Rule 113
Rule 113
Rule 113
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court Petitioners counter the finding of the
of Appeals committed a reversible error Court of Appeals by arguing that
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal jurisdiction over the person of the
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in accused is required only in applications
the docket of active criminal cases of for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue,
Branch 36 of the regional trial court of assuming that such jurisdiction over their
Santiago City, Philippines, and in person is required before the court can act
ordering the public respondent to issue on their motion to quash the warrant for
warrants of arrest against herein their arrest, such jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by the court liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
by their filing of the above Urgent cannot be posted before custody of the
Motion. accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the
person is required only in the adjudication
of applications for bail, petitioners quote Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar distinction between custody of the law
Herrera: and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can
act upon the application for bail, but is not
Except in applications for bail, it is not required for the adjudication of other
necessary for the court to first acquire reliefs sought by the defendant where the
jurisdiction over the person of the mere application therefor constitutes a
accused to dismiss the case or grant other waiver of the defense of lack of
relief. The outright dismissal of the case jurisdiction over the person of the
even before the court acquires accused.8 Custody of the law is
jurisdiction over the person of the accomplished either by arrest or
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of over the person of the accused is acquired
Criminal Procedure and the Revised upon his arrest or voluntary
Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). appearance.10 One can be under the
In Allado v. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the custody of the law but not yet subject to
case was dismissed on motion of the the jurisdiction of the court over his
accused for lack of probable cause person, such as when a person arrested by
without the accused having been arrested. virtue of a warrant files a motion before
In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254 arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to other hand, one can be subject to the
hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in jurisdiction of the court over his person,
abeyance pending review by the and yet not be in the custody of the law,
Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v. such as when an accused escapes custody
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025 ), after his trial has commenced.11 Being in
the Court ordered the case transferred the custody of the law signifies restraint
from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC on the person, who is thereby deprived of
which eventually ordered the dismissal of his own will and liberty, binding him to
the case for lack of probable cause.6 become obedient to the will of the law.12
Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes,
In arguing, on the other hand, that but is not limited to, detention.
jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong,
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7 : should not have been separated from the
issue in that case, which is the application
for admission to bail of someone not yet
The voluntary appearance of the accused, in the custody of the law. The entire
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
over his person, is accomplished either by reads:
his pleading to the merits (such as by
filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the A person applying for admission to bail
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing must be in the custody of the law or
for arraignment, entering trial) or by otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the person who has not submitted himself to
same is intended to obtain the provisional the jurisdiction of the court has no right to
invoke the processes of that court. ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
Respondent Judge should have diligently person of the accused; and (3) motions to
ascertained the whereabouts of the quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
applicant and that he indeed had consequences of the fact that failure to
jurisdiction over the body of the accused file them would constitute a waiver of the
before considering the application for defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
bail.13 person. The third is a consequence of the
fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the
While we stand by our above person of the accused that is the very
pronouncement in Pico insofar as it issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general arrest.
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in To recapitulate what we have discussed
the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
an affirmative relief in court, whether in the person of the accused is deemed
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes waived by the accused when he files any
voluntary appearance. pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by
Pico deals with an application for bail, impugning such jurisdiction over his
where there is the special requirement of person. Therefore, in narrow cases
the applicant being in the custody of the involving special appearances, an
law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held accused can invoke the processes of the
that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure court even though there is neither
one's release and it would be incongruous jurisdiction over the person nor custody
to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail of the law. However, if a person invoking
is the security required and given for the the special jurisdiction of the court
release of a person who is in the custody applies for bail, he must first submit
of law.' " The rationale behind this special himself to the custody of the law.
rule on bail is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just In cases not involving the so-called
send another in his stead to post his bail, special appearance, the general rule
without recognizing the jurisdiction of applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to
the court by his personal appearance have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
therein and compliance with the of the court upon seeking affirmative
requirements therefor.17 relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody
of the law. The following cases best
There is, however, an exception to the illustrate this point, where we granted
rule that filing pleadings seeking various reliefs to accused who were not in
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary the custody of the law, but were deemed
appearance, and the consequent to have placed their persons under the
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the these cases involve the application for
case of pleadings whose prayer is bail, nor a motion to quash an information
precisely for the avoidance of the due to lack of jurisdiction over the person,
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
to a special appearance. These pleadings
are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over 1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer
the person of the defendant, whether or of the accused in a petition for certiorari
not other grounds for dismissal are on the ground of lack of probable cause,
included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, we issued a temporary restraining order
motions to quash a complaint on the enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of
therein from further proceeding with the regularity of official functions, the
case and, instead, to elevate the records to warrant continues in force and effect until
us. it is quashed and therefore can still be
enforced on any day and at any time of
the day and night.22 Furthermore, the
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 continued absence of the accused can be
upon the accused's Motion to Suspend taken against him in the determination of
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance probable cause, since flight is indicative
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the of guilt.
ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice,
we directed respondent judge therein to In fine, as much as it is incongruous to
cease and desist from further proceeding grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
with the criminal case and to defer the incongruous to require one to surrender
issuance of warrants of arrests against the his freedom before asserting it. Human
accused. rights enjoy a higher preference in the
hierarchy of rights than property rights,23
demanding that due process in the
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on deprivation of liberty must come before
the prayer of the accused in a petition for its taking and not after.
certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal subsequently filed Petition for Review
cases to the Regional Trial Court even with the Secretary of Justice and based on
before the issuance of the warrants of doubts engendered by the political
arrest. climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-
City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise Appellee.
directed to report to this Court
compliance hereto within ten (10) days
from transfer of these cases; Alexander T. Peñaranda for Accused-
Appellant.
Continuing, this witness swore that as This witness also declared that at about
they neared the chapel along the street, eight o’clock that same evening, while
she saw Ong, who was wearing "a striped she was lying in her bed, somebody
T-shirt, maong pants, shoes, socks and a entered her room and pointed a 30-
wrists watch." Suddenly a shot rang out centimeter shotgun at her throat. The man
and Ong fell to the ground. Almost in the said, "Nene, close your mouth. Do not
same instant, she also saw Molina hiding interfere so there will be no trouble." He
behind a balibago tree on the other side of then left. She recognized the intruder as
the street about five meters diagonally Molina, who was still in the denim shorts
from Ong. Molina was wearing short and jacket he was wearing earlier in the
denim pants and a jacket and carrying a afternoon. 6
long shotgun with his right hand.
According to her, the jeep then stopped in
front of the NGA warehouse and minutes Mrs. Sisenia Ong testified that there was
later Molina tapped her on the back and bad blood between her husband and the
said to her, "What you saw, you just saw." accused-appellant because Ong had
She did not reply because she was imputed the theft of one of his gamecocks
frightened. The jeep thereafter resumed to Molina’s barkada. Reports of his
its trip and she got off at San Isidro. 3 suspicion reached Molina, who resented
it. She also said that on another occasion
the Molina family approached Ong as
Upon arriving home, she narrated her barangay captain about the squatters on
experience to her husband, who said their land but he merely advised them to
nothing. Later she reported the incident to go to the Bureau of Lands. She also spoke
the provincial governor’s wife, for whom vaguely of a lawsuit in which her husband
she was doing some laundering, and Mrs. and some members of the Molina family
Etcubañez advised her to inform the were involved. 7
authorities. She talked to Mrs. Ong and
later to the police, identifying the
accused-appellant as the killer. She was For his part, the accused-appellant
later approached by several persons who offered the defense of alibi and claimed
tried to dissuade her from testifying he was in Manila at the time of the
against Molina. 4 commission of the crime. He narrated his
movements from the day he left Baler on
March 13, 1983, until his return from
Libed was a 16-year old high school Manila on March 19, 1983, and presented
student who said she was walking home several witnesses to corroborate his
from school that afternoon of March 17, testimony. 8 Focusing on the afternoon of
1983, when she saw Molina hiding March 17, 1983, he described how he
behind the balibago tree on the left side of went to his cousin’s office at Pacific
the street. She looked away because she Engineering Co., Inc. in Makati, where he
thought he was urinating. Shortly signed the logbook, a photocopy of the
thereafter, she heard a shot and almost at pertinent page of which he submitted as
the same time she saw Ong on the other an exhibit. 9 From there he proceeded to
side of the street clutching his chest and another office, the First Holdings
slowly collapsing. She immediately ran to International, where he was interviewed
him and found he was no longer and filled up some forms in connection
breathing, whereupon she rushed to the with his application for employment
Molina house nearby from which five abroad. It was only on March 19, 1983, at
men came out, including the Accused- half past six o’clock in the morning, that
Appellant. She added that at the precise he and his wife boarded at PNR bus in
time of the shooting she saw a yellow jeep Tutuban station and headed for Baler,
where they arrived at about two o’clock that Ong was shot, both the girl Libed and
in the afternoon. 10 the yellow jeep in which Poblete was
riding just happened to be passing by. The
timing is too perfect to be believable. Or
The trial court rejected the alibi, may be it was imperfect. For, indeed, one
describing it as fabricated, and refused to may well wonder why the killer should be
believe the defense witnesses on the so reckless as to choose that precise
ground that, as relatives of the accused or moment to fire the shot that would kill
employees of his cousin who exercised Ong when Libed and the persons in the
much influence over them, they had jeep would easily and surely see him.
testified only to help Molina. His That is unnatural and irrational. Unless he
documentary evidence was dismissed as was extremely stupid, the killer would
"unverifiable." The trial judge also have waited for a few minutes at least,
speculated that it was not impossible for after both the jeep and the girl had passed,
Molina, considering his good physical before firing the fatal shot. No one could
condition, to have used his motorcycle or then have seen him in flagrante delicto.
a private car in going to Baler from Yet, as the prosecution would have the
Manila to commit the crime and then Court believe, the accused-appellant
returning to Manila that same night of decided at that exact moment, when he
March 17, 1983, after warning Libed. The was in plain view of Poblete and Libed,
distance between Baler and Manila was to pull the trigger and kill Ong.
only 232 kilometers and could have been
negotiated by him in 5 to 6 hours.
For another, there is the strange
conversation that took place within
The Court has examined the evidence of hearing of Poblete, as if it had been
the parties and finds that even if the alibi intended for her ears. The men freely
were correctly rejected, the conviction of talked of the crime about to be committed
the accused-appellant would not as if it were the most innocuous and
necessarily follow. We have repeatedly innocent subject in the world. Poblete did
stressed that the prosecution must depend not say that they even lowered their
on its own strength instead of relying voices or whispered to each other so she
merely on the weakness of the defense, as would not hear what they were saying.
it seemed to be doing here. While it is not They talked as if there were no other
certain in the case at bar that Molina is persons around. Yet, as the prosecution
innocent, it is not certain either that he is would put it, they were plotting death.
guilty; and the rule is that it is innocence, These men were talking of a killing to be
not guilt, that is presumed. accomplished within minutes, and yet
they were so mindless, or so brazen, that
they did not care who heard
The testimony of the principal witnesses them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
is in some parts too pat to be convincing
and in other parts just plainly
unbelievable. Assuming that Poblete and There is still another thing that puzzles
Libed are credible witnesses without any the Court and that is what happened to the
known motive against Molina, we feel other motorcycle. Poblete said the four
that such credibility is not sufficient by men came on two motorcycles, with two
itself alone for it is necessary as well that on each vehicle, and that later, after their
their testimony itself be credible. In our conversation, three men boarded the jeep
view, their statements on the stand suffer while Molina went alone on one of the
from serious flaws that have raised grave motorcycles. So what happened to the
doubts about the guilt of the Accused- second motorcycle? Poblete was sure it
Appellant. was not loaded on the jeep, 11 which
could simply mean it was left behind in
that deserted street. A valuable vehicle
For one thing, the Court finds it too much abandoned just like that? Did the three
of a coincidence that at the precise time men simply donate it to any lucky finder
or was this piece of testimony another As for Libed, the most striking part of her
concoction? testimony is her sworn story of Molina’s
nocturnal visit and of the armed warning
he made in her bedroom. Just like in the
Poblete also testified that after the movies, this is simply too exciting for
shooting of Ong, the jeep where she was words. But levity aside, it is not easy to
riding stopped, although she gave no believe that just anybody, least of all an
reason why. Molina approached to warn armed stranger, can freely enter a young
her not to talk and then left, ignoring the lady’s bedroom — and at night, at that —
other passengers. She did not say that the especially as there were other persons in
accused-appellant also threatened the the same house who could have seen him.
driver, who also saw what she saw and It was only eight o’clock then; the
was apparently not part of the plot like the household was presumably still awake.
other three passengers behind. It was One might rightly say that this kind of
important for Molina to warn not only her incident just does not happen in a Filipino
but also that driver; yet she said he talked home, especially in the province, and
only to her. particularly in the small house where
Libed was living.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
Significantly, the police never located
that driver although he was driving a
passenger jeep plying that regular route. If the Court is skeptical of this tale, it is
The man simply vanished. It is also because Libed is not a convincing enough
strange that the other three persons in the witness, what with the other flaws in her
jeep were also never found although declarations. Her answers are too glib, as
Poblete says she used to see them in the if she had been rehearsed, as when she
motorpool in Baler and could identify was asked by the prosecutor why she was
them if she saw them again. 12 The testifying and she replied: "First, I would
yellow jeep has itself also disappeared like justice to prevail. Second, I received
without a trace. a subpoena, sir." 17 It is especially
noteworthy that when she gave her
statement to the police on March 22,
In other respects, Poblete’s testimony 1983, 18 she said she saw no one besides
also fails under scrutiny. Although she Ong that afternoon before he was shot,
said she usually took a tricycle to and making no particular mention of Molina.
from Baler, it just so happened — again Asked to explain this omission, she said
— that on that particular date and at that she was confused when she gave that
particular time, she took a jeep 13 that, statement although it was all of five days
coincidentally enough, as it turned out after the killing, when she would have
later, would be passing by as Molina shot already collected her thoughts. On the
Ong in front of the chapel. Asked if it was stand, she was relating an entirely
a passenger jeep, she said she did not different story, emphasizing how she saw
know although she took it just the same Molina hiding behind the tree and later
and was admitted as a passenger. 14 She running away after the shot that killed
said she had never seen that yellow jeep Ong was fired. Libed also insisted that no
before (and curiously, as earlier noted, it one had talked to her before the hearing
has never been seen again). It is also about the testimony she was going to
significant that when asked on cross- give, not even Mrs. Ong or the
examination if she had ever testified in prosecutor, whom she was evidently
court, Poblete categorically replied she intending to surprise with her revelations.
had never done so. 15 Confronted with 19
contrary evidence, however, she admitted
having appeared in three court cases, in
two of which she was in fact the accused. Given all these suspicious statements
16 from the two principal witnesses for the
prosecution, the Court hesitates to accept
the judgment of conviction pronounced
by the trial court. Even the reasons matter how unimportant and immaterial it
suggested by Mrs. Ong do not seem to be may be, even if this might lighten their
serious enough as to have provoked the work. By such indolent process, they only
murder of her husband by the Accused- complicate and lengthen their decisions,
Appellant. The prosecution has in our beclouding and possibly misreading the
view not established that quantum of real issues in their tiresome narration of
proof needed to overcome the the facts, including even those without
constitutional presumption of innocence. bearing in the case. Judges should make
an effort to sift the record and relieve it of
all inconsequential matters, to give them
We feel that the trial judge’s obsession a clearer view of the real questions to be
for details, including the most trivial, has resolved and a better idea of how this
prevented him from seeing the bigger resolution should be done. In the decision
picture and arriving at the correct before us, written single-spaced on 25
conclusion. He could have been more legal-size sheets, less than four pages are
perceptive and judicious rather than devoted to evaluation and analysis, the
merely reportorial. The decision would rest being a recitation of virtually every
have been less ponderous with the single detail, however unimportant,
elimination of such inconsequentials as volunteered by the witnesses. The larger
the following turgid paragraph and other issues are lost in the plethora of
similar statements that have contributed irrelevancies that evidently have
absolutely nothing to Philippine obscured the judgment under
jurisprudence:chanrob1es virtual 1aw challenge.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
library
The warrantless search and seizure could A We followed her and introduced
not likewise be categorized under exigent ourselves as NARCOM agents and
and emergency circumstances, as applied confronted her with our informant and
in People v. De asked her what she was carrying and if we
Gracia.22 In said case, there were can see the bag she was carrying.
intelligence reports that the building was
being used as headquarters by the RAM
during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team Q What was her reaction?
was fired at by a group of armed men
coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to A She gave her bag to me.
open the door despite repeated requests.
There were large quantities of explosives
and ammunitions inside the building. Q So what happened after she gave the
Nearby courts were closed and general bag to you?
chaos and disorder prevailed. The
existing circumstances sufficiently
showed that a crime was being A I opened it and found out plastic bags
committed. In short, there was probable of marijuana inside.24
cause to effect a warrantless search of the
building. The same could not be said in
the instant case. This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor
General's contention for the Malasugui
case is inapplicable to the instant case. In
The only other exception that could said case, there was probable cause for
possibly legitimize the warrantless search the warrantless arrest thereby making the
and seizure would be consent given by warrantless search effected immediately
the accused-appellant to the warrantless thereafter equally lawful.25 On the
search as to amount to a waiver of her contrary, the most essential element of
constitutional right. The Solicitor General probable cause, as expounded above in
argues that accused-appellant voluntarily detail, is wanting in the instant case
submitted herself to search and inspection making the warrantless arrest unjustified
citing People v. Malasugui23 where this and illegal. Accordingly, the search
Court ruled: which accompanied the warrantless arrest
was likewise unjustified and illegal.
Thus, all the articles seized from the
accused-appellant could not be used as not be lightly taken as consent to such
evidence against her. search. The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity
Aside from the inapplicability of the given under intimidating or coercive
abovecited case, the act of herein circumstances and is thus considered no
accused-appellant in handing over her consent at all within the purview of the
bag to the NARCOM agents could not be constitutional guarantee. Furthermore,
construed as voluntary submission or an considering that the search was
implied acquiescence to the unreasonable conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
search. The instant case is similar to warrant, we cannot appreciate consent
People v. Encinada,26 where this Court based merely on the presumption of
held: regularity of the performance of duty."
(Emphasis supplied)
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the . . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed
motor tricycle, what happened next? to have waived the unlawful search
conducted on the occasion of his
warrantless arrest "simply because he
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that failed to object" —
he carried.
Q — And what did or what was the reply In an attempt to further justify the
of the driver, if there was any? warrantless search, the Solicitor General
next argues that the police officers would
have encountered difficulty in securing a
A — He said "you can see the contents search warrant as it could be secured only
but those are only clothings" (sic). if accused-appellant's name was known,
the vehicle identified and the date of its
arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case
Q — When he said that, what did you do? where the arresting officers had forty-
eight hours within which to act.
Q — When you said that, what did he tell Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution
you? provides:
COURT:
A It came to my hand which was written
in a required sheet of information, maybe
for security reason and we cannot Identify
Q And as a result of that report, you put
the person.
him under surveillance?
ATTY. LLARIZA:
A Yes, sir.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a to the effect that he had been stopped and
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the searched without a search warrant by the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall military manning the checkpoints,
be proceeded against in accordance with without more, i.e., without stating the
Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a) details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his light against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to
From the foregoing provision of law it is enable the Court to determine whether
clear that an arrest without a warrant may there was a violation of Valmonte's right
be effected by a peace officer or private against unlawful search and seizure. Not
person, among others, when in his all searches and seizures are prohibited.
presence the person to be arrested has Those which are reasonable are not
committed, is actually committing, or is forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
attempting to commit an offense; or when be determined by any fixed formula but is
an offense has in fact just been to be resolved according to the facts of
committed, and he has personal each case.
knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
Where, for example, the officer merely police checkpoints and the search thereat
draws aside the curtain of a vacant in the case at bar, there is no question that,
vehicle which is parked on the public fair indeed, the latter is more reasonable
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or considering that unlike in the former, it
flashes a light therein, these do not was effected on the basis of a probable
constitute unreasonable search. cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there
The setting up of the questioned was a probable cause that he was
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably concealing something illegal in the bag
in other areas) may be considered as a and it was the right and duty of the police
security measure to enable the NCRDC to officers to inspect the same.
pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the It is too much indeed to require the police
benefit of the public. Checkpoints may officers to search the bag in the
also be regarded as measures to thwart possession of the petitioner only after
plots to destabilize the government in the they shall have obtained a search warrant
interest of public security. In this for the purpose. Such an exercise may
connection, the Court may take judicial prove to be useless, futile and much too
notice of the shift to urban centers and late.
their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not held as follows:
to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban . . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is
centers, not all of which are reported in indispensably necessary, the mechanics
media, most likely brought about by prescribed by the Constitution and
deteriorating economic conditions — reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
which all sum up to what one can rightly followed and satisfied. But We need not
consider, at the very least, as abnormal argue that there are exceptions. Thus in
times. Between the inherent right of the the extraordinary events where warrant is
state to protect its existence and promote not necessary to effect a valid search or
public welfare and an individual's right seizure, or when the latter cannot be
against a warrantless search which is performed except without warrant, what
however reasonably conducted, the constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
former should prevail. search or seizure becomes purely a
judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances
True, the manning of checkpoints by the involved, including the purpose of the
military is susceptible of abuse by the search or seizure, the presence or absence
men in uniform in the same manner that of probable cause, the manner in which
all governmental power is susceptible of the search and seizure was made, the
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional place or thing searched and the character
inconvenience, discomfort and even of the articles procured.
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are The Court reproduces with approval the
part of the price we pay for an orderly following disquisition of the Solicitor
society and a peaceful community. General:
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when These requirements have not been
lawful. — A peace officer or private established in the case at bar. At the time
person may, without a warrant, arrest a of the arrest in question, the accused-
person; appellant was merely "looking from side
to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers
(a) When, in his presence, the person to themselves. There was apparently no
be arrested has committed, is actually offense that had just been committed or
committing, or is attempting to commit was being actually committed or at least
an offense; being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and These are certainly not sinister acts. And
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a the setting of the arrest made them less so,
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the if at all. It might have been different if
nearest police station or jail, and he shall Mengote bad been apprehended at an
be proceeded against in accordance with ungodly hour and in a place where he had
Rule 112, Section 7. no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3
o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
We have carefully examined the wording crowded street shortly after alighting
of this Rule and cannot see how we can from a passenger jeep with I his
agree with the prosecution. companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of
day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour This case is similar to People v.
in the blaze of the noonday sun. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that
the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while
On the other hand, there could have been be was coming down a vessel, to all
a number of reasons, all of them innocent, appearances no less innocent than the
why his eyes were darting from side to other disembarking passengers. He had
side and be was holding his abdomen. If not committed nor was be actually
they excited suspicion in the minds of the committing or attempting to commit an
arresting officers, as the prosecution offense in the presence of the arresting
suggests, it has nevertheless not been officers. He was not even acting
shown what their suspicion was all about. suspiciously. In short, there was no
In fact, the policemen themselves probable cause that, as the prosecution
testified that they were dispatched to that incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
place only because of the telephone call constitutional requirement of a warrant.
from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a Par. (b) is no less applicable because its
robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The no less stringent requirements have also
caller did not explain why he thought the not been satisfied. The prosecution has
men looked suspicious nor did he not shown that at the time of Mengote's
elaborate on the impending crime. arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, indicating that Mengote had committed it.
5 the Court sustained the warrantless All they had was hearsay information
arrest of the accused because there was a from the telephone caller, and about a
bulge in his waist that excited the crime that had yet to be committed.
suspicion of the arresting officer and,
upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, The truth is that they did not know then
6 the accused boarded a bus and placed what offense, if at all, had been
the buri bag she was carrying behind the committed and neither were they aware of
seat of the arresting officer while she the participation therein of the accused-
herself sat in the seat before him. His appellant. It was only later, after
suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously Danganan had appeared at the Police
examined the bag, which he found to headquarters, that they learned of the
contain marijuana. He then and there robbery in his house and of Mengote's
made the warrantless arrest and seizure supposed involvement therein. 8 As for
that we subsequently upheld on the the illegal possession of the firearm found
ground that probable cause had been on Mengote's person, the policemen
sufficiently established. discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted
later revealed that he was not its owners
The case before us is different because nor was he licensed to possess it.
there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
darting eyes and his hand on his Before these events, the Peace officers
abdomen. By no stretch of the had no knowledge even of Mengote'
imagination could it have been inferred identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion)
from these acts that an offense had just that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm
been committed, or was actually being or that he was involved in the robbery of
committed, or was at least being Danganan's house.
attempted in their presence.
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, The Court feels that if the peace officers
Section 5, of the Rules of Court in had been more mindful of the provisions
connection with a crime about to be of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of
committed, being committed, or just the accused-appellant might have
committed, what was that crime? There is succeeded. As it happened, they allowed
no allegation in the record of such a their over-zealousness to get the better of
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be them, resulting in their disregard of the
observed that under the Revised Rule requirements of a valid search and seizure
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the that rendered inadmissible the vital
arrest must have personal knowledge of evidence they had invalidly seized.
the ground therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People v. Burgos.
(Emphasis supplied)
This should be a lesson to other peace
officers. Their impulsiveness may be the
very cause of the acquittal of persons who
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any deserve to be convicted, escaping the
person could be summarily arrested and clutches of the law because, ironically
searched just because he is holding his enough, it has not been observed by those
abdomen, even if it be possibly because who are supposed to enforce it.
of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer
could clamp handcuffs on any person
with a shifty look on suspicion that he
may have committed a criminal act or is
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on
ordered released immediately unless he is
May 15, 1992. 5 After trial on the merits,
validly detained for other offenses. No
judgment was rendered by the court
costs.
below on October 8, 1992 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, attended by the
SO ORDERED.
aggravating circumstance of nighttime,
7. People v Marra and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He was further
G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994 ordered to pay the heirs of Nelson Tandoc
the sums of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
plaintiff-appellee, and the costs. 6
vs.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy
ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan Yao," Din, positively identified appellant as the
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM triggerman in the killing of Nelson
DOE, accused. Tandoc. Din recounted that at around
2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, with each other in front of Lucky Hotel
accused-appellant. located at M.H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan
City, which was owned by the witness'
father and of which he was the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- administrator. He noticed a man pass by
appellee. on the opposite side of the street. The man
made a dirty sign with his finger and Din
informed Tandoc thereof. The man
repeated his offensive act and called them
Public Attorney's Office for accused-
by waving his hands. Infuriated, they
appellant.
followed the man until the latter stopped
in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the
corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets.
They demanded an explanation from the
REGALADO, J.: man but they were not given any. 7
In an information filed before the At that instant, two men arrived and one
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of them inquired what was going on.
Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, Tandoc informed him that they were just
John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom demanding an explanation from the man.
Doe were charged with the crime of Din was surprised when Tandoc
murder for the fatal shooting of one unexpectedly slapped one of the two men.
Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 1 On A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing
June 4, 1992, an amended information with the two men while Din exchanged
was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan blows with the man who made the dirty
Yao," was indicated as an accused instead finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three
of John Doe. 2 A warrant of arrest was opponents ran away in a westward
thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but direction. 8
the same was returned unserved, 4 hence
trial proceeded with regard to herein
accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone. Tandoc and Din then decided to walk
back to the hotel. When they were about
to enter the place, they noticed that the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the
men with whom they just had a fight were guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together
running towards them. Sensing danger, with some companions, chasing two
they ran inside the annex building of the persons running towards M. H. del Pilar
hotel and immediately secured the lock of Street. He further added that the man was
the sliding outer door. They entered a wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's
room and waited until they felt that the uniform. Asked where that particular
situation had normalized. After ten to guard might be, he pointed to a man
fifteen minutes, thinking that the men eating inside the eatery nearby. The man
were no longer in the vicinity, they left eating was not in a security guard's
the room. Having decided to go home, uniform. 12
Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a
sudden, Din saw Appellant, who at that
time was wearing a security guard's They approached the man and inquired
uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. whether he was the security guard of
There was a fluorescent bulb installed at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter
the front of the hotel which enabled Din answered in the affirmative. After a series
to identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot of questions, they learned that he was
in the middle of the chest and he fell Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was
down. Then, Din saw four to five men from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00
scamper away from the scene. 9 A.M. the following day, that he was still
on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of
March 7, 1992, and that the firearm
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, issued to him was in his house. Upon their
"Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase request to see the firearm, they proceeded
appellant and his companions but he to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva
failed to catch up with them. Din and his Street. 13
wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor
Hospital. The victim was taken to the
emergency room but he expired an hour When they arrived, Marra took a .38
later. 10 caliber revolver from inside an aparador
and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also
found five live bullets and one spent shell.
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of
SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he
City Police Station received a report last fired the gun but the latter denied ever
about a shooting incident at the annex having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked
building of the Lucky Hotel. He him point-blank why he shot Tandoc.
proceeded to the crime scene along with Marra at first denied the accusation but
SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio when informed that someone saw him do
Flores and SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon it, he said that he did so in self-defense,
their arrival about five minutes later, they firing at the victim only once. Tandoc
were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din allegedly had a samurai sword with him
that the victim had been brought to the at the time of the incident. However,
Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the persistent efforts on the part of the
hospital where Din informed them that he policemen to thereafter locate said bladed
could recognize the man who killed weapon proved futile. Marra also
Tandoc and that the killer was, at that admitted that prior to the incident, he
time, wearing the polo shirt of a security chased the victim and Din. The officers
guard's uniform. 11 then took Marra to the police station
where he was detained. 14
The Issue
The accused to pay the fine of Five
Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.
Stripped to its core, the essential issue in
the instant case is whether there was a
The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be valid search and seizure conducted by the
submitted to any authorized police officers. The answer to this critical
representative of the PDEA for proper question determines whether there is
disposition. enough evidence to sustain accused-
appellant Sapla's conviction under
Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Court's Ruling
On the other hand, an extensive search of In Comprado, the Court held that the
a vehicle is permissible, but only when search conducted "could not be classified
"the officers made it upon probable cause, as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out particular type of search, the vehicle is the
of circumstances known to the seizing target and not a specific person."18 The
officer, that an automobile or other Court added that "in search of a moving
vehicle contains [an] item, article or vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
object which by law is subject to seizure used as a means to transport illegal items.
and destruction."16 It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a
passenger of that particular bus was
The Court finds error in the CA's holding carrying marijuana such that when the
that the search conducted in the instant police officers boarded the bus, they
case is a search of a moving vehicle. The searched the bag of the person matching
situation presented in the instant case the description given by their informant
cannot be considered as a search of a and not the cargo or contents of the said
moving vehicle. bus."19
The fairly recent case of People v. Applying the foregoing to the instant
Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling case, it cannot be seriously disputed that
the target of the search conducted was not However, in order for the search of
the passenger jeepney boarded by vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-
accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or -violative of an individual's right against
contents of the said vehicle. The target of unreasonable searches, the search must be
the search was the person who matched limited to the following: (a) where the
the description given by the person who officer merely draws aside the curtain of
called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
wearing a collared white shirt with green public fair grounds; (b) where the officer
stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the
sack. officer flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (d) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical
As explained in Comprado, "to extend to or body search; (e) where the inspection
such breadth the scope of searches on of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
moving vehicles would open the or visual inspection; and (f) where the
floodgates to unbridled warrantless routine check is conducted in a fixed
searches which can be conducted by the area.22
mere expedient of waiting for the target
person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up
a checkpoint along the route of that Routine inspections do not give the
vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle authorities carte blanche discretion to
when it arrives at the checkpoint in order conduct intrusive warrantless searches in
to search the target person."20 the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, as opposed to a mere
Therefore, the search conducted in the routine inspection, "such a warrantless
instant case cannot be characterized as a search has been held to be valid only as
search of a moving vehicle. long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will
Probable Cause as an Indispensable find the instrumentality or evidence
Requirement for an Extensive and pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving searched."23
Vehicle
Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the This case is markedly different. The
tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and police officers here proceeded to effect a
was stopped by the team of police officers search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of
on standby. The team leader asked the a solitary tip: the radio message that a
driver about inspecting the vehicle. The certain pickup carrying three (3) people
driver alighted and, at an officer's was transporting marijuana from Pikit.
prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly
(2) sacks of marijuana were discovered matching this description) reached the
beside the engine."65 checkpoint, the arresting officers went
ahead to initiate a search asking the driver
about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon
In the erudite ponencia of Associate this insistence did the driver alight. It was
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, also only upon a police officer's further
the Court held that, in determining prodding did he open the hood.
whether there is probable cause that
warrants an extensive or intrusive
warrantless searches of a moving vehicle, The records do not show, whether on the
"bare suspicion is never enough. While basis of indubitably established facts or
probable cause does not demand moral the prosecution's mere allegations, that
certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify the three (3) people on board the pickup
conviction, it requires the existence of 'a were acting suspiciously, or that there
reasonable ground of suspicion supported were other odd circumstances that could
by circumstances sufficiently strong in have prompted the police officers to
themselves to warrant a cautious man to conduct an extensive search. Evidently,
believe that the person accused is guilty the police officers relied solely on the
of the offense with which he is radio message they received when they
charged.'"66 proceeded to inspect the
Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence
the following conditions in allowing a
reasonable search of a bus while in
transit: (1) the manner of the search must At this juncture, the Court clarifies that
be least intrusive; (2) the search must not there is indeed a line of jurisprudence
be discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of holding that information received by the
the search, it must be confined to ensuring police provides a valid basis for
public safety; and (4) the courts must be conducting a warrantless search,77
convinced that precautionary measures tracing its origins to the 1990 cases of
were in place to ensure that no evidence People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and
was planted against the accused.76 People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.).
Several of the cases following this line of
jurisprudence also heavily rely on the
It must be stressed that none of these 1992 case of People v. Bagista80
conditions exists in the instant case. (Bagista).
First, unlike in Saluday wherein the It is high time for a re-examination of this
search conducted was merely visual and divergent line of jurisprudence.
minimally intrusive, the search
undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla
was extensive, reaching inside the In Tangliben, acting on information
contents of the blue sack that he allegedly supplied by informers that dangerous
possessed. drugs would be transported through a bus,
the authorities conducted a surveillance
operation at the Victory Liner Terminal
Second, the search was directed compound in San Fernando, Pampanga.
exclusively towards accused- appellant At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed
Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike in a person carrying a red travelling bag who
Saluday where the bags of the other bus was acting suspiciously. They confronted
passengers were also inspected, the him and requested him to open his bag.
search conducted in the instant case The police found marijuana leaves
focused exclusively on accused-appellant wrapped in a plastic wrapper inside the
Sapla. bag.
Third, there is no allegation that the It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the
search was conducted with the intent of authorities' decision to conduct the
ensuring public safety. At the most, the warrantless search did not rest solely on
search was conducted to apprehend a the tipped information supplied by the
person who, as relayed by an anonymous informants. The authorities, using their
informant, was transporting illegal drugs. own personal observation, saw that the
accused was acting suspiciously.
Moreover, it is observed that when the Hence, the jurisprudential support of the
Court in Tampis held that "tipped Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best,
information is sufficient to provide frail.
probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the
case of Aruta as its basis. However, the With respect to Bagista, the Court held
Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped therein that the authorities had probable
information in and of itself is sufficient to cause to search the accused's belongings
create probable cause. In fact, in Aruta, as without a search warrant based solely on
already previously explained, despite the information received from a confidential
fact that the apprehending officers informant.
already had prior knowledge from their
informant regarding Aruta's alleged
activities, the warrantless search In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the
conducted on Aruta was deemed SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97
unlawful for lack of probable cause. (Carroll) in holding that "[w]ith regard to
the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it violations of the Prohibition Act. This
possible for the vehicle to be searched to seems to have been their regular tour of
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and
which the warrant must be sought."98 Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids
in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed
Cronenwett and Scully some distance out
Does Carroll support the notion that an from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to
unverified tipped information engenders Scully, who was taking lunch, that the
probable cause? In Carroll, which upheld Carroll boys had passed them going
the validity of a warrantless search of a toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to
vehicle used to transport contraband catch up with them to see where they
liquor in Michigan, the SCOTUS found were going. The officers followed as far
that the warrantless search was justified as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but
in light of the following circumstances: there lost trace of them. On the 15th of
December, some two months later, Scully
and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of
The search and seizure were made by duty, with Peterson, the State officer,
Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia,
prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and
state officer, in December, 1921, as the Carroll met and passed them in the same
car was going westward on the highway automobile, coming from the direction of
between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government
point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. agents turned their car and followed the
The facts leading to the search and defendants to a point some sixteen miles
seizure were as follows: on September east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped
29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an them and searched the car.
apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men
came to that apartment, a man named
Kruska and the two defendants, Carroll xxxx
and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to
them as one Stafford, working in the
Michigan Chair Company in Grand We know in this way that Grand Rapids
Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that
whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a Detroit and its neighborhood along the
case. The three men said they had to go to Detroit River, which is the International
the east end of Grand Rapids to get the Boundary, is one of the most active
liquor and that they would be back in half centers for introducing illegally into this
or three-quarters of an hour. They went country spirituous liquors for distribution
away, and in a short time Kruska came into the interior. It is obvious from the
back and said they could not get it that evidence that the prohibition agents were
night, that the man who had it was not in, engaged in a regular patrol along the
but that they would deliver it the next day. important highways from Detroit to
They had come to the apartment in an Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor
automobile known as an Oldsmobile carried in automobiles. They knew or had
Roadster, the number of which convincing evidence to make them
Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did believe that the Carroll boys, as they
Scully. The proposed vendors did not called them, were so-called "bootleggers"
return the next day, and the evidence in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were
disclosed no explanation of their failure engaged in plying the unlawful trade of
to do so. One may surmise that it was selling such liquor in that city. The
suspicion of the real character of the officers had soon after noted their going
proposed purchaser, whom Carroll from Grand Rapids half way to Detroit,
subsequently called by his first name and attempted to follow them to that city
when arrested in December following. to see where they went, but they escaped
Cronenwett and his subordinates were observation. Two months later, these
engaged in patrolling the road leading officers suddenly met the same men on
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for their way westward, presumably from
Detroit. The partners in the original accused." In explaining his dissent,
combination to sell liquor in Grand Justice Padilla correctly explained that:
Rapids were together in the same
automobile they had been in the night
when they tried to furnish the whisky to In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
the officers which was thus identified as searched the bag of the accused on the
part of the firm equipment. They were basis alone of an information they
coming from the direction of the great received that a woman, 23 years of age
source of supply for their stock to Grand with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3"
Rapids, where they plied their trade. That in height would be transporting
the officers, when they saw the marijuana. The extensive search was
defendants, believed that they were indiscriminately made on all the
carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and baggages of all passengers of the bus
we think it is equally clear that they had where the accused was riding, whether
reasonable cause for thinking so. male or female, and whether or not their
Emphasis is put by defendant's counsel on physical appearance answered the
the statement made by one of the officers description of the suspect as described in
that they were not looking for defendants the alleged information. If there really
at the particular time when they appeared. was such an information, as claimed by
We do not perceive that it has any weight. the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing
As soon as they did appear, the officers thought why they had to search the
were entitled to use their reasoning baggages of ALL passengers, not only the
faculties upon all the facts of which they bags of those who appeared to answer the
had previous knowledge in respect to the description of the woman suspected of
defendants.99 carrying marijuana.
Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause Moreover, the accused was not at all
justifying the warrantless search was not acting suspiciously when the NARCOM
founded on information relayed by agents searched her bag, where they
confidential informants; there were no allegedly found the marijuana.
informants involved in the case
whatsoever. Probable cause existed
because the state authorities themselves From the circumstances of the case at bar,
had personally interacted with the it would seem that the NARCOM agents
accused, having engaged with them in an were only fishing for evidence when they
undercover transaction. searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused.
They had no probable cause to reasonably
Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the believe that the accused was the woman
jurisprudential support upon which carrying marijuana alluded to in the
Bagista heavily relies is not strong. information they allegedly received.
Thus, the warrantless search made on the
personal effects of herein accused on the
It is also not lost on the Court that in basis of mere information, without more,
Bagista, the Court did not decide with is to my mind bereft of probable cause
unanimity. and therefore, null and void. It follows
that the marijuana seized in the course of
such warrantless search was inadmissible
In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, in evidence.100
Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
expressed the view that "the information
alone received by the NARCOM agents, It is said that dissenting opinions often
without other suspicious circumstances appeal to the intelligence of a future
surrounding the accused, did not give rise age.101 For Justice Padilla's Dissenting
to a probable cause justifying the Opinion, such age has come. This
warrantless search made on the bag of the holding, which is reflected in the recent
tide of jurisprudence, must now fully find x x x Everyone would be practically at the
the light of day as it is more in line with mercy of so-called informants,
the basic constitutional precept that the reminiscent of the Makapilis during the
Bill of Rights occupies a position of Japanese occupation. Any one whom they
primacy in the fundamental law, hovering point out to a police officer as a possible
above the articles on governmental violator of the law could then be subject
power. The Court's holding that tipped to search and possible arrest. This is
information, on its own, cannot engender placing limitless power upon informants
probable cause is guided by the principle who will no longer be required to affirm
that the right against unreasonable under oath their accusations, for they can
searches and seizures sits at the very top always delay their giving of tips in order
of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any to justify warrantless arrests and searches.
allowable transgression of such right is Even law enforcers can use this as an
subject to the most stringent of scrutiny. oppressive tool to conduct searches
without warrants, for they can always
claim that they received raw intelligence
Hence, considering the foregoing information only on the day or afternoon
discussion, the Court now holds that the before. This would clearly be a
cases adhering to the doctrine that circumvention of the legal requisites for
exclusive reliance on an unverified, validly effecting an arrest or conducting a
anonymous tip cannot engender probable search and seizure. Indeed, the majority's
cause that permits a warrantless search of ruling would open loopholes that would
a moving vehicle that goes beyond a allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
visual search - which include both long- seizures.103
standing and the most recent
jurisprudence - should be the prevailing
and controlling line of jurisprudence. It is not hard to imagine the horrid
scenarios if the Court were to allow
intrusive warrantless searches and
Adopting a contrary rule would set an seizures on the solitary basis of
extremely dangerous and perilous unverified, anonymous tips.
precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of
an unverified information passed along
by an alleged informant, the authorities Any person can easily hide in a shroud of
are given the unbridled license to anonymity and simply send false and
undertake extensive and highly intrusive fabricated information to the police.
searches, even in the absence of any overt Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly
circumstance that engenders a reasonable take advantage of this and easily harass
belief that an illegal activity is afoot. and intimidate another by simply giving
false information to the police, allowing
the latter to invasively search the vehicle
This fear was eloquently expressed by or premises of such person on the sole
former Chief Justice Artemio V. basis of a bogus tip.
Panganiban in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion in People v.
Montilla.102 In holding that law and On the side of the authorities,
jurisprudence require stricter grounds for unscrupulous law enforcement agents can
valid arrests and searches, former Chief easily justify the infiltration of a citizen's
Justice Panganiban explained that vehicle or residence, violating his or her
allowing warrantless searches and right to privacy, by merely claiming that
seizures based on tipped information raw intelligence was received, even if
alone places the sacred constitutional there really was no such information
right against unreasonable searches and received or if the information received
seizures in great jeopardy: was fabricated.
Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and
heavilv-protected right against
In fact, as borne from the cross-
unreasonable search and seizure will be at
examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the
the mercy a phony tips. The right against
authorities did not even personally
unreasonable searches and seizures will
receive and examine the anonymous text
be rendered hollow and meaningless. The
message. The contents of the text
Court cannot sanction such erosion of the
message were only relayed to them by a
Bill of Rights.
duty guard, whose identity the police
could not even recall:
D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the
Instant Case
Q x x x [W]ho received the information,
was it you or another person, Mr.
Witness?
Applying the foregoing discussion in the
instant case, to reiterate, the police merely
adopted the unverified and
A The duty guard, sir.
unsubstantiated suspicion of another
person, i.e., the person who sent the text
through the RPSB Hotline. Apart from
the information passed on to them, the Q And usually now, informations (sic) is
police simply had no reason to reasonably usually transmitted and text (sic) to the
believe that the passenger vehicle duty guard, Mr. Witness?
contained an item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and
destruction. A Yes, sir.
What further militates against the finding Q Can you produce the transcript of the
that there was sufficient probable cause text message (sic) can you write in a piece
on the part of the police to conduct an of paper, Mr. Witness?
intrusive search is the fact that the
information regarding the description of
the person alleged to be transporting A Our duty guard just informed us the
illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared information, sir.
white shirt with green stripes, red ball
cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed
merely through a text message from a Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr.
completely anonymous person. The Witness?
police did not even endeavor to inquire
how this stranger gathered the
information. The authorities did not even A Yes, sir.
ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete
stranger was credible. After receiving this Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?
anonymous text message, without giving
any second thought, the police accepted
the unverified information as gospel truth A I cannot remember, sir.104
and immediately proceeded in
establishing the checkpoint. To be sure,
information coming from a complete and Simply stated, the information received
anonymous stranger, without the police through text message was not only
officers undertaking even a semblance of hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.
verification, on their own, cannot
reasonably produce probable cause that
warrants the conduct of an intrusive Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan
search. himself, tipped information received by
the authorities through the duty guard was
unwritten and unrecorded, violating the
Therefore, with the glaring absence of
Standard Operating Procedure that any
probable cause that justifies an intrusive
information received by a police station
warrantless search, considering that the
that shall be duly considered by the
police officers failed to rely on their
authorities should be properly written in a
personal knowledge and depended solely
log book or police blotter:
on an unverified and anonymous tip, the
warrantless search conducted on accused-
appellant Sapla was an invalid and
Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating
unlawful search of a moving vehicle.
Procedure that any information received
by the Police Stations or a detachment
properly written in a log book or written
The Inapplicability of The Other
in a Police blotter, that is the Standard
Instances of Reasonable Warrantless
Operating Procedure, correct, Mr.
Searches and Seizures
Witness?
SO ORDERED.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames: