Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of

Scientific Methodology

John Earman /

1 Introduction

For the past two decades logical positivism has served as a whipping
boy. By emphasizing the shortcomings of this failed philosophical,
program, the virtues of the new postpositiyist pTi|osop_hy__of_sciencc
arc made to seem more lustrous. It is, of course, not surprising to
find such polemical devices employed, since they are common to the
rhetoric of revolutions, whether political, scientific, or philosophical.
Or so the standard assessment would go. What I find askew in this
assessment is the notion that a philosophical revolution as opposed
to an evolution has taken place. For although I am no apologist for
logical positivism, it does sccoiJo jme that many of the themes£fjJT£
so-called postpositivist philosophy of jscicncc arc extensions of ideas
found in the writings oLCarnap and other leading logical positivists
and logical emplficlstC^But my purpose here is not to contribute to
a revisionist history of philosophy. Rather, I aim to pay homage to
both Carnap and Kuhn by noting some striking similarities and also
some striking differences. These similarities and differences are use-
ful in helping to focus some of the still unresolved issues about the
nature of scientific methodology.

2 Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricism,, and Kuhn's

Structure of Scientific Revolutions

The members of the Vienna Circle often took votes on the issues
they debated. While I have no documentary evidence to offer of an
John Earman

aclual vole, I am morally certain of what the rcsull would have been
for ihc question, Verification is a relation between what and what?
In "x is verified by y,"j&fs presumably a sentence. And it is tempting
to lake^jHo be a fact, stale of affairs, or something in ihe world lhal
makes AC iruc and can be directly ascertained. But an attempt to
compare language and ihe world would have slruck ihe Circle mem-
bers as of a piece with the metaphysics thai ihe verifiabilily principle
of meaning was supposed lo banish. Their alternative was lo lake y
lo be another sentence, for then the relationjjctwecn x and y is an .
unproblcmalic logical _ rcjation._Th.Í5 move, however, seems lo leave j
us in ihc same metaphysical thickel since verificalion would seem to /
require thai y is a true sentence, and is not a true sentence one that /
corresponds to the facls?
The escape lhat some of ihe circle members soughl was a resort to
a coherence theory of truth. Eventually, however, Carnap abandoned
resort, presumably because of a combinalion of the drawbacks
of the coherence account of truth and the allracliveness of '
theory of truth. Bui whal I wish to emphasize here are ihe qualifi-
calions that Carnap put on any talk about comparing stalemenls wilh
facls. In "Truth and Confirmation" (1949) he emphasized lhat he
preferred lo speak of confronling slatements wilh facts:
There has been a good deal of dispute as to whether in ihc procedure
scientific testing slatements must be compared with facts or as lo whether such
comparisons be unnecessary, if nol impossible. If "comparison of slalerncnl
wilh fact" means ihc procedure which we called ihc firsl opcralio^rylhcn it
musí be adinillcd lhal ihis procedure is nol only possible, bul even indis-
pensable for scientific testing. Yel il musí be remarked lhal ihc formulation
"comparison of statement and fact" is nol unobjeclionable. First, ihe conccpl
"comparison" is not quilc appropriate here. Two objecls can be compared
in regard lo a properly which m i r r j j a rn rlnrj ~ r them in varia
We ihcrefore prefer lo speak of "cwnfronlalihH" ralhcr ihan^compansol
Confrontation is understood to consX^jrjJiMnng out as to
fact is such as is described in the statement, or, lo express it differently, as
lo whether the statement is true to fact. (1949, 125)
Carnap then continued with a passage that might have served as an
advertisement for Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Furthermore, ihc formulalion in icrms of "comparison," in speaking of
"facls" or "realities" easily Icmpts one inlo the absolutislic view according lo
JJ
Carnap, Kulin, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

which we arc said to search for an absolulc reality whose nature is assumed
as fixed independently of the language chosen for its description. The answer
to a question concerning reality however depends not only upon that "reality"
or upon the facts, but also upon the structure (and the set concepts) of the
language used for the description. In translating one language into another
the factual content of an empirical statement cannot always be preserved
unchanged. Such changes arc inevitable if the structures of the two languages
differ .inessential points. (1949, 125-126)
Here we have two of the key theses oTthe^gostpositivisl" philosophy i
of science:, the noncxistcnce of neutral facts and incommensurabilly
in the foriTiof''ftiftn^Trof™iriKrrtTanshrtabHfly. NotcTttMrt-tucsc theses
were propounded in the mid 1930s/for although I have, for the sake
of convenience, quoted from the 1949 version of Carnap's paper, the
relevant passage is also in "Wahrhcil und Bewahrung" (1936)./* |
Given these Kuhnian themes—or should we rather say Carnapian
themes?—one might predict that Carnap would have found Structure
philosophically congenial. That this was indeed the case has been
documented by Rcisch (1991). Structure was published as part of the
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, of which Carnap was
an associate editor. After reading the completed manuscript for Struc-
ture, Carnap wrote to Kuhn in April of 1962. The text of the letter
is reproduced in Reisch 1991. I will quote from notes written in
Carnap's archaic shorthand. Carnap begins with a piece of Darwinian
evolution and then adds, concerning Kuhn's thesis,
In analogy to this one has to understand the development of scientific the-
ories: not directed to an ideal [true] theory, the one true theory of the world,
but evolution as a step to a belter form, by selection of one oul of several
competing forms. The selection is made on ihc basis of preference in ihc
community of scientists. Many factors, sociological, c u l t u r a l , . . . , are involved.
Nol:vwe are approaching irulh, but: we arc improving an instrument

Another important though largely tacit theme of Structure, a holistic

view of meaning, can also be seen as emerging from the writings of
the logical empiricists in the 1950s. Hcmpel, for example, took to
heart Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, which may
be taken to embody the thesis that there is a sharp distinction to be
drawn between two functions of language: one to specify meaning,
the other to make empirical assertions. Applying the moral to sci-
entific theories, one arrives at the conclusion that there is no princi-
,„*>
 12
John Earmaii

pled way to distinguish those postulates of the theory that may

properly be dubbed meaning postulates. It is then but a seemingly
short and tempting step to the further conclusion that all the pos-
tulates of the theory function to specify the meaning of the constit-
uent terms and thus that any significant change in the theory implies
a change in meaning.
This route to semantic holism cannot be traced to any of Carnap's
writings. Indeed, in his response to HempePs contribution to the
Schilpp volume (1963), Carnap attempted to use the notion of the
Ramsey sentence of the theory to identify the postulates of the theory
that "merely represent meaning relations" (1963a, 965). And in his
last book, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (1966), Carnap maiiv
tained that "a sharp analytic-synthetic distinction is of supreme im- '
portance for the philosophy of science" (1966, 257).§ There is,
however, another Carnapian route to semantic holism, but that route
must be traced all the way back to Carnap's attempt in the Aufbau
(1928) to explain how scientific objectivity can emerge from a recon-
struction that starts from a phcnomcnalistic basis. An exploration of
this matter would take me too far afield; I will simply refer the reader
to Michael Friedman's (1987) illuminating discussion. 7 Q
^'JV /*•
3 Carnap's Relativism

losophy and Logical Syntax" (1935) proclainicd the relativity ol all

philosophical theses to language. This relativity was supposed to hold
the key to solving, or rather dissolving, traditional philosophical dis-
putes. Suppose, for example, one philosopher asserts, "Numbers are -
primitive entities," while another proclaims, "Numbers are classes of
classes." "They may," Carnap writes, "philosophize without end about
the question of what numbers really are, but in this way they will
never come to an agreement" (1935, 450). If, however, they are acute
enough to recognize Carnap's relativity principle, they will quickly
realize that one is asserting, "In Language LI (Peano), numerical
expressions are elementary expressions," while the other is maintain-
ing, "In Language L? (Russell) numerical expressions are class ex-
pressions of the second order." "Now these assertions are compatible j
 Carnap, Kulin, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

with each other and both arc true; the controversy has ceased to
exist" (1935, 451). This model for resolving philosophical disputes in •
the philosophy of mathematics was supposed by Carnap to be cxtend-
iblc quite broadly to philosophical disputes, such as phenomenalism
versus materialism and the question of whether space-time points
have an existence independent of physical events.
Some, like Donald Davidson (1973), have found an air of paradox
in the fact that saying in one breath (as Carnap thought he could)
that 5 is true in L\, LS, Las, • • . but false in L?, ¿4, ... seems to
presuppose a neutral metaframe within which all the language frames
can be treated.6 Others, like Michael Friedman (1992), have argued
that Carnap's relativism is undercut by Godel's incompleteness theo-
rems, which show that no such neutral metaframe is available. My
objections are more local and tactical.
My first complaint is that Carnap assumes what needs to be proved.
According to Carnap's "principle of tolerance," we are free to choose
whatever language system we like. The decision is largely a pragmatic
affair, turning on such matters as efficiency and fruitfulness for the
-purposes at hand. But to apply the slogan of "free to choose" to
dissolve, say, the phenomenalism versus materialism debate assumes
that a phenomenalistic language has been produced that shows how
physical object talk can be reduced to talk about sensa data or, as
Carnap preferred, momentary total experiences ("Elementarerlcb-
nissc"). This, of course, is exactly what Carnap tried to do in the
Av/lau. But by his own admission, the attempt has to counted as a

c failure if, as he originally assumed, the reduction has to proceed via

explicit definitions and explicit Iranslalions. Similarly, to apply the
"free to choose" slogan to dissolve disputes about the ontplogical
status of space-time points assumes that it can be shown how space-
time points can be constructed out of events, such as coincidences of
particles. Advocates of relational theories of space and time repeat-
edly claim that this can be done and even that it has been done. But
none of the claims stands up to scrutiny.7 I am emphatically not
claiming that materialism is correct or that space-time points con-
strued as irreducible entities are essential to physics. Rather, I am
claiming that the dissolution of the traditional disputes on these
matters is not as easy as Carnap made it seem.
 M
John Earman

Another complaint arises from the breathtaking scope of the in-

tended application of Carnap's dissolving strategy. Among the "philo-
sophical" disputes that Carnap proposed to treat in this way were
such matters as whether time is finite or infinite and whether the
world is deterministic. There is obviously a very slippery slope here.
If the question about the finilude of time is a philosophical question
in the relevant sense, then why not the question of whether the world
began from a big-bang singularity? And if this latter question is a
philosophical question in the relevant sense, then why not other deep
questions in cosmology? But more important, one does not have to
go down the slope to recognize the implausibihty of Carnap's pro-
cedure. Even if one agrees to talk about truth in L rather than truth
period, there is no plausibility to the idea that whether time is finite
and whether determinism holds are matters to be settled in L by
adopting linguistic rules for L rather than by consulting the facts.
Carnap, not surprisingly, acknowledged the point. Speaking of the
determinism issue, he said,
The objection may pcriiaps be raised at this point that the form of physical
laws depends upon experimental results of physical investigation, and that
it is not determined by a merely theoretical syntactical consideration.' This
assertion is quite right, but we must bear in mind the fact that the empirical
results at which physicists arrive by way of their laboratory experiments by
no means dictate their choice between the deterministic and the statistical' form
of laws. The form in which a law is to be slated has to be decided by an act
of volition. This decision, it is true, depends upon the empirical results, but
not logically, only practically. The results of the experiments show merely
ill.il one mode of formulation would be more suitable than another. (1935,
455)
These sentiments resonate with those Carnap expressed three de-
cades later in commenting on Kuhn's Structure. But here the senti-
ments arc not to the point. The issue is not whether, for Duhemian
or other reasons, the results of experiments, say the recent Einstein,
Rosen, Podolsky, and Bell type of experiments, fail to dictate the
acceptance of indeterministic laws. Rather the issue is whether deter-
minism is a scientific claim to be argued over the way one argues
over other deep scientific claims, none of which ever gets definitively
settled by the dictates of experimental evidence; or whether deter-
minism is a claim that can be made true by linguistic fiat in L\, Lr,,
Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

¿35, . . . and false by linguistic fiat in L2, LT, ¿37 ..... and then we
just pays our money and takes our choice of language. Again I refuse
to give a global answer to this query and favor instead a tactical
response. All indications are that the debate over the implications for
deterijiinism of the Bell inequalities and the Aspect experiments
belongs to the former rather than to the latter. Indeed, indications
are that in any language system adequate for the formulation of
theories that save the experimentally verifiable quantum statistics, the
laws must be indeterministic. 9
I suspect that Carnap's relativism began by his being impressed by
the achievements of Frege, Russell, and others in the philosophy of
mathematics and was furthered by a misplaced zeal for extending his
model for resolving philosophical disputes in this area to a broad
area of philosophical and scientific questions. Of course, whatever
the origins of Carnap's relativism, it or something like it could per-
haps be promoted on the basis of his doctrine that language-neutral
facts do not exist. I find it difficult to assess this matter, since I do
not find in Carnap's writing a helpful explanation of this
In the following section I will comment on the related doctrine of
Feycrabcnd, Hanson, and Kuhn that observation is theory laden.
In closing this section, I note that Carnap displayed a consistency
on the matter at hand — not the consistency that is the hobgoblin of
little minds but the magnificent consistency of a grand visionary. In
his contribution to the Schilpp volume for Carnap, Herbert Fcigl
(1963) sketched a mind-body identity theory that he was later to
elaborate in his famous essay "The 'Mental' and the Thysi-
caF"(1958).'° Clearly, the politically correct thing for Carnap was to
endorse Fcigl's approach. Instead, he wrote, "it seems preferable to
me to formulate the question [of mind-body identity] in the meta-
language, not as a factual question about the world, but as a question
concerning the choice of language. Although we prefer a different
language, we must admit that a dualistic language can be constructed
and used without coming into conflict with cither the laws of logic or
with empirically known facts" (1963b, 885-886).

4 Kuhn's Relativism

Kuhn resists being labeled a relativist. I use the label here to refer to
three doctrines of Structure: the theory ladenncss of observation, the
]G
John Earnian

¡ncomnicnsurability of theories, and (lie denial that there is a llicory-

indcpcndcnl notion of truth.
Part of what was meant by the theory ladcnncss of observation is
embodied in the thesis that what we see depends upon what we
believe, a thesis open to challenge (see Fodor 1984). I am concerned
rather with the related thesis of the nonexistence of a neutral obser-
vation language in which different theories can be compared. My
response is once again tactical. That is, without trying to adjudicate
the general merits of the thesis, I claim that things aren't so bad for
actual historical examples. Even for cases of major scientific revolu-
tions, we cari find, without having to go too far downward toward
something like foundations for knowledge, an observation base that
is neutral enough for purposes at hand. A nice example is provided by
Allan Franklin (1986, 110-113), who shows how to construct an
experiment that is theory-neutral enough between Newtonian and
special-relativistic mechanics to unambiguously decide between the
predictions of these theories for elastic collisions. The two theories
agree on the procedure for measuring the angle between the velocity
vectors of the scattered particles, and the two theories predict differ- ~
ent angles. A ^b
More generally, I claim that in the physical sciences there is in
principle always available a neutral observation base in spatial coin-
cidences, such as dots on photographic plates, pointer positions on
dials, and the like. If intcrsubjective agreement on such matters were
not routine, then physical science as we know it would not be possible.
1 reject, of course, the posilivistic attempt to reduce p'hysics to such
coincidences. And I readily acknowledge that such coincidences by
themselves are mute witnesses in the tribunal for judging theories.
But what is required to make these mute witnesses articulate is not a
Gcstalt experience but a constellation of techniques, hypotheses, and
theories: techniques of data analysis, hypotheses about the operation
of measuring instruments, and auxiliary theories that support boot-
strap calculations of values for the relevant theoretical parameters
that test the competing theories. But I again assert that to the extent
that this process cannot be explicitly articulated but relies on some
sui generis form of perception, the practice is not science. This is not
to say, however, that the vulgar image of science as a blindly impartial
enterprise is correct, for the articulation uncovers assumptions to
 /

17
Carnap, Kulin, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

which different scientists may assign vcfy different, degrees of con-

fidence. But this sense in which different scientists can (mislcadingly)
be said to "see" different things when looking at the same phenom-
enon is one with which a probabilistic or Bayesian epistemology—the
kind of epistemology which the later Carnap came to advocate—must
cope on a routine basis, even in cases far away from the boundaries
of scientific revolutions. How these differences are resolved is part
of the Bayesian analogue of Kuhn's problem of community decision
on theory choice. Kuhn's problem will be encountered in the follow-
ing section, and the Bayesian analogue will be discussed in sections
8 and 9.
The matter of incommensurability is much more difficult to discuss
for two reasons. First, it is tied to difficult issues about meaning and
reference that I cannot broach here. Second, issues about incom-
mensurability present amorphous and shifting targets. In Structure,
for example, incommensurability was a label for the entire constel-
lation of factors that lead proponents of different paradigms to talk
past one another. In recent years Kuhn has come around to a more
Carnapian or linguistic formulation in which incommensurability is
equated with untranslatability. More specifically, the focus has shifted
from paradigms to theories, and two theories are said to be incom-
mensurable just in case "there is no common language into which
both can be fully translated" (Kuhn 1989, 10). I have no doubts about
Kuhn's claims that theories on different sides of a scientific revolution
often use different "lexicons," that differences in lexicons can make
for a kind of untranslatability, and that in turn this explains why
scientists reading out-of-date texts often encounter passages that
"make no sense" (1989, 9). But I deny that there is incommensura-
bility/untranslatability that makes for insuperable difficulties for con-
firmation or theory choice (a phrase I don't like for reasons to be
given below) in the standardly cited cases of scientific revolutions
such as the transition from Newtonian to special-relativistic mechanics
and the subsequent transition to general relativity. Newtonian, spe-
cial-relativistic, gcncral-relativistic, and many other theories can all
be formulated in a common language, the language of differential
geometry on a four-dimensional manifold, and the crucial differences
in the theories lie in the differences in the geometric object fields
J8
John Earman

postulated and the manner in which these fields relate to such things
as particle orbits. This language is anachronistic and so may not be
the best device to use when trying to decide various historical dis-
putes." But it does seem to me to be an appropriate vehicle for
framing and answering the sorts of questions of most concern to
working physicists and philosophers of science. For example, on the
basis of the available evidence, what is it reasonable to believe about
the structure of space and time and the nature of gravitation? This
is not to say that the common language makes for an easy answer. It
is indeed a difficult business, but it is a business that involves the
same sorts of difficulties already present when testing theories that
lie on the same side of a scientific revolution. Finally, so that there
can be no misunderstanding, let me repeat: I am not claiming (hat
what I call a common language provides what Kuhn wants. It docs
not show, for example, that the Newtonian and the Einstcinian can
be brought into agreement about what is and is not a "meaningful"
question about simultaneity. But what I do claim is that these residual
elements of incommensurability do not undermine standard accounts
of theory testing and confirmation. 12
My response to worries about the applicability of the notion of
truth to whole theories is similarly local and tactical. In the Postscript
to the second edition of Structure, Kuhn writes, "There is, I think, no
theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the
notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real'
counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle" (1970,
206). I need not demur if "theory" is understood in 'a very broad
sense to mean something like a conceptual framework so minimal
that without it "the world" would be undifferenliated Kantian ooze.
But I do demur if "theory" is taken in the ordinary sense, i.e., as
Newton's theory or special-relativity theory or general-relativity the-
ory.13 For scientists are currently working in a frame in which they
can say, correctly I think, that the match between the ontology of the
theory and its real counterpart in nature is better for the special
theory of relativity and even better for the general theory. Of course,
to get to this position required two major coneptual revolutions. How
such revolutions affect theory choice, or as I would prefer to say,
theory testing and confirmation, remains to be discussed.
]9
Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

5 Kuhn's Account of Scientific Revolutions

Carnap, as we have seen, found Kuhn's Structure congenial. But many •

philosophers of the younger generation, including those who prided
themselves on having gone beyond the crudities of logical positivism,
professed shock and dismay at Kuhn's account of the displacement
of an old paradigm by a new one. For those readers who do not have
a copy of Structure to hand, here are some of the purple passages:
Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between com-
peting paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of
community life. . .. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about
paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses' its own
paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense. (P. 94)

As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice—there is no standard

higher than the assent of the relevant community. To discover how scientific
revolutions arc effected, we shall therefore have to examine not only the
impact of nature and logic, but also the techniques of persuasive argumen-
tation within the cjuilc special groups that constitute the community of sci-
entists. (P. 94)
The proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different
worlds. . . . Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists sec
different things when they look from the same point in the same direction.
(P. 150)

In these matters neither proof nor error is at issue. The transfer of allegiance
from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience that cannot be forced.
(P. 151)

Before they can hope to communicate fully, one group or the other must
experience the conversion that we have been calling a paradigm shift. Just
because it is a shift between incommensurables, the transition between com-
peting paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, forced by logic and
neutral experience. Like a gcslalt switch, it must occur all at once (though
not necessarily at an instant) or not at all. (P. 150)

Many readers saw in these passages an open invitation to aralio-

nality if not outright irrationality. Thus Imre Lakatos took Kuhn to
be saying that theory choice is a matter of "mob psychology" (1970,
178), while Dudley Shapcre read Kuhn as saying that the decision to
adopt a new paradigm "cannot be based on good reasons" (1966, 67).
20
John Earman

Kulin in turn was equally shocked by such criticisms. In the Postscript

to the second edition of Structure (1970), he professed surprise that
readers could have imposed such unintended interpretations on the
above quoted passages. I will leave aside the unfruitful question of
whether or not Kuhn ought to have anticipated such interpretations
and will concentrate instead on what, upon reflection, he intended
to say.
Kuhn's own explanation in the Postscript begins with the common-
place that "debate over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that
resembles logical or mathematical choice" (1970, 195). But he hastens
to add that this commonplace does not imply that "there are no good
reasons for being persuaded or that these reasons are not ultimately
decisive for the group" (1970, 195). The reasons listed in the Post-
script are accuracy, simplicity, and fruitfulness. The later paper "Ob-
jectivity, Value Judgments, and Theory Choice" (1977) added two
further reasons: consistency and scope. And as Kuhn himself notes,
the final list does not differ (with one notable exception to be dis-
cussed later) from similar lists drawn from standard philosophy-of-
scicnce texts (see also Kuhn 1983).
These soothing sentiments serve to deflate charges of arationality
and irrationality, but at the same time they also serve to raise the
question of how Kuhn's views are to be distinguished from the or-
thodoxy that Structure was supposed to upset. The answer given in
the Postscript contains two themes, which are elaborated in "Objec-
tivity." First, the items on the above list are said to "function as values"
that can "be differently applied, individually and collectively by men
who concur in honoring them" (1970, 199). Thus, "there is no neutral
algorithm for theory choice, no systematic decision procedure which,
properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same
decision." Second, it (supposedly) follows that "it is the community
of specialists rather than the individual members that makes the
effective decision" (1970, 200).
I think that Kuhn is correct in locating objectivity in the community
of specialists, at least in the uncontroversial sense that intersubjective
agreement among the relevant experts is a necessary condition for
objectivity. But how the community of experts reaches a decision
when the individual members differ on the application of shared
values is a mystery that to my mind is not adequately resolved by
21
Carnap, Kuhn, and ihc Philosophy of Scicnlific Mclhodology

Structure or by subsequent writings. My strategy will be to explore

these and related issues from the perspective of Carnap's
cpistcmology.

6 Carnap and Kuhn: Incommensurability?

The passage Reisch (1991) quotes from Carnap's letter to Kuhn and
the passage from Carnap's shorthand notes I quoted in section 2
would seem to indicate that Carnap and Kuhn were in substantial
agreement as regards paradigm choice. This is surely the case when
"paradigm" is interpreted to mean something like a linguistic frame-
work. At this level Carnap would agree, indeed, would insist, on the
need to choose, and he would hold that the choice is'a pragmatic one
whose dynamics may well involve the sorts of factors emphasized in
Kuhn's account. But when the focus shifts to theories, as it does in •
Kuhn's later writings, the disagreement begins. In the first place,
Kuhn's list of criteria for theory choice is conspicuous for its omission
of any reference to the degrees of confirmation or probabilities of
the theories. This is not an oversight, of course, but derives both
from explicit doctrines, such as the nonexistence of a theory-neutral
observation language, and the largely tacit but pervasive anti-induc-
tivism of Structure. Needless to say, this shunning of confirmation
theory is most un-Carnapian. But even more anomalous from Car-
nap's perspective is Kuhn's emphasis on theory choice or acceptance,
for in Carnap's version of epistemology, theories arc not chosen or
accepted but only probabiIified. M
Carnap's writings in the 1940s and 1950s portray him as espousing
a "logical" conception of probability. But by the late 1950s and early
1960s, he clearly favored a view that can be termed tempered per-
sonalism: probability is rational degree of belief.15 I will have more
to say on this matter in section 8, but in the meantime I will present
Carnap as a tempered Bayesian personalist.
A shotgun marriage of Kuhn and Carnap could be arranged by
taking Carnap to supply the probabilities, Kuhn to supply the values
or utilities, and then applying the rule of maximizing the expected
utility to render a decision on theory choice.16 But like most shotgun
marriages, this one would be a mistake. For Carnap it would be a
mistake because it would involve the pretense that the accepted the-
22
John Carman

ory is certain even though one's degree of belief in the theory may
be less than one, perhaps substantially so. For Kuhn it would also be
a mistake, since the efficacy of his values does not depend on the
truth of the theories, so estimates of the probable truth of the theories
is irrelevant to Kuhnian theory choice.
Part of the wrangle here derives from the unfortunate phrase
"theory choice." Scientists do choose theories, but on behalf of Car-
nap, I would claim that they choose them only in the innocuous sense
that they choose to devote their time and energy to them: to articu-
lating them, to improving them, to drawing out their consequences,
to confronting them with the results of observation and experiment.
Choice in this sense allows for a reconciliation of Bayes and Kuhn,
since this choice is informed by both Baycsian and Kuhnian factors:
probability and the values of accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity,
and fruitfulncss.
Alas, this reconciliation is rather shallow. Once we are clear that
the sort of choice involved in "theory choice" is a practical one, there
is nothing sacred about the list of items on Kuhn's list of values.
Other values, such as getting an NSF grant or winning the Nobel
Prize, can and do enter. Further, the kind of choice in question allows
a scientist to be bigamous, since he can choose to work on two or
more theories at once, and it allows him to be fickle, since he can
oscillate back and forth. The kind of choice Structure envisioned was
much more permanent; indeed, the impression given there is that
normal science is not possible without tying Catholic bonds to a
theory, bonds that can only be broken by leaving the Church, i.e., by
creating a revolution.
Is there no way to bridge the gap between Carnap and Kuhn on
this issue? To see how baffling the Bayesian finds the notion of theory
acceptance, consider the case of Einstein's general theory of relativity
(GTR), arguably the leading theory of gravitation and thus the top
candidate for acceptance. Marie, a research worker in the field fa-
miliar with all of the relevant experimental findings, does some in-
trospection and finds that her degree of belief in GTR is p.
Case 1: p is 1, or so near 1 as makes no odds. Here there is a natural
sense in which the Bayesian can say that Marie accepts GTR. Such
cases, however, arc so rare as to constitute anomalies. Of course, one
23
Carnap, Kuhn, and llic Philosophy of Scientific Mclhodology

can cite any number of cases from the history of science where
scientists seem to be saying for their pet theories that they set p = 1.
Here I would urge the need to distinguish carefully between scientists
as advocates of theories versus scientists as judges of theories. The
latter role concerns us here, and in that role scientists know, or should
know, that only in very exceptional cases does the evidence rationally
support a full belief in a theory. Let us move on to case 2.
Case 2: p is, say, .75. Subsequently Marie decides to "accept" GTR on
the basis of her probability assignments and the values she attaches
to GTR and its competitors. What could this mean?
Subcase 2a. When she accepts GTR, Marie changes her degree of
belief from .75 to 1. This is nothing short of folly, since she has
already made a considered judgment about evidential support and
no new relevant evidence occasioning a rejudgment has come in.
Suitcase 2b. When she accepts GTR, Marie docs not change her de-
gree of belief from .75 to 1, but she acts as z/all doubt were swept
away in that she devotes every waking hour to showing that various
puzzling astronomical observations can be explained by the theory,
she assigns her graduate students research projects that presuppose
the correctness of the theory, she writes a textbook on gravitational
research that is devoted almost exclusively to GTR, etc. But at this
point we have come full circle back to a sense of theory acceptance
that is really a misnomer, for what is involved is a practical decision
about the allocation of personal and institutional resources and not
a decision about the cpistcmic status of the theory.
This rather pedantic diatribe on theory acceptance would be best
forgotten were it not for its implications for our picture of normal
science. As we have seen, theory "choice" or "acceptance" can refer
cither to adopting an epislemic attitude or to making a practical
choice. In the former case there is no natural Bayesian explication
of theory acceptance save in the case where the probability of the
theory is one. Since scientists as judges of theories are almost never
in a position to justify such an acceptance, the Bayesian prediction is
that rarely is a theory accepted in the epistemic sense. Similarly, when
theory choice is a matter of deciding what theory to devote one's lime
and energy to, the Bayesian prediction is that in typical situations
John l'.arnian

where members of the community assign different utilities to such

devotions, they will make different choices. Thus from either the
cpistcmic or practical-decision perspective, the Bayesian prediction is
diversity. This prediction is, I think, borne out by actual scientific
practice. In section 9 below I will argue that insofar as normal science
implies a shared paradigm, the paradigm need not and in fact often
is not so specific as to include a particular ("accepted") theory. I will
also hazard a proposal for a minimal sense of "shared paradigm" that
yields a less strait-jacketed image of normal science and that also
diminishes without obliterating the difference between normal and
revolutionary science.
By way of closing this section and introducing the next, I will
consider a final way of reconciling Kuhn and Carnap on theory
choice. Radically new theories, so the story goes, carry with them
different linguistic/conceptual frameworks. Thus, even seriously lo
entertain the new theory involves the decision to adopt, if only ten-
tatively, the new framework, and this decision is for Carnap a prag-
matic one that involves the sorts of factors emphasized in Kuhn's
account of paradigm replacement. In response I would repeat what
I have already said in section 4: major scientific revolutions such as
the transition from Newtonian to special-relativistic physics- and
thence lo general relativity needn't be seen as forcing a choice be-
tween incommensurable linguistic/conceptual systems, since it is often
possible lo fit ihc possibilities into a larger scheme thai makes llic
theories commensurable lo the extenl lhal confirmalion questions
can be posed in terms of an observation base lhal is ncuiral enough
for assessing ihe relalive confirmation of the theories. However, ihe
rccognilion of ihe larger possibility set can produce a drastic change
in probability values, a change best described in Kuhnian terms.

7 Revolutions and Belief Shifts

A mild form of scientific revolution occurs with ihe inlroduclion of

a new llieory lhal articulates possibilities thai lie wilhin ihe bound-
aries of ihe space of iheories to be taken seriously but that, because
of the failure of actual scientists to be logically omniscienl, had pre-
viously been unrecognized as explicil possibilities. The more radical
form of revolulion occurs when ihe space of possibilities itself needs
25
Carnap, Kuhn, and ihc Philosophy of Scicnlific Methodology

to be significantly altered to encompass the new theory. In practice

the distinction between the two forms of revolution may be blurred,
perhaps even hopelessly so, but I will begin discussion by pretending
that we can perform a separation of cases.
Even the mild form of revolution may induce a non-Bayesian shift
in belief functions. By non-Bayesian I mean that no form of condi-
tionalizalion, whether strict or Jeffrey or some natural extension of
these, will suffice to explain the change. For conditionalizing (in any
recognizable sense of the term) on the information that just now a
heretofore unarliculated theory T has been introduced is literally
nonsensical, because such a conditionalization presupposes that prior
to this time there was a well-defined probability for this information
and thus for T, which is exactly what the failure of logical omniscience
rules out.
We can try to acknowledge the failure of logical omniscience by
means of Abner Shimony's (1970) device of a catch-all hypothesis Hf,
which asserts in effect that something, we know not what, beyond
the previously formulated theories T\, Tz, . . . , TT is true. Now
suppose that a new theory T is introduced and that as a result the
old degrce-of-bclief function Pr is changed to Pr'. The most conser-
vative way the shift from Pr to Pr' could take place is by the process
I will call shaving off, namely, Pr(T,) =.Pr'(Ti) for i = 1, 2, . . . , q and
Pr'(T) = r > 0 and Pr'(//e) = Pr(//c) - r. That is, under shaving off,
Hf serves as a well for initial probabilities for as yet unborn theories,
and the actual introduction of new theories results only in drawing
upon this well without disturbing the probabilities of previously for-
mulated theories. Unfortunately, such conservatism eventually leads
to the assignment of ever smaller initial probabilities to successive
waves of new theories until a point is reached where the new theory
has such a low initial probability as to stand not much of a fighting
chance.
Certainly shaving off is a factually inadequate description of what
happens in many scientific revolutions, especially of the more radical
type. Think of what happened following the introduction of Ein-
stein's special theory of relativity (STR) in 1905. Between 1905 and
1915 little new empirical evidence in favor of STR was recorded, and
yet the probability of competing theories, such as those of Lorentz
and Abraham, set in classical space and time, fell in the estimates of
26
John Earman

most of the members of the European physics community, and the

probability subtracted from these electron theories was transferred
to Einstein's STR. The probabilities of auxiliary hypotheses may also
be affected, as illustrated by the introduction of the general theory
of relativity (GTR). When Einstein showed that GTR accounted for
the exact amount of the anomalous advance of Mercury's perihelion,
the hypothesis of an amount of zodiacal matter sufficient to affect
Mercury's perihelion dropped dramatically in the estimates of most
of the physics community (see Earman and Glymour 1991).
In using the term "non-Bayesian" to describe such noncondition-
alization belief changes, whether of the conservative shaving-off type
or some more radical form, I do not mean to imply that the changes
are not informed by Bayesian considerations. Indeed, the problem
of the transition from Pr to Pr' can be thought of as no more and
no less than the familiar Bayesian problem of assigning initial prob-
abilities, only now with a new initial situation involving a new set of
possibilities and a new information basis. But the problem we arc
now facing is quite unlike those allegedly solved by classical principles
of indifference or modern variants thereof, such as E. T. Jayncs's
maximum-entropy principle, where it is assumed we know nothing
or very little about the possibilities in question. In typical cases the
scientific community will possess a vast store of relevant experimental
and theoretical information. Using that information to inform the
redistribution of probabilities over the competing theories on the
occasion of the introduction of the new theory or theories is a process
that, in the strict sense of the term, is\o?Slipnal: it cannot'be accom-
plished by some neat formal rules or, To use Kuhn's term,_bvan
algorithm. On the otherjjand, the process is far from beirígjrrationaí>>
since it is informecf by reasons. But the reasons, as Kuhn Tias~crrf-
phasized, come in the form ofpersuasions rather than proof. In
Bayesian terms, the reasons are marshaled in the guise of ptausiblTily
arguments. The deployment of plausibility arguments is an art form
for which there currently exists no taxonomy. And considering the
limitless variety of such arguments, it is unlikely that anything more
than a superficial taxonomy can be developed. Einstein, the consum-
mate master of this art form, appealed to analogies), symmetry con-
siderations, thought experiments, heuristic principles such as the
principle of equivalence, etc. All of these considerations, I am sug-
27 t " •
Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

gcsting on behalf of the Baycsians, were deployed to nudge assign-

ments of initial probabilities in favor of the theories Einstein was
introducing in the early decades of this century. Einstein's success in
this regard is no less important than experimental evidence in ex-
plaining the reception of his theories.
To summarize, Kuhn's purple passages do not seem overblown
when applied to revolutions in the strong sense distinguished above.
The persuasions that lead to the adoption of the new shape for the
possibility space cannot amount to proofs. Certainly for the Bayesian
they cannot consist of inductive proofs, since the very assignment of
degrees of belief presupposes the adoption of such a space. After a
revolution has taken place, the new and old theories can often be
fitted into a common frame that belies any vicious form of incom-
mensurability (as I tried to illustrate in section 4 for Newtonian and
relativistic theories). But this retrospective view tends to disguise the
shake-up in our system of beliefs occasioned by the adoption of the
new shape for the possibility space. Baycsianism brings the shake-up
to light, albeit in a way that undercuts the standard form of the
doctrine.
I have no way of knowing whether Carnap would have approved
of my Bayesian reading of Kuhn. But I do claim that it is a reading
that fits naturally with Carnap's mature views on probability and
induction.

8 Objectivity and the Problem of Consensus

I have endorsed a Bayesianized version of Kuhn's claim that in sci-

entific revolutions persuasion rather than proof is the order of the
day: revolutions involve the introduction of new possibilities; this
introduction causes the redistribution of probabilities; the redistri-
bution is guided by plausibility arguments; and such arguments be-
long to the art of persuasion.
This endorsement is confined to the first stage of the revolution,
when the initial probabilities are established for the expanded pos-
sibility set. The Bayesian folklore would have it that after this first
stage, something more akin to proof than persuasion operates. The
idea is that an evidence-driven consensus emerges as a result of the
Bayesian learning model: degrees of belief change by conditional!-
28
John Earman

/.¡ilion on ilic accumulating evidence of observation and experiment,

and the long-run result is to force a merger of posterior opinion for
those Baycsian agents who initially assign zeros to the same hy-
potheses. This folklore can draw on some mathematically impressive
merger-of-opinion theorems. But these theorems are of dubious ap-
plicability not only to the sorts of cases discussed in Structure but also
to examples from normal, as opposed to revolutionary, science. For
one thing, the mathematical results are in the form of long-run or
limit results that give no information about how long the long run
is."
If honest theorem proving won't suffice to explain the merger of
opinion that, for the Bayesian epistemologist, constitutes the heart of
scientific objectivity, then perhaps we can define our way to a solution.
That is, why not define "scientific community" in terms of de facto
convergence of opinion over a relevant range of hypotheses? The
answer is the same as that given by Kuhn in the Postscript to the
threatened circularity of taking a paradigm to be what members of
the community share while also taking a scientific community to
consist of those scientists who share the paradigm. Just as scientific
communities "can and should be isolated without prior recourse to
paradigms" (Kuhn 1970, 176), so they can and should be isolated
without recourse to convergencc-of-opinion behavior. The European
physics community in the opening decades of this century can be
identified by well-established historical and sociological techniques.
One wants to know how and why, for example, this community so
identified reached a consensus about Einstein's STR. Nevertheless,
there does seem to be at least this much truth to the definitional
move: repeated failures to achieve merger of opinion on key hy-
potheses will most likely lead.to a split in or a disintegration of the
community.
This is the appropriate place to ask whether Carnap's views on
probability are of any help. In a letter dated July 30, 1963, Carnap
wrote to Bruno De Finctti, the arch Baycsian personalisl, that he
believed that the constraints of rationality extend beyond the require-
ment of coherence, which entails that degrees of belief must conform
to the standard axioms of probability.18 According to Carnap the
requirements of rationality do not suffice to single out a unique
probability function, but they do significantly constrain the choice of
2!)
Carnap, Kuliii, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

a probability funclion. If this were corrccl, ihc liaycsian version of

llie problem of scicnlific objectivity would be made correspondingly
easier. However, I do not think that Carnap managed to stake out a
defensible position, as can be brought out by the question of how
one recognizes which probability functions are "rational." Carnap's
answer was to appeal to what he variously called "inductive intuilion"
and "induclivc common sense." The trouble, of course, is that one
person's inductive common sense is another's inductive non-sense.
So the appeal to intuition reveals very diffcrenl opinions as lo
whelhcr it is rational to learn from experience at all and, if so, at
what rate.
At this juncture il will be helpful to review a mechanism proposed
by Lehrei and Wagner in Rational Consensus in Science and Society
(1981) for achieving a group consensus. Their mechanism requires
that the members of ihc community change ihcir degrees of belief
in accordance wilh a wcighled-aggrcgalion rule. Suppose that at the
initial moment, person i has a degree of belief /;, in the theory in
question. Each person i is assumed to assign a weight w¡/ ^ 0 to every
person _;', which can be taken as an index of i's opinion as to the
reliability of/s opinions. According to Lchrcr and Wagner's rule, i
then "improves" her inilial opinion />? by changing it to pi = X,w,y/>".
If there arc still differences of opinion, the aggregation process is
repeated with the /;,' to obtain further "improved" probabilities /;?,
etc., until eventually the probabilities for all members fall into line.
Lchrcr and Wagner offer a consistency argument for their aggre-
gation rule: "If a person refuses to aggregate, though he does assign
a positive weight to other members, he is acting as though he assigned
a weight of one to himself and a weight of zero to every other member
of the group. If, in fact, he assigns positive weight to other members
of the group, ihen he should nol behave as if he assigned zero weight
lo them" (1981, 22). This argument has the flavor of "When arc you
going to slop beating your wife." I do assign a, positive weight to the
opinions of others, but as a liaycsian I do this not by means of
weighted aggregation but by conditionalization: I conditionalizc on
information about the opinions of my peers, and I notice that the
result is a shift in my degrees of belief toward the degrees of belief
of those I respect. When I was a young student, these shifts brought
. my opinions closely in line with those belonging to people I regarded
30
John lüirmun

as the experts, but as a mature member of the community, I find

that such shifts, while still nonnegligiblc, do not conform my opinions
lo those of others, at least not on matters where I now regard myself
as an expert. And I resist any further attempt to bend my carefully
considered opinions.
There are two reasons, independent of Bayesianism, to be unhappy
with Lehrer and Wagner's proposal and ones like it. The first is that
it is descriptively false, as shown by the very example they use to
motivate their proposal. In the 1970s Robert Dicke claimed that
optical measurements of the solar disk revealed an oblateness large
enough to account for 3" to 5" of arc in Mercury's centenary peri-
helion advance and thus to throw into doubt Einstein's explanation
of the advance. When other astrophysicists disagreed with Dicke's
conclusions the differences were not smoothed over by producing a
consensual probability by means of a weighted aggregation process.
The disagreement remains unresolved to this day. The weight of
opinion docs seem lo be going against Dicke's inlcrprctation, but this
partial agreement is in fact due not to aggregation but to the acqui-
sition of additional evidence.
Of course, Lchrcr and Wagner are perfectly aware of these facts,
and the descriptive inadequacies of their proposal do not concern
them, since they take themselves to be offering a normative proposal.
But even in ihcsc terms the proposal should be faulted. It is funda-
mental lo science thai opinions be evidence-driven. Differences of
opinion need not constilutc an embarrassment that needs lo be
quashed, for ihesc differences can serve as a spur lo further iheo-
relical and experimental research, and the new information pro-
duced may drive a genuine scientific consensus. The alternative, an
atlcmpl lo manufaclure a consensus by a weighted-aggregation pro-
cedure, smacks of the "mob psychology" of which Kuhn was
criticized.
This last point generalizes. Bayesianism and other approaches to
scienlific inference as well suggest that unless there is some evidence-
driven process that operates on the level of individual scientists to
produce a group consensus, ihe consensus will amounl lo something
that, if not mob psychology, is nevertheless a social artifact not de-
serving either of the labels "rational" or "scienlific." Thus, conlrary
Carnap, Kulin, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

to Kuhn's idea, the group cannot decide—it cannot rationally decide

to agree if the individuals disagree. I do not see how this conclusion
can be escaped unless some yet to be articulated collcctivisl method-
ology is shown lo be viable.

9 A Partial Resolution to the Problem of Consensus

Part of the answer to the Bayesian version of the problem of consen-

sus is that quite often it does not exist and does not need to exist for
normal scientific research to take place. Structure warned of the dan-
ger of taking textbook science as our image of how real science
actually operates, and in particular, it showed how textbook science
tends lo make scientific revolutions invisible by painting an overly
rosy picture of a smoothly accumulating stockpile of scientific knowl-
edge. But I think that Structure failed to emphasize how textbook
science also disguises the diversity of opinions and approaches that
flourish in nonrcvolutionary science.
If I had the space, 1 would offer as a case study the development
of relativistic gravitational research over the last seventy-five-years.19
Textbooks in this area have tended to be books on Einstein's GTR,
thus fostering the illusion that GTR has achieved the status of para-
digm hegemony. In addition, early textbooks not only downplayed
the existence of rival theories but disguised serious difficulties with
two of the principal experimental tests of GTR, the red shift and the
bending of light. Normal scientific research in this field continued in
the face of both a challenge lo the third experimental leg of GTR
deriving from Dicke's solar-oblateness measurements and also an ever
growing number of rival theories of gravitation. This and similar
examples suggest that normal science is possible when the community
of experts share a paradigm in the weak sense of agreement on the
explanatory domain of the field, on the circumscription of the space
of possible theories to be considered as serious candidates for cov-
ering the explanatory domain, on exemplars of explanatory success,
and on key auxiliary hypotheses. (I am tempted to say that this is the
minimal sense of paradigm needed to underwrite normal science,
but historians of science probably have counterexamples waiting in
the wings.)
John Kai man

One could argue that not having a paradigm in the stricter sense
of a shared theory of gravitation has lowered the puzzle-solving
efficiency of normal science. One can recall Thornc and Will's (1971)
lament thai, faced with a zoo of alternative theories of gravitation,
astrophysicists where hamstrung in their model-building activity.
While I think that this is a fair observation, I also think that there is
more to progress in normal science than puzzle solving. In particular,
I would emphasize the conceptual advances derived from the explo-
ration of the space of possible theories, a point that brings me to the
second part of my partial answer to the problem of consensus.
Again, if I had the space, I would argue that insofar as a consensus
is established, it is often due to a process akin to the much maligned
idea of eliminativc induction. This process is often accompanied by
a proliferation of theories, not as an exercise in Feyerabendian an-
archy or Dadaism, but as a means of probing the possibilities and as
a preliminary to developing a classification scheme that makes sys-
tematic elimination a tractable exercise.20 The elimination is not of
the simplcmindcd Sherlock Holmes variety, for it involves Bayesian
elements, especially in the assessment of the auxiliary assumptions
needed to bring about a confrontation of theory and experiment.
Thus the Baycsianizcd version of the problem of consensus remains.
And at the present time I do not see any resolution that does not fall
back on something like the definitional solution, which I casually
dismissed in the preceding section. Such a fallback undermines sci-
entific objectivity in a way that would not have pleased Carnap and,
I presume, docs not please K u h n cither. ,

10 Conclusion

I was a distant student of Carnap and a close student of Kuhn. But

the two seemed to me so different in style and concerns that I placed
them in different parts of the philosophical firmament. Only now
have I begun to appreciate how misguided my placement was and
how much philosophy of science can be enriched by considering how
the ideas of these two giants interact. I have presented one way to
stage the interaction. There are surely better ones. I urge more able
hands to take up the task.21
33
Carnap, Kulin, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology

Notes

Sections 6-9 of this paper arc based on chapter 8 of Earman 1992. I am grateful to
Richard Jeffrey and Wcs Salmon for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1. I will not atlcmpl<to'thaia(Jlcti*c^UÍ8sjdifferences between logical positivism and '

logical empiricism. Interms of adhcrcnls¡Slhc former includes the members of the j
Vienna Circle, while the latlcT-HwlwtlcsTTic members of the Berlin Society for Empirical \
Philosophy. '

2. Or so it was thought until Ayer and others tried to spell out the conditions for
vcrifiabilily. For a review of the problems encountered, see Hcmpcl 1950, 1951, 1965.

3. That is, confrontation of a statement with observation.

4. "Analog[iich] isl die Entiuicklung der wiisenschaftliclien Theoricn ill verslchen: nicht als
gcrichlcl auf ( ] die idéale, wahrc [?] Thcoric, die tint wahrc Thcoric ubcr die
Well [ ], sondcrn Enlwicklung al Schritt zu cincr bcsscrcn 1'orm, durch Auswnhl
cincr aus incineren kompclicrcndcn die Auswahl gcschichl durch Bcvorzugung in
dcr community dcr Wisscnschafllcr, wobci allcrhand soziologi, kullurcllc usw. Fakto-
re n milspiclcn. Nichl: »Wirkommcn dcr Wahrhcit nahcr,« sondcrn »Wir vcrbcsscrn
cin Instrument.» Archive for Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, document
no. KG 082-03-01:1 r/1. Quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh; all rights
reserved. 1 am grateful to Pirmin Slccklcr-Wiclhofcr for providing the English
translation.

5. Keep in mind that I'hilmo/ihical l'~ounrlatinns of Physics was compiled by Martin

Gardner. i'-> • ' ' , < •'• • • ' • ' . • • • ' • ' , . ' • •"•'•••• . '..,',.,,-..' . . '

6. Davidson writes, "The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that ofdirfcrcnl

points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make
sense, but only if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot them; yet the
existence of a common system belies the claim of a dramatic incomparabilily".(197<l,
6).

7. See Kantian I OH!) for an evaluation of these claims.

8. In ibis period Carnap was under the illusion that the logic of science could be
discussed purely in terms of logical syntax, but the point 1 am making here holds with
respect to synlax and scmanlics. Carnap's 1930s strategy for dissolving philosophical
problems appears in slightly new garb in his distinction between "internal" and "ex-
ternal questions" (sec Carnap 1950).

9. Sec Earman 1986 for some caveats.

10. Fcigl's paper for the Schilpp volume was written in 1954. But due to delays, the
volume did not appear until 1963.

11. While the use-of this language may not be appropriate for understanding all the
historical disputes, it docs help to illuminate the long running disputes over absolute
versus relational conceptions of space and lime (sec Earman 1989).

12. Here is a place where a resort to Carnapian subscripting may be healthy. I Use \
"incoinmcnsurabilityi" to indicate Kulin's sense of incommensurability that derives
34
John Karman

from changes in the lexicon, and 1 use "¡ncommcnsurability2" to stand for the kind of
incommensurability that makes theory choice impossible or difficult by means of
relatively neutral observations. My claims arc that incommensurability) docs not imply
incommensurability; and that as .1 matter of actual historical fact incommensurability:
is not so bad in typical cases of scientific revolutions.

13. Since 1 have never been able to understand what is at issue here, I don't know
whether I should demur.

H. Sec Carnap 1962, I963c, and 1968. Carnap was not a dogmatist on this matter.
In his final published pronouncement on this matter he wrote, "When I say that the
end result of inductive reasoning is not the acceptance of a hypothesis, but rather the
assignment of a probability to the hypothesis, this is not meant as a description of
what is actually done, but rather as a proposal for a rational reconstruction. Therefore,
although in the present controversy I agree essentially with Professor Bar-Hillcl [who
argues against rules of acceptance) against Professor Kyburg [who argues for rules of
acceptance], 1 am quite doubtful about one view in which they seem to agree, that we
have to choose between two irreconcilable positions. I do not think, as Kyburg docs,
that our using or not using rules of acceptance (or detachment) makes a vast difference
in our philosophy of science. Nor would I, like Bar-Hillcl, totally condemn such rules"
(1968, 146), For the sake of a sharp contrast with Kuhn, I am presenting a Carnap
who would condemn rules of acceptance. Contrary to Carnap, I think that one's
attitude on this matter docs make a significant difference for one's image of science.

15. I have borrowed the phrase "tempered pcrsonalism" from Shimony (1970).

10. There is a bit of awkwardness here, since in Carnap's systems of inductive logic
the probability of theories for infinite domains will be flatly zero. Carnap was thus
forced to talk about "instance confirmation" of theories. I will pass over this difficulty,
since it is one that is peculiar to Carnap's language-based systems and docs not apply •
to Uaycsianism in general.

17. For a detailed discussion of these matters, sec chapter 6 of Earman 1992.

18. Archive for Scientific Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, document no. 084-
16-01.

19. Sec chapter 7 of I'.arman 1992 for details.

20. Again, sec Earman 1992 for a discussion of how this exercise works for rclalivistic
gravitational theory.

21. The able hands of Wesley Salmon have taken up the work (sec Salmon 1990).

References

Carnap, R. 1928. Der logisclie Au/bau der Welt. English translation: The Logical Structure
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