Acmdc vs. Cir

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DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

In the present case, however, it appears that TPI’s judicial claims for refund of its unutilized input
VAT covering the third and fourth quarters of 2001 were prematurely filed on October 24, 2003 and
January 22, 2004, respectively.

However, although TPI’s judicial claim for the fourth quarter of 2001 has been filed prematurely, the
most recent pronouncements of the Court provide for a window wherein the same may be
entertained.

As held in the San Roque ponencia, strict compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and
jurisdictional periods is not necessary when the judicial claims are filed between December 10, 2003
(issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 which states that the taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day
period to expire before it could seek judicial relief) to October 6, 2010 (promulgation of the Aichi
doctrine).

Clearly, therefore, TPI’s refund claim of unutilized input VAT for the third quarter of 2001 was denied
for being prematurely filed with the CTA, while its refund claim of unutilized input VAT for the fourth
quarter of 2001 may be entertained since it falls within the exception provided in the Court’s most
recent rulings.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ATLAS


CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 104151 March 10, 1995 SECOND DIVISION REGALADO, J.

Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. So that, in the absence of proof
of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed.

FACTS
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue served two notices and demand for payment of the respective
deficiency ad valorem and buiness taxes for taxable years 1975 and 1976 against the respondent
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ACMDC). The latter protested both
assessments but the same were denied, hence it filed two separate petitions for review in the Court
of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered a consolidated decision holding, inter alia, that ACMDC was not
liable for deficiency ad valorem taxes on copper and silver for 1975 and 1976 thereby effectively
sustaining the theory of ACMDC that in computing the ad valorem tax on copper mineral, the refining
and smelting charges should be deducted, in addition to freight and insurance charges.

However, the tax court held ACMDC liable for the amount consisting of 25% surcharge for late
payment of the ad valorem tax and late filing of notice of removal of silver, gold and pyrite extracted
during certain periods, and for alleged deficiency manufacturer's sales tax and such contractor's tax
for leasing out of its personal properties. ACDMC elevated the matter to the Supreme Court claiming
that the leasing out was a mere isolated transaction, hence should not be subjected to contractor's
tax.

ISSUE
Is the claim of the private respondent, with respect to the contractor's tax, impressed with merit?

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DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

RULING
No. It is being held that ACMDC was not a manufacturer subject to the percentage tax imposed by
Section 186 of the tax code. However such conclusion cannot be made with respect to the contractor's
tax being imposed on ACMDC. It cannot validly claim that the leasing out of its personal properties
was merely an isolated transaction. Its book of accounts shows that several distinct payments were
made for the use of its personal properties such as its plane, motor boat and dump truck. The series
of transactions engaged in by ACMDC for the lease of its aforesaid properties could also be deduced
from the fact that during the period there were profits earned and reported therefor. The allegation
of ACMDC that it did not realize any profit from the leasing out of its said personal properties, since
its income therefrom covered only the costs of operation such as salaries and fuel, is not supported
by any documentary or substantial evidence.

Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. Contrary to the theory of
ACMDC, it is the taxpayer and not the BIR who has the duty of proving otherwise. It is an elementary
rule that in the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an
assessment will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of tax assessments. Verily, failure to
present proof of error in assessments will justify judicial affirmance of said assessment.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and NIELSON &
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-38540 April 30, 1987 SECOND DIVISION PADILLA, J

The follow-up letter reiterating demand for payment could be considered a notice of assessment in itself
if duly received by the taxpayer.

FACTS
The petitioner sought the review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
reversing the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered private respondent
Nielson & Co., Inc. to pay the Government the amount of P11,496.00 as ad valorem tax, occupation
fees, additional residence tax and 25% surcharge for late payment, for the years 1949 to 1952.
Petitioner claims that the demand letter of 16 July 1955 showed an imprint indicating that the
original thereof was released and mailed on 4 August 1955 by the Chief, Records Section of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and that the original letter was not returned to said Bureau; thus, said
demand letter must be considered to have been received by the private respondent. According to
petitioner, if service is made by ordinary mail, unless the actual date of receipt is shown, service is
deemed complete and effective upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing. As the letter of
demand dated 16 July 1955 was actually mailed to private respondent, there arises the presumption
that the letter was received by private respondent in the absence of evidence to the contrary. More
so, where private respondent did not offer any evidence, except the self-serving testimony of its
witness, that it had not received the original copy of the demand letter dated 16 July 1955.

ISSUE
Was notice of assessment or demand properly served to the respondent? Should the receipt by the
respondent of the succeeding follow-up demand notices be construed as receipt of the original
demand?

RULING

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