Pecson v.

Coronel 45 Phil 216

FACTS: On November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and
testament of Dolores Coronel (testatrix) who named as her sole heir Lorenzo Pecson, the husband of her
niece. The relatives of testatrix by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following
grounds: First, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate
by excluding her blood relatives; and second, that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to
extraneous illegal influence.

ISSUE: Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate.

HELD: YES. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong but we understand
that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. There is nothing strange in the
preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as
her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the
most usual and customary, still this would not be null per se.“In the absence of any statutory restriction
every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he
pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite
capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud or undue influence,
the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can
prevent the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or
revenge can dictate.
BALANAY vs MARTINEZ 64 SCRA 452

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate children, Felix, Jr. Avelina,
Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia. She left a notarial will where she devised and partitioned of in the
will her husband’s one-half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Sr and Avelina opposed. Subsequently,
Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed and renounced his hereditary rights. However, Avelina continued
on with her opposition, alleging that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the
southern half of the conjugal lots and that she could not partition the conjugal estate. The lower court
declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding to an intestate proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will and the renunciation of the surviving spouse hereditary rights is valid

HELD: The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does not affect the validity of the other
dispositions. Except if the other dispositions is dependent on the first invalid disposition that has been
made. The valid parts should be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the
intention of the testator. Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half
share of the conjugal partnership but insofar as it partakes of a donation, it should be subject to the
limitations prescribed in Arts. 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be
respected. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy.
Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights.
MONTINOLA-SANSON vs. CA G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila
the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola, the testatrix, who died single,
parentless and childless at the age of 70. Private respondent who was named executor in the will filed
an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator with the conformity of all the relatives and
heirs of the testatrix except the oppositor, the court in its order appointed private respondent as Special
Administrator of the testate estate. Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of
the deceased but who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging
inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the
same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties
to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the
testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Holographic Will is valid

HELD: We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the
charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground for new
trial. Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry much probative weight which can alter
the judgment. It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose
of delaying the proceedings.

During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix
presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in
the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the
Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, 22 or the probate of
holographic wills.

The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was executed
according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by
evidence. We have examined the records of this case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by
the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law.

Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason,
being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus
demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.

In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24 it was held —The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in
this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's estate is an exceptional
case. It is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that
cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate
by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines
since 1889.
 Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. It is within the right of the
testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will.

Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her
estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind. We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841
of the Civil Code provides —A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an
heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted
should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.In such cases, the testamentary
dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall
pass to the legal heirs. Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of
her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound
mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate
succession. There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the
most authentic proof that decreased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will,
is the Will itself which according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence of
significant handwriting characteristics such as: Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing, good line
quality and presence of natural variation. The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line
quality could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind and/or
under undue influence or improper pressure when she the Will.
Nuguid vs Nuguid 17 SCRA 449

FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, surviving her were her parents –Felix and Paz, and 6 siblings.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the
ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are
compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the
institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir.

ISSUE: Whether the institution of one of the sister as the sole heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

HELD: Where the deceased left no descendants, but left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her
parents, her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether,
the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition “consists
in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”. The one sentence will instituting the petitioner as
the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or
bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
ACAIN vs IAC

G.R. No. 72706,

FACTS:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his
late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his
brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased
respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition
for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

RULING:

Article 854 of the Civil Code: The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prefudice to the right of representation. Preterition consists in the omission in
the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein,
or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted
daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives
to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted
and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child. The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYES

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will
and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of
Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of
whom were Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of
Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with
law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy
with petitioners being the compulsory heirs. It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply
that Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire
estate to the respondents as the latter's legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners
inferred that from the use of the terms, "sapilitangtagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and
"sapilitangmana" (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies
whereby, “the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written,
unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known
the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners’
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her
will.

HELD:

NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the
cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent's will does
not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look
at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely
favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for
her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what
she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance,
considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of
intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on
its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the
decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her will must be in order.
ANSELMA DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990

FACTS:

The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows: It is undisputed: 1)
that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother
Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that
Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother
of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona
Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona
Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor
children with Felixberta Pacursa. Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the
old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the
Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children
certain successional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. De Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD:

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate
children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In
whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves
illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.