different functional regions, such as different sense
modalities. We call such theories of consciousness “integration theories”; a presupposition of such theories is that uncon-
scious processing cannot achieve this kind of integration, as witnessed by such claims as “unconscious input processing is
limited to sensory regions”, and “consciousness is needed to integrate multiple sensory inputs” (Baars 2002, p 47-48). We
set out to evaluate firstly, whether associative learning can take place without conscious perception of the stimuli and sec-
ondly, whether this can be achieved where stimuli to be associated are presented in different modalities. We introduced a
new paradigm where pairs of words presented subliminally are demonstrated to have been associated by the ability of one
word to prime classification of the other. Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experi-
ment 3 presented one of the paired words auditorily and the other word visually. Experiment 4 generalised this paradigm to
non-linguistic stimuli (auditory and visual). All four experiments found the same significant inhibitory priming effect with
concordant test pairs associated with slower classification judgements. Thus it appears that, contrary to integration theo-
ries, unconscious inputs from distinct sensory modalities can be integrated. After reviewing the background and the above
experimental findings, this talk assesses the impact of the findings on integration theories. In particular, we consider how
integrationist theories might be modified to accommodate these findings. For example, one might abandon the idea that
consciousness is required for integration tout court, and instead claim that it is required for integrated information to be de-
ployed in a flexible way, e.g. that spans longer time scales, can potentially manifest itself in a wide range of effects depending
on the needs of the subject (e.g., not just reaction time), and is generally under the executive control of the subject. Refer-
ences: 1) Anonymous2, Anonymous3, Anonymous1 and Anonymous4 “Cross-modal associative learning without aware-
ness”, under review; 2) Baars, B. (2002) “The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence”. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 6(1):47-52.

266 Dynamics of a negative choice in identifying ambiguous images

Filippova Margarita
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, St.Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Miroshnikov Sergey
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Chernov Roman
Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

We showed earlier that unnoticed meanings of dual-meaning images though are not conscious, but not the same as not
shown. These meanings are more likely “slowed down” and they may be called “negatively chosen” (whereas conscious
meanings, on the contrary, are “positively chosen”). Our new research is directed on detection of regularities of how nega-
tively chosen meanings get into consciousness. We present results of two experiments with both dual-meaning images (Ex-

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 3 . 9 U nconscious / conscious e x perience

periment 1) and up-down double-dealing images (Experiment 2). In both experiments: at a training stage we showed to
examinees images for storing (including ambiguous images – dual-meaning or double-dealing images); then at the check
stage examinees had to identify images among both shown earlier (including positively and negatively chosen meanings of
ambiguous images) and new images. In Experiment 2 at the check stage we used images or their verbal descriptions; in Ex-
periment 1 we used only verbal descriptions. We have 4 experimental groups which differed by interval before check stage:
1) right after training; 2) in 5 minutes; 3) next day 4) in a month.
In the last case (in a month) we observed paradoxical improvement of accuracy of identification of images in many
parameters. But at identification of negatively chosen meanings or their elements we found gradual increase of number of er-
rors of recognition. In two experiments it was shown as follows: In a case with dual- meaning images (Experiment 1) exami-
nees more often mistakenly identified positively chosen meanings by theirs descriptions with elements of negatively chosen
meanings (38% - directly right after training; 44% - in 5 minutes; 51% - next day; 75% - in a month). So, within a month the
quantity of errors of false identification of elements of negatively chosen meanings increased by 37%28,5261; ? < 0,01). It is
much less than quantity of recognition errors of dual-meaning images on the base of their confused descriptions in which el-
ements of two unambiguous images mixed up (that was the control term): the quantity of these mistakes increased only by
6% in a month. In Experiment 2 (with double-dealing images) examinees more often mistakenly identified inverted versions
of double-dealing images on the base of their descriptions (56% - directly right after training; 46% - in 5 minutes; 54% - next
day; 83% - in a month). So after a month the quantity of errors of false recognition grew by 27%27,3061; ? < 0,01). But iden-
tification of old unambiguous images with new elements by their description improved. Considering results of the control
term, we came to the conclusion: weakening of a negative choice after a month can’t be explained only with forgetting, and
is related more likely with reorganization of information stored in memory. The fact that only distribution of different types
of mistakes changes (but not total sum) within a month confirms the idea about possibility of penetration of negatively cho-
sen meanings into consciousness as mistakes. The research is supported by grant N14-06-00302A & 14-06-00374A from
the RFBR.

267 Aftereffects in solving dual-meaning anagrams

Naumenko Olga
Psychology, Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Kostina Daria
Saint Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

We assume that a person cannot be conscious of several different meanings of the same stimulus at a time (even when each
meaning taken separately is possible). This choice between the meanings occurs unconsciously and tends to be uncon-
sciously repeated later on, i.e. has aftereffect. Our hypothesis is that the rejected meanings are actively suppressed and this
suppression has aftereffect. Functional fixedness can be an example of this. One way of getting rid of such “fixedness” upon
one of the meanings is to have some break or to have change-over from one task to another in order to change the actual
content of consciousness. In our experiment we presented 5 dual-meaning anagrams to our subjects. The task was to find
the word. Then there was a pause (its content depending on the experimental condition). After the pause the subjects were
asked to find another meaning of the anagram. Control group (1) had no pause between two presentations of the anagram.
In experimental groups during the pause between the two presentations subjects had to (2) wait for 20 seconds silently; (3)
read aloud 10 different unrelated words; (4) repeat the same unrelated word for 10 times aloud; (5) repeat their first answer
for 10 times aloud. We found that it was relatively easy for the subjects to find the word in anagram during the first presen-
tation – in 93% of the first trials subjects found the right answer and it took them only ̃6 s. But it was much more difficult
to find the alternative variant in the same anagram: subjects found another right answer only in 73% of trials (on average)
and it took them ̃12 s to do this. The result for the second presentation of the anagram differed between groups (?2-Pear-
son=6.192, df=2, p=0.045). If one of the meanings was previously found during the first presentation of the anagram, the
alternative meaning was correctly found during the second presentation in 69% of trials in control group (1). In groups
(2) and (3) (without verbal satiation distracting task during the pause) the alternative answer was correctly found in 81%
of trials. In groups (4) and (5) (with verbal satiation distracting task during the pause) the alternative answer was correctly
found in 74% of trials. The alternative meaning of the anagram was not subjectively equal to the meaning which was found
at first. Subjects had difficulties with finding another meaning when one of possible variants had already been found, as if
the alternative variant was suppressed. Pauses with distracting tasks influenced this “aftereffect of meaning” similarly to the
effect of incubation period during the problem solving process. The research is supported by grant No 14-06-00302A from
the RFBR. Olga V. Naumenko also acknowledges Saint-Petersburg State University for a research grant 8.50.2098.2013.

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268 Consciousness and elevator travel – the relationship between self-

consciousness and elevator design
Rousi Rebekah
Computer Science and Information Systems, University of Jyväskylä, Kinkomaa, FINLAND

Mainly utilitarian, elevators present an example for studying consciousness in human-technology interaction in which nu-
merous factors ranging from the physical, psychological and social can be readily observed. Elevators vary greatly in terms of
age, mechanics, materials, features and surrounding environment. There are certain characteristics which pertain to all eleva-
tors, these are: that people travel in close proximity to other elevator travelers (often unfamiliar); the spaces are enclosed en-
tailing that travelers are unable to leave the space until the transportation operation is successfully completed; and that peo-
ple need to trust the technology in terms of both the adequacy of controls available to the travelers, as well as their ability to
safely transport people to extreme heights without falling, jamming or performing any other unanticipated actions. Due to
this heightened element of physical vulnerability, there is also increased likehood that people are more alert, or consciously
aware of the physical elements surrounding them. In elevator design there are many measures which can be taken to reduce
people’s awareness of the physical dynamics in which their bodies are placed, such as controlled and consistent speeds and
dampened sounds (both of the elevator’s mechanics and e.g. wind in elevator shafts). While this psycho-physiological re-
lationship between the traveler and their environment (other travels and elevator characteristics) raises design questions
regarding the elements which should and should not be consciously experienced (height, building swaying etc.), what is not
often mentioned is the impact that this psycho-physiological relationship has on the experience of self-consciousness. This
paper discusses the findings of two elevator studies in which self-consciousness was both observed and recounted by travel-
ers on differing levels, for various reasons. The reasons pertained to: social dynamics within the elevators – gender factors,
group sizes and design elements reinforcing the experience of these dynamics; as well as mechanical properties.

3.11 Cognitive Development

269 What Can Be Learned from Learning to Count

Card Charles
Physics and Astronomy, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, CANADA

In most cultures, natural number counting becomes easy for most humans by adolescence, but learning to count is a dif-
ficult, protracted struggle that typically extends through the first four years of a child’s life. Cognitive psychologists have hy-
pothesized, tested, and debated for more than four decades the cognitive processes involved with counting without achiev-
ing consensus. In fact, though much has been learned in that period, the discussion has never been livelier, to the point
where certain aspects of this research have been generalized and used to account for the cognitive processes underlying con-
cept formation and even extended to the emergence of new concepts in scientific theories.
This presentation will first summarize the findings of studies of subitizing behaviour exhibited both by humans and other
animal species, accompanied by a survey of the evidence for the existence of two core systems of numerical representation, the
approximate number (or analogue magnitude) system and the object tracking (or parallel individuation) system. Proponents
of each system have argued that their system alone can account for the acquisition of the counting principles, without par-
ticipation by the other system, and these claims will be briefly assessed. Furthermore, as a central feature of her account of en-
riched parallel individuation, Carey has implemented a bootstrapping process (attributed to Quine) that involves a discontinu-
ous abductive or inductive leap that is undertaken in the course of a transition from one cognitive system to a higher one that is
incommensurable with the first. She maintains that “Quinian” bootstrapping occurs not only in the acquisition of the counting
principles but in the development of conceptual understanding in general, with examples drawn from the conceptualization of
rational numbers, of weight/density concepts, and even from the scientific theorizing of Kepler, Darwin, and Maxwell.
Carey’s notion of bootstrapping has come under close scrutiny and has been criticized for its failure to clearly articulate
the discontinuous process that lies at its heart. This presentation will put forth an account of the bootstrapping process that
occurs with counting principle acquisition that both clarifies and substantiates Carey’s intention for her concept and that
illustrates the essential and interdependent roles played by the approximate number system and the object tracking system

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 3 . 1 1 C o g nitive D eve l op m ent

in the acquisition of the counting principles. Specifically, it will be shown that the discontinuous process in this instance
invokes a previously unutilized ordering relation. A second example illustrating a discontinuous bootstrapping process will
then be drawn from the history of the development of complex numbers in mathematics. Here the reinterpretation of i from
mathematical object to mathematical operator clearly illustrates the uptake of a conceptually discontinuous process via the
mental rotation of an image of the number line. Finally, it will be concluded that there is evidence for four distinct numerical
cognitive processes involving identification, distinction, ordering and rotation. These processes are core processes—innate,
evolutionarily ancient cognitive primitives that are likely involved with neuronal recycling and thus are generally available
for conceptualization at many different levels.

270 Seeing Oneself through the Eyes of Others: Visual versus Social Perspective-
taking in Early Infancy
Ciaunica Anna
Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy - Porto, Porto, PORTUGAL

It is widely agreed that taking an outside stance towards oneself is an important developmental milestone. It is also com-
mon to claim that explicit self-consciousness is only present from the moment the child is capable of recognizing herself in
the mirror (Lewis and Ramsey 2004), that is around eighteen months of age, when they engage in self-directed behaviour
and manifest embarrassment when confronted with their mirror-image. This view rests on the basic idea that the others’
look on us functions as a social “mirror” through which the child becomes aware of herself. In this paper I argue that the
usual expression – to see oneself through the eyes of others – is highly misleading in examining more primitive forms of
pre-reflective self-awareness, since at the basic level, the self-other relatedness is not experienced on this visual perspective-
taking fashion. For example, in his famous analysis of shame, Sartre (1943) argued that my experience of the other is an
experience that involves my own self-consciousness, that is a self-consciousness in which I am pre-reflectively aware that
I am a visible object for another. Here I draw on recent empirical findings on the developmental primacy of social versus
visual perspective-taking (Moll and Kadipasaoglu 2013) to provide a nuanced understanding of the notion of basic pre-
reflective self-consciousness. I argue that at the basic developmental level, my being-for-others is not experienced as an ex-
ternal dimension of being or as an existential “alienation” provoked by my encounter with the other (Sartre 1943). Rather,
in my experience of the other, I am pre- reflectively aware that we (i.e. the other and I) are co-subjects of a shared experience
(Rochat 2000, 2004). I conclude that at the most primitive level, pre-reflective self-awareness might be best characterized as
other- relatedness or “we-ness” rather than self-centred or first-personal “mineness”.

REFERENCES: Lewis, M., and Ramsay, D. 2004. Development of self-recognition, personal pronoun use, and
pretend play during the 2nd year. Child Development, 75(6), 1821–1831.
- Moll, H., and Kadipasaoglu, D. 2013.
The primacy of social over visual perspective-taking. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(558). doi: 10.3389/
fnhum2013.00558
- Rochat, P., and Striano, T., 2000. Perceived Self in Infancy. Infant Behavior and Develop-
ment, Vol. 23, Issue 3-4, pp. 513–530.
- Rochat, P. 2004. The emergence of self-awareness as co-awareness in early
development. In Zahavi D. and Grünbaum, eds. The Structure and Development of Self –Consciousness (pp.
1 - 20). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Sartre, J.-P., 1943. L’Etre et le néant. Paris: Tel Gal-
limard; English translation: H. E. Barnes. Being and Nothingness, New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.

271 The predictive role of consciousness in determining the Meta-Cognitive

ability
Mehra Jyoti
IT, IBM, Mohali, INDIA

Ahuja Sona
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Education Institute, Agra, INDIA

Cognitive abilities are basic to various performances or task achievements. The efficiency of cognitive processes can be
honed by knowledge of one’s cognitive abilities and further can be controlled or regulated in accordance to the demand of
the situation. These metacognitive components participate in general intelligence, together with processing efficiency and

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reasoning, which have traditionally been considered to compose fluid intelligence (Flavell, Demetriou, A.; Kazi, S. (2006)).
The metacognitive abilities also optimize the potential to think, learn and evaluate. The self-reflection of cognition addresses
the underlining characteristics of consciousness. Consciousness binds together knowledge and metaknowledge (Koriat,
2000). But the influential role of consciousness on the metacognitive abilities is not envisaged.
The present study attempts to investigate the predictive role of consciousness in determining the metacognitive ability
by establishing the functional relationship between the two. The regression model gives the extent of variation in metacog-
nition as accountable by consciousness. The results also reveal the most accounting dimension of consciousness for vari-
ance in knowledge about cognition and control of cognition. Further, the predictive ability of each of the dimension of con-
sciousness to determine metacognitive processes is discussed using regression analysis.

272 Differences in a formal reasoning stage in adolescents with different level

of intelligence.
Saulina Ekaterina
Department of Psychology, Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Background: Academics employ various criteria to determine the stages of cognitive development (Piaget, Demetriou, Gla-
ser, and et.). It is an interesting question what is the best way to determine the stage for children of one age group if they
demonstrate different level of IQ. The main point is understanding what kind of differences children have in this case: only
quantitative (for ex., intellectual speed) or qualitative too. Method: The present sample included 249 children aged 14 - 17
years, grades 9 - 11 from about 50 Russian schools. The group was divided into two subgroups: 1) 132 adolescents, 81 girls
and 51 boys, with high IQ; 2) 117 teenagers, 66 girls and 51 boys, with average IQ. It was used Universal Test of Intellect
“UIT” (11 subtests) developed by Baturin&Kurgansky which includes: Spatial and Verbal abilities, Numerical Reasoning,
Working Memory and IQ score. Average group IQ: 90 -119. High IQ group: >119. Two subgroups demonstrate significant
differences in IQ and in all subtests.
Results: The structure of cognitive abilities has been analyzed in both groups. Math and logical thinking abilities (the
formal reasoning) lead among other abilities in the higher IQ group. Average IQ group grades 9-10
demonstrates the highest results in general knowledge (verbal abilities). Math and logical thinking abilities of adoles-
cents with average IQ take the lowest position till the 11th grade.
The comparative analysis in different age shows that for-
mal reasoning score increases between 9th and 11th grade in both groups. This observation is also true for the other verbal
abilities except general knowledge in average IQ group, which are stable from 10th to 11th grade. According to this data we
can conclude that age 14-17 is a period of intensive development of formal reasoning and it is different in high and average
IQ groups. Formal reasoning became the dominant ability in the intelligence structure in the higher IQ group earlier than in
the average IQ group. The general knowledge is the leading ability from 9 to 10th grade in average IQ group and then it gives
place to formal reasoning.
The factor analysis shows different structure of formal reasoning abilities in groups with high and average IQ. The logi-
cal thinking is included in verbal abilities factor in the average IQ sample and in the same time it is a part formal reasoning
abilities factor in the high IQ group.
Discussion: The results show differences in developmental processes in the formal rea-
soning stage from 9 to 11th form in adolescents with different IQ level. These differences are: 1) Formal reasoning became
the dominant abilities in intelligence structure in high IQ group earlier than in average IQ group; 2) Combining abilities in
the factors based on different principles depending on the level of intelligence in adolescence. Based on the data we can con-
clude that the children of the same age with different IQ levels have conceptual differences in 1) the structure of their formal
and logical abilities and 2) the dynamic characteristics of this structure of their abilities.

273 Mindfulness and Memory Sensitivity: Opposite sides of the same coin?
Tonkovic Mirjana
Department of Psychology, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA
Vranic Andrea
Department of Psychology, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, CROATIA

Mindfulness is a state of active and open attention on the present moment. It is an intentional and self- regulated focusing
of attention, whose purpose is to relax and calm the mind and body. Studies using the Five Factor Mindfulness Question-

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 3 . 1 4 C o g nitive A rchitectures

naire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) , distinguish among five facets of mindfulness (observe, acting with awareness, describe,
non-judgment and non-reactivity. Men tend to score higher on the non-reactivity facet of the FFMQ, while women score
higher on observe. Memory sensitivity, on the other hand, is described as a behavior dedicated to saving memories of one’s
life - people who often reminisce are those with higher memory sensitivity. This behavior is more strongly pronounced in
women. Although contrary in definition both, mindfulness and memory sensitivity, have been found to contribute to one’s
satisfaction with life (SWL).
We hypothesized that this contribution is of differential strength as a function of age; while satisfaction with life of
young people is better predicted by their mindfulness, in elderly satisfaction with life will be more the result of higher mem-
ory sensitivity. More specifically, we hypothesized that sensitivity to one’s own memory might, in the old age, serve as a
mechanism similar to mindfulness and its relation to SWL earlier in life. Furthermore, since rumination (and reflection)
could change the beneficial influence of reminiscing the past and fully attending to experiences in present moment we exam-
ined potential influence of rumination as a moderator variable in predicted relations.
Therefore, the aim of this study was to investigate the potential predictors of satisfaction with life in people of 480 partici-
pants (50% female) consisted of two subsamples of equal size: young (average age 22) and old (average age 65). The Five Facet
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ), Memory Sensitivity Questionnaire (MS; Cornoldi et al., 2007) and Satisfaction With
Life Scale (SWLS; Pavot & Diener, 1993) were used. Additionally, Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell &
Campbell, 1999) was also employed. Controlling for gender differences, the results show a differential influence of mindfulness
vs. memory sensitivity as a function of age. These findings are discussed within the metacognitive view upon aging processes.

3.14 Cognitive Architectures

274 Beyond Error Correction: Homeostasis in Action and Perception

McBride Russ
Department of Philosophy, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

“The whole function of the brain is summed up in: error correction” – Ross Ashby.
Ashby was more correct than he knew. Everywhere we look–not only in neuroscience, but in cognition and conscious-
ness—we find error correction (Clark, 2013; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2010; Hosoya et al., 2005).
Expectations (conscious and unconscious) form the cornerstone for many cases of error correction.
But this leaves the explanatory question unanswered: Why do we find error correction in all facets of mental and neu-
ral activity? My answer is that we find error correction everywhere only because it is a component of a more fundamental
biological process—homeostasis. A homeostatic system is the regulation of a parameter within a given range. Homeostasis
is commonly seen as the single most prevalent design pattern in all life forms, a design pattern that forms the core of physiol-
ogy. Every one of us is thousands upon thousands of inter-nested homeostatic systems with error correction as one of its
components. So, the current growing prominence of error correction in neuroscience, in addition to work going back to
Helmholz, Ashby, MacKay, Neisser, and Gregory (among others), all of which gave error correction a place of prominence,
is on track. But this tradition still misses the reason why error correction is so ubiquitous. Error correction is found eve-
rywhere because it is part of every homeostatic system and homeostatic systems, not error correction, are the real atomic
building blocks of cognition, and more generally, of life itself.
I shall advance a simple argument regarding homeostasis: Since all physiological systems are homeostatic, to the degree
that the mind is a physiologic system, we have good reason to suspect that the mind is homeostatic too. This then brings out
the subsidiary nature of error correction, and the limitation in thinking it has caused. Contrary to the recent work of Clark
and Friston, the ubiquity of error correction, once seen in the context of homeostasis, is not a perceptual phenomena alone.
The homeostatic model extends the error correction insight substantially, to cases of both perception and cases of action. In
both, error correction is critical as an aspect of the more fundamental systemic process involved. The chief difference is that
the defeasible component in error and that which is not are inverted relative to each other. In perception the expectation is
defeasible. In action the sensory input, instead, is defeasible. Further, this approach also provides a key role for conscious-
ness as the primary means by which expectations are primed.
The reflexive homeostatic model provides an elegant explanation of the prominence of error correction and a unified
model for both action and perception.

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3.16 Self-Consciousness and Metacognition

275 Embodied Knowledge and Distributed Cognition: The role of Cognitive Maps.
Lins Marcos
Department of Production Engineering, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL
Leal Rachel
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL

Empirical studies show high levels of complexity in natural collective systems. Social insect colonies disclose an impres-
sive level of collective intelligence. We discuss their communication and interaction in performing internal jobs that dis-
play self-organization and collective decision-making. As a result, regulation is distributed and energetically efficient. The
study aims to analyze aspects of self-organization of complex social systems comparing human organizations with biologi-
cal organizations such as social insects colonies. The methodology characterizes decision-making and regulation either as
centralized and external or distributed and internal. The latter relates to self-organized and self-regulated human processes.
Comparing distributed and internal organized systems with hierarchical and external organized systems, differences in the
speed of information distribution and effectiveness in the performance of functions within organizations can be observed.
Hierarchical and external organized systems are usually evaluated by performance indicators, which often do not cover all
aspects needed to know in detail all the processes that occur within the system. The people’s perception of reality is limited.
Identify phenomena that may affect the performance of activities is more difficult for an outside observer to the system than
to a member of it. One way to externally evaluate the functioning of human organizations seeking to cover all aspects neces-
sary for the knowledge of them is doing cognitive maps of the members of an organization investigating whether people are
aware that they are part of a larger entity and its role in it. The cognitive maps allow structuring knowledge about a problem,
which is the first step in the decision making process, adding the views of different system components about the concepts
and their interrelations, as the complexity recognizes the differences between people and does not consider all equally. Cog-
nitive maps are constructed from information provided by the components of organizations through exhaustive interviews.
At the same time, we investigate if people are aware that the proper functioning of the organizations which they are part,
whether the company for which they work or the community where they live, depends on doing a good job for them or ap-
propriate behavior for life in society, for the well being of the population. Cultural changes are necessary to allow individuals
to see themselves as members of a larger entity, where its performance is critical to the proper functioning of this. Self aware-
ness is the first step for that cultural change occurs, and this is necessary for the distributed internal regulation can override
the hierarchical external regulation necessary for the evolution of a given system.

276 Rubber hand illusion alters thermoception in the disowned real hand.
Lukowska Marta
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Siedlecka Marta
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Consciousness Lab C-lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, POLAND

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental way of altering the sense of hand ownership by inducing a conflict be-
tween visual, tactile and proprioceptive information. In a typical RHI protocol a participant’s experimental hand is hidden
from view and stroked synchronously with a visible rubber hand. As a result the participant usually experiences tactile sen-
sations as coming from the rubber hand (touch misattribution), feels ownership over the rubber hand, and misjudges the
position of the unseen real hand (proprioceptive localisation error).
There has been a growing interest in limb-disownership in the real body part involved in the illusion. Although several
studies revealed changes in subjective experience (i.e. tactile sensations or pain intensity) and physiological parameters (i.e.
skin temperature, histamine reactivity) of the experimental hand under RHI, empirical data are still ambiguous.
Here, we investigated the effect of the rubber hand illusion on the perceived discomfort caused by ice compress applied

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to the real hand. The results showed the illusion reduces discomfort to cold reflected in behavioural and subjective meas-
ures. Participants in the experimental group requested the removal of the ice application later and rated the experience as
less unpleasant compared to members of the control group. Moreover, the intensity and the time of discomfort occurrence
correlated with the proprioceptive localisation error in the experimental group: the greater the error, the later the cold tem-
perature became unpleasant and the less unpleasant it was rated.
The results could be interpreted in the context of the body matrix hypothesis suggesting a link between autonomic pro-
cesses and spatial bodily representations. Strictly speaking, RHI recalibrated spatial bodily representation such that the real
hand was excluded from it causing changes in homeostatic processes and altering thermoception.
We further discuss several possible controversies concerning this interpretation: (1) whether the real hand really be-
came disowned under RHI, (2) whether it was excluded from body schema, (3) whether the exclusion resulted in homeo-
stasis disturbances, (4) whether these disturbances led to altered thermoception, and finally (5) whether altered thermo-
ception decreased sensitivity to unpleasant cold stimuli. Resolving these controversies requires strict definition and accurate
operationalization of body disownership, proper measures of body part exclusion from body schema, monitoring autonomic
system parameters under RHI, as well as tracking changes in temperature detection and discomfort thresholds.

277 Influence of prior causal belief on sense of agency – the cue integration
approach
Majchrowicz Bartosz
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND

Sense of agency (SoA) refers to a subjective feeling of being an author of one’s own actions and their effects, which may also
be accompanied by an explicit judgment. In recent years, cue integration model of SoA has been proposed and empirically
tested. According to this model, SoA depends on various – but interacting – kinds of cues: (1) predictive, such as efferent
copy of motor command, (2) inferential, such as (re)afferent signals of actions’ sensory consequences, and (3) prior, such as
higher-level causal beliefs. The model is capable to explain not only regular SoA, but also various cases of SoA errors observ-
able in both health and disease. Preliminary studies have already investigated the possible mechanism of cue integration,
suggesting Bayes-like process of cue weighting. However, the extent and possible asymmetries in integration of different
cues are still unclear. Here, we took a closer look at the role of prior causal belief and its influence on predicting sensory
consequences of actions.
A version of Libet’s clock paradigm implementing a measurement of temporal attraction of actions and their effects (i.e.
temporal intentional binding effect; IB) were used for SoA assessment. Participants first underwent baseline and associa-
tive phases, which allowed measuring standard IB effect and also let participants associatively learn that their actions (key
presses) always led to specific effects (tones delivered after fixed delay). Then, via instruction manipulation, we induced spe-
cific bias in experimental group: participants were informed that in the subsequent phase their actions would sometimes
produce different, surprising effects. Thus, some of actions’ consequences were unpredictable (in terms of tone characteris-
tics and delay). In experimental phase trials, unpredictable oddball tones were presented with more frequent tones identical
to those learnt in the previous phase. We hypothesized that induced bias should lead to higher weighting of prior informa-
tion and outweigh less reliable predictions about actions’ consequences. Accordingly, SoA over unexpected outcomes (odd-
balls) should be higher in experimental than in control group. Moreover, we assumed that in the course of the experiment,
prior regarding action-effect association should also be updated, leading to increase of IB (and thus, SoA) in the later odd-
ball trials of control group.
Specific results of the experiment will be presented at the conference. The results may validate the integrative account of
SoA adopted here, as well as add further evidence suggesting that cognitive system’s functioning may be described in terms
of weighting and integration of different sensorimotor and cognitive cues following Bayesian rules, consistent also with the
predictive coding framework.

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278 What do male and female mental health trainees think about their mood?
Rani Prachi
Department of Neuroscience, Narayana Hrudayalaya Hospital, Bangalore, INDIA
Mehrotra Seema
NIMHANS, Bangalore, INDIA

Males and females differ in their faculty of emotions, and they agree about it too. If they consciously agree about the emotions,
they must have given it a thought. The thoughts and feelings about one’s mood are called meta-mood. The present study at-
tempts to assess the gender differences on meta-mood. The prevalent socio- cultural factors in India make it difficult to obtain
comparable groups from the general population. Hence, a specific population group was chosen- trainees at a prestigious mental
health institute. This not only provided comparable groups in terms of age and education, but also training in dealing with emo-
tions. Thus, as a sample, they provide extra knowledge in terms of their understanding of and exposure to emotions and moods.
The study explores the relationship among meta-mood components [attention to, clarity, intensity, and repair of mood],
motivation to maintain negative mood, generalized expectancy for negative mood regulation and negative affect (at Time 1)
and perceived stress (at Time 2 – after a gap of one month following the first assessment) in male and female MHTs.
Results show that female MHTs obtained a significantly higher mean on affect intensity than their male counterparts,
confirming the general population trend that females consistently describe themselves as more emotionally intense. Male
MHTs obtained a significantly higher mean on repair of moods than their female counterparts. Gender differences also
emerged with regard to perceived stress. The results indicate robust gender differences, especially keeping in mind the pro-
fessional background of the sample group.

279 The influence of recognition on metacognitive awareness

Siedlecka Marta
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND
Paulewicz Boryslaw
Warsaw School of Social Science and Humanities, Katowice, POLAND
Wierzchon Michal
Jagiellonian University, Krakow, POLAND

Metacognitive awareness enables us to know that we know something. One way of measuring it is to ask participants how
confident they are that they have or will access specific information. Some researchers postulate, that although low-level
stimuli-related activation may lead to correct recall or recognition, conscious awareness requires metacognitive access.
Here we present the results of two experiments aiming to investigate the relation between retrieving an item stored in
semantic memory and metacognitive awareness ratings. In Experiment 1 participants were asked to remember lists of words,
each word starting with a different letter. After a distracting task they were presented with a cue – first letter of a word that
they had to recall. Then participants were asked to choose a word previously presented from a pair of stimuli and to judge
how confident they were that it was the right one. The accuracy of their judgments in this condition (recognition-confidence)
was compared to the accuracy of participants who first determined their confidence in correct recognition and then chose the
word (confidence- recognition). The results showed that although recognition accuracy was high in both conditions, it was
predicted by confidence only when metacognition was assessed after the decision. This effect might be explained by differ-
ences between recall and recognition, as participants who already saw the actual words to choose received more cues to judge
their confidence (i.e. they recognized the word even thought they could not remember it). Therefore, in Experiment 2 we
used a different task. Participants were working on the sets of anagrams and asked to determine their confidence in identifica-
tion the solution either before or after presenting a target word. Half of the targets were anagram solutions and half of them
were words similar to actual solutions, differing mostly in one letter. Therefore if participants did not solve given anagram, the
targets could not constitute cues for recognition, on the contrary, they were misleading. Results of this study were similar to
those of Experiment 1, that is the confidence accuracy was higher when a judgment followed a decision.
We interpret those results as a support for hierarchical theories of consciousness, that claim that although activation of
low level representation might allow above chance performance in memory task, conscious awareness requires metacogni-
tive access. The results are in line with our data on perceptual task, showing that visual awareness ratings predicted identifi-
cation accuracy better when they were preceded by identification response.

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3.17 Temporal Consciousness

280 Consciousness for the Past/Present/Future - Chronesthesia: Experiments of

a Stubborn Illusion
Gruber Ronald
Medical Center, Stanford University , Palo Alto, CA, USA
Block Richard
Psychology, Montana State U., Bozeman, Montana, USA, Michael Bach, University of Freiburg, GERMANY
Bach Michael
University of Freiburg, GERMANY

Background: Consciousness of the past/present/future (introduced by Tulving and referred to as chronesthesia) is a mental
time travel into the past and future. During that mental processing a person imagines him/herself to be the same person.
More generally, there is a presumption of object persistence (OP), e.g. that a person or object persists from the present into
the past. Without that prerequisite there would be no past/present/future, and instead a series of unrelated objects appear-
ing and disappearing.
Modern physical cosmological theories do not insist on persistence. Most of those theories are timeless and are com-
fortable with the universe as a series of individual events that do not disappear. Thus, the question arises as to why and how
the brain constructs persistence for an experience of past/present/future. Must it be a stubborn illusion as Einstein claimed?
Our previous studies with the flow of time indicated that there two components: 1) the phenomenon of the past/pre-
sent/future, and 2) the flow of events such as motion. It was concluded that motion is an illusory percept “painted onto
each snapshot” in order to fill the perceptual gaps. Those findings now beg the question as to whether or not OP is also an
illusory percept.
Method/Results: The experiential evidence relating to the phenomenon of OP was reviewed and some experiments
replicated. This included: 1) apparent motion; 2) color phi; and 3) the tunnel effect. In all these spatiotemporal situations
the percept of OP overrode other contradictory perceptual and cognitive data. For example, a red car entering a tunnel not
only gave the impression that it is passing through the tunnel (amodal completion) but upon exiting as a yellow car was per-
ceived as the same car.
Of greater interest recently was the discovery that OP may manifest itself in temporal-only situations, e.g. stationary
objects. Using a slight-of-hand trick, an object that appeared to be hidden in a stationary hand evoked OP as expected. What
was not expected was the fading away of OP within seconds suggesting that the OP was a percept of amodal completion
and not just a cognitive conclusion. Recalling that visual perception is not completely continuous even for temporal-only
situations whereas the amodal completion of OP is continuous, we are left with the conclusion that OP, like motion, is an
illusory percept that “fills the (perceptual) gaps.”
Conclusions: It is increasingly clear that the brain constructs OP (as it does motion) to fill the (perceptual) gaps. There-
fore, consciousness for the past/present/future, chronesthesia, would seem, at the least, to be based upon an illusory per-
cept, or at most, to be a stubborn illusion.

281 As Time Passes by: Motion-speed dilates and contracts subjective

estimation of time intervals
Nyman Thomas
Department of Psychology and Logopedics (IPL), Åbo Akademi, Turku, FINLAND

It is has been shown that subjective perception of time dilates when observing motion, yet little is known concerning the
effect of alterations of video-playback speeds on time perception. The current study focused on the effects of three speeds
of video playback (slow, normal, and fast) on a timing task. The study included 23 female and 7 male participants who were
asked to view an ecologically valid stimulus (film recording of people walking) and it was found that video-playback speed

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affected the perceived duration of time. A comparison of the mean time estimates between conditions revealed that the slow
condition compared with the normal condition gave rise to significantly longer time estimates (d ? -0.225, p < .001). The
mean time estimates in the fast condition were significantly shorter compared with the normal condition (d ? 0.388. p <
.001). The difference between the slow and fast condition was naturally also significant (d ? 0.638, p < .001). The results cor-
roborate the notion that time estimation and time perception are related to the perceived speed of objects in one’s surround-
ings and that the human brain recalibrates time in accordance with its surroundings.

282 Perceiving change: between retention and extension.

Tsompanidis Vasilis
Philosophy, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, Novo Hamburgo, BRAZIL

Recent philosophical investigation of temporal experience can be used to form novel replies to the following older question:
(1) whether, and how, it might be possible to directly perceive change.
If indeed humans can directly perceive non-static temporally extended phenomena, such as motion, or the dynamic
features of sounds, then one could defend the position that humans can also directly perceive change.

The philosophical theories describing such temporally extended experiences have been recently classified into three
camps:
(1) anti-realists claim that we do not perceive change, but we infer it from static perceptions through memory; (2)
retentionalists claim that we perceive change through retentions; and
(3) extensionalists claim that acts of perceiving are
themselves extended over time.

All three theories face significant problems. Anti-realist and retentionalist theories are phenomenologically suspect,
while extensionalist theories seem cognitively so. The latter two have been criticized as leading to an infinite multiplication
of contents, and they both face difficulties in accounting for temporal perception defects such as akinetopsia.

I argue that the classification imposes a false trichotomy on human experience. There is not just one way that humans
perceive change, but (at least) three, that indicate three separate paths from sense to consciousness that dynamic sensory
data might follow:
(1) Fast visual motion perception validates the retentional model, as it often involves some retention
phenomenology;
(2) Slow motion perception validates the anti-realist model, as in it memory is essential.
(3)Sound per-
ception validates the extensional model, as it works through sub-personal phonological feedback loops that furnish ready-
made dynamic contents, without any accompanying retentions.

However, a simple disjunctive reply to question (1) that mentions all three cases above is mistaken, as it would preserve
the problems each group of theories face. For a single explanation I propose instead a hybrid model, where all three cases
have the following structure:
(1) They contain a subpersonal mechanism processing change;
(2) a memory mechanism
concurrently processing parts of the change; and
(3) a mechanism that infers change from divergent memory traces.

The main advantage of such a model is that the trichotomy noted above can be attributed to the diverging processing
speed of each case: sound perception is far faster than vision, while the first two cases are already separated by their process-
ing speed in their description. Hence, we can easily describe all three paths to consciousness noted in this abstract.

The attached image illustrates the first case of fast visual motion detection:
• p1...p3 are momentary percepts. Here, pn could be “ObjectA at location Ln”.
• “p1->p2”, then, is the change repre-
sentation, of an object moving from L1 to L2 • C(p) means conscious-of(p)
• M(p) means retention-of(p)
• M’(p) means
faded-retention-of(p)

The full paper provides illustrations for the other two cases. Its last section deals with two remaining problems: the
possibility of double or triple registrations of change representations, and the objection that slow visual motion processing
should not be counted as perception at all.

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3.18 Intelligence ans Creativity

283 Embodied Reasoning via Motor-Spatial Models

Berendzen J.C.
Philosophy, Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, USA

The aim of this paper is to argue that reasoning has its roots in bodily action via the use of spatial representations that I call
“motor-spatial models.” This view is inspired by and draws from Markus Knauff ’s spatial theory of human thought (Space
to Reason: A Spatial Theory of Human Thought (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013)), Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenom-
enology of the perception of space (as found primarily in Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. D.A. Landes (London:
Routledge, 2012)), and recent research into motor imagery. My main thesis is that a significant portion of human reasoning
is based on our ability to imagine our bodies moving in space.
Knauff has recently argued, using behavioral and neuroimaging studies, that visual mental imagery does not play a per-
vasive role in human reasoning. Rather than inspecting images the “minds eye,” reasoners actually use spatial representa-
tions. He develops a conception of “spatial layout models,” which are abstract, supramodal representations that present in-
formation in spatial arrays. The spatial relations between elements of the representation can be inspected in such a way that
relational inferences can be drawn.
Knauff does not really consider the role that action plays in spatial representation, and he is mildly dismissive of “em-
bodied cognition” (Space to Reason, 6-7). I argue, however, that spatial layout models must be understood as primarily
embodied and action-centered; they depend upon our ability to represent our movements in space. This idea takes inspira-
tion from Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “there would be no such thing as space if I did not have a body”(Phenomenology of
Perception, 104). The idea here is that our primary conception of space is egocentric and is dependent upon our experience
of our body’s movements in space. A central part of this paper will discuss the ways in which the adoption of a Merleau-
Pontyian conception of space would change Knauff ’s view.
One of the primarily elements of Knauff ’s theory is his contention that spatial layout models are supra-or-a- modal.
They are highly abstract representations of spatial relations that while built upon perceptual information from the various
modalities remove most perceptual information which is irrelevant to (and potentially a hinderance to) the reasoning pro-
cess. For example, spatial layout models do not have to represent visual qualities (such as color) that would add to the rea-
soner’s cognitive load without contributing to the relevant inferences. The adoption of the Merleau-Pontyian conception of
space would leave this element of Knauff ’s view mostly untouched. It would be necessary, however, to argue that motor-per-
ceptual (such as kinesthetic and kinematic) information plays a special role in the development of embodied motor-spatial
models. While Knauff may be right to downplay the role that visual mental imagery plays in reasoning, I will argue that
motor imagery plays a crucial role in spatial reasoning.

284 The impact of Personality Traits on the View of Uniqueness of

Consciousness
Kajonius Petri
Work- and Organizational Psychology, Department of Psychology, Trollhättan, SWEDEN

Personality traits, including the well-known Big Five traits, the subclinical Dark Triad traits, as well as cognitive (IQ) and emo-
tional abilities (EQ), are known to predict a number of outlooks on life, such as views of politics, importance of other people,
or interest in self. This present study set out to research the impact of personality traits on the view of consciousness, the main
question being whether consciousness sets mankind apart from the animal kingdom. A Swedish sample was tested on six differ-
ent personality-related tests measuring traits, values, and abilities. The results showed that high scorers in emotional intelligence,
openness and extraversion had a view of consciousness being unique for human beings only. Furthermore, people high on self-
enhancing values and the tendency to manipulate others (Machiavellianism) also held a view of consciousness being unique
for human beings. Only self-transcending values, such as universalism, showed a negative association with the uniqueness of

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consciousness. The discussion extends to how the view on consciousness affects other outlooks on life, such as the view on one’s
personal future or mankind’s environmental predicament. Motivational agendas stemming from personality traits, in terms of
stable and genetical influences, might explain views on ontological questions to a greater degree than previously thought.

285 A metacognition model of the social aspects of consciousness.

Toshima Mayumi
Department of Informatics, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Tokyo, JAPAN
Ishikawa Tetsuo
Computational Intelligence and Systems Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama, JAPAN
Oyama Keizo
Digital Content & Media Sciences Research Division, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, JAPAN
Mogi Ken
Fundamental Research Laboratory, Sony Computer Science Laboratories, Tokyo, JAPAN

Intelligence is an important denominator of consciousness. An essential aspect of intelligence resides in communication.

The Turing test (Turing A. 1950) was designed to judge by means of communications if the examinees would be regarded
to have ‘intelligence’. General intelligence could be used for measuring one’s capability or competence, and to nurture the
emergence of intellectual human activities. In this respect, not only the examinees but also the examiners of the Turing test
would need to have general intelligence. Communications provide essential means of judging the nature of intelligence in
one’s counterpart. To judge the nature of intelligence, it is necessary to have some form of metacognition. Metacognitive
abilities are necessary to survive socially among people, and have been one of the vital and influential strategic factors during
the evolution of humans, affecting the emergence of consciousness. In particular, explicit metacognition enables us to share
our experiences of action and sensation with others (Frith C. 2012)
Sharing information with others sometimes leads to improvements in functionality. Under certain conditions, two peo-
ple could obtain better results than one alone could have. In a decision making paradigm, ‘two people could collectively
count better than either one alone’ (Bahrami B. 2013). Collective diversified characteristics are now thought to enable hu-
mans to fully bring the abilities out: Humans are able to procure far better results when working with others furnished with
metacognitive abilities. When working with other people, the context of the functioning of one’s general intelligence could
be changed from a single confined state to a socially collective state.
Here we present a model concerning metacognition based on the idea that ‘ two heads are better than one.’ The humans
increasingly live in an environment surrounded by various types of social networking technology. It is an interesting scien-
tific question how the human consciousness, in particular its social aspects, would be altered in such an era. Humans have
chances to collaborate with others easily, especially in the environment provided by the Internet. When collecting informa-
tion on the Internet, many subjects conventionally retrieve information alone, but this is not necessarily the most efficient
way. Collective search methods could tap into the rich collaborative possibilities within the spectrum of intersubjectivity.
We analyze data from collective search experiment on the Internet to explore the possibility that humans could have better
results using the collective intelligence and metacognition of each other’s mind states. Based on the results, we discuss con-
sciousness, metacognition, communication and general intelligence within an integrated scheme.

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3.19 Miscellaneous
(Cognitive Science and Psychology)

286 Becoming more conscious: using the Consciousness Quotient Inventory

(CQ-i) as a psychological tool for increasing conscious awareness and facilitating
inner growth process
Brazdau Ovidiu
Research, Consciousness Quotient Institute, New York, USA
Tuazon Jennifer Luna
West Visayas State University, Iloilo, PHILIPPINES

The Consciousness Quotient (CQ) is a composite psychological construct based on a list of traits, skills and abilities that
describe conscious experience. The CQ Inventory (CQ-i) evaluates the frequency of various behaviours and the usage of
specific skills and abilities, providing a detailed description of conscious awareness experiences.
An important element of conscious experience is intentionality, being the mind-set that allows a person to deliberately
choose what behaviour to enact and what attitude to select. ‘More conscious’ (a higher CQ) means a higher degree of wit-
nessing awareness and being less automatic in thinking-feeling-sensing, together with a higher degree of choice when initi-
ating a behaviour. The witnessing perspective, which leads to the ability to observe the inside and outside worlds without
engaging with them, is one of the key factors of the CQ construct. ‘Witnessing awareness’ is usually described as the ‘I am
experience’, ‘the observer experience’, ‘just being’ (as opposed to ‘doing’), ‘awareness of awareness itself ’ and ‘no-mind’.
The CQ-i is composed of seven dimensions, which comprise the Consciousness Quotient: physical, emotional, cogni-
tive, social-relational, self, inner growth and spiritual. These seven dimensions are the main seven factors of the Conscious-
ness Quotient Inventory.
This exploratory study specifically aimed to find out the consciousness quotient and intrapersonal and interpersonal
relationship skills of participants prior to and after exposure to transformative consciousness exercises (as developed by Ste-
phen Wolinsky, for the experimental group) and the self-awareness sessions (for the comparison group). This randomized
pretest and posttest control group design utilized the CQ-i and a validated researcher made Intrapersonal and Interpersonal
Relationship Skills Scale. These research instruments were administered to 23 individuals in the experimental group and 21
participants in the comparison group before and after the Transformative Consciousness sessions. The study determined
significant differences between scores of the pre and post intervention in both conditions.

287 Why we need a new paradigm to study the evolution of the mind.
Gabriel Rami
HHSS, Research group in Mind, Science, and Culture, Columbia College Chicago, Chicago, USA

This talk charts an epistemological position on fundamental issues in the study of the evolution of the mind. I describe
a non-modular model of affective mechanisms and its implications for an evolutionary approach to cognitive psychology.
Most models of value generation are based either on behaviorist conditioning paradigms or cognitive rational cost/benefit
decision- making. But the former mechanical associations are too dumb, and the latter discursive and computational rea-
soning is too smart. Aristotle and Spinoza serve as touchstones for my interpretation of the function of mental capacities:
the neuroplastic brain generates and assigns affective values with pushmi-pullyu representations and somatic markers long
before propositional manipulation of the external world. This new paradigm is distinguished from the dominant schools of
thought in cognitive and developmental psychology through contrasting interpretations of particular paradigmatic experi-
mental findings (such as work on attitudes and unconscious reactions) as epistemological justification. Finally, I describe
how future empirical research in animal ethology and on the relation between emotion and cognition will benefit from
being buttressed by this new paradigm.

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288 Coping with stressful situations: A comparison between Tanzanian and

Emirati university students.
Al Miskry Abdullah Seif
Psychology & Counseling, UAE University, Al Ain, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Hamid Abdalla A. R. M.
Psychology & Counseling, UAE University, Al Ain, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Coping theories mainly postulate two or three dimensions of coping. This study was an attempt to identify and compare
the coping strategies of Tanzanian and UAE university students. The aim of the study was two-fold: to investigate whether
the dimensions of coping measured by the Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations will be replicated; and, to examine
differences in coping strategies between the students of the two countries that will eventually reflect their coping strate-
gies at their work settings. A sample of 233 students was selected from each of the two counties and the Coping Inventory
for Stressful Situations was used to assess coping strategies. Principal component analysis with matrix rotation was used to
identify the coping dimensions of the two groups. Results showed few but significant variations in coping strategies used
by students from the two countries. Significant differences were found in relation to age, gender, and marital status. Results
were further discussed in relation to previous findings and limitations were highlighted.
Keywords: Coping, Stress, Differences, Tanzania, UAE

289 The Developmental Basis of Visuomotor Capabilities and the Causal

Nature
of Motor Clumsiness to Cognitive and Empathic Dysfunction
Vakalopoulos Costa
Medicine, Private Practice, Melbourne, AUSTRALIA

Motor disorders are a prominent feature of several psychiatric conditions including autism and schizophrenia. The paper
extends the idea of a causal association between motor feedback and the cognitive character of the brain. First, it elaborates
a detailed theory of how motor function and visual transformations are encoded as a cortical algorithm. The mechanism of
motor efference copy is proposed for all forms of cognitive development. A special case
of a component theory of efference
copy is reconsidered with regards to the dorsal stream property of spatial awareness, in addition to its role in the formulation
of motor repertoires. The spatial component of awareness within any and all sensory modalities, including proprioception
itself, is compromised by the failed cerebellar contribution. This does not mean the peripheral proprioceptive signal is de-
fective. Rather, it’s an aberrant capacity of a predictive cerebellar-mediated reafference. Normally considered a feedforward
output for changes in the positions of joints as part of a planned action, the proposal is for the consequences of those actions
to categorize cortical networks as a feedback copy. This leads directly to higher level disorders of attention, theory of mind,
and ultimately empathic insights by autistic subjects. Cognition and empathy are embodied by the process of active explora-
tion of an organism and are dependent on the integrity of structures subserving aspects of motor behaviour. The main focus
here is the cerebellum, an organ writ large in the pathophysiology of autism. What autism teaches us is that empathy is a
construct of spatial awareness. (Published in the journal cerebellum)

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 4 . P hysica l and Bio l o g ica l S ciences

4. Physical and Biological

Sciences

4.1 Quantum Theory

290 Wigner’s Friend Paradox and Intersubjectivity

Borgheai Seyyed Bahram
Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, IRAN
Golshani Mehdi
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, IRAN

In this paper, it is shown that Wigner’s Friend paradox is not successful in reaching its desired goal which is the causal role
of consciousness in the measurement problem, rather the legitimate conclusion of the paradox is that the (piece of) knowl-
edge (information) of the observation should be treated (explanatorily) in a different way.
Moreover, it is objected that by granting collapse principle and also communicability, there would be no paradox. To
save the paradox, we reduce collapse principle from a general claim to first-person version. Then, by eliminating the com-
municability from the presumptions, the paradox raised again whose resolution is gained through rejection of the first-per-
son collapse. Thus, one of the significant results of the remodeled paradox is that the third-person collapse provides a valid
knowledge for all observers, i.e. communicability.
However, with a third person collapse, there would be no paradox. To
have the paradox again, it is restructured by assuming a distinction between the objective (external) object and its corre-
spondent knowledge in the observer’s mind. The immediate resolution of the new paradox is rejection of this distinction.
This rejection results in some weak and strong implications: two weak ones are firstly that the referent of the wave function,
of course in QM explanatory domain, is knowledge, since there should be some sort of unity between the state of the system
and its correspondent knowledge. Secondly, this referred knowledge belongs not to a specific subject (observer) but to an
intersubjective domain which is in principle accessible for all possible observers (subjects) immediately. This immediacy is
shown through a new version of paradox, titled as “Wigner and Friend Paradox”, in which there are more than one observer
at observation at a same time. Through this version it is explained that the sharing of knowledge is immediate, non- local and
entangled.
The strong claim here is that as wave function refers to the intersubjective knowledge domain, collapse of this
wave function might also happen in this intersubjective domain. Furthermore, not only collapse belongs to this intersubjec-
tive domain but also all the knowledge gained through quantum mechanics is correspondent to this realm. Though needs
more clarifications, intersubjectivity is very fruitful posit in interpretation of QM.
the claim here is epistemic and not onto-
logical or metaphysical. If we go under the presumptions of Wigner through Paradox, especially by communicability, with
all our modifications, it leads to posit some sort of inter- subjectivity in the epistemic level, i.e. the knowledge about system.
The intersubjective knowledge domain should be added to the explanatory framework of QM to treat some paradoxical as-
pects of conscious observation as challenged in Wigner’s Friend paradox.

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291 Increased coincidence detection for quantum versus pseudo random

generated numbers.
Boshoff Lieze
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS
Jolij Jacob
Psychology, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS

People often see meaning in stimuli that are typically considered meaningless. According to Von Lucadou’s idea of General-
ized Quantum Theory (GQT), such perceived coincidences, or examples of synchronicity, may be the result of entangle-
ment between a conscious observer and the physical world. Here we test this idea by means of a ‘coincidence detection
task’. Participants were shown a series of 150 randomly generated stimuli (here, a set of three numbers between 0 and 255),
and had to indicate per stimulus whether that set of numbers held any meaning to them. Critically, the random source
could either be a quantum event generator, or a pseudo random number generator. If ‘coincidences’ are indeed the result
of quantum entanglement, or a process like it, we would expect an increased number of reported coincidences for quantum
versus pseudo- random generated events. A preliminary data analysis shows that this indeed is the case: over 150 random
pseudo-randomly generated numbers; this increased significantly to 12% for quantum generated random numbers. This re-
sult seems to suggest that synchronicities may indeed be interpreted as non-local correlations between an observer and the
physical world.

292 Multi Dimensional Time, Retro Causality and Consciousness

Emrén Allan
N/A, Nuchem Research AB, Tollered, SWEDEN

The necessity for unobserved quantum systems to, under certain circumstances, exist simultaneously in several mutually ex-
clusive states could be considered as the most shocking discovery of physics during the last one hundred years. The analysis
of von Neumann and Wigner resulted in the conclusion that human consciousness is causing the collapse of the wave func-
tion, forcing the system to reach a unique state. Although this conclusion is denied in some interpretations, none of those
have been proven to be correct.
If the Schrödinger equation is written in imaginary time, it becomes identical to the diffusion equation. This suggests
that time is multi dimensional. Taking into account the Hellmann-Feynman theorem, and the Feynman multipath theo-
rem, quantum mechanics may be interpreted as the result of random motion in real space and time, in which retro causality
causes an illusion of superluminal speeds. In this interpretation, all the random motions in real space and time take place in
imaginary time. As the complex conjugate Schrödinger equation describes a diffusion backwards in imaginary time, we are
led to an interpretation with pairs of particles diffusing in different directions in imaginary time. This symmetry eliminates
the need for an arrow of imaginary time.
Observation of a system results in a partial collapse of the wave function preventing real time to (locally) proceed back-
wards beyond that point, causing an arrow of (real) time. Investigation of two Mach-Zehnder interferometers demonstrate
that while the direction of time is random at one location, an arrow of time may be established at another.
Before an observation takes place, many possibilities are open. Also, the wave function is able to propagate far into the
future of real time. The system is even able to visit futures of extremely low probability. At observation, one out of all present
possibilities becomes real. At the same time, all futures as well as all histories are closed, that were possible before the obser-
vation, but are incompatible with the observed result.
There is some evidence that consciousness may influence which possibility, and thus outcome of an observation, to
make real. This may have influenced the strange outcome of the 9/11 terror attack, and indicates that retro causal interaction
between consciousness and wave functions played a major role. Similarly, miracles could possibly be interpreted as some
kind of resonance between consciousness and the tails of extremely low probability that are present in most wave functions.

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293 Decoherence in brain processes and the forces of nature

Goodman Maurice
School of Physics, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin, IRELAND

Decoherence in brain processes and the forces of nature
There are four forces of nature. Their relative strengths (S) are 1
for the strong force, ~10-2 for the electromagnetic force, ~10-9 for the weak force and ~10-35 for the gravitational force.
The reduction/decoherence time (h/2pE, where E is the separation energy for a particular force) is equal to r/Sc where c is
the speed of light and r is the scale over which decoherence takes place. If brain processes and consciousness are quantum
mechanical in nature this decoherence scale would need to be cellular distances (10-5 meters) or greater. This yields deco-
herence times of greater than10-13 seconds for the strong force, greater than 10-11 seconds for the electromagnetic force,
greater than 10-4 seconds for the weak force and greater than10+22 seconds for the gravitational force. Therefore, if brain
processes and consciousness are fundamentally quantum mechanical the relevant dynamical timescales in the brain (~10-3
– 10-1 seconds) clearly suggest that the force likely to be implicated in this is the weak force.
About the time theories of con-
sciousness began to proliferate in the early 1990’s a holistic theory of the forces, particles and structures present in the uni-
verse (Goodman 1994) suggested a connection between the biological cell, the weak force and the neutrino. A prediction of
the neutrino mass was made which was 400 times below what was measurable at that time. The prediction was on the basis
that the minimum uncertainty in position of the neutrino was of the same order as the size of a typical cell (10-5 m.). This
prediction is about to be confirmed in the coming year by the Katrin spectrometer in Karlsruhe, Germany. That will mean
that quantum effects associated with the weak force and neutrino can occur over cellular scales, and greater, via the exchange
of virtual neutrino’s. As is required, such weak coherent quantum states would be insulated from normal electromagnetic
processes in the brain. This makes a quantum theory of consciousness, based on the weak force, a real possibility in the
future.
Unlike all other forces, the weak force does not appear to be a key component of any macroscopic structure found in
nature. The gravitational force builds galaxies, the electromagnetic force builds atoms and the strong force builds nuclei. The
fact that the weak force appears to build nothing needs an explanation. Wouldn’t it be amusing if, all along, one of the most
extraordinary weak force structures was staring us in the back of the face?

Goodman, M. Key self-organising systems. Proceedings of the 1st ICASSE, June 1994, pp118-125

294 Making sense of weirdness in classical, statistical and quantum formalisms

Jansen Franz
Herault, retired, Assas, FRANCE

Ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics include weird aspects, such as many worlds or a physical collapse of the
wave function with or without an observer. The Copenhagen Interpretation, emphasizing the epistemic nature of quantum
theory avoided some of these strange aspects. However, according to e.g. Tegmark we have to live with weird interpretations.
In the formalism of classical physics, some characteristics of observable reality already disappear, such as the present,
past and future, as claimed by Einstein. In statistics the distribution variety of a population is replaced by one virtual mean
with a constant standard deviation. In quantum mechanics the unicity of one space location for one time point is replaced
by multiple spaces with the consequence that one needs to give up the notion of trajectories, leading to timeless concepts
(Zeh 1970; Barbour 2009). In addition, multiple spaces for the same time point (Dirac 1947) naturally impose non-locality
in the physical formalism. However, the non- contradiction principle (Aristotle) does not allow us to consider such for-
malism as reality, only as potentiality. Thus it is not nature, but the mathematical abstraction imposed by the formalism,
which reduces observable reality to mental models with artificial properties, such as timelessness and non-locality. However,
when physical formalism is applied in new concrete experiments, the lost properties are partially regained, such as past, pre-
sent and future in classical physics, the distribution variety in statistics and space and time coordinates in QM experiments.
Therefore, physical formalism must be considered as a mental construct projected on physical reality, which has to be veri-
fied, if it is to represent a valuable approach for predicting future experimental outcomes.
Classical physics extrapolates regular past events, such as the revolution of the earth to regular events in the future.
However, the future or the unobservable far past remain uncertain, thus the earth revolution was more rapid some billion
years ago. This shows that even classical physical formalism is a mental model, which may or may not correspond to physical
reality and has to be verified. In the same sense, QM formalism predicting from irregular past events irregular future events
with probabilities should be seen as a mental model projected on nature and not a direct description of nature’s behavior.
The astonishing performance of QM could probably be explained by its similarity to normal mental functions allowing

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4 . 1 Q uantu m T heory

the prediction of an uncertain future by mental superposition of possible events with probability estimations. Thus, for the
next morning several future actions can be mentally superposed, although only one could be realized during the limited
time. Superposition is possible with mental potentiality, which is different from reality, since only one potential action could
be realized. For the prediction from regular outcomes classical physics or statistics and from irregular outcomes quantum
mechanics with potentiality are the best adapted mental models.
www.jansen-fk.com : QUANTUM MECHANICS ARE NOT PHYSICAL REALITY BUT MENTAL POTENTIAL-
ITY BECAUSE OF THE LAW OF NON-CONTRADICTION, forthcoming in NeuroQuantology, 2015

295 Irreducibility of the Logic of Integrated Information: From Quantum

Coherence to Unity of Consciousness and Beyond
Schroeder Marcin J.
Basic Education, Akita International University, Akita, JAPAN

The association of consciousness with quantum mechanics has long and convoluted history. Original interest in the poten-
tial relationship was generated by the problem of quantum measurement. Attempts to avoid the decoherence of quantum
superposition of states in the process of measurement always failed at the point when a human observer was involved, even
when through ingenious procedures superposition could be maintained at the earlier stages of measurement. This suggested
that it is involvement of consciousness which is responsible for the necessity of decoherence.
Later, the interest in the reversed relationship became a subject of many speculative explanations of the phenomenal
unity of consciousness. This unity, which after two millennia of philosophical reflection was recognized by William James
as the primary characteristic of our conscious experience to be studied in psychology, did not match any other known phe-
nomena observed in nature, except in quantum mechanical systems.
Dennis Gabor, inventor of holography, started the long sequence of attempts to explain cognitive functions in his work
on a mathematical model of holographic associative memory. His work on holographic model of memory was followed by
his colleague Pieter Jacobus van Heerden (1970). Experimental work in psychology carried out by Karl Lashley showing
non-local character of memory stimulated the work of Karl Pribram (1974) on his “holonomic brain model” based on quan-
tum mechanical phenomena. This was also time when Stuart Hameroff (1974) began to work on his model of brain func-
tioning. This early interest in the “quantum mechanical brain” was followed by multiple other attempts culminating in the
1990’s Penrose-Hameroff model (Penrose 1994; Hameroff & Penrose 1996). From this high point the wave of interest sub-
sided due to the problem with explanation how the brain (or rather its large portions), large and warm can maintain coher-
ence. The discussions whether the upper limit of 1013 or 104 of a second for the duration of coherence is more appropriate
marked the time of sudden decrease of interest (Hagen et al. 2002).
Another approach to the unity of consciousness of the very different type came from the statistical analysis of the firing
of neurons in the brain. Gulio Tononi used as a tool for the analysis Shannon’s measure of information to develop measure
phi of what he considered information integration. (Tononi & Edelman 1998; Tononi 2007). Tononi proposed to consider
consciousness as integrated information and his measure phi as a measure of consciousness. Since almost everything en-
countered in reality has this measure different from zero, according to Tononi human consciousness is different from con-
sciousness of a proton only in degree, but not in quality.
The present paper is presenting models of the brain as a system which integrates information and of consciousness as
integrated information. The level of information integration can be described through mathematical characteristics which
serve the distinction of quantum mechanical system from classical ones. This gives an explanation of the unity of conscious-
ness similar to that of quantum superposition without necessity to require that the brain actually is a quantum mechanical
system. On the other hand, the formalism developed by the author provides a description of the mechanism of integration,
while in Tononi’s approach no mechanism is proposed, but integration is an epiphenomenon of the excitation activity of
neurons detected only in a statistical manner. Moreover, simple classical mechanical systems do not exhibit any form of in-
formation integration, and therefore are devoid of consciousness.
The theory of information integration presented here as explanation of consciousness provides several different alterna-
tives for the mechanisms of integration which are explained and compared in the paper.

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296 Are quantum probabilities subjective states of belief or states of nature ‘out
there’?
John Small
Faversham, UNITED KINGDOM

The Reverend Bayes teaches us that probabilities should be considered to be subjective states of belief. Yet it is often as-
sumed that quantum probabilities are real states of nature. Recent work in quantum Bayes’ Theorem has emphasised the
subjective nature of quantum probability. Yet there is a crucial element missing in this analysis, quantum probabilities are
predictions about the outcomes of measurements and measurements are interactions between external entities and measur-
ing agents. They therefore contain an element of self- reference. We explore this facet of quantum measurement and find that
quantum probabilities are an inevitable consequence of classical mechanics co-joined with Turing’s proofs on non-comput-
ability. Exploring this further we find that the symmetry groups of the Standard Model can be understood as consequence
of self-referential agents exchanging classical information which update their states of belief. The implication is that self-
aware agents are fundamental to the physical world.

297 Experimental Results Support the Notion of Generalised Non-locality in

Mind-Matter Interactions
Walach Harald
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Horan Majella
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
von Lucadou Walter
European University Viadrina, Institute for Transcultural Health Studies, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

A model of generalised quantum theory presented earlier (Atmanspacher, Römer & Walach 2002; Lucadou, Römer &
Walach 2007; Römer & Walach 2011) predicts generalised non-local correlations. It is derived from the quantum formal-
ism but is not a physical but a formal systemic theory. Yet it predicts correlations analogous to and reminiscent of quantum
entanglement correlations that are non-local, yet regular. Such correlations are expected whenever within a system subsys-
tems can be identified whose descriptions are incompatible or complementary to the description of the global system. The
results of a recent experiment will be presented that support this notion. The experiment utilised a random number genera-
tor that drives a fractal spiral as display which volunteer participants are asked to intentionally change in direction according
to experimental instructions. Thus, the experiment adopts procedures known form micro-psychokinesis (PK) experiments
that test for non-local influences of mental intention on material systems using a random process. Unlike in other PK experi-
ments the target was not the output of the random process directly, but the output was used to construct a large matrix of
physical and psychological variables with 2025 cells. The expectation from the theoretical model was that in the experimen-
tal condition more significant correlations should be obtained than in a control run and more than would be expected by
chance. This prediction was verified in an experiment with 243 participants. The number of correlations in the experimental
matrix was significantly different from the number of significant correlations both in the control matrix and from chance
expectation with a z score larger than 5, no matter what significance criterion was used.

Atmanspacher, H., Römer, H., & Walach, H. (2002). Weak quantum theory: Complementarity and entangle-
ment in physics and beyond. Foundations of Physics, 32, 379-406. Lucadou, W. v., Römer, H., & Walach, H.
(2007). Synchronistic Phenomena as Entanglement Correlations in Generalized Quantum Theory. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 14(4), 50-74. Römer, H., & Walach, H. (2011). Complementarity of phenomenal and
physiological observables: A primer on generalised quantum theory and its scope for neuroscience and con-
sciousness studies. In H. Walach, S. Schmidt & W. B. Jonas (Eds.), Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality
(pp. 97-107). Dordrecht: Springer.

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4 . 2 S pace and T i m e

4.2 Space and Time

298 The Geometry and Physics of the Multidimensional World

Egoyan Alexander
Health Care Economics and Management, University Geomedi, Tbilisi, GEORGIA

Most physical and mathematical theories such as Special and General Relativity theories, Quantum Mechanics and String
theory are multidimensional, the number of dimensions in these theories being not fixed. The same thing may be said about
geometrical and topological theories. All these theories do not require the number of dimensions to be equal to three. At
the same time all these theories do not explain how spaces with different numbers of dimensions are embedded one into
another, how the points of the embedded space differ from the points of the higher dimensional space and how we can
define a metric on these spaces. In the present work we propose geometry which postulates that instead of being composed
of points, spaces and surfaces are composed of dualistic objects - “point-connections”: connections connect the points of
the surface and create a metric – the distance between two points is the minimal number of connections needed to con-
nect these points. One-dimensional connections are closed lines, n-dimensional connections are compositions of (n-1)- di-
mensional connections. The theory is based on the idea introduced firstly in the smooth infinitesimal analysis according
to which lines are composed of infinitesimally small linear segments. All the connections with the same number of dimen-
sions are identical and form isotropic and homogeneous spaces. Obviously, we can assign two different metrics to the points
of the embedded manifold – internal and external: the former measured from the position of the internal observer of the
manifold and the latter from the position of the external observer from the higher dimensional space. The infinitesimal seg-
ments which form connections of the embedded manifold may be stretched along the infinitesimal segments of the con-
nections of the higher dimensional space. This means that the embedded manifold can change its external metric without
changing the internal one. This geometry has an intuitive and simple physical interpretation: manifolds may be associated
with elastic membranes. The elastic membranes look different for internal and external observers: for the internal observers
they are space-times we are used to, while from the point of view of the external observers they are material objects - sur-
faces with homogeneous material properties. Elementary particles are true multidimensional objects and may have different
number of dimensions depending on the dimensionality of the membrane they live in. Elementary particles from the higher
dimensional space cannot directly interact with particles living in the embedded elastic membrane; they interact with the
embedded elastic membrane by exchanging the elastic energy with it. According to the theory the probabilistic character
of Quantum Mechanics is a manifestation of higher dimensional elastic vibrations of the elastic membrane we live in (the
Universe). The theory is in agreement with the experimentally proved phenomenon of quantum entanglement which points
to the existence of “now” and the discovery of Higg’s boson which tells us that there is some underlying reality beyond the
space-time. This approach may help us to use dimensional analogy and build a science consistent with our perceptions and
imagination.

4.3 Intergrative Models

299 How a cyclical structure of interlocking dimensions can connect a discrete

neurological event to the universe of conscious experience
Edwards Christopher
n/a, unaffiliated, Guelph, CANADA

The active neuron is distinguished by an ongoing electro-chemical event: an oriented electrical impulse is directed through
the matrix of an individual cell from an apparent cause or stimulus toward a prospective response. This simple or rudimen-
tary structure is the product of a dimensional articulation. The oriented impulse moves along the axion path in one dimen-
sion; the forthcoming or prospective response assumes the form of a limiting plane in two dimensions; the cell matrix has a

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 4 . 3 I nter g rative Mode l s

physical presence in three dimensions; and the apparent stimulus or pre-existing condition is an empty, or dislocated pres-
ence without dimensions.
In addition to this geometric structure of interlocking dimensions, we see a structured articulation of time and space.
The stimulus resides in a previous condition; the response resides in an ideal future; the matrix resides in an enduring pre-
sent; and the ongoing impulse resides in an undifferentiated or momentary timelessness.
The geometric dimensionality of this discrete neurological event unfolds in an intricate pattern of interlocking cycles
as we move from a single cell to a network of connected neurons. This pattern is characterized by a four-fold, geometric
progression that moves through a cycle of one, two, three and zero dimensions. If we consider a string of four connected
neurons, the mediating presence of the active matrix in one cell becomes the conditioning stimulus in the next. Similarly,
the prospective response for this cell becomes the mediating presence in the next. We see that the passage of four connected
events completes a cycle of four interlocking phases-- each dimensional component moves through the cycle of four steps.
We can increase the complexity of this network even further by considering multiple inputs and outputs as well as the
orientation of sensory and motor functions. The fourfold pattern of interlocking cycles remains the same. In this light, the
pattern of interlocking cycles becomes a ‘standing wave’-- a fixed form of ever-changing content. An examination of this dy-
namic reveals the underlying structure of a conscious space.

300 Consciousness as an inevitable phenomenon derived from the

maximization of information transfer
Perez Velazquez Jose Luis
Neuroscience & Mental Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, CANADA
Guevara Erra Ramon
Inserm, Paris, FRANCE

The proposal is that consciousness, or features associated with it like perception, awareness, and others, is (are) an inevitable
result of the universal tendency towards a maximal information exchange, or equivalently, widespread distribution of en-
ergy/matter. This is an extension of previous work (Perez Velazquez [2009] Finding simplicity in complexity: general prin-
ciples of biological and nonbiological organization, J. Biol. Phys. 35: 209-221) where it was proposed that a general organis-
ing principle of natural phenomena is the tendency toward maximal, or more probable, distribution of energy (and matter),
which is encapsulated by the notion of the maximization of information transfer (Haken, Information and Self-organization,
1998; Smith, J. Theor. Biol. 2008).
In an analogous manner as occurred during the development of a connected metabolism that at some point reached
characteristics associated with what is called ‘life’, mainly due to a catalytic closure phenomenon (Kauffman, The Origins
of Order, 1993) when chemicals started to auto-catalyze themselves forming a “closed’ web of chemical reactions, it is here
proposed that consciousness (or features associated with it) arose as a consequence of another type of “closure” within the
nervous system, the brain especially. The maximization of the information exchange requires an efficient web of connections
and, once certain complexity is attained (due to the number and coordinated activities of the constituents: cells, networks
or molecules, depending on the level of description), the emergent property of consciousness took place. Once again, in
analogy with the “problem of defining life”, when at some point in time the features of the connected metabolism could be
classified as characteristics of living processes, the emergent features of cognitive phenomena that can be termed “conscious”
arose due to the information transfer in the connected cell circuits of brains. Considerations on the possible quantification
of the information exchange based on the interactions among constituents of the system (nervous systems or any other liv-
ing process in general) will be discussed. Hence, the hypothesis put forward is that consciousness (and living organisms in
general) is the result of the tendency towards maximising information exchange, or equivalently towards the widespread, or
more probable, distribution of energy.

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4 . 4 E m er g ent and H ierarchica l S yste m s

4.4 Emergent and Hierarchical Systems

301 Fractal Geometry as the Basis for Hierarchical Computing in the Brain
Gupta Saatviki
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, New Delhi, INDIA
Gupta Arun Kumar
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, INDIA
Nandita Gupta
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, INDIA

This paper attempts to explain how quantum computation may be taking place in the human brain using fractal theory as the
basis. Recently, many studies have shown that fractal based computing may provide a viable structure for carrying out quan-
tum computing in real life systems. Fractals, which start from a simple point of origin evolve following some mathematical
equations to emerge as extremely complex patterns. However, it is the underlying physical geometry which is what gives rise
to the fractal nature of the entire system. The ‘dimensionality’ of the fractal is critical in evaluating the level of complexity
that the system is capable of achieving. Using this as the basis, in this study, the different levels of the human brain starting
from the macroscopic brain down to nanoscale microtubules have been examined as fractal systems each with their own
unique dimensionality. These individual systems have been analyzed as fractal networks or lattices which demonstrate vary-
ing levels of connectivity but an increasing level of complexity as we move down to the level of the microtubule (and pos-
sibly the tubulin pathways within it) and at that scale may be forming the basis for one-way quantum computation.

4.5 Nonlinear Dynamics

302 EEG Attractor Dimensions. Why so many?

Walling Peter
Retired Anesthesiologist, Baylor Uni Med Center, Bartonville. Texas, USA

The attractor of a simple pendulum is a 1dimensional (1D) scale free circle described by a 0D moving point. Each incre-
mental advance of the point represents a slight change in the balance of forces. The attractor portrays the dynamics, while its
dimension is a measure of the systems’ complexity. Electroencephalographic (EEG) attractors may be reconstructed, meas-
ured, and observed in motion by 3D co-ordinate embedding. (1) We measured the EEG attractor dimension in 21 species
acting as surrogates for their distant fossilized ancestors. From fish to human, the maximum correlation dimension increased
from about 2D to 4.8 D during the past 500 my. (2,3)
Animals demonstrated a range of EEG attractor dimensions from ~1D up to the species’ maximum. Advanced fauna
had more dimensions available to them for neural processing. In humans, a meditating Zen Priest exhibited an EEG attrac-
tor dimension of 1.3D, focused mental arithmetic correlated with 2.2D, a multisensory experience 3.2D and multitasking
4.8D
Why?
The highest EEG attractor dimensions are associated with multitasking. Both hunters and prey could benefit from
the ability to process multiple senses and actions simultaneously.
How does this work?
Our binding experiments suggest that the mechanism of a Gestalt, (a combined sensory experience), is the assigna-
tion of approximately one sense per dimension, thereby keeping data representing sensations both bound but distinct at
the same time within multi-dimensional perceptual space.
The proliferation of EEG attractor dimensions during evolution
sidesteps the constraints imposed by 3D physical space by commandeering higher dimensional non-physical space, thereby
allowing perceptual space to flourish.

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 4 . 7 Bioe l ectro m a g netics / resonance effects

1. Walling, P. T., and Hicks, K. N. (2006). Nonlinear changes in brain dynamics during emergence from sevo-
flurane anesthesia: preliminary exploration using new software. Anesthesiology 105, 927–935.
2. Walling, P. T.,
(2014). Chapter 30 “The Dynamics of Consciousness.” In ”Brain, Mind, Cosmos” Edited by Deepak Chopra .
(Ebook) 3. Walling, P. T., and Hicks, K.N. (2009). “Consciousness: Anatomy of the Soul” Authorhouse.

4.7 Bioelectromagnetics/resonance effects

303 Using principles of light science to enhance the doctor-patient relationship.

Jamieson Susan
Medicine, Dr Susan Jamieson Integrative Medical Practice, Hong Kong, HONGKONG

Health and spirituality have become separated in our current healthcare system. A physician of 25 years practicing experi-
ence describes utilizing a particular state of consciousness in the healing arena. This is a process whereby the doctor can not
only facilitate the biomechanical healing of the body but be the midwife into change on the emotional-spiritual level, ie heal-
ing of the whole person.
I describe the methodology I have developed which combines cutting edge science with ancient healing modalities and
techniques that specifically aid abilities to interpret/interface with subtle energies, which I believe to be light. I explain our
body’s biology in scientific terms of light, whose photons intermingle with those of each other as well as the natural world
– a subtle web that connects us in oneness. We’re inherently attuned to a quantum process and interface / interpret the
light unconsciously on a daily basis. The biology, neurology and physiology of light in the body will be explored - DNA
releasing light, enzyme systems orchestrated by light, fields resonating in the body’s cellular structure. This is a backdrop to
understanding the interconnectedness of our light bodies with that of the Earth, and the Sun, in a holographic way, and the
resonance that can develop between living beings.
This is possibly the realm of ‘spontaneous remissions’, and intuitive diagnosis, with information gleaned form both ther-
apist interviews and personal experience. There are tools used in this process, such as
Presence (timelessness, no space for perceptions and judgment.)
Moving one’s consciousness from limited to infinite
possibilities. Singularity to plurality; Changing perspective :observation changes everything-
Therefore seeing a person’s
core essence;
Coherence of heart waves acting in synchrony with both brain hemispheres. The right bran is abstract, non- linear, free
of the need to organize into spatial dimensions and make sense, accessing all realms simultaneously;
Intent is dropping another pebble that will create new ripples in the complex interference light pattern formed between
2 people. A subtle change can collapse the wave form of an illness into infinite possibility, reconfiguring it to a mow whole
form;
Vision of wholeness in consciousness, of wholeness/wellness. This is a complex interference (hologram) formed by the
two energies. Resonance can occur, in the same way that when using tuning forks, the lower frequency

304 QEEG measurement of a post-mortem human brain: geometry,

electromagnetic resonance, and the sense of self
Lehman Brendan
Behavioural Neuroscience, Laurentian University, Sudbury, ON, CANADA
Rouleau Nicolas
Laurentian University, Sudbury, ON, CANADA

Traditional studies of human consciousness assume the necessitation of dynamic, time-varying metabolic processes often
without consideration of the properties of and interactions with the spatial environment within which these processes
occur. Quantitative electroencephalographic (QEEG) measurements were obtained from an adult human brain specimen,
preserved in ethanol-formalin-acetic acid (EFA). Probes were inserted into gyri approximating areas which underlie QEEG

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4 . 7 Bioe l ectro m a g netics / resonance effects

channels corresponding to the 10-20 International System of Electrode Placement and referenced to a living human ear.
Before measurements were obtained, the specimen was submerged for 20 min in EFA (pH<3) or distilled H2O (pH >
5). During measurements, the brain was either placed on a flat surface, within a polystyrene box, or within a polyethylene
human replica skull. Baseline measures were obtained with applied filters so as to eliminate ambient electromagnetic noise.
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) performed upon the QEEG data revealed two major activation patterns. The first
activation pattern consisted of a right temporo-occipital profile, which dominated all conditions. However, a second pattern
emerged: bilateral frontal lobe and left supramarginal gyrus activation. This second pattern was only observed when the
experimental conditions approximated those that would be expected to closely simulate the human body (i.e. brain pH ap-
proached neutrality and was contained within a skull). In order to identify a potential mechanism, environmental electrody-
namics were considered. Raw data from all conditions as well as data collected from an induction coil which measures Schu-
mann oscillations from the Earth’s geomagnetic field were extracted and spectral analyzed. Correlational analyses of spectral
densities within the frequency band corresponding to the fundamental mode of the Schumann field (7Hz – 9Hz) revealed
significant relationships that were present only when the brain was contained within a skull (r? -.25, p<.01) or approached
pH neutrality (r? -.29, p? .001). These results are indicative of a relationship between the Earth’s magnetic field, the human
skull, water, and areas of the brain associated with the construction of the sense of self.

305 The influence of terahertz radiation on biological systems: heating,

resonance and non-linear resonance
Popova Svetlana
Laboratory of Laser Biophysics, ILP SB RAS, Novosibirsk State University, Novosibirsk, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Terahertz radiation usually is defined as electromagnetic radiation with frequencies from 0.1 to 10 THz (where 1
THz=10E12 Hz). In contrast to the ionizing radiation, it is subject of a controversial debate whether nonionizing radiation
can influence on biological systems except thermal effect. Energy of THz photons is far below the energy level required to
ionize electrons from biological molecules and strongly absorb by hydrated biological tissues. Thus, the radiation is assumed
to cause thermal effects in biological materials. In addition to conventional thermal effects, several recent studies propose
that this radiation may also induce non-thermal effects are mediated through resonance mechanisms.
The key question consists of the absorbed energy distribution in biological systems. Some authors implicitly presume
equilibrium distribution in homogenous media for biological condition. Only microthermal effects caused by spatial dis-
tribution of energy are possible in this way. However, several researchers have proposed that nearly all of energy can con-
centrated in just one of vibrational mode. These theories were initially hypothesized by Frohlich in series seminal papers
published between 1960 and 1980 years. Frohlich condensation usually compared with unique phenomena involving mac-
roscopic quantum coherence such as superconductivity, lasing and others.
Linear resonance mechanisms deal with direct interaction biomolecules vibration and electromagnetic radiation the
same frequency (the classical framework) or absorption of radiation with energy equivalent energy separation between vi-
brational levels (the quantum-mechanical framework). Biomolecular absorption spectra confirm the likelihood of strong
absorption lines in the THz region.
More sophisticated and interesting mechanism is nonlinear resonance in which effects on biochemical kinetics are pos-
sible. This is exactly the situation met in kinetic phenomena in resonating-irradiated gases when relaxation processes turn
the gas system from the thermodynamic equilibrium. The processes of cooling and spatial localization of atoms have the
same nature. Landscape of almost all biological macromolecules and kinetics of biochemical processes are influences by
spatial characteristics. Unlike gas living cells inner media is ordered by a network of tubules forming the cytoskeleton. Much
additional experimental and theoretical work is required in order to fully understand the interactions between THz radia-
tion and biological systems.

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306 Bioelectromagnetics in Microbes ans Mosquitoes: A Comparative Study

With Special Reference to Biofield
Richa
Zoology, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Chaturvedi D. K.
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Parkash Sam
Zoology, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Consciousness research warrants development and integration of new empirical concepts. Non-conventional approach may
decipher long awaited unanswered questions of this science. One of such fundamental questions is how prokaryotes evolved
to eukaryotes with higher level of consciousness? How consciousness acquired its highest form in humans? The emerg-
ing concept of connecting biofield science with consciousness can be a promising solution to these queries ( Jerman et al.
2009). Biofield may be referred to vital energy of a conscious organism which regulates the biological functions and helps in
well-being (Rubik, 2002). The rationale for this approach is to study biofield as an indirect measure of consciousness in liv-
ing organism. Biofield is a measure of well-being in humans and biofield therapy is widely practiced as a complementary and
alternative medicine in most Asiatic countries.
In this present study we have attempted to study and measure the biofield of microbes and mosquitoes. The bacterial
cultures of Bacillus subtilis and Bacillus thuringiensis were subjected to Improvised DEI Meridian Energy Analysis Device
(DEI MEAD) System. Likewise two species of mosquitoes Culex quinquifacistus and Aedes aegypti were also investigated
for the same objectives. We studied the role of bioelectromagnetic communication in two bacterial cultures placed in dou-
bled walled test tube and its biofield. The non-chemical, non-contact bioelectromagnetic communications between the
similar bacterial cultures promote the growth while in different cultures the growth was inhibited. Thus, the biofield was sig-
nificantly stronger in the cultures incubated together while in the other cultures it was found weaker than the former. Also,
a typical pattern of the bioradiation emission was observed which was specific to the bacterial specie. This indicates that
identification of the bacterial specie could be possible with its specific biofield formation pattern.
In the case mosquitoes, Culex quinquifacistus and Aedes aegypti were selected. They are responsible for fatal vec-
tor borne tropical diseases like dengue, chikunguniya, yellow fever and filariasis. We intend to investigate the biofield
of mosquito larvae (all instars) with the same DEI MEAD System. A comparative study of the biofield of microbes and
the mosquitoes was done. It was then observed that the biofield was significantly stronger in the mosquito larvae than
microbial culture. Also, there was specie specific pattern in the electromagnetic radiation emission from the two different
genuses. In conclusion, we could propose that biofield may be a possible correlate of consciousness measurement in liv-
ing organisms.


4.8 Biophysics and Living Processes

307 Biophotons and Magnetoreceptors in Red Blood Cells:The Conscious

Conversation
Agarwal Sapna
Pathology, Saran Ashram Hospital, Dayalbagh, Agra, INDIA

Red blood cells in the blood of humans and also in animals and birds possess some unique characteristics. They contain the
pigment haemoglobin which is made up of iron with porphyrin ring , similar to the pigment chlorophyll found in plants
whose main function is to absorb light and act as photoreceptors. The RBC’s have inherent photo-reception quality in them
and can talk to each other and other haemolymphatic cells through Biophotons of nano-scale dimensions .
The high iron content make them to behave as magneto-receptors , by which birds and animals navigate and behave
differently in electromagnetic fields. Human RBC’s also have the magneto-reception property , rather it is weak . One im-

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 4 . 8 Biophysics and Livin g P rocesses

portant behaviour of RBC’s magneto and photo-receptors is observed in Transcendental or meditational state , when during
controlled breathing , the oxygen content of haemoglobin goes up and heart slows down , the magneto reception power
increases , and so we achieve higher level of consciousness.

308 Does consciousness and electrons exist in water - a necessity for all forms
of life?
Fredriksson Ingrid
Authr, Triquetra-Return AB, Årjäng, SWEDEN

Every one of your cells are conscious, together they make up you and your consciousness.
Does consciousness and electrons
exist in water? In every living being and organism there is an entire world as amazing as the one we see around us. In our
body there are 100 trillion cells, and DNA that extends 10,000 kilometres. The base pairs in our DNA are held together
by hydrogen. Maybe the hydrogen bonds in DNA’s base pairs that constitute our immune system and our consciousness!
There is water in the cells, and between them, and while large molecules have to go through membrane proteins to enter
the cells, small molecules like H2O and O2 can pass through the cell membrane without difficulty. In the spaces between
the brain cells, at the end of every neuron, the basic unit of a brain cell, are synapses, where chemical charges build up. In
the same space dendrites- tiny filaments of nerve endings communicate with other neurons, sending out and receiving their
own electrical wave impulses. This, together with the quantum hologram and non-local consciousness, provides an explana-
tion and an exciting developmental phase in the illusion in which we live. Consciousness appears to exist in everything that
has DNA. If we conceive a non-local consciousness, as it is demonstrated by the EPR paradox, Alain Aspect, or modern in-
formation technology, we gain a number of explanations for what had previously been unexplained, as when consciousness
leaves the body in out-of-body or near-death experiences when people describe having seen their body from above, or – why
not? – when a loved one dies and knowledge of this reaches us instantaneously on another continent.

309 Instantaneous Correlations of Gravitational Curvature at a Distance and

their Role in the Brain Processes
Egoyan Alexander
Health Care Economics and Management, University Geomedi, Tbilisi, GEORGIA

According to the General theory of Relativity, which is recognized as the most successful theory of gravity, gravity is a space-
time curvature produced by material objects. The project of grand unification of quantum mechanics and gravity set the
stage for the ambition of some of today’s best scientists. As a result of their efforts, two theories of quantum gravity: loop
quantum gravity and string theory have been created. But in spite of the indubitable success, neither of these theories could
be called the final theory. One of the main differences between gravity and quantum mechanics is that quantum mechan-
ics allows interaction at a distance while modern physical theories state that gravity doesn’t. There are other approaches to
gravity, for example, Erik Verlinde’s theory postulates that gravity is not a true fundamental force of nature (like e.g. electro-
magnetism), but instead is a consequence of the universe striving to maximize entropy. This interpretation of gravity has a
holistic character and presupposes instantaneous information processing at a distance. Obviously, the best theory of gravity
should be able to explain gravity as a fundamental force of nature with the ability to interact instantaneously at a distance.
According to the elastic membrane concept introduced recently by the author our universe is a three dimensional elastic
membrane embedded into a higher dimensional space. In this model gravity is explained as transformation of material
properties of the surface of the membrane caused by elementary particles. This model accepts the experimentally proved
postulate of General Relativity that gravity propagates with the speed of light but it also admits the possibility of existence
of instantaneous correlations of gravitational curvature at a distance due to holistic properties of the elastic membrane of
the Universe. Elementary particles produce transformation of the material properties of the elastic membrane collectively
so that curvatures can fluctuate around the positions of the particles. This phenomenon may play a very important role in
the brain processes related to the phenomenal experience. According to the proposed model our phenomenal experience is
caused by elastic oscillations of the two dimensional elastic membrane embedded into our bodies. In the absence of two di-
mensional membranes instantaneous correlations of gravitational curvature at a distance are distributed randomly and have
a chaotic character. But under the influence of gravitational field of two dimensional elastic membranes gravitational cor-
relations become more organized. This phenomenon explains why living organisms can move on their own while inanimate

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bodies cannot. Gravitational correlations at a distance are able to preserve coherence in the brain microtubules and support
quantum calculations (ORch OR). This interaction at a distance gives explanation to the effect of the third dimension when
observing the world with two eyes: information about binocular rotations of the eyes is encoded into the elastic oscillations
of the elastic membrane together with the two dimensional picture of the world. Frequencies of the oscillations are respon-
sible for colors, while amplitudes for the feeling of a distance. Philosophically the theory represents a multidimensional ver-
sion of panpsychism.

310 Quantum Entanglement in DNA: From Information Storage to the

Holographic Genome
Kurian P
National Human Genome Center/Physics and Astronomy, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA
Dunston G
Microbiology/National Human Genome Center, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC, USA,
Lindesay J
Physics and Astronomy, Howard University, Washington, DC, USA

Several living systems have been examined for their exhibition of macroscopic quantum effects, showcasing biology’s ap-
parent optimization of structure and function for quantum behavior. Prevalent in lower organisms with analogues in eu-
karyotes, type II restriction endonucleases are the largest class of restriction enzymes. Orthodox type II endonucleases rec-
ognize four-to-eight base pair sequences of palindromic DNA, cut both strands symmetrically, and act without an external
energy source such as ATP. While it is known that these enzymes induce strand breaks by nucleophilic attack on opposing
phosphodiester bonds of the DNA helix, what remains unclear is the mechanism by which cutting occurs in concert at the
catalytic centers. Previous studies indicate the primacy of intimate DNA contacts made by the specifically bound enzyme in
coordinating the two synchronized cuts. We propose that collective electronic behavior in the DNA helix generates coher-
ent oscillations—quantized through boundary conditions imposed by the endonuclease—that provide the energy required
to break two phosphodiester bonds. Such quanta may be preserved in the presence of thermal noise and electromagnetic
interference through the specific complex’s exclusion of water and ions surrounding the helix, with the enzyme serving as a
decoherence shield. Clamping energy imparted by the decoherence shield is comparable with zero-point modes of the di-
pole-dipole oscillations in the DNA recognition sequence. The palindromic mirror symmetry of this sequence should con-
serve parity during the process. Experimental data corroborate that symmetric bond-breaking ceases when the symmetry of
the endonuclease complex is violated, or when environmental parameters are perturbed far from biological optima. Serv-
ing as hallmarks for DNA double-strand breakage, similar palindromic complexes have been implicated in HIV integration,
human immunodiversity, and meiotic recombination. Persistent correlation between states in DNA sequence across longer
spatial separations—a characteristic signature of quantum entanglement—may be explained by such a physical mechanism.
The prospect that DNA maintains quantum-computable states in thermally turbulent aqueous environments may be related
to similar implementations of Grover’s database search algorithm, which uses quantum superposition to reduce the number
of required queries to select a desired object from an unsorted collection of items. That the human genome gives rise to
brain microtubules exhibiting quantum coherent effects, thereby manifesting our quantum consciousness, leads us to the
conceptualization of the holographic genome.

311 Tubulin conformation and hydrophobic pockets : An in-vitro study

Sahni Pushpa
Chemistry, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

The current endeavour of neuroscience and philosophy is to discover the code of consciousness or rather how the material
brain produces our immaterial sense of awareness. Some scientists believe that consciousness is something distinct from
the physical brain and body, as consciousness continues to exist even when the brain is not functioning. But from a sci-
entific viewpoint, consciousness is a function of the brain. Since the brain is a material entity, consciousness is subject to
the study of science. The human brain is a complex mass of tissue endowed with extraordinary capabilities. Microtubules
turn out to be a common target of neurotransmitter action and play a significant role in learning and memory. Memory

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4 . 9 E vo l ution of C onsciousness

and consciousness are interrelated, thus, microtubules could be the link between these two phenomena. Microtubules
are cylindrical hexagonal lattice polymers of the protein tubulin, comprising 15% of total brain protein. Microtubules
regulate synapses and are suggested to process information via interactive bit-like states of tubulin. Microtubules are very
dynamic polymers whose assembly and disassembly is determined by whether their heterodimeric tubulin subunits are
in a straight or curved conformation. Curvature is introduced by bending at the interfaces between monomers. This is be-
cause GTP hydrolysis promotes bends in protofilaments. However, while GDP-bound protofilaments are still associated
together as a microtubule or 2D sheet, the contacts between neighbouring subunits constrain them to remain in a straight
form. The resulting tension is proposed to store conformational energy that is released during depolymerisation. Also,
the mechanism by which anaesthetics prevent consciousness remains largely unknown because the mechanism by which
brain physiology produces consciousness is unexplained. Tubulins have other smaller non-polar regions that contain pi
electron-rich indole rings separated by only about 2 nm. Penrose-Hameroff Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-
OR) Theory proposes that these electrons are close enough to become quantum entangled. They suppose that quantum-
superposed states develop in tubulins, remain coherent and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy
threshold, related to quantum gravity, is reached called as the ‘bing’ moment. This paper characterizes the conformation
of tubulin in both polymerized and depolymerized conditions and the involvement of hydrophobic interactions in tu-
bulin functional activities. We have also examined the effects of anaesthetic binding with tubulin protein on the circular
dichroism.

4.9 Evolution of Consciousness

312 Mental and Spiritual Evolution Awakens Consciousness and Spiritual

Awareness
Mathur Vineeta
Theology, Faculty of Arts, Dayalbagh Educational Institue, Agra, India, Agra, INDIA

The Reductionist thinking of science endeavors to reduce human consciousness to the development of a mass of wrinkled
brain tissue. On the other hand, Eastern traditions elucidate that consciousness is the spirit and is irreducible; human beings
do not have souls- they are souls with covers of mind and material; they are spiritual beings having a human experience.
The animating source for human life and consciousness is provided by a non material, non-mind component contained in
the Universe. This component is a form of spiritual energy or force, comparable to the breath of the Supreme Being in the
East. When the soul descends and enters the realm of universal mind it acquires a causal mind and body. Descending further
it takes on an astral mind and astral body. When it takes birth in the physical world it acquires a human mind and physical
body for functioning in the world.
Such concepts have not yet been accounted for in the Western scientific world. Evolutionary biologists only regard
the evolution of the physical form or body. Nothing that has been proved by them pertains to the spirit. However accord-
ing to the Adepts of Radhasoami Faith evolution of the physical body is accompanied by the evolution of the two entities
mind and spirit which are distinct from the physical body. The mind and spirit are the prime forces by which not only this
physical body but the entire physical universe is sustained. In human beings there is mental and spiritual evolution beyond
biological growth which enables the spirit entities to get evolved forms of brain and mind so that they may attain awak-
ened consciousness and spiritual awareness. The process of evolution of the two entities mind and spirit is the emergence
of higher proportions of elements of consciousness, thoughtfulness and positive emotions from a predominantly matter-
energy stage. The proportion of these elements determines the difference in evolved consciousness between one being and
another being or object. Depending on the predominance of these elements the level of evolution can be graded and clas-
sified.
A survey was designed and conducted to investigate the hypothesis that consciousness levels of people can be graded.
The participants of the study were 50 adults from an Ashram and 60 students of an Indian University. The method of study
was through questionnaires and based on their answers to questions related to spiritual, positive psychological (thought and
emotion) and physical (energy and matter) health, a statistical study of consciousness was conducted. The results showed
that the majority of Ashram adults could be graded as conscious and uni-conscious beings with significant correlation values

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between consciousness and spirituality (.4233*) while almost half the University students were graded as unconscious and
subconscious beings with low correlation values between consciousness and spirituality.
Key words: evolution, mind, spirit, consciousness, grades.

313 With powerful subconsciousness, why do we need consciousness?

Wu Dylan
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cogniti, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, TAIWAN

Touching the nose and toes at the same time, we should feel touching the nose earlier than feel touching the toes, but the
feeling of touch appear simultaneously. Our brain does a little tricky editing working to put the signals togather in a useful
way. Our perceptual world always lags behind the real world.
When it comes to visual and auditory perception, we can only
perceive what the brain thinks we should perceive. The brain needs bother regulating various information, and also attentive
to fill the visual or auditory speculation, and also have to rationalize a reasonable explanation for consciousness. We accept
the visions concocted by our unconscious minds without question, and without realizing that they are only an interpretation,
one constructed to maximize our overall chances of survival, but not one that is in all cases the most accurate picture possible.
Furthermore, consider a task: Each time a light blinks on, you hit the corresponding button as quickly as you can, if
there is a hidden pattern to the lights, your reaction times will eventully speed up, indicating that you have picked up on the
sequence and make some sort of predictions about which light will flash next. The surprise is that this speed up works even
when you are completely unaware of the sequence. The conscious mind does not need to be involved at all for this type of
learning to occure.
Since the brain can detemine what we perceive, and can do lots of what consciousness can’t, we should ask : Why
should a brain construct a consciousness?
My purpose here is to suggest that, like [the blindwatchmaker] build us into a pair
of moral way, expected us can benefit from the sinisterly human interaction,
[why there is consciousness] is to creat a innocent individual appearance, in order to advancing our reproductive fitness.

4.10 Medicine and Healing

314 Can consciousness influence our epigenetics and can epigenetics influence
our consciousness?
Fredriksson Ingrid
Author, Triqetra-Return AB, Årjäng, SWEDEN

In our body there are 100 trillion cells each of which containing circa 22 000 genes.
Epigenetics is a mechanism for regulating gene activity independent of DNA sequence that determines which genes are
turned on or off: in a particular cell type, in a different disease states or in response to a physiological or even psychological
stimulus.
There is a microbiota-gut-brain axis communication in health and disease. (Under healthy conditions, the pre-
dominance of symbiotic bacteria, an intact intestinal barrier, a healthy innate immunity controlling pathobiont overgrowth
inside the intestinal barrier).
The molecules that constitute epigenomes have no resembalence of DNA. While DNA is a double spiral, similar to a
twisted rope ladder, the epigenome is a system of chemical markers that sits on the DNA. What is its purpose? In the same
manner that a conductor leads an orchestra, the epigenome decides how the genetic information of DNA shall be should
be expressed. The molecule markers either engage or disengage the genes depending upon the cell’s needs and environ-
mental factors, such as diet, stress and poisons. Of late, the discoveries surrounding the epigenome have caused a revolu-
tion in the field of biology now being able to prove a connection between the epigenome and certain illnesses, including
aging.
Negative epigenetic changes can increase the risk of illness while positive epigenetic changes minimise the risk for
illness. From different methyl-donators, such as methionine, folic acid, choline, betaine and vitamin B2, B6 and B12 SAM
is formed as methylated DNA and histones. When the fiber breaks down in the large intestine with the help of probiotic

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bacteria, short chain fatty acid is the product, especially butyric acid that has the important task of acetylation of histones.
A line of polyphenol/flavonoids/iridiods from berries, vegetables, green tea and dark chocolate with a high cocoa content
may have strong epigenetic impact. Amongst these there are certain substances noticeable, genistein from soya, curcumin
from turmeric, resveratrol from red wine and lingon berry, isothiocyanates from the cabbage family, allyl sulfides from on-
ions, epigallocatechin gallate (EGCG) from green tea and a line of polyphenol/flavonoids/iridiods from lingon, blueberries
and Hippophae rhamnoides to name but a few. All of these substances can methylate DNA and histones and acethylate
histones. Normally it requires a great amount. Through the named substances it is also possible to get the positive effects of
non-coded RNA (ncRNA; miRNA). Physical activity , including working out, and how we feel, can also give you positive
epigenetic benefits.
New mechanisms found in epigenetics open new possibilities for consciousness, whatever it is, to inter-
act with the physical reality.

315 Experience Sampling Elevating Consciousness

Habra Jacques
Noonspheric Startup Accelerator, Santa Barbara, CA, USA
Schooler Jonathan
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA

This talk will review evidence that regular experience sampling of individuals conscious state can be an important compo-
nent of effective treatment for a host of psychological disorders. In recent years there has been accumulating evidence that
systematically monitoring the progress of patients can have marked benefits on patient outcomes. An important strand of
this evidence comes from studies using monitoring and feedback systems (MFS) in which patients complete weekly stand-
ardized questionnaires the outcomes of which are summarized via electronic dashboards showing trajectories of change
over time. Although several metaanalyses indicate that MFS offers significant benefits over clinical treatment that lacks di-
rect patient feedback (e.g. Bickman et al. 2011), it nevertheless has major limitations as patients’ assessment of their experi-
ences span an entire week or more. As a result patients reports can be biased by memory and the severity of their symptoms
at the time that they complete the weekly assessment. Experience Sampling takes advantage of electronic mobile devices to
query patients at multiple times during the day in order to assess their symptoms and the circumstances surrounding those
symptoms. A growing body of research demonstrates that ES provides critical information about the symptoms of patients
that far exceeds those derived from questionnaires or clinical interviews alone (Shiffman et al, 2008). Some of the advan-
tages of ES include: greater sensitivity to the occurrence of symptoms, enhanced ability to determine the antecedents and
sequelae of symptoms, and reduced bias stemming from memory and severity of symptoms. Its useful application has been
effectively demonstrated with a host of psychopathologies including depression (Barge-Schaapveld & Nicolson, 2002), anx-
iety (Henker et al 2002), addictions (Shiffman et al., 1997), ADHD (Whalen et al 2002), bulimia (Myers et al, 2006), and
even schizophrenia (Kimby et al, 2010). After discussing research on the numerous documented benefits of ES this talk will
describe a recently developed a state-of-the-art clinical ES system: Mobile Therapy (http://www.mobiletherapy.com). This
system has been designed to take advantage of new developments in the science and technology of ES and recent adopters
of it have reported it to be particularly useful in tracking and treating their patients.

316 Addiction Recovery: The Result of a Radical Change in Consciousness

Scharff Constance
Research, Cliffside Malibu, Austin, USA

How is it that addicts recover? It is an age-old question that until recently has had no good answer, because by and large until
the middle of the 20th century, addicts didn’t recover, at least not in any appreciable numbers. However, in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, thinkers like William James, Carl Jung, and Bill Wilson (one of the founders of Addicts Anonymous),
posited that addiction recovery is grounded in a spiritual shift, a change in consciousness so profound that addicts are “mi-
raculously” transformed from addict to non-addict, a person who has “recovered.” Alcoholics Anonymous is founded on
this very principle.
Recent research in addiction and addiction recovery is confirming this early theory. Scholars like Gregory Bateson and
Bradford Keeney suggest that addiction recovery is a 3rd order change, a radical shift in consciousness that allows the addict
to both perceive and live his/her life differently, not as an addict, but as a person in recovery. Contemporary neuroscientists

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and neuropsychologists also seem to be confirming this idea. In particular, Dan Siegel shows how mindfulness meditation
makes changes in the brain in line with both addiction recovery and profound consciousness shifts. Other research shows
how intensive one-on-one psychotherapy can create the psychic shift of the “educational” variety that is so well-known in
Alcoholics Anonymous. Finally, renewed research into the use of entheogens will be discussed. How can substances like
ibogaine, ayahuasca, LSD and others be used in therapeutic settings to create the circumstances for consciousness shifts that
will lead to recovery or improvement for those suffering from alcoholism, drug addiction, and co-occurring disorders such
as depression, PTSD or anxiety? Do these treatments have the potential to decrease the amount of time individuals spend in
addiction treatment centers or the costs associated with addiction treatment and are they an option for nations where access
to quality addiction treatment is limited or nonexistent? Are entheogens the future for creating shifts in consciousness for
addicts, allowing even greater numbers of those who suffer to recover?
This paper will introduce the relationship between changes of consciousness and addiction recovery as well as map out
areas for future research and possibilities for improvements to existing addiction treatment protocols.

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5 . E x perientia l approaches

5. Experiential approaches
5.1 Phenomenology

317 Introspective disagreement

Fink Sascha Benjamin
Institute of Philosophy, University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, GERMANY

Do we dream in color or in black-and-white? Do we see a coin at an angle as circular or as elliptic? Is there cognitive phe-
nomenology or not? Is the self part of an experience or not? Scholars widely disagree on these and other fundamental is-
sues concerning conscious experiences. The opposing opinions are based mainly on introspection or phenomenology. Thus,
Kriegel (2007), Bayne & Spener (2010), and Schwitzgebel (2011) call these introspective disagreements, phenomenologi-
cal or introspective disputes.
Crucially, such disputes seem to be irresolvable: We lack any method to determine who is right and who is wrong. This
methodological lacunae has motivated skeptical positions, as expressed by Dennett (1991), Metzinger (2004), Schwitzge-
bel (2011), and mentioned by Kriegel (2007). If we are unable to overcome these disputes, so their opinion, then there
can hardly be a science of consciousness, because we cannot agree on the essential but non-analytic features of the target
phenomenon.
In this talk, I present a list of introspective disputes, and sketch why one might think that these are genuine disputes. I
further present the skeptical arguments derived from introspective disputes. I discuss suggested ways of overcoming intro-
spective disputes by Kriegel (2007), Bayne & Spener (2010) as well as the proposal to use “introspective experts” like bud-
dhist monks instead of naive subjects. But none of these proposals are fully satisfactory, I argue. As an alternative, I develop a
deflationary account: There are no introspective disagreements --- yet! What we diagnose as introspective disputes can arise
even if introspection were infallible. As an outlook, I sketch the hypothetical scenario in which introspective disputes may
arise, and what the deflationary account of introspective disputes entails for a science of consciousness.

318 Emotions and the Distinction Between Minimal and Narrative Self: A
Phenomenological Account
Bortolan Anna
Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, UNITED KINGDOM

This paper explores how the relationship between two specific notions of self should be conceived in light of a phenom-
enological account of emotions. Building on the insights provided within phenomenology, hermeneutics and philosophy
of cognitive sciences, it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two complementary but distinct forms of
selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008; Zahavi 2005; 2007). In this context, the minimal self
is considered as an experiential and bodily sense of self integral to any instance of phenomenal consciousness. The notion of
narrative selfhood, on the other hand, refers to a self which is characterised by an individual history and personality and is
constituted primarily through the stories that we and others tell about ourselves. In this paper I aim to challenge some of the
assumptions on which this account is based, namely the idea that the minimal and narrative sense of self complement each
other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions and that, while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility
for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative self-understanding do not have a structur-
ing effect on minimal self-experience. I will do so by showing that emotions are complex phenomena in which minimal and
narrative forms of self-awareness are deeply entwined. More specifically, I will focus on three fundamental ways in which
story-telling moulds the experiential structure of affectivity. First, relying in particular on Peter Goldie’s work (2000; 2012),
I will show that thanks to narrativity emotions can be organised and experienced as unitary processes whose components
are meaningfully connected. I will then draw attention to the fact that the notion of ‘depth’ is central to our intuitions re-
garding the phenomenology of affectivity (De Monticelli 2003; Pugmire 2005), claiming that it is through autobiographical
story-telling that affective depth is constituted. Finally, I will argue that narrativity constitutively shapes affective experience

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 5 . 1 P heno m eno l o g y

also by virtue of the role it plays in various affect regulation mechanisms. In particular, in this regard I will show how pro-
viding a narrative about our emotions impacts on the bodily and temporal experience that is associated with them. These
observations will allow me to maintain that emotions are best understood as complex forms of self-awareness in which the
minimal and narrative sense of self are knit together and to suggest that a deficit in the integration of the two dimensions can
be at the origin of some psychopathological disturbances, such as those characteristic of borderline personality disorder. On
this basis, I will conclude that, although it is possible to distinguish between different aspects of selfhood, it is important to
acknowledge that the narrative self shapes the minimal level of self-experience in various ways and the two dimensions are
structurally integrated.

319 Thinking toes...?
Proposing a reflective order of embodied self-

consciousness
Buttingsrud Camille
Philosophy, Former: University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen S, DENMARK

Philosophers investigating the experiences of the dancing subject (Sheets-Johnstone 1980, 2009, 2011, 2012; Parviainen
1998; Legrand 2007, 2013; Legrand & Ravn 2009; Montero 2013; Foultier & Roos 2013) unearth vast variations of em-
bodied consciousness and cognition in performing body experts. The traditional phenomenological literature provides us
with descriptions and definitions of reflective self-consciousness as well as of pre-reflective bodily absorption, but when it
comes to the states of self-consciousness dance philosophers refer to as thinking in movement and a form of reflective con-
sciousness at a bodily level – as well as to dancers’ reported experiences of being in a trance and yet hyper-aware – we are
challenged in terms of terminology and precise descriptions.
After empirical research on dancers’ experiences and studies of the above-mentioned philosophies of dance, aligning
this material with Husserl, Zahavi and other phenomenologists’ descriptions of reflection and embodied self-conscious-
ness, I find it plausible to acknowledge the existence of a third state of self- consciousness; a reflective process experienced
through and with the embodied and/or emotional self. This self-consciousness seems to have its own distinct structure ir-
reducible to reflectivity and pre-reflectivity. The proposed paper aspires to capture the nature of this transcendence of the
bodily aspect of the self, and thus, through the phenomenology of dance extend the present notions of consciousness.
The interviewed dancers describe their bodily self-consciousness on stage with terminology phenomenology tradition-
ally uses on the order of reflection: they are (bodily) attentive, intensely self-aware, explicitly aware of the other and the
world, they are disclosing experiences through transformation (by means of the body), they are (emotionally and/or bod-
ily) articulating what they experience pre-reflectively, and thematically transforming or reproducing something received or
grasped from their second-nature as dancers, or from other pre-reflective experiences. This could indicate a reflective state
of self-consciousness, yet, there is a simultaneous lack of thinking and rational control, reports of having artistic black-outs,
feeling something taking over, someone else leading their arms and legs, of being in a trance. There seems to be an experien-
tially lived as well as theoretically seen experience of the self in which the subject’s bodily aspect of self “thinks_ 94/reflects/
accesses herself as object through/in/by means of her embodied activity, in which she is completely immersed.
I define this state of self-consciousness as embodied reflection. In this state the subject’s attention is springing from and
is of the bodily self, more specifically the subject’s movements and/or her emotions - the lived body (Leib). Temporarily
embodied reflection shares the characteristic immediacy with pre-reflectivity, the straight- forward mode with which the
subject undergoes its experience. In my paper I shall elaborate on its further characteristics.
Embodied reflection is neither mystical nor exclusively experienced by artists or experts. I believe we all have the capacity
to reflect emotionally and bodily – playing as children, during erotic convergence, and in meditation, just to mention some
situations. It is the universal human experience of being profoundly focused through the non-conceptual aspect of the self.

320 Exploring transformations in affective consciousness using mixed methods:

The value of incorporating the subjective viewpoint
Hammond Emily
Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter, UNITED KINGDOM

Jack and Roepstorff (2002) have argued that the failure to incorporate subjective, self-report data into experimental research
is a wasted opportunity to obtain the fullest possible understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Nevertheless,

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experimental approaches in psychology and neuroscience frequently discard this opportunity. This paper contends that the
subjective viewpoint can enrich the experimental study of consciousness in two main ways: by uncovering fresh targets for
experimental research and by nuancing interpretation of quantitative data (as in, for example, Francisco Varela’s (1996) neu-
rophenomenology research programme). This argument will be reinforced using empirical data that explores the subjective
experience of emotion in the context of a mixed-methods doctoral research project, which is currently underway.
Qualitative research methodologies that draw on hermeneutic philosophy, such as Interpretative Phenomenological
Analysis (IPA; Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009), situate experiential data in the context of lived meaning, with the indi-
vidual positioned as an active, sense-making agent. Results from an IPA study exploring the lived experience of sadness fol-
lowing Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams and Teasdale, 2013) will be presented. These illus-
trate how investigating the phenomenology of sadness and the psychological-existential context in which it arises can refine
understanding of theoretical mechanisms of therapeutic effect and identify novel targets for experimental work on MBCT
and emotion.
This completed study serves as the foundation for doctoral research examining the potential for synergy in combin-
ing first- and third person approaches to investigating affective consciousness. The final section of the paper will describe
how insights from the IPA study will be applied in neurophenomenological work (scheduled for mid-2015) integrating psy-
chophysiological indices of affect and a phenomenological interview technique, the elicitation interview (e.g., Petitmengin,
2006), which aims to elicit fine-grained accounts of direct experience. The aim of this work will be to map correspondences
between the phenomenological and psychophysiological dynamics of affect, and to more finely nuance interpretation of the
third-person data.

References: Jack, A I. & Roepstorff, A. (2002). Introspection and cognitive brain-mapping: from stimulus-
response to script- report. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 333-339. Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s
subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. Phenome-
nology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 229-269. Segal, Z.V., Williams, J.M.G. and Teasdale, J.D. (2013). Mindful-
ness-Based Cognitive Therapy for Depression: Second Edition. The Guilford Press: New York, NY. Smith, J.A.,
Flowers, P. and Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research.
Sage: London. Varela, F. J. (1996). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330-349.

321 A Phenomenologically Motivated Approach to Introspection

Havel Ivan M.
Center for Theoretical Study, Charles University Prague, Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC

The recent rise, or more aptly revival, of interest in introspection (or in the first-person approach) in psychology and cog-
nitive science on the one hand and the call for naturalization of phenomenological concepts on the other, is more than
welcomed. However, such interest is often though perhaps unnecessarily, motivated by an implicit or explicit intention of
bringing phenomenology as close as possible to the objective third-person methodology of natural sciences. In this paper,
I suggest a way of approaching human conscious experience that offers a third, alternative approach to both philosophical
(transcendental) phenomenology and phenomenologically informed cognitive science. The proposed method, called “In-
trospection Plus,” concentrates on subjective perceptions of concrete episodic experiences that can be pursued prior to and,
initially, independently of any later attempts to verbalize findings by adopting the third-person objective point-of- view. My
aim is to build on the essential incorrigibility and self-intimacy (Schwitzgebel’s terms) of currently ongoing or very recently
past experience while its mental image continues to persist. For this purpose, I coined the concept of “mental persistence” to
describe a mental artefact that differs from physiological persistence (like sensory after-images) as well as from full-fledged
memory (with its three stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval). From a phenomenological point-of-view, mental persis-
tence is akin to the Husserlian concept of retentional consciousness but unlike the latter, it allows for a certain elementary
after-the-fact mental scanning.
The method of Introspection Plus is particularly apt for the capture of experiences of very short duration–to be called
“snap experiences“– exemplified by phantasms, or “micro-dreams“, occurring during micro-sleep episodes. I will supplement
the exposition with examples of my own introspective reflections of snap experiences of various types.

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322 Intentional Horizon and Cognitive Phenomenology

Marta Jorba
Department of Philosophy, University of Girona, Barcelona, SPAIN

In the discussions on cognitive phenomenology, authors normally defend or deny the claim that there is a specific phe-
nomenal character for thought, the existence question, and, those that accept it, wonder about the nature of this alleged
phenomenal character. Such discussions have impact on different aspects of our theories of consciousness, like the reach of
phenomenal consciousness or the extent to which problems of consciousness spread to the cognitive domain. In this paper
I propose to go a step further and explore the nature of thinking or cognitive experiences in a holistic manner, which will
allow us to focus on an element in our consciousness that relevantly relates to cognitive phenomenology. This element is
what phenomenologists like Husserl called “intentional horizon”, which is an aspect of our current experience that ties our
present experience with the just past one and with an anticipation of the following ones, as if the actual experience had an
“intentional arrow” coming from previous experiences in the stream of consciousness and an “anticipation arrow” pointing
to the possibilities open in having certain experiences. I will argue that this general notion can be rightly applied to cognitive
experiences in particular, involving different cognitive attitudes (entertaining, judging, wondering, etc.). This intentional
horizon can be characterised and examined in two different ways: (i) the horizon with respect to the future possibilities and
(ii) the horizon coming from past experiences. I will characterise (i) as a horizon of possibilities that the present experience
leaves open, a certain disposition to draw inferences and that is relevantly dependant on our background knowledge and
(ii) as the background consciousness present in our actual cognitive experiences. Regarding (ii) I will moreover propose to
characterise this background consciousness as a form of what psychologists and philosophers have called _ 93unsymbolised
thinking”, which have proved difficult to argue for, both theoretically and empirically. In order for this picture to be plausi-
ble, I will argue for three different claims: (a) the intentional horizon is “felt” or experienced, and this has interesting con-
nections with the distinction conscious/unconscious processes; (b) this horizon is not reducible to a temporal horizon by
means of which we connect to past experiences and anticipate further ones; and (c) this intentional horizon is an instance of
cognitive phenomenology, as it cannot be reduced to sensory and emotional phenomenal elements. These aspects will pre-
sent a picture of cognitive experiences holistically tied by the intentional horizon and interestingly connected to the debate
on cognitive phenomenology and the characterisation of the so-called “unsymbolised thinking”.

323 Involved consciousness: Maori relationships with things in the world

Mika Carl
Faculty of Education, University of Waikato, Hamilton, NEW ZEALAND

In colonial New Zealand, discussions amongst Maori – the indigenous peoples of that country – around what constitutes
consciousness, generally highlight the living interplay of the external world. In a similar way to other indigenous peoples,
Maori acknowledge broadly that all things are connected in a very deep sense. Yet the nature of that connection between self
and object remains to be explored in light of the potential for the individual to relate to an object and vice versa. In some in-
stances, that relationship transcends consciousness, to the extent that a thing has an effect on the self without the self being
aware of that thing. This possibility means that Maori may have placed an abbreviated emphasis on the conscious presence
of a thing. Despite this expansive view of the interconnected and unaware self, however, there were still terms that depicted
the manifestation of a thing into one’s consciousness. Thus, Maori consciousness revolved around both an orthodox notion
that something has come into the ‘aroaro’ (sensory fold) of the person and a much more complicated philosophy that con-
sciousness could merely be an awareness that the self is immersed in a field of potential. In the latter case, there is a continual
sense that something ‘could be’, always in relation to the self but on its own terms.
There are certain Maori terms that explicate these phenomena. In this paper I discuss the conceptual framework of
consciousness that is both thing-aware and yet also possibility-aware. I also consider the terms that emphasise this dual na-
ture of consciousness. Within that description, however, comes a necessary recounting of colonisation that has encouraged
Maori to doubt a more holistic notion of consciousness. A potential outcome is the lessening of subsequent things that used
to share an active connection to the self but now threaten to be separate.

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324 The early ontogenesis of existential feelings

Saarinen Jussi
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

The starting point for this paper is philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. Ratcliffe classifies feelings
as existential in virtue of two shared characteristics. Firstly, they are pre-intentional feelings that structure all intentional
experience. This distinguishes existential feelings from intentional states like emotions, which are directed towards specific
objects or situations within the world. Secondly, they are bodily feelings. In sum, existential feelings always furnish us with
pre-intentional affective backdrops to overall experience.
In this paper I will examine a theoretically underdeveloped aspect of existential feelings, namely their early ontogenesis.
My motivating concern is this: if, as suggested, existential feelings play a constitutive role in experience, we need a better
understanding of how such feelings arise, persist, or change over time. In particular, how does ontogenesis figure in the in-
dividual proclivity for certain existential feelings? My general aim, then, is to complement descriptive and typological phe-
nomenological analyses of existential feelings with a developmental account of their formation. My specific argument is that
some existential feelings have an interpersonal developmental trajectory that begins from the earliest bodily-affective inter-
actions between infant and caretaker(s). To support this claim, I will draw from the findings of empirical infant research,
especially as pertains to the processes of dyadic interaction. As an example, I will briefly discuss shame as a deep and pervad-
ing existential feeling.

325 Power Law of Meditational Consciousness

Satsangi Prem Saran
Advisory Committee on Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institutions, Agra, INDIA
Sahni Vishal
Centre for Consciousness Studies, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

This paper may be viewed as a logical extension of our earlier paper on Cosmic Consciousness Hierarchization : Analytic,
Experimental and Experiential (TSC 2012).
Interesting conclusions can be drawn from a study of 1/f a behaviour of brain-scans of humans, particularly during Eastern
Meditational Practice. The cerebral cortex with its most complicated architecture generates the most complex noise known to
Physics. One over f (a = 1) power spectrum (also called “pink noise”) is a golden mean between the white noise (a = 0, i.e. con-
stant power spectrum) representing disorder with high information content, and brown noise (a = 2) representing predictabil-
ity with low information content. The anatomical functional organization of the cerebral cortex brings to mind a well-known
psycho-physical law credited to Weber and Fechner. Accordingly, the magnitude of a subjective sensation such as meditational
consciousness in cognitive and meta-cognitive domains increases proportionally to the logarithm of the stimulus intensity,
“one over f (i.e. rhythmic frequency)”, a physical unit. Notably, scale-free systems or fractals are governed by Power Laws.
The formulation of power law of meditational consciousness requires invoking a family of models based on Omni quan-
tum theory and physical system theory (including fuzzy analytical hierarchy process), and requisite integration of first per-
son inner experiences of meditationists as co-investigators with the third person scientific methodology of observing, re-
porting, understanding and hypothesis-testing.

326 What does creative thinking really mean?

Simon Judit
Social Sciences, Special Education Stockholm University, Stockholm, SWEDEN

This paper is based on my PhD thesis (2009) which is a phenomenological study of the experience of creativity, and aims
to lighten up the work of consciousness while being in a creative mode. The PhD thesis aimed to understand creativity, not
just in a particular area, but generally as a human experience, independent from the specific area of creating. The phenom-
enological analysis has been carried out through interviews of adult people about their experience of creativity in its natural
expression in the everyday life. Data has been collected in 18 open interviews about a variety of type of creative processes
both individually and in-group collaboration. Each interview is constituted of a description of a particular situation of the
participant’s own choice when they experienced creativity or lack of creativity.

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The results of the PhD thesis consist of the meaning structure of the phenomenon along with insights about being crea-
tive. The analysis has shown that the creative process is both meaning creating and product producing at the same time. The
three main distinguishing features of the experience of creativity are: 1) an experienced discrepancy between the existing
and the possible in a situation; 2) a special alertness that surfaces during the creating and holistic because it involves body,
feelings and thoughts; 3) a progression which occurs synchronistically under the process, involves realizing a creative result
and a new potential and cannot be completely controlled. The creative results can be a new idea, a new knowledge, a new ap-
proach, at change in emotion and new constituted gestalts.
Creativity is a complex phenomenon and, as such, it emerges through a combination of simple acts. The creative re-
sult and the new meaning show themselves on a complex level and can’t be controlled by will. But the simple acts on the
lower level are controllable through the attitude and thinking of the individual, with other words through the individual’s
approach. From the meaning structure of the creative experience, the result of the PhD thesis, it is possible to read out what
an individual actively can do for coming into the creative mode of consciousness. This active approach involves adopting
a creative readiness, tuning in to a receptivity which involves as well the body, as the emotions and the thoughts, and also
believing and expecting the imagined result.

327 Phenomenology and Externalism: a Perfect Marriage?

van Mazijk Corijn
Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, NETHERLANDS

Phenomenology and Externalism: A Perfect Marriage?

Throughout most of the twentieth century, Husserl has been regarded a Cartesian internalist, whereas Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty are supposedly paradigmatic externalists. However, more recently, some renown scholars (Smith; Zahavi)
have argued that this image is incorrect. According to Zahavi, Husserl is in fact much closer to the externalism usually as-
cribed to his students. This image of phenomenology as evident
supporter of externalism has been further standardized through the rise of enactivism (Noë, Thompson). From this it
appears to follow that the entire phenomenological tradition can now be taken to support externalism.
This paper aims to set boundaries on phenomenological support of externalism. For this I first distinguish four kinds of
externalism: (1) semantic externalism (Putnam, Burge), (2) radical externalism (Honderich), and the two most important
ones: (3) enabling externalism and (4) vehicle externalism. I will argue that phenomenology only supports one of these:
enabling externalism.
I first illustrate that phenomenology cannot reason with semantic externalism. I then turn to radical externalism, which
(in brief) holds that perceptual conscious is ‘only for an extra-cranial state of affairs to exist’ (Honderich 2006, p. 6-8). This
seems to imply that consciousness equals the existence of real things. Phenomenology, however, cannot support the equa-
tion of real things with conscious awareness. Husserl, for one, holds that we experience the appearing of objects as existing
in the external world. But this is not to say that the external thing itself is a part of our experience. The physical object one
intentionally relates to can be destroyed, but the ‘perceived as such’ belongs to the mental content of the intentional act, and
is as such immaterial.
More recently, enactivists have been criticized for committing the so-called ‘coupling constitution fallacy’ (Wilson;
Block; Clark; Prinz; Rupert). These critics claim that enactivists conflates elements constitutive for supervenience of mental
content with elements having a causal influence. There are thus (at least) two possible externalist claims to be distinguished:
the strong claim that the ‘vehicles’ constitutive of supervenience are located outside the body, and the weaker claim that
without the right kind of causal environment, certain experiences (e.g. perceptions) will not occur. The stronger claim I call
‘vehicle externalism’, the weaker ‘enabling externalism’. Note that enabling externalism is not necessarily opposed to the idea
that the (vehicle) basis for supervenience is internal to the body.
The rest of this paper shows why phenomenology does not support vehicle externalism, but only enabling externalism.
Contemporary phenomenological externalism mistakenly confuses our ways of experiencing things with the way in which
these complex experiences (e.g. perceptual objects) come about. Although perception obviously pretends to involve outer
objects, the structure of intentionality, with its form/matter- scheme, favors internalism. This shows that Husserl is anti-rep-
resentationalistic in the first (pretentious) sense (Zahavi), but also that it supports an internal vehicle representationalism.

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Burge, Tyler 1979: ‘Individualism and the Mental’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4 (1), 73-122.
Burge,
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says, Volume 2, Oxford: Clarendon Press (2007).
Clark, Andy 2009: ‘Spreading the Joy? Why the machinery of
consciousness is (probably) still in the head’. Mind, 118 (472), 963-993.
Honderich, Ted 2006: ‘Radical Exter-
nalism’. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 (7-8), 3-13.
Husserl, Edmund 1901: Logische Untersuchungen:
Zweiter Theil: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntis. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
____
1981: ‘Inaugural Lecture: Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of Investigation’, in: Husserl:
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____ 1983: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Transl.
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____ 2009: ‘Extended Cognition and the Mark of the
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tive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press Smith, A. D. 2008: ‘Husserl
and Externalism’. Synthese, 160, 313-333.
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the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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garet 2002: ‘Six views of embodied cognition’. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9 (4), 625-636. Zahavi, Dan
2004: ‘Husserl’s noema and the internalism-externalism debate’. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Phi-
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dental idealism’. Synthese, 160, 355-374.

5.2 Meditation, Contemplation and Mysticisim

328 Long-term meditation alters both visual responses and resting state
fluctuations in visual and DMN areas
Berkovich-Ohana Aviva
Neurobiology, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL
Harel Michal
The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL
Hahami Avital
The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL
Arieli Amos
The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL
Malach Rafael
The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, ISRAEL

Recently we hypothesized that the information contained in spontaneously emerging (resting-state) fluctuations may re-
flect individually unique neuro-cognitive traits. One prediction of this hypothesis, termed “spontaneous trait reactivation”
(STR), is that unique life-styles of individuals affecting their daily network activations, should be reflected in their corre-
sponding resting-state activity. Long-term meditators could thus provide a unique experimental group to test this conjec-
ture. Using a conventional visual-recognition memory task, we found that long-term Mindfulness meditation (MM) prac-
titioners show increased visual cortex responsivity, concomitant with weaker negative BOLD responses in Default Mode
Network (DMN) areas. Importantly, we found for the MM practitioners a corresponding change in resting-state fluctua-
tions: the amplitude of their spontaneous (resting-state) fluctuations was enhanced in the visual cortex and reduced in the

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DMN. Our results are compatible with the STR hypothesis in demonstrating that task-related changes induced by long term
MM in visual and DMN networks, are recapitulated in the nature of spontaneous resting-state fluctuations. Importantly, the
results extend the nature of such recapitulation to the domain of fluctuations’ amplitude.

329 Spatio-temporal EEG Spectral Analysis of Newborn with and without

Spiritual Sound Input
Bhatnagar Phool Chand
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, INDIA
Gupta Satendra
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, INDIA
Dayalbagh Vijai Kumar
Educational Institute, INDIA
Bahtnagar Anjoo A
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Paramedical Science, INDIA

Changes in the level of consciousness and alterations of functional state usually have a marked effect on the morphology
of EEG. This applies not only for pathological states such as coma but also for physiological states during which conscious-
ness is either inhibited (drowsiness or sleep) or heightened (mental attention, stress, or meditation).Studies in adults show
a higher level of mental and lower level of physical consciousness experienced in Yoga practice. This pilot study was under-
taken to measure changes in level of neonatal consciousness in spiritual perspective. Newborn with pure consciousness
and less of physical and mental awareness shows a change in the level of consciousness by repetition of Dhunyatmak (ever
reverberating) Name of RA-DHA-SOA-MI at 4 chakras of pind (physical body), as is shown by changes in reflex scoring
using standardized neonatal behavioral assessment scale(NBAS) . To objectively confirm these findings EEG was done in
newborns before and after same intervention. The observations were deeper sleep,more of continuous pattern and frontal
sharp transients after the input . While no other significant EEG changes on routine examination were detected between
newborns subjected to repetition of Holy name and those not so exposed, spectral analysis of EEG recording shows some
differences in frequency and amplitude. The significance of these findings of digital EEG in the newborns is being further
studied with spectral analysis of the recorded data which will be presented.

330 Contemplative Media Design: Practicing Mindful Media

Karande Aarshin
N/A, YantraWare, Bellevue, WA, USA

Most think of emerging media and technology forms, like computer games, as encouraging violence or addiction amongst
players. However, the development of games that encourage more contemplative and reflective forms of gameplay are a
growing trend in the game industry.
However, general consensus finds that these mindfulness-based games are either not entertaining or not effective at en-
couraging mindfulness. Game developers make fun games that are ineffective at causing change and scholars make theoreti-
cally rich games that are not fun.
This paper examines this gap between developers and scholars, looks at the possibility of games becoming a modern
form of meditation, and offers theoretical and practical principles for designing media and technology to induce contempla-
tive experiences (“contemplative media design”).
With the objective of outlining guiding principles for designing “mindful media,” this paper reviews methods used to
apply fundamental concepts in consciousness studies, media studies, and game studies (like those by William G. Braud, Mi-
haly Czikszentimihalyi, and David Bordwell) and evaluates the results in existing and forthcoming games.
Moreover, this paper assesses the history of games as a technological exploration of consciousness, from the ancient to
modern, and presents examples of research and products studying this relationship. Games are already being used to help
patients deal with the adverse effects of chemotherapy brain injuries, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), stress, and de-
pression. Games have been found to be successful as a way of enhancing cognitive functions through trends in what is called
“neurogaming.”

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5 . 2 Meditation , C onte m p l ation and Mysticisi m

This critical analysis identifies phenomena essential for designing “mindful media,” presents the results as principles for
“contemplative media design,” and offers examples of games which have incorporated these principles.
This paper concludes by asking that if there are games for the body and mind, then why not the “soul”? Moreover, this
paper will explore how games can help induce and encourage more mindful states of consciousness and elucidate how de-
signing and developing “mindful media” through “contemplative media design” holds rich creative and research opportuni-
ties available for scholars across all disciplines.

331 EEG differences between meditators and non-meditators during multistable

perception
Kornmeier Jürgen
Perception and Cognition, IGPP, Freiburg, GERMANY
Friedel Evelyn
Section Visual Function, University Eye-Hospital, Freiburg, GERMANY
Schmidt Stefan
Klinik für Psychosomatische Medizin, Freiburg, GERMANY
Atmanspacher Harald
Collegium Helveticum, Zürich, SWITZERLAND
Wittmann Marc
IGPP, Freiburg, GERMANY

Introduction. During observation of ambiguous figures, like the famous Necker cube, our perception is only temporarily
stable and reverses spontaneously between different interpretations. The recently presented Necker-Zeno-model of bista-
ble perception provides a mathematical relation between the median duration of stable percepts (“dwell times”) and two
other basic time scales of cognitive relevance (Atmanspacher et al. 2008). Experienced meditators show longer dwell times
than inexperienced control observers (Carter et al., 2005; Sauer et al., 2012). According to the Necker-Zeno-model they
should also show changes in one or both other time scales. The current EEG study was aimed to test these predictions.
Methods. We used Kornmeier & Bach’s „Onset-Paradigm“(2012) to measure event-related EEG potentials (“ERPs”) during
perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal resolution. 20 experienced meditators and a matched group of
non- meditators observed the ambiguous Necker cube and indicated perceived reversals by button presses. In separate ex-
perimental conditions participants observed the cubes either passively or with the instruction to hold their current percept
as long as possible.
Results. (1) We replicated Kornmeier & Bach’s findings of a chain of reversal-related ERP components. (2) In both
experimental conditions, the meditators showed longer dwell times and higher latencies in two ERP components than the
control participants. (3) Meditators further showed a smaller early visual EEG response than the control observers already
100 ms after stimulus onset.
Discussion. The early ERP amplitude effect indicates influence of meditation practice on the earliest visual processing
steps. The extended dwell times of the Necker cube in meditators compared to non-meditators confirms previous results. The
concurrent increase in ERP latencies in meditators compared to non-meditators can be interpreted as a modulation of the
300-ms time scale as predicted from the Necker-Zeno-model. We found no evidence for modulation of the 30- ms time
scale from the model. Our results provide evidence for a relation between multistable perception and higher-level cognitive
functions as proposed in the Necker-Zeno-Model.


References: Atmanspacher, H., Bach, M., Filk, T., Kornmeier, J., & Römer, H. (2008). Cognitive Time Scales
in a Necker- Zeno Model for Bistable Perception. The Open Cybernetics and Systemics Journal, 2, 234–
251.
Carter, O. L., Presti, D. E., Callistemon, C., Ungerer, Y., Liu, G. B., & Pettigrew, J. D. (2005). Meditation
alters perceptual rivalry in Tibetan Buddhist monks. Current Biology, 15(11), R412–3.
Kornmeier, J., & Bach, M. (2012). Ambiguous figures – what happens in the brain when perception changes but
not the stimulus. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6(51), 1–23. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2012.00051
Sauer, S.,
Lemke, J., Wittmann, M., Kohls, N., Mochty, U., & Walach, H. (2012). How long is now for mindfulness medita-
tors? Personality and Individual Differences, 52, 750–754.

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332 Samaadhi – An Explanation of Non-Locality in the Human Psyche?

MacPhail Jean C.
Santa Fe, NM, USA

Walach et al discuss paranormal psychic events such as telepathy, healing, clairvoyance, etc. that defy ordinary physical cau-
sation. They propose that such phenomena may be mediated between entangled pairs by a non-local process.
The yoga tradition of India provides a possible explanation of what might constitute “non-locality” in this context. In
the Yoga Sutras by Patanjali, dating back to the first century CE, “ordinary consciousness” is regarded as a very close and
tight relationship between two functions of the psyche:
1. A conceptual aspect of consciousness that perceives and values its substrates “from the outside.”
2. An experiential part of consciousness that is concerned with the direct, unmediated “inner state” encounter with
those same substrates.
In contemporary terminology the relationship between these two would be considered one of complementarity: two
co-existing aspects of the same entity, necessary to understanding the entity, of equal ontological dignity, and that cannot be
reduced to one another.
In yoga practice these two aspects are radically disconnected through a process known as samyama that takes place in
three steps:
1. Pratyahara: drawing the psyche away from, and involvement with, outer perceptions of any substrate.
2. Dhyana: concentrating the mind exclusively on the inner experience of the substrate.
3. Samadhi, when the conceptual and experiential aspects of the psyche are totally separated and the experiential side—
which is commonly dominated in everyday human discourse by the conceptual aspect—comes completely into its own.
No doubt building on centuries—if not millennia—of shamanic data, the Sutras asserts that samadhi endows the sub-
ject with supernormal capacities such as clairaudience, clairvoyance, telekinesis, etc. Under five categories—each succeed-
ing category being less materialistic in context and content than its predecessor—the Sutras provides a listing and explana-
tion of the varieties of supernormal phenomena.
In addition to the Sutras, there are other, more recent, Indian sources relating to this topic:
The extensive research of Sri Aurobindo (18 -1950) into the literature on and his advanced personal experience of yoga,
deals, under the category of cognition/samadhi, with supernormal phenomena similar to those described in the Sutras. Au-
robindo psychologizes and humanizes the import of these phenomena and especially emphasizes the need to document just
how the samadhi experience relates to subsequent, long-term behavior in the subject.
The five samadhis of Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) and their epiphenomena were observed and recorded in detail
by many different groups of Western-trained observers. Here the paranormal epiphenomena were of a quite psychological
nature, e.g. the ability to command allegiance from very large groups of people in both India and the West and to direct their
subsequent behavior up to the present day. In developing these powers, Vivekananda utilized conceptual insights generated
by his spiritual mentor from his own samadhis.
Paranormal phenomena appear to be related to the samadhi event, in which there is a radical removal of complementary
between concept and experience within the psyche. Recent data suggest that the psyche is thereafter able to align itself with
compatible conceptual constructs, resulting in significant long-term, beneficial effects.

1 Walach, Harald, von Lucadou, Walter, Romer, Hartmann (2014). Parapsychological Phenomena as Nonlocal
Correlations—A Theoretical Framework. Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 603–629. 2 Vive-
kananda, Swami. (1896c). Yoga Philosophy: Lectures Delivered in New York, Winter of 1895-96 by the Swami
Vivekananda on Raja Yoga, or Conquering the Internal Nature; also Patanjali’s Yoga Aphorisms, with Commen-
taries. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co. 3 Walach, Harald. Criticisms of Transper-
sonal Psychology and Beyond—the Future of Transpersonal Psychology: A Science and Culture of Conscious-
ness, in Friedman, Harris L. and Hartelius, Glenn, eds. 2013. The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal
Psychology. Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons. 4 Debashish Banerji (2012). Seven Quartets of
Becoming: A Transformative Yoga Psychology Based on the Diaries of Sri Aurobindo. New Delhi: D. K. Print-
world. 5 MacPhail, Jean C. (2013). Learning in Depth: A Case Study in Twin 5x5 Matrices of Consciousness.
Presented as a doctoral dissertation to the Department of Cultural Studies at the University of Viadrina, Frank-
furt on Oder, Germany. http://opus.kobv.de/euv/volltexte/2013/83/pdf/MacPhail_Learning

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333 Can Mind comprehend Mind?

Roy Sukhdev
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Saran Sant
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Since time immemorial, man has been intrigued by his own self, his awareness and his existence in the universe. The human
form is the most superior and unique in the entire creation. It raises fundamental questions as Who am I ? What is life ?
Does it have a purpose ? What is truth or ultimate reality ? and also considers himself competent to answer them.
Man is endowed with a set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and mem-
ory. We experience the outer world through our sense organs and find the physical world composed of different forms of
matter. Besides this, our very experience involves thoughts, feelings, imagination, ability of logical rational analysis and deci-
sion making that constitutes what is called the mind. Hence, our quest for making sense of whatever we experience involving
outer or inner dimensions is through the mind. We believe that humans are conscious beings who know what is going on in
their minds. It is consciousness that lies behind the process of thinking. It is obvious that one is conscious and its certainty is
self-certifying.
In the quest to comprehend reality and the natural impulse to interact with the outer world, we use our minds to study
the physical world. This has provided mind the impetus to develop a powerful form of expression, i.e., language and a scien-
tific methodology that is materialistic, deterministic, mechanistic and reductionist. Progressing from the macroscopic to the
microscopic understanding of matter, we have developed the quantum theory of reality. In a parallel endeavor, we also want
to understand mind. The conventional outlook is to study the brain to study the mind.
In this paper, we question the capability of mind to comprehend mind itself. It is necessary to have a perspective from
within and without to understand any entity. We argue that it is necessary to study (i) the mind from within that would
necessarily require subjective experience to be recognized as a valid mode of scientific enquiry; (ii) the condition when all
mental functions are withdrawn, a state of complete self-absorption, to successfully understand its functionality and the
process of conscious experience; and (iii) to take inspiration from Eastern Spiritual traditions that have perfected practical
meditation techniques to access such a state and have time tested exhaustive experiential accounts through the ages. The
above integration of East-West approaches to consciousness is urgently needed for progress in consciousness research.

334 Contemplative Pedagogical Practices for Transformation in Consciousness

Ahuja Sona Sharma Sadhna
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, INDIA
Sharma Sadhna
Faculty of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Contemplative pedagogy is an educational movement which is concerned with developing greater awareness in students
(Spicer, 2011), perceiving everything in relation to a greater underlying unity and understanding how working of one’s
mind affect one’s behavior( Jennings, 2009). For the present study contemplative pedagogy implies an approach in which
the learner’s plane of consciousness is at the centre. It is the normal tendency of human brain to generalize the informa-
tion which senses acquire. This in the long term leads to development of habitual patterns of learning. This mechanical way
of learning de-sensitizes the mind towards reception and understanding of acquired information. Contemplative pedagogy
aims at de-conditioning or sensitization of the human mind leading to conditions for creativity, insights, intuition and dis-
covery attitude. It also facilitates removal of fallacies associated with the frame of reference of learning (i.e. the learner).
The efforts in the direction of implementing contemplative pedagogy are scarce and are generally known as mindful-
ness based instructions whereas in this paper, it is proposed that it is more than being mindful. There is no consensus over
what should be the content of contemplative pedagogy and there is a dearth of empirical researches in this area. Based on
exhaustive literature review from eastern contemplative tradition (specifically, Yoga sutras of Patanjali, texts by Shri Aurob-
indo Ghose and Ramana Mahirishi), the present paper highlights the model of human mind as something greater than just a
physical and biological entity with the proposed principles of contemplative pedagogy. Further, contemplative pedagogical
practices as implied by the derived principles are detailed. Concerns related to feasibility, acceptance and effectiveness of the
contemplative pedagogical practices are discussed in the light of experiences acquired through the implementation of the
proposed practices.

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335 Investigating the Depths of Consciousness Through Meditation. Outlines of

an Interdisciplinary Contemplative Phenomenology
Sparby Terje
Bender Institute of Neuroimaging, University of Giessen, Gießen, GERMANY

One of the main distinctions in phenomenology is between the descriptive and genetic kind. Descriptive phenomenol-
ogy can be said to consist of investigating and describing the basic features of conscious experience from the first person
perspective, while genetic phenomenology ventures to uncover how conscious experience arises in the first place. In the
contemplative traditions ordinary consciousness is understood to be resulting from a deeper activity that constructs the
experience of world and self. Through meditative practice it seems possible to gain access to and investigate this activity;
hence, in this sense, descriptive and genetic phenomenology merge. As the process of investigation deepens, it is sometimes
said that the fundamental source of the activity that constructs the self and the world is fully revealed, which gives a special
meaning to Edmund Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as “the science of the essence of consciousness”. Contemplative
phenomenology gives an account of such an investigation.
Accordingly, contemplative phenomenology can be divided into three sub-disciplines: A descriptive and genetic phe-
nomenology, and a phenomenology of the source. Together they investigate the whole range of meditative activity, includ-
ing the meditative techniques and their results. Initially, contemplative phenomenology is a descriptive practice that gives
an account of changes in consciousness effected by meditative practice. As contemplative phenomenology proceeds, it can
uncover deep structural changes in consciousness and potentially the source of these changes.
Here I present an outline of a way of doing contemplative phenomenology. I begin by proving support for the idea of
“depth” in consciousness and that this depth can be investigated (section I). For this I use the William James’ idea of “low-
ering the threshold” of consciousness. Because I provide empirical support for the idea that depths in consciousness can
be investigated with the help of meditation (section II), what I’m doing could be called an interdisciplinary contemplative
phenomenology. I mainly draw on accounts of meditative or contemplative experience, both historical and my own (section
III, IV and V). Some space will be dedicated to arguing that meditative depth experience is not in principle ineffable, but
requires its own kind of reasoning. Here I will draw on Hegel’s understanding of synthetic concepts. The main characteristic
of synthetic concepts is that they contain the particulars in them (thinking “plant” means thinking all possible plants, as in
Goethe’s idea of the primal plant, the Urpflanze). In deep meditative experience, this conceptuality can also manifest in the
sensory system. This may give rise to an experience of transcending time and space. My investigation concludes with an
overview of the depths of consciousness as revealed by actual contemplative practice (section VI).

336 Meditation and Ignorance: Concepts of Positive and Negative Ignoring

Wilson Margot
Philosophy, University of Glasgow, New Haw, UNITED KINGDOM

Is there a relationship, first between meditation and the concept of positive ignoring, and second, between ignorance and
the concept of negative ignoring? Themes include current neuroscience perspectives of ‘free won’t’, dispositional neural
pointing and ‘dispositional harmony’ . The conclusion explores whether meditation as positive ignoring, is a means of align-
ing subjective dispositional neural pointing to objective dispositional harmony.

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5.4 Other Altered States of Consciousness

337 The use of sound and music in contemporary shamanic rituals in the
creation of altered states of consciousness
Hytönen-Ng Elina
Humanistic department, University of Eastern Finland, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

Music has accompanied healing rituals and the attainment of altered states since ancient times. It has been shown in studies
that the monotonous drumming often associated with shamanic rituals, effects the functions of the human brain and acts as
a core element in trance induction (Szabo 2004). Shamanic practitioners use music as an essential part in the shamanic ritu-
als which involve Altered State of Consciousness (ASC). Van Deusen (2004) reported, in the case of Siberian shamanism,
that as the Soviet regime forced the practitioners underground and caused them to eliminate sounds from the rituals, the
community around them felt that the shamans became weaker.
A case-study approach was used to investigate how two contemporary individual practitioners use different types of
sound and music as part of their ritual practises with an outcome of creating ASC. As part of the ritual processes the practi-
tioner used the music to transport the sacred space from one place to the next. This paper tries to elucidate how the musical
instruments - drums, rattles and sistrums ¬- and their sounds act as transformative tools. These sounds change the ritual
space in which the altered states and healing rituals then take place. The aim of this paper is also to decipher how this musi-
cal transformation is explained by these individual practitioners. As a result, the findings from these interviews provide new
information on how contemporary shamanism in western cultures uses musical instruments during healing rituals and in
the attainment of ASC. The emphasis is on the practitioners’ experiences and explanations.
This research project conveys
a stance on medical ethnomusicology, exploring the roles of music and sound in the cultural context of health and healing
(Koen, Barz & Brummer-Smith 2011), and combines the ethnographic data with recent neuroscientific findings.

References: Koen, B. D., Lloyd, J., Barz, G. & Brummerl-Smith, K. (eds.) 2011. The Oxford Handbook of Medi-
cal Ethnomusicology. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. Szabo, Csaba. 2004. “The effects of mo-
notonous drumming on subjective experience.” Music Therapy Today, Vol. 1, Jan. 2004. Van Deusen, Kira. 2004.
Singing Story, Healing Drum: Shamans and Storytellers of Turkic Siberia. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press.

338 A Phenomenological Investigation Reframing Mediums as Mystics

Lyke Jennifer
Psychology, Richard Stockton College, Galloway, USA

Psychological research into mediumship has been dominated by attempts to validate mediums’ claims of paranormal cogni-
tion and investigations related to hypothesized explanations for mediums’ beliefs that they communicate with discarnate
entities. This research took a different approach by qualitatively investigating mediums’ descriptions of their subjective expe-
rience of spirits and the afterlife. Six Certified Research Mediums from across the United States engaged in semi-structured
interviews regarding the nature of non- physical reality with which they believe they interact. Themes within the mediums’
reports were identified using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis, a qualitative approach to understanding individuals’
sense of meaning related to their subjective experiences.
Initial analysis of the interviews revealed broad consensus among mediums regarding the nature of spirits and the after-
life although they disagreed on some particulars. Most importantly, several overarching themes emerged highlighting simi-
larities between the phenomenological experience of mediumship and the state of consciousness associated with other mys-
tical practices. For example, mediums described the afterlife as a timeless, transcendent reality; they reported they access it
through trance states, feel guided by higher powers, and experience paranormal cognition; and they described perceiving an
ordered universe in which individual manifestations of consciousness perpetually evolve toward a unified state of absolute
love. On the other hand, mediums’ phenomenological experiences also differed from many descriptions of classic mystical
states in that they emphasize dualistic relationships (e.g., between discarnates and sitters, mediums and guides) as opposed
to unitary consciousness or non-dual reality. However, some conceptualizations of mystical consciousness suggest particular

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experiences manifest on a continuum between ordinary awareness and unitary consciousness with intermediary states in-
volving visions and perceptions of spirits. Using that framework, the mediums’ phenomenological descriptions suggest they
may have the ability to access an intermediary state of mystical awareness voluntarily.
Interpreting mediums’ experiences as fundamentally related to mystical consciousness has important consequences for
understanding mediumship from a psychological perspective. Not only does this view validate mediumship as a fundamen-
tally spiritual practice, as opposed to a fraudulent or delusional one, but it frames mediums’ work with clients as parallel to
that of other spiritual and therapeutic practitioners. In other words, it describes mediumship in terms mediums themselves
endorse, which brings the psychological perspective of this phenomenon more into line with efforts within the social sci-
ences to avoid pathologizing “the other”. This view also provides a theoretical rationale for mediums’ claims of paranormal
abilities since mystical states have been associated historically and cross-culturally with purported psychic phenomena. Re-
framing mediumship as a manifestation of a particular type of mystical consciousness therefore may be useful for informing
future explorations of mediums’ experiences.

339 Paraphenomenological Methodology: proposal of foundation for

investigation resources and self- development of phenomenology operant on
psychic phenomena.
Schlosser Ulysses
Holociclo, Center for Higher Studies of the Conscientiology, Foz do Iguaçu, BRAZIL

The present paper aims to propose the Paraphenomenological Methodology, in order to help consciential self- research on
psychic phenomena, conducting the individual closer to its consciential reality.
Paraphenomenology is considered here under the premise to have development available through educational process,
refuting exclusivities of gifted ones.
The central issue refers to the basic technical procedures in the field of consciential paraphenomenology used to experi-
ence, develop and investigate psychic phenomena in general.
The procedures are based on the paraphysiology of the holosoma (set of 4 vehicles of consciential manifestation:
physical body, energosoma, psychosoma and mentalsoma), which can be verified through OBEs, in line with Projectiology
(VIEIRA, 2002).
The intended contribution is to gather information from literature and self-experimentation to identify and propose
acknowledgment of general parapsychic patterns of functioning available to any interested consciential self-researcher.
To Perform the core steps of the methodology, at least 3 preliminary trained skills are necessary to achieve procedures
in laboratorial experiments or in daily life: (1) to induce physical relaxation until reducing or neutralizing organic sensorial
perception, (2) to identify self-bioenergies to control their movement, vibrational frequency and density, (3) to induce tiny
and major discoincidences between vehicles of consciential manifestation.
The main foundation to the core procedures is the physiological response of the parapercept (the mental image of ex-
trassensorial perception) to the fine tuning provided by controlled exteriorization of bioenergies and adjustments on the
grade of discoincidence in the holossoma, especially in the region of the human head.
In this way, consciousness may operate parapercept tuning, making it useful (1) to prospect different extraphysical di-
mensions, (2) to avoid imaginative contamination on paraperception and (3) better distinguish paraperception from imagi-
nation preventing misinterpretation.
The whole methodological proposal includes 9 stages of procedures:
1. Paraphenomenological attitude. The self-re-
searcher guides himself with (1) scientific interest, (2) paraperceptive opening and (3) cosmoethic orientation.
2. Imagistic
apassivation. The self-researcher decreases the production of mental images to avoid interference in the paraperception con-
tent.
3. Imagetic activation. The paraphenomenon rises to consciousness do to spontaneous configuration or through active
mental functions as attention, volition, scanning, probing and expansion of lucidity.
4. Deactivation of imagistic tension.
Deactivation of inner sources of undesirable interference on paraperception.
5. Parapercept tuning. The set of techniques
used to adjust tuning of paraperception: adjustment of lucidity, control of discoincidence, energetic tuning, fine control
of energetic exteriorization and operatory transferences to the parabrain of psychosoma.
6. Reverification of parapercept.
Repetition of parapercept tuning in order to certify experimentation.
7. Analyses and hermeneutics of the paraphenomenic
components.
8. Assistential synchronization. Convergence of assistential utilities of the paraphenomena.
9. Self-evolutive
synchronization. Convergence of self-evolutive utilities of the paraphenomena.
The development of this methodology is a result of the organization of sequenced paratechnological procedures for
making parapercepts tuning clear and lasting.

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5 . 6 P sychoana l ysis and P sychotherapy

It should encourage the development of protocols and adequate standards regarding the interchange in paraphenom-
enological research.

Reference:
Vieira, Waldo; Projectiology: A Panorama of Experiences of the Consciousness outside the Human
Body; Rio de Janeiro, RJ; 2002.

5.6 Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy

340 Dreaming and Lucid Dreaming Based on an Ontology of Experience

Day Latasha
Consciousness &Transformative Studies, John F. Kennedy University, Pleasant Hill, USA

This project is based on an ontology of experience which premises that all experience, including dreams, hallucinations, and
fictional stories at least have some degree of reality. I will discuss the implications for this. In the Western world, we have
adopted the view that only waking, rational, explainable experience is real, I am proposing that we consider other possibili-
ties focusing specifically on the idea that experiences occurring in other states of consciousness, such as dreaming or combi-
nations of interference between waking and dreaming, for instance hypersomnia, or lucid dreaming. This exploration comes
from the occurrence of REM atonia where the body becomes paralyzed during REM sleep in order to keep us from acting
out our dreams since the brain doesn’t seem to make a distinction between waking and dreaming experience. Alfred North
Whitehead proposed that particles are not units but “occasions of experience” and the from that comes the idea that all
matter has both an objective and subjective component. If we are able to expand the notion of entanglement from quantum
physics and propose that maybe the subjective and objective components of reality are entangled, then it may provide a new
way of thinking about dreaming and waking reality as two sides of the same coin. This way of seeing the world may also pro-
vide some insight into the connection between mind and body and provide a basis for ideas such as lucid dream healing as
well as provide us with an expanded view of our experiences that shape our lives. Philosophy has long considered dreaming
a conscious state, but it is not usually given any relevance outside of the psychological realm. I am proposing in this paper
that our conscious experience of the dream state is as real as our conscious experience of the waking state and as relevant to
our lives and our understanding of consciousness.

341 MUUPU– A mindfulness and value-based research program to reduce work

burnout and to promote well-being
Puolakanaho Anne
Psychology, University of Jyvaskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND
Kinnunen Sanna
Psychology, University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, FINLAND

Mindfulness and value-based practices offer a way to become aware of one’s own mind and to make visible the stream of
thoughts, emotions, sensations, attitudes and beliefs. One aspect of being a human is to get overly attached with one’s own
mind-related processes such as thoughts and emotions, which can lead to inflexible stance towards oneself and the world.
This kind of mindset might be the cause of ill-being and suffering.
The Muupu-program is designed to open up the inflexible mindset and to improve skills of being non- judgmentally
present with one’s thoughts, feelings and sensations. In addition the program helps to clarify individual values and value-
based actions. These practices are thought to increase mindfulness skills and psychological flexibility, which in turn might
increase well-being and quality of life.
The 8-week Muupu-intervention is delivered using jointly face-to-face group meetings and web-based program. The
program provides new mindfulness meditation practice each week and there are also practices which aim to apply the
learned skills into the everyday life. In addition, there are voluntary practicing materials such as written information, audio-
taped metaphors and videos.

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109+109 is to examine the effectiveness of intervention based on mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) and
value-based methods (from ACT) to the recovery from work burnout. Although there already exist studies of mindfulness
and ACT connected to stress and well-being, little is known of the individual processes when practicing mindfulness and
value-based skills in the burnout context.
The results of the Muupu-research suggest that although group level changes in well-being can be found, there are also
several paths indicating more individual patterns in the development of mindfulness skills and well- being.
This presentation shows what kinds of changes participants experience in their mindset, psychological flexibility and
(work) well-being due to the program. Also, the different paths of mindfulness skills development will be presented.

342 Lucid Dreams and Cognitive Functioning in Pilot Cadets

Soffer-Dudek Nirit
Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, ISRAEL
Gordon Shirley
Psychology Branch, IDF Medical Corps, Chief Surgeon Headquarters, Israeli Air Force, Ramat-Gan, ISRAEL

In lucid dreams (LDs), one is aware of being in a state of dreaming while dreaming. This is a unique meta- cognitive con-
dition, whereby one is simultaneously both an actor and an observer in one’s dream. Thus, lucid dreamers exhibit a dual
mode of attention, perhaps characterized by an increased ability to monitor and regulate one’s state or behavior. Previous
studies explored associations between LDs and cognitive abilities which involve increased attentional abilities such as si-
multaneously allocating attention to conflicting sources of information. Blagrove, Bell, and Wilkinson (2010) found a link
of LDs with performance on the Stroop task, while Blagrove and Wilkinson (2010) failed to find a relation between LDs
and change blindness. Patrick and Durndell (2004) found that LDs are related to the ability to ignore distraction, but Bla-
grove and Tucker (1994) did not. Such inconsistencies leave open the question of whether there is continuity between
LDs and waking attentional abilities. Importantly, LDs are associated with wake-like mental activity during sleep (Holz-
inger, LaBerge, & Levitan, 2006; Voss, Holzmann, Tuin & Hobson, 2009). Possibly, frequently experiencing such nocturnal
arousal might impair alertness and thus worsen cognitive functioning, despite increased attentional control. To address all
of these issues, in the present study we aimed to explore whether increased LDs might also have a negative impact on rel-
evant cognitive abilities, in addition to a positive one. To this end, we explored both linear and curvilinear effects of LDs on
performance, and controlled for subjective reports of who self-reported LDs, and underwent the CogScreen- Aeromedi-
cal Edition (Cogscreen-AE; Kay, 1995). The CogScreen battery was designed to measure the underlying perceptual, cogni-
tive and information processing abilities associated with flying. We assessed attention (symbol-digit coding - SDC, auditory
discrimination – AD, visual sequence comparison - VSC, geometrical visual scanning – GVS, pathfinder visual scanning
– numbers and letters – PFN, PFL), divided attention (VSC under cognitive load – DAVSC, pathfinder visual (selecting
visual stimuli according to color, direction, rule deduction, and changing instructions – SAC, SAD, SAR, SAIN), and ability
to perform mental rotation of visual stimuli (mental rotation – MR). For each of the 14 variables, a measure of functioning
efficiency was predicted by the linear and the non-linear components of LDs, controlling for alertness. AD, PFN, PFL, and
PFC evinced a positive linear effect, suggesting better attentional skills for those high in LDs. SDC evinced a predominantly
positive, concave downward curve (see Aiken & West, 1991), suggesting optimal functioning among mid-range to high
LDs, and DAVSC, GVS, and DIFVSC evinced an inverted U-shaped function, suggesting optimal functioning at mid-range
LDs. These results point to an association between LDs and several cognitive abilities, suggesting sleep-wake continuity in
attentional functioning. Future studies are encouraged to further investigate the curvilinear nature of some of these effects to
shed more light on the positive versus the negative correlates of LDs.

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5 . 6 P sychoana l ysis and P sychotherapy

343 Lucid dreaming and personality: results on Russian sample

Vorobiova Alicia
School of Psychology, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Pozdniakov Ivan
School of Psychology, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Gordeeva Olga
Faculty of Psychology, Moscow State University, Moscow, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Our study is the first study of associations between frequency of lucid dreams and personality traits and predictors of success-
ful lucid dreaming training on Russian sample. Our study involved 40 subjects aged 18 to 26 years (M ? 20,8; females). We
used Hartmann’s Boundary Questionnaire, Gottshaldt’s Embedded Figures Test, Chromov’s Big Five Questionnaire (Russian
version of NEO PI-R), Karpov’s Self- reflection Questionnaire, Level of Internality Questionnaire, Need for Cognition Scale,
Schredl’s Dreaming Frequency Scale, the Dissociative Experiences Scale, Torrance Tests of Creativity (ss. Incomplete figures
task). The training part of the study involved 13 participants aged 18 to 25 years (M ? 20,9; females) with low experience of
lucid dreaming (less than 2-4 times a year). They were asked to exercise combined technique for inducing lucid dreams for six
weeks and to diarize their dreams. After this period, we estimated their success in training lucid dreaming and divided them
into two groups according to having (n ? 7) / not having (n ? 6) progress. One-way ANOVA showed that often dream recall-
ers are significantly higher with the parameter “originality” of Torrance Test (F ? 11,27; p ? ,002). Lucid dream frequency
is significantly associated with need for cognition (F ? 4,62; p ? ,016) and openness of Big Five questionnaire (F ? 3,80; p ?
,032). Analysis of subscales showed significant association of lucid dream frequency with the primary factor 5.1 (“curiosity –
conservatism”, subscale of “openness”) of Russian version of Big Five questionnaire (F? 3,67; p ? ,036). Bonferroni test post
hoc comparisons showed that frequent lucid dreamers are significantly higher in need for cognition than dreamers with mini-
mal experience of lucid dreaming (p < 0,05). Participants who increased their frequency of lucid dreams during the training
had lower neuroticism (z? -1,96; p ? ,048). To sum up, results of our study are generally consistent with results on samples
from other countries. Lucid dreaming frequency is associated with need for cognition and openness (especially with “curios-
ity- conversation” subscale) of Big Five. Moreover, emotional stability is a predictor of successful lucid dreaming training. The
future direction of our study is dynamics of personality traits during lucid dream training.

344 Structural Analogies between Process Oriented Psychology and Quantum

Theory in the Context of a Dual Aspect Monism
Widdra Tobias
Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, GERMANY

Process oriented psychology is a phenomenological method, aiming at working as directly as possible with the flow of phenom-
enal consciousness, often referred to as stream of consciousness. The physicist and Jungian analysist Arnold Mindell developed
this originally psychotherapeutic procedure with the intention to grasp what Jung called unconscious by something directly
phenomenologically observable. The procedure provides a conceptual framework to detect and analyze certain marginalized or
unrecognized patterns as well as elaborated methods for getting people to switch their attention from verbal descriptions to the
momentary, direct, sensory based experience, i.e. the stream of consciousness within different sensory channels. In this context,
a fundamental differentiation is made between the level of concepts and descriptions within a general, consented upon language
and more dreamlike, sensory based experiences, which are distant from everyday awareness and difficult to express.
As a trained physicist, Mindell points out analogies between aspects of the phenomenology of the stream of conscious-
ness and quantum physical concepts. In general, there are different approaches to conceptualize possible relations between
quantum theory and mental processes. First, a significant role of quantum physics as a theory of matter in direct relation
with consciousness by, for instance, looking for quantum physical processes in the brain (based on reductionist assump-
tions) or by considering the role of consciousness in the collapse of the wave function. Second, the quantum physical for-
malism as tool to model mental processes, but without intention to refer to quantum physics as a theory of matter. Third,
examining structural analogies, e.g. in the context of a dual aspect monism, where such analogies are expected to occur.
The current contribution examines structural analogies between aspects of the stream of consciousness and quantum
physics, as pointed out by Mindell, and discusses them in terms of the second and third category, especially in the context of
a dual aspect monism as proposed by Pauli und Jung.

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 5 . 8 A no m a l ous E x periences

5.8 Anomalous Experiences

345 Sentient companions predicted and modeled into existence: explaining the
tulpa phenomenon
Sotala Kaj
Computer Science, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

Within the last few years, several Internet communities have sprung up around so-called “tulpas”. One website (tulpa.info)
describes a tulpa as “an independent consciousness in the mind [...] an internal personality separate from your own, but
just as human. They are sentient, meaning they have their own thoughts, consciousness, perceptions and feelings, and even
their own memories.” Members of these communities discuss ways of actively creating tulpas, and exchange experiences and
techniques. Tulpas may interact with their hosts via e.g. auditory, visual, or tactile hallucinations, appearing as real people.
Although the existence of such beings may sound implausible, several related phenomena are known to exist. These in-
clude childrenís imaginary friends, dissociative personality disorder, and the “illusion of independent agency” where fiction
writers report experiencing their characters as real.
I hypothesize that tulpas may arise from the combination of three factors. First, conscious thought acts as a “reality sim-
ulator”, and imagining something is essentially the same process as perceiving it, with the sense data being generated from
an internal model rather than from external input (Hesslow 2002, Metzinger 2004). Second, our brains have evolved to be
capable of modeling other people and predicting their behavior, so as to facilitate social interaction. Third, according to the
predictive coding model of the brain (Clark 2013), action and perception/prediction are closely linked: doing something
involves us predicting that we will do it, after which the brain carries out backwards inference to find the actions that are
needed to fulfill the prediction.
This allows for a tulpa-creation process in which the practitioner starts with imagining the kind of person they wish to
create, and how that person would behave in different situations. The mental images produced by this process are picked
up by the people-modeling modules of the brain, which might not be able to distinguish between imagined and perceived
sense data, and they begin creating a model of the tulpa that is being imagined. Practitioners report their tulpas sometimes
doing new and surprising things, which could be explained by the brain doing backwards inference to find possible “deep
causes” of the tulpaís imagined behavior, whose other consequences are then simulated, causing the tulpa to act in ways un-
anticipated by the practitioner. Eventually, once the model and the practitionerís ability to imagine the tulpa become strong
enough, there will be a self-sustaining feedback loop: the model of the tulpa creates new predictions of its behavior, which
are experienced as happening, and these experiences are fed back into the model, giving rise to new predictions and behav-
ior. By this point, the tulpa will be experienced as acting independently and separately from the ìmainî personality.
Clark, A. (2013) Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 36:3.
Hesslow, G. (2002) Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and perception. Trends in Cogni-
tive Sciences, 6(6).

Metzinger, T. (2004) Being No-one: The self-model theory of subjectivity.

346 What it is like to be a non-sentient bat?

Spector Shirtz Aviv
History and Philosophy of Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, ISRAEL

It seems that many attributes of consciousness, e.g. intentionality, subjectivity, qualitativeness and unity, are strongly related
to the ability of the brain to receive and process sensory input from the outside world. How strong is the relation between
the conscious experience and sensory input? Is sensory input a necessary condition to the existence of the conscious experi-
ence? Can conscious experience emerge or arise from brain processes without external intervention?
In an attempt to answer these questions, or, at least, to propose an intuitive answer, few extreme cases will be presented,
which may assist us to sharpen our understanding of the relationship between conscious experience and sensory input.
The extreme cases to be presented, which will focus on sensory deprivation and its relation to the conscious experience
or lack of, are based on two main criteria:

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5 . 9 P arapsycho l o g y

1. How many senses did the person have in the beginning (Moment A)?
‘In the beginning’ means from the gestation
period. A person blind from birth but having some senses active did not have sight even as an embrio; however, his brain did
receive a sensory input from the other intact senses.
2. With how many senses was the person equipped at the moment of interest (Moment B)?
There are two more important criteria, which are not necessarily related to my examples, but may shed more light on
the subject; 3. was the change in the number of senses from Moment A to Moment B sudden or gradual? 4. Which senses
were active at Moment A and which were active at Moment B?
Among the many cases that can be examined, I will now focus on three extreme cases, which emphasize the conditional
relations between sensory input and conscious experience:
A: A person which at Moment A had some active senses and at Moment B has zero active senses. Why would he not
have a conscious experience, when his brain has enough raw materials accumulated during his entire life, and he is still capa-
ble of imagining, remembering and thinking about things?
B: A person which at Moment A had zero active senses and at Moment B has zero active senses, i.e. his brain never re-
ceived any sensory input. If this person has a conscious experience, this experience must be content- less.
C: A person which at Moment A had zero active senses and at Moment B has some active senses. Prima facie it seems
that there is no reason to claim that he has no conscious experience starting from Moment B, even if his senses will be shut
down again, as in Case A.
It seems that unless we are willing to accept content-less conscious experience, we must accept the claim that a con-
scious experience is a phenomenon which must be ‘activated’ by sensory input. However, from the moment of activation,
there is no requirement for receiving an additional input in order for it to continue to exist; hence the initial sensory input is
a necessary condition to the existence of a conscious experience.

5.9 Parapsychology

347 Explorations Into Remote Viewing Microscopic Organisms (“The Phage”) and
the Effects of Biological Scientists’ Exposure to Non Local Perception Within a
Multidisciplinary Approach
Katz Debra
Parapsychology, International School of Clairvoyance, Phelan, CA 92329, USA
Beem Lance
Lead Researcher, Kari Beem Research Foundation, Sacramento, CA, USA

In a double-blind, free-response pilot experiment, 39 remote viewers (“viewers’) were given the task of describing a bac-
teriophage, or “phage,” a virus that attacks bacteria. Ten of the viewers were re-tasked on elements described in their first
session; 35 viewers were then given a second target containing the task, “describe the trigger for replication.” This time, they
were provided with information that the target was of a microscopic nature.
This remote viewing project was unique not only in its subject matter, but in its purpose, which was to evaluate remote
viewing sessions not only for evidence of psychic functioning but to make use of the information in order to advance the
work of scientists outside the field of parapsychology. Viewers submitted a total of 83 sessions, producing a total of 3,263
descriptors to be analyzed. They also provided dozens of detailed sketches, some of which are presented here.
Virologists were recruited over period of two years and reported his interactions with them. Five of 16 virologists that
were approached agreed to participate as raters. Two offered to assist by providing a student to rate the remote viewing ses-
sions. Eight refused, one calling the project “pseudoscience” before examining the data or expressing any interest in under-
standing what it entailed.
In all, four methods of analysis were employed, including what herein will be referred to as a “Big Data Corroborative
Approach.” This method has not been used previously for evaluation of remote viewing data, although similar approaches
are being used in other fields to evaluate large data sets for the purpose of making predictions and assessments.
Our primary phage expert, a molecular biologist, conducted a qualitative analysis of the remote viewing reports. He

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 5 . 9 P arapsycho l o g y

wrote: “At first appearances these data appear to show nothing more than some musings. On further inspection, however, I
am convinced that they describe bacteriophage, and the uses of bacteriophage. This is my professional opinion as a scientist
and a professional and impartial observer.” Off the record, he stated, “This blows my mind. How is this possible? It’s scary.”
All 39 viewers also participated in an extensive biographic survey evaluating their past remote viewing experience,
methodologies, preparation techniques, number of words used in a session, time spent on sessions, etc. This survey data was
compared with those sessions that received the highest and lowest accuracy ratings to help draw conclusions about what
led to the most useful sessions when tasked with topics that are not typically explored with remote viewing. The survey
suggested that experience with remote viewing, spending more than 30 minutes on a session, and using a training approach
known as “controlled remote viewing” seemed to produce the highest- rated sessions, but none of those factors guaranteed
success.
This project’s proposal was the first recipient of the 2011 IRVA Warcollier Award. It took over three years to complete in
addition to two years of preliminary experiments involving thousands of trials in which remote viewers attempted to blindly
identify the presence of the Tomato Mosaic Virus in plants. The entire project required the help of 10 volunteers, and in all,
57 people were involved.

348 Evidence for a New Savant Skill in Nonverbal Autistic Children

Powell Diane
Psychiatry, ISSAC, Medford, OR, USA

Savant skills are exceptional abilities occurring in spite of cognitive deficiencies and often involve superior pattern recogni-
tion and/or prodigious memory. These genius talents can appear full-blown at a young age, or develop after a head injury
(acquired savants). Savants know information through mechanisms not understood. Autistic twins can give six digit prime
numbers in sequence without having memorized or derived them. Nonverbal autistic children have been reported by clini-
cians, parents, and teachers to “read minds.” Their answers were an exact repetition of the other’s thoughts. Hayley is a ten
year old, severely autistic girl who can barely speak. She can’t do simple math, but gives correct answers to complex equa-
tions. She’s not a mathematical savant because she doesn’t know the answer unless the person working with her does. Two
of Hayley’s therapists believe she reads their minds, and three local psychiatrists agree.
I filmed Hayley and her therapists for
over six hours of controlled experiments using randomized stimuli. A visual barrier was introduced between Hayley and her
therapists to minimize potential for cueing. Because autistic children do not handle change well, Hayley regressed to select-
ing her answers from stencil boards instead of typing them directly. Randomized numbers, sentences, fake words, and visual
images were presented to the therapist out of view of the girl, who was asked to “read the therapist’s mind.” The therapist
wrote her own verbal descriptions of the images for comparison with the girl’s answers. To assess for any possible visual
and/or auditory cueing, five high definition point-of-view (POV) cameras and three microphones were strategically placed
in the experimental space to cover the entire room, the therapist and child, and their separate workspaces. All cameras were
synchronized and time-stamped. Data with Therapist A includes: 100% accuracy on ten out of forty image descriptions con-
taining up to nine letters each, 60 to 100% accuracy on five-letter nonsense words, 100% accuracy on two random numbers
of eight and nine digits, 100% accuracy on six sets of numbers between 15 and 19 digits each, and 81 to 100% accuracy on
sentences between 18 and 35 letters. Data with Therapist B showed 100% accuracy with five out of twenty random numbers
of up to six digits, and 100% accuracy with five out of twelve image descriptions containing up to six letters. This information
transfer occurs extremely rapidly and the statistical odds against this level of accuracy occurring by chance are exponential.
The phenomenon’s reliability and unknown mechanism is consistent with being a savant skill. Analysis of all experimental
footage revealed no patterns to explain the results by subtle cueing. Even if the therapists cue unconsciously, this is worthy
of further investigation. However, the evidence as a whole suggests that an alternative, latent and/or default communication
mechanism may be accessed by people with severely impaired language expression and autism.

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5 . 9 P arapsycho l o g y

349 Research on Anomalous Effect in Distant Intention Research

Schmidt Stefan
Transcultural Health Sciences, Europa Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder
Exceptional Experiences, University for Humanistics, Utrecht, NL
Academic Section for the Evaluation of Complementary Medicine, University Medical Center Freiburg, Germany
Center for Meditation, Mindfulness and Neuroscience Research, University Medical Center Freiburg, Germany

Distant Intention Research subsumes a group of experimental paradigms assessing anomalous information transfer. In these
experiments one person tries to interact from a distance with another person without the use of any know information chan-
nel. In these studies the intention of one persons is systematically varied while either a physiological, behavioral or self-
report parameter is measured in the second person. Four paradigms will be displayed and the results of the according meta-
analyses presented. These are the ‘feeling of being stared at’ and the ‘Remote Staring’ experiments in which the detection of
a distant gaze is assessed by either self-report of the staree or by measuring the electrodermal activity (EDA) of the staree
as an indicator of autonomous arousal. Furthermore there is the EDA-DMILS paradigm in which the distant person tries
either activation or calming the other person. Here again EDA is the dependent variable. In the Attention Focusing Facilita-
tion Experiment finally, the distant person tries to help the other person to focus on an object in a meditation-like proce-
dure. The dependent variables are self-reported distractions. For the latter three paradigms overall 62 studies with N=1970
sessions were conducted within 25 years which were all meta-analyzed. The resulting effect sizes are in the range of d=0,108
to 0,128 and show thus a striking similarity. This consisting finding supports an interpretation that all three paradigms reflect
the same effect with the intentional effort being the common feature of these studies. For the ‘feeling of being stared at’ the
situations is different since no meta-analysis exists and the majority of the data in the field are all from one researcher. Paral-
lels and differences of these experimental setups will be outlined and their application in daily life discussed.

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 6 . C u l ture and hu m anities

6. Culture and humanities

6.1 Literature and Hermeneutics

350 Apparitions, Narrative and Consciousness: An Early 19th-Century Theory of

Hallucinations
Kakko Tommi
Language, Translation and Literary Studies, University of Tampere, London, UNITED KINGDOM

Samuel Hibbert’s (1782–1848) Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions (1824) is a famous early attempt to understand
the phenomenon of apparitions from a scientific perspective. The work targeted stories of ghosts and hallucinatory experi-
ences in an effort to provide materialistic explanations for such phenomena. Its criticism extended to alchemical and occult
Renaissance writers whom Hibbert viewed as his predecessors. One of its theoretical achievements was to provide an as-
sociationistic picture of consciousness and the unconscious. The paper will examine Hibbert’s criticism of previous phi-
losophers, his theory of consciousness and the unconscious, and questions his use of second-hand sources as evidence. The
latter problem is of particular interest. Folklore and magical thinking, according to Hibbert, had filled nature with all sorts of
imaginary creatures. While Hibbert argued vehemently for the authenticity of the subject’s personal experiences, however
strange they may be, he also noted the fact that the narratives he examined could influence what kind of apparitions the hal-
lucinating subject encountered. It was the task of the philosopher to correct the problem and allay the fears of those who
thought the creatures were actually able to assume a sensible form. In arguing for the authority of the hallucinatory expe-
rience, Hibbert was following the examples of Robert Burton (1577–1640) and his contemporary colleague John Ferriar
(1761–1815), but he failed to seriously engage with the linguistic issues the stories on which he relied obviously raised. The
implication of his accusations against folklore and magical thinking was that some hallucinations might actually be the direct
symptoms of folk stories, literature and even religious sermons. Instead of analyzing the nature of the stories that made up
his main material, Hibbert focused on the aberrant brain. There were a number of literary references in the Sketches of the
Philosophy of Apparitions, but apart from one or two exceptions, literary criticism and poetics did not feature in Hibbert’s
thinking. This is surprising, because the very issues that seemed most important to his analyses had been debated by early
modern literary theorists at least since John Dryden (1631–1700). A speculative conclusion to the paper asks what, if any-
thing, Hibbert could have learned from literary critics and how their influence might have contributed to later theories of
hallucinations, consciousness and the unconscious.

351 “Strange” Fictional Minds. Mimetic and Literary Models of Constructing

Consciousness in Literature
Ovaska Anna
The Department of Finnish, Finno-Ugrian and Scandi, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

How are fictional minds constructed in literature? To what extent do they resemble real minds – or diverge from the real?
And what can the representation of non-normative minds (of for example fictional minds that “suffer” from psychiatric dis-
orders) teach us about the creation of fictional consciousness? Cognitive narratology has in recent years connected the rep-
resentation of fictional minds to real minds. For example Alan Palmer (2004) has emphasized that the main purpose of nar-
rative fiction is to represent consciousness, and that fictional minds are modeled according to our knowledge of real minds.
However, works of art are also always self-reflective and their meanings are connected to literary conventions. Fictional
minds, when they are abstracted by the readers, resemble real minds but they are also influenced by and created in relation
to other literary phenomena: e.g. to character types, to intertexts and to genres. In addition, the construction is dependent
on the changing socio-historical conceptions of mind and consciousness (this is particularly visible in the context of mod-
ernist fiction, as Virginia Woolf astutely wrote: “In or around December 1910 human nature changed”). Thus, in addition to
their knowledge of real minds, readers use their cultural knowledge and knowledge of fictional minds and worlds while con-
structing and interpreting character’s minds. This interrelation between real-world knowledge and story-world knowledge is

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6 . 2 A rt and A esthetics

particularly visible in the representations of psychopathologies (of “deviant” or “strange” minds) which are often considered
unintelligible and which also often contest (or are based on contesting) folk psychological models of minds and conscious-
ness.
I will explicate and evaluate both the mimetic model (construction of fictional minds by simulating and inferring from
real minds) and the literary model (construction of fictional minds by relying on our knowledge of story- worlds) by using
representations of non-normative minds as case examples. These representations bring up a tension between verisimilitude
of fictional and real minds and point to the “fictional” nature of mind itself (e.g. Daniel Dennett 1991). Not only do we use
our folk psychological abilities to construct and interpret fictional characters as if they were real people, also our cultural and
scientific knowledge of minds, of mental illness (and of socio-historical conceptions of illness), of literature and fiction in
general is crucial to interpretation in these cases. In fact, literary representations of (especially) psychopathologies force us
to contest the intuitive conceptions of minds, and at the same time they participate in negotiating new ways to conceptualize
mind and consciousness.

6.2 Art and Aesthetics

352 Intermedia Performance and Consciousness

Anstey Josephine
Media Study, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, USA

This paper discusses IMPROVISING CONSCIOUSNESS (IMPCON), a media work of speculative evolution created by
the author. Its alternative world view exists as a hybrid work online and at live events. The main components of IMPCON
are a performance lecture that purports to be a scholarly account of human consciousness from 2.5M BCE to 3,000 CE; and
accompanying “cognitive exercises” that play at the borders of improvisation, performance and game. The IMPCON project
is an argument that alternate thinking-spaces and methods add convention-breaking and radicalizing perspectives to scien-
tific and popular discourses on the mind.
Performed by the author, the IMPCON lecture is given by Jennifer Årnstay, Professor of Material and Analogical Eco-
Cognition, visiting from an “unspecified time and place.” Årnstay rewrites standard evolutionary accounts of human con-
sciousness, fore-fronts women, visual and analogical thinking; argues that environmental changes have led and will lead to
radical evolutions in mind configurations; and suggests that language-based consciousness may be a problem. She urges her
audience to experience her phenomenological and sensory cognitive exercises which include: the work-shopping of alter-
egos; improvisation in a multiple personality melodrama; play sessions with an visually conscious alien intelligence; and a
sono-tactile experience designed to give the player a taste of a pre-historic cognition.
IMPCON uses but disrupts, inverts, and problematizes, existing evolution of consciousness theories that equate human
intelligence with men, language, and rationality. From the “Descent of Man,” to Miodownik‘s 2013 “Stuff Matters: Explor-
ing the Marvelous Materials That Shape Our Man-Made World,” Man the Hunter often sits unquestionably at the center.
Human civilization progresses from Stone, to Bronze, Iron, Steel – there is no age of the weaving of the first baby sling.
Although the notion of evolutionary progress is increasingly questioned, like these other assumptions it still percolates, un-
selfconsciously into many fields. Merlin Donald, Walter Ong (and the bible) all see human origins entwined with language:
then in majestic progression, literacy supersedes orality engendering rationality and scientific inquiry.
Aping these male theorists, Årnstay presents a sweeping theory of consciousness, deliberately deploying an authorita-
tive, linear structure. The lecture which combines research, visualization, and dramatic narrative, is informed by cognitive
science, creative non-fiction and science fiction explorations of the mind, among them: Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We
Live By; Jaynes’ The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind; Morgan’s The Descent of Woman;
Casteneda’s Don Juan series; novels and short stories by Philip K. Dick and James Tiptree. IMPCON (and Årnstay’s) online
existence allows the project to maintain ambiguity around questions of fiction/reality and the status of Professor Årnstay as
an expert. However, IMPCON includes many marks that destabalize Årnstay’s authority and by implication the authority
of all such theorists: Årnstay’s historical account proceeds blithely into the future; the “cognitive exercises” become increas-
ingly unlikely.

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 6 . 2 A rt and A esthetics

353 ‘Seecular’ – visual stimuli in cultural contexts and their present relevance in
an art-science project
Bend Hannes
Institute of Neuroscience, University of Oregon, Eugene, USA

For Gilles Deleuze, the “brain is a screen” that emerges in the world of images, in the sense that it is a filter that extracts itself
from chaos.
The upcoming science/art project “Seecular” of the Institute of Neuroscience at the University of Oregon in collabora-
tion with artist Hannes Bend examines visual stimuli in relation to brain states and the history of this complex dynamic, in
order to develop a visualization program.
Recent scientific papers on neurostimulation and self-experiments devices inducing an electric current into the brain, as
visible in online videos on “tDCS,” are evidence of the correlation between brain states, self-regulation and cognitive capaci-
ties.
With an increase in screen-based lifestyles, work situations, and environments, understanding the associations between
certain images and image-flows on screen and stress may provide insight into how to utilize technology to manage stress and
maintain focus. Consumer psychology is examining how eye movements can be monitored via webcams and simultaneously
the screen design programed to keep the attention of viewers focused (Rosa, 2014). These instantaneous technological ad-
justments via algorithms to the screen-users behavior are novel to the users and could lead to a decrease of conscious control
over eye movements and successively cognitive patterns. Novel stress levels and altered self-awareness and self-monitoring
capacities accompany the experiences. Users of screens constantly need to adapt to an increasing input of visual information
in public, professional and private environments. They are confronted with the task of how to control the eye movement and
conscious attention in the high-paced technological environments of today.
The objective of the project is to identify stress reducing visual stimuli which enable conscious gaze control and deci-
sion making about perceptual attention and which visual stimuli are preferred by a ‘normal’ and a ‘meditative’ state.
The
relation and influence of eye movements and visual stimuli on brain states is part of current research in the field of cogni-
tive psychology and neuroaesthetics. The usage of visualizations, especially abstractions with geometric patterns, is evident
throughout human history and cultures. In different contexts their function ranges from simplifying, symbolizing, meaning-
making to aesthetic pleasure and many more.
The most comprehensive analysis of neuroimaging studies to date (Brown, Gao, Tisdelle, Eickhoff, Liotti, 2011) ar-
gued that aesthetics evolved through human history to now enable the experience of artworks for the satisfaction of social
needs.
The project employs geometric patterns from various cultures and contexts used in relation to observation, sustained
attention and focus, mindfulness practices, sense making and aesthetic pleasure, such as Buddhist mandalas, images from
optogenetics, physics and other scientific fields, fractals and paintings.
The activity of viewing paintings on neural activity has been studied using FMRI and suggests that viewing paintings
engages not only systems involved in visual representation and object recognition, but also structures underlying emotions
and internalized cognitions (Vartanian, Skov. 2014).
We argue that art and aesthetics, besides their social function, have evolved to process psychological, emotional and
cognitive processes of the conscious and unconscious experience of life, and to potentially induce a stress-reducing and
“meditative” condition.

354 Waking Space: The Emerging Art Object, Quantum Theory, and Algorithmic
Art
Breaux Steven J.
Visual Arts, University of Louisiana-Lafayette, Lafayette, USA

This paper concerns my investigations into the analogous relationship between the art-making process and the scientific
method as process with a focus on quantum mechanics and theory. In particular, aspects of the infamous double slit experi-
ment are compared to the art-object-making process revealing connections between the emergence and the nature of the
electron, matter, and the role that consciousness plays in that event (according to several eminent quantum physicists), and
the emergence of the object of art. My writings suggest that aspects of the traditional processes of art making (painting, for
example) reveal a method useful to explore and comprehend reality through experiential, subjective means that expands the
nature of the art object and thus distinguishes the traditional art object from algorithmic art.

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6 . 2 A rt and A esthetics

Though quantum physicists strive toward the explication of the physical world some of their experiments and interpre-
tations, including their mathematical functions are edging toward a definition of the nonphysical, un- manifested aspects of
existence - intruding into the “subjective” - using however, the tools and mindset of the “objective.”
A lack of insight into the traditional artistic process has contributed to relegating artistic discovery and exploration to
the margins of relevancy. For convenience consider the traditional artistic process as a conventional painting on stretched
canvas as compared to a digital, computer image. In the face of increased availability of computer applications and technol-
ogy to artists, who can use these applications off the shelf with little comprehension of the underlying code or operation,
this lack of insight has led to a tacit concession as to their equivalence and relevance. An intrinsic difference between them
exists, I suggest, that can be illuminated with a comparative understanding of certain quantum mechanical processes and
a refocusing of the artistic process in light of the revelations of quantum theory. I propose that the qualitative state of con-
sciousness of the observer in the double slit experiment affects aspects of the results in the same way that the state of con-
sciousness of the artist affects the final object of art.
This paper originates from my art practice as a visual artist, personally illuminating the object making process and ex-
panding its potentialities in light of quantum mechanics. I do not define the artistic process within the scientific milieu. By
focusing on the processes of object making and a quantum physics experiment my work advocates that the process of object
making illuminates the nature of reality in a way that expands the ramifications of the artistic medium and quantum physics.
My approach situates the qualitative expressive aspects, the arena of the artist (the Subjective) as parallel to the quantitative,
mathematical expressions and arena of the physicist (the Objective) and vice versa, as each exemplify and elucidate different
aspects of a whole. The act of creating an art object is an event similar to a quantum physics experiment in which the act of
measurement and the collapsing wave function is determined by a qualitative focusing of consciousness.

355 From Hitchcock to Penrose: How cinema and storytelling connects us at the
deepest level of reality
Day Nick
Media Education, Conscious Pictures, Sonoma, USA

BRIAN: “You’re all individuals!”? MAN IN CROWD: ”I’m not!”

~ Monty Python’s Life of Brian
We’re all individuals — or so it seems. Certainly no two lives are identical; our personal story unfolds through a unique
cascade of actions, choices, changing circumstances, impulses and desires. But there are times when we gather for perfor-
mance, such as theatre and movies, and our sense of individuality somehow dissolves into the background. As an audience
member we effectively become part of one single process, not only engaged in the story unfolding on the big screen, but
also bound together with other individuals sharing the experience. The active, analytical part of our minds goes quiet and
we enter an altered state where boundaries are dissolved. In this way, a film becomes something akin to a collective waking
dream.
What might be going on behind the scenes of our own consciousness as we are engaged in the film’s spectacle and story?
Is there a scientific way to gauge our shared experience? And, interestingly, can we measure whether certain film directors
“entangle” us more effectively than others? Does a powerful auteur such as Alfred Hitchcock command our attention more
effectively than, say, Sergio Leone? If so, how? And what is the role of the “hero’s journey” and of archetypes that enable us
to find meaning in the narrative?
Joseph Campbell and Carl Jung are well known for exploring this rich realm of the human psyche, and Jung’s friend and
collaborator, quantum physics pioneer Wolfgang Pauli, proposed that archetypes might be regarded as a bridge to a deeper
objective reality from which everything arises. Therefore an archetype may also be seen in terms of Platonic information,
along with mathematics, aesthetics and morality, an approach that in turn connects the creative arts to the ideas of quantum
consciousness theorists such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff.
As Richard Brody, film critic and former student of Thomas Nagel points out:
“Art is a primary mode of coming to grips
with the mental and moral essence of the universe.”
This talk will explore these ideas as well as the broader role of storytelling throughout human history, illustrated with
movie extracts.

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356 Combination of Western and Eastern perspectives on creativity in a four-

criterion construct
Kharkhurin Anatoliy
International Studies, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Current creativity research lacks common framework of creativity and the tests employed in this research provide mixed
assessments with no strong correlation among each other. Considerable fragmentation in the field may stem from a com-
mon epistemological orientation emphasizing novelty and the pragmatic aspects of problem solving, which appear to re-
flect a Western concept of creativity. In contrast, Eastern cultures emphasize inner growth, personal fulfilment, and aesthetic
aspects of creative problem solving. The present work makes an attempt to account for different cultural perspectives and
provides a theoretical framework combining both Western and Eastern orientations. It presents an extended definition of
creativity that embraces potential cross-cultural variations in this construct. Creativity is defined as a four-criterion con-
struct, which includes attributes of novelty, utility, aesthetics, and authenticity. Novelty attribute stipulates that a creative
work brings something new into being, which presents a new conceptual framework and/or modifies or violates an existing
one. Utility attribute stipulates that a creative work is what a producer or a recipient considers creative, what represents an
important landmark in spiritual, cultural, social, and/or political environment, and what addresses moral issues. The aes-
thetics attribute stipulates that a creative work presents the fundamental truth of nature, which is reflected in a perfect order,
efficiently presents the essence of the phenomenal reality, and is satisfactorily complex, expressing both tension and intrinsic
contradiction. Authenticity attribute stipulates that a creative work expresses an individual’s inner self and relates one’s own
values and believes to the world. These attributes establish a comparison matrix, which can be used to evaluate and compare
the levels of creativity of works from different areas of human endeavor. Specific exemplars of creative production in arts,
sciences, and business as well as in everyday life are compared along the dimensions of the matrix. Finally, the methods of
assessment of the proposed creativity attributes are discussed.

6.3 Music

357 Synchronized music perception by production

Bader Rolf
University of Hamburg, Institute of Systematic Musicology, Hamburg, GERMANY

Cochlea mechanisms and neural nets for music perception may work with similar self-organizing and synchronizing mech-
anisms as do the physical production process of sound in musical instruments. Using time- dependent Finite-Element
(FEM) and Finite-Difference models (FDM) of violins, flutes, guitars or the singing voice it appears that these systems are
self-organizing, where impulse-like wave fronts interact among the instrument subsystems, which can be simplified using
an Impulse Pattern Formulation (IPF) model. Synchronization is needed because only then musical instruments produce
nearly perfect harmonic overtone spectra. In the cochlea using a FDM model it is shown that these impulse patterns syn-
chronize to neural spike bursts. A neural network is proposed which is the same as the physical IPF to detect the physical
properties producing the sound. This IPF is also able to produce musical sounds without external stimulation like in a crea-
tive musical composition process. Therefore the conscious perception or production of sound in the brain may use the same
mechanics as does the physics of musical instruments.

358 Perceptual consciousness and time in artistic experience

Laiho Timo
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, FINLAND

In the field of artistic expression, particularly in relation to musical experience but also in a modified form in relation to the
visual arts, poetry, cinema etc., we are straightforwardly connected with perceptual processes and their relationships to the
temporal and contextual factors. My aim in this paper is to outline certain basic structural features, which are essential par-

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6 . 3 Music

ticularly for perceptual musical organization. However, from the present viewpoint, these structural features have relevance
also to processes that form our perception-based consciousness in general.
The key point in this discussion is to demonstrate in what way, or by what kind of mechanisms, our perceptions differen-
tiate the incoming flow of sensible information. This demonstration highlights the structural realist viewpoint, particularly
the viewpoint taken up by Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), according to which the outcome of perceptual differentiation is
not based on individual, separately existing units but essentially on relational structures. This standpoint emphasizes the im-
portance of time- and context-dependent structural analysis, which does not straightforwardly deal with objective entities
but investigates structural relationships based on differentiation.
Thus, when we are speaking about the overall nature of our perceptual consciousness, we also come into contact with
artistic experiences, which are necessarily situated in concrete perceptual circumstances. Regarding this, we must find a
structural basis of analysis, which does not principally rely on ‘non-temporal’ conceptualization. In spite of the fact that this
kind of conceptualization is usually seen as a basis of the objectivity of all scientific analysis, we need to seek an objective
ground for analysing perceptual experience, which is often understood as subjective in nature. While this enterprise strives
to develop a fresh perspective for art-analysis, particularly in the musical context by combining the practices of composing,
analysing, performing and listening, it also aims at the unification and dialogue of the analytic thinking in the fields of the
science, art and philosophy. Although the structural basis of my research as a development of a new analytic- generative
methodology (AGM) is grounded on over twenty-years work based on my own ideas as a composer and music theorist, it
also as an interdisciplinary study (including readings of the recent developments in the fields of poststructuralist philosophy,
linguistics, cognitive theory, semiotics and modern physics) is highly influenced by quantum physicist David Bohm’s ‘im-
plicate order’ theory. In the end, when we try to understand the structure of perceptual consciousness and the principles of
perceptual differentiation, we confront a difficult but intriguing question concerning the role of relational, implicate infinity
and how this infinity will be continuously limited, explicated or differentiated by our perceptual capacity.

359 Achieving body self-awareness in playing a musical instrument through the

phenomenological method.
Minafra Annamaria
Lifelong and Comparative Education, UCL Institute of Education, Firenze, ITALY

This study aimed to explore how the First-person method with mediator could help musicians to develop self- body aware-
ness. When playing, musicians use their body and gestures in ‘pre-reflective self- awareness’(Zahavi, 1998), automatizing
their movements without controlling them through an explicit process of thought (Holgersen, 2010). They perform the ac-
tion of playing as a ‘goal-direct act’ (Gallese, 2006), but often their focus is mainly on listening to the sound they are making
and what is to be produced, rather than how their body affects this production. In this way they are not self-aware of their
body. This could be an underlying factor in the tensions and pain experienced during playing (Wynn Parry, 2004). The ap-
plied method was the phenomenological First-person method with mediator (Vermersch, 2002) which brought musicians
to consider their body as ‘an intentional object’ and introspectively exploring their lived experience. Using semi- structured
interviews, the mediator (the interviewer) directed the First-person (the musician) in her introspective processes, in relation
to the musicians performing two playing tasks. Twenty two musicians participated in the research. Before the intervention
musicians were requested to choose a short calm piece of music which they would performed twice during the interview.
After the first performance, musicians were asked to describe their feelings, breathing, physical tensions, mental images, and
whatever else they wanted to convey. In the second task, they were requested to perform the piece using mental rehearsal,
then play it again, once more describing how they felt and also whether they observed any differences in their body percep-
tion and the quality of the sound they were producing between the first and second performance. The whole procedure was
video recorded. From the recordings verbal and non-verbal data were analysed. The verbal data showed that after the second
performance most of the musicians were more aware of the part that their body played in their performance, the move-
ments they needed for playing, and their breathing. Some of them also reported feeling less tense. Moreover most claimed
that they were more involved in the music when playing the second time and indicated that they had a better quality of
sound. The non-verbal data showed that during mental rehearsal most of the musicians were very focused. They performed
the mental rehearsal with closed eyes, breathing deeply, and slightly swinging the body. It seemed that ‘the act of attention’
(Merleau-Ponty, 1662) focusing on their body facilitated the musicians in developing a higher level of body self-awareness.
Further research could investigate the efficacy of this practice over a longer period of time. New teaching strategies could be
developed in order to improve performance and assist in the removal of tension.

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 6 . 3 Music

360 Determination of State of Consciousness with Indian Classical Music Ragas

and Color
Roy Sukhdev
Physics and Computer Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Pyari Pritam
Music, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Roy Saran Pyari
Sociology and Political Science, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Saran Sant
Electrical Engineering, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Indian Classical Music is inspired from its spiritual traditions that describe Shabda (internal sound currents) and Anhad
Nada (unstruck music) as the very nature of the spirit and consciousness. The Sanskrit word Raga uses a series of five or
more musical notes upon which a melody is constructed. It is defined as ‘the act of colouring or dyeing’ (the mind and
mood/emotions in this context) and therefore metaphorically means ‘any feeling or passion’. Renowned Indian musicians
and yoga practitioners have identified different Ragas that have an impact on different Chakras or energy centres as each
Chakra is associated with a seed syllable, color and number of petals or currents emanating from them. The healing effect of
Ragas has also been well established.
The correlation of music with colour is well accepted and persistent. It has been observed that every musical note has
a particular frequency which corresponds to a specific colour. In indian classical music, every raga has distinct combina-
tions of swaras (musical notes) having distinct frequencies. Every raga has some vaadi (most important), samvadi (second-
important), anuvaadi (third-most important), alpavaadi (fourth-most important) and varjit swara (prohibited) notes, and
each note represents a particular colour. When a raga is sung or played on a specific instrument (string, wind or percussion)
corresponding to a chakra it generates its own unique colour.
In this paper, we extend our previous study reported in TSC-2014 by studying the combined effect of Raga and color
to design a musical test to ascertain the consciousness level of an individual. Four 5 minute instrumental flute compositions
of Alap form of Ragas, namely, Ahir Bhairav, Jaijaiwanti, Bhupali and Darbari that affect the Anahata (heart), Vishuddha
(throat), Agnya (third eye) and Sahasrara chakras respectively, were carefully chosen. Two groups of subjects of different
ages were made to listen to the Raga compositions. The order of the Ragas was not in the progressive order of the chakras.
The responses were recorded through a questionnaire by noting their order of preference and the qualitative effect in terms
of feelings, imagination, color etc. The subjective experience pertaining to the perception of feelings and colors in most of
the individuals corresponded to that attributed to the different Chakras.
The study highlights the impact of Ragas and color on the consciousness of an individual and the usefulness of de-
signing musical psychometric consciousness tests to ascertain consciousness states. Such a test can be invaluable for il-
literate individuals and better suited to obtain direct honest responses than through purely written psychometric ques-
tionnaires. It would not only help in measurement but also to tune consciousness to higher levels. The results of a corre-
lational study with frequencies generated during the musical test using a SQUID based Magnetoencephelogram (MEG)
will also be presented.

361 Serious Music--A means for communicating with, observing and evolving
the nonverbal mind
ZehraNoor
Musicology, Sanjan Nagar Institute of Philosophy and Arts , Lahore, PAKISTAN
Tauqir Iram
Philosophy, Sanjar Nagar Institute of Philosophy of Arts, PAKISTAN

This paper will explain how and why ‘serious music’ enables us to go beyond the limitations of the existing scientific method
in ‘observing, understanding, communicating with, and evolving’ our ‘nonverbal’ mental processes and capabilities. The
need to focus on this area arises because our nonverbal mental processes compared to the verbal ones constitute not only a
significant portion of our mind but also its core. And thereby are largely responsible for determining the quality of entire our

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6 . 6 S ocio l o g y

internal and external social life. So we must not sidestep the issue of understanding and upgrading them until they become
‘scientifically tangible’.
In our view serious arts and specifically music have the capacity to establish contact with the deepest layers of our non-
verbal mind which determine the formation of our motivations, feelings, responses, behaviour, temperament, habits and
even ideas. Serious music can activate areas of our nonverbal mind that are capable of generating a variety of new and quali-
tatively enabled perceptual, emotive, sensitivity as well as intelligence capabilities. Which can be harnessed to observe, cri-
tique, change and develop our nonverbal world of ideas and feelings, and promote the formation of sensitivities, motivations
and behaviors that are constructive for our individual as well as collective happiness and pleasure. Finally, it also has the
capability of triggering the development of our inquiry and intellectual functions, which are crucial for upgrading our emo-
tional and sensitivity processes.
To explain our entire proposition our dissertation will be divided into three segments
1. Our understanding of the non-
verbal mind, which we conceive to constitute the entire variety of mental processes we posses and are familiar with, i.e., per-
ceptual, observational, cognitive, emotional, sensitivity, feeling, intelligence as well as the ‘Will’ function. We propose three
layers of their functioning, i.e., unconscious, subconscious, and conscious or aware, and discuss the nature of their function-
ing as distinct from the verbal mind. We further classify the nonverbal into ‘programmes’ and ‘capabilities’, and also make a
distinction between our specifically human nonverbal areas and ones we share with animals.
2. How the musical process op-
erates within the producer’s as well as the receiver/listener’s mind in terms of stages and mechanisms involved at the level of
brain and neuronal processes. And then beyond that at the level of mental processes which are a separate phenomenon from
the biological brain processes, and which is where feelings and messages are converted into combinations of pitches, tim-
bers and resonances that constitute music, and vice versa. We discuss the existing status of science in understanding these
mechanisms, including the progress as well as the limitations.
3. Understanding of serious music as a product and expression
of developed sensitivity and intellectual processes, and how it makes it way within the hidden layers of our emotional pro-
cesses by means of signaling and communicating with the deeper sensitivity processes. Which together activate our unused
perceptual, observational, and also evaluative, like/dislike capabilities that ordinarily remain dormant. Resulting finally in
the triggering of our nonverbal inquiry and thought processes to discover new feelings, sensitivities and motivations.

6.6 Sociology

362 All knowledge is personal:
exploring the ‘via’ of the tacit dimension for
addressing domestic abuse and intimate violence
Dijkstra Sietske
Research, Dijkstra Agency, Utrecht, NETHERLANDS

The presentation described here is the second of two linked presentations exploring the application of Polanyian postcriti-
cal epistemology to the problem of consciousness. The first (by a different author and described in the previous abstract)
presents an outline of Michael Polanyi’s ideas of indwelling and tacit knowing as they relate to the structure of conscious-
ness. The second presentation (described below) demonstrates how those ideas are being applied to real-world problems of
domestic abuse and intimate violence.
The discovery by scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi of the tacit dimension as the ground of personal knowing made
an essential contribution to the understanding of how we acquire and confirm skills through learning from complex cases.
Those insights contribute to how social professionals can intuit the tacit elements of challenged interpersonal relationships,
in ways that facilitate addressing the issues arising from domestic abuse.
Polanyi defines the dynamic of tacit knowing as ‘from-via-to’, meaning the process of knowing from the personal ground
(mindbody) to the focus of attention via a subsidiary tacit process that cannot be explicated but instead must be practiced.
To illustrate the ‘how’ of knowing more than we can tell, Polanyi uses everyday examples such as riding a bicycle or how a
hammer is indwelled when used.
But how can such mechanical examples be applied to the tools and techniques appropriate to intervening in abusive
domestic relations--especially when such intervention may be exceedingly delicate, and even dangerous? In applying this to
the real-world issue of domestic violence, the ‘via’ factor is especially salient. Such intangible, inarticulable tools are shaped
and deployed within the interpersonal field uniting professionals and clients, who are often beset by emotional pain, uncon-

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 6 . 8 I nfor m ation T echno l o g y

trolled grief, chronic trauma, and physical injury--with the intention of transforming ‘stuck cases’ into sustainable recovery
and restoration.
What kinds of perspectives and techniques are specific to this highly charged context, and how can the personal knowl-
edge thus acquired be used in a professional and interdisciplinary manner? How can professionals learn from each other and
their clients to build recursively and sustainably on the power of tacit knowing?
This presentation uses examples that suggest how the focus on the ‘via’ of the ‘from-via-to’ dynamic can facilitate the un-
derstanding of crisis intervention, restraining orders, and high-conflict divorce as themes in which time and timing work on
different levels. They suggest that we can go beyond Polanyi’s idea of the ‘via’ factor by reconsidering it from the perspective
of the tacit knowledge developed in this practice-based application.
By learning from philosophy the dynamics of tacit knowing, the learning processes and reflections on their caseloads can
help professionals develop and use tacit tools to modify the interpersonal fields of which they become a part in ways that help
to mitigate interpersonal crises and intimate violence. Both professionals and their clients can learn to address underlying
causes that may have been overlooked and discover a potentially fruitful source of transfer that can sharpen theoretical insights.

363 Maintaining Personhood by Recognition in Long-Term Care for Older People

Pirhonen Jari
School of Health Sciences, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND

Laitinen Arto
School of Social sciences nd Humanities, University of Tampere, Tampere, FINLAND

Background: Theories of mutual recognition have been intensively discussed in the social philosophy of the last decades. As
one of the main theorists in the field, Axel Honneth, puts it, the entire social world might actually be based on interpersonal
recognition (such as mutual respect, esteem and care). Our aim was to study whether residents in long-term care become
recognized as persons in the deepest philosophical meaning and whether full recognition might manifest itself as feeling
dignified despite being dependent on others.
Methods: In this theoretical study, we apply essential concepts and insights of modern theories of recognition to prac-
tices of long-term care based on observations conducted in sheltered housing.
Results: A more fine-grained classification of relevant types of recognition can be proposed based on these observa-
tions. Old people living in long-term care are at risk of losing their full personhood for many reasons due to their descending
functional abilities and psychosocial losses consequent upon ageing.
Conclusions: In order to support residents’ dignity, long-term care should be arranged in a way that preserves residents’
full personhood regardless of their cognitive abilities. This starts with recognizing residents’ normative characteristics, such
as being a sentient being, a human being, and so on. In addition to normative characteristics good care recognizes residents’
personal characteristics and their significant others. Based on our study securing due recognition seems to be an effective way
to ensure that residents can maintain their feeling of being loved, respected and appreciated when receiving long-term care.

6.8 Information Technology

364 Virtual time travel: How to go back in time, kill your grandparents, and get
back alive
Friedman Doron
Communications , IDC, Herzliya, ISRAEL

In this presentation we formalize time travel and describe a computer program that allows us to interactively explore the
consequences of “changing the past”. Our system uses automated reasoning to compute the specific consequences of modi-
fying history, and thus requires a careful formalization of philosophical concepts such as time, causality, and personal iden-
tity. We provide one example of a well-known paradox involving time travel – the grandfather paradox – and show how
our program was used to carefully explore the consequences of time travel while maintaining consistency. Furthermore, we

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6 . 9 E thics and Le g a l S tudies

show how the underlying reasoning mechanism was used to proactively resolve the paradox by suggesting transformations
of history, resulting in some narratives that may be considered valid solutions to the famous paradox.
Using immersive virtual reality (IVR) our method was used to give people the illusion of having traveled backwards
through time to relive a sequence of events in which they can intervene and change history. The participant had played an
important part in events with a tragic outcome—deaths of strangers—by having to choose between saving 5 people or 1.
We consider whether the ability to go back through time, and intervene, to possibly avoid all deaths, has an impact on how
the participant views such moral dilemmas, and also whether this experience leads to a re-evaluation of past unfortunate
events in their own lives. We carried out an exploratory study where in the “Time Travel” condition 16 participants relived
these events three times, seeing incarnations of their past selves carrying out the actions that they had previously carried
out. In a “Repetition” condition another 16 participants replayed the same situation three times, without any notion of time
travel. Our results suggest that those in the Time Travel condition did achieve an illusion of “time travel” provided that they
also experienced an illusion of presence in the virtual environment, body ownership, and agency over the virtual body that
substituted their own. Time travel produced an increase in guilt feelings about the events that had occurred, and an increase
in support of utilitarian behavior as the solution to the moral dilemma. Time travel also produced an increase in implicit
morality as judged by an implicit association test. The time travel illusion was associated with a reduction of regret associ-
ated with bad decisions in their own lives.
In addition to experiencing time travel in virtual reality, we explicate the conditions required for digital time travel: i)
the ability to record events, ii) the ability to replay events, and iii) the ability to model and track causality. The first two
requirements are relatively easy to satisfy; we suggest that using methods such as ours the third requirement may also be
satisfied, indicating that digital time travel can be applied to many useful domains, including mixed and augmented reality.

6.9 Ethics and Legal Studies

365 The role of consciousness and the possibility of consciousness in criminal law
Brito Ana
CEDIS, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa, PORTUGAL

The presentation will focus on the importance of an interdisciplinary criminal law theory based on neuroscience of action
and other cognitive sciences like cognitive psychology. In particular, it adresses lhe following issues:
1. The role of consciousness in voluntary actions according to Benjamin Libet theory and his opponent Daniel Wagner:
1.1 Benjamin Libet’s experiences with voluntary actions and his consequences to criminal law 1.2 The experience of
consciousness according Daniel Wegner.
2. Implications of Libet’s “mind-time theory” of consciousness on the concept of action in criminal law. In special:
2.1. The idea of control, that is essential for criminal liability, depending on the consciousness of decision and the possi-
bility of veto, instead of being a process of deliberation in the following forms of criminal action: (i) intentional actions; (ii)
knowledge actions and (iii) recklessness actions.
2.2 The possibility of control depending on the possibility of consciousness decision in the ultimate form of criminal
actions, the negligent actions.
2.2.1 The difference between automatic actions and voluntary actions based on the distinction between vision-for-ac-
tion (detection) and vision-for-perception, presented among others by Christopher Koch.
2.2.2. The possibility of consciousness of a certain decision (relevant to criminal law) depending on the sensorial or cog-
nitive consciousness of certain “signals of danger” and on the possibility of consciousness of an unlawful action:
i)The concept of consciousness
ii)The concept of “signals of danger”
iii)Others elements necessary to the possibility of
consciousness: (a)the consciousness or the
possibility of consciousness of the decision to act; (b)the possibility of consciousness of the abstract danger; (c) the
possibility of consciousness of the concrete danger;
(d)the possibility of consciousness of the agent own capacity to avoid
the concretisation of danger.
3. Implications of the vision of voluntary actions of Benjamin Libet and his followers on the philosophical question of
free will and determinism. In special, the theory of the nature of consciousness according John Searle.

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 6 . 1 0 E ducation

366 “Taking Emotions Seriously: How Do Emotions Affect Our Ethical

Decisions?”
Mun Cecilea
SHPRS, Arizona State University, Richmond, FINLAND

Emotions affect how we understand others and ourselves as individuals, as members of a social group, as members of a com-
munity, and as a member of a society. We often judge, act, and create policies based on our understanding of what emotions
are. Emotions serve as evidence for our moral and epistemic status as rational agents. We appeal to the appropriateness of
emotional responses as an indication of a wrongdoer’s moral and rational sensibilities. The failure to appropriately respond
to emotional situations have led to the stigmatization and marginalization of various members of our society as irrational
or abnormal persons. Emotional responses influence the formation and adoption of various corporate, social, and public
policies. Our emotions and our attributions of emotions affect our moral and legal judgments. In this paper I briefly discuss
various ways in which the experience of emotions have been treated in relation to our ethical decisions, and highlight a
significant aspect of our moral decision making that has gone ignored. More specifically, philosophical and psychological
research on mind are currently concerned with questions about unconscious states, especially questions regarding the cri-
teria for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious states? The concern with unconscious mental states have largely
gone ignored within the area of ethics and applied ethics. These concerns, however, are significant to our understanding of
intentional actions and moral responsibility. One set of considerations that has been ignored within this discourse regarding
the relation between ethics and emotions is the question of how unconscious experiences, such as implicit biases directly
impact our judgement’s one’s rationality, one’s epistemic status as a good epistemic or moral agent, how we determine the
blameworthiness of various individuals in our society, and how emotions play a significant mediating role in these judg-
ments. More specifically, I clarify the normative nature of shame and anger, how these emotions affect conditions of health
and flourishing, and how attributions of shame and anger are mediated by implicit and explicit biases. These attributions
affect the formulation and implementation of moral imperatives, laws, and other public policies, and these imperatives, laws,
and policies in return differentially affect various groups within a society. Thus, it is important that these considerations are
made salient not only for philosophers of mind and ethicists, but also for cognitive-behavioral psychologists, policy makers,
and individual members of a society.

6.10 Education

367 Conscious Leadership: A pre-requisite for the Learning Organizations

Chauhan Vaibhav
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Sharma Sadhna
Pedagogical Sciences, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Satsangee Nandita
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Educational leadership has a critical role in the transformation of society and for any such transformation; effective lead-
ers in the organizations are the key. Senge (1990) pioneered the theory of learning organization and defined it as the place
where new patterns and comprehensive thinking fosters, a place where collective tendencies and wills become free and peo-
ple continuously understand ‘how to learn together’. After a review of literature in the field, it is found that many researchers
have expressed a note of concern on present leadership scenario, indicating that the leaders are more likely to be technolo-
gists rather than philosophers if they continue to focus on gaining and using power, influencing people, and maintaining
an appearance of control. Conscious leadership is a value based philosophy in which a leader is holistic & intuitive, who is
aware of the fact that leadership is about being not just doing; and who can experience a significant sense of oneness & inter-
connectedness with the world around them, such that they are motivated to act responsibly. The present paper emphasises
that there is a need to restructure the current leadership skills with the touch of deeper spiritual philosophy. The core of this

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philosophy is: unless an individual learns to manage himself he cannot manage others. To do so the leaders have to develop
their inner potential, raise their levels of conscious awareness and express them fully. The paper discusses in detail about the
philosophy of conscious leadership and its role in developing the learning organizations. The paper also portray the con-
scious aspect of learning organizations and its various disciplines viz. personal mastery, mental models, shared vision, team
learning and systems thinking.

368 Phenomenology of learning History: 6 case studies with children in primary

school
Lesar Mateja
Master Program Cognitive Science, Faculty of pedagogy, Ribnica, SLOVENIA
Kordeš Urban
Faculty of pedagogy, Ljubljana, Ljubljana, SLOVENIA

Theme of presented research is phenomenology of learning History. The aim of presented research is to consider child’s
experience of learning and whether these categories of experience consist of multiple modalities. The theories of cognitive
styles, learning styles and learning strategies are mainly methodologically based on third-person research (Cassidy, 2004). In
my research I focused on first-person methodology of explicitation interview (Petitmengin, 2006) and tried to compare new
modalities with established ones. Research questions were following: How child experiences process of learning History?
Does experience of learning History have different modalities? Which kinds of modalities occur and are they compatible
with previous theories? Could understanding of learning experience be useful in pedagogical processes? To provide these
answers, qualitative phenomenological research has been done with multiple case studies. The method of gathering infor-
mation has been explicitation interview (Petitmengin, 2006). Series of interviews have been done with thirteen year old
participants in their elementary school. Analysis of the qualitative data has been done with the comparative analysis of six
cases also grounded theory has been established (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
The results suggest the occurrence of different modalities, which could be found in the reports of child’s experiences
of learning. Although the modalities have multiple varieties of visual and auditory representations, they could not define
participant’s style. However the comparative analysis of cases has shown that between cases there are specific differences of
the experience of learning also there are some similarities. The experience of emergence of representations as key words is
common when remembering something. In addition, “focused” learning has been noticed, which means participants were
having the same strategy for learning – their learning has been focused on specific content with the aim of effective perfor-
mance on test. Also the role of feelings, sensations, opinions and standpoints is included, since mentioned strongly influence
learning. The process of learning could roughly be described as two phase process with genesis and emergence of mental
representations between phase of learning and phase of remembering and reporting.

References: Petitmengin, C. (2006). Describing one’s Subjective Experience in the Second Person. An Inter-
view Method for the Science of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 229-269.
• Gla-
ser, B. G. in Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. New
York: Aldine de Gruyter. Cassidy, S. (2004). Learning Styles: An overview of theories, models, and measures.
Educational Psychology: An International Journal of Experimental Educational Psychology, 24:4, 419-444.

369 Reflection and becoming aware as a teacher in academics’ teacher

development
Nevgi Anne
Centre for Research and Development in Higher Educ, University of Helsinki, University of Helsinki, FINLAND

The aim of the paper is to explore the relationship between teacher reflection and consciousness, how academics’ reflection
of their teaching and oneself as a teacher is related to becoming aware of own teachership and own identity as a teacher.
Reflection is in pedagogical literature defined as a key professional skill/competence for teacher development. In order to
reflect own actions and emotions, one needs to step outside own mind and observe oneself as seen by others as interpreted
by others. Research on university teachers’ pedagogical development has emphasised reflection as a crucial competence for
an academic to develop his/her teaching and to self-direct own professional learning as a teacher (Kreber, 2010; McAlpine

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& Weston, 2000). Dewey (1933, 118) defines reflection as ‘active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or sup-
posed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends.’ Mezirow
(1991) proposes three kinds of reflection: content reflection, process reflection, premise reflection.
In this paper, academics’ teacher reflection and how it relates to their becoming aware of being a teacher is examined by
analysing 43 reflective practicum reports of academics who participated in Teacher Development Programme of 60 ECTS.
Their final course was to practice teaching outside university, in adult education institute or in upper secondary school. The
content analysis is applied.
The results indicate that all academics applied pedagogical concepts in describing their practicum experience. However,
they varied in reflection of their teaching practicum and in reflection of oneself as a teacher. Some of them could only de-
scribe what they had done during their practicum, but they provided no example which could be interpreted as reflection.
Most of them had become aware of being a teacher and only few of them had become critically reflective teachers.

370 Factors Impacting Intuitive Consciousness: A Study of the Intuitive

Consciousness of Library-Going Children
Satsangee Nandita
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA
Paul Sarla
Foundations of Education, Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Agra, INDIA

Intuitive consciousness is defined as the state in which knowledge is acquired witout any sensory inputs or rational thought
processes. Researches have indicated that knowledge obtained through the intuitive mode is faster and likely to be more
accurate than knowledge received through the rational mode. Furthermore, is also accepted that intuitive abilities may be
developed through appropriate intervention. For instance, there are indicators that meditation is instrumental in developing
intuitive consciousness. Other studies have provided evidence regarding the influence of learning environments on the de-
velopment of intuition. Further factors need to be identified which may help to develop intuitive abilities during the forma-
tive years of the child’s growth. Hence the present study was undertaken to investigate whether library reading-an important
source of learning –also impacts the intuitive abilitiesof young learners.
The following objectives were formulated for the study:
1. To study the intuitive abilities of secondary school students
with respect to four dimensions - physical, mental, emotional and spiritual
2. To study the intuitive abilities of library-going
students with respect to the four dimensions
To compare the intuitive abilities of library-going children with non-library
going children
The descriptive survey method was used to collect data from a sample of 90 children from grades VIII, IX
and X. the respondents comprised of 2 major groups: library-going students (32) and non- library going students (58).
Both the groups were administered a self constructed test of intuition which included 4 dimensions or levels of intuition
viz. physical, mental, emotional and spiritual .The test employed a 5-point rating scale. The scores reflected that: (a) The
emotional & spiritual dimensions of intuition were slightly higher than the mental & physical dimensions (b) The spiritual
dimension of intuition was found to be the highest (especially among girls) in the library going children and (c) The in-
tuitive abilities of library-going students were found to be significantly higher than those of the non-library going students
(t?4.260577 , P< .05) (Figure 3)
Thus, it was concluded on the basis of the study that regular reading habits are helpful in
raising the intuition levels of students and monitoring the reading material of students may be conducive to elevating their
intuitive ability. The study may be further replicated and verified using neuro-imaging techniques like fMRI to identify the
default mode networks of library -going children and non library going children.

371 An application of metacognitive strategies in second language writing

Suwanthep Jitpanat
School of Foreign Languages, Suranaree University Of Technology, Nakhonratchasima, THAILAND

Based on the concept of metacognition, the study is an exploration of supportive resources for metacognition by means of
available technology, i.e., Google Translate and Microsoft Word 2013 Grammar Checker, as pedagogical tools and stimuli
for students to think metacognitively. It is an attempt to provide a plausible framework for explicit pedagogical grammar
instruction to solve students’ problems with lexical-semantic selections around English verb usage in the process of writing
in English as a second language (L2). The application of metacognitive strategies is expected to enhance students’ writing

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performance in helping them analyze and control the knowledge and learning strategies involved in the learning processes.
In other words, it aims at stimulating students to think not only about the problems on their L2 writing but about the pro-
cess involved in writing, i.e., to provide them with a way to think about it in a form that can be understood as well as to
encourage them to be alert, sensitive, and actively engaged in classroom participation and problem-solving tasks. The study
main foci are on the investigation of the effect of supportive resources for metacognition on the development of students’
self-thinking and self-monitoring in the L2 writing process and on the students’ attitude towards the application of metacog-
nitive strategies in L2 writing.
The participants were students who enrolled in an English for Business class at a university in a northeastern Thailand.
They were required to write in English as a part of their course assignments as well as to provide feedback and comments on
their peer writing. They were introduced to differences between Thai/English semantic space via the concepts of contrastive
mapping and contrastive examples. Error correction was used as a tool to motivate and jump-start students in the metacog-
nitive processes involved in learning how to write. In the process of drafting and revising, Google Translate and Microsoft
Word 2013 Grammar checker were used as practical pedagogical tools to stimulate students to be cognitively involved in
the process of error- corrections as they develop their own judgment about the identified errors, i.e., metacognitive thinking.
They were stimulated to think actively about how they write in L2, and about the processes involved in L2 writing in meta-
cognitive thinking, to think, in other words, of how they think.
Some problems in English verb usage and omissions of verbs due to Thai structure are still found in the end of the ex-
periment due to participants’ English proficiency level and the finding that the general purpose of the two resources under
investigation may not address and identify most of specific writing problems of these Thai leaners of English. Nonetheless,
based on the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, most participants state that the metacognitive strategies and
supportive resources help them become more aware of errors on the verb usages and the L2 writing process. The study
concludes with implications for further research study and suggestions for alternative strategies to stimulate students’ meta-
cognitive thinking around the writing tasks.

6.11 Miscellanous

372 Film as consciousness. The body, the soul and the consciousness of film.
Antonia Giannoccaro
Film, School of creative arts, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UNITED KINGDOM

Every film is a universe and an organic being, with its own body, soul and consciousness. A film moreover represents the
best instrument for explaining and understanding the principles of consciousness. In its engagement with the spectator, a
film in fact evokes and recreates a universe that challenges the perception and the consciousness of the spectator to define
a new state of consciousness, shaking its more realistic and commonly accepted meanings, its limits-borders, in order to
expand the limited consciousness into a limitless one. A film is the most intelligible, haptic and emotionable aspect of con-
sciousness. Through the creation of new narratives a film in fact reveals new horizons and discloses new meanings, enabling
the aware connection and dialogue between a personal consciousness and a collective consciousness. The reception and
perception of a film seem indeed not to emulate the principles of consciousness but to hold in it their own core, as much as
the human experience of life and its action directly connect to existence itself. In a film the existential aspects and the factual
ones meet, proving a film to be the personification of a state of consciousness that entering in an emotional, psychological
and active dialogue with the spectator reveals a movie to be active consciousness in itself: that is to say the eternal mode
of understanding and being within and without itself that awareness assumes with the constant reproduction of existence
into an action that (shaped with creativity, uniqueness and in relation-communication with others) creates a momentum in
motion. Following the actual debate about consciousness, I would like to ask two questions: Can a film be defined as a con-
scious being in itself? Is consciousness a collaborative narrative space? I will produce an experimental documentary film in
Irish post conflict society as analytical tool of investigation.

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373 ‘All for one, one for all’: collective consciousness and the genealogy of the
concept of ‘esprit de corps’
de Miranda Luis
Literatures, Languages and Cultures, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UNITED KINGDOM

In a planet that will count around ten billion humans in 2100, modern individualism and its form of consciousness might
not be viable anymore. Evolution might demand that collective groups of intermediate size form communities of common
consciousness with a strong esprit de corps.
How does Life (which I have proposed to call ‘Creal’, following Bergson and
Deleuze’s intuition of a creative becoming) create phenomena of conscious unity? How do groups build an effective singular
conscience that respects the diversity of its members? How do communities act in unified manner without becoming rigid?
‘Mechanical laws [...] explain everything except the unity of a concrete movement [...]. Unity of movement is an affair of the
soul, and almost of a conscience, as Bergson will later discover.’ (Deleuze 1988)
‘Esprit de corps’ designates the capacity of
a group of individuals to aim consciously, persistently and coherently to a common purpose. Through the notion of ‘esprit
de corps’ and its rich genealogy, I am exploring the process of individuation of communities of interest and ‘corporealities’
of practice. The idiom ‘esprit de corps’ is 250 years old. Invented by the French Musketeers as an enthusiastic military value
(‘an expeditious [fighting] joy’), it was redesigned as a revolutionary semantic weapon by the French Enlightenment. The
French Revolution in particular considered local ‘esprit de corps’ as The Enemy, while still searching for a collective cogito,
a supra-consciousness in the name of the Nation/State (the ‘general will’). Conscious of that ambiguity, I suggest a positive
definition of ‘esprit de corps’, as the core concept of an reality-creating solidarity.
I will present my findings in the conceptual
history of ‘esprit de corps’ in order to participate in a collective deciphering of the original ‘alchemy’ that allows communi-
ties of interest to be, feel or act ‘as one’. How can a conscious solidarity become the ‘secret power’ of a collective body? The
mystery is not so much the creativity of Life. The mystery (may be because we have forgotten that skill) is group individua-
tion: how can we act socially as ‘all for one and one for all’?

374 Business Leadership, Synchronicity, and Psychophysical Reality

Laveman David
Executive Business Consultancy, Laveman & Associates , New Hope, Pa, USA

The social, economic and political context of today’s world reveals a drastic imbalance between material success and inner,
qualitative values. This has led to almost truly disastrous situations more than once. Leadership in general and business lead-
ers in particular, plays a key role in this development. This contribution argues that more awareness toward synchronistic
coincidences may be capable of inducing a complementary worldview conducive to creating a more harmonious and benefi-
cial future. Three examples and findings from qualitative interviews with senior executive business leaders provide illustra-
tions of the role of synchronistic coincidences and worldview upon applicable mind-matter correlations: the significance of
‘serendipity’ in drug development, the instructive case of Apple founder, Steve Jobs, and a historically relevant excursion to
Herman Melville and the writing of Moby Dick.
(This contribution has been published in The Pauli-Jung Conjecture: And Its Impact Today. Edited by Harald Atmans-
pacher and Christopher A. Fuchs)

375 The Artificial Other

Yli-Annala Kari
Film and Scenography, Aalto University, Helsinki, FINLAND

In recent decades the question of artificial consciousness or intelligence (AI) have been inspiring both artists and scientists.
But there is a long history behind it. There has been old myths about human-made machines, often with troublesome con-
sequences, as in the old myth about the rabbi who made Golem, a man out of clay. Even in the old verses in Finnish Kale-
vala you can find a story about the blacksmith Ilmarinen making a golden maiden. Besides of the myths there is the whole
recorded history of automatons who seem to respond to the intellectual ideas of the particular time when they are made (i.e.
the famous writing machines from the 18th century seem to state ”I write, therefore I am”).
The fear of AI culminate in the figure of Stanley Kubrick’s Space Odyssey 2001:s computer HAL, whose own thinking
leads it to the solution that he has to kill the crew on the board of the spaceship to secure the mission that they are perform-

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ing. Since the dawn of the cybernetics and computers in the 19th century the capacity of the machines to perform tasks have
grown to such an extend that some scientists have predicted that the machines will surpass humans in every aspect of knowl-
edge and intelligence in a few decades from now. This is a view shared by the scientist Ray Kurzweil (currently working for
Google) and Erkki Kurenniemi, Finnish scientist, inventor and media artist. In my paper I try show how the artificial other
in the history is unseparable of the story of the changing concepts of the human consciousness in general.

376 Trauma, grief and mystical experiences in 19th century U.S. history
Zaccarini Cristina
History, Adelphi University, New York, USA

Nineteenth century Americans experienced what we could term ‘prolonged grief ’, or, incomplete mourning, as a result of
what Drew Gilpin Faust has described as the inability to fulfill the prescripts of Ars moriendi, or good death during the
Civil War. Astronomical casualties and lack of knowledge of the whereabouts of loved ones led to the inability of mourners
to realize, or accept, the deaths of those who passed on. This state of psychological and spiritual despair led some women
and men to traverse into the realm of spiritualist practices. This paper examines 19th century reports of women and men
who ventured into the realm of spiritualism, as they detailed such experiences as precognitive visions, after death commu-
nications, and dream visitations. Understood within the context of a general belief in Swedenborgian ideas shared by most
Americans, who resolutely believed that it was possible to make some kind of contact with the spirit world, the experiences
of these individuals shed great light upon the links between trauma and altered states of consciousness.

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Forum Abstracts

Plenary Talk Abstracts

Rhythms of Macrocosmic Universe and Human-Microcosm : Consciousness

Systemology Perspective
Satsangi Prem Saran
Leader of Radhasoami Faith, Dayalbagh
Chairman, Advisory Committee on Education,
Dayalbagh Educational Institutions
Dayalbagh, Agra, INDIA

The Eastern Philosophical aphorism “Sat (the truth of love or inseparability) Chit ( the conscious knowing (the reality of
immortal existence)) Anand (Bliss of love (experiencing the joy of unity consciousness))” captures the triad of conscious-
ness of the grand macro/ micro-cosmology ranging from the ephemeral physical / material reality of science of outer experi-
ence at the tertiary level, through the semi-abstract (real / abstract) cognitive science (transcendental meditation) of outer-
inner experience at the secondary level, to the eternal abstract spiritual science (ultra-transcendental meditation) of ultimate
inner experience at the primary level.
The central idea is that system modelling is important for study of consciousness as rhythms or frequencies of oscilla-
tion, both in macrocosmic universe as well as in human microcosm (considered to be a perfect analog of macrocosm). We
refer to it as O-Theory (Omni-Quantum Theory-based system modelling of consciousness in cosmology).

Consciousness as a property of the universe

Hameroff Stuart
Professor, Anesthesiology and Psychology
Director, Center for Consciousness Studies
The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA

In philosophical terms, feelings and conscious awareness are composed of mental features termed ‘qualia’ whose essential
nature remains a scientific mystery. The mainstream view in neuroscience and Western philosophy contends conscious-
ness and qualia emerge from complex computation among many simple brain neurons, implying consciousness appeared

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on earth as an adaptation of biological evolution, and may eventually be replicated in silicon. But these views are based on
cartoon-like abstractions of actual neurons, neglect the question of what life is, and fail to provide testable predictions, falsifi-
ability or validation. These failings have pushed some computationalists toward philosophical panpsychism, the assertion
that qualia are properties of matter, or deeper, intrinsic features of the universe, features underlying matter, charge, spin, and
various cosmological parameters. In these views, mental features would have preceded life, perhaps prompting its origin
and driving evolution. The makeup of the universe, ‘fundamental spacetime geometry’, remains unknown, but approached
in fields such as quantum gravity, general relativity and string theory, and characterized as spin networks, vibrating strings,
twistors and/or topological sheaves. It does appear that spacetime geometry extends inward to the Planck scale at 10-33 cm,
and may support 1/f scale-invariant self-similar resonances transcending scales. But in looking inward in search of qualia,
panpsychism encounters the quantum boundary, i.e. ‘collapse of the wave function’, where superpositioned possibilities re-
duce to material reality. Penrose suggested superpositions collapse by ‘objective reduction’ (‘OR’, given by E=h/t), processes
in fundamental spacetime geometry producing proto-conscious qualia, e.g. occurring ubiquitously, but randomly. When ‘or-
chestrated’ (by inputs, memory and resonances) in brain microtubules (‘Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR’), qualia are integrated
to give moments of full, rich conscious experience, with causal action. Such views are consistent with Eastern philosophy in
which consciousness is intrinsic to the fine scale structure of the universe.

Conscious Mental States and Essential Self-Awareness

Gennaro Rocco J.
Professor and Chair, Philosophy Department
University of Southern Indiana, USA

Several contemporary theories of consciousness, such as the higher-order thought (HOT) theory (Rosenthal, Gennaro)
and self-representationalism (Kriegel), hold that there is an essential “self-awareness” that accompanies each conscious men-
tal state. Other major figures, such as Brentano and Sartre, have also embraced a similar position. This view, or something
very close to it, is interestingly also found in some Indian philosophy whereby consciousness is taken to be “inherently re-
flexive” and cognition is thought to have a “dual-aspect” (such as in Dignāga). In this talk I will lay out some of the similari-
ties and differences among these views and explain why I opt for the way that HOT theory accounts for such self-awareness.

Sin- Adi Karma, Fall of Angel- Spirits from Spirit Consciousness: Christian and
Oriental Radhasoami Spiritual Philosophical Perspectives
Dhir Bani Dayal
Prem Lata V.
Department of English Studies
Dayalbagh Educational Institute (Deemed University)
Dayalbagh, Agra, INDIA

Key words: Altered states of consciousness, Adi karma, Original sin, Material consciousness, Pure Consciousness, Region of
Pure Spirituality.
“The serpent of old who is called the devil and Satan, who deceives the whole world; he was thrown down to the earth,
and his angels were thrown down with him.” (Revelation 12:9)
O Satt Purush! My Merciful Supreme Lord!
Grant me a separate kingdom to rule,
Also grant me the seed of spirit ansa.
Dwelling here no more fascinates me,
Thy region no more appeals to me .
Hearing that, replied the Supreme Lord,
O you destroyer of the mansion ! Go out!
Create thine own kingdom in the lower planes,
Remain there and enjoy thy rule.
(Prem Bani, Scripture of Radhasoami Faith)

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Much has been written, is still being written about ‘Altered States of Consciousness’ from psychological perspective.
Psychologists have deduced that man in his life time oscillates between negative altered states of consciousness viz., frag-
mented, hysterical, dream, trance including many more and through prayer, meditation, yoga and other means strives to
experience Profound or Transcendental or higher altered states of consciousness viz., rapturous, calm, God consciousness
and integrative consciousness.(Charles T Tart ,1990, Andrzej Kokoszka,2008)
The present study makes a departure from the current ongoing research on ‘Altered states of Consciousness’, by plung-
ing deep into the very cause of man’s entanglement in these ‘Altered States of Consciousness’ which has yet not found space
in the psychological study of states of consciousness. Within an intercultural- inter-theological hermeneutical paradigm it
explores questions whose answers must be sought to provide a corrective to the notion of states of consciousness – What
led to the fall of spirits from Cosmic consciousness- ‘blissful pre creational state’ to alternation between different states of
material consciousness? How can the spirit re-gain and re-experience the lost “Spirit Consciousness”?
It would juxtapose the two divergent oriental and western strands to bring to the fore some interesting parallels and
also contrasts with special reference to the concepts of Adi karma- desire to mix with matter as explained in Radhasoami
Spiritual philosophy and Christian doctrine of original sin, Kala Purusha and Satan who never allow man to ‘rise’ , Five evil
tendencies of human mind – kama (lust), krodh (anger), lobha(greed), moha (attachment) and ahamkar (ego) and the con-
cept of ‘seven deadly sins’.
The paper would endeavour to bring out some major points of contrast which would illuminate the notions of “Pure
Consciousness” and “Spirit Consciousness” as explained in Radhasoami Spiritual philosophy. Though Adi Karmas are held
responsible for the spirit’s downfall from the Region of Pure Spirituality (Nirmal Chetan Desh), a clear scientific and spir-
itual path i.e. Surat Shabd Yoga is prescribed for the annihilation of theses karmas, for attaining “Pure Consciousness” by expe-
riencing communion with The Supreme Lord Radhasoami Dayal in the Region of Pure Spirituality (Nirmal Chetan Desh),
who is Supreme Truth, Supreme intelligence and Supreme Refulgence, thus getting rid of perpetual cycle of birth death and
rebirth. Christian philosophy refers to the ancestral sin i.e., original sin, sinful nature of man, suggests ways to get rid of it but
there is no mention of how the fallen angels can attain “Pure Consciousness” and thus get out of the cycle of birth -death
forever. It is also observed that over a period of time it has acquired different interpretations by different sects of Christian-
ity.
The concluding part would elaborate the difference in the paths suggested by Christian philosophy and Radhasoami
Spiritual Philosophy for the redemption of spirits from ‘material altered states of consciousness’. As long as ‘mind’ and ‘mat-
ter’ exist, the alternation between ‘altered state of consciousness’ will continue. With reference to the revelation of four
grand divisions of the creation in Radhasoami Spiritual Philosophy, an attempt would be made to probe into the differences
in the levels of “spiritual consciousness” when the two philosophies are juxtaposed.
Thus to sum up the latter excerpt from eastern philosophical scripture marks the origin of banishing corrupt spirits from
the region of the Supreme Being along with like-minded spirits from the Kingdom of Supreme Being. The first excerpt from
Christian philosophy refers to enactment of similar expulsion at another level of hierarchy of consciousness of devilish Satan
from the kingdom of heaven.

Creation through Observation and the Quantum Zeno Effect: Comparative

Analysis of Two Theories from East and West
Kak Subhash
Regents Professor
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, USA

This paper examines the parallels in eastern and western approaches to consciousness by considering ideas on how observa-
tion can lead to creation. In the east, the theory of observation-creation is called Drishti-Srishti Vada and it is credited to
Prakashananda who is thought to have lived in the sixteenth century or earlier. In the west, the Quantum Zeno Effect is
sometimes seen as an example of acausal interaction between consciousness and matter. Prakashananda advanced his theory
to address the criticism that Advaita admits a duality between the unchanging Brahman (ground-stuff of reality) and the
changing material world. So he denied this materiality and claimed that the existence of an object is nothing more than its
perception.  This position of extreme idealism has antecedents in the Yoga Vasishtha and in the Buddhistic school of Vijna-
navada. Both the Drishti-Srishti Vada and the acausal Quantum Zeno Effect lead to their own difficulties. For example, if
ideas are primary, where do they reside. Likewise, the process of interaction between an agent and an apparatus when ana-
lyzed leaves no room for anything extraneous.    

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Matrix mathematics and its tools as a foundation of eastern philosophy of art,

science and spiritualism: A comparative perspective of the west
Bandyopadhyay Anirban
National Institute for Materials Science
Tsukuba, Japan

The core of Indian philosophy, which is as old as the Sumerian’s materialistic world that defined Greek’s materialistic phi-
losophy, and have got everything ranging from art, culture, science, just like the pure materialistic world. In the infinitely
expanded matrix of truth that forms the basis of Indian philosophy, Turing and Darwin’s core material based binary argu-
ments, that form the basis of western civilization, are just one point. These two religions of science stem from a fundamental
ground “matter” and binary true/false argument, whereas, “matter+energy” duality is the key for the Indian philosophy. We
analyse west and the east in the light of our new invention of “invincible rhythm” (or Ajeya Chhandam in Sanskrit, shortly
AjoChhand) concept that disregards the materialistic philosophy and binary arguments, where the logical statements are
composed of multiple truths. Hence there is nothing as the truth and nothing as the false, to hold and process a matrix of
truths with analogue values, we need matter+energy duality, then, no arguments are isolated, everything is interconnected.
This leads to the philosophy of information fractal, —very different from the fractal holographic universe and other fractal
models of the human brain and that of the universe. Here, a point carries infinite numbers of scales inside, but just by read-
ing it one cannot explain the entire universe. AjoChhand world of computation has one argument, one energy packet, one
Turing like tape, one clock, one rhythm, one oscillator that encompasses the entire universe, but if we enter inside, we find
millions of those inside, the journey continues forever to the Planck scale. The zoom-journey inherits a fractal culture, but
there is no absolute self-similarity at any scale.

A Possible Universal Source of Proto Consciousness

Bhaumik Mani
Physics and Astronomy
University of California at Los Angeles

While studies of brain functions are very important for understanding how consciousness works in individual beings, it
will be instructive to explore the possibility of a cosmic proto-consciousness that may be the progenitor of consciousness,
a source that evokes awareness in our brain utilizing its unique neural structure. A search for such a universal source natu-
rally leads to the ultimate source of everything, which is the quantum vacuum and the Quantum Field Theory (QFT) that
deals with it. The stunning scientific discoveries of the twentieth century, supported by QFT, reveal that the quantum fields,
which are the primary ingredient of everything in this universe is present in each element of space-time of this immensely
vast universe. The most intriguing question is what keeps the immutability of the fields intact throughout the universe for
all times. Does it not suggest the existence of some sort of self-referral scheme that is responsible for maintaining the fidelity
of the quantum fields? Self-referral is an inherent feature of the self-interacting dynamics of the non-Abelian quantum fields.
For example, the non-Abelian gluon field strongly responds to its own presence. The self-interaction aspect of the quantum
fields would be much more pronounced at fundamentally shorter distances, where gradually increasing unification of the
fields is expected to occur. The robust self-interacting feature of the unified field near Planck’s dimensions can be imparted
to ambient dimensions by means of quantum entanglement. This attribute of self-interaction, self-coupling, self-organiza-
tion or self-referral is also the hallmark of proto-consciousness. Penrose proposes that our brains have somehow contrived
to harness an as yet undiscovered element embedded in primary reality that is responsible for evoking our own awareness.
It would be plausible to identify this unknown feature to be the proto-consciousness that is apparently associated with the
quantum fields for keeping their immutability for all times.

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Consciousness: Down the Rabbit Hole

Entanglement, Space-Time Wormholes, and the Brain
Hagelin John
Maharishi University, USA

Using a rigorous but bizarre new principle from M-theory known as holographic duality, we explain the “spooky action-at-
a-distance” nature of quantum entanglement, showing that it is a direct consequence of space-time wormholes—tunnels
through space. (i.e., we show that EPR = ER.)
We use these same, state-of-the-art principles to show that human consciousness originates deep within the physical
realm—in quantum gravity and M-theory. i.e., while some scientists (e.g., Penrose) have speculated that consciousness orig-
inates from Planck-scale mechanisms rooted in quantum gravity, we demonstrate this explicitly. We show how Planck-scale
mechanics directly relate to brain-scale cognitive functioning, thus providing a bridge between the Planck scale (the unified
field) and the brain: how Consciousness enters the brain.
We explain the key difference between content-free consciousness (Samadhi) and waking consciousness (awareness of
content), which is key to experiencing both Samadhi and perpetual Samadhi—Enlightenment.

EEG-guided meditation – some preliminary results

Kallio-Tamminen Tarja
University of Helsinki

EEG-guided meditation is a practical method that combines western science and eastern philosophy. It can be used to find
out objective results given by various meditation techniques as well as for designing optimal training protocols for different
kinds of individuals.
Meditation is an age old method to promote personal growth and spiritual purification. It has been used within religions
and on atheistic bases. Nowadays, many scientific studies consider meditation as a set of self-regulatory techniques which
are meant to achieve well-being and serenity through the enhancement of control over mental and some physiological pro-
cesses (Walsh and Shapiro, 2006). There is an increasing body of evidence suggesting positive clinical outcomes of medita-
tion. It has found to improve e.g. mood, ability to focus and concentrate and to reduce anxiety, depression and stress which
has recently been linked to the development of broad spectrum of disorders. Meditation might be useful as a therapeutic
method but all particular practices may not be suitable for everybody as indications also for negative effects, such as panic
attacks, anxiety, depersonalization, confusion and disorientation have been found.
Modern digitalized EEG provides reliable information on brain functions and their mental correlates. Thus EEG can
be used to adjust suitable meditation practice for different kinds of individuals. The BrainMind Audit tool (based on EEG-
screening) has been constructed to reveal the weak and strong cognitive skills in a screened individual. The resulting profile
contains 9 parameters such as tonus level, speed of cognitive and memory performance, internal concentration and stress
resistance whose values (deviation from the optimal) can be used to adjust a suitable meditation practice for every particular
individual. When the screening procedure is later repeated it is possible to detect the actual effects gained by the training.
Until now 20 persons who have decided to meditate 20 minutes a day for four months have been screened in the be-
ginning and after the given period using such BrainMind Audit tool. Some of them have followed their own meditation
technique whereas others were given a personally tailored training protocol. The results are promising for the purpose to
maximize the positive effects and minimize the negative effects of meditation, and make it suitable for clinical use, too.

Towards a deeper integration of Western and Eastern views of Consciousness

Velmans Max
Goldsmiths, University of London

The relationships among consciousness, mind and the physical world have been much disputed in the East just as they have
in the West over millennia, so it is not possible to give a simple characterization of either Eastern or Western views. Fun-
damental East-West divergences nevertheless persist. Currently dominant Western views about the nature and function of
consciousness appear to be entirely opposed to those that have been classically dominant in the East, for example within
Advaita Vedanta and various forms of Buddhism. Western materialist reductionists commonly assume the universe both in

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its primal form and its manifestations to be entirely physical. Consequently they view phenomenal conscious states as being
either illusory or reducible to states or functions of the brain. By contrast, various forms of classical Eastern philosophy view
‘pure consciousness’ to be the primal state of the universe and view physical phenomena to be concretizations of that con-
sciousness that are, in a sense, illusory (maya), projections of the mind, or ‘empty’ (in the sense of having no autonomous
self-existence). These foundational ontologies also support very different views about the function and evolution of con-
sciousness. In the West, the function and evolution of consciousness is commonly thought of in Darwinian terms, while in
the East the evolution of consciousness is thought of as a deepening realization of the nature of one’s own ground of being.
In this talk, I will introduce a number of aspects of Reflexive Monism, a non-reductive analysis of the relations among
consciousness, mind and brain that allows one to integrate many facets of these apparently opposed philosophical systems.

Suggested readings (available online): Velmans, M. (2008) Reflexive Monism, JCS, 15 (2), 5-50; Velmans, M.
(2012) Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter and consciousness. JCS, 19 (9-10),
143-165; Velmans, M. (2013) How to arrive at an Eastern place from a Western Direction: Convergences
and divergences among Samkya Yoga, Advaita Vedanta, the Body-Mind-Consciousness (Trident) Model and
Reflexive Monism. In B. S. Prasad (ed.) “Consciousness Gandhi and Yoga: Interdisciplinary, East-West Odyssey of
K.Ramakrishna Rao” New Delhi: D.K.Printworld, pp. 107-139.

Quantum biology, nanotechnology, and the implications for an integrative

medicine
Douglas E. Friesen
Department of Oncology
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

The study of consciousness has profound potential for understanding chronic disease. The placebo effect and the field of
psychoneuroimmunology point to the importance of our belief system, our emotions, and our focus in maintaining health.
To cure or prevent a disease, finding the root cause of the problem or stressors in the biological system will determine the
solution. Thus, we need to know as much about an organism as possible, and have a framework as encompassing as possible
to find the root issues and correct the problem. In this context, integrating the role of consciousness is paramount to advanc-
ing medicine. In this talk, I discuss how quantum biology and biosensors arising from nanotechnology have the potential to
expand our knowledge of the health of the organism as a system in the key areas of information processing, energy metabo-
lism and transfer, and organization. I discuss our work on information processing in microtubules and how microtubules,
actin, and collagen may form a continuous matrix throughout the body to form an organism-wide communication system. I
also discuss the topic of information storage in an organism, which plays a key role in understanding trauma, the memories
our consciousness is built on, and the concept of accessing our “inner wisdom”, “higher self ”, “intuition”, or “gut feeling”.
Nanosensors able to detect electromagnetic signals and effects in our bodies, combined with therapeutic modalities able to
rewire our brains to overcome trauma, provide a compelling vision of integrating consciousness into Western medicine to
provide a highly effective integrative medicine to prevent chronic disease.

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Oral Presentation Abstracts

Six Sigma Spirituality - An Eastern Methodology
Mathur Gazal
Mathur Sohang
The recent Hollywood blockbuster ‘Interstellar’ – addresses a concept which we are still grappling with – reality beyond our
physically perceived dimensions. Where the third dimension offers a sense of comfort – the fourth dimension comes with
greater perceptual challenges. The dimensions beyond that of course seem far beyond our conceptual ability. Yet we now be-
lieve them to be the realm of reality. It however stands to reason that if it is real, then it must be perceivable. A physicist may
be able to offer a logical rationalization of the existence of innumerable dimensions but an enlightened sage may be able to
give you an experiential account of them. Thus the amalgamation of science and spirituality seems to be not only a probable
but beneficial eventuality. This paper addresses the need to engage with the internal without defacing the external. It offers a
methodology by which one can come full circle - realize higher dimensions and as seen from the Eastern philosophical per-
spective – attain higher spiritual levels of consciousness as well as being a contributive member of society.

Hemodynamic Effect of meditation on blood pressure, Heart Rate, Oxygen Level,

Temperature and Energy Level
Arora Jyoti
Ravindra Bhardwaj
Meditation is a technique of achieving harmony between the physical mental intellectual and spiritual personalities of man.
The technique of meditation where a flow of thoughts is encouraged thus using mind in a natural way. Meditation has num-
ber of positive effects on the physiology of human body. The aim of this study is to highlight the hemodynamic effect of
meditation on blood pressure, heart rate, oxygen level, temperature, energy level. Data was collected of 26 meditators from
meditation centre for 9 days and mean value was calculated of each individual meditator. It has shown to reduce the diastolic
blood pressure, systolic blood pressure and heart rate to reduce the coronary artery disease. This paper discusses topics in-
cluding brain-mind reality consciousness, Sense of self, meditative mind, and meditative brain. Thus, meditation can emerge
as one of the important non pharmacological method of prevention of heart diseases.

16. Patanjali Yoga Practice and its Effect on Mental Health and Moral Judgment:
An Empirical Research amongst Juvenile Delinquents
Sandhu Dayal
Suman Kumari
Archana Kapoor
Research awareness and involvement in yoga for health-related results are growing worldwide. Patanjali Yoga relieves stress
and fatigue which haves turned into one of the few major challenges confronting the medical fraternity in present times.
Yoga lets go the body from any type of muscular or chronic strain and rejuvenates the body from exhaustion, body aches,
stress, aids to ease the body and mind, enhances concentration and alertness, and frees the soul. It helps one to create in-
tegrity amongst his outward self as well as his innermost self. If the practices are followed meticulously then Patanjali Yoga
develops a constructive effect both in the inward and outer selves of an organism. Patanjali’s yoga practice aims to bind the
individual self with the Ultimate One and one can achieve this union by regulating and discarding the ever-arising ‘vrittis’ or
amendments of the mind. With Patanjali Yoga, mind can be balanced through the exact kind of discipline and training. The
purpose of this paper is to study the effect of Patanjali Yoga practice on mental health and moral judgment of experimental
group of juvenile delinquents.

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Consciousness at birth: Spectral Analysis of the First Cry

Bhatnagar Anjoo
Srivastav Nihar
Chand Bhatnagar Phool
Kumar Vijai
Chaturvedi Devendra
The first cry at birth of a newborn declares that he or she is alive and conscious. Crying at birth is almost a unique feature
of the human newborn and maybe viewed as a distinct state of consciousness. Animals do not cry at birth. What does this
cry mean and why every human newborn cries at birth? Is there just a physical reason to expand the lungs and get the breath
of life? Or is it a psychological reason that the baby is not happy with the environment outside the mother’s womb, or is it
more subtle deeper spiritual cause: a change in plane of consciousness which it might be experiencing. This paper converges
western science and eastern philosophy and presents the results of the spectral analysis of first cry.

Scientific Investigation of Mystical Experiences & Pure Consciousness Events

Sona Ahuja
Mysticism is as enigmatic as the term itself. It is expressed in terms of subjective experience. There is no consensus till now
in the procedure adopted by mystics to experience pure consciousness events (PCE). Then the following problem is of
measurement of such experience. It is possible to experience one’s own conscious states through varied procedures but dif-
ficult to examine or observe the conscious states of others (Searle, 1998). Mystical experiences occur in solitude and hence
third person account is not possible pragmatically. The underlying problem in using first person approach is the use of lan-
guage or expression of experiences and hence these are called ineffable. The problem is as hard as is that of consciousness.
The scientific investigation requires the objective measure. For objectivity in studying mystical experiences, the instrument
has to be subtle as a system of higher frequency can observe the system of lower frequency. The instrument can be none
other than the mystic himself. Thus, the mysticism can be studied from within. The investigator should evolve subtle senses
so that they can vibrate and reverberate. To understand abstract mathematics, symbols should be meaningful to the exami-
nee or he cannot study it at all. Similarly, for disciplined examination of mysticism, the tester should be a subject who can
comprehend the subjective mystical phenomena. Harmonics can be at same wavelength. It is important to integrate inner
experience with scientific investigations and develop what one might call inner science or experiential science or phenom-
enological science (Satsangi, 2012). Thus, experiential science can give insight into underlining the extra ordinary content
of PCE and can possibly solve the mystery of mysticism.

Determination of State of Consciousness with Indian Classical Music Ragas and

Color
Pyari Pritam
Pyari Roy Saran
Saran Sant
Roy Sukhdev
In this paper, we extend our previous study reported in TSC-2014 by studying the combined effect of Raga and color to
design a musical test to ascertain the consciousness state of an individual. Four 5 minute instrumental flute compositions
of Alap form of Ragas, namely, Ahir Bhairav, Jaijaiwanti, Bhupali and Darbari that affect the Anahata (heart), Vishuddha
(throat), Agnya (third eye) and Sahasrara chakras respectively, were carefully chosen. Two groups of subjects of different
ages were made to listen to the Raga compositions. The order of the Ragas was not in the progressive order of the chakras.
The responses were recorded through a questionnaire by noting their order of preference and the qualitative effect in terms
of feelings, imagination, color etc. The subjective experience pertaining to the perception of feelings and colors in most of
the individuals corresponded to that attributed to the different Chakras. The study highlights the impact of Ragas and color
on the consciousness of an individual and the usefulness of designing musical consciousness tests to ascertain consciousness
levels. Such a test can be invaluable for illiterate individuals and better suited to obtain direct honest responses than through

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purely written psychometric questionnaires. It would not only help in measurement but also to tune consciousness to higher
levels. The results of a correlational study with frequencies generated during the musical test using a SQUID based Magne-
toencephelogram (MEG) will also be presented.

Can Mind comprehend Mind?

Saran Sant
Roy Sukhdev
In this paper, we question the capability of mind to comprehend mind itself. It is necessary to have a perspective from within
and without to understand any entity. We argue that it is necessary to study (i) the mind from within that would necessar-
ily require subjective experience to be recognized as a valid mode of scientific enquiry; (ii) the condition when all mental
functions are withdrawn, a state of complete self-absorption, to successfully understand its functionality and the process of
conscious experience; and (iii) to take inspiration from Eastern Spiritual traditions that have perfected practical meditation
techniques to access such a state and have time tested exhaustive experiential accounts through the ages. The above integra-
tion of East-West approaches to consciousness is urgently needed for progress in consciousness research.

Brahma Vidyā : A Visionary Light to Supreme Consciousness with reference to

the Rath-Rathi Rupak of Kathopanishad
Bhatia Namita
Das Bhatia Soami
The Upanishads are the concluding portion of the Vedas and deal with the philosophy and realization of Brahma. The
Kathopanishad is one of the older Upanishads commented upon by Shankara. It may be regarded as the most appropriate
introduction to spiritual life in general. The story of Nachiketa, with which it begins, provides the proper foundation for
commencing a study of the higher science of the life of man. Brahma-Vidyā or Para-Vidyā, by which the Immortal Ātman
is known, is the most wonderful science. Knowledge of the Ātman is unique. The man who is able to expound and compre-
hend the Self is great. The Ātman, subtler than the subtle, greater than the great, is seated in the heart of each living being.
He who is free from desire, with his mind and the senses composed, beholds the majesty of the Self, and becomes free from
pain and sorrow.

The Concept of Stress - An Indian View

Srivastava Sumitra
This paper is an attempt to interpret the modern concept of stress and its phenomenology from the perspective of classical
Indian thought. It studies the ideas of stress and coping as discussed in the Sankhya, the Gita, Buddhist philosophy and the
ideas propagated by the lineage of saints -“Santmat”, which presumes that there is an inner force which operates at the sub-
liminal level while the sensory apparatus is occupied by the mundane activities of life. This concept can be compared to the
Freudian concept of Id forces which attempt coming out to the conscious level. A person can get an occasional glimpse into
the real purpose of life and then strives to achieve this. The paper documents the difference in approach to coping with stress
between the Indian and western thought. It attempts to suggest methods and techniques which help to move from non-
cognition to awareness of higher goals and move towards achieving these goals.

Spiritually-Inspired Quantum Dynamics of Consciousness

Roy Sukhdev
Considering the spirit entity under covers of mind and matter to be in a bound state, we present a powerful analogy with
the particle in a potential well problem in quantum mechanics. Embodied consciousness gets conditioned and mind-based
manifesting in a variety of discrete vibrational mental states, forms and modes and we perceive qualia through resonance.
Considering consciousness and qualia to have a non-local field character, focused attention leads to attachment that gener-

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ates harmonics in the form of desires causing action, volition and thoughts, leaving traces in the mind in the form of vibra-
tional patterns (samskaras) that fuel more thoughts. This results in qualia dynamics, i.e., transformation and generation of
qualia through complex feedback loops of energy and information with the environment.
Applying the principle of conditional forward causation, we consider propensities as vibrational dispositions, with the
spirit generating intention (impulse) to give rise to mental propensities that make us perform actions. We consider mind to
predispose physical/physiological potentialities in a quantum-like manner. The consequence of the spirit-mind uncertainty
relationship leads to an expansion of awareness in the spiritual domain on reducing the spread in the mental domain by
meditation. The capability to attain higher states of consciousness in the embodied state is akin to the possibility of having
bound states in the continuum, proposed by von-Neumann and Wigner that have also been recently experimentally demon-
strated. The theory not only opens up prospects of understanding the dynamics of consciousness, but also explaining medi-
tation, cognitive anomalies, parapsychological phenomena and healing.

The beauty of mathematics and eastern mysticism

Prakash Shiroman
While an East-West forum will naturally focus a great deal on the neuroscience of meditation, we would like to discuss a
recent experiment by the group of Semir Zeki et. al. (2014) regarding the perception of mathematical beauty. The subjects
of the experiment were 16 mathematicians, whose brains were scanned while they were presented with several mathemati-
cal equations of varying degrees of beauty. They found that the experience of mathematical beauty correlates with activity
in part of the medial orbito-frontal cortex (mOFC) -- the same area of the brain activated by other forms of beauty, such as
artistic beauty.
Indeed many beautiful ideas in mathematics -- Riemannian Geometry, Yang-Mills Theories, etc. later found their way
into physics; and many theoretical physicists have expressed the idea that beauty is a guide to truth. For example, take the
following quote of Dirac: “If one is working from the point of view of getting beauty into one’s equation, ... one is on a sure
line of progress.” The idea that mathematics can be beautiful, and that its beauty is somehow related to its truth or relevance
to understanding the laws of nature is certainly a mystical idea; though many of its proponents (e.g., Dirac) may have been
non-religious. Ultimately, the perception of beauty, whether in mathematics, art or elsewhere, is an inner (i.e., subjective)
experience and should be studied systematically using the methodology of Price and Barrell.

Unraveling The Mystery of The Observer Through Sampling Theorem

Markan CM
Gupta Priti
According to the recent Quantum Consciousness theory by Penrose and Hameroff, the brain seems to be governed by two
different kinds of information processing. Classical information processing at the level of neurons and Quantum informa-
tion processing at the level of subtler microtubules. While the classical information processing is limited by the frequency at
which neurons can operate, at the quantum level, processing is at a much higher frequency now reported to be of the order
of KHz, MHz and even GHz by Anirban Bandopadhyay’s group. An interesting analogy for such a system, where subsystems
operating at different frequencies interact closely, can be drawn from the principle of sampling in digital communication.
According to the sampling theorem a signal can be truly observed and understood if the observing signal has a frequency
that is more than twice its own frequency. In the last TSC, we had proposed that in the brains of highly evolved species
with large brains, the frequency of quantum processing (collapses) (T=h/E) becomes much faster than the classical pro-
cesses and therefore in these species an observer gets created. This observer has mind like qualities and allows the species
to observe its own actions and place itself in past or future and take actions according to prior experiences. As multiple
sub-systems working at different frequencies interact, it is possible to have a hierarchy of observers where higher frequencies
observe the lower frequencies and this approach could possibly lead to an understanding of the Mind-Brain and the Spirit-
Mind-Brain interactions.

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Pharmacology of Consciousness
Bhat Seema
Bhat Laxminarayan
The scientific evaluation of consciousness phenomena has become one of the thrust areas of biomedical research due to its
important role in the spiritual, physical, mental and social wellbeing of mankind. There are several spiritual practices de-
scribed in the religious literature to achieve higher levels of consciousness but widely practiced methods are prayer, medita-
tion and yoga. The biggest challenge in the scientific evaluation of consciousness phenomena is that the reproducibility of
the consciousness effect in individual spiritual practitioners regardless of the spiritual methods practiced. To date, all litera-
tures related to the scientific studies of consciousness phenomena are focused on the evaluation and measurement of phar-
macodynamic effects of spiritual practices, and they can be broadly classified in to the following four groups: (1) environ-
mental correlates, (2) neural correlates, (3) physiological correlates and (4) psychological correlates. It is evident that the
magnitude of pharmacodynamic effects of consciousness phenomena is directly proportional to the levels of consciousness
attained by the individual spiritual practitioners. However, the pharmacology of consciousness to explain the pharmacody-
namics effects has not been reported in any scientific literature. We present the pharmacology of consciousness and provide
the scientific rationale for molecular or receptor level interactions between cosmic waves and human body. The receptors
that regulate the key neurochemicals/neurotransmitters such as dopamine, serotonin and norepinephrine appear to be the
primary interaction sites between the cosmic waves and human body. We discuss in this paper the pharmacological mecha-
nism for consciousness and also, role and expression of the key receptors involved in the consciousness phenomena.

Frequency Domain Analysis of the Lights and Sounds of the Religion of Saints
Sahni Prakash
Scientific methods rely on objective models of the phenomena which they wish to explain. A physicist will try to ex-
plain light of a certain color in terms of the wavelength (or mixture of wavelengths) present in it. The different wavelengths
are attributed to the energies of the photons present in the light. Sound is explained in terms of the frequencies present in
the elastic waves which travel through a media. So for temperature measurements in terms of the randomness of the mol-
ecules and chemical reactions based on the structure of the molecules that form matter. Human perception of various phe-
nomena such as light, sound, taste and smell, hotness and coldness depend on the sensory organs to perceive these phe-
nomena and transmit the neural impulses to the brain. Although physiologists have been able to explain a great deal about
the way the sensory organs work, practically nothing is understood about why the brain perceives things the way it does.
For example, why does light of 590 nm produce yellow and light of 760 nm produce red. Such is the case for other phe-
nomena like registering of sound, coldness or taste. Empirical data has been gathered to show relate phenomena with
the sensations. However it is impossible to relate them using the structure of molecules or the energies of the particles or
waves. For example there is nothing yellow in the electron which emits the light, or nothing bitter about the chemical which
produces a bitter taste. In eastern philosophies, such as the Religion of the Saints, and the Upanishads, various metaphysical
phenomena are described. These include the journey of the soul after death, or the possibility of gaining spiritual experiences
during one’s lifetime. The descriptions given correspond to real world experiences which we all are familiar with. A soul which
has good karma may experience being on a space odyssey or a trek through pristine mountains and water bodies. More subtle
experiences include the sensation of music from an orchestra and light of various hues.Science may not attempt to classify
what is good karma, and what is pleasurable, however, similar to the approach taken to analyze the sensory perceptionswe ana-
lyze the sounds and lights in terms of the constituent frequencies and their relations to each other. The sounds are analyzed in
terms of the harmonics present in them and the lights in terms of its intensity and the frequencies which may be present in it.

Frequency and Energy as Neuro-correlates of Beauty in Maths, Science and Art

Srivastava Dayal Pyari
Sahni Vishal
Satsangi Prem Saran
Beauty as a concept or subjective experience has been widely described in various ways by philosophers, psychologists
and litterateurs apart from may others. However, it has rarely been associated with mathematicians. In a seminal work by

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Semir Zeki, et. al. (February 2014), an attempt has been made to identify the region of the brain responsible for appreciat-
ing beauty in Maths. To many of us, mathematical formulae appear abstract and unreal (abstruse) but to a mathematician,
an equation can embody the quintessence of beauty. The motivation comes from Eastern philosophy where Spanda Shastra
emphasizes the role of frequency. According to Spanda Shastra, the whole universe in all its states and aspects is nothing but
a system of vibratory movement. The ultimate movement takes place inside the Supreme consciousness.
We have begun conducting experiments on various students belonging to different subject-classes by studying the re-
sponse of their brains while trying to observe beauty in different subject areas (maths, science and art). We identified the
peak resonant frequency of each individual brain which was stimulated by the piece of mathematics, science or art in order
to respond with evaluation of beauty ranging from most beautiful to ugliest. Their brains were scanned with the help of
magneto-encephalogram (MEG). This helped us in identifying the level of consciousness of each one of them. We saw some
trend towards high frequency being linked with discovery of truth, i.e. true knowledge while perceiving beauty. From the
data collected by us, we were able to evaluate the (1) mean grade point average, (2) standard deviation, (3) mean energy
level, (4) standard deviation of the mean energy level and (5) mean frequencies.
As an example of the experiment conducted in the field of maths, we took a certain group of students belonging to a par-
ticular class and showed them a certain set of equations which they could understand. The students were then asked to grade
the equations on a scale of -5 (ugliest) to +5 (most beautiful). As they were grading the equations, their brains were scanned.
In the physical plane, we have used frequency as the stimulus for identifying or perceiving beauty as a cognitive re-
sponse. In the cognitive domain of mind, we respond with knowledge or consciousness of beauty, while in the highest spir-
itual domain, we can identify it as a beauty, truth or ultimate reality.

Meditation and its Stages (from an Eastern Perspective)

Gupta Chhavi
Gupta Gopi Chand
In the attainment of ultimate freedom or Nirvana, meditation contributes to spiritual progress, to quiet the mind and to di-
minish the impact of ills and sorrows but meditation is not an end in itself but only a means for the attainment of the highest
end. According to Arahanta Upatissa, (in his Vimuttimagga), “concentration means that one has purity of mind, endeavors
steadfastly, dwells with the truth having the benefit of tranquility and is not distracted. This is called concentration. And
again, it means not allowing one’s mind to be bent by the strong wind of passion. It is comparable to the unflickering flame
of the lamp behind the palace.” Among the benefits produced by concentration are mentioned ‘pleasant dwelling in the hap-
piness of truth in the present life, enjoyment of all objects through investigation, acquisition of worldly knowledge, and the
attainment of perfection.

Impact of Daily Spiritual Experiences on Life Satisfaction in School Students

Srivastava Anoop
Srivastava Dayal Pyari
Narain Karan
Srivastava Mukti
There is no single definition of the term “spirituality” that may be acceptable to all. However, experiences, feelings and emo-
tions that can be ascribed to some faith in supernatural power, during the course of daily life, afford relatively wider accept-
ability. The Daily Spiritual Experiences Scale (DSES) developed by Lynn Underwood is a 16 item self report measure to
assess ordinary experiences from which a connection with the transcendent can be inferred. The scale has a high degree of
psychometric reliability and validity, which makes it an important tool for scientific research.
According to Abraham Maslow, satisfaction is derived from the fulfillment of a hierarchy of needs, which range from
basic necessities of life to self-actualization and self- transcendence. Since higher order needs such as self-actualization be-
come more relevant towards the later part of one’s life, measurement of life satisfaction of students at the school level using
the Brief Multidimensional Students’ Life Satisfaction Scale – PTPB Version (BMSLSS - PTPB) has been found to be rel-
evant and reliable. The BMSLSS-PTPB is a 6-item instrument used to measure Life Satisfaction of students by addressing
three dimensions : intrinsic, social, and external. Participants can answer each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (very
dissatisfied) to 4 (very satisfied).

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This paper attempts to study the correlation between the Daily Spiritual Experiences Scale (DSES) and life satisfaction.
The main hypothesis is that students with a higher DSES score have a higher score in BMSLSS, implying a higher degree of
Life Satisfaction.

Mindfulness and Consciousness: A Correlational Study

Pyari Prem
Srivastava Anoop
Mindfulness is a key factor behind human behavior. Difference in the degree of absence or presence of mindfulness can
change the behavior of the same individual at different times. For this reason, mindfulness or mindlessness is studied more
often as an important state characteristic rather than as a personality trait.
However, there are practitioners who train the interested individuals to pay more attention to the present moment, es-
pecially to cope with mental stress. In this context, if one remains mindful of what he/she does more often than not, mind-
fulness can be regarded as his/her personality trait.
Though mindfulness and consciousness may find usage as synonyms in a limited sense, mindfulness refers to paying
non-judgmental attention on purpose in the present moment ( Jon Kabat-Zinn, 2013), whereas consciousness has much
wider connotation. According to Brazdau (2009), consciousness is understood to encompass six dimensions, viz., Physical,
Emotional, Mental, Spiritual, Social and the Self.
In the present study, the authors have attempted measurement of mindfulness using Mindfulness Attention Awareness
Scale (MAAS) developed by Bryan and Ryan (2003) and consciousness using Consciousness Quotient Inventory (CQI)
developed by Brazdau (2009) to study the correlation between the two. The correlation coefficients of subjects practicing
yoga/meditation have also been compared with the control subjects.

Poster Presentation
Abstracts
F01 An explorative study on CGPA Grading System and Adolescent’s self worth
Seema Rani Bangalore Nagaraja
Vadapalli Asha
Grading system is a standardized system that tries to measure knowledge in a particular subject. It even compares the grades
in a cross sectional sample. It helps in ranking. A student shows full faith in the system and believes that the grades are actu-
ally expressing his knowledge quotient. A student with grade A+ feels he knows everything and a student with grade E feels
he knows nothing. This, in turn, affects the grades in other subjects. When this pattern repeats a couple of times, a child is
declared weak in a particular subject or in general. The consequences of grading system reflect directly on the way a student
looks at oneself. His Self Worth might increase or decrease accordingly.

F02 Transmigration of Soul and Consciousness

Satsangi Anirudh Kumar
Seenappa Sunitha N
Steven J Rosen writes in ‘The Reincarnation Controversy, Uncovering the Truth in World Religions’ that belief in reincarna-
tion allows us to see ourselves as architects of our own future. Rosen raises certain queries,‘what is it that reincarnates from
one body to another? Is it the soul? the mind? the intellect?’ To understand this, we should suggest answer to these ques-

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tions. We all know that there are four fundamental forces in the universe viz., gravitation force, electromagnetic force, weak
nuclear force and strong nuclear force. Every point of action of Gravitational Force Field is individual consciousness or soul,
electromagnetic force as the force of mind and weak and strong nuclear force as the gross material force which constitute
physical frame of body.

F03 Systems spiritual quantum theory of creation and consciousness and its
representation by Bonds graph
Sundaram Mani
Sundaram Prem
Today, quantum science has confirmed long held esoteric view that ultimate reality is vibrational or quantum and not
atomic. However quantum scientists are puzzled over the mother energy or source of vibration . This is because, although,
quantum physics has discovered the quantum nature of physical universe, it is still a physicist view. Esoteric wisdom which
is transcendental, holistic and a systems philosophy considers cosmos, as consisting of mental and spiritual regions as well
and also, that evolution of creation is hierarchical and holographic. So that each successive region is subsystem of its preced-
ing ones and reflection of it. Thus, the source of physical region, pind is brahmand, mental region and of latter is spiritual
region and creator or source of all is supreme being, the infinite reservoir of pure or spiritual consciousness, the primordial
energy. Again, the whole cosmos is a spiritual quantum field and thus ground for creation and source of quantum field is
spiritual. Hence, for a complete theory of creation and consciousness, we need a spiritual, psychophysical theory.

F04 Spiritual sounds as the essence of consciousness in different religions

Mathur Reena
Mathur Gaurav
Every religion talks about the sound which is very subtle and is reverberating in side us. This can be listened by doing con-
centration practices along with leading a pure and spiritual life. This topic has a special place in my heart as it lured me all my
life to know the actual truth. Shabda is Pure Consciousness. It is the active life-principle of the whole creation. It is the driv-
ing and controlling power behind all that exists. All manifestation is the result of Shabda and without it, nothing exists. All
the world religion accepts the power of shabda by which the creation has come into existence. Despite the deep mysticism
reveled in every religion today mankind is only caught up in religious dogmas and rituals which he believes to be the true
religion and has forgotten the basic essence of shabda which can only be achieved through surat shabd yoga with the help of
a tatva darshi guru.

F05 ‘Intuitive Communication Expressways’ – The Science behind Sustaining &

Harnessing the Spiritual Progress
Sahibzada Amit Dayal
Intuition provides views, understandings, judgements, or beliefs that we cannot in every case empirically verify or ra-
tionally justify. For this reason, it has been not only a subject of study in psychology, but also a topic of interest in vari-
ous religions and esoteric domains, as well as a common subject of writings. The right brain is popularly believed to
be associated with intuitive processes or generally creative abilities. We are exposed to millions of subtle messages
every day, the body language clues our boss gives us in meetings, the shifting eyes of the person we’re interviewing, the
faint hesitation of the real estate agent when we ask about the smell in the basement. Your intuition, or gut instinct, is
the sum of all your senses; it’s your subconscious brain working in the background, taking in glances, smells, visual cues
and tone of voice. So our subconscious mind scans the clues, to discern what’s important and what’s not and your grey
matter is fermenting lots of data that your conscious mind is unaware of. It is this subconscious data processing which
triggers off the intuitive thought to guide you or warn you about your work, your decisions or the people you are deal-
ing with. The author shall put forth some intuition based very common experiences which almost everyone has had
at some point or the other. This would form the basis of explanation as we scientifically probe the process of intuition.

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F06 Mental and Spiritual Evolution Awakens Consciousness and Spiritual

Awareness
Mathur Vineeta
A survey was designed and conducted to investigate the hypothesis that consciousness levels of people can be graded. The
participants of the study were 50 adults from an Ashram and 60 students of an Indian University. The method of study was
through questionnaires and based on their answers to questions related to spiritual, positive psychological (thought and
emotion) and physical (energy and matter) health, a statistical study of consciousness was conducted. The results showed
that the majority of Ashram adults could be graded as conscious and uniconscious beings with significant correlation values
between consciousness and spirituality (.4233*) while almost half the University students were graded as unconscious and
subconscious beings with low correlation values between consciousness and spirituality.

F07 Nature of Pure Consciousness according to the Upanishads

Prasada Rao Durga
The nature of Universal self and the Individual self is described in the Upanishads as Truth, Consciousness and Bliss, Sat
Chit and Ananda. Chandogya Upanishad declares that ‘The Self indeed is this entire world. Aatmaiva idam sarvam (7-25-2).
Mundaka Upanishad states that Brahman indeed is the Universe. Brahmaiva idam purastat (2-2-11). Chandogya Upanishad
establishes the Unique-ness of self. Brihadaranyaka Upanishad goes to the extent of ruling out the plurality of self. All this
universe indeed is Brahman. Sarvam khalvidam Brahma (3-14-1) and there is no plurality in it. Regarding the characteris-
tics of Brahman (Atman), Aitareya Upanishad says Prajnanam Brahma, ‘Consciousness is Brahman’. Therefore Brahman is
Consciousness itself. It includes mind, consciousness, perception, discrimination, wisdom, insight, steadfastness, thought,
thoughtfulness, impulse, memory, conception, purpose, life, desire, control are all included. In this paper, the Upanishadic
view of Consciousness is eloborately discussed.

F08 Assessing effect of Disease Progression on Consciousness

Agarwal Siddharth
Agarwal Sapna
Singh Preetvanti
Disease and sufferings bring religious persons nearer to Almighty in search of Mercy. Not much is known about how to
design and disseminate programs of spiritual exercises and consciousness indicators for persons suffering with some disease
(Sufferers). Research is required to advance the understanding of prioritized internal and external indicators responsible for
spiritual awakening among these sufferers. In this paper, an attempt is made to compute Overall Futuristic Decision Prior-
ity (OFDP) Weights to generate spiritual scenarios for increased level of consciousness by using Multi-Criteria Futuristic
Decision Making (MCFDM) Methodology. The generated prioritized Spiritual Scenarios responsible for conscious up-
gradation among sufferers were then used to assess the effect of some kind of Disease (physical problem, suffering, disorder
etc.) on strengthening their Religious Faith and defining their optimal spiritual trajectories towards Ultimate Reality. In this
Research work, a two phased Disease-Religious Faith-Interaction (DRFI) Experiment is also designed and developed. The
results derived from phase-I pilot research study are presented.

F09 Systems Approach to Conscious living

Satsangi Sumiran
Satsangi Shipra
Living a conscious life means making conscious choices rather than leaving things to chance or doing things without think-
ing. Earlier we use to talk of time management, but now a day’s it’s about managing our attention our conscious with so
many distractions around us. Are we having control on our mind by taking conscious decisions, at each point of time or are
we being controlled by our mind and we are doing what our mind tells us to do. Do we consider the real cost and consider

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impact of each decision before we take it? Is our thinking very short term or do we deep dive to understand the relationship
and cause and impact of these decision on our life. Systems approach to conscious living helps us to understand interrela-
tionship of each factor which is part of our everyday life with the whole ‘our self ’ or “Atman”. Thus by understanding the re-
lationships and impact of each variable to our self and taking each decision consciously, we nourish our ‘soul’ or ‘atman’ and
take it towards the higher and ultimate truth.

F10 Bhakti Marg (Path of devotion) a Super highway to ultimate consciousness-

A Sant Mat perspective
Satsangi Ranjeet
Saini Dayal
Three ways are mentioned in Indian scriptures to attain salvation or attaining highest spiritual consciousness. These ways are
the gyan marg, the karma marg and the bhakti marg. In bhakti marg, the devotee completely surrender himself to God, the
almighty, the reservoir of ultimate consciousness and serve Him with his wealth, body, mind and soul with extreme love and
devotion. The devotee obeys the orders and mandates of God (sagun or nirgun) to the best of his capacity and tries his level
best to please him. In this way his total attention is directed towards his deity and his bonds with worldly objects automati-
cally gets loosened. The devotee out of extreme love for his lord continuously remembers his name and contemplates His
form. This process is carried out in a very natural way without much efforts. The devotee most of the time remain in a medi-
tative state and his soul automatically ascends to higher spiritual planes and ultimately merges with the supreme soul or the
reservoir of ultimate consciousness. Therefore, Bhakti marg seems to be a very natural and easiest way to attain highest level
of consciousness in today’s age of utmost stress and strain.

F11 Perceptions on the Discursive Location of Non-Violence [ahimsa]: a survey

of practitioners of Radhasoami Mat
Sahgal Smita
Sahgal Sanjeev
Ahimsa or non-violence is taken as an axiom amongst the followers of Religion of saints. A link between ahimsa and spiritu-
ality is an assumed one. Spirituality implies transcendental consciousness that defines the inner core of the self of an indi-
vidual. It makes an individual more than just a physical or mental being. It seeks to highlight the aspect of human existence
that satiates supra-mundane needs. Many religious traditions, especially the Sant Mat inform us that the distinguishing ele-
ment of human beings is their ability to form a connect with Supreme Being because of the inner faculty that they are gifted
with; on whose invocation they can experience higher consciousness that ordinary living beings are not capable of. The issue
at stake is whether ahimsa can be taken as a tenet with spiritual quality or is it just an ethical virtue. A study of the religious
texts reveals that the teachers of Radhasoami Faith have clearly worked out a link between spiritual consciousness and non
violence. The issue is whether the practitioners comprehend the connect between the two on theological lines. A small sur-
vey has been undertaken amongst the followers of the Radhasoami Faith [Dayalbagh]to elucidate the issue.

F12 The Linkage between Spirituality in Work Place and Organizational

Performance : A Literature Review
Mittal Priyanka
Sandhu Dayal
This paper reviews previous researches on spirituality at workplace to review their findings that in what way spirituality sup-
ports organizational performance. The spirituality at work arena by integrating three different outlooks that in what way
spirituality empowers or leads to organizational performance: a) Human resources outlook : Spirituality enriches worker
well-being and quality of life; b) Philosophical outlook: Spirituality offers employees a sense of motive and implication at
work; c) Interpersonal outlook: Spirituality offers workers a sense of inter-connectedness and community. This paper also
addresses potential advantages and cautions of bringing spirituality into the workplace and also provides recommendations

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and proffered suggestions for practitioners to incorporate spirituality positively in organizations. It has been recommended
that organizations that boost spirituality experience enriched organizational performance and all round growth.

F13 Ontology and Epistemology of Consciousness : A Perspective

Sriramamurti P
Human Frame is created to enable spirit entities to communicate with all the Regions of creation - Region of Pure Spirit,
Regions of Universal Minds and Regions of Matter. The spirit entity embodied in human frame can not only communicate
with all the regions, but it can also get out of it forever to merge in the Reservoir of Spiritual Consciousness attaining Su-
preme Bliss. While situated in human body the spirit entity communicates with outside material world with sense organs
assisted by spirit currents (Chaitanya Vrittis) and mind currents (Chitta Vrittis). It communicates with the Regions of Uni-
versal Minds through currents of individual mind assisted by Spirit Currents. However, it communicates with the Region
of Pure Spirit directly by means of Chaitanya Vrittis, spirit currents only, knowing itself by itself. All through, the conscient
being, the knower, is only the spirit entity. It is also explained how the Primary Spiritual Substance gets transformed into
mind and objective world through the emergent currents of Kala and Adya, the three gunas of equipoise of spirit forces (sat-
tva) their proactive state (rajas) and inertia (tamas). They further change into the five Tanmatras the fundamental elements
from which the Universal Minds and Individual Minds evolved. They further gave rise to the five bio forces - five pranas,
five sense organs, five motor organs and five gross tattvas constituting the physical worlds and the bodies in it. In the human
body, created as Microcosm, apertures (inner and outer senses) are provided to know the macrocosmic worlds at every level.
The methods of activating those inner senses are taught to human beings by higher spirit entities incarnating in human form.
The continual presence of the Adept of the Radhasoami Faith ever since its revelation provides for the emancipation of the
spirit entities without any interruption. This is in short the Ontology and Epistemology of Sant Mat, the Radhasoami Faith.

F14 Click Blackhole to Pick Consciousness

Singh Swati
Blackholes emit a radiation aka “Hawking Radiation“. We although are not yet definitely sure about its presence, but some
experiments tell it is there. What we are trying is to relate this radiation’s effect on our consciousness. By studying the way
that waves interact with other waves, researchers have found that even low-powered oscillations can have enormous effects
on standing waves, physical structures, and even the human brain. So what we propose is to learn the effect of the Hawking
radiation on human brain waves and therefore on human consciousness.

F15 A Work Life Balance Consciousness among Working Women in India

Nigam Shalini
Goswami Neelni
With the rapid changing socio - economic- -cultural- psycho and political scenario, more and more women in India are stepping
out of the house as they want to be financially independent, be their own boss, support the family and participate in economic
development. The multiple roles performed by women for family, friends and relatives, society and work place create pres-
sure and stress to handle the various responsibilities. This affects the mental, physical, emotional, social, and spiritual well
being of working women. Whenever there is a conflict between these roles, families and organizations get affected. An em-
pirical study was conducted to analyze the work-life related consciousness among women in India. Balance needs score card
variables identified related to personal life was: child care and spouse relationship and similarly two variables under work
variables were: rewards and workload. The self-structured questionnaire was administered on 59 working women from Agra
and National Capital Region in India.

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F16 Spiritual Ecological Consciousness and Sustainability Findings from an

Empirical Study on Two Higher Education Domains of India
Kumari Srivastava Prem
Rai Pratibha
Shukla Saumya
This poster hopes to unveil some key elements of a significant dimension of human consciousness: Spiritual Ecological Con-
sciousness through an empirical study on two higher educational domains of India: The University of Delhi, Delhi and Day-
albagh Educational Institute (Deemed University) Agra. The poster will present the need and relevance of its conceptual
framework and its findings and hopes to offer some possible and plausible solutions from the Eastern philosophical thought.

F17 Effects of Natural Environment on Human Conciousness: A Correlational

Study
Sahni Pooja
Kumar Jyoti
It has been seen that interaction with natural environment inevitably yields corresponding states of conscious experiences
through positively affecting our brain/cognition. (Selhub, Eva M and Logan,Alan C.2012). On the other hand, understand-
ing how to optimize and improve the functioning of human consciousness (i.e powers of thinking, understanding, com-
prehension of complexity, creativity and innovation, etc) offers major opportunities to accelerate positive and practical re-
sponses to the sustainable development. In this research paper, we set to find out whether i) there is a correlation between
one’s consciousness level and the inclination towards environmental issues or sustainability at large and; ii) to attempt a
predictive model based on empirical data. This study is unique in the sense that it delves into deeper issues of what drives
the human consciousness, behavior and actions towards environment or sustainability that could be moderated. As there
is no prior study reported in the literature, a customized questionnaire has been prepared and applied to measure the con-
sciousness level and to measure the intensity of inclination towards pro- environment behavior. The questionnaire data was
analyzed using statistics. Factor analysis has confirmed that the two constructs, Consciousness Quotient and the pro-Envi-
ronmental behavior and actions are very highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.738.

F18 Phenomenology of higher order conscious experience in a Natural

Environment
Sharan Swami
Sahni Pooja
As popularly believed, the physical world has little or no role to play in a person’s spiritual progress or rather should not have
any role in affecting a meditating mind. Yet the physical senses themselves, stimulated by the natural surroundings could
lead man to attain higher consciousness. Interesting to note is that all world religions respect, revere or worship nature.In
eastern philosophy it is believed that, God is Truth, Pure Consciousness and Supreme Bliss -‘Sat- Chit- Anand’. Man is both
Truth and Consciousness and is yearning for Bliss. Nature is Truth and acts as gateway to Consciousness and Ultimate Bliss.
In western science it is proven that interaction with natural environments inevitably yields corresponding states of conscious
experiences through positively affecting our brain/cognition (Chalmers, 2003).Through this phenomenological research we
set to establish that nature uniquely influences the human mind, and has the potential to influence cognitions and behaviors.
It promotes our inner faculties to connect and reach for higher levels of consciousness consequently realizing the Ultimate
Truth and state of Bliss. The study approaches the subject by ascertaining the historic relationship & the religious signifi-
cance of the nature and consciousness. It also analyzes the scientific research on how body-mind- intellect acts as a stimulus
higher order conscious experiences.

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F19 Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram: A System of Education

Nigam Shalini
Jain Sanjay
Satyam Shivam Sundram is the eternal truth and reality which is exotic and brings happiness to oneself which is beyond
explanation and is blissful. The concept of ultimate happiness was the source of inspiration for this research. The teachers as
learned bodies have the responsibility to design the curriculum in such a manner that the latent faculties with which human
beings are endowed with are developed and this world becomes a better place to live and the journey to rise above the dual-
ity of materialism and to merge in the unity of creator becomes the objective of every beings life. Educators need to diagnose
and prescribe what is needed for each stage of development. Education is a systematic attempt towards human learning.
Educational activity starts with the individual—Who am I? Where am I going? Where have I come from? University as the
name suggests should be able to provide universal knowledge. Universal values reveal the essence of the human condition. It
is through universal values that we link ourselves with humanity and the cosmos. These values are not evident. They must be
experienced, as one sees a sunrise, the exquisiteness of a flower, as one feels happy, feeling of fear and joy.

F20 Spiritual Ecology in Dayalbagh Way of Life: A Different Story

Sri-Narain Mukti
Narain Karan
Srivastava Anoop
Srivastava Dayal Pyari
The current Ecological condition, with all the natural calamities like earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc. call
for a spiritual response from us, human beings. It is almost as if these disastrous events are signals from Nature to engage
our attention to the situation. The emerging field of Spiritual Ecology is based on the need for a kind of spiritual connect
to address the growing ecological crisis. Spirituality in this context may not have any religious connotation. Yet, a strong
spiritual base is expected to result in better response to correct the ecological imbalance. It is not easy to measure spiritual at-
tainments that could be related with good ecological practices or behaviour. Therefore, the Daily Spiritual Experience Scale
(DSES), a 16 item self-report measure developed by Lynn Underwood (Underwood, 2006), which assesses ordinary spir-
itual experiences in a person’s daily life, by recording responses to items such as how frequently one thinks about God, how
close one feels to God, etc., has been used by the authors to assess the spiritual inclinations of the volunteer subjects in terms
of their ordinary spiritual experiences.
The scores obtained on DSES have been compared with special reference to the “Sigma Six Q” way of life followed
in Dayalbagh and by those who live elsewhere but are influenced by it. The “Sigma Six Q” way of Dayalbagh life can be
described as aiming at maximizing the summation of six qualities, viz., Innovation, Air Quality, Water Quality, Agriculture
and Dairying, Education and Healthcare, and Values (Satsangi, 2014). The value based education policy of Dayalbagh Edu-
cational Institute, which is intimately related with the Dayalbagh way of life, has already been found to be positively related
with the scores of school children on DSES (Srivastava et al., 2013). This paper seeks to highlight the relationship between
the daily spiritual inclination, as measured by DSES, and eco-friendly behaviour with special reference to the Dayalbagh way
of life.

F21 Dayalbagh Eco-village - A Spiritual Home

Sahni Mukti
Sahni Pushpa
With the rapid development of science and technology, despite numerous contributions to the well being and progress of
humanity, the serenity and essence of natural environment is vanishing due to pollution. People living in pollution prone
environment cannot be physically, mentally and spiritually fit. An eco-village is a synthesis of a highly diverse community
living on a common land in which the members are united by shared ecological, social, cultural or spiritual values and are
willing to scale down their current lifestyle, to live just by their basic needs, and heighten their level of consciousness. Day-
albagh, which means the Garden of Merciful is an example of a successful and blissful eco-village. This is the holiest pilgrim-

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age or the spiritual home for the followers of Radhasoami Faith. It is the place where meditation can be practiced at the
highest level to attain the Ultimate Truth of life. Similar eco-villages in are Murar in rural east India, Rajaborari and Timarni
tribal areas in forests of central India, and Melathiruvenkatanathpuram in deep South India, which are running on Dayal-
bagh lines. People residing in such eco-villages attain higher consciousness level in due course.

F22 New Tendencies in Hindu Religion

Sharma Prem Kali
Nineteenth century India witnessed an awakening in political, social, religious and cultural spheres which, in turn, gave rise
to many reform movements. These new tendencies in Hindu Religion emerged in the form of Brahma-Samaj, Prarthana
Samaj, Arya Samaj, Theosophical Society and Ramakrishna Mission. New tendencies in Hindu religion reflect the opposi-
tion to superstitions, religious dogmas and distorted traditions. These new tendencies made an effort to bring out the reality
of human religion and worked continuously towards the aim of relating human beings to religion.

F23 Entrepreneurial Intuition

Dayal Arsh
Successful entrepreneurs are passionate innovators and risk-takers who have extraordinarily accurate hunches about the
locus of new future business opportunities (La Pira and Gillin, 2006, Bradley, 2006). Streaks of entrepreneurial intuition are
profoundly visible in the most successful entrepreneurs of our times such as Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Warren Buffet, Dhirubhai
Ambani, Azim Premji or even among certain business communities, such as Gujaratis in India. They are passionate innova-
tive risk-takers whose actions are informed by accurate intuitions about future business opportunities. Often such intuitive
foreknowledge involves perception of implicit information about non-local objects and / or events. The intuitive basis of
entrepreneurship is that part of entrepreneurial decision and action that is not based on reason or logic, or on memories or
extrapolations from the past, but is based, instead, on accurate foreknowledge of the future. McCraty, Atkinson, and Bradley
(2004) defined such foreknowledge of a future event as intuition, and viewed intuition as a process by which information
normally outside of the range of conscious awareness is immediately sensed and perceived which could be in the form of
dream, flash or intuition.
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, where consciousness pervades all aspects of life, is the living embodiment of the inno-
vative educational initiatives of Dayalbagh over the century long period and endevaours to develop entrepreneurial intuition
among its graduates through the twin features of educational values and quality teaching, and involve initiatives like coop
training and Virtual Incubation Centre. Even the Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch-OR) theory of consciousness
recognizes a fundamental additional ingredient to our presently understood laws of Nature, which plays an important role at
the Planck-scale level of space-time structure. The answer lies in the Spiritual System Theory Framework (Satsangi, 2013).
Telepathy holds the answer at the next frontier beyond current status of teleportation or even, a possible “all quantum tel-
eportation” in future.

F24 Spiritual Exercise and Meditation Training at Workplace

Mittal Priyanka
Sandhu Dayal
The motive of this paper is to highlight the spiritual values and work life by means of meditation training and spiritual ex-
ercise at workplace. The paper also addresses values and spirituality which are considered conventionally to be the preroga-
tives of religion and they are observed as being embodied in the household unit. Meditation helps us to detach from damag-
ing practices of feeling, thought and reaction. This outcome is a conscious, optimistic release of energy which progresses the
quality of our attitude, movements, and interactions.

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 T S C 2 0 1 5 E ast - W est F oru m A b stracts

F25 Is Investment Decision of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) A

Conscious Choice? A study of Indian MSMEs Using Multiple Case Study Approach
Kandikonda Santi Swarup
Sri-Narain Mukti
Narain Karan
Life of a business is the sum of all the decisions taken by the entrepreneur. Of all the choices entrepreneurs make, in-
vestment decisions are critical to the survival and growth of firms. These are irreversible. So the question that arises is
whether these are conscious choices or not. A conscious investment choice results in deeper awareness i.e., from under-
standing to experience and planning. A conscious choice leads to higher chances of business continuity and success.
So the objective of this study is to gain an understanding of factors influencing entrepreneurs choice of investment and
their perception of associated risks. A qualitative phenomenological study using multiple case study approach is used
here to study Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) in India. A purposive sample of 24 entrepreneurs in four
groups: six are planning to become entrepreneurs, six running micro business, six from small business and six from me-
dium business who have approached Business Advisory Clinic (BAC) for investment advise was considered. The set-
ting for this study is Agra, India. Data was collected using in-depth semi structured interviews and it was analyzed
using thematic analysis. The three stages identified for a conscious choice are understanding, experience and planning.
In majority of cases, the entrepreneurs only crossed the first stage before considering investment choice. This study indicates
that entrepreneurs perceive that they have to invest for various reasons like economies of scale, for increasing margins, com-
peting in the marketplace etc. They do not understand the risks and they feel that they do not have control when it comes
to investment. The need therefore is for entrepreneurial education to develop deeper awareness of investment choice and
associated risks.

F26 Consciousness- Divinity and Trinity of Human Form

Arora Kanta
Indian philosophy revolves around the belief that consciousness is that form, from which all things are born, and after being
born they live, and into which they merge when they cease to be. It explains its trinity of function of creation, preservation
and dissolution, trinity of modes of nature i.e. Rhythm, activity and inertia. Christianity describes the trinity of divinity as
God the father, the son and the messenger. I endeavor to explain the experience of microcosm of trinity of divinity as aware-
ness, strong urge and natural inclination in human forms. The paper explains that among all the uncertainties of life, there
are certain physical and experiential realities known to all and there is overshadow of natural urges and inclinations in indi-
vidual human form. I consider human life to be a tool, a technician and transmitter (the apparatus that transmits the wireless
waves through the air or telegraphic apparatus which converts sound waves) of divinity or the Ultimate Reality.

F27 Peace Education for Universal Consciousness

Srivastava Savita
Education for total consciousness is an ingenious, inspired, self- enlightening process for human development and divine
recognition. The consciousness of man is as old as humanity. The quest for understanding the nature of Universal Con-
sciousness is inherent in the senses as butter in milk. When the sensory consciousness becomes more and finer, it opens a
high way to Universal Consciousness. The whole creation is within the parameters of awareness. The cosmic consciousness
is so mysterious in its nature and proportions that no man conceives it in terms of his intelligence.

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F28 Treating Vital Force Induces Holistic Healing and not mere Symptom Relief:
A Pilot Study
Saraswathi Sudha
Kumar Vijai
A lot of research is in progress on measuring spiritual quotient of people and astonishingly many tests done on thousands of
pupils across the world gave a similar result that the spiritual quotient that differentiates man from other living creatures is
responsible for the qualities like outlook about life, humility, compassion etc. This paper is an attempt to find out the effect
of one being spiritually inclined on healing. A study was done on 200 patients to observe the effect of spiritual inclination
(esoteric practices) on outcome of the treatment.

F29 Consciousness and reality

Perfjell Christer
Consciousness is a form of energy that exist every where, and we all is a part of it. We can feel the rest of the consciousness
but we can not see, hear, touch or even think about it. The consciousness have created the brain and the brain is a small tool
for the consciousness to make a reality of all those energy field around us.
I will teach how I do, and then others can find their own ways to knowledge about their own life they live, and then they
can find their own special path in this life, and then we all will be a life. Like the cells in the body who have their own truth of
where they shall be, and what they shall do, and for how long time they shall be there. Then they together will be one life and
in this case a life for a Human. We will then be the same for the next level of consciousness, a life for our Father, God, Allah,
or some other name on the “thing” that science call consciousness.

F30 Consciousness of Vedanta and Modern Science

Srivastava Preeti
Srivastava Savita
Vision of Vedanta enlightens us that man’s real nature is conscious. But we do not properly grasp the idea because of ‘Maya’
(ignorance). The search for Truth compels us to watch the operation of the ego in our own consciousness. Unity in Diversity
is the plan of nature and the ‘Mahavakyas’ (great words) of Indian thought like ‘Aham Brahmasmi’, ‘Tatvamasi’, ‘Ayamatma
Brahma’ and ‘Prajnanam Brahma’ speak volumes of the real nature of total consciousness. In Vedanta there is no distinction
between subjective and objectives knowledge.

F31 Exploring Consciousness

Sahni Sudhir
Sahni Renu
Several questions about consciousness must be resolved in order to acquire a full understanding of it. These questions in-
clude, but are not limited to, whether being conscious could be wholly described in physical terms, such as the aggrega-
tion of neural processes in the brain. If consciousness cannot be explained exclusively by physical events, it must transcend
the capabilities of physical systems and require an explanation of non-physical means. The Eastern perspective believes that
there is a third, in fact the most important, dimension of consciousness – the spiritual dimension. Trying to explain con-
sciousness without introducing this dimension is akin to the parable of the ‘blind men and an elephant’. The parable implies
that each one’s subjective experience can be true, but that such experience is inherently limited by its failure to account for
other truths or a totality of truth.

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 Conference
information

Practical information 396

Registered participants 400
Name Index 406
Conference rooms 414
Map of Helsinki 418

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Practical information

Conference venue
The conference venue is located in the Main Building of the University of Helsinki (official
address: Fabianinkatu 33). You can access the building either from Fabianinkatu (33) or
Unioninkatu (the Senate Square side). Most of the conference rooms are located on the Sen-
ate Square side, in the old wing of the building.

Registration and information

You will find the conference registration and information desk on the ground floor of the old
side (take the stairs down from the main lobby of the old side when entering from the Senate
Square).

IT IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED, THAT CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS PICK UP

THEIR CONFERENCE MATERIAL ON MONDAY TO AVOID THE TUESDAY MORN-
ING RUSH HOUR AT THE REGISTRATION DESK.

The registration desk accepts ONLY CASH PAYMENTS.

The registration and information desk will be in your service

Monday : 8:00 – 20:00

Tuesday: 8:00 – 18:30
Wednesday: 8:00 – 17:00
Thursday: 8:00 – 18:30
Friday: 8:00 – 19:00
Saturday: 8:30 – 15:00

Registration desk phone number: +358440612273.

Accessibility
The Great Hall in which the keynote and plenary lectures take place is accessible by wheel
chair. The concurrent sessions take place in small auditoriums about half of which are acces-

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 P ractica l infor m ation

sible by wheelchair. The auditoriums I, II, III, IV and room 3 are accessible by wheel chair,
whereas auditoriums IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI are not. The conference receptions,
conference lunches, poster session and conference dinner are accessible by wheel chair.
The wheel chair entrance of the main building is located on the new side of the builiding
(address: Fabianinkatu 33).

Technical assistance in the conference rooms

If you need technical assistance or encounter technical problems, please contact any of the
conference assistants.
You can also contact the building managers +358 9 191 22338 (old side entrance).

Internet
1. If you have downloaded Eduroam on your computer and your home university uses Edu-
roam, you connect to University of Helsinki Eduroam network with the internet username
and password of your home institution.
2. The University WLAN (HUPnet) is free of charge. You need a username and a password
in order to log in. You can find your temporary username and password in your conference
material envelope. Please save the username and password throughout the conference.
Your laptop should automatically find the University HUPnet when you are inside the
Main Building. Just select the “Univ Helsinki HUPnet” from the list of available wireless net-
works and the log in -page should automatically open.

Social Media
The social media hashtag for the conference is #tsc2015.
Follow the account TSC 2015 on Twitter for the latest conference updates.
The facebook group ”TSC 2015” is meant for the conference participants to organize their
own unofficial collegial meetings before, during and after the conference days. The facebook
group can also be used to present questions to the local organizing committee and to share
conference photos and useful links.

Luggage room
You can leave your luggage at the registration desk on Saturday. There are also lockers meant
for backpacks and smaller items on the ground floor of the Main Building (New side).

Lunch
Light lunches on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday are included in the con-
ference fee. Lunch is served at the Great Hall foyers, the press hall and at the Teacher’s café (on
the first floor of the old side of the main building)

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Coffee and refreshments

Coffee and tea will be served on Wednesday (16:00 – 16:30), Thursday and Friday (9:00 –
9:30, 15:00 – 15:30), and Saturday (9:00 – 9:30, 15:30 – 16:00) next to the conference rooms
on the 2nd floor (the Finnish 3rd floor).

• Karl Fazer Café, Kluuvikatu 3

• Café Engel, Aleksanterinkatu 26
• Espresso Edge, Liisankatu 29
• Ciao Café, Aleksanterinkatu 28
• Torrefazione Fratello, Yliopistonkatu 6
• Café Neuhaus, Unioninkatu 32
• Gran Delicato Galleria Esplanad, Kämp Gallery, Pohjoisesplanadi 29

The University café on the ground floor of the Main building (new side) is open on Monday,
Tuesday Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (8:30 – 15:30).

Dinner Restaurants
There are many nice restaurants in the city centre close to the Main Building. In these restau-
rants you can have both lunch and dinner:

• Restaurant Aino, Pohjoisesplandi 21

• Belge Bar & Bistro, Kluuvikatu 5
• Sasso, Pohjoisesplanadi 17
• Kappeli, Eteläesplanadi 1
• Il Siciliano, Aleksanterinkatu 36
• Restaurant Sunn, Aleksanterinkatu 26

You can find more restaurants at www.eat.fi.

ATM
The nearest ATM is located on Aleksanterinkatu 30 inside the Nordea Bank head office. The
Nordea head office is opposite to the University main building on Aleksanterinkatu. There are
also several other ATM’s on Aleksanterinkatu.

Shopping
Most department stores and shopping centres are open Monday-Friday 9:00-21:00, on Satur-
day 9:00-18:00, and on Sunday 12:00-18:00.

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Tourist information
The tourist information point is located on Pohjoisesplanadi 19. See also
www.visithelsinki.fi.

Police and medical assistance

If you need to call the police or need an ambulance, the emergency number is: 112.

Taxi
Dial 0100 0700 to call a taxi. Taxis are rather expensive but safe. Taxis accept all major credit
cards.

Arriving in Helsinki
By plane: Helsinki-Vantaa airport.
Connections to the city center (railway station) from the airport:
• Taxi (40-50 €)
• Finnair City Bus (6-7 €),
• Public Transport Bus (c. 5 €),
Helsinki is also easily reached by high-class ferries from Stockholm (overnight trips) and from
Tallinn (several ferries, duration 1.5 to 3.5 hours). There is also a direct train connection to St.
Petersburg (4 hours).

Transportation in Helsinki
You can find information about timetables and routes of public transport at the Helsinki Jour-
ney Planner. (www.hsl.fi)
There are numerous taxi stands around the city centre. To order a taxi, you can call +358
100 0700 at any time (more information at www.taksihelsinki.fi). Taxis can also be hailed (if
the taxi light is on).

Weather
The average day temperature is around 17 °C in Helsinki in early June. There might be occa-
sional rain showers, and in the night the temperature might drop down to 10 °C, so remember
to take some warm clothes and an umbrella with you.

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(by 10 May 2015)

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 Name index

Agargun Mehmet Yucel Arikan Sandikcioglu Pakize Berkovich-Ohana Aviva 342

71, 280 242 Bernardi Luciano 48
Agarwal Sapna Arnold John 65, 217 Besedin Artem 66, 243
78, 82, 329, 387 Arora Jyoti 379 Bhatia Namita 381
Arora Kanta  84, 393 Bhat Laxminarayan  383
Agarwal Siddharth Arstila Valtteri 127 Bhatnagar Anjoo  380
82, 387, 55 Aru Jaan  115 Bhatnagar Phool Chand 343
Astikainen Piia 72, 287 Bhat Seema 383
Ahlsén Elisabeth  104 Atmanspacher Harald  Bhaumik Mani  376
Ahmadpour Shahriar 62, 167 91, 111, 344 Bilimoria Purushottama 289
Ahuja Sona Awret Uzi  168 Binder Marek 69, 273
71, 75, 284, 307, 346 Bachmann Talis  119, 120 Blackmore Susan  97
Akula Chandramouli 67, 261 Bach Michael 313 Bleau Renee 66, 235
Alfredo Paternoster 61, 162 Bader Rolf 361 Block Richard 313
Allen John JB  99 Baer Wolfgang  169 Boly Melanie 120
Allwood Jens 103 Bahtnagar Anjoo A 343 Borgheai Seyyed Bahram
Almér Alexander 103 Baker Richard  169 76, 319
Al Miskry Abdullah Seif Balcerak Jackson Magdalena Bortolan Anna 336
76, 318 154 Boshoff Lieze 77, 320
Anand Vaidya 289 Bandyopadhyay Anirban  376 Bosinski Cameron 211
Andersson Jon Erik 167 Bardon Adrian 141 Bothereau Fabrice  170
Andriyanova Natalya 73, 294 Barker Stephen 200 Boyes Arielle 130
Anstey Josephine 80, 358 Barrett Nathaniel 224 Bradley Postle 120
Antonia Giannoccaro 81, 370 Bayne Timothy 133 Brandmeyer Tracy 266
Antti Revonsuo  135 Beal Daniel 71, 281 Brazdau Ovidiu 317
Anubhooti Verma 68, 265 Becev Ondrej 66, 242 Brázdil Milan 66, 242
Araki Kenji 64, 210 Beem Lance 80, 354 Breaux Steven J.  359
Araya Jose M. 296 Bend Hannes 359 Brito Ana 80, 366
Archana Kapoor 379 Bennett Tyler 123 Brown Derek 289
Arieli Amos 342 Beran Jim 70, 275 Brugger Peter  112
Berendzen J.C.  315 Brugnoli Paola 55

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 N a m e inde x

Bruza Peter  92 Cooley Sterling  99 Edwards Jonathan 172

Bucci Alessio 218 Coward Andrew 267 Egoyan Alexander
Bucelli Irene 236 Craddock Travis J. A.  93 78, 324, 330
Buller Tom  200 C. Tena-Calderon Brandia Electra Dorian  62, 173
Burke Ryan  71, 283 213 Elpidorou Andrea 116
Buttingsrud Camille 337 C. Tena-Calderon Brandia, 64 Emami Ahmad 61, 149
Byrne Darragh 201 Dalkvist Jan 64, 207 Emerson Phillip 297
Cadirci Fadime 71, 280 Daoust Louise 251 Emrén Allan 320
Cahill Reginald T. 141 Das Bhatia Soami  381 Engelen Eva-Maria 251
Camargo-Perez Luis 70, 278 David Chalmers 87 Erdogan Cem 69, 272
Canpolat Gamze 69, 272 Davies Kim 219 Fach Wolfgang  112
Capolupo Antonio 279 Dayal Arsh  392 Fairhurst Merle  106
Card Charles 306 Dayalbagh Vijai Kumar 343 Farleigh Peter 149
Carlo Ventura
 58 Day Latasha 79, 350 Farmer Harry 106
Carmel David 284 Day Nick 360 Farooqui Ausaf 266
Carruth Alex  170 Delorme Arnaud 266 Farrell Jonathan 150
Caswell Joseph 71, 283 de Miranda Luis 81, 371 Farzmahdi Amirhossein 273
Cavalcante Felix Francisco de Paiva Gilberto 64, 209 Fazekas Peter 285
Helio 63, 202 Derda Monika 69, 273 Filippova Margarita 75, 304
Cavaller Victor 65, 227 Dhir Bani Dayal  374 Fingelkurts Alexander  50, 53
Cavedon-Taylor Daniel Diaz-Leon Esa  116 Fingelkurts Andrew 50, 53
67, 249 Dienes Zoltan 304 Fink Sascha Benjamin 336
Champagne Marc 124 Dijkstra Sietske 80, 364 Fischer M.  70, 277
Chand Bhatnagar Phool 380 Dilek Caglan Cinar 226 Flockhart Carson 130
Changeux Jean-Pierre  87 Dinis Pereira Vitor Manuel Foghi Khadijeh  62, 167
Chaturvedi Devendra  380 65, 219 Forrest Peter 173
Chaturvedi D. K.  78, 329 Dolega Krzysztof  63, 202 Foultier Petronella 252
Chatzopoulos Andreas 147 Donaldson John  171 Frammartino Wilks Anna 190
Chauhan Vaibhav 81, 367 Dorsey Jonathan 65, 220 Franken Dirk 150
Cheng Tony  171 Douglas E. Friesen 378 Frecska Ede 70, 275
Chen Yen 72, 285 Doyle Denise  124 Fredriksson Ingrid
Chernov Roman 75, 304 Dranseika Vilius 236 78, 330, 333
Chevalier Jean-Marie 65, 228 Drobná E. 70, 277 Freeman Walter
Choi Yeoul 74, 302 Drobný M. 70, 277 50, 51, 101, 151, 279
Chopra Deepak  97 Duggins Andrew 290 Friedel Evelyn 344
Chrisley Ron 304 Dulany Donelson 260 Friedman Doron 365
Chuang Yi Hsin 147 Dunston G 66, 237, 331 Fuscà Marco 72, 292
Churchland Patricia S.  88 Dyukarev Mikhaile  61, 148 Gabriel Rami 76, 317
Ciaunica Anna  106, 307 Dzhafarov Damir  203 Gackenbach Jayne  130
Clarke Sam 67, 249 Dzhafarov Ehtibar 203 Gáliková Silvia 61, 151
Coelho Mollo Dimitri 250 Ebrahimpour Reza 273 Gaona Jose 71, 283
Colapietro Vincent 122 Edwards Christopher 324 Garcia Armando 66, 237

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 4 0 7

N a m e inde x

García-Valdecasas Miguel224 Hamblin Caitlin 227 Ilmoniemi Risto  118

Garfinkel Sarah 109 Hambrecht-Wiedbusch Ishikawa Tetsuo
Gedeon Tom 267 Viviane 69, 271 73, 76, 294, 316
Gennaro Rocco J.  98, 374 Hameroff Stuart  94, 99, 373 Issajeva Jelena 121, 254
Geradin-Laverde Loraine 152 Hamid Abdalla A. R. M.  Ivanchei Ivan 73, 295
Ghim Sungchan 74, 302 76, 318 Ivanovskyy Mykola 74, 301
Gibb Sophie 170 Hammond Emily 337 Ivantchev Boyan 67, 261
Gibson Raechelle 133 Hamžík J.  70, 277 Jaan Aru 120
Gierstl Ludwig 238 Hanoglu Lutfu Jacobi Thomas  107
Gill Richard 62, 174 69, 71, 272, 280 Jain Sanjay  83, 391
Goff Philip  95 Harel Michal 342 Jakub Jonkisz 61, 155
Gokmen Arzu 153 Hari Riitta 89 Jamieson Susan 77, 327
Gök Selvi Elif 74, 301 Harley Trevor 281, 296 Jansen Franz 321
Goldgaber Deborah 153 Haukioja Jussi 193 Janssen-Lauret Frederique235
Golshani Mehdi 76, 319 Havel Ivan M.  338 Jaskolla Ludwig 238
Goncalves Coelho Jonas  212 Hayward Max 253 Jeuk Alexander 255
Goodman Maurice 321 Heil John  92 Jo Han-Gue 248
Gordeeva Olga 79, 352 Heim Derek 74, 303 John Small 77, 323
Gordon Shirley  351 Heinänen Hannu  66, 238 Joli Jacob 77, 194, 320
Gorjup Niko 72, 286 Helvaci Yilmaz Nesrin Jurchis Razvan 73, 295
Gorjup Rado 72, 286 69, 71, 272, 280 Kajonius Petri 315
Gosseries Olivia 120 Herbert Beate M. 108, 109 Kakko Tommi 357
Goswami Neelni  83, 389 Hermoso-Duran Juan 64, 212 Kak Subhash  375
Grandy John 70, 276 Hietanen Jari K. 72, 287 Kakuda Kanna 271
Grankvist Gunne  63, 192 Hiley Basil. J. 86 Kallio Ilkka 156
Grasso Matteo 192, 218 Hinterberger Thilo 248 Kallioinen Minna 68, 269
Gruber Ronald 313 Hintikka Jaakko  86 Kallionpää Roosa 68, 269
Grygiel Wojciech 67, 244 Hirvonen Ilmari  193 Kallio Sakari  274
Guevara Erra Ramon 77, 325 Hirvonen Jonni 68, 268 Kallio-Tamminen Tarja  377
Gupta Arun Kumar 77, 326 Hizarci Burcu 69, 272 Kandikonda Santi Swarup 
Gupta Chhavi 384 Hoffman Donald 185 84, 393
Gupta Gopi Chand  384 Hohenberger Annette 74, 301 Kanellou Aspasia 244
Gupta Priti  382 Holbrook Dwight  62, 174 Kant Pratul 67, 245
Gupta Saatviki 77, 326 Homeyer Léon 207 Karande Aarshin 343
Gupta Satendra 343 Honderich Ted  175 Karinen Annika 298
Guta Mihretu 224 Horan Majella 77, 323 Karvonen Hannu  63, 195
Haanila Heidi 154 Horowitz Amir 253 Karvonen Milla 68, 269
Habra Jacques 334 Howe E. Alexander 175 Kasperbauer T.J.  262
Hagelin John  377 Hsu Shao-An 176 Katz Debra 80, 354
Hahami Avital 342 Hunt Tam, J.D.  142 Kauppinen Tommi  63, 195
Hakkarainen Jani 140 Hytönen-Ng Elina 79, 348 Kelvin McQueen  87
Hale Jo  106 Ikaheimo Heikki 254 Ken Zhi Abraham Lim 67, 245

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 N a m e inde x

Keric Vjeran 255 Laveman David 81, 371 Manzotti Riccardo 179
Key Brian  63, 203 Leal Rachel 75, 310 Marecek Radek 66, 243
Keys Cameron 228 LeBlanc Andre 246 Marinova Mila 287
Kharkhurin Anatoliy 361 Lee Seohee 74, 302 Markan CM 382
Kilakos Dimitris 65, 229 Lee UnCheol 94 Marraffa Massimo 239
Kilpinen Erkki 122 Lehman Brendan 327 Marta Jorba 339
Kinnunen Sanna 350 Lemaires Stephane 203 Martarelli Corinna S. 73, 300
Kirchhoff Michael D. 56 Lesar Mateja 81, 368 Martens Judith 67, 257
Kiverstein Julian 56, 128 Levine Seth 72, 73, 292, 293 Martikainen Viljo 161
Kizilarslan Deniz 69, 272 Lieze Boshoff  194 Martínez-Manrique Fernando
Kjellman Arne  176 Liljenström Hans 246 299
Klincewicz Michal 128 Lim Jijun 74, 302 Martins Jorge Emanuel
 60
Knowles Jonathan 157 Limnell Petteri 62, 178 Mashour George  69, 271
Kocsis Anna 255 Lim Sung Moon 74, 302 Massimini Marcello  119
Koculak Marcin 69, 273 Lim Sung Moon 302 Mast Fred W. 73, 300
Komuda Radoslaw 64, 208 Lindesay J 331 Mathur Gaurav  82, 386
Kondor Zsuzsanna 61, 158 Lindqvist Daniela 48 Mathur Gazal 379
Kordeš Urban 81, 368 Lindström Jonathan  64, 207 Mathur Reena 82, 386
Kornmeier Jürgen 344 Lini Giacomo  207 Mathur Sohang  379
Kostina Daria 75, 305 Lins Marcos 75, 310 Mathur Vineeta
Kozel Susan 125 Lisowski Grzegorz 195 78, 82, 332, 387
Kozma Robert Llamas Erick  178 McBride Russ 309
50, 52, 101, 279 Lo Dico Giuseppe 229 McGowan Luke  180
Kronholm Erkki  137 Loorits Kristjan 179 McKenty Adam 66, 196, 231
Kumari Srivastava Prem Lukas Wolfgang 66, 230 Megvinyte Marija 67, 263
83, 390 Lukowska Marta 76, 310 Mehra Jyoti 75, 307
Kumar Jyoti 70, 83, 274, 390 Luna Luis Eduardo 70, 275 Mehrotra Seema 76, 312
Kumar Vijai  84, 380, 394 Lyke Jennifer 348 Meini Cristina 239
Kurian P 66, 237, 331 Lynn Steven Jay  90 Melnyk Andrew 180
Kuznetsov Anton 177 Lyyra Pessi 72, 287 Metcalfe Janet 291
Laatikainen Tiina  138 Määttänen Pentti 258 Michels Robert 197
Ladyman James  95 MacPhail Jean C.  78, 345 Mihailis Diamantis 204
Lähteenmäki Vili  139 Maguire Phil 159 Mihalik Jakub  181
Laiho Timo 361 Maguire Rebecca 159 Mika Carl 339
Laine Pauli 73, 299 Maister Lara  89 Miller Gregory 62, 182
Laitinen Arto 262, 365 Majchrowicz Bartosz 76, 311 Miller James 225
Laks Alex 158 Maksakova Olga  160 Miller Steven 270
Lambert-Mogiliansky Ariane  Maksimow Anu 68, 269 Minafra Annamaria 362
92 Malach Rafael 342 Miracchi Lisa  133
Lamoš Martin 66, 242 Manly Tom 266 Miroshnikov Sergey 75, 304
Lara Juan Jose  67, 256 Mantar Nagihan 71, 280 Mittal Priyanka
Launay Jacques  107 Mantovaara Riitta 48 83, 84, 388 392

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N a m e inde x

Mnatsakanian Elena 282 Parkash Sam 78, 329 Renate Rutiku 119
Mogi Ken Parthemore Joel 247 Re Tania 58
73, 76, 282, 294, 316 Passos Claudia 259 Revonsuo Antti
Mölder Bruno 128 Pättiniemi Ilkka 231 68, 90, 136, 137, 138, 269
Monk Rebecca 74, 303 Paulewicz Boryslaw Richa 78, 329
Monto Simo 68, 268 72, 292, 312 Robertson Christopher 270
Moran Alex  182 Paul Sarla 81, 369 Roelofs Luke  187
Mørch Hedda Hassel  183 Paunio Tiina  138 Roinila Markku  188
Morgan Alexander 257 Pearson Francis 198 Rouleau Nicolas 71, 283, 327
Mulder Jesse 161 Peatfield Nicholas A.,  114 Rousi Rebekah 75, 306
Mun Cecilea 81, 367 Pennington Charlotte 74, 303 Roy Saran Pyari 80, 363
Muñoz-Jimenez Daniel Pentikäinen Juha
 58, 60 Roy Sukhdev
64, 70, 213, 278, Perez Velazquez Jose Luis 79, 80, 346, 363, 380, 381
Muñoz-Jiménez Gerardo 77, 325 Russomano Thais 125
64, 213 Perfjell Christer  84, 394 Rutiku Renate 120
Naama Kostiner  144 Perry Lacey  203 Ryan Nefdt 162
Nanay Bence 285 Pietarinen Ahti-Veikko 123 Rzepka Rafal 64, 208, 210
Nandita Gupta 77, 326 Pilotti Jan 62, 184 Saarinen Jussi 340
Narain Karan Pirhonen Jari 80, 365 Sahgal Sanjeev  83, 388
84, 384, 391, 393 Popova Svetlana 77, 328 Sahgal Smita 83, 388
Naumenko Olga 75, 305 Powell Diane 355 Sahibzada Amit Dayal
Neisser Joseph 183 Power Sean 129 82, 386
Nevgi Anne 368 Pozdniakov Ivan 79, 352 Sahni Mukti 84, 391
Ney Alyssa  92 Prakash Chetan  185, 382 Sahni Pooja 70, 83, 274, 390
Nielsen Merin  197 Prasada Rao Durga  82, 387 Sahni Prakash 65, 227, 383
Nieminen Jaakko O.  120 Prem Lata V.  374 Sahni Pushpa 78, 84, 331, 391
Nigam Shalini 83, 389, 391 Puolakanaho Anne 350 Sahni Renu  84, 394
Noreika Valdas 137 Pyari Prem 385 Sahni Sudhir 84, 394
Nyman Thomas 313 Pyari Pritam 80, 363, 380 Sahni Vishal  340, 383
O’Conaill Donnchadh 184 Pyari Roy Saran  380 Saini Dayal  83, 388
Olivares del Campo Andrés Qureshi Adam 74, 303 Salice Alessandro 247
279 Rabin Gabriel  186 Samaha Jason 304
Onzo Ayako 73, 298 Rahul Mathur 68, 265 Sánchez Caviares Javier 224
Opre Adrian 73, 295 Rai Pratibha 83, 390 Sandhu Dayal 
Ovaska Anna 357 Raisuddin Shaikh 61, 163 83, 84, 379, 388, 392
Oyama Keizo 76, 316 Rajaee Shahid 273 Sandman Nils 68, 137, 269
Oz Huseyin 69, 272 Rangarajan Anand  186 Sanguinetti Joseph L.  99
Pal Dinesh 69, 271 Rani Prachi 76, 312 Sániová B.  70, 277
Palva Matias 68, 268 Raoult Aida 209 Saran Sant
Palva Satu 68, 114, 268 Raulefs Peter  54 79, 80,346, 363, 380, 381
Panda Ranjan 226 Ravindra Bhardwaj 379 Saran Sant 381
Papineau David  93 Ray Rajib 65, 226 Saraswathi Sudha 84, 394

4 1 0 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

 N a m e inde x

Sarihan Isik 220 Shin Nari 74, 302 Srivastav Nihar  380
Satne Glenda 247 Shiroman Prakash  220 Stamm Mihkel 120
Satsangee Nandita Shukla Saumya  83, 390 Steen Francis  215
81, 367, 369 Siclari Francesca 120 Stepanenko Walter  63, 189
Satsangi Anirudh Kumar Siedlecka Marta Sterpetti Fabio 232
82, 385 72, 76, 292, 310, 312 Sterrantino Giuliano  206
Satsangi Prem Saran Sikka Pilleriin 137 Stjernberg Fredrik  104
340, 373, 383 Silberstein Michael 56 Stockdale Bradford 216
Satsangi Ranjeet 83, 388 Silverman David  205 Stoll Joshua 62, 165
Satsangi Shipra  83, 387 Silverstein Brian 69, 271 StrozierJohn A.  210
Satsangi Sumiran 83, 387 Simoes Mario  60 Sudhish Prem Sewak 67, 245
Saulina Ekaterina 75, 308 Simon Judit 340 Suman Kumari  379
Sayim Bilge 72, 291 Singh Kamlesh 70, 274 Sundaram Mani 82, 386
Scharff Constance 334 Singh Preetvanti  82, 387 Sundaram Prem  82, 386
Scheinin Annalotta 68, 269 Singh Swati  83, 389 Sundin Per 196
Scheinin Harry 68, 269 Sinokki Jani 139 Sundström Pär  204
Schlicht Tobias 163 Sinyard Anne 130 Suwanthep Jitpanat 81, 369
Schlosser Ulysses 79, 349 Skoghol Christoffer t 215 Suzgun Eyup 71, 280
Schmidt Stefan Smith Kaleb 62, 164 Swami Sahni Pooja 65, 227
80, 248, 344, 356 Smortchkova Joulia 263 Swiatek Krzysztof 239
Schomaecker Astrid 222 Soffer-Dudek Nirit 351 Szymanska-Swiatek Elzbieta
Schooler Jonathan  141, 334 Sohrabi Ahmad 57 240
Schroeder Marcin J. 322 Sona Ahuja  380 Tallon-Baudry Catherine 114
Schumacher David 71, 283 Sotala Kaj 79, 241, 353 Tamori Yoshi 271
Schwarzbach Jens Sparby Terje 347 Tania Re 59
72, 292, 293 Spector Shirtz Aviv Tauqir Iram 363
Schwengerer Lukas 232 63, 79, 199, 353 Taylor Henry 288
Scott Ryan 304 Speth Clemens 281, 296 Telakivi Pii 165
Seager William 56, 96 Speth Jana 281, 296 Tessaro Lucas 71, 283
Sebastián Miguel Ángel 221 Sri-Narain Mukti Tezcan Gunay 69, 272
Seema Rani Bangalore 84, 391, 393 Thiel Holger 189
Nagaraja  82, 385 Sriramamurti P Thomsen Knud 72, 288
Seenappa Sunitha N  82, 385 62, 83, 164, 389 Tikka Pia  126
Seneca Jankel Nick 62, 188 Srivastava Anoop Tonkovic Mirjana 75, 308
Shahmoradi Ayoob 259 84, 382, 385, 391 Tononi Giulio 120
Sharan Swami 83, 390 Srivastava Dayal Pyari Toprak Guven
Shargel Daniel 214 84, 383, 384, 391 69, 71, 272, 280
Sharma Prem Kali 84, 392 Srivastava Mukti  384 Toshima Mayumi
Sharma Sadhna 81, 367 Srivastava Preeti 84, 394 73, 76, 294, 316
Sha Zhi Gang 191 Srivastava Savita Tsakiri Amalia 259
Shepherd Joshua 232 68, 84, 264, 393, 394 Tschacher Wolfgang 108, 110
Shiauhua Liu 72, 285 Srivastava Sumitra  381 Tsompanidis Vasilis 314

TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 4 1 1

N a m e inde x

Tuazon Jennifer Luna 317 Windt Jennifer M.  91

Tuominen Jarno  135, 136 Wittmann Marc 110, 248, 344
Turjman Odeh 65, 222 Woodward Philip  190
Ueng Yunn 67, 249 Worden Robert 64, 214, 216
Uryu Yuko 271 Wu Dylan 78, 333
Uygun Tunç Duygu  63, 199 Xiu Rulin  63, 191
Vadapalli Asha  82, 385 Yalciner Betul 71, 280
Vakalopoulos Costa 318 Yamanoglu Merve 
Valli Katja 69, 71, 272, 280
68, 130, 135, 136, 137, 269 Yampolskiy Roman 209
Valpola Harri 241 Yang Kai-Chung 65, 217
van Elk Michiel 298 Yasuko Kitano 156
van Mazijk Corijn 341 Yetter-Chappell Helen 118
Vatrap Ravi  211 Yilai Li 61, 159
Veillet Benedicte 117 Yildirim Erol 71, 280
Velmans Max  49, 241, 377 Yildiz Sultan 69, 71, 272, 280
Ventura Carlo
 60 Yli-Annala Kari 371
Vernazzani Alfredo 233 Yoo Hyeonjeong 74, 302
Vesterinen Tuomas 234 Zabbah Sajjad 273
Vicente Agustín 299 Zaccarini Cristina 81, 372
Vineeta Mathur 68, 265 Zahavi Dan  90
Vinos Michael 259 Zehra Noor 363
Vitiello Giuseppe Zhang Xin 290
50, 51, 58, 59, 101, 279 Zhou Jin 74, 303
von Lucadou Walter 77, 323
Vorobiova Alicia 79, 352
Vranic Andrea  75, 308
Vuorre Matti 291
Wagemans Johan 72, 291
Walach Harald 77, 323
Walling Peter 326
Wang Sheng 68, 268
Ward Dave 223
Weijer Charles 134
Weksler Assaf 117, 166
Westerlund Joakim  64, 207
Widdra Tobias 79, 352
Wierzchon Michal  69, 72, 76,
273, 292, 310, 311, 312
Wilson Louise 126
Wilson Margot 79, 347
Wilson Thomas 74, 260, 303

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TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 4 1 3
 Conference Rooms

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C onference R oo m s

4 1 6 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015

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TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015 – 4 1 7

C onference R oo m s

4 1 8 – TOWA R D A SCI E NCE OF CONSCIOUSN E SS 2015