Foam Firefighting Appliances For Helidecks and Helicopter Landing Area
Foam Firefighting Appliances For Helidecks and Helicopter Landing Area
Foam Firefighting Appliances For Helidecks and Helicopter Landing Area
Technical
Information
No. TEC-1090
Date 27 September 2016
To whom it may concern
The ninety-sixth session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC 96) was held at the IMO in London,
U.K. from 11 to 20 May 2016. Since the minutes, resolutions and circulars of the meeting were
recently released from the IMO, a summary of the decisions taken at MSC 96 is provided as below for
your information.
(2) Foam firefighting appliances for helidecks and helicopter landing area
(See attachments 2, 3, 5)
New chapter 17 of FSS Code which provides specifications for foam firefighting appliances
for the protection of helideck defined in SOLAS II-2/III and helicopter landing area (an area
on a ship designated for occasional or emergency landing of helicopter), and amendments to
SOLAS II-2/18 to make the provisions mandatory were adopted. Further, the amendments
to chapter 9 of the 2009 MODU Code (non-mandatory) were adopted with a view to
incorporate the requirements of amended FSS Code.
(3) Evacuation analysis for passenger ships (See attachments 3 and 17)
Ro-ro passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 1999 are required to conduct an
evacuation analysis for escape routes in accordance with existing SOLAS. At this session,
the amendments to SOLAS II-2/13 to require an evacuation analysis for passenger ships
carrying more than 36 passengers were adopted. Further, the amendments to Guidelines for
evacuation analysis for new and existing passenger ships (MSC.1/Circ.1238) were approved
in conjunction with its extended application (Please see section 3.2.(3)).
(To be continued)
NOTES:
ClassNK Technical Information is provided only for the purpose of supplying current information to its readers.
ClassNK, its officers, employees and agents or sub-contractors do not warrant the accuracy of the information contained herein and are not
liable for any loss, damage or expense sustained whatsoever by any person caused by use of or reliance on this information.
Back numbers are available on ClassNK Internet Homepage (URL: www.classnk.or.jp).
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
Following mandatory requirements were approved at this session, which are expected to be
considered for adoption at MSC 97 (November 2016).
(To be continued)
2
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
(iii) Use of butterfly valve as a collision bulkhead valve for cargo ships (Regulation 12)
A butterfly valve may be used for cargo ships as an alternative use of screw-down
valve. In that case, a butterfly valve shall be suitably supported by a seat or
flanges and capable of being operated from above the freeboard deck.
(3) Requirements for fire integrity of wheelhouse window for ships carrying liquefied gases in
bulk (See attachment 8)
Amendments to paragraph 3.2.5 of the IGC Code chapter 3 were approved, for deletion of
the provision that the wheelhouse windows facing the cargo area shall be constructed not less
than "A-0" class.
(4) Harmonization of survey periods of cargo ships subjected to and not subjected to the ESP
Code (See attachment 7)
Amendments to SOLAS chapter XI-1 introducing a new regulation XI-1/2-1 on
harmonization of survey periods of cargo ships subjected to and not subjected to the ESP
Code were adopted.
(5) Amendments to SOLAS II-1 on application of the Code on Noise levels on board ships (See
attachments 9 and 22)
Since the ships for which the building contract is placed before 1 July 2014, the keels of
which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 January 2015 and
the delivery of which is before 1 July 2018, do not fall either under MSC.337(91) or
A.468(XII), the amendments to SOLAS II-1/3-12 were approved with a view to apply the
requirements in A.468(XII) to the ships. In addition, Guidance on the application of
SOLAS Regulation II-1/3-12 to ships delivered before 1 July 2018 (MSC.1/Circ.1547) was
approved as an interim measure.
(To be continued)
3
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
3. The following unified interpretations (UIs) and guidelines were approved during MSC 96. IACS
Unified Interpretations (UI) shown as below are available on our website
(http://www.classnk.or.jp/) or that of IACS (http://www.iacs.org.uk/).
(2) UIs related to FSS Code 5,6 & 9 (See attachment 14)
- Regarding the control unit which releases carbon dioxide in three phases as prescribed
in FSS Code Chapter 5 paragraph 2.2.1.7, it is clarified that the release amount is not
depended on the respective volumes of each cargo hold space but on the volume of the
largest cargo hold space.
- Regarding foam-generating capacity of fixed foam fire-extinguishing systems, criteria
to be adopted when determining the size of the "largest protected space" of machinery
space of category A is clarified (based on IACS UI SC262).
- Regarding a cargo control room where the additional cargo control console for fixed fire
detection and fire alarm system is required, it is clarified that the room in which the
cargo control console is installed should be regarded as cargo control room even if it
does not serve as a dedicated cargo control room. (based on IACS UI SC271).
(4) UIs related to SOLAS III/6.4, 6.5 and LSA Code 7.2 (See attachment 16)
- Requirements of the audibility (sound pressure level) and installation of general
emergency alarm and public address system are clarified.
(5) UIs related to International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (See attachment 18)
- Regarding definition of position I and position II for determination of the coaming
height of hatchway, doorway and ventilators, interpretation for its upper limits and the
handling for the exposed deck such as a deckhouse etc. are clarified.
(To be continued)
4
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
3.2 Guidelines
(1) Guidance on methodologies for assessing operational capabilities and limitations in ice (See
attachment 11)
- This guidance addresses the development of methodologies for assessing the structural
capabilities and limitations in different ice regimes and operational modes when the ship
is operating in ice considering associated risks.
(2) Provisional guidelines on ship cyber security management (See attachment 12)
- These are non-mandatory guidelines on cyber risk management with a focus on
functional elements. Please see item 4.(2) below for more details.
(To be continued)
5
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
(3) Guidelines for evacuation analysis for passenger ships (See attachment 17)
- Guidelines provide a methodology to carry out evacuation analysis in passenger ships
including acceptable evacuation durations.
4. Others
Goal Based Standards (GBS) for new ship constructions applicable to Oil Tankers and Bulk
Carriers have been discussed since MSC 78 in 2004. At MSC 87 in May 2010, GBS and
amendments to SOLAS to implement GBS were adopted.
GBS is applied to Oil Tankers and Bulk Carriers of length 150m or above, contracted for
construction on or after 1 July 2016 or in case of absence of a contract, ships for which keel
laid on or after 1 July 2017 or delivered on or after 1 July 2020. Design and construction of
these ships shall comply with rules deemed as compliant with GBS. The verification audit on
rules of IACS members were conducted between March 2014 and July 2015. In December
2015, IACS and its members submitted corrective action plans in response to the audit
findings.
At this session, GBS verification audit reports and corrective action plans submitted by
IACS were considered. As a result of the deliberation, it was confirmed that rules of IACS
members comply with GBS. It was also confirmed that Oil tankers and Bulk carriers, which
are contracted for construction on or after 1 July 2016 and constructed in compliance with
these rules, should be deemed as compliant with GBS. IMO has published MSC.1/Circ.1518
to disseminate the results of MSC 96.
With the development of the recent information and communication technologies, advanced
cyber systems are being deployed not only in land based systems but also the maritime field.
It is expected that, in future, communication of electronic information and sharing of
intelligence between the ship and land based systems will be further accelerated. On the
other hand, examination of cybersecurity measures in the maritime field, in order to prevent
unauthorised access to the critical ship systems such as navigation, was discussed at IMO,
considering examples of several cyber-attacks and weaknesses of the cyber systems reported
in land based systems.
(To be continued)
6
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
Following amendments were agreed to be discussed at next MSC meeting (MSC 97) with a
view to adoption.
(To be continued)
7
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
Attachment:
1. RESOLUTION MSC.402(96)
2. RESOLUTION MSC.403(96)
3. RESOLUTION MSC.404(96)
4. RESOLUTION MSC.405(96)
5. RESOLUTION MSC.407(96)
6. DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS REGULATIONS II-2/1 AND II-2/10
7. DRAFT NEW SOLAS REGULATION XI-1/2-1
8. DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE IGC CODE
9. DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO SOLAS CHAPTER II-1
10. MSC.1/Circ.1518
11. MSC.1/Circ.1519
12. MSC.1/Circ.1526
13. MSC.1/Circ.1527
14. MSC.1/Circ.1528
15. MSC.1/Circ.1529
16. MSC.1/Circ.1530
17. MSC.1/Circ.1533
18. MSC.1/Circ.1534
19. MSC.1/Circ.1536
20. MSC.1/Circ.1539
21. MSC.1/Circ.1545
22. MSC.1/Circ.1547
8
Attachment 1. to
ClassNK Technical Information No. TEC-1090
ANNEX 1
RESOLUTION MSC.402(96)
(adopted on 19 May 2016)
RECOGNIZING the need to establish a uniform, safe and documented standard for
maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats
(including free-fall lifeboats) and rescue boats (including fast rescue boats), launching
appliances and release gear,
NOTING that, by resolution MSC.404(96), it adopted amendments to regulations III/3 and III/20
of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 ("the Convention"),
concerning maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair of
lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances and release gear,
NOTING ALSO that the aforementioned regulation III/20 of the Convention provides that
the maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair shall be
carried out in accordance with the Requirements for maintenance, thorough examination,
operational testing, overhaul and repair of lifeboats and rescue boats, launching appliances
and release gear ("the Requirements"),
ANNEX
1 GENERAL
1.2 The detailed procedures covered by these Requirements are provided in section 6.
1.4 The Company1 shall ensure that maintenance, thorough examination, operational
testing, overhaul and repair on board its ships is conducted in accordance with these
Requirements and SOLAS regulation III/20. The Company shall establish and implement
health, safety and environment (HSE) procedures covering all activities set out in these
Requirements.
1.5 The personnel carrying out maintenance, thorough examination, operational testing
overhaul and repair as described in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 shall be certified by an authorized
service provider in accordance with the requirements specified in section 8. When performing
such activities on board ships they shall comply with health, safety and environment (HSE)
instructions and procedures established by the Company.
2 APPLICATION
.1 lifeboats (including free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats and fast rescue boats; and
.2 launching appliances and on-load and off-load release gear for lifeboats
(including primary and secondary means of launching appliances for free-fall
lifeboats), rescue boats, fast rescue boats and davit-launched liferafts.
1
For the purpose of these Requirements, Company is as defined in SOLAS regulation IX/1.2.
3 AUTHORIZATION
3.1 Administrations shall ensure that the thorough examination, operational testing, repair
and overhaul of equipment (see paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3) shall be carried out in accordance
with SOLAS regulation III/20 by service providers authorized in accordance with section 7.
3.2 The requirements in section 7 shall equally apply to manufacturers when they are
acting as authorized service providers.
4.1 Weekly and monthly inspections and routine maintenance as specified in the equipment
maintenance manual(s), shall be conducted by authorized service providers, or by shipboard
personnel under the direction of a senior ship's officer in accordance with the maintenance
manual(s).
4.2 Annual thorough examinations and operational tests, as described in section 6.2, shall
be conducted by certified personnel of either the manufacturer or an authorized service
provider in accordance with section 7 and section 8. The service provider may be the ship
operator provided that it is authorized in accordance with section 3 and section 7.
2
See SOLAS regulations III/20.11.1.2, III/20.11.2.2 and III/20.11.3.2.
5.1 All reports and checklists shall be completed and signed by the person who carries
out the inspection and maintenance work and countersigned by the Company's representative
or the ship's master.
5.3 When thorough examination, operational testing, overhaul and repair are completed,
a statement confirming that the lifeboat arrangements remain fit for purpose shall be promptly
issued by the manufacturer or authorized service provider that conducted the work. A copy of
valid documents of certification and authorization as appropriate shall be included with
the statement.
6.1 General/Maintenance
6.2.1 All items listed in checklists for the weekly/monthly inspections required by SOLAS
regulations III/20.6 and III/20.7 also form the first part of the annual thorough examination.
6.2.2 Records of inspections and routine on-board maintenance carried out by the ship's
crew and the applicable certificates for the equipment shall be reviewed.
6.2.3 For lifeboats (including free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats and fast rescue boats,
the following items shall be thoroughly examined and checked for satisfactory condition and
operation:
.1 condition of the boat structure including fixed and loose equipment (including
a visual examination of the external boundaries of the void spaces, as far as
practicable);
.5 manoeuvring system;
.7 bailing system;
6.2.4 For release gear of lifeboats (including free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats, fast rescue
boats and liferafts, the following shall be thoroughly examined for satisfactory condition 3 and
operation after the annual operational test of the winch brake with the empty boat or equivalent
load, as required by paragraph 6.2.10:
.5 hook fastening.
Notes: 1 The setting and maintenance of release gear are critical operations
with regard to maintaining the safe operation of lifeboats (including
free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats, fast rescue boats and davit launched
liferafts. Utmost care shall be taken when carrying out all inspection
and maintenance operations on the equipment.
6.2.5 The operational test of davit-launched lifeboats' and rescue boats' on-load release
function shall be carried out as follows:
.1 position the boat partially in the water such that the mass of the boat is
substantially supported by the falls and the hydrostatic interlock system,
where fitted, is not triggered;
.4 examine the release gear and hook fastening to ensure that the hook is
completely reset and no damage has occurred.
3
Hanging-off pennants may be used for this purpose but should not remain connected at other times, such
as when the lifeboat is normally stowed and during training exercises. The release gear is to be examined
prior to its operational test. The release gear is to be re-examined after its operational test and the operational
test of the winch brake. Special consideration shall be given to ensure that no damage has occurred during
the winch brake test, especially to the hook fastening.
6.2.6 The operational test of davit-launched lifeboats' and rescue boats' off-load release
function shall be carried out as follows:
.4 recover the boat to the stowed position and prepare for operational readiness.
During the test, prior to hoisting, it shall be checked that the release gear is completely and
properly reset. The final turning-in of the boat shall be done without any persons on board.
6.2.7 The operational test of the free-fall lifeboat release function shall be carried out as
follows:
.1 engage the arrangements for the test without launching the lifeboat, required
by paragraph 4.7.6.4 of the LSA Code, as specified in the manufacturer's
operating instructions;
.6 remove the arrangements for the test without launching the lifeboat, required
by paragraph 4.7.6.4 of the LSA Code; and
6.2.8 The operational test of the davit-launched liferaft automatic release function shall be
carried out as follows:
.2 automatically release the hook with a dummy weight of 200 kg on the hook
when it is lowered to the ground; and
.3 examine the release hook and hook fastening to ensure that the hook is
completely reset and no damage has occurred.
If a raft is used for the test instead of a dummy weight, the automatic release function shall
release the raft when waterborne.
6.2.9 For launching appliances for lifeboats (including free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats, fast
rescue boats and liferafts, the following items shall be examined for satisfactory condition and
operation:
.4 if applicable:
.5 for winches:
.4 if applicable:
6.2.10 For winches of the launching appliances for lifeboats (including free-fall lifeboats),
rescue boats, fast rescue boats and liferafts, annual operational testing shall be done by
lowering the empty craft or boat or equivalent load. When the craft has reached its maximum
lowering speed and before the craft enters the water, the brake shall be abruptly applied.
Following these tests, the stressed structural parts shall be reinspected4 where the structure
permits the reinspection.
6.3.1 The five-year operational test of the winches of the launching appliances shall be
carried out with a proof load equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat
and its full complement of persons and equipment. When the proof load has reached its
maximum lowering speed, the brake shall be abruptly applied.
6.3.2 Following these tests, the stressed structural parts shall be reinspected4 where
the structure permits the reinspection.
4
In loading the craft or boat for this test, precautions should be taken to ensure that the stability of the craft
or boat is not adversely affected by free surface effects or the raising of the centre of gravity.
6.3.3 The operational tests and overhaul at five-year intervals of release gear for lifeboats
(including free-fall lifeboats), rescue boats, fast rescue boats and liferafts shall include:
6.3.4 Any other overhaul if required shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 6.3.3.
.5 a documented and certified quality system, which covers at least the following:
5
Non-destructive examination (NDE) techniques, such as dye penetrants (DPE), may be suitable.
7.2 Administrations shall ensure that information regarding authorized service providers
is made available.
.2 the Administration shall ensure that work continues, e.g. by periodic audit,
to be carried out in accordance with these Requirements, and shall withdraw
the authorization of service providers who are not in compliance; and
8.1 Personnel for the work specified in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 shall be certified by
the manufacturer or authorized service provider for each make and type of the equipment to
be worked on in accordance with the provisions in this section.
8.2.1 Initial certification shall be issued only to personnel having completed education,
training and competence assessment. Education shall address, as a minimum:
8.2.2 Training shall include practical technical training on thorough examination, operational
testing, maintenance, repair and overhaul techniques using the equipment for which the personnel
are to be certified. The technical training shall include disassembly, reassembly, correct
operation and adjustment of the equipment. Classroom training shall be supplemented by field
experience in the operations for which certification is sought, under the supervision of
a certified person.
8.3.1 Upon completion of training and competency assessment, a certificate shall be issued
defining the level of qualification and the scope of the certification (i.e. makes and types of
equipment and specifically state which activities in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 are covered by
the certification). The expiry date shall clearly be written on the certificate and shall be three
years from the date of issue. The validity of any certificate shall be suspended in the event of
any shortfall in performance and only revalidated after a further competency assessment.
***
ANNEX 2
RESOLUTION MSC.403(96)
(adopted on 19 May 2016)
NOTING resolution MSC.98(73), by which it adopted the International Code for Fire Safety
Systems ("the FSS Code"), which has become mandatory under chapter II-2 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 ("the Convention"),
NOTING ALSO article VIII(b) and regulation II-2/3.22 of the Convention concerning the procedure
for amending the FSS Code,
HAVING CONSIDERED, at its ninety-sixth session, amendments to the FSS Code proposed
and circulated in accordance with article VIII(b)(i) of the Convention,
4 REQUESTS the Secretary-General, for the purposes of article VIII(b)(v) of the Convention,
to transmit certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the amendments contained
in the annex to all Contracting Governments to the Convention;
5 REQUESTS ALSO the Secretary-General to transmit copies of this resolution and its
annex to Members of the Organization, which are not Contracting Governments to the Convention.
ANNEX
CHAPTER 8
AUTOMATIC SPRINKLER, FIRE DETECTION AND FIRE ALARM SYSTEMS
"2.4.1 General
2.4.1.1 Any parts of the system which may be subjected to freezing temperatures in
service shall be suitably protected against freezing.
2.4.1.2 Special attention shall be paid to the specification of water quality provided
by the system manufacturer to prevent internal corrosion of sprinklers and clogging
or blockage arising from products of corrosion or scale-forming minerals."
"CHAPTER 17
HELICOPTER FACILITY FOAM FIREFIGHTING APPLIANCES
1 Application
This chapter details the specifications for foam firefighting appliances for the protection
of helidecks and helicopter landing areas as required by chapter II-2 of the Convention.
2 Definitions
2.1 D-value means the largest dimension of the helicopter used for assessment
of the helideck when its rotors are turning. It establishes the required area of foam
application.
2.2 Deck integrated foam nozzles are foam nozzles recessed into or edge
mounted on the helideck.
2.3 Foam-making branch pipes are air-aspirating nozzles in tube shape for
producing and discharging foam, usually in straight stream only.
2.6 Hose reel foam station is a hose reel fitted with a foam-making branch pipe
and non-collapsible hose, together with fixed foam proportioner and fixed foam
concentrate tank, mounted on a common frame.
2.7 Monitor foam station is a foam monitor, either self-inducing or together with
separate fixed foam proportioner, and fixed foam concentrate tank, mounted on
a common frame.
2.8 Obstacle free sector is the take-off and approach sector which totally
encompasses the safe landing area and extends over a sector of at least 210º, within
which only specified obstacles are permitted.
2.9 Limited obstacle sector is a 150º sector outside the take-off and approach sector
that extends outward from a helideck where objects of limited height are permitted.
3.1 The system shall be capable of manual release, and may be arranged for
automatic release.
3.2 For helidecks the foam system shall contain at least two fixed foam monitors
or deck integrated foam nozzles. In addition, at least two hose reels fitted with
a foam-making branch pipe and non-collapsible hose sufficient to reach any part of
the helideck shall be provided. The minimum foam system discharge rate shall be
determined by multiplying the D-value area by 6 l/min/m2. The minimum foam system
discharge rate for deck integrated foam nozzle systems shall be determined by
multiplying the overall helideck area by 6 l/min/m2. Each monitor shall be capable of
supplying at least 50% of the minimum foam system discharge rate, but not less
than 500 l/min. The minimum discharge rate of each hose reel shall be at least 400 l/min.
The quantity of foam concentrate shall be adequate to allow operation of all connected
discharge devices for at least 5 min.
3.3 Where foam monitors are installed, the distance from the monitor to the farthest
extremity of the protected area shall be not more than 75% of the monitor throw in still
air conditions.
3.4 For helicopter landing areas, at least two portable foam applicators or two
hose reel foam stations shall be provided, each capable of discharging a minimum
foam solution discharge rate, in accordance with the following table.
The quantity of foam concentrate shall be adequate to allow operation of all connected
discharge devices for at least 10 min. For tankers fitted with a deck foam system,
the Administration may consider an alternative arrangement, taking into account
the type of foam concentrate to be used.
3.5 Manual release stations capable of starting necessary pumps and opening
required valves, including the fire main system, if used for water supply, shall be
located at each monitor and hose reel. In addition, a central manual release station
shall be provided at a protected location. The foam system shall be designed to
discharge foam with nominal flow and at design pressure from any connected
discharge devices within 30 s of activation.
3.6 Activation of any manual release station shall initiate the flow of foam solution
to all connected hose reels, monitors, and deck integrated foam nozzles.
3.7 The system and its components shall be designed to withstand ambient
temperature changes, vibration, humidity, shock impact and corrosion normally
encountered on the open deck, and shall be manufactured and tested to the satisfaction
of the Administration.
3.8 A minimum nozzle throw of at least 15 m shall be provided with all hose reels
and monitors discharging foam simultaneously. The discharge pressure, flow rate and
discharge pattern of deck integrated foam nozzles shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration, based on tests that demonstrate the nozzle's capability to
extinguish fires involving the largest size helicopter for which the helideck is designed.
3.9 Monitors, foam-making branch pipes, deck integrated foam nozzles and
couplings shall be constructed of brass, bronze or stainless steel. Piping, fittings and
related components, except gaskets, shall be designed to withstand exposure to
temperatures up to 925ºC.
3.11 Any foam system equipment installed within the take-off and approach
obstacle-free sector shall not exceed a height of 0.25 m. Any foam system equipment
installed in the limited obstacle sector shall not exceed the height permitted for objects
in this area.
3.12 All manual release stations, monitor foam stations, hose reel foam stations,
hose reels and monitors shall be provided with a means of access that does not
require travel across the helideck or helicopter landing area.
3.14 If a foam monitor with flow rate up to 1,000 l/min is installed, it shall be
equipped with an air-aspirating nozzle. If a deck integrated nozzle system is installed,
then the additionally installed hose reel shall be equipped with an air-aspirating
handline nozzle (foam branch pipes). Use of non-air-aspirating foam nozzles (on both
monitors and the additional hose reel) is permitted only where foam monitors with
a flow rate above 1,000 l/min are installed. If only portable foam applicators or hose
reel stations are provided, these shall be equipped with an air-aspirating handline
nozzle (foam branch pipes).
_____________
*
Refer to the International Civil Aviation Organization Airport Services Manual, part 1, Rescue and
Fire Fighting, chapter 8, Extinguishing Agent Characteristics, paragraph 8.1.5, Foam
specifications table 8-1, Performance Level B, or to the Revised Guidelines for the performance
and testing criteria, and surveys of foam concentrates for fixed fire-extinguishing systems
(MSC.1/Circ.1312)."
***
ANNEX 3
RESOLUTION MSC.404(96)
(adopted on 19 May 2016)
RECALLING ALSO article VIII(b) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974 ("the Convention"), concerning the amendment procedure applicable to the annex
to the Convention, other than to the provisions of chapter I,
5 REQUESTS ALSO the Secretary-General to transmit copies of this resolution and its
annex to Members of the Organization, which are not Contracting Governments to
the Convention.
ANNEX
CHAPTER II-2
CONSTRUCTION – FIRE PROTECTION, FIRE DETECTION
AND FIRE EXTINCTION
PART A
GENERAL
Regulation 3 – Definitions
1 The following new paragraphs are added after the existing paragraph 56:
PART D
ESCAPE
2 The following new paragraphs are added after the existing paragraph 3.2.6.2:
3.2.7.1 Escape routes shall be evaluated by an evacuation analysis early in the design
process. This analysis shall apply to:
3.2.7.2 The analysis shall be used to identify and eliminate, as far as practicable,
congestion which may develop during an abandonment, due to normal movement of
passengers and crew along escape routes, including the possibility that crew may
need to move along these routes in a direction opposite to the movement of
passengers. In addition, the analysis shall be used to demonstrate that escape
arrangements are sufficiently flexible to provide for the possibility that certain escape
routes, assembly stations, embarkation stations or survival craft may not be available
as a result of a casualty.
______________
*
Refer to the Revised Guidelines on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships
(MSC.1/Circ.1533), as may be amended."
PART G
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
4 A new paragraph 2.3 is added after the existing paragraph 2.2, as follows:
6 A new paragraph 5.1.6 is added after the existing paragraph 5.1.5 as follows:
CHAPTER III
LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES AND ARRANGEMENTS
PART A
GENERAL
Regulation 3 – Definitions
7 The following new paragraph 25 is added after the existing paragraph 24:
PART B
REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPS AND LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES
11.2 Lifeboat and rescue boat release gear, including fast rescue boat release
gear and free-fall lifeboat release systems, shall be:
____________________
*
Refer to Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution A.689(17)), as amended.
For life-saving appliances installed on board on or after 1 July 1999, refer to Revised
Recommendations on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), as amended.
11.4 Lifeboats and rescue boats, including fast rescue boats, shall be subject to
a thorough examination and operational test during the annual surveys
required by regulations I/7 and I/8.
____________________
*
Refer to Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution A.689(17)), as amended.
For life-saving appliances installed on board on or after 1 July 1999, refer to Revised
Recommendations on testing of life-saving appliances (resolution MSC.81(70)), as amended."
***
ANNEX 4
RESOLUTION MSC.405(96)
(adopted on 19 May 2016)
NOTING resolution A.1049(27), by which the Assembly adopted the International Code on
the Enhanced Programme of Inspections during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers, 2011 ("the 2011 ESP Code"), which has become mandatory under chapter XI-1 of
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 ("the Convention"),
NOTING ALSO article VIII(b) and regulation XI-1/2 of the Convention concerning the procedure
for amending the 2011 ESP Code,
HAVING CONSIDERED, at its ninety-sixth session, amendments to the 2011 ESP Code
proposed and circulated in accordance with article VIII(b)(i) of the Convention,
4 REQUESTS the Secretary-General, for the purposes of article VIII(b)(v) of the Convention,
to transmit certified copies of the present resolution and the text of the amendments contained
in the annex to all Contracting Governments to the Convention;
5 REQUESTS ALSO the Secretary-General to transmit copies of this resolution and its
annex to Members of the Organization, which are not Contracting Governments to the Convention.
ANNEX
ANNEX A
Part A
1 In paragraph 4.2.1.3, the words "hard protective" are inserted after the words "When
such breakdown of".
"5.2.2 In order to enable the attending surveyors to carry out the survey, provisions
for proper and safe access should be agreed between the owner and the Administration,
based on recommendations developed by the Organization.3
______________
3 Refer to the Revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.1050(27)."
Part B
"5.2.2 In order to enable the attending surveyors to carry out the survey, provisions
for proper and safe access should be agreed between the owner and the Administration,
based on recommendations developed by the Organization.7
______________
7
Refer to the Revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.1050(27)."
"5.2.9 The surveyor(s) should always be accompanied by, at least, one responsible
person, assigned by the owner, experienced in tank and enclosed space inspection."
ANNEX B
Part A
"5.2.1.1 In order to enable the attending surveyors to carry out the survey, provisions
for proper and safe access should be agreed between the owner and the Administration,
based on recommendations developed by the Organization.11
____________
11
Refer to the Revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.1050(27)."
Part B
"5.2.1.1 In order to enable the attending surveyors to carry out the survey, provisions
for proper and safe access should be agreed between the owner and the Administration,
based on recommendations developed by the Organization.15
______________
15
Refer to the Revised recommendations for entering enclosed spaces aboard ships, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.1050(27)."
***
ANNEX 11
RESOLUTION MSC.407(96)
(adopted on 19 May 2016)
RECALLING ALSO that the Assembly, when adopting resolution A.1023(26) on the Code for
the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009 (2009 MODU Code),
authorized the Committee to amend the Code as appropriate, taking into consideration
development in the design and technologies, in consultation with appropriate organizations,
RECOGNIZING the need for harmonizing the requirements for helicopter facility foam firefighting
appliances,
1 ADOPTS amendments to the 2009 MODU Code, set out in the annex to the present
resolution;
ANNEX
CHAPTER 9
FIRE SAFETY
The following new paragraph 9.16.4.6 is added after existing paragraph 9.16.4.5, and
the remaining paragraphs renumbered accordingly:
***
ANNEX 13
CHAPTER II-2
CONSTRUCTION – FIRE PROTECTION, FIRE DETECTION AND FIRE EXTINCTION
PART A
GENERAL
Regulation 1 – Application
PART C
SUPPRESSION OF FIRE
Regulation 10 – Firefighting
"In the case of domestic boilers of less than 175 kW, or boilers protected by fixed
water-based local application fire-extinguishing systems as required by paragraph 5.6,
an approved foam-type extinguisher of at least 135 l capacity is not required."
***
1
Tracked changes are created using "strikeout" for deleted text and "grey shading" to highlight all
modifications and new insertions, including deleted text.
ANNEX 14
CHAPTER XI-1
SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SAFETY
1 The following new regulation 2-1 is inserted after the existing regulation 2:
For cargo ships not subject to enhanced surveys under regulation XI-1/2,
notwithstanding any other provisions, the intermediate and renewal surveys included
in regulation I/10 may be carried out and completed over the corresponding periods
as specified in the 2011 ESP Code, as may be amended and the guidelines
developed by the Organization*, as appropriate.
_____________
*
Refer to Survey Guidelines under the harmonized system of survey and certification (HSSC), […],
as adopted by the Assembly of the Organization by resolution [A....(…)]."
***
ANNEX 15
CHAPTER 3
SHIP ARRANGMENTS
In paragraph 3.2.5, the words "Wheelhouse windows shall be constructed to not less than
"A-0" class (for external fire load)." are deleted.
***
ANNEX 16
PART A
GENERAL
Regulation 1 – Application
1 The following new paragraphs 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 are added after the existing paragraph 1.1:
"1.1.1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, parts B, B-1, B-2 and B-4 of this
chapter shall only apply to ships:
1.1.2 Unless expressly provided otherwise, for ships not subject to the provisions
of subparagraph 1.1.1 but constructed on or after 1 January 2009,
the Administration shall ensure that the requirements for parts B, B-1, B-2
and B-4 which are applicable under chapter II-1 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended by
resolutions MSC.216(82), MSC.269(85) and MSC.325(90) are complied with."
"Unless expressly provided otherwise, for ships constructed before 1 January 2009,
the Administration shall ensure that the requirements which are applicable under
chapter II-1 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as
amended by resolutions MSC.1(XLV), MSC.6(48), MSC.11(55), MSC.12(56),
MSC.13(57), MSC.19(58), MSC.26(60), MSC.27(61), Resolution 1 of the 1995 SOLAS
Conference, MSC.47(66), MSC.57(67), MSC.65(68), MSC.69(69), MSC.99(73),
MSC.134(76), MSC.151(78), and MSC.170(79) and MSC.[…](99) are complied with."
Regulation 2 – Definitions
1
Tracked changes are created using "strikeout" for deleted text and "grey shading" to highlight all
modifications and new insertions, including deleted text.
"9 Draught (d) is the vertical distance from the keel line at:
.2 the mid-point of the subdivision length (Ls), for ships not subject to
the provisions of regulation II-1/1.1.1.1 but constructed on or
after 1 January 2009;
13 Trim is the difference between the draught forward and the draught aft, where
the draughts are measured at the forward and aft:
The bulkhead deck may be a stepped deck. In a cargo ship the freeboard deck may
be taken as the bulkhead deck.In a cargo ship not subject to the provisions of
regulation II-1/1.1.1.1 but constructed on or after 1 January 2009, the freeboard deck
may be taken as the bulkhead deck."
".1 contracted for construction before 1 July 2014 and the keels of which are
laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 January 2009
but before 1 January 2015; or"
PART B
SUBDIVISION AND STABILITY
Regulation 4 – General
8 The existing paragraph 1 and the footnote to existing paragraph 1 are deleted.
9 The following new paragraphs 1 and 2 are introduced before the existing paragraph 2:
"1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, the requirements in parts B-1 to B-4
shall apply to passenger ships.
2 For cargo ships, the requirements in parts B-1 to B-4 shall apply as follows:
__________________
*
Guidelines for verification of damage stability requirements for tankers (MSC.1/Circ.1461).
**
.1 For offshore supply vessels of not more than 100 m in length (L), the Guidelines for the design
and construction of offshore supply vessels, 2006 (resolution MSC.235(82), as amended by
resolution MSC.335(90)); or
.2
For special purpose ships, the Code of safety for special purpose ships, 2008
(resolution MSC.266(84))."
PART B-1
STABILITY
1 Every passenger ship, regardless of size and every cargo ship having
a length (L) of 24 m and upwards, shall be inclined upon its completion and the
elements of its stability determined. The light ship displacement and the longitudinal,
transverse and vertical position of its centre of gravity shall be determined. In addition
to any other applicable requirements of the present regulations, ships having a length
of 24 m and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2010 shall as a minimum comply
with the requirements of part A of the 2008 IS Code.
2 The Administration may allow the inclining test of an individual cargo ship to
be dispensed with provided basic stability data are available from the inclining test of
a sister ship and it is shown to the satisfaction of the Administration that reliable
stability information for the exempted ship can be obtained from such basic data, as
required by regulation 5-1. A lightweight survey shall be carried out upon completion
and the ship shall be inclined whenever in comparison with the data derived from
the sister ship, a deviation from the lightship displacement exceeding 1% for ships
of 160 m or more in length and 2% for ships of 50 m or less in length and as
determined by linear interpolation for intermediate lengths or a deviation from
the lightship longitudinal centre of gravity exceeding 0.5% of LsL is found.
_______________________
*
Refer to the Code on Intact Stability for All Types of Ships covered by IMO Instruments, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.749(18), as amended. From 1 July 2010, the International Code on
Intact Stability, 2008, adopted by resolution MSC.267(85), is expected to enter into force."
12 The existing footnote to the title of the regulation is amended to read as follows:
"* Refer also to the Guidelines for the preparation of intact stability information (MSC/Circ.456);
Guidance on the intact stability of existing tankers during transfer operations (MSC/Circ.706); and
the Revised guidance to the master for avoiding dangerous situations in following and quartering
seas (MSC.1/Circ.1228)."
"3 The intact and damage stability information required by regulation 5-1.2 shall
be presented as consolidated data and encompass the full operating range of draught
and trim. Applied trim values shall coincide in all stability information intended for use
on board. Information not required for determination of stability and trim limits should
be excluded from this information.
16 In paragraph 2, the existing chapeau and paragraph 2.2 are amended to read as follows:
"2 For all ships to which the damage stability requirements of this chapterpart
apply, the degree of subdivision to be provided shall be determined by the required
subdivision index R, as follows:
.2 In the case of cargo ships not less than 80 m in length (Ls) and not
greater than 100 m in length (Ls):
…"
Persons on Board R
N ≤ 1,000 R = 0.000088 ∗ N +0.7488
1,000 < N ≤ 6,000 R = 0.0369 ∗ ln (N + 89.048) + 0.579
𝑅 = 1 – (𝐶1 ∗ 6,200)/(4 ∗ 𝑁 + 20,000)
N> 6,000
with: 𝐶1 = 0.8 – (0.25 / 10,000) ∗ (10,000 − 𝑁)
Where:
"1 AnThe attained subdivision index A is obtained by the summation of the partial
indices As, Ap and Al, (weighted as shown and) calculated for the draughts ds, dp and dl
defined in regulation 2 in accordance with the following formula:"
"2 As a minimum, In the calculation of A, the level trim shall be usedcarried out
at level trim for the deepest subdivision draught ds and the partial subdivision
draught dp. The actualestimated service trim shallmay be used for the light service
draught dl. If, in any anticipated service condition within the draught range from ds
to dl, the trim variation in comparison with the calculated trims is greater than 0.5%
of Ls, one or more additional calculations of A are to be submittedperformed for
the same draughts but differentincluding sufficient trims so to ensure that, for all
intended service conditions, the difference in trim in comparison with the reference
trim used for one calculation will be lessnot more than 0.5% of Ls. Each additional
calculation of A shall comply with regulation 6.1.
3 When determining the positive righting lever (GZ) of the residual stability
curve in the intermediate and final equilibrium stages of flooding, the displacement
used should be that of the intact loading condition. All calculations should be done
with the ship freely trimming. That is, the constant-displacement method of calculation
should be used."
21 In the existing paragraph 1, the text of the notation for the mean transverse distance b
is amended to read as follows:
"2 For passenger ships and cargo ships fitted with cross-flooding devices
tThe factor sintermediate,i is applicable only to passenger ships (for cargo ships sintermediate,i
should be taken as unity) and shall be taken as the least of the s-factors obtained
from all flooding stages including the stage before equalization, if any, and is to be
calculated as follows:
1
𝐺𝑍max 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 4
𝑆intermediate,𝑖 = [ ∙ ]
0.05 7
where GZmax is not to be taken as more than 0.05 m and Range as not more than 7°.
sintermediate,i = 0, if the intermediate heel angle exceeds 15° for passenger ships and 30°
for cargo ships.
For cargo ships not fitted with cross-flooding devices the factor sintermediate,i is taken as
unity, except if the Administration considers that the stability in intermediate stages of
flooding may be insufficient, it should require further investigation thereof.
For passenger and cargo ships, wWhere cross-flooding devices are fittedfittings are
required, the time for equalization shall not exceed 10 min.
where:
where:
TGZmax = 0.20 m, for ro-ro passenger ships each damage case that involves
a ro-ro space,
TRange = 20°, for ro-ro passenger ships each damage case that involves
a ro-ro space,
K = 1 if e ≤ min
K = 0 if e ≥ max
max e
K= otherwise,
max min
where:
min is 7° for passenger ships and 25° for cargo ships; and
max is 15° for passenger ships and 30° for cargo ships.
4 The factor smom,i is applicable only to passenger ships (for cargo ships smom,i
shall be taken as unity) and shall be calculated at the final equilibrium from the formula:
where:
smom,i ≤ 1
4.1.1 Mpassenger is the maximum assumed heeling moment resulting from movement
of passengers, and is to be obtained as follows:
where:
Alternatively, the heeling moment may be calculated assuming the passengers are
distributed with 4 persons per square metre on available deck areas towards one side
of the ship on the decks where muster stations are located and in such a way that
they produce the most adverse heeling moment. In doing so, a weight of 75 kg per
passenger is to be assumed.
where:
2
P = 120 N/m ;
Z = distance from centre of lateral projected area above waterline to T/2; and
_______________
*
Reference is made to the "Revised Rrecommendation on a standard method for establishing
compliance with the requirements for evaluating cross-flooding arrangements in passengers ships",
adopted by the Organization by resolution A.266(VIII)MSC.362(92), as may be amended.
5.2 In all cases,The factor si is to be taken as zero in those cases where the final
waterline, taking into account sinkage, heel and trim, immerses:
5.3 The factor si is to be taken as zero if, taking into account sinkage, heel and
trim, any of the following occur in any intermediate stage or in the final stage of
flooding:
"1 A passenger ship intended to carry 400 or more persons shall have watertight
subdivision abaft the collision bulkhead so that si = 1 for a damage involving all
the compartments within 0.08L measured from the forward perpendicular for the three
loading conditions used to calculate the attainedon which is based the calculation of
the subdivision index A.and for a damage involving all the compartments within 0.08L
measured from the forward perpendicular. If the attained subdivision index A is calculated
for different trims, this requirement must also be satisfied for those loading conditions.
Regulation 8-1 – System capabilities and operational information after a flooding casualty
on passenger ships
"A passenger ship constructed on or after 1 July 2010 shall be designed so that
the systems specified in regulation II-2/21.4 remain operational when the ship is
subject to flooding of any single watertight compartment."
"For the purpose of providing operational information to the Master for safe return to
port after a flooding casualty, passenger ships constructed on or after 1 January 2014
shall have:"
PART B-2
SUBDIVISION, WATERTIGHT AND WEATHERTIGHT INTEGRITY
Regulation 9 – Double bottoms in passenger ships and cargo ships other than tankers
"3.1 Small wells constructed in the double bottom in connection with drainage
arrangements of holds, etc. shall not extend downward more than necessary.
The vertical distance from the bottom of such a well to a plane coinciding with the keel
line shall not be less than h/2 or 500 mm, whichever is greater, or compliance with
paragraph 8 of this regulation shall be shown for that part of the ship. A well extending
to the outer bottom is, however, permitted at the after end of the shaft tunnel.
3.2 Other wells (e.g. for lubricating oil under main engines) may be permitted by
the Administration if satisfied that the arrangements give protection equivalent to that
afforded by a double bottom complying with this regulation. In no case shall
the vertical distance from the bottom of such a well to a plane coinciding with the keel
line be less than 500 mm.
3.2.2 For cargo ships of less than 80 m in length the arrangements shall
provide a level of safety satisfactory to the Administration."
For 0.3 L from the forward Any other part of the ship
perpendicular of the ship
Longitudinal 1/3 L2/3 or 14.5 m, whichever 1/3 L2/3 or 14.5 m, whichever
extent is less is less
Transverse B/6 or 10 m, whichever is less B/6 or 5 m, whichever is less
extent
Vertical B/20 or 2 m, whichever is B/20 or 2 m, whichever is
extent, less less
measured B/20, to be taken not less B/20, to be taken not less
from than 0.76 m and not more than 0.76 m and not more
the keel line than 2 m than 2 m
"1 A collision bulkhead shall be fitted which shall be watertight up to the bulkhead
deck in passenger ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships. This bulkhead shall be
located at a distance from the forward perpendicular of not less than 0.05L or 10 m,
whichever is the less, and, except as may be permitted by the Administration, not
more than 0.08L or 0.05L + 3 m, whichever is the greater."
"23 Where any part of the ship below the waterline extends forward of the forward
perpendicular, e.g. a bulbous bow, the distances stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be
measured from a point either:
34 The bulkhead may have steps or recesses provided they are within the limits
prescribed in paragraph 1 or 32.
56.1 Except as provided in paragraph 65.2, the collision bulkhead may be pierced
below the bulkhead deck in passenger ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships by
not more than one pipe for dealing with fluid in the forepeak tank, provided that
the pipe is fitted with a screw-down valve capable of being operated from above
the bulkhead deck in passenger ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships, the valve
chest being securedlocated inside the forepeak atto the collision bulkhead.
The Administration may, however, authorize the fitting of this valve on the after side
of the collision bulkhead provided that the valve is readily accessible under all service
conditions and the space in which it is located is not a cargo space. Alternatively, for
cargo ships, the pipe may be fitted with a butterfly valve suitably supported by a seat
or flanges and capable of being operated from above the freeboard deck. All valves
shall be of steel, bronze or other approved ductile material. Valves of ordinary cast
iron or similar material are not acceptable.
56.2 If the forepeak is divided to hold two different kinds of liquids the Administration
may allow the collision bulkhead to be pierced below the bulkhead deck in passenger
ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships by two pipes, each of which is fitted as
required by paragraph 65.1, provided the Administration is satisfied that there is no
practical alternative to the fitting of such a second pipe and that, having regard to
the additional subdivision provided in the forepeak, the safety of the ship is
maintained.
78 Where bow doors are fitted and a sloping loading ramp forms part of
the extension of the collision bulkhead above the bulkhead deck in passenger ships
and freeboard deck in cargo ships the ramp shall be weathertight over its complete
length. In cargo ships the part of the ramp which is more than 2.3 m above
the bulkheadfreeboard deck may extend forward of the limit specified in paragraph 1
or 23. Ramps not meeting the above requirements shall be disregarded as an
extension of the collision bulkhead.
910 Bulkheads shall be fitted separating the machinery space from cargo and
accommodation spaces forward and aft and made watertight up to the bulkhead deck in
passenger ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships. In passenger ships aAn afterpeak
bulkhead shall also be fitted and made watertight up to the bulkhead deck or
the freeboard deck. The afterpeak bulkhead may, however, be stepped below
the bulkhead deck or the freeboard deck, provided the degree of safety of the ship as
regards subdivision is not thereby diminished.
1011 In all cases stern tubes shall be enclosed in watertight spaces of moderate
volume. In passenger ships the stern gland shall be situated in a watertight shaft
tunnel or other watertight space separate from the stern tube compartment and of
such volume that, if flooded by leakage through the stern gland, the bulkhead deck
will not be immersed. In cargo ships other measures to minimize the danger of water
penetrating into the ship in case of damage to stern tube arrangements may be taken
at the discretion of the Administration."
Regulation 15 – Openings in the shell plating below the bulkhead deck of passenger
ships and the freeboard deck of cargo ships
33 The existing paragraphs 4, 5.1, 8.2.1 and 8.4 are amended to read as follows:
"4 Efficient hinged inside deadlights so arranged that they can be easily and
effectively closed and secured watertight, shall be fitted to all sidescuttles except that
abaft one eighth of the ship's length from the forward perpendicular and above a line
drawn parallel to the bulkhead deck at side and having its lowest point at a height
of 3.7 m plus 2.5% of the breadth of the ship above the deepest subdivision draught,
the deadlights may be portable in passenger accommodation other than that for
steerage passengers, unless the deadlights are required by the International
Convention on Load Lines in force to be permanently attached in their proper
positions. Such portable deadlights shall be stowed adjacent to the sidescuttles they
serve.
8.4 Moving parts penetrating the shell plating below the deepest subdivision
draught shall be fitted with a watertight sealing arrangement acceptable to
the Administration. The inboard gland shall be located within a watertight space of
such volume that, if flooded, the bulkhead deck in passenger ships and freeboard
deck in cargo ships will not be submerged. The Administration may require that if such
compartment is flooded, essential or emergency power and lighting, internal
communication, signals or other emergency devices must remain available in other
parts of the ship."
1.1 Tthe design, materials and construction of all watertight closures such as
doors, hatches, sidescuttles, gangway and cargo ports, valves, pipes, ash-chutes and
rubbish-chutes referred to in these regulations shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration;
1.2 Ssuch valves, doors, hatches, and mechanisms shall be suitably marked to
ensure that they may be properly used to provide maximum safety; and
1.3 Tthe frames of vertical watertight doors shall have no groove at the bottom
in which dirt might lodge and prevent the door closing properly.
2 In passenger ships and cargo ships Wwatertight doors and hatches shall be
tested by water pressure to athe maximum head of water they might sustain in a final
or intermediate stage of flooding. For cargo ships not covered by damage stability
requirements, watertight doors and hatches shall be tested by water pressure to
a head of water measured from the lower edge of the opening to one metre above
the freeboard deck. Where testing of individual doors and hatches is not carried out
because of possible damage to insulation or outfitting items, testing of individual doors
and hatches may be replaced by a prototype pressure test of each type and size of
door or hatch with a test pressure corresponding at least to the head required for
the individual location. The prototype test shall be carried out before the door or hatch
is fitted. The installation method and procedure for fitting the door or hatch on board
shall correspond to that of the prototype test. When fitted on board, each door or hatch
shall be checked for proper seating between the bulkhead, the frame and the door or
between deck, the coaming and the hatch."
Regulation 16-1 – Construction and initial tests of watertight decks, trunks, etc.
3 In ro-ro passenger ships, Wwhere all or part of the penetration of the bulkhead
deck is on the main ro-ro deck, the trunk shall be capable of withstanding impact
pressure due to internal water motions (sloshing) of water trapped on the ro-ro deck."
Regulation 17 – Internal watertight integrity of passenger ships above the bulkhead deck
"3 The open end of aAir pipes terminating within a superstructure which are not
fitted with watertight means of closure shall be considered as unprotected openings
when applying regulation 7-2.6.1.1.shall be at least 1 m above the waterline when
the ship heels to an angle of 15º, or the maximum angle of heel during intermediate
stages of flooding, as determined by direct calculation, whichever is the greater.
Alternatively, air pipes from tanks other than oil tanks may discharge through the side
of the superstructure. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to
the provisions of the International Convention on Load Lines in force."
PART B-4
STABILITY MANAGEMENT
39 The following new regulation 19-1 is introduced after the existing regulation 19:
2 A damage control drill shall take place at least every three months. The entire
crew need not participate in every drill, but only those crew members with damage
control responsibilities.
3 The damage control drill scenarios shall vary each drill so that emergency
conditions are simulated for different damage conditions and shall, as far as
practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency.
5 At least one damage control drill each year shall include activation of
the shore-based support, if provided in compliance with regulation II-1/8-1.3, to
conduct stability assessments for the simulated damage conditions.
7 A record of each damage control drill shall be maintained in the same manner
as prescribed for the other drills in regulation III/19.5."
40 The existing title and paragraph 1 of regulation 20 are amended to read as follows:
1 On completion of loading of the ship and prior to its departure, the master shall
determine the ship's trim and stability and also ascertain and record that the ship is
upright and in compliance with stability criteria in relevant regulations. The determination
of the ship's stability shall always be made by calculation or by ensuring that the ship
is loaded according to one of the pre-calculated loading conditions within the approved
stability information. The Administration may accept the use of an electronic loading
and stability computer or equivalent means for this purpose."
"Drills for the operating Operational tests of watertight doors, sidescuttles, valves and
closing mechanisms of scuppers, ash-chutes and rubbish-chutes shall take place
weekly. In ships in which the voyage exceeds one week in duration a complete drillset
of operational tests shall be held before leaving portthe voyage commences, and
others thereafter at least once a week during the voyage."
"A record of all drillsoperational tests and inspections required by this regulation shall
be entered in the logbook with an explicit record of any defects which may be
disclosed."
43 In the existing paragraph 1, the words "and 4" are removed from the end of the first
sentence.
"2 Watertight doors located below the bulkhead deck in passenger ships and
freeboard deck in cargo ships having a maximum clear opening width of more
than 1.2 m shall be kept closed when the ship is at sea, except for limited periods
when absolutely necessary as determined by the Administration."
"3 A watertight door may be opened during navigation to permit the passage of
passengers or crew, or when work in the immediate vicinity of the door necessitates
it being opened. The door must be immediately closed when transit through the door
is complete or when the task which necessitated it being open is finished.*
_____________________
*
Refer to the Guidance for watertight doors on passenger ships which may be opened during
navigation (MSC.1/Circ.[…]."
46 The existing paragraph 4 is deleted and the subsequent paragraphs are renumbered
accordingly.
"5 Portable plates on bulkheads shall always be in place before the ship leaves
portvoyage commences, and shall not be removed during navigation except in case
of urgent necessity at the discretion of the master. The necessary precautions shall
be taken in replacing them to ensure that the joints are watertight. Power-operated
sliding watertight doors permitted in machinery spaces in accordance with
regulation 13.10 shall be closed before the ship leaves portvoyage commences and
shall remain closed during navigation except in case of urgent necessity at the discretion
of the master.
7 Gangway, cargo and fuelling ports fitted below the bulkhead deck in
passenger ships and freeboard deck in cargo ships shall be effectively closed and
secured watertight before the ship leaves port, and shall be kept closed during
navigation."
"8 The following doors, located above the bulkhead deck in passenger ships
and freeboard deck in cargo ships, shall be closed and locked before the ship
proceeds on any voyage and shall remain closed and locked until the ship is at its next
berth:"
.2 For any ship that has one or more sidescuttles so placed that
the requirements of paragraph 14 would apply when it was floating
at its deepest subdivision draught, the Administration may indicate
the limiting mean draught at which these sidescuttles will have their
sills above the line drawn parallel to the bulkhead deck at side in
passenger ships and freeboard deck at side in cargo ships, and
having its lowest point 1.4 m plus 2.5% of the breadth of the ship
above the waterline corresponding to the limiting mean draught, and
at which it will therefore be permissible to depart from port without
previously closing and locking them and to open them at sea on
the responsibility of the master during the voyage to the next port.
In tropical zones as defined in the International Convention on Load
Lines in force, this limiting draught may be increased by 0.3 m."
50 In regulation 22-1, the words "constructed on or after 1 July 2010" are removed from
the end of the existing title.
51 In regulation 24, the existing title and paragraph 3 are amended to read as follows:
PART C
MACHINERY INSTALLATIONS
52 The following new sentence is added at the end of the existing paragraph 2.6:
"For ships subject to the provisions of regulation II-1/1.1.1.1, for the special hazards
associated with loss of stability when fitted with fixed pressure water-spraying
fire-extinguishing systems see II-2/20.6.1.4."
53 In paragraph 3.2, the existing text of the whole volume of the passenger and crew
spaces below the bulkhead deck P is amended to read as follows:
"P = the whole volume of the passenger and crew spaces below the bulkhead
deck (cubic metres), which are provided for the accommodation and use of
passengers and crew, excluding baggage, store, and provision and mail rooms;"
"3.4 On a ship of 91.5 m in length L and upwards or having a bilge pump numeral,
calculated in accordance with paragraph 3.2, of 30 or more, the arrangements
shall be such that at least one power bilge pump shall be available for use in
all flooding conditions which the ship is required to withstand, and, for ships
subject to the provisions of regulation II-1/1.1.1.1, in all flooding conditions
derived from consideration of minor damages as specified in regulation 8
which the ship is required to withstand as follows:"
55 The following new sentence is added at the end of the existing paragraph 3.10:
"For ships subject to the provisions of regulation II-1/1.1.1.1, the deepest subdivision
load line shall be taken as the deepest subdivision draught."
***
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MSC.1/Circ.1518
13 May 2016
Promulgation of rules for the design and construction of bulk carriers and oil tankers
of an organization, which is recognized by Administrations in accordance with the
provisions of SOLAS regulation XI-1/1, confirmed by the Maritime Safety Committee to
be in conformity with the goals and functional requirements of the
Goal-based Ship Construction Standards for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers
2 Having considered the verification audit reports and the Corrective Action Plans
referred to above, the Committee confirmed that the information provided by the 12 Submitters
demonstrates that, in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-1/3-10.3, their rules conform to the
International goal-based ship construction standards for bulk carriers and oil tankers
(resolution MSC.287(87)) (GBS Standards); and that ships contracted under the current
Submitters' verified rules are deemed to meet the GBS Standards.
3 The list set out in the annex contains those 12 Submitters, i.e. a list of organizations,
which are recognized by Administrations in accordance with the provisions of SOLAS
regulation XI-1/1, whose rules have been verified as conforming to the goals and functional
requirements of the GBS Standards.
4 Where non-conformities have been identified in the verification audit reports, the
Committee agreed that such non-conformities are to be rectified and that the 12 Submitters
submit new requests for a verification audit on the rectification of non-conformities. Where
observations have been identified in the verification audit reports, the Committee requested
that the ROs address the identified observations and that the ROs submit the outcomes in the
future.
5 The Committee also noted that, as a new request for the verification audit of an
organization's rules for the design and construction of bulk carriers and oil tankers may be
made to the Secretary-General at any time, other organization(s) may be added to the list set
out in the annex at subsequent sessions.
***
ANNEX
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MSC.1/Circ.1519
6 June 2016
2 The Polar Code also requires that information on ship-specific capabilities and
limitations in relation to the assessment required under section 1.5 of the Polar Code be
included in the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).
3 The annexed guidance addresses the development of methodologies for the assessment
of operational limitations in ice which may be referenced on the Polar Ship Certificate and
which may form part of information on ship-specific capabilities and limitations included in
the PWOM.
4 This guidance has been issued as "interim guidance" in order to gain experience in
its use. It should be reviewed four years after the entry into force of the Polar Code in order to
make any necessary amendments based on experience gained.
5 In the meantime, Member States and international organizations are invited to report
on their experience with the use of the guidance to the Maritime Safety Committee under
the agenda item "Any other business".
6 Member States are invited to bring the annexed guidance to the attention of all parties
concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 Introduction
1.1 In order to maintain an acceptable level of risk under different ice regimes and types
of operation in ice, voyage planning and operation should take into account ship structural
capability, ship characteristics, type of operation and current and expected ice conditions.
Where applicable, the Polar Ship Certificate should reference a practical methodology for
assessing the operational capabilities and limitations in ice.
1.2 Ice class, if any, is included in the Polar Ship Certificate and gives information on
structural capability. This provides the basis for assessing limiting ice conditions and
determining acceptable safe operating procedures.
1.3 This guidance addresses the development of methodologies for assessing the structural
capabilities and limitations in different ice regimes and operational modes when the ship is
operating in ice. It may also be used as a tool for voyage planning. At the design stage, ice class
selection may also be assessed by matching the anticipated ice conditions to this guidance
1.4 Any system or methodology for assessing structural capabilities and limitations based
on this guidance should not be interpreted as a "Go/No Go" tool but as a decision support tool.
The decision for operating in specific ice regimes should be based on the consideration of
personnel on board qualified in accordance with chapter 12 of the Polar Code, taking into
account the condition and characteristics of the ship; current and forecasted environmental
conditions, including type and concentration of ice, sea state and visibility; and an
understanding of the anticipated ship-ice interactions.
1.5 Currently, there are well established national shipping systems such as Canada's
Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System and the Russian Ice Certificate. This guidance is aimed at
making use of that experience to assist shipboard personnel, companies and administrations.
2 Definitions
For the purpose of this guidance, in addition to the definitions in the Polar Code, the following
definition applies:
3 General
3.1 Ships operating in ice should be provided with a practical methodology to assess their
limitations for specific operational conditions. The methodology should take into account:
.1 hull structural capability to resist ice load and the capability of the propulsion
machinery, rudders and steering gear to resist ice loads;
.2 ice regimes;
3.2 To determine and record the limitations for operating in ice in the Polar Ship
Certificate, acceptance criteria should be established whereby the risk of structural damage
and/or loss of watertight integrity are effectively assessed against the ice conditions and modes
of operation for the intended area of operation.
3.3 Assessments should be practical and intended to be used on board prior to, and
during polar water operation and/or transit. Masters, chief mates and officers in charge of a
navigational watch should receive suitable training in the use of any system or methodology
used for assessing the ship's limitations in ice. Practical examples on the use of the
methodology should be included in the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).
3.4 Where applicable, the methodology used for setting operational limitations should be
referenced on the Polar Ship Certificate1.
4 Acceptance of methodologies
4.1 The appendix includes an acceptable methodology for assessing limitations for ships
operating in ice.
4.3 Alternative methodologies should have a means to describe limiting ice conditions
using tables and/or curves based on ice concentration, ice type and stage of ice decay.
4.4 For ships with no ice class, measures that will keep the ship from coming into contact
with ice may be adopted instead of this type of methodology.2
1
The following information should be included in section 5.1 of the Certificate:
Limited to operation in Polar waters in accordance with the outcome of the accepted system for determining
operational limitations appropriate to the ice strengthening applied.
Name of system:…………………………………………..e.g. AIRSS, POLARIS, Ice Certificate
Reference document number:………………e.g. PWOM section number / Ice Certificate report number
2
Where the ship is restricted to operate in ice-free waters as identified in 2.2 of the Certificate, the following
information should be included in section 5.1 of the certificate: "Limited to ice free waters."
APPENDIX
Introduction
I The Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) has been
developed incorporating experience and best practices from Canada's Arctic Ice Regime
Shipping System, the Russian Ice Certificate supplemented by pilot ice assistance as
prescribed in the Rules of Navigation on the water area of the Northern Sea Route and other
methodologies.
II The basis of POLARIS is an evaluation of the risks posed to the ship by ice conditions
in relation to the ship's assigned ice class. It uses the WMO nomenclature and the ice class
consistent with the ice class(es) referenced in the Polar Ship Certificate.
III POLARIS uses a Risk Index of Risk Values (RIVs) which are assigned to a ship based
on the ice class. The RIVs may be used to evaluate the limitations of the ship operating in an
ice regime using input either from historic or current ice charts for voyage planning or in real
time from the bridge of the ship.
.1 the use of a combination of IACS Polar Class ice classes and ice classes
assigned equivalence to Finnish-Swedish Ice Class Rules under HELCOM3,
which are consistent with ice class references used elsewhere in the Code;
.2 the use of ice type definitions generally consistent with WMO nomenclature
and which can be found on international ice charts;
3
Refer to the annex to HELCOM Recommendation 25/7, Safety of Winter Navig ation in the Baltic Sea
Area, available at www.helcom.fi
1.1.1 Ships assigned an ice class and ships without an ice class have been assigned a
Risk Index in POLARIS. The Risk Index Values (RIVs) within the Risk Index are values
corresponding to a relative risk evaluation for corresponding ice types.
1.1.2 Ice types in POLARIS generally conform to WMO nomenclature used on ice charts
with the exception that Medium First Year Ice and Multi Year Ice are given two RIVs. Where
the operator can confidently determine that the Medium First Year Ice in a regime is less
than 1 metre in thickness, the RIVs in the column "Medium First Year Ice less than 1 m thick"
may be used. Otherwise the RIVs in the column "Medium First Year Ice" should be used.
Similarly, where the operator can confidently determine that the Multi-Year Ice in a regime is
less than 2.5 metres in thickness, the RIVs in the column "Light Multi-Year Ice" may be used.
Otherwise the RIVs in the column "Heavy Multi-Year Ice" should be used.
1.1.3 Risk Index values have been developed in tables 1.3 and 1.4. Table 1.4 reflects a
reduction in risk associated with decayed ice during times of higher ambient temperatures for
certain ice types. The standard Risk Index Values of table 1.3 should be used unless ice
decay is confirmed by ice information/visual observation by personnel on board qualified in
accordance with chapter 12 of the Polar Code. Only then may table 1.4 be used.
1.2.2 The RIO is determined by a summation of the RIVs for each ice type present in the
ice regime multiplied by its concentration (expressed in tenths):
RIO = (C1xRIV1)+(C2xRIV2)+(C3xRIV3)+…(CnxRIVn)
Where C1…Cn are the concentrations (in tenths) of ice types within the ice
regime; and
RIV1…RIVn are the corresponding Risk Index Values for each ice type.
1.3.1 Operational limitations for ships operating independently are determined based on
the criteria in table 1.1, using the calculated value of the RIO for the ice regime encountered
by the ship, given that due caution of the Mariner will be exercised, taking into account such
factors as changes in weather and visibility.
*
See section 1.4
**
See section 1.5
1.4.1 Ships operating in an elevated risk ice regime, based on the RIO outcome, should
limit the speed to the values indicated in table 1.2. Operational measures may also include,
provision of additional watch keeping or use of icebreaker support. When the speed reduction
may impair the ship manoeuvrability, the operation should be avoided.
1.4.2 Ships equipped with ice load measurement and monitoring systems can utilize these
systems to calibrate recommended speeds included in table 1.2.
1.4.3 Ships having undergone full scale ice trials and/or calculation-based methodologies
can utilize these results to calibrate recommended speeds included in table 1.2.
1.4.4 Recommended speed limits for elevated operational risk conditions should be
included in the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM).
1.4.5 For voyage planning generally, areas in which the potential to encounter elevated risk
operations has been identified should be avoided. Where elevated risk operations are
identified and included in a voyage plan, contingency plans should be in place and documented
in the PWOM.
1.5.2 Where a ship encounters an ice regime where the RIO identifies Operations Subject
to Special Consideration, suitable procedures should be contained in the PWOM and should
be followed. Such procedures should contain guidance to the operator on reducing the
increased risks present to the ship and should include course alteration/re-routing, further
reduction in speed and other special measures.
1.5.3 For voyage planning purposes, ice regimes where the RIO identifies Operations
Subject to Special Consideration should be avoided.
1.6.1 In determining the RIO for a ship under icebreaker escort, the ice immediately ahead
of the ship should be considered as its ice regime. This regime should include both the track
of the icebreaker and, when the icebreaker has a smaller beam than the escorted ship, any
unmodified ice out to the maximum beam of the escorted ship.
1.6.2. The icebreaker itself should calculate its own RIO along the intended route.
1.6.4 For voyage planning purposes when icebreaker escort is intended to be used, the RIO
derived from non-escorted historical ice data may be assumed to be modified by adding 10 to
its calculated value. However, it is cautioned that this is an average value which can vary
significantly. For actual operations, the RIO under escort should not be modified and should
be derived as described in the previous paragraphs.
1.7.1 The presence of glacial ice represents additional risks to the ship. Areas containing
glacial ice should be approached with caution.
1.7.2 Appropriate training should be provided to the Master and officers in charge of a
navigational watch when navigating in ice on identification and avoidance of glacial ice and the
consequences of collision. Measures to avoid glacial ice should be documented in the PWOM.
1.7.3 Where glacial ice is encountered, in addition to the RIO, a safe stand-off distance
should be observed by the ship. This stand-off distance should be recorded in the PWOM.
Ice Class
Ice-Free
New Ice
Grey Ice
PC2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0
PC3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1
PC4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1 -2
PC5 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 -1 -2 -2
PC6 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -3
PC7 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -3 -3
IA Super 3 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -4
IA 3 2 2 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -5
IB 3 2 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -6
IC 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8
Not Ice 3 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -8
Strengthened
Ice Class
Ice-Free
New Ice
Grey Ice
PC2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0
PC3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1
PC4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 0 -1 -2
PC5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 -1 -2 -2
PC6 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 0 -2 -3 -3
PC7 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 -1 -3 -3 -3
IA Super 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 -1 -3 -4 -4
IA 3 2 2 2 1 0 0 -1 -2 -4 -5 -5
IB 3 2 2 1 0 -1 -1 -2 -3 -5 -6 -6
IC 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -2 -3 -4 -6 -7 -8
Not Ice 3 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -3 -4 -5 -7 -8 -8
Strengthened
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MSC.1/Circ.1526
1 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016),
having considered the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risk threats and vulnerabilities,
approved the Interim guidelines on maritime cyber risk management, as set out in the annex.
3 Member Governments are invited to bring the contents of this circular to the attention
of all stakeholders concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 These Guidelines provide high-level recommendations for maritime cyber risk
management. For the purpose of these Guidelines, maritime cyber risk refers to a measure of
the extent to which a technology asset is threatened by a potential circumstance or event,
which may result in shipping-related operational, safety or security failures as a consequence
of information or systems being corrupted, lost or compromised.
1.2 Stakeholders should take the necessary steps to safeguard shipping from current and
emerging threats and vulnerabilities related to digitization, integration and automation of
processes and systems in shipping.
1.3 For details and guidance related to the development and implementation of specific
risk management processes, users of these guidelines should refer to specific Member
Governments' and Flag Administrations' requirements, as well as relevant international and
industry standards and best practices.
1.4 Risk management is fundamental to safe and secure shipping operations. Risk
management has traditionally been focused on operations in the physical domain, but greater
reliance on digitization, integration, automation and network-based systems has created an
increasing need for cyber risk management in the shipping industry.
1.5 Predicated on the goal of supporting safe and secure shipping, which is operationally
resilient to cyber risks, these Guidelines provide recommendations that can be incorporated
into existing risk management processes. In this regard, the Guidelines are complementary to
the safety and security management practices established by this Organization.
2 GENERAL
2.1 Background
Bridge systems;
Cargo handling and management systems;
Propulsion and machinery management and power control systems;
Access control systems;
Passenger servicing and management systems;
Passenger facing public networks;
Administrative and crew welfare systems; and
Communication systems.
2.1.2 The distinction between information technology and operational technology systems
should be considered. Information technology systems may be thought of as focusing on the
use of data as information. Operational technology systems may be thought of as focusing on
the use of data to control or monitor physical processes. Furthermore, the protection of
information and data exchange within these systems should also be considered.
2.1.3 While these technologies and systems provide significant efficiency gains for the
maritime industry, they also present risks to critical systems and processes linked to the
operation of systems integral to shipping. These risks may result from vulnerabilities arising
from inadequate operation, integration, maintenance and design of cyber-related systems, and
from intentional and unintentional cyberthreats.
2.1.4 Threats are presented by malicious actions (e.g. hacking or introduction of malware)
or the unintended consequences of benign actions (e.g. software maintenance or user
permissions). In general, these actions expose vulnerabilities (e.g. outdated software or
ineffective firewalls) or exploit a vulnerability in operational or information technology. Effective
cyber risk management should consider both kinds of threat.
2.1.5 Vulnerabilities can result from inadequacies in design, integration and/or maintenance
of systems, as well as lapses in cyberdiscipline. In general, where vulnerabilities in operational
and/or information technology are exposed or exploited, either directly (e.g. weak passwords
leading to unauthorized access) or indirectly (e.g. the absence of network segregation), there
can be implications for security and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.
Additionally, when operational and/or information technology vulnerabilities are exposed or
exploited, there can be implications for safety, particularly where critical systems (e.g. bridge
navigation or main propulsion systems) are compromised.
2.1.6 Effective cyber risk management should also consider safety and security impacts
resulting from the exposure or exploitation of vulnerabilities in information technology systems.
This could result from inappropriate connection to operational technology systems or from
procedural lapses by operational personnel or third parties, which may compromise these
systems (e.g. inappropriate use of removable media such as a memory stick).
2.1.7 Further information regarding vulnerabilities and threats can be found in the additional
guidance and standards referenced in section 4.
2.1.8 These rapidly changing technologies and threats make it difficult to address these
risks only through technical standards. As such, these Guidelines recommend a risk
management approach to cyber risks that is resilient and evolves as a natural extension of
existing safety and security management practices.
2.1.9 In considering potential sources of threats and vulnerabilities and associated risk
mitigation strategies, a number of potential control options for cyber risk management should
also be taken into consideration, including amongst others management, operational or
procedural, and technical controls.
2.2 Application
2.2.1 These Guidelines are primarily intended for all organizations in the shipping industry,
and are designed to encourage safety and security management practices in the cyberdomain.
2.2.2 Recognizing that no two organizations in the shipping industry are the same, these
Guidelines are expressed in broad terms in order to have a widespread application. Ships with
limited cyber-related systems may find a simple application of these Guidelines to be sufficient;
however, ships with complex cyber-related systems may require a greater level of care and
should seek additional resources through reputable industry and Government partners.
3.1 For the purpose of these Guidelines, cyber risk management means the process of
identifying, analysing, assessing, and communicating a cyber-related risk and accepting,
avoiding, transferring, or mitigating it to an acceptable level, considering costs and benefits of
actions taken to stakeholders.
3.2 The goal of maritime cyber risk management is to support safe and secure shipping,
which is operationally resilient to cyber risks.
3.3 Effective cyber risk management should start at the senior management level. Senior
management should embed a culture of cyber risk awareness into all levels of an organization
and ensure a holistic and flexible cyber risk management regime that is in continuous operation
and constantly evaluated through effective feedback mechanisms.
3.4 One accepted approach to achieve the above is to comprehensively assess and
compare an organization's current, and desired, cyber risk management postures. Such a
comparison may reveal gaps that can be addressed to achieve risk management objectives
through a prioritized cyber risk management plan. This risk-based approach will enable an
organization to best apply its resources in the most effective manner.
3.5 These Guidelines present the functional elements that support effective cyber risk
management. These functional elements are not sequential – all should be concurrent and
continuous in practice and should be incorporated appropriately in a risk management
framework:
3.6 These functional elements encompass the activities and desired outcomes of
effective cyber risk management across critical systems affecting maritime operations and
information exchange, and constitute an ongoing process with effective feedback mechanisms.
3.7 Effective cyber risk management should ensure an appropriate level of awareness of
cyber risks at all levels of an organization. The level of awareness and preparedness should
be appropriate to roles and responsibilities in the cyber risk management system.
4.1 The approach to cyber risk management described herein provides a foundation for
better understanding and managing cyber risks, thus enabling a risk management approach
to address cyberthreats and vulnerabilities. For detailed guidance on cyber risk management,
users of these guidelines should also refer to Member Governments' and Flag Administrations'
requirements, as well as relevant international and industry standards and best practices.
4.2 Additional guidance and standards may include, but are not limited to:1
4.3 Reference should be made to the most current version of any guidance or standards
utilized.
___________
1 The additional guidance and standards are listed as a non-exhaustive reference to further detailed
information for users of these Guidelines. The referenced guidance and standards have not been issued by
the Organization and their use remains at the discretion of individual users of these Guidelines.
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MSC.1/Circ.1527
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), with
a view to providing more specific guidance on the conditions under which materials other than
steel may be permitted for components mounted on engines, turbines and gearboxes;
arrangements for fixed hydrocarbon gas detection systems in double-hull and double-bottom
spaces of oil tankers; and non-combustible material as "steel or equivalent" for ventilation
ducts, approved unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-2, prepared by the Sub-Committee on
Ship Systems and Equipment, at its second session (23 to 27 March 2015), as set out in the
annex.
2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations as guidance
when applying SOLAS regulations II-2/4 and II-2/9 and to bring the unified interpretations to
the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
Application of materials other than steel on engine, turbine and gearbox installations
Materials other than steel may be assessed in relation to the risk of fire associated with
the component and its installation. The use of materials other than steel is considered
acceptable for the following applications:
.1 internal pipes which cannot cause any release of flammable fluid onto
the machinery or into the machinery space in case of failure; or
.2 components that are only subject to liquid spray on the inside when
the machinery is running, such as machinery covers, rocker box covers,
camshaft end covers, inspection plates and sump tanks. It is a condition that
the pressure inside these components and all the elements contained therein
is less than 0.18 N/mm2 and that wet sumps have a volume not
exceeding 100 litres; or
1 The term "cargo tanks" in the phrase "spaces adjacent to the cargo tanks" includes
slop tanks except those arranged for the storage of oily water only.
2 The term "spaces" in the phrase "spaces under the bulkhead deck adjacent to cargo
tanks" includes dry compartments such as ballast pump-rooms and bow thruster rooms and
any tanks such as freshwater tanks, but excludes fuel oil tanks.
3 The term "adjacent" in the phrase "adjacent to the cargo tanks" includes ballast tanks,
void spaces, other tanks or compartments located below the bulkhead deck located adjacent
to cargo tanks and includes any spaces or tanks located below the bulkhead deck which form
a cruciform (corner to corner) contact with the cargo tanks.
With respect to SOLAS regulation II-2/9.7.1.1, a ventilation duct made of material other than
steel may be considered equivalent to a ventilation duct made of steel, provided the material
is non-combustible and has passed a standard fire test in accordance with annex 1 to part 3
of the 2010 FTP Code as a non-load bearing structure for 30 minutes, following
the requirements for testing "B" class divisions.
___________
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MSC.1/Circ.1528
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), with
a view to providing more specific guidance on fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems and fixed
fire detection and fire alarm systems; foam-generating capacity of fixed foam fire-extinguishing
systems; and an additional indicating unit in the cargo control rooms, approved unified
interpretations of chapters 5, 6 and 9 of the FSS Code, prepared by the Sub-Committee
on Ship Systems and Equipment, at its second session (23 to 27 March 2015), as set out in
the annex.
2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations as guidance
when applying paragraph 2.2.1.7 of chapter 5 of the FSS Code, paragraphs 3.2.1.2 and 3.3.1.2
of chapter 6 of the FSS Code, as amended by resolution MSC.327(90), and paragraph 2.5.1.3
of chapter 9, of the FSS Code, as amended by resolution MSC.339(91), to the systems and
units to be installed on board ships constructed on or after 13 May 2016 and to bring the unified
interpretations to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 The "quantity of gas" means that quantity required for the largest cargo space in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2.1.1.1 of chapter 5:
2 In such cases, the system controls should be capable of allowing one third, two thirds
or the entire quantity of gas as required by paragraph 2.1.1.1 of chapter 5 to be discharged to
comply with the last sentence of paragraph 2.2.1.7 (i.e. the number of setting points of control
is three).
1 This interpretation of the term "largest protected space" applies to a machinery space
of category A protected by a fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing system complying
with the provisions of the FSS Code.
3 The level up to which foam should be filled to protect the highest positioned fire risk
objects within the machinery space should not be less than:
4 Where such a machinery space does not include a casing, the volume of the largest
protected space should be that of the space in its entirety, irrespective of the location of any
fire risk object therein (see figure 2).
5 Fire risk objects include, but may not be limited to, those listed in SOLAS
regulation II-2/3.31 and those defined in regulation II-2/3.34. Although not referred to in those
regulations, they may also include items having a similar fire risk such as exhaust gas boilers
or oil fuel tanks.
Additional indicating unit in the cargo control room (paragraph 2.5.1.3, as amended by
resolution MSC.339(91))
A space in which a cargo control console is installed, but does not serve as a dedicated cargo
control room (e.g. ship's office, machinery control room), should be regarded as a cargo control
room for the purposes of paragraph 2.5.1.3 of chapter 9 of the FSS Code, as amended by
resolution MSC.339(91), and therefore be provided with an additional indicating unit.
__________
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MSC.1/Circ.1529
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), with
a view to providing more specific guidance on lifeboat release and retrieval systems, approved
unified interpretations of paragraph 4.4.7.6 of the LSA Code, as amended by
resolution MSC.320(89), prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment, at
its second session (23 to 27 March 2015), as set out in the annex.
2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretation as guidance when
applying paragraphs 4.4.7.6.6, 4.4.7.6.7.2, 4.4.7.6.9 and 4.4.7.6.14 of the LSA Code, as
amended by resolution MSC.320(89), to the systems to be installed on board ships constructed
on or after 13 May 2016 and to bring the unified interpretations to the attention of all parties
concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 The reset function as required by paragraph 4.4.7.6.6 should also apply to the "other
means" or "similar device" referred to in paragraph 4.4.7.6.7.2.
2 Where a safety pin is fitted to facilitate compliance with SOLAS regulation III/1.5 then,
in line with paragraph 4 of the annex to MSC.1/Circ.1327, the safety pin arrangement should
be acceptable to the hook manufacturer, as defined in paragraph 9.9 of the annex
to MSC.1/Circ.1392.
Paragraph 4.4.7.6.9
3 Where stainless steel having a PREN < 22, or another corrosion resistant
material/alloy is chosen, the material should be qualified by corrosion test according to
standard ISO 9227:2012 or other equivalent recognized national standard. When the test is
carried out in accordance with standard ISO 9227:2012, neutral salt spray (NSS) should be used,
with 1,000 hours test duration for components outside the lifeboat, and 160 hours for those
inside the lifeboat. The salt spray tests may be conducted by using round specimens
(diameter is 14 mm) according to IACS UR W2.4.2.
4 After the salt spray test, the release mechanism should be subjected to load and
release test as described in resolution MSC.81(70), as amended by resolution MSC.321(89),
part 1, paragraph 6.9.4.1, to demonstrate satisfactory operation. The load and release should
be repeated 10 times. Where specimens are used for the salt spray tests, tensile tests should
be conducted in lieu of the load and release test. The results from the tests should be in order
to verify that the reduction in the ultimate tensile strength and reduction in cross sectional area
ratio is less than 5% between corrosion tested and non-corrosion tested specimens.
5 Where austenitic stainless steels (e.g. 316L or 316) are used for welded structures,
the risk of sensitization to intergranular corrosion should be addressed by the component
manufacturer's quality control system.
6 Austenitic stainless steels 201, 304, 321, 347 are susceptible to pitting and crevice
corrosion and, therefore, unsuitable for these applications. For operating cables covered with
sheath and installed inside the lifeboat, inner cables made of austenitic stainless steels 304
are acceptable without the corrosion test above.
Paragraph 4.4.7.6.14
The hanging-off arrangement, including the connections to the lifeboat release and retrieval
system and davit, should be designed with a calculated factor of safety of 6 based on
the ultimate strength of the materials used, and mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full
complement of fuel and equipment plus 1,000 kg equally distributed between the falls.
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1530
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), with
a view to providing more specific guidance on general emergency alarms and public address
systems in ro-ro spaces, approved unified interpretations of SOLAS regulations III/6.4
and III/6.5 and section 7.2 of the LSA Code, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems
and Equipment, at its second session (23 to 27 March 2015), as set out in the annex.
2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations as guidance
when applying SOLAS regulations III/6.4 and III/6.5 and section 7.2 of the LSA Code and to
bring the unified interpretations to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
General
2 The term "similar spaces" used in SOLAS regulation II-2/3.1, when applied to public
address and general alarm systems required in SOLAS regulations II-2/12.3, III/6.4 and III/6.5,
includes, but is not limited to, the following spaces: stairways, lifts, recreation rooms and
pantries.
3 The word "audibility" or the term "audible" used in SOLAS regulations III/6.4.2, III/6.4.3
and III/6.5, and when referred to in these unified interpretations, means the sound pressure
level requirements as defined in section 7.2 of the LSA Code.
5 For cargo ships, it is not necessary to provide a public address system in cargo
spaces used for the carriage of vehicles (i.e. only a general emergency alarm is required in
spaces used for the carriage of vehicles on cargo ships).
6 Regarding SOLAS regulation III/6.4.3, the term "normal crew working spaces"
includes spaces where routine maintenance tasks or local control of machinery operated at
sea are undertaken.
8 For cargo ships, it is not necessary to provide a public address system in cargo
spaces used for the carriage of vehicles (i.e. only a general emergency alarm is required in
spaces used for the carriage of vehicles on cargo ships).
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1533
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-first session (19 to 28 May 1999),
having approved the Interim guidelines for a simplified evacuation analysis of ro-ro passenger
ships (MSC/Circ.909) as a guide for the implementation of SOLAS regulation II-2/28-1.3,
requested the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection (FP) to also develop guidelines on evacuation
analysis for passenger ships in general and high-speed passenger craft.
2 The Committee, at its seventy-fourth session (30 May to 8 June 2001), following
a recommendation of the forty-fifth session of the FP Sub-Committee (8 to 12 January 2001),
approved the Interim guidelines for a simplified evacuation analysis of high-speed passenger
craft (MSC/Circ.1001). The Committee, at its eightieth session (11 to 20 May 2005), after
having considered a proposal by the forty-ninth session of the
FP Sub-Committee (24 to 28 January 2005) in light of the experience gained in the application
of the aforementioned interim guidelines, approved the Guidelines for a simplified evacuation
analysis of high-speed passenger craft (MSC/Circ.1166), which superseded MSC/Circ.1001,
together with the worked example appended thereto.
3 The Committee, at its seventy-fifth session (15 to 24 May 2002), further approved the
Interim guidelines on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships
(MSC/Circ.1033) and invited Member States to collect and submit to the FP Sub-Committee
for further consideration, any information and data resulting from research and development
activities, full-scale tests and findings on human behaviour which may be relevant for the
necessary future upgrading of the interim guidelines.
5 The Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), approved the Revised
Guidelines on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships, as set out in the
annexes, as a guide for the implementation of amendments to SOLAS regulation II-2/13.3.2.71,
making evacuation analysis mandatory not only for ro-ro passenger ships but also for other
passenger ships constructed on or after 1 January 2020.
1 The amendments to SOLAS regulation II-2/13.3.2.7 were adopted by the Committee, at its ninety-sixth
session (11 to 20 May 2016) and are expected to enter into force on 1 January 2020.
6 The annexed revised guidelines offer the possibility of using two distinct methods:
7 The assumptions inherent within the simplified method are by their nature limiting.
As the complexity of the ships increases (through the mix of passenger types, accommodation
types, number of decks and number of stairways), these assumptions become less
representative of reality. In such cases, the use of the advanced method would be preferred.
However, in early design iterations of the ship, the simplified method has merit due to its
relative ease of use and its ability to provide an approximation to expected evacuation
performance.
8 It is also to be noted that the acceptable evacuation durations in these guidelines are
based on an analysis of fire risk.
9 Member States are invited to bring the annexed guidelines (annexes 1 to 3) to the
attention of all those concerned and, in particular, to:
***
ANNEX 1
Preamble
1 The following information is provided for consideration by, and guidance to, the users
of these guidelines:
.1 To ensure uniformity of application, typical benchmark scenarios and
relevant data are specified in the guidelines. Therefore, the aim of the
analysis is to assess the performance of the ship with regard to the
benchmark scenarios rather than simulating an actual emergency.
.2 Although the approach is, from a theoretical and mathematical point of view,
sufficiently developed to deal with realistic simulations of evacuation on
board ships, there is still a shortfall in the amount of verification data and
practical experience on its application. When suitable information is provided
by Member Governments, the Organization should reappraise the figures,
parameters, benchmark scenarios and performance standards defined in the
interim guidelines.
.3 Almost all the data and parameters given in the guidelines are based on
well-documented data coming from civil building experience. The data and
results from ongoing research and development show the importance of such
data for improving the interim guidelines. Nevertheless, the simulation of
these benchmark scenarios are expected to improve ship design by
identifying inadequate escape arrangements, congestion points and
optimizing evacuation arrangements, thereby significantly enhancing safety.
2 For the above considerations, it is recommended that:
.1 the evacuation analysis be carried out as indicated in the guidelines, in
particular using the scenarios and parameters provided;
.2 the objective should be to assess the evacuation process through
benchmark cases rather than trying to model the evacuation in real
emergency conditions;
.3 application of the guidelines to analyse actual events to the greatest extent
possible, where passengers were called to assembly stations during a drill
or where a passenger ship was actually evacuated under emergency
conditions, would be beneficial in validating the guidelines;
.4 the aim of the evacuation analysis for existing passenger ships should be
to identify congestion points and/or critical areas and to provide
recommendations as to where these points and critical areas are located on
board; and
.5 keeping in mind that it is the company's responsibility to ensure passenger
and crew safety by means of operational measures, if the result of an
analysis, conducted on an existing passenger ship shows that the maximum
allowable evacuation duration has been exceeded, then the company should
ensure that suitable operational measures (e.g. updates of the onboard
emergency procedures, improved signage, emergency preparedness of the
crew, etc.) are implemented.
1 General
The purpose of this part of the guidelines is to present the methodology for conducting an
evacuation analysis and, in particular, to:
.1 confirm that the performance standards set out in these guidelines can be
met;
2 Definitions
2.1 Persons load is the number of persons considered in the means of escape
calculations contained in chapter 13 of the International Code for Fire Safety Systems
(FSS Code) (resolution MSC.98(73)).
2.2 Response duration (R) is the duration it takes for people to react to the situation. This
duration begins upon initial notification (e.g. alarm) of an emergency and ends when the
passenger has accepted the situation and begins to move towards an assembly station.
2.3 Individual travel duration is the duration incurred by an individual in moving from its
starting location to reach the assembly station.
2.4 Individual assembly duration is the sum of the individual response and the individual
travel duration.
2.5 Total assembly duration (tA) is the maximum individual assembly duration.
2.6 Total travel duration (T) is the duration it takes for all persons on board to move from
where they are upon notification to the assembly stations.
2.7 Embarkation and launching duration (E+L) is the duration required to provide for
abandonment by the total number of persons on board, starting from the time the abandon
ship signal is given after all persons have been assembled, with lifejackets donned.
3 Method of evaluation
This method of estimating the evacuation duration is based on several idealized benchmark
scenarios and the following assumptions are made:
.1 passengers and crew will evacuate via the main escape route towards their
assigned assembly station, as referred to in SOLAS regulation II-2/13;
.5 smoke, heat and toxic fire products are not considered to impact
passenger/crew performance;
4 Scenarios to be considered
4.1 As a minimum, four scenarios (cases 1 to 4) should be considered for the analysis as
follows. If more detailed data considering the crew distribution is available, it may be used.
.1 case 5 (Open Deck): If an open deck is outfitted for use by passengers and
its gross deck surface area is larger than 400 m² or accommodates more
than 200 persons, the following, additional day case should be analysed: All
persons are to be distributed as defined in the primary day case (case 2)
considering the open deck as an additional public space with an initial density
of 0.5 persons/m², calculated using the gross deck surface area.
4.3 If the total number of persons on board calculated, as indicated in the above cases,
exceeds the maximum number of persons the ship will be certified to carry, the initial
distribution of people should be scaled down so that the total number of persons is equal to
what the ship will be certified to carry.
5 Performance standards
5.1 The following performance standards, as illustrated in figure 5.1, should be complied with:
.2 for passenger ships other than ro-ro passenger ships, n = 60 if the ship has
no more than three main vertical zones; and 80, if the ship has more than
three main vertical zones.
Figure 5.1
The embarkation and launching duration (E+L) should be clearly documented to be available
in case of change of LSA.
5.5 For cases where neither of the three above methods can be used, (E+L) should be
assumed equal to 30 min.
6 Documentation
7 Corrective actions
7.1 For new ships, if the total evacuation duration calculated is in excess of the allowed
total evacuation duration, corrective actions should be considered at the design stage by
suitably modifying the arrangements affecting the evacuation system in order to reach an
acceptable total evacuation duration.
7.2 For existing ships, if the total evacuation duration calculated is in excess of the
allowed total evacuation duration, onboard evacuation procedures should be reviewed with a
view toward taking appropriate actions which would reduce congestion which may be
experienced in locations as indicated by the analysis.
***
ANNEX 2
1 Specific assumptions
This method of estimating evacuation duration is basic in nature and, therefore, common
evacuation analysis assumptions should be made as follows:
.1 all passengers and crew will begin evacuation at the same time and will not
hinder each other;
.2 initial walking speed depends on the density of persons, assuming that the
flow is only in the direction of the escape route, and that there is no
overtaking;
.1 response duration (R) should be 10 min for the night time scenarios
and 5 min for the day time scenarios;
3 Identification of congestion
.2 the difference between inlet and outlet of calculated flows (FC) is larger
than 1.5 persons per second.
APPENDIX 1
1 Parameters to be considered
Clear width is measured off the handrail(s) for corridors and stairways and the actual passage
width of a door in its fully open position.
The initial density of persons in an escape route is the number of persons (p) divided by the
available escape route area pertinent to the space where the persons are originally located
and expressed in (p/m2).
The speed (m/s) of persons along the escape route depends on the specific flow of persons
(as defined in paragraph 1.4) and on the type of escape facility. People speed values are given
in tables 1.1 (initial speed) and 1.3 below (speed after transition point as a function of specific
flow).
Specific flow (p/m/s) is the number of escaping persons past a point in the escape route per
unit time per unit of clear width Wc of the route involved. Values of FS are given in tables 1.1
(initial Fs as a function of initial density) and 1.2 (maximum value) below.
Table 1.12 – Values of initial specific flow and initial speed as a function of density
Initial density Initial specific Initial speed of
Type of facility
D (p/m2) flow Fs (p/m/s) persons S (m/s)
0 0 1.2
0.5 0.65 1.2
Corridors 1,9 1.3 0.67
3.2 0.65 0.20
3.5 0.32 0.10
2 Data derived from land-based stairs, corridors and doors in civil building and extracted from the publication
SFPE Fire Protection Engineering Handbook, 2nd edition, NFPA 1995.
The calculated flow of persons (p/s) is the predicted number of persons passing a particular
point in an escape route per unit time. It is obtained from:
Fc = Fs W c (1.5)
Flow duration (s) is the total duration needed for N persons to move past a point in the egress
system, and is calculated as:
tF = N / F c (1.6)
1.7 Transitions
Transitions are those points in the egress system where the type (e.g. from a corridor to
a stairway) or dimension of a route changes or where routes merge or ramify. In a transition,
the sum of all the outlet-calculated flow is equal to the sum of all the inlet-calculated flow:
T = (+ ) tI (1.8)
where:
= is the correction factor to be taken equal to 2 for cases 1 and 2 and 1.3 for
cases 3 and 4;
= is the counterflow correction factor to be taken equal to 0.3; and
2 Data derived from land-based stairs, corridors and doors in civil building and extracted from the publication
SFPE Fire Protection Engineering Handbook, 2nd edition, NFPA 1995.
2.1 Symbols
tstair = stairway travel duration (s) of the escape route to the assembly
station
tdeck = travel duration (s) to move from the farthest point of the escape
route of a deck to the stairway
tassembly = travel duration (s) to move from the end of the stairway to the
entrance of the assigned assembly station
.2 Calculation of the density D in the main escape routes of each deck. In the
case of cabin rows facing a corridor, it is assumed that the people in the
cabins simultaneously move into the corridor; the corridor density is,
therefore, the number of cabin occupants per corridor unit area calculated
considering the clear width. For public spaces, it is assumed that all persons
simultaneously begin the evacuation at the exit door (the specific flow to be
used in the calculations is the door's maximum specific flow); the number of
evacuees using each door may be assumed proportional to the door clear
width.
.4 Calculation of the flow Fc for corridors and doors, in the direction of the
correspondent assigned escape stairway.
.5 Once a transition point is reached; formula (1.7) is used to obtain the outlet
calculated flow(s) Fc. In cases where two or more routes leave the transition
point, it is assumed that the flow Fc of each route is proportional to its clear
width. The outlet specific flow(s), Fs, is obtained as the outlet calculated
flow(s) divided by the clear width(s); two possibilities exist:
.6 The above procedure is repeated for each deck, resulting in a set of values
of calculated flows Fc and speed S, each entering the assigned escape
stairway.
.8 Calculation of the travel duration tdeck from the farthest point of each escape
route to the stairway, is defined as the ratio of length/speed. For the various
portions of the escape route, the travel durations should be summed up if the
portions are used in series, otherwise the largest among them should be
adopted. This calculation should be performed for each deck; as the people
are assumed to move in parallel on each deck to the assigned stairway, the
dominant value tdeck should be taken as the largest among them. No tdeck is
calculated for public spaces.
.9 Calculation, for each stair flight, of its travel duration as the ratio of inclined
stair flight length and speed. For each deck, the total stair travel duration,
tstair, is the sum of the travel durations of all stairs flights connecting the deck
with the assembly station.
.10 Calculation of the travel duration tassembly from the end of the stairway (at the
assembly station deck) to the entrance of the assembly station.
.11 The overall duration to travel along an escape route to the assigned
assembly station is:
.12 The procedure should be repeated for both the day and night cases. This will
result in two values (one for each case) of tI for each main escape route
leading to the assigned assembly station.
.14 Once the calculation is performed for all the escape routes, the highest t I
should be selected for calculating the travel duration T using formula (1.8).
APPENDIX 2
EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION
1 General
1.1 This example provides an illustration on the application of the guidelines regarding
cases 1 and 2. Therefore, it should not be viewed as a comprehensive and complete analysis
nor as an indication of the data to be used.
2 Ship characteristics
2.1 The example is limited to two main vertical zones (MVZ 1 and MVZ 2) of a hypothetical
cruise ship. For MVZ 1, a night scenario is considered, hereinafter called case 1 (see figure 1)
while a day scenario (case 2, see figure 2) is considered for MVZ 2.
2.2 In case 1, the initial distribution corresponds to a total of 449 persons located in the
crew and passengers cabins as follows: 42 in deck 5; 65 in deck 6 (42 in the fore part and 23 in
the aft part); 26 in deck 7; 110 in deck 9; 96 in deck 10; and 110 in deck 11. Deck 8
(assembly station) is empty.
2.3 In case 2, the initial distribution corresponds to a total of 1,138 persons located in the
public spaces as follows: 469 in deck 6; 469 in deck 7; and 200 in deck 9. Deck 8 (assembly
station) is empty.
For both MVZ 1 and MVZ 2, the assembly stations are located at deck 8, which is also the
embarkation deck.
3.2.1 In MVZ 1, the escape routes are as follows (see figure 3):
.1 Deck 5 is connected with deck 6 (and then deck 8 where assembly stations
are located) through one stair (stair A) in the fore part of the zone. Four
corridors (corridors 1, 2, 3 and 4) and two doors (respectively door 1 and 2)
connect the cabins with stair A. The clear widths and lengths are:
.2 Deck 6 is connected with deck 7 (and then deck 8) through two stairs (stairs A
and B respectively in the fore and aft part of the zone). Four corridors
(corridors 1, 2, 3 and 4) and two doors (doors 1 and 2) connect the fore
cabins with stair A; and two corridors (corridors 5 and 6) and two doors
(doors 3 and 4) connect the aft cabins with stair B. The clear widths and
lengths are:
.3 Deck 7 is connected with deck 8 through stair C (stairs A and B coming from
below stop at deck 7). Arrival of stairs A and B and deck 7 cabins are
connected to stair C through 8 corridors, doors are neglected here in view of
simplifying this example. The clear widths and lengths are:
Wc (clear Length
Item Area m2 Notes
width)m m
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 1 0.9 6 5.4 To stair C
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 2 0.9 9 8.1 To corridor 7
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 3 0.9 15 13.5 To corridor 8
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 4 0.9 6 5.4 To stairway C
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 5 0.9 14 12.6 To corridor 7
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 6 0.9 15 13.5 To corridor 8
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 7 2.4 11 26.4 From stair B
From stair A to
MVZ1 – deck 7 – corridor 8 2.4 9 21.6
stair C
MVZ1 – deck 7 – stair C 1.40 4.67 N.A. Up to deck 8
.4 Deck 11 is connected with deck 10 through a double stair (stair C) in the aft
part of the zone. Two corridors (corridor 1 and 2) connect the cabins with
stair C through two doors (respectively doors 1 and 2). The clear widths and
lengths are:
.5 Deck 10 has a similar arrangement as deck 11. The clear widths and lengths
are:
.6 Deck 9 has a similar arrangement as deck 11. The clear widths and lengths
are:
.7 Deck 8, people coming from decks 5, 6 and 7 (stair C) and from decks 11,
10 and 9 (stair C) enters the assembly station through paths 1 and 2. The
clear widths and lengths are:
3.2.2 In MVZ 2, the escape routes are as follows (see figure 4):
.1 Deck 6 is connected with deck 7 (and then deck 8 where assembly stations
are located) through two stairs (stair A and B respectively) in the fore part of
the zone and through a double stair (stair C) in the aft part of the zone. Two
doors (respectively door A and B) connect the public space with stairs A
and B; and two doors (respectively door port side (PS) and door starboard
side (SB)) connect the public space with stair C. The clear widths and lengths
are:
.3 Deck 9 is connected with deck 8 through a double stair (stair C) in the aft part
of the zone. Two doors (respectively door PS and door SB) connect the
public space with stair C. The clear widths and lengths are:
.4 Deck 8, people coming from decks 6 and 7 (stairs A and B) enter directly the
embarkation station (open deck) through doors A and B, while people coming
from deck 9 (stair C) enter the assembly (muster) station through paths 1
and 2. The clear widths and lengths are:
NOTE: "Muster Station" has the same meaning as "Assembly Station". Refer to Indication of the
assembly station in passenger ships (MSC/Circ.777).
NOTE: "Muster Station" has the same meaning as "Assembly Station". Refer to Indication of the
assembly station in passenger ships (MSC/Circ.777).
4 Scenarios considered
4.1 Case 1 refers to a day scenario in MVZ 1, according to chapter 13 of the FSS Code,
the 449 persons are initially distributed as follows: 42 in deck 5; 65 in deck 6 (42 in the fore
part and 23 in the aft part); 26 in deck 7; 110 in deck 9; 96 in deck 10; and 110 in deck 11.
Deck 8 (assembly station) is empty. In accordance with paragraph 2.2 of appendix 1 to the
guidelines, all persons in the cabins are assumed to simultaneously move into the corridors.
The corresponding initial conditions are:
Persons (N)
Total
MVZ 1 – Specific Max. Specific Cal-
including specific Speed of
Stairs, From flow flow culated
those flow persons Queue Comments Notes
doors & current Fs in Fs flow
from Fs S (m/s)
corridors route (p/m/s) (p/m/s) Fc (p/s)
other (p/m/s)
routes
Deck 5 – From corridors
34 34 2.28 1.3 1.3 1.17 N.A. Yes 1
door 1 1, 2 and 4
Deck 5 –
8 8 1.85 1.3 0.85 0.77 N.A. From corridor 3 1
door 2
Deck 5 – From doors 1
42 42 1.43 0.88 0.88 1.188 0.44 Yes 1, 2
stair A and 2
Deck 6 – From corridors
34 34 2.58 1.30 1.3 1.17 N.A. Yes 1
door 1 1, 2, and 4;
Deck 6 –
8 8 0.85 1.30 0.85 0.77 N.A. From corridor 3 1
door 2
From doors 1
Deck 6 –
42 84 2.32 0.88 0.88 1.188 0.44 Yes and 2, from 1, 2
stair A
deck 5
Deck 6 –
11 11 0.85 1.30 0.85 0.77 N.A. From corridor 5 1
door 3
Deck 6 –
12 12 0.73 1.30 0.81 0.73 N.A. From corridor 4 1
door 4
Deck 6 – From doors 3
23 23 1.05 0.88 0.88 1.188 0.44 Yes 1, 2
stair B and 4
From corridors
Deck 7 –
8 92 0.78 1.3 0.78 1.88 1.09 3 and 6, from 1, 3
corridor 8
deck 6, stair A
From corridors
Deck 7 – 2, 5 and 8,
18 125 1.75 1.3 1.3 3.12 0.67 Yes 1, 4
corridor 7 from deck 6,
stair B
From corridors
Deck 7 –
8 133 3.21 0.88 0.88 1.232 0.44 Yes 1, 4 and 7; up 1, 2, 5
stair C
to deck 8
Deck 11
55 55 1.21 1.3 1.21 1.09 N.A. To stair C 1
– door 1
Deck 11
55 55 1.21 1.3 1.21 1.09 N.A. To stair C 1
– door 2
Deck 11 Down to deck
110 110 0.78 1.1 0.78 2.17 0.81 1, 2
– stair C 10
Deck 10
48 48 1.11 1.3 1.11 1 N.A. To stair C 1
– door 1
Deck 10
48 48 1.11 1.3 1.11 1 N.A. To stair C 1
– door 2
Deck 10
96 206 1.49 1.1 1.10 3.08 0.55 Yes Down to deck 9 1, 2
– stair C
Deck 9 –
55 55 1.21 1.3 1.21 1.09 N.A. To stair C 1
door 1
Deck 9 –
55 55 1.21 1.3 1.21 1.09 N.A. To stair C 1
door 2
Deck 9 –
110 316 1.88 1.1 1.10 3.08 0.55 Yes Down to deck 8 1, 2
stair C
Deck 8 – To assembly
0 200 0.96 1.3 0.96 1.92 0.95 1, 6
path 1 stat
Deck 8 – To assembly
0 249 0.96 1.3 0.96 2.4 0.95 1, 6
path 2 stat
Notes:
1 The specific flow "Fs in" is the specific flow entering the element of the escape route;
the maximum specific flow is the maximum allowable flow given in table 1.3 of
appendix 1 of the guidelines; the specific flow is the one applicable for the calculations
i.e. the minimum between "Fs in" and the maximum allowable; when "Fs in" is greater
than the maximum allowable, a queue is formed.
2 Some stairs are used by both persons coming from below (or above) and persons
coming from the current deck considered; in making the calculation for a stair
connecting deck N to deck N+1 (or deck N-1), the persons to be considered are those
entering the stairs at deck N plus those coming from all decks below (or above)
deck N.
3 At deck 7, 8 persons initially move from the cabins into corridor 8 and 84 persons
arrive to corridor 8 from deck 6, stair A; the total is therefore 92 persons.
4 At deck 7, 18 persons initially move from the cabins into corridor 7, 23 persons arrive
to corridor 7 from deck 6 stair B and 84 persons arrive to corridor 8 from deck 7,
corridor 7; the total is, therefore, 125 persons.
5 At deck 7, 8 persons initially move from the cabins directly to the stair C and
125 persons arrive to stair C from corridor 8; the total is therefore 133 persons.
6 At deck 8 (assembly station), no persons are initially present; therefore, the escape
routes on this deck are then used by the total number of persons arriving from above
and/or below.
4.2 Case 2 refers to a day scenario in MVZ 2, according to chapter 13 of the FSS Code,
the 1,138 persons are initially distributed as follows: 469 in deck 6; 469 in deck 7; and 200 in
deck 9. Deck 8 (assembly station) is initially empty. In accordance with paragraph 2.2
of appendix 1 to the guidelines, all persons are assumed to simultaneously begin the
evacuation and use the exit doors at their maximum specific flow. The corresponding initial
conditions are:
Initial Initial
Initial Calculated
Specific speed of
MVZ 2 – Doors Persons density flow
flow Fc (p/s) persons
D (p/m2)
Fs (p/m/s) S (m/s)
Deck 6 – door A 100 N.A. 1.3 1.3 N.A.
Deck 6 – door B 100 N.A. 1.3 1.3 N.A.
Deck 6 – door C
134 N.A. 1.3 1.76 N.A.
PS
Deck 6 – door C
135 N.A. 1.3 1.76 N.A.
SB
Deck 7 – door A 170 N.A. 1.3 2.21 N.A.
Deck 7 – door B 170 N.A. 1.3 2.21 N.A.
Deck 7 – door C
65 N.A. 1.3 1.17 N.A.
PS
Deck 7 – door C
64 N.A. 1.3 1.17 N.A.
SB
Deck 9 – door C
100 N.A. 1.3 1.3 N.A.
SB
Deck 9 – door C
100 N.A. 1.3 1.3 N.A.
PS
Persons (N)
Max. Calcu-
Total Specific Specific Speed
specific lated
MVZ 2 – From including flow flow of
flow flow Queue Comments Notes
Stairs curren those from Fs in Fs persons
Fs Fc
t route other (p/m/s) (p/m/s) S (m/s)
(p/m/s) (p/s)
routes
Deck 6 – up to
100 100 0.93 0.88 0.88 1.23 0.44 Yes 1
stair A deck 7
Deck 6 – up to
100 100 0.93 0.88 0.88 1.23 0.44 Yes 1
stair B deck 7
Deck 6 – up to
269 269 1.1 0.88 0.88 2.82 0.44 Yes 1
stair C deck 7
Deck 7 – up to
170 270 1.68 0.88 0.88 1.8 0.44 Yes 1, 2
stair A deck 8
Deck 7 – up to
170 270 1.68 0.88 0.88 1.8 0.44 Yes 1, 2
stair B deck 8
Deck 7 – up to
129 398 1.61 0.88 0.88 2.82 0.44 Yes 1, 2
stair C deck 8
Deck 9 – down to
200 200 0.81 1.1 0.81 2.60 0.78
stair C deck 8
from
Deck 8 –
0 266 1.2 1.3 1.2 2.41 0.75 decks 7 1, 3
path 1
and 9
from
Deck 8 –
0 332 1.2 1.3 1.2 3.01 0.75 decks 7 1, 3
path 2
and 9
Deck 8 –
0 270 0.88 1.3 0.88 1.8 N.A. from deck 7 1, 3
door A
Deck 8 –
0 270 0.88 1.3 0.88 1.8 N.A. from deck 7 1, 3
door B
Notes:
1 The specific flow "Fs in" is the specific flow entering the element of the escape route;
the maximum specific flow is the maximum allowable flow given in table 1.3 of
appendix 1 of the guidelines; the specific flow is the one applicable for the calculations
i.e. the minimum between "Fs in" and the maximum allowable; when "Fs in" is greater
than the maximum allowable, a queue is formed.
2 Some stairs are used by both persons coming from below (or above) and persons
coming from the current deck considered; in making the calculation for a stair
connecting deck N to deck N+1 (or deck N-1), the persons to be considered are those
entering the stairs at deck N plus those coming from all decks below (or above)
deck N.
3 At deck 8 (assembly station), no persons are initially present; therefore, the escape
routes on this deck are then used by the total number of persons arriving from above
and/or below.
5.2 For case 2: since in this particular arrangement there are no corridors, the deck
duration is zero.
Deck or
Calculated Speed Flow
Persons Length stairs dur.,
Item flow Fc S dur. tF (s) Entering
N L (m) tdeck, tstairs
(p/s) (m/s) tF = N/ Fc
t = L/S
Deck 6 – door A 100 N.A. 1.3 N.A 76.9 N.A. Stair A
Deck 6 – door B 100 N.A. 1.3 N.A. 76.9 N.A. Stair B
Deck 6 – door C PS 134 N.A. 1.76 N.A. 76.4 N.A. Stair C
Deck 6 – door C SB 135 N.A. 1.76 N.A. 76.9 N.A. Stair C
Deck 6 – stair A 100 4.67 1.23 0.44 81.2 10.6 Deck 7
Deck 6 – stair B 100 4.67 1.23 0.44 81.2 10.6 Deck 7
Deck 6 – stair C 269 4.67 2.82 0.44 95.5 10.6 Deck 7
Deck 7 – door A 170 N.A. 2.21 N.A 76.9 N.A. Stair A
Deck 7 – door B 170 N.A. 2.21 N.A. 76.9 N.A. Stair B
Deck 7 – door C PS 65 N.A. 1.17 N.A. 55.6 N.A. Stair C
Deck 7 – door C SB 64 N.A. 1.17 N.A. 54.7 N.A. Stair C
Deck 7 – stair A 270 4.67 1.8 0.44 149.7 10.6 Deck 8
Deck 7 – stair B 270 4.67 1.8 0.44 149.7 10.6 Deck 8
Deck 7 – stair C 398 4.67 2.82 0.44 141.3 10.6 Deck 8
Deck 8 – door A 270 N.A. 1.8 N.A. 149.7 N.A. Embarkation
Deck 8 – door B 270 N.A. 1.8 N.A. 149.7 N.A. Embarkation
Deck 9 – door PS 100 N.A. 1.3 N.A. 76.9 N.A. Stair C
Deck 9 – door SB 100 N.A. 1.3 N.A. 76.9 N.A. Stair C
Deck 9 – stair C 200 4.67 2.6 0.78 76.9 6 Deck 8
6 Calculation of tassembly
6.1 Case 1: In this case, all the 429 persons use stair C (316 coming from above deck 8
and 133 from below) and, once arrived at deck 8, need to travel on deck 8 to reach the
assembly station using either path 1 or path 2. The corresponding duration is as follows:
Flow
Speed
Calculated
Persons Length flow dur. tassembly
Item S Entering
N L (m) Fc (p/s) (m/s) tF (s) t = L/S
tF = N/ Fc
Deck 8 – path 1 200 9.5 1.92 0.95 104.4 10 Assembly station
Deck 8 – path 2 249 7.5 2.4 0.95 103.9 7.9 Assembly station
6.2 Case 2: In this case, all the persons using stair C (totalling 598), once arrived at
deck 8, need to travel through on deck 8 to reach the assembly station using either path 1 or
path 2. The corresponding duration is as follows:
7 Calculation of T
7.1 Case 1: The travel duration T, according to appendix 1 to the interim guidelines, is the
maximum tI (equation 2.2.11) multiplied by 2.3 (sum of correction factor and counterflow
correction factor). The maximum values of tI for each escape route are given in the following:
Notes:
1 The flow duration, tf, is the maximum flow duration recorded on the whole
escape route from the deck where persons started evacuating up to the
assembly station.
2 The travel duration on the stairways (tstair) is the total duration necessary to
travel along all the stairs from the deck where persons originally started
evacuating up to the deck where the assembly station is located; in the
present case, tstair for persons moving down from deck 11 is, therefore, the
sum of tstair from deck 11 to 10 (5.7 s), from deck 10 to 9 (8.5 s) and from
deck 9 to 8 (8.5 s), in total 22.7 s; similarly for the other cases.
3 The travel duration on the stairways (tstair) is the total duration necessary to
travel along all the stairs from the deck where persons originally started
evacuating up to the deck where the assembly station is located; in the
present case, tstair for persons moving up from deck 5 is, therefore, the sum
of tstair from deck 5 to 6 (10.6 s.), from deck 6 to 7 (10.6 s) and from deck 7
to 8 (10.6 s), in total 31.8 s; similarly for the other cases.
7.2 Case 2: The travel duration T, according to appendix 1 to the guidelines, is the
maximum tI equation 2.2.11) multiplied by 2.3 (sum of correction factor and counterflow
correction factor). The maximum values of tI for each escape route are given in the following:
Notes:
1 The flow duration, tf, is the maximum flow duration recorded on the whole
escape route from the deck where persons started evacuating up to the
assembly station.
2 In this example, stairs A and B are already leading to the embarkation station;
therefore, only those escape routes passing through stair C need additional
duration, tassembly, to reach the assembly station.
3 The travel duration on the stairways (tstair) is the total duration necessary to
travel along all the stairs from the deck where persons originally started
evacuating up to the deck where the assembly station is located; in the present
case, tstair for persons moving from deck 6 is therefore the sum of tstair from
deck 6 to 7 (10.6 s) and from deck 7 to 8 (10.6 s).
8 Identification of congestion
8.1 Case 1: Congestion takes place on deck 5 (door 1 and stair A), deck 6 (door 1, stairs A
and B), deck 7 (corridor 7 and stair C), deck 10 (stair C) and deck 9 (stair C). However, since
the total duration is below the limit (see paragraph 9.1 of this example) no design modifications
are needed.
8.2 Case 2: Congestion takes place on deck 6 (stairs A, B and C) and deck 7 (stairs A, B
and C). However, since the total duration is below the limit (see paragraph 9.2 of this example)
no design modifications are needed.
9 Performance standard
9.1 Case 1: The total evacuation duration, according to paragraph 5.1 of the revised
guidelines is as follows:
1.25 (R+T) + 2/3 (E+L) = 1.25 x (10' + 7'18") + 20 = 41' 38" (9.1)
where:
9.2 Case 2: The total evacuation duration, according to paragraph 5.1 of the revised
guidelines is as follows:
1.25 (R+T) + 2/3 (E+L) = 1.25 x (5' + 6' 43") + 20 = 34' 39" (9.2)
where:
***
ANNEX 3
GUIDELINES FOR AN ADVANCED EVACUATION ANALYSIS
OF NEW AND EXISTING PASSENGER SHIPS3
1 Specific assumptions
This method of estimating the evacuation duration is based on several idealized benchmark
scenarios and the following assumptions are made:
The following components should be included in the calculation of the evacuation duration as
specified in the appendix:
3 Identification of congestion
3.1 Congestion within regions is identified by local population densities exceeding 4 p/m2
for significant duration. These levels of congestion may or may not be significant to the overall
assembly process.
3.2 If any identified congestion region is found to persist for longer than 10% of the
simulated total assembly duration (tA), it is considered to be significant.
3 Note: Advanced evacuation analysis is taken to mean a computer-based simulation that represents each
occupant as an individual that has a detailed representation of the layout of a ship and represents the
interaction between the occupants and the layout.
APPENDIX 1
1.2 The abilities of each person are determined by a set of parameters, some of which
are probabilistic.
1.4 The parameters should vary among the individuals of the population.
1.5 The basic rules for personal decisions and movements are the same for everyone,
described by a universal algorithm.
1.6 The time difference between the actions of any two persons in the simulation should
be not more than one second of simulated time, e.g. all persons proceed with their action in
one second (a parallel update is necessary).
2 Parameters to be used
2.1 In order to facilitate their use, the parameters are grouped into the same 4 categories
as used in other industrial fields, namely: GEOMETRICAL, POPULATION, ENVIRONMENTAL
and PROCEDURAL.
2.2 Category GEOMETRICAL: layout of escape routes, their obstruction and partial
unavailability, initial passenger and crew distribution conditions.
3.1.1 General
The evacuation analysis specified in this annex is aimed at measuring the performance of the
ship in reproducing benchmark scenarios rather than simulating an actual emergency situation.
Four benchmark cases should be considered, namely cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 (refer to paragraph
4 for detailed specifications) corresponding to primary evacuation cases (cases1 and 2, where
all the escape routes should be assumed to be in operation) and secondary evacuation cases
(cases 3 and 4, where some of the escape route should be assumed to be unavailable).
3.1.2 Layout of escape routes – primary evacuation cases (cases 1 and 2): Passengers
and crew should be assumed to proceed along the primary escape routes and to know their
ways up to the assembly stations; to this effect, signage, low-location lighting, crew training
and other relevant aspects connected with the evacuation system design and operation should
be assumed to be in compliance with the requirements set out in IMO instruments.
3.1.3 Layout of escape routes – secondary evacuation cases (cases 3 and 4): Those
passengers and crew who were previously assigned to the now unavailable primary escape
route should be assumed to proceed along the escape routes determined by the ship designer.
3.1.4 Initial passenger and crew distribution condition. The occupant distribution should be
based upon the cases defined in chapter 13 of the FSS Code, as outlined in section 4.
3.2.1 This describes the make-up of the population in terms of age, gender, physical
attributes and response durations. The population is identical for all scenarios with the
exception of the response duration and passenger initial locations. The population is made of
the following mix:
All of the attributes associated with this population distribution should consist of a statistical
distribution within a fixed range of values. The range is specified between a minimum and
maximum value with a uniform random distribution.
The response duration distributions for the benchmark scenarios should be truncated
logarithmic normal distributions4 as follows:
4 "Recommendations on the Nature of the Passenger Response Time Distribution to be used in the MSC.1033
Assembly Time Analysis Based on Data Derived from Sea Trials", Galea, E. R., Deere, S., Sharp, G., Fillips,
L., Lawrence, P., and Gwunne, S., The Transaction of The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, Part A –
International Journal of Maritime Engineering ISSN 14798751.2007.
The maximum unhindered travel speeds to be used are those derived from data published
by Ando5 which provides male and female walk rates as a function of age. These are distributed
according to figure 3.1 and represented by approximate piecewise functions shown in
table 3.3.
2.0
Walking
speed
Male
1.0
(m/s)
Female
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Age (years)
5 Ando K, Ota H, and Oki T, Forecasting The Flow Of People, Railway Research Review, (45), pp 8-14, 1988.
For each gender group specified in table 3.1, the walking speed should be modelled as
a statistical uniform distribution having minimum and maximum values as follows:
6 Maritime EXODUS V4.0, USER GUIDE AND TECHNICAL MANUAL, Authors: E R Galea,
S Gwynne, P. J. Lawrence, L. Filippidis, D. Blackshields and D. Cooney, CMS Press, May 2003 Revision 1.0,
ISBN: 1 904521 38 X.
Speeds are given on the base of gender, age and travel direction (up and down). The speeds
in table 3.5 are those along the inclined stairs. It is expected that all the data above will be
updated when more appropriate data and results become available.
The unhindered travel speeds of each evacuee on flat terrain and on stairs (down and up) are
consistent within the respective ranges specified in tables 3.4 and 3.5.
The specific unit flow rate is the number of escaping persons past a point in the escape route
per unit time per unit width of the route involved, and is measured in number of persons (p).
The specific unit flow rate8 for any exit should not exceed 1.33 p/m/s.
Static and dynamic conditions of the ship. These parameters will influence the moving speed
of persons. Presently no reliable figures are available to assess this effect; therefore, these
parameters could not yet be considered. This effect will not be accounted for in the scenarios
(cases 1, 2, 3 and 4) until more data has been gathered.
7 The maximum unhindered stair speeds are derived from data generated by J. Fruin. Pedestrian planning
and design, Metropolitan Association of Urban Designers and Environmental Planners, New York, 1971.
The study comprises two staircase configurations.
8 Value based on data accepted in civil building applications in Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States; this value is also consistent with the simplified evacuation analysis method.
For the purpose of conducting the evacuation analysis, the following initial distributions
of passengers and crew should be considered as derived from chapter 13 of the FSS Code,
with the additional indications only relevant for the advanced evacuation analysis. If more
detailed data considering the distribution of crew is available, the distribution may deviate from
the following specifications:
4.1 Cases 1 and 3 (night)
Passengers in cabins with maximum berthing capacity fully occupied; 2/3 of crew members
in their cabins; of the remaining 1/3 of crew members:
.1 50% should be initially located in service spaces;
.2 25% should be located at their emergency stations and should not be
explicitly modelled; and
.3 25% should be initially located at the assembly stations and should proceed
towards the most distant passenger cabin assigned to that assembly station
in counterflow with evacuees; once this passenger cabin is reached, these
crew are no longer considered in the simulation. The ratio between the
passenger and counterflow crew should be the same in each main vertical
zone.
Public spaces, as defined by SOLAS regulation II-2/3.39, will be occupied to 75% of maximum
capacity of the spaces by passengers. Crew will be distributed as follows:
.1 1/3 of the crew will be initially distributed in the crew accommodation spaces
(cabins and crew day spaces);
5.1 The travel duration, both that predicted by models and as measured in reality, is a
random quantity due to the probabilistic nature of the evacuation process.
5.2 In total, a minimum of 500 different simulations should be carried out for each of the
benchmark cases. This will yield, for each case, a total of at least 500 values of tA.
5.3 These simulations should be made up of at least 100 different randomly generated
populations (within the range of population demographics specified in paragraph 3).
Simulations based on each of these different populations should be repeated at least 5 times.
If these 5 repetitions produce insignificant variations in the results, the total number of
populations analysed should be 500 rather than 100, with only a single simulation performed
for each population.
5.4 The minimum number of 500 different simulations can be reduced when a
convergence is determined by an appropriate method, such as the one shown in appendix 3.
The total number of different simulations should be in this case not less than 50.
5.5 The value of the travel duration for each of cases 1 to 4: the value tI is taken which is
higher than 95% of all the calculated values (i.e. for each of cases 1 to 4, the durations tA are
ranked from lowest to highest and tI is selected for which 95% of the ranked values are lower).
5.6 The value of the travel duration to comply with the performance standard T is the
highest of the four calculated travel durations tI (one for each of cases 1 to 4).
5.7 The procedure for calculating the travel duration for cases 5 and 6 should be based
on the same principles as for cases 1 to 4.
6.1 The assumptions made for the simulation should be stated. Assumptions that contain
simplifications above those in paragraph 3.2 of the Guidelines for the advanced evacuation
analysis of new and existing passenger ships, should not be made.
.1 the variables used in the model to describe the dynamics, e.g. walking speed
and direction of each person;
.3 the type of update, e.g. the order in which the persons move during the
simulation (parallel, random sequential, ordered sequential or other);
.5 a detailed user guide/manual specifying the nature of the model and its
assumptions and guidelines for the correct use of the model and
interpretations of results should be readily available.
APPENDIX 2
GUIDANCE ON VALIDATION/VERIFICATION OF
EVACUATION SIMULATION TOOLS
.1 component testing;
.2 functional verification;
.4 quantitative verification.
Component testing
2 Component testing involves checking that the various components of the software
perform as intended. This involves running the software through a battery of elementary test
scenarios to ensure that the major sub-components of the model are functioning as intended.
The following is a non-exhaustive list of suggested component tests that should be included
in the verification process.
3 One person in a corridor 2 m wide and 40 m long with a walking speed of 1 m/s should
be demonstrated to cover this distance in 40 s.
4 One person on a stair 2 m wide and a length of 10 m measured along the incline with
a walking speed of 1 m/s should be demonstrated to cover this distance in 10 s.
5 One person on a stair 2 m wide and a length of 10 m measured along the incline with
a walking speed of 1 m/s should be demonstrated to cover this distance in 10 s.
9 Note: This procedure has been highlighted in ISO document ISO/TR 13387-8:1999.
9 Choose a panel consisting of males 30-50 years old from table 3.4 in the appendix to
the Guidelines for the advanced evacuation analysis of new and existing ships and distribute
the walking speeds over a population of 50 people. Show that the distributed walking speeds
are consistent with the distribution specified in the table.
Functional verification
10 Functional verification involves checking that the model possesses the ability to
exhibit the range of capabilities required to perform the intended simulations. This requirement
is task specific. To satisfy functional verification the model developers must set out in a
comprehensible manner the complete range of model capabilities and inherent assumptions
and give a guide to the correct use of these capabilities. This information should be readily
available in technical documentation that accompanies the software.
Qualitative verification
11 The third form of model validation concerns the nature of predicted human behaviour
with informed expectations. While this is only a qualitative form of verification, it is nevertheless
important, as it demonstrates that the behavioural capabilities built into the model are able to
produce realistic behaviours.
12 Two rooms 10 m wide and long connected via a corridor 10 m long and 2 m wide
starting and ending at the centre of one side of each room. Choose a panel consisting of
males 30-50 years old from table 3.4 in the appendix to the Guidelines for the advanced
evacuation analysis of new and existing ships with instant response time and distribute the
walking speeds over a population of 100 persons.
13 Step 1: One hundred persons move from room 1 to room 2, where the initial
distribution is such that the space of room 1 is filled from the left with maximum possible density
(see figure 2). The time the last person enters room 2 is recorded.
14 Step 2: Step one is repeated with an additional ten, fifty, and one hundred persons in
room 2. These persons should have identical characteristics to those in room 1. Both rooms
move off simultaneously and the duration for the last persons in room 1 to enter room 2 is
recorded. The expected result is that the recorded duration increases with the number of
persons in counterflow increases.
15 Public room with four exits and 1,000 persons (see figure 3) uniformly distributed in the
room. Persons leave via the nearest exits. Choose a panel consisting of males 30-50 years old
from table 3.4 in the appendix to the Guidelines for the advanced evacuation analysis of new
and existing ships with instant response time and distribute the walking speeds over a population
of 1,000 persons.
Step 1: Record the amount of time the last person needs to leave the room.
The expected result is an approximate doubling of the duration to empty the room.
18 The software should be tested for a corridor without any obstructions. It should be
demonstrated that the flow of persons in the corridor is generally smaller at very high
population densities compared with that at moderate densities.
Quantitative verification
APPENDIX 3
1 In total, a minimum of 50 different simulations should be carried out for each of the
benchmark cases. This will yield, for each case, a total of at least 50 values of t A. More
than 50 simulations may be required according to the outcome of the convergence test (3 and
4 below), which requires to increment the number of simulations one by one (see 3) and to test
the criterion every batch of 50 simulation runs (see 4).
3.1 For each case, the evaluation of the 95th centile is an incremental evaluation which
is performed every simulation run using all available tA previously calculated from the first to
the last simulation run of the case studied.
3.2 The value of the 95th centile of all calculated total assembly times (noted T0.95 ) is
taken which is higher than 95% of all the previous calculated values (i.e. for each of the four
cases, for each simulation run increment, indexed on letter "i" below, all available values of
i
assembly times tA of the case are ranked from lowest to highest and T0.95 is selected for
which 95% of the ranked values are lower. Consequently, at the simulation number i, there is
i
a series of i values of T0.95 ).
4 Convergence criterion
4.1 For each case, the convergence test is an evaluation of the following criterion which
is performed every batch of 50 simulation runs. N denotes the number of simulations that have
been run every time the criterion is tested (i.e. N = 50 for the first batch, N = 100 for the second
batch etc.)
i
4.2 The distance between the maximum to the minimum of T0.95 obtained over the 50 last
i
simulation increments should not exceed the distance (in absolute value) of the mean of T0.95
over the 50 last simulation increments, to the maximum allowable assembly time (Tlim ):
Where:
2
n− (E+L)
Tlim = 3
with n, E, and L, as defined in Annex1, §5.1 (1),
1.25
mean50 i
T0.95 = mean(T0.95 ), with i between (N − 49) and N,
max50 i
T0.95 = maximum(T0.95 ), with i between (N − 49) and N, and
min50 i
T0.95 = minimu m(T0.95 ) , with i between (N − 49)and N.
4.3 For each of the four cases, the following iterative method should be followed to
determine the travel Time Tcase:
- If the criterion is met, sufficient number of simulations has been run for the case.
mean50
T0.95 (for the first N which satisfies the criterion) is selected as the travel time
Tcase; and
- If a total of 500 simulations have been run for the case, the process should be
mean50
stopped and T0.95 is selected as the travel time Tcase.
5 The value of the travel time to comply with the performance standard T is the highest
of the four calculated travel times Tcase (one for each of the four cases).
6 The same procedure for a convergence criterion for case 5 and the travel duration in
case 6 (travel duration from assembly stations to the LSA entry points) can be based on the
same principle (paragraph 1 to 5). For case 6, the procedure requires to adapt the notations
(tA) and to take into account (E+L) ≤ 30' (see annex 1, paragraph 5.1 (2) for the definition of Tlim.
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1534
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), in order to
facilitate global and consistent implementation of the requirements of the 1966 Load Lines
Convention, approved unified interpretations relating to the International Convention on Load
Lines, 1966, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction, at its third session
(18 to 22 January 2016), as set out in the annex.
2 Member States are invited to apply the annexed unified interpretations and to bring
them to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 For the purpose of these regulations, two positions of hatchways, doorways and
ventilators are defined as follows:
Position 1 – Upon freeboard decks and raised quarterdecks, or other exposed decks*
lower than one standard height of superstructure above the freeboard deck, and upon
exposed decks* situated forward of a point located a quarter of the ship's length from
the forward perpendicular that are located lower than two standard heights of
superstructure above the freeboard deck.
Position 2 – Upon exposed decks* situated abaft a quarter of the ship's length from the
forward perpendicular and located at least one standard height of superstructure above
the freeboard deck and lower than two standard heights of superstructure above the
freeboard deck.
Upon exposed decks* situated forward of a point located a quarter of the ship's length from the
forward perpendicular and located at least two standard heights of superstructure above the
freeboard deck and lower than three standard heights of superstructure above the freeboard
deck.
the exposed parts of the pipes should be of substantial construction, and the height from the
deck to the point where water may have access below should be at least:
.1 760 mm on the freeboard deck or other exposed decks* lower than one
standard height of superstructure above the freeboard deck; and
Note: Flush bolted access covers, which are of substantial construction and are secured by
gaskets and closely spaced bolts to maintain water tightness, are not subject to the minimum
sill height requirements.
* "Exposed decks" include top decks of superstructures, deckhouses, companionways and other similar deck
structures.
Regulation 27(13)(e)
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1536
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), with a
view to providing more specific guidance on the application of the provisions of SOLAS
regulations II-1/29.3 and 29.4 concerning the steering gear test, approved the unified
interpretations of SOLAS regulations II-1/29.3 and II-1/29.4, prepared by the Sub-Committee
on Ship Design and Construction, at its third session (18 to 22 January 2016), as set out in the
annex.
***
ANNEX
2 In order to demonstrate this ability, the trials may be conducted in accordance with
section 6.1.5.1 of the standard ISO 19019:2005 (Sea-going vessels and marine technology –
Instructions for planning, carrying out and reporting sea trials).
3 On all occasions when trials are conducted with the vessel not at the deepest
seagoing draught, the loading condition can be accepted on the conditions that either:
.1 The rudder is fully submerged (at zero speed waterline) and the vessel is in
an acceptable trim condition.
.2 The rudder torque at the trial loading condition has been reliably predicted
(based on the system pressure measurement) and extrapolated to the
maximum seagoing draught condition using the following method to predict
the equivalent torque and actuator pressure at the deepest seagoing
draught:
QF QT
AF VF 2
1.25( )( )
AT VT
where:
PF PT
where:
Where constant volume fixed displacement pumps are utilized then the
regulations can be deemed satisfied if the estimated steering actuator
hydraulic pressure at the deepest draught is less than the specified maximum
working pressure of the rudder actuator. Where a variable delivery pump is
utilized pump data should be supplied and interpreted to estimate the
delivered flow rate corresponds to the deepest seagoing draught in order to
calculate the steering time and allow it to be compared to the required time.
4 In any case for the main steering gear trial, the speed of the ship corresponding to the
number of maximum continuous revolution of main engine and maximum design pitch applies.
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1539
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), in order to
facilitate global and consistent implementation of the requirements of SOLAS chapter II-1, approved
unified interpretations of SOLAS chapter II-1, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Construction, at its third session (18 to 22 January 2016), as set out in the annex.
2 Member States are invited to apply the annexed unified interpretations and to bring
them to the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
1 The weight of mediums on board for the fixed firefighting systems (e.g. freshwater,
CO2, dry chemical powder, foam concentrate, etc.) should be included in the lightweight and
lightship condition.
Regulation 3-2 – Protective coatings of dedicated seawater ballast tanks in all types of
ships and double-side skin spaces of bulk carriers
2 The following tanks should not be considered to be dedicated seawater ballast tanks
and should, therefore, be exempted from the application and requirements of the Performance
standard for protective coatings for dedicated seawater ballast tanks in all types of ships and
double-side skin spaces of bulk carriers (resolution MSC.215(82)), provided the coatings
applied in the tanks described in subparagraphs .2 and .3 below are confirmed by the coating
manufacturer to be resistant to the media stored in these tanks and provided such coatings
are applied and maintained according to the coating manufacturer's procedures.
.2 seawater ballast tanks in passenger ships also designated for the carriage
of grey water or black water; and
.3 seawater ballast tanks in livestock carriers also designated for the carriage
of livestock dung.
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4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1545
6 June 2016
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its ninety-sixth session (11 to 20 May 2016), approved
the Unified interpretations relating to the application of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-6, as amended,
and the Revised technical provisions for means of access for inspections (resolution MSC.158(78)),
prepared by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction, at its third session
(18 to 22 January 2016), as set out in the annex, with a view to ensuring a uniform approach
towards the application of the provisions of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-6.
2 Member States are invited to use the annexed unified interpretations when applying
the relevant provisions of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-6, as amended, and to bring them to
the attention of all parties concerned.
***
ANNEX
Revised technical provisions for means of access for inspections (resolution MSC.158(78)),
paragraphs 3.13.2 and 3.13.6
Adjacent sections of vertical ladder need to be installed so that the following provisions are
complied with:
- the minimum "lateral offset" between two adjacent sections of vertical ladder, is
the distance between the sections, upper and lower, so that the adjacent stringers
are spaced of at least 200 mm, measured from half thickness of each stringer.
- adjacent sections of vertical ladder should be installed so that the upper end of
the lower section is vertically overlapped, in respect to the lower end of the upper
section, to a height of 1500 mm in order to permit a safe transfer between ladders.
Figure "A"
≥A
≥A
≥ B (mm)
Dimension
Horizontal separation
A between two vertical ladders, ≥ 200 mm
stringer to stringer
Stringer height above landing
B ≥ 1500* mm
or intermediate platform
Horizontal separation
C 100 mm ≤C< 300 mm
between ladder and platform
* The minimum height of the handrail of resting platform is
1000 mm (Technical Provision, resolution MSC.158(78),
paragraph 3.3)
Figure "B"
≥A
≥ B (mm)
Dimension
Horizontal separation
A between two vertical ladders, ≥ 200 mm
stringer to stringer
Stringer height above landing
B or intermediate platform ≥ 1500* mm
Horizontal separation
C between ladder and platform 100 mm ≤C< 300 mm
___________
4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT
LONDON SE1 7SR
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7735 7611 Fax: +44 (0)20 7587 3210
MSC.1/Circ.1547
9 June 2016
2 In this regard, MSC 96, with a view to providing, in the interim period following
approval and until the amendment enters into force, guidance on the application of SOLAS
regulation II-1/3-12, as provided in resolution MSC.338(91), to ships for which the building
contract is placed before 1 July 2014, the keels of which are laid or which are at a similar stage
of construction on or after 1 January 2015 and delivered before 1 July 2018, approved the
following guidance:
On ships:
.1 for which the building contract is placed before 1 July 2014; and
.2 the keels of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on
or after 1 January 2015; and
3 Member States are invited to use the above guidance when applying the relevant
provisions of SOLAS regulation II-1/3-12 and to bring it to the attention of all parties concerned.
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