Rule 113

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RULE 113 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001

issued by the then acting Presiding Judge


1. Miranda v Tuliao
Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
FIRST DIVISION

2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-


[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006] 3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED
in the docket of active criminal cases of
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. Santiago City, Isabela; andcralawlibrary
DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,
Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO,
Respondent. 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the
DECISION apprehension of private respondents Jose
"Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: accused Rodel T. Maderal in said
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-
3524.2
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision The factual and procedural antecedents of
1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP the case are as follows:
No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration. The dispositive On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers
portion of the assailed decision reads as were discovered in Purok Nibulan,
follows: Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad under the witness protection program.
to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, Two informations for murder were filed
the instant petition for certiorari, against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1
mandamus and prohibition is hereby Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2
and it is hereby ordered: Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio
Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August
17, 2001, Order dated September 21,
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 The venue was later transferred to
and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
dismissing the two (2) Informations for Manila convicted all of the accused and
Murder, all issued by public respondent sentenced them to two counts of reclusion
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are yet to be arraigned at that time, being at
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for large. The case was appealed to this Court
having been issued with grave abuse of on automatic review where we, on 9
discretion amounting to lack or excess of October 2001, acquitted the accused
jurisdiction, and another entered therein on the ground of reasonable
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and doubt.
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25,
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint
Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, Order dated 22 October 2001.
he executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao
P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus
and Amado Doe, as the persons and prohibition with this Court, with
responsible for the deaths of Vicente prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case,
and seeking to nullify the Orders and
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17
complaint for murder against petitioners, August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
submitted the sworn confession of SPO2
Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan On 12 November 2001, this Court issued
issued warrants of arrest against a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. for a temporary restraining order against
Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the criminal cases. Shortly after the
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad
urgent motion to complete preliminary issued a Joint Order dated 14 November
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to 2001 dismissing the two Informations for
recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. murder against petitioners. On 19
November 2001, this Court took note of
respondent's cash bond evidenced by
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November
July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the 2001, and issued the temporary
absence of petitioners and issued a Joint restraining order while referring the
Order denying said urgent motion on the petition to the Court of Appeals for
ground that, since the court did not adjudication on the merits.
acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a
appealed the resolution of State Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
Department of Justice. "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding November 2001 dismissing the
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the informations for murder." On 21
case and issued a Joint Order reversing November 2001, we referred said motion
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. to the Court of Appeals in view of the
Consequently, he ordered the previous referral to it of respondent's
cancellation of the warrant of arrest petition for certiorari, prohibition and
issued against petitioner Miranda. He mandamus .
likewise applied this Order to petitioners
Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. On 18 December 2002, the Court of
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for Appeals rendered the assailed decision
the reconsideration of the said Joint Order granting the petition and ordering the
and prayed for the inhibition of Judge reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
Anghad, but the motion for RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
reconsideration was denied in a Joint issuance of warrants of arrest against
Order dated 16 October 2001 and the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration
of this Decision, but the same was denied petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. therein having become final and
executory.

Hence, this petition.


Adjudication of a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest requires neither
The facts of the case being undisputed, jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioners bring forth to this Court the accused, nor custody of law over the body
following assignments of error: of the accused.

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR The first assignment of error brought


forth by the petitioner deals with the
Court of Appeals' ruling that:
With all due respect, the Honorable Court
of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, relief if he does not submit his person to
2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in over the person of the accused may be
criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36- acquired either through compulsory
3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming process, such as warrant of arrest, or
and reinstating the Order dated July 6, through his voluntary appearance, such as
2001 issued by then Acting Presiding when he surrenders to the police or to the
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the court. It is only when the court has
alleged rule that an accused cannot seek already acquired jurisdiction over his
any judicial relief if he does not submit person that an accused may invoke the
his person to the jurisdiction of the court. processes of the court (Pete M. Pico v.
Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-
91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR accused must first be placed in the
custody of the law before the court may
validly act on his petition for judicial
With all due respect, the Honorable Court reliefs.3
of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Proceeding from this premise, the Court
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda,
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any
Philippines, and in ordering the public judicial relief since they were not yet
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrested or otherwise deprived of their
arrest against herein petitioners. liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent
Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR and/or quash warrants of arrest."4

Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court Petitioners counter the finding of the
of Appeals committed a reversible error Court of Appeals by arguing that
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal jurisdiction over the person of the
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in accused is required only in applications
the docket of active criminal cases of for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue,
Branch 36 of the regional trial court of assuming that such jurisdiction over their
Santiago City, Philippines, and in person is required before the court can act
ordering the public respondent to issue on their motion to quash the warrant for
warrants of arrest against herein their arrest, such jurisdiction over their
person was already acquired by the court liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
by their filing of the above Urgent cannot be posted before custody of the
Motion. accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the
person is required only in the adjudication
of applications for bail, petitioners quote Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar distinction between custody of the law
Herrera: and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can
act upon the application for bail, but is not
Except in applications for bail, it is not required for the adjudication of other
necessary for the court to first acquire reliefs sought by the defendant where the
jurisdiction over the person of the mere application therefor constitutes a
accused to dismiss the case or grant other waiver of the defense of lack of
relief. The outright dismissal of the case jurisdiction over the person of the
even before the court acquires accused.8 Custody of the law is
jurisdiction over the person of the accomplished either by arrest or
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of over the person of the accused is acquired
Criminal Procedure and the Revised upon his arrest or voluntary
Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). appearance.10 One can be under the
In Allado v. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the custody of the law but not yet subject to
case was dismissed on motion of the the jurisdiction of the court over his
accused for lack of probable cause person, such as when a person arrested by
without the accused having been arrested. virtue of a warrant files a motion before
In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254 arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to other hand, one can be subject to the
hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in jurisdiction of the court over his person,
abeyance pending review by the and yet not be in the custody of the law,
Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v. such as when an accused escapes custody
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025 ), after his trial has commenced.11 Being in
the Court ordered the case transferred the custody of the law signifies restraint
from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC on the person, who is thereby deprived of
which eventually ordered the dismissal of his own will and liberty, binding him to
the case for lack of probable cause.6 become obedient to the will of the law.12
Custody of the law is literally custody
over the body of the accused. It includes,
In arguing, on the other hand, that but is not limited to, detention.
jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above
Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong,
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals
D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7 : should not have been separated from the
issue in that case, which is the application
for admission to bail of someone not yet
The voluntary appearance of the accused, in the custody of the law. The entire
whereby the court acquires jurisdiction paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
over his person, is accomplished either by reads:
his pleading to the merits (such as by
filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the A person applying for admission to bail
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing must be in the custody of the law or
for arraignment, entering trial) or by otherwise deprived of his liberty. A
filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the person who has not submitted himself to
same is intended to obtain the provisional the jurisdiction of the court has no right to
invoke the processes of that court. ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
Respondent Judge should have diligently person of the accused; and (3) motions to
ascertained the whereabouts of the quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
applicant and that he indeed had consequences of the fact that failure to
jurisdiction over the body of the accused file them would constitute a waiver of the
before considering the application for defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
bail.13 person. The third is a consequence of the
fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the
While we stand by our above person of the accused that is the very
pronouncement in Pico insofar as it issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general arrest.
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief
is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court.15 As we held in To recapitulate what we have discussed
the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over
an affirmative relief in court, whether in the person of the accused is deemed
civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes waived by the accused when he files any
voluntary appearance. pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by
Pico deals with an application for bail, impugning such jurisdiction over his
where there is the special requirement of person. Therefore, in narrow cases
the applicant being in the custody of the involving special appearances, an
law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held accused can invoke the processes of the
that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure court even though there is neither
one's release and it would be incongruous jurisdiction over the person nor custody
to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail of the law. However, if a person invoking
is the security required and given for the the special jurisdiction of the court
release of a person who is in the custody applies for bail, he must first submit
of law.' " The rationale behind this special himself to the custody of the law.
rule on bail is that it discourages and
prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just In cases not involving the so-called
send another in his stead to post his bail, special appearance, the general rule
without recognizing the jurisdiction of applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to
the court by his personal appearance have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
therein and compliance with the of the court upon seeking affirmative
requirements therefor.17 relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody
of the law. The following cases best
There is, however, an exception to the illustrate this point, where we granted
rule that filing pleadings seeking various reliefs to accused who were not in
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary the custody of the law, but were deemed
appearance, and the consequent to have placed their persons under the
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the these cases involve the application for
case of pleadings whose prayer is bail, nor a motion to quash an information
precisely for the avoidance of the due to lack of jurisdiction over the person,
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
to a special appearance. These pleadings
are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over 1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer
the person of the defendant, whether or of the accused in a petition for certiorari
not other grounds for dismissal are on the ground of lack of probable cause,
included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, we issued a temporary restraining order
motions to quash a complaint on the enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of
therein from further proceeding with the regularity of official functions, the
case and, instead, to elevate the records to warrant continues in force and effect until
us. it is quashed and therefore can still be
enforced on any day and at any time of
the day and night.22 Furthermore, the
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 continued absence of the accused can be
upon the accused's Motion to Suspend taken against him in the determination of
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance probable cause, since flight is indicative
Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the of guilt.
ground that they filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice,
we directed respondent judge therein to In fine, as much as it is incongruous to
cease and desist from further proceeding grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
with the criminal case and to defer the incongruous to require one to surrender
issuance of warrants of arrests against the his freedom before asserting it. Human
accused. rights enjoy a higher preference in the
hierarchy of rights than property rights,23
demanding that due process in the
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on deprivation of liberty must come before
the prayer of the accused in a petition for its taking and not after.
certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan, we directed the Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a
Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal subsequently filed Petition for Review
cases to the Regional Trial Court even with the Secretary of Justice and based on
before the issuance of the warrants of doubts engendered by the political
arrest. climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us


to require custody of the law in We nevertheless find grave abuse of
applications for bail are not present in discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little
we allow the granting of bail to persons too eager of dismissing the criminal cases
not in the custody of the law, it is against the petitioners. First, he quashed
foreseeable that many persons who can the standing warrant of arrest issued by
afford the bail will remain at large, and his predecessor because of a subsequently
could elude being held to answer for the filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
commission of the offense if ever he is and because of his doubts on the
proven guilty. On the other hand, if we existence of probable cause due to the
allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to political climate in the city. Second, after
persons not in the custody of the law, it the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
would be very rare that a person not prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the
genuinely entitled to liberty would criminal cases on the basis of a decision
remain scot-free. This is because it is the of this Court in another case with
same judge who issued the warrant of different accused, doing so two days after
arrest who will decide whether or not he this Court resolved to issue a temporary
followed the Constitution in his restraining order against further
determination of probable cause, and he proceeding with the case.
can easily deny the motion to quash if he
really did find probable cause after
personally examining the records of the After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants
case. for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant
prosecutor's resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad,
shortly after assuming office, quashed the Judge Anghad is referring to the
warrant of arrest on the basis of said following provision of the Constitution as
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x having been violated by Judge
x prudence dictates (that) and because of Tumaliuan:
comity, a deferment of the proceedings is
but proper."24
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of and effects against unreasonable searches
discretion. It is inconceivable to charge and seizures of whatever nature and for
Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
and oblivious to comity when he issued search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
the warrants of arrest against petitioners issue except upon probable cause to be
just because the petitioners might, in the determined personally by the judge after
future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's examination under oath or affirmation of
resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But the complainant and the witnesses he may
even if the Petition for Review was filed produce, and particularly describing the
before the issuance of the warrants of place to be searched and the persons or
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency things to be seized.27
of a petition for the review of the
prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to
quash the warrants of arrest. However, after a careful scrutiny of the
records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the the prosecutor in his determination of
petitioners therein cannot assail as probable cause, we find that Judge
premature the filing of the information in Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
court against them on the ground that they
still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the According to petitioners:
Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the
issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners herein should not have been In this case, the nullity of the order of
quashed as premature on the same Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
ground. petitioners is apparent from the face of
the order itself, which clearly stated that
the determination of probable cause was
The other ground invoked by Judge based on the certification, under oath, of
Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of the fiscal and not on a separate
arrest is in order if true: violation of the determination personally made by the
Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked Judge. No presumption of regularity
and resolved the question: could be drawn from the order since it
expressly and clearly showed that it was
based only on the fiscal's certification.28
In these double murder cases, did this
Court comply or adhere to the above-
quoted constitutional proscription, which Petitioners' claim is untrue. Judge
is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. Tumaliuan's Joint Order contains no such
6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal indication that he relied solely on the
Procedure and to the above-cited prosecutor's certification. The Joint Order
decisional cases? To this query or issue, even indicated the contrary:
after a deep perusal of the arguments
raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the Upon receipt of the information and
contention of herein accused-movant, resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26 proceeded to determine the existence of a
probable cause by personally evaluating however, focused on the substantive part
the records x x x.[29] of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to find probable
cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
The records of the case show that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible
prosecutor's certification was for the following reasons: (1) it was given
accompanied by supporting documents, after almost two years in the custody of
following the requirement under Lim, Sr. the National Bureau of Investigation; (2)
v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The it was given by someone who rendered
supporting documents are the following: himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive
for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State discharge from the information; and (4) it
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes; was given during the election period
amidst a "politically charged scenario
where "Santiago City voters were pitted
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of against each other along the lines of the
Modesto Gutierrez; Miranda camp on one side and former
City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and
allegedly that of DENR Secretary
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
B. Ocon;

We painstakingly went through the


4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May records of the case and found no reason to
2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and disturb the findings of probable cause of
Reynaldo de la Cruz; Judge Tumaliuan.

5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of It is important to note that an exhaustive


Alberto Dalmacio; debate on the credibility of a witness is
not within the province of the
determination of probable cause. As we
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the held in Webb33 :
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 than not a crime has been committed and
of Rodel Maderal; was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty
of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao;
States, while probable cause demands
andcralawlibrary
more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify x
x x conviction." A finding of probable
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers cause merely binds over the suspect to
of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude


that there was no violation on the part of x x x Probable cause merely implies
Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, probability of guilt and should be
of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
determined in a summary manner. This Court finds merit to the
Preliminary investigation is not a part of manifestation of the accused Miranda
trial x x x. dated October 18, 2001, praying for the
summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of the Supreme Court in People of the
a decision of this Court in another case Philippines v. Wilfredo Leaño, et al.,
with different accused constitutes grave G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
abuse of discretion. therein and in effect disregarding all the
evidence presented by the prosecution in
that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of informations [for] murder filed against
arrest on the ground, among other things, Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
that there was a Petition for Review of the
assistant prosecutor's resolution before
the Secretary of Justice. However, after This is a clear case of abuse of discretion.
the Secretary of Justice affirmed the Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
prosecutor's resolution, Judge Anghad decision and interpret it to the discredit of
summarily dismissed the two criminal SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large
cases against the petitioners on the basis when the evidence of the prosecution in
of the following explanation: the Leaño case was presented. A
decision, even of this Court, acquitting
the accused therein of a crime cannot be
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in the basis of the dismissal of criminal case
People v. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, against different accused for the same
Branch 41, Manila, and based from his crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is
sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. even more pronounced by the fact that
Miranda - the mastermind and with him our decision in Leaño was based on
and the other police officers as the direct reasonable doubt. We never ruled in
perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Leaño that the crime did not happen; we
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving just found that there was reasonable doubt
the five cops of murder, certainly makes as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
his sworn Statements a "narration of the prosecution in that case relied on
falsehood and lies" and that because of circumstantial evidence, which
the decision acquitting said officers "who interestingly is not even the situation in
were likewise falsely linked by said the criminal cases of the petitioners in the
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 case at bar as there is here an eyewitness:
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leaño
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, furthermore had no motive to kill
fabricated and perjured statements and respondent Tuliao's son, whereas
therefore the same is without probable petitioners herein had been implicated in
value." This Court agrees with the the testimony of respondent Tuliao before
defense's views. Indeed, of what use is the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Maderal's statements when the Supreme
Court rejected the prosecution's evidence
presented and adduced in Criminal Case It is preposterous to conclude that
No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is because of our finding of reasonable
supposed to turn state witness in these doubt in Leaño, "it is now beyond doubt
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
decision adverted to, the probative value fabricated and perjured statements and
of his statements is practically nil. therefore the same is without probable
value."35 On the contrary, if we are to
permit the use of our decision in Leaño,
xxx an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of
the prosecution's version of the facts
therein. Such probability of guilt certainly should be deemed to carry with it the
meets the criteria of probable cause. reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghad's
order quashing the warrants of arrest had
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge been nullified; therefore those warrants of
Anghad's dismissal of the informations arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
two days after we resolved to issue, upon
the filing of a bond, a temporary
restraining order prohibiting him from Even if, however, the Court of Appeals
further proceeding with the case. The had directed the issuance of new warrants
bond was filed the day after the of arrest based on a determination of
informations were dismissed. While the probable cause, it would have been
dismissal of the case was able to beat the legally permissible for them to do so. The
effectivity date of the temporary records of the preliminary investigation
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of had been available to the Court of
the informations (days after this Court's Appeals, and are also available to this
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Court, allowing both the Court of
Anghad) creates wild suspicions about Appeals and this Court to personally
the motives of Judge Anghad. examine the records of the case and not
merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals,
carries with it the reinstatement of the the determination of probable cause does
orders set aside by the nullified not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had
proceeding. resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges
therein on the ground of grave abuse of
In their second assignment of error, discretion, in the same vein, we can also
petitioners claim that the Court of overrule the decision of a judge reversing
Appeals did not recall or reinstate the a finding of probable cause, also on the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge ground of grave abuse of discretion.
Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge
Anghad to issue apparently new warrants
of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, There is no double jeopardy in the
it was an error for the Court of Appeals to reinstatement of a criminal case
have done so, without a personal dismissed before arraignment
determination of probable cause.

In their third assignment of error,


We disagree. Whether the Court of petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals ordered the issuance of new Appeals committed a reversible error in
warrants of arrest or merely ordered the ordering the reinstatement of Criminal
reinstatement of the warrants of arrest Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524,
issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a alleging that the order of dismissal issued
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight therein had become final and executory.
inaccuracy whereof should not be According to petitioners:
allowed to affect the dispositions on the
merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals It is also worthy to point out at this
point to the other direction. Firstly, the juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 NOT ONE of those Orders which were
which issued the warrants of arrest. assailed in the private respondent Tuliao's
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
declared the proceedings conducted by Prohibition filed by the private
Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the respondent before the Court of Appeals.
declaration of nullity of proceedings As carefully enumerated in the first page
of the assailed Decision, only the Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the
following Orders issued by Judge Motion to Cite Public Repondent in
Anghad were questioned by private Contempt places the 14 November 2001
respondent, to wit: Order within the issues of the case
decided by the Court of Appeals. In
claiming that Judge Anghad committed
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001; contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent
Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; act much more serious than grave abuse
of discretion.

3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001;


andcralawlibrary Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge
Anghad issued the 14 November 2001
Order on 15 November 2001, antedating
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001. it so as to avoid the effects of our 12
November 2001 Resolution. In said 12
November 2001 Resolution, we resolved
Obviously, the Joint Order dated to issue a temporary restraining order
November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, enjoining Judge Anghad from further
which ultimately dismissed Criminal proceeding with the criminal cases upon
Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is the respondent Tuliao's filing of a bond in
NOT included in the list of the assailed the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent
Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Tuliao had filed the bond on 15
Appeals should not have passed upon the November 2005.
validity or nullity of the Joint Order of
November 14, 2001.38
While we cannot immediately pronounce
Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
Petitioners must have forgotten that disobedience to lawful orders of a court
respondent Tuliao's Petition for and abuse of court processes are cases of
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus indirect contempt which require the
was filed not with the Court of Appeals, granting of opportunity to be heard on the
but with this Court. The Court of Appeals part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
decided the case because we referred the public respondent in contempt and for
same to them in our 19 November 2001 other reliefs just and equitable under the
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 premises should be construed to include a
October 2001, around three weeks before prayer for the nullification of said 14
the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon November 2001 Order.
receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order,
however, respondent Tuliao lost no time
in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite In any case, the reinstatement of a
Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging criminal case dismissed before
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and arraignment does not constitute double
willfully committed contempt of court jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be
when he issued on 15 November 2001 the invoked where the accused has not been
Order dated 14 November 2001 arraigned and it was upon his express
dismissing the informations for murder." motion that the case was dismissed.40
On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals, in view
of the previous referral of respondent As to respondent Tuliao's prayer (in both
Tuliao's petition for certiorari, prohibition the original petition for certiorari as well
and mandamus . as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio,
convince us of an apparent bias on the Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T.
part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve Maderal, conformably with the decision
to follow the case of People v. SPO1 of the Court of Appeals dated 18
Leaño,41 by transferring the venue of December 2002.
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-
3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 4, of the The Temporary Restraining Order issued
Constitution. by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against
Petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated 18 December 2002
and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of SO ORDERED.
the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36- 2. People v Molina
3524 be transferred to and raffled in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of FIRST DIVISION
Manila. In this connection,

[G.R. No. 70008. April 26, 1990.]


1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished
the Executive Judge of the RTC of the
City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
to effect the transfer of the cases within Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSALITO
ten (10) days after receipt hereof; MOLINA, Accused-Appellant.

2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-
City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise Appellee.
directed to report to this Court
compliance hereto within ten (10) days
from transfer of these cases; Alexander T. Peñaranda for Accused-
Appellant.

3) The Executive Judge of the City of


Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal
cases within ten (10) days from the SYLLABUS
transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of


Manila is likewise directed to report to 1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS;
this Court compliance with the order to SHOULD AVOID REPRODUCING
raffle within ten (10) days from said INCONSEQUENTIAL AND
compliance; andcralawlibrary IMMATERIAL MATTERS
VOLUNTEERED TO BY WITNESSES.
— Trial courts should not merely
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal reproduce everything testified to by the
cases are raffled is directed to act on said witnesses no matter how unimportant and
cases with reasonable dispatch. immaterial it may be, even if this might
lighten their work. By such indolent
process, they only complicate and
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is lengthen their decisions, beclouding and
directed to issue forthwith warrants of possibly misreading the real issues in
arrest for the apprehension of petitioners their tiresome narration of the facts,
including even those without bearing in most irrelevant and inconsequential
the case. Judges should make an effort to details have been recited, to only clutter
sift the record and relieve it of all the record and befuddle the issues.
inconsequential matters, to give them a Plowing through it would have been
clearer view of the real questions to be punishment enough for the accused-
resolved and a better idea of how this appellant, assuming he was guilty. But
resolution should be done. In the decision the Court cannot excuse the waste of its
before us, written single-spaced on 25 valuable time by this extraordinary
legal-size sheets, less than four pages are verbiage.
devoted to evaluation and analysis, the
rest being a recitation of virtually every
single detail, however unimportant, This case arose from the killing of Pedro
volunteered by the witnesses. The larger T. Ong on March 17, 1983, at about five
issues are lost in the plethora of o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay
irrelevancies that evidently have Suklayin, Baler, in the province of
obscured the judgment under challenge. Aurora. He succumbed almost instantly
to seven bullet wounds found later to
have been caused by a single shot from a
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; MURDER; GUILT 30-centimeter firearm. In due time,
OF ACCUSED NOT PROVED Rosalito Molina was arrested and charged
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; in the Regional Trial Court of Aurora
CASE AT BAR. — The Court is not with the murder of Ong. After trial, the
prepared to affirm the decision not accused was found guilty and sentenced
because it is long and convoluted but to reclusion perpetua and all accessory
because the prosecution has failed to penalties, besides being required to pay a
prove the guilt of the accused-appellant civil indemnity of P12,000.00 to the
beyond reasonable doubt. The inherent victim’s heirs. 1
incredibility of witnesses Poblete and
Libed has sown the seeds of suspicion
that the evidence against Molina has been The prosecution relied principally on the
fabricated, and rather awkwardly at that. testimony of two supposed eyewitnesses,
The convergence of events in this case is, namely, Felicidad B. Poblete and
plainly, too coincidental to deserve belief Rosalinda Libed. Two other witnesses
and the other improbable declarations of swore to having seen Molina near the
the government witnesses have added to scene of the crime shortly before it was
that disbelief The defense of alibi may be committed. The rest of the witnesses for
weak, and perhaps it was really Molina the prosecution testified only on events
who killed Ong, but the prosecution has that transpired after the killing except that
failed to prove the accused-appellant’s the victim’s wife also suggested the
guilt and so he must go free. motive for the crime.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

Poblete, a 43-year old laundress, declared


DECISION
on the stand that in the afternoon in
question she took a jeep in Baler bound
for San Isidro, where she was residing.
On the way, four men riding on two
CRUZ, J.: motorcycles (two on each vehicle)
signaled the jeep to stop, and she then
heard one of them ask: "Ano kaya,
mapupuruhan mo?" to which another
replied, "Purong-puro." (This translate to
The decision of the trial court in this case "Can you make a direct hit?" "Sure.")
is exasperatingly long and has made no Three of the men then boarded the jeep
effort to separate the chaff from the grain. while the fourth man, whom she later
Everything has been indiscriminately identified as Molina, left by himself on
dumped in as into a catch-all. Even the
his motorcycle, proceeding ahead of them passing by with a woman seated in front
along the same road. 2 and three male passengers behind. 5

Continuing, this witness swore that as This witness also declared that at about
they neared the chapel along the street, eight o’clock that same evening, while
she saw Ong, who was wearing "a striped she was lying in her bed, somebody
T-shirt, maong pants, shoes, socks and a entered her room and pointed a 30-
wrists watch." Suddenly a shot rang out centimeter shotgun at her throat. The man
and Ong fell to the ground. Almost in the said, "Nene, close your mouth. Do not
same instant, she also saw Molina hiding interfere so there will be no trouble." He
behind a balibago tree on the other side of then left. She recognized the intruder as
the street about five meters diagonally Molina, who was still in the denim shorts
from Ong. Molina was wearing short and jacket he was wearing earlier in the
denim pants and a jacket and carrying a afternoon. 6
long shotgun with his right hand.
According to her, the jeep then stopped in
front of the NGA warehouse and minutes Mrs. Sisenia Ong testified that there was
later Molina tapped her on the back and bad blood between her husband and the
said to her, "What you saw, you just saw." accused-appellant because Ong had
She did not reply because she was imputed the theft of one of his gamecocks
frightened. The jeep thereafter resumed to Molina’s barkada. Reports of his
its trip and she got off at San Isidro. 3 suspicion reached Molina, who resented
it. She also said that on another occasion
the Molina family approached Ong as
Upon arriving home, she narrated her barangay captain about the squatters on
experience to her husband, who said their land but he merely advised them to
nothing. Later she reported the incident to go to the Bureau of Lands. She also spoke
the provincial governor’s wife, for whom vaguely of a lawsuit in which her husband
she was doing some laundering, and Mrs. and some members of the Molina family
Etcubañez advised her to inform the were involved. 7
authorities. She talked to Mrs. Ong and
later to the police, identifying the
accused-appellant as the killer. She was For his part, the accused-appellant
later approached by several persons who offered the defense of alibi and claimed
tried to dissuade her from testifying he was in Manila at the time of the
against Molina. 4 commission of the crime. He narrated his
movements from the day he left Baler on
March 13, 1983, until his return from
Libed was a 16-year old high school Manila on March 19, 1983, and presented
student who said she was walking home several witnesses to corroborate his
from school that afternoon of March 17, testimony. 8 Focusing on the afternoon of
1983, when she saw Molina hiding March 17, 1983, he described how he
behind the balibago tree on the left side of went to his cousin’s office at Pacific
the street. She looked away because she Engineering Co., Inc. in Makati, where he
thought he was urinating. Shortly signed the logbook, a photocopy of the
thereafter, she heard a shot and almost at pertinent page of which he submitted as
the same time she saw Ong on the other an exhibit. 9 From there he proceeded to
side of the street clutching his chest and another office, the First Holdings
slowly collapsing. She immediately ran to International, where he was interviewed
him and found he was no longer and filled up some forms in connection
breathing, whereupon she rushed to the with his application for employment
Molina house nearby from which five abroad. It was only on March 19, 1983, at
men came out, including the Accused- half past six o’clock in the morning, that
Appellant. She added that at the precise he and his wife boarded at PNR bus in
time of the shooting she saw a yellow jeep Tutuban station and headed for Baler,
where they arrived at about two o’clock that Ong was shot, both the girl Libed and
in the afternoon. 10 the yellow jeep in which Poblete was
riding just happened to be passing by. The
timing is too perfect to be believable. Or
The trial court rejected the alibi, may be it was imperfect. For, indeed, one
describing it as fabricated, and refused to may well wonder why the killer should be
believe the defense witnesses on the so reckless as to choose that precise
ground that, as relatives of the accused or moment to fire the shot that would kill
employees of his cousin who exercised Ong when Libed and the persons in the
much influence over them, they had jeep would easily and surely see him.
testified only to help Molina. His That is unnatural and irrational. Unless he
documentary evidence was dismissed as was extremely stupid, the killer would
"unverifiable." The trial judge also have waited for a few minutes at least,
speculated that it was not impossible for after both the jeep and the girl had passed,
Molina, considering his good physical before firing the fatal shot. No one could
condition, to have used his motorcycle or then have seen him in flagrante delicto.
a private car in going to Baler from Yet, as the prosecution would have the
Manila to commit the crime and then Court believe, the accused-appellant
returning to Manila that same night of decided at that exact moment, when he
March 17, 1983, after warning Libed. The was in plain view of Poblete and Libed,
distance between Baler and Manila was to pull the trigger and kill Ong.
only 232 kilometers and could have been
negotiated by him in 5 to 6 hours.
For another, there is the strange
conversation that took place within
The Court has examined the evidence of hearing of Poblete, as if it had been
the parties and finds that even if the alibi intended for her ears. The men freely
were correctly rejected, the conviction of talked of the crime about to be committed
the accused-appellant would not as if it were the most innocuous and
necessarily follow. We have repeatedly innocent subject in the world. Poblete did
stressed that the prosecution must depend not say that they even lowered their
on its own strength instead of relying voices or whispered to each other so she
merely on the weakness of the defense, as would not hear what they were saying.
it seemed to be doing here. While it is not They talked as if there were no other
certain in the case at bar that Molina is persons around. Yet, as the prosecution
innocent, it is not certain either that he is would put it, they were plotting death.
guilty; and the rule is that it is innocence, These men were talking of a killing to be
not guilt, that is presumed. accomplished within minutes, and yet
they were so mindless, or so brazen, that
they did not care who heard
The testimony of the principal witnesses them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
is in some parts too pat to be convincing
and in other parts just plainly
unbelievable. Assuming that Poblete and There is still another thing that puzzles
Libed are credible witnesses without any the Court and that is what happened to the
known motive against Molina, we feel other motorcycle. Poblete said the four
that such credibility is not sufficient by men came on two motorcycles, with two
itself alone for it is necessary as well that on each vehicle, and that later, after their
their testimony itself be credible. In our conversation, three men boarded the jeep
view, their statements on the stand suffer while Molina went alone on one of the
from serious flaws that have raised grave motorcycles. So what happened to the
doubts about the guilt of the Accused- second motorcycle? Poblete was sure it
Appellant. was not loaded on the jeep, 11 which
could simply mean it was left behind in
that deserted street. A valuable vehicle
For one thing, the Court finds it too much abandoned just like that? Did the three
of a coincidence that at the precise time men simply donate it to any lucky finder
or was this piece of testimony another As for Libed, the most striking part of her
concoction? testimony is her sworn story of Molina’s
nocturnal visit and of the armed warning
he made in her bedroom. Just like in the
Poblete also testified that after the movies, this is simply too exciting for
shooting of Ong, the jeep where she was words. But levity aside, it is not easy to
riding stopped, although she gave no believe that just anybody, least of all an
reason why. Molina approached to warn armed stranger, can freely enter a young
her not to talk and then left, ignoring the lady’s bedroom — and at night, at that —
other passengers. She did not say that the especially as there were other persons in
accused-appellant also threatened the the same house who could have seen him.
driver, who also saw what she saw and It was only eight o’clock then; the
was apparently not part of the plot like the household was presumably still awake.
other three passengers behind. It was One might rightly say that this kind of
important for Molina to warn not only her incident just does not happen in a Filipino
but also that driver; yet she said he talked home, especially in the province, and
only to her. particularly in the small house where
Libed was living.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
Significantly, the police never located
that driver although he was driving a
passenger jeep plying that regular route. If the Court is skeptical of this tale, it is
The man simply vanished. It is also because Libed is not a convincing enough
strange that the other three persons in the witness, what with the other flaws in her
jeep were also never found although declarations. Her answers are too glib, as
Poblete says she used to see them in the if she had been rehearsed, as when she
motorpool in Baler and could identify was asked by the prosecutor why she was
them if she saw them again. 12 The testifying and she replied: "First, I would
yellow jeep has itself also disappeared like justice to prevail. Second, I received
without a trace. a subpoena, sir." 17 It is especially
noteworthy that when she gave her
statement to the police on March 22,
In other respects, Poblete’s testimony 1983, 18 she said she saw no one besides
also fails under scrutiny. Although she Ong that afternoon before he was shot,
said she usually took a tricycle to and making no particular mention of Molina.
from Baler, it just so happened — again Asked to explain this omission, she said
— that on that particular date and at that she was confused when she gave that
particular time, she took a jeep 13 that, statement although it was all of five days
coincidentally enough, as it turned out after the killing, when she would have
later, would be passing by as Molina shot already collected her thoughts. On the
Ong in front of the chapel. Asked if it was stand, she was relating an entirely
a passenger jeep, she said she did not different story, emphasizing how she saw
know although she took it just the same Molina hiding behind the tree and later
and was admitted as a passenger. 14 She running away after the shot that killed
said she had never seen that yellow jeep Ong was fired. Libed also insisted that no
before (and curiously, as earlier noted, it one had talked to her before the hearing
has never been seen again). It is also about the testimony she was going to
significant that when asked on cross- give, not even Mrs. Ong or the
examination if she had ever testified in prosecutor, whom she was evidently
court, Poblete categorically replied she intending to surprise with her revelations.
had never done so. 15 Confronted with 19
contrary evidence, however, she admitted
having appeared in three court cases, in
two of which she was in fact the accused. Given all these suspicious statements
16 from the two principal witnesses for the
prosecution, the Court hesitates to accept
the judgment of conviction pronounced
by the trial court. Even the reasons matter how unimportant and immaterial it
suggested by Mrs. Ong do not seem to be may be, even if this might lighten their
serious enough as to have provoked the work. By such indolent process, they only
murder of her husband by the Accused- complicate and lengthen their decisions,
Appellant. The prosecution has in our beclouding and possibly misreading the
view not established that quantum of real issues in their tiresome narration of
proof needed to overcome the the facts, including even those without
constitutional presumption of innocence. bearing in the case. Judges should make
an effort to sift the record and relieve it of
all inconsequential matters, to give them
We feel that the trial judge’s obsession a clearer view of the real questions to be
for details, including the most trivial, has resolved and a better idea of how this
prevented him from seeing the bigger resolution should be done. In the decision
picture and arriving at the correct before us, written single-spaced on 25
conclusion. He could have been more legal-size sheets, less than four pages are
perceptive and judicious rather than devoted to evaluation and analysis, the
merely reportorial. The decision would rest being a recitation of virtually every
have been less ponderous with the single detail, however unimportant,
elimination of such inconsequentials as volunteered by the witnesses. The larger
the following turgid paragraph and other issues are lost in the plethora of
similar statements that have contributed irrelevancies that evidently have
absolutely nothing to Philippine obscured the judgment under
jurisprudence:chanrob1es virtual 1aw challenge.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
library

At any rate, the Court is not prepared to


Delfin Malibago, who was riding with his affirm the decision not because it is long
wife on their service motorcycle from and convoluted but because the
their farm in Zarah, San Luis, Aurora to prosecution has failed to prove the guilt
their home in Suklayin, met at the curve of the accused-appellant beyond
where palay was being dried near the reasonable doubt. The inherent
ricemill of Calabuanan Barangay Captain incredibility of witnesses Poblete and
Ramon Flores the blue long-nose Isuzu Libed has sown the seeds of suspicion
truck of Governor Etcubañez driven by that the evidence against Molina has been
Pedrito who greeted him with his light fabricated, and rather awkwardly at that.
which he answered with his horn, then the The convergence of events in this case is,
blue passenger-type Sarao jeep of Dolfo, plainly, too coincidental to deserve belief
and lastly the deep red jeep owned by the and the other improbable declarations of
son of Ang just after the Welcome sign. the government witnesses have added to
When they were opposite Juanito Flores’ that disbelief The defense of alibi may be
place about 80 meters from the NFA weak, and perhaps it was really Molina
compound, he noticed people running who killed Ong, but the prosecution has
ahead of them and they stopped opposite failed to prove the accused-appellant’s
the NFA compound. They proceeded and guilt and so he must go free.
passed by a person lying down they did
not attempt to recognize. When they
reached the mango trees at the road going WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
to Setan they heard that Barangay Captain REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
Ong was the person lying down, they ACQUITTED. No costs.
went back, looked at the cadaver and saw
it was indeed him. There were many
people there among whom was Board Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and
Member Dr. Samano. Medialdea, JJ., concur.
3. Peoplev Aruta
Trial courts should not merely reproduce G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998
everything testified to by the witnesses no
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics
plaintiff-appellee, Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City
and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their
vs.
testimonies, the court a quo found the
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused- following:
appellant.

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was


tipped off by his informant, known only
as Benjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa"
ROMERO, J.: would be arriving from Baguio City the
following day, December 14, 1988, with
a large volume of marijuana. Acting on
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team
drugs and its pernicious effects on our composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt.
society, our law enforcers tend at times to Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt.
overreach themselves in apprehending Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
drug offenders to the extent of failing to
observe well-entrenched constitutional
guarantees against illegal searches and Said team proceeded to West Bajac-
arrests. Consequently, drug offenders Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in
manage to evade the clutches of the law the afternoon of December 14, 1988 and
on mere technicalities. deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) building along
Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y station. Dividing themselves into two
Menguin was arrested and charged with groups, one group, made up of P/Lt.
violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs posted themselves near the PNB building
Act. The information reads: while the other group waited near the
Caltex gasoline station.

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day


of December, 1988, in the City of While thus positioned, a Victory Liner
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the Bus with body number 474 and the letters
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the BGO printed on its front and back
above-named accused, without being bumpers stopped in front of the PNB
lawfully authorized, did then and there building at around 6:30 in the evening of
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly the same day from where two females and
engage in transporting approximately a male got off. It was at this stage that the
eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) informant pointed out to the team "Aling
grams of dried marijuana packed in Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling
plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" bag.
placed in a traveling bag, which are
prohibited drugs.
Having ascertained that accused-
appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team
Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not approached her and introduced
guilty." After trial on the merits, the themselves as NARCOM agents. When
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about
convicted and sentenced her to suffer the the contents of her bag, the latter handed
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a it to the former.
fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos.1
Upon inspection, the bag was found to
contain dried marijuana leaves packed in
The prosecution substantially relied on a plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak." The
the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello,
team confiscated the bag together with
the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt.
During investigation at said office, she
Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-
disclaimed any knowledge as to the
appellant was then brought to the
identity of the woman and averred that
NARCOM office for investigation where
the old woman was nowhere to be found
a Receipt of Property Seized was
after she was arrested. Moreover, she
prepared for the confiscated marijuana
added that no search warrant was shown
leaves.
to her by the arresting officers.

Upon examination of the seized


After the prosecution made a formal offer
marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime
of evidence, the defense filed a
Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga,
"Comment and/or Objection to
P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic
Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence"
Chemist, prepared a Technical Report
contesting the admissibility of the items
stating that said specimen yielded
seized as they were allegedly a product of
positive results for marijuana, a
an unreasonable search and seizure.
prohibited drug.

Not convinced with her version of the


After the presentation of the testimonies
incident, the Regional Trial Court of
of the arresting officers and of the above
Olongapo City convicted accused-
technical report, the prosecution rested its
appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos
case.
and five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
City in violation of Section 4, Article 11
Instead of presenting its evidence, the
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence"
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
alleging the illegality of the search and
1972 and sentenced her to life
seizure of the items thereby violating
imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty
accused-appellant's constitutional right
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without
against unreasonable search and seizure
subsidiary imprisonment in case of
as well as their inadmissibility in
insolvency.2
evidence.

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits


The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was,
the following:
however, denied without the trial court
ruling on the alleged illegality of the
search and seizure and the inadmissibility
1. The trial court erred in holding that the
in evidence of the items seized to avoid
NARCOM agents could not apply for a
pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court
warrant for the search of a bus or a
continued to hear the case.
passenger who boarded a bus because one
of the requirements for applying a search
warrant is that the place to be searched
In view of said denial, accused-appellant
must be specifically designated and
testified on her behalf. As expected, her
described.
version of the incident differed from that
of the prosecution. She claimed that
immediately prior to her arrest, she had
2. The trial court erred in holding or
just come from Choice Theater where she
assuming that if a search warrant was
watched the movie "Balweg." While
applied for by the NARCOM agents, still
about to cross the road, an old woman
no court would issue a search warrant for
asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag.
the reason that the same would be
In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and
considered a general search warrant
Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to
which may be quashed.
go with them to the NARCOM Office.
issue or refuse to issue search warrants or
warrants of arrest.4
3. The trial court erred in not finding that
the warrantless search resulting to the
arrest of accused-appellant violated the
Further, articles which are the product of
latter's constitutional rights.
unreasonable searches and seizures are
inadmissible as evidence pursuant to the
doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that
Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later
although the defense of denial is weak yet
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of
the evidence of the prosecution is even
the Constitution, thus:
weaker.

Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in


These submissions are impressed with
violation of this or the preceding section
merit.
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.

In People v. Ramos,3 this Court held that


a search may be conducted by law
From the foregoing, it can be said that the
enforcers only on the strength of a search
State cannot simply intrude
warrant validly issued by a judge as
indiscriminately into the houses, papers,
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
effects, and most importantly, on the
Constitution which provides:
person of an individual. The
constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be searches and seizures. As such, it protects
secure in their persons, houses, papers, the privacy and sanctity of the person
and effects against unreasonable searches himself against unlawful arrests and other
and seizures of whatever nature and for forms of restraint.6
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
Therewithal, the right of a person to be
determined personally by the judge after
secured against any unreasonable seizure
examination under oath or affirmation of
of his body and any deprivation of his
the complainant and the witnesses he may
liberty is a most basic and fundamental
produce, and particularly describing the
one. A statute, rule or situation which
place to be searched and the persons or
allows exceptions to the requirement of a
things to be seized.
warrant of arrest or search warrant must
perforce be strictly construed and their
application limited only to cases
This constitutional guarantee is not a specifically provided or allowed by law.
blanket prohibition against all searches To do otherwise is an infringement upon
and seizures as it operates only against personal liberty and would set back a
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. right so basic and deserving of full
The plain import of the language of the protection and vindication yet often
Constitution, which in one sentence violated.7
prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures and at the same time prescribes
the requisites for a valid warrant, is that
The following cases are specifically
searches and seizures are normally
provided or allowed by law:
unreasonable unless authorized by a
validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
1. Warrantless search incidental to a
protection accorded by the search and
lawful arrest recognized under Section
seizure clause is that between person and
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court8 and
police must stand the protective authority
by prevailing jurisprudence;
of a magistrate clothed with power to
search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are:
Although probable cause eludes exact
and concrete definition, it generally
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
valid warrantless arrest in which the
supported by circumstances sufficiently
police are legally present in the pursuit of
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
their official duties;
man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence
(b) the evidence was inadvertently of such facts and circumstances which
discovered by the police who had the could lead a reasonably discreet and
right to be where they are; prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in
(c) the evidence must be immediately connection with said offense or subject to
apparent, and seizure and destruction by law is in the
place to be searched.12

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of


evidence without further search; It ought to be emphasized that in
determining probable cause, the average
man weighs facts and circumstances
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly without resorting to the calibrations of
regulated by the government, the our rules of evidence of which his
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he
expectation of privacy especially when its relies on the calculus of common sense
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a which all reasonable men have in
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to abundance. The same quantum of
probable cause that the occupant evidence is required in determining
committed a criminal activity; probable cause relative to search. Before
a search warrant can be issued, it must be
shown by substantial evidence that the
4. Consented warrantless search; items sought are in fact seizable by virtue
of being connected with criminal activity,
and that the items will be found in the
5. Customs search;9 place to be searched.13

6. Stop and Frisk;10 and In searches and seizures effected without


a warrant, it is necessary for probable
cause to be present. Absent any probable
7. Exigent and Emergency cause, the article(s) seized could not be
Circumstances.11 admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested. Probable cause, in these
cases, must only be based on reasonable
The above exceptions, however, should ground of suspicion or belief that a crime
not become unbridled licenses for law has been committed or is about to be
enforcement officers to trample upon the committed.
constitutionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The In our jurisprudence, there are instances
essential requisite of probable cause must where information has become a
still be satisfied before a warrantless sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,14 acting on Note, however, the glaring differences of
information supplied by informers, police Malmstedt to the instant case. In present
officers conducted a surveillance at the case, the police officers had reasonable
Victory Liner Terminal compound in San time within which to secure a search
Fernando, Pampanga against persons warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was
who may commit misdemeanors and also priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not
on those who may be engaging in the acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt
traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a
evening, the policemen noticed a person legally accepted exception to the warrant
carrying a red traveling bag who was requirement. Aruta, on the other hand,
acting suspiciously. They confronted him was searched while about to cross a street.
and requested him to open his bag but he
refused. He acceded later on when the
policemen identified themselves. Inside In People v. Bagista,16 the NARCOM
the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in officers had probable cause to stop and
a plastic wrapper. The police officers search all vehicles coming from the north
only knew of the activities of Tangliben to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the
on the night of his arrest. confidential information they received
from their regular informant that a
woman having the same appearance as
In instant case, the apprehending officers that of accused-appellant would be
already had prior knowledge from their bringing marijuana from up north. They
informant regarding Aruta's alleged likewise had probable cause to search
activities. In Tangliben policemen were accused-appellant's belongings since she
confronted with an on-the-spot tip. fitted the description given by the
Moreover, the policemen knew that the NARCOM informant. Since there was a
Victory Liner compound is being used by valid warrantless search by the
drug traffickers as their "business NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained
address". More significantly, Tangliben in the course of said search is admissible
was acting suspiciously. His actuations against accused-appellant. Again, this
and surrounding circumstances led the case differs from Aruta as this involves a
policemen to reasonably suspect that search of a moving vehicle plus the fact
Tangliben is committing a crime. In that the police officers erected a
instant case, there is no single indication checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
that Aruta was acting suspiciously. requirements of a search warrant.

In People v. Malmstedt,15 the Narcom In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and


agents received reports that vehicles People,17 the policemen conducted a
coming from Sagada were transporting surveillance in an area of the Kalookan
marijuana. They likewise received Cemetery based on information that drug
information that a Caucasian coming addicts were roaming therein. Upon
from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his reaching the place, they chanced upon a
person. There was no reasonable time to man in front of the cemetery who
obtain a search warrant, especially since appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was
the identity of the suspect could not be observed to have reddish eyes and to be
readily ascertained. His actuations also walking in a swaying manner. Moreover,
aroused the suspicion of the officers he appeared to be trying to avoid the
conducting the operation. The Court held policemen. When approached and asked
that in light of such circumstances, to what he was holding in his hands, he tried
deprive the agents of the ability and to resist. When he showed his wallet, it
facility to act promptly, including a contained marijuana. The Court held that
search without a warrant, would be to the policemen had sufficient reason to
sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in accost accused-appellant to determine if
law enforcement, to the detriment of he was actually "high" on drugs due to his
society. suspicious actuations, coupled with the
fact that based on information, this area Aminnudin. When the case was brought
was a haven for drug addicts. before this Court, the arrest was held to
be illegal; hence any item seized from
Aminnudin could not be used against
In all the abovecited cases, there was him.
information received which became the
bases for conducting the warrantless
search. Furthermore, additional factors Another recent case is People v. Encinada
and circumstances were present which, where the police likewise received
when taken together with the information, confidential information the day before at
constituted probable causes which 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant
justified the warrantless searches and that Encinada would be bringing in
seizures in each of the cases. marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V
Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the
following day. This intelligence
In the instant case, the determination of information regarding the culprit's
the absence or existence of probable identity, the particular crime he allegedly
cause necessitates a reexamination of the committed and his exact whereabouts
facts. The following have been could have been a basis of probable cause
established: (1) In the morning of for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This
December 13, 1988, the law enforcement Court held that in accordance with
officers received information from an Administrative Circular No. 13 and
informant named "Benjie" that a certain Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the
"Aling Rosa" would be leaving for lawmen could have applied for a warrant
Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and even after court hours. The failure or
would be back in the afternoon of the neglect to secure one cannot serve as an
same day carrying with her a large excuse for violating Encinada's
volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the constitutional right.
evening of December 14, 1988, accused-
appellant alighted from a Victory Liner
Bus carrying a traveling bag even as the In the instant case, the NARCOM agents
informant pointed her out to the law were admittedly not armed with a warrant
enforcement officers; (3) The law of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless
enforcement officers approached her and search and seizure of accused-appellant's
introduced themselves as NARCOM bag, accused-appellant must have been
agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule
about the contents of her traveling bag, 113 which provides inter alia:
she gave the same to him; (5) When they
opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
was then brought to the NARCOM office lawful. — A peace officer or a private
for investigation. person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

This case is similar to People v.


Aminnudin where the police received (a) When in his presence, the person to be
information two days before the arrival of arrested has committed, is actually
Aminnudin that the latter would be committing, or is attempting to commit
arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V an offense;
Wilcon 9. His name was known, the
vehicle was identified and the date of
arrival was certain. From the information xxx xxx xxx
they had received, the police could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said
warrant. Instead of securing a warrant to be committing a crime. Neither was she
first, they proceeded to apprehend about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Accused-appellant such search and arrest would be unlawful,
was merely crossing the street and was for being contrary to law.18
not acting in any manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and As previously discussed, the case in point
conclude that she was committing a is People v. Aminnudin19 where, this
crime. It was only when the informant Court observed that:
pointed to accused-appellant and
identified her to the agents as the carrier
of the marijuana that she was singled out . . . accused-appellant was not, at the
as the suspect. The NARCOM agents moment of his arrest, committing a crime
would not have apprehended accused- nor was it shown that he was about to do
appellant were it not for the furtive finger so or that he had just done so. What he
of the informant because, as clearly was doing was descending the gangplank
illustrated by the evidence on record, of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
there was no reason whatsoever for them outward indication that called for his
to suspect that accused-appellant was arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
committing a crime, except for the of the other passengers innocently
pointing finger of the informant. This the disembarking from the vessel. It was only
Court could neither sanction nor tolerate when the informer pointed to him as the
as it is a clear violation of the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
constitutional guarantee against became suspect and so subject to
unreasonable search and seizure. Neither apprehension. It was the furtive finger
was there any semblance of any that triggered his arrest. The
compliance with the rigid requirements of identification by the informer was the
probable cause and warrantless arrests. probable cause as determined by the
officers (and not a judge) that authorized
them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
Consequently, there was no legal basis immediately arrest him.
for the NARCOM agents to effect a
warrantless search of accused-appellant's
bag, there being no probable cause and In the absence of probable cause to effect
the accused-appellant not having been a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the search and seizure of accused-appellant's
arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically bag would also not be justified as seizure
follows that the subsequent search was of evidence in "plain view" under the
similarly illegal, it being not incidental to second exception. The marijuana was
a lawful arrest. The constitutional obviously not immediately apparent as
guarantee against unreasonable search shown by the fact that the NARCOM
and seizure must perforce operate in favor agents still had to request accused-
of accused-appellant. As such, the articles appellant to open the bag to ascertain its
seized could not be used as evidence contents.
against accused-appellant for these are
"fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Neither would the search and seizure of
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution. accused-appellant's bag be justified as a
search of a moving vehicle. There was no
moving vehicle to speak of in the instant
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the case as accused-appellant was
law requires that the search be incidental apprehended several minutes after
to a lawful arrest, in order that the search alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In
itself may likewise be considered legal. fact, she was accosted in the middle of the
Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful street and not while inside the vehicle.
arrest must precede the search of a person
and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based People v. Solayao,20 applied the stop and
on evidence produced by the search, both frisk principle which has been adopted in
Posadas v. Court of Appeals.21 In said When one voluntarily submits to a search
case, Solayao attempted to flee when he or consents to have it made on his person
and his companions were accosted by or premises, he is precluded from
government agents. In the instant case, complaining later thereof. (Cooley,
there was no observable manifestation Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol.
that could have aroused the suspicion of I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
the NARCOM agents as to cause them to unreasonable search may, like every
"stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To right, be waived and such waiver may be
reiterate, accused-appellant was merely made either expressly or impliedly.
crossing the street when apprehended.
Unlike in the abovementioned cases,
accused-appellant never attempted to flee In support of said argument, the Solicitor
from the NARCOM agents when the General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello,
latter identified themselves as such. thus:
Clearly, this is another indication of the
paucity of probable cause that would
sufficiently provoke a suspicion that Q When this informant by the name of
accused-appellant was committing a alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what
crime. happened after that?

The warrantless search and seizure could A We followed her and introduced
not likewise be categorized under exigent ourselves as NARCOM agents and
and emergency circumstances, as applied confronted her with our informant and
in People v. De asked her what she was carrying and if we
Gracia.22 In said case, there were can see the bag she was carrying.
intelligence reports that the building was
being used as headquarters by the RAM
during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team Q What was her reaction?
was fired at by a group of armed men
coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to A She gave her bag to me.
open the door despite repeated requests.
There were large quantities of explosives
and ammunitions inside the building. Q So what happened after she gave the
Nearby courts were closed and general bag to you?
chaos and disorder prevailed. The
existing circumstances sufficiently
showed that a crime was being A I opened it and found out plastic bags
committed. In short, there was probable of marijuana inside.24
cause to effect a warrantless search of the
building. The same could not be said in
the instant case. This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor
General's contention for the Malasugui
case is inapplicable to the instant case. In
The only other exception that could said case, there was probable cause for
possibly legitimize the warrantless search the warrantless arrest thereby making the
and seizure would be consent given by warrantless search effected immediately
the accused-appellant to the warrantless thereafter equally lawful.25 On the
search as to amount to a waiver of her contrary, the most essential element of
constitutional right. The Solicitor General probable cause, as expounded above in
argues that accused-appellant voluntarily detail, is wanting in the instant case
submitted herself to search and inspection making the warrantless arrest unjustified
citing People v. Malasugui23 where this and illegal. Accordingly, the search
Court ruled: which accompanied the warrantless arrest
was likewise unjustified and illegal.
Thus, all the articles seized from the
accused-appellant could not be used as not be lightly taken as consent to such
evidence against her. search. The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity
Aside from the inapplicability of the given under intimidating or coercive
abovecited case, the act of herein circumstances and is thus considered no
accused-appellant in handing over her consent at all within the purview of the
bag to the NARCOM agents could not be constitutional guarantee. Furthermore,
construed as voluntary submission or an considering that the search was
implied acquiescence to the unreasonable conducted irregularly, i.e., without a
search. The instant case is similar to warrant, we cannot appreciate consent
People v. Encinada,26 where this Court based merely on the presumption of
held: regularity of the performance of duty."
(Emphasis supplied)

[T]he Republic's counsel avers that


appellant voluntarily handed the chairs Thus, accused-appellant's lack of
containing the package of marijuana to objection to the search is not tantamount
the arresting officer and thus effectively to a waiver of her constitutional rights or
waived his right against the warrantless a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's search. As this Court held in People v.
testimony. Barros:27

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the . . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed
motor tricycle, what happened next? to have waived the unlawful search
conducted on the occasion of his
warrantless arrest "simply because he
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that failed to object" —
he carried.

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear


Q: Are you referring to the two plastic first that the right exists; secondly, that
chairs? the person involved had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and lastly, that said person had
A: Yes, sir. an actual intention to relinquish the right
(Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil.
698). The fact that the accused failed to
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada object to the entry into his house does not
agreed to allow you to examine the two amount to a permission to make a search
chairs that he carried, what did you do therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil.
next? 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in
the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin (supra):
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed
that something inside in between the two
chairs. xxx xxx xxx

We are not convinced. While in principle . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not


we agree that consent will validate an dependent upon any affirmative act of the
otherwise illegal search, we believe that citizen, the courts do not place the citizen
appellant — based on the transcript in the position of either contesting an
quoted above — did not voluntarily officer's authority by force, or waiving his
consent to Bolonia's search of his constitutional rights; but instead they
belongings. Appellant's silence should hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a
A — When I went inside and opened the
demonstration of regard for the
bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic)
supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
that was contained in the bag.

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge


Q — And when you saw that it was not
every reasonable presumption against
clothings (sic), what did you do?
waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights."28 (Emphasis supplied) A — When I saw that the contents were
not clothes, I took some of the contents
and showed it to my companion Fomocod
and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there
was marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
should be an actual intention to relinquish
the right. As clearly illustrated in People
v. Omaweng,29 where prosecution
witness Joseph Layong testified thus: In the above-mentioned case, accused
was not subjected to any search which
may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
searches and seizures. If one had been
made, this Court would be the first to
condemn it "as the protection of the
Q — When you and David Fomocod saw
citizen and the maintenance of his
the travelling bag, what did you do?
constitutional rights is one of the highest
duties and privileges of the Court." He
willingly gave prior consent to the search
A — When we saw that traveling bag, we and voluntarily agreed to have it
asked the driver if we could see the conducted on his vehicle and traveling
contents. bag, which is not the case with Aruta.

Q — And what did or what was the reply In an attempt to further justify the
of the driver, if there was any? warrantless search, the Solicitor General
next argues that the police officers would
have encountered difficulty in securing a
A — He said "you can see the contents search warrant as it could be secured only
but those are only clothings" (sic). if accused-appellant's name was known,
the vehicle identified and the date of its
arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case
Q — When he said that, what did you do? where the arresting officers had forty-
eight hours within which to act.

A — We asked him if we could open and


see it. This argument is untenable.

Q — When you said that, what did he tell Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution
you? provides:

A — He said "you can see it". . . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of


arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or
Q — And when he said "you can see and such other responsible officer as may be
open it," what did you do? authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
1. The waiver would only apply to
produce, and particularly describing the
objections pertaining to the illegality of
place to be searched and the persons or
the arrest as her plea of "not guilty" and
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
participation in the trial are indications of
her voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction.32 The plea and active
Search warrants to be valid must
participation in the trial would not cure
particularly describe the place to be
the illegality of the search and transform
searched and the persons or things to be
the inadmissible evidence into objects of
seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit
proof. The waiver simply does not extend
the things to be seized to those and only
this far.
those, particularly described in the
warrant so as to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what
2. Granting that evidence obtained
articles they shall seize to the end that
through a warrantless search becomes
unreasonable searches and seizures may
admissible upon failure to object thereto
not be made.30
during the trial of the case, records show
that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer
to Evidence and objected and opposed the
Had the NARCOM agents only applied
prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.
for a search warrant, they could have
secured one without too much difficulty,
contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor
It is apropos to quote the case of People
General. The person intended to be
v. Barros,33 which stated:
searched has been particularized and the
thing to be seized specified. The time was
also sufficiently ascertained to be in the
afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling It might be supposed that the non-
Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant admissibility of evidence secured through
and the thing to be seized was marijuana. an invalid warrantless arrest or a
The vehicle was identified to be a Victory warrantless search and seizure may be
Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents waived by an accused person. The a priori
purposely positioned themselves near the argument is that the invalidity of an
spot where Victory Liner buses normally unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest
unload their passengers. Assuming that effected with a defective warrant of arrest
the NARCOM agents failed to may be waived by applying for and
particularize the vehicle, this would not in posting of bail for provisional liberty, so
any way hinder them from securing a as to estop an accused from questioning
search warrant. The above particulars the legality or constitutionality of his
would have already sufficed. In any case, detention or the failure to accord him a
this Court has held that the police should preliminary investigation. We do not
particularly describe the place to be believe, however, that waiver of the latter
searched and the person or things to be necessarily constitutes, or carries with it,
seized, wherever and whenever it is waiver of the former — an argument that
feasible.31 (Emphasis supplied) the Solicitor General appears to be
making impliedly. Waiver of the non-
admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid
warrantless arrest and of a warrantless
While it may be argued that by entering a
search and seizure is not casually to be
plea during arraignment and by actively
presumed, if the constitutional right
participating in the trial, accused-
against unlawful searches and seizures is
appellant may be deemed to have waived
to retain its vitality for the protection of
objections to the illegality of the
our people. In the case at bar, defense
warrantless search and to the
counsel had expressly objected on
inadmissibility of the evidence obtained
constitutional grounds to the admission of
thereby, the same may not apply in the
the carton box and the four (4) kilos of
instant case for the following reasons:
marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. justify indifference to the basic principles
We consider that appellant's objection to of government.36
the admission of such evidence was made
clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his Those who are supposed to enforce the
rights under the premises can be law are not justified in disregarding the
reasonably inferred from his conduct rights of the individual in the name of
before or during the trial. (Emphasis order. Order is too high a price to pay for
supplied). the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes
declared: "I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the
In fine, there was really no excuse for the government should play an ignoble part."
NARCOM agents not to procure a search It is simply not allowed in free society to
warrant considering that they had more violate a law to enforce another,
than twenty-four hours to do so. especially if the law violated is the
Obviously, this is again an instance of Constitution itself.37
seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," hence illegal and inadmissible
subsequently in evidence. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 73, Olongapo City, is hereby
The exclusion of such evidence is the REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack
only practical means of enforcing the of evidence to establish her guilt beyond
constitutional injunction against reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
unreasonable searches and seizure. The ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby
non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
letter and spirit of the prohibition against from confinement unless she is being held
unreasonable searches and seizures.34 for some other legal grounds. No costs.

While conceding that the officer making SO ORDERED.


the unlawful search and seizure may be
4. People v Aminnudin
held criminally and civilly liable, the
Stonehill case observed that most G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
jurisdictions have realized that the
exclusionary rule is "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
injunction" against abuse. This approach plaintiff-appellee,
is based on the justification made by
Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the vs.
prosecution which itself controls the IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-
seizing officials, knows that it cannot appellant.
profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed."35
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-
appellee.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are
the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio
protection. While the power to search and for defendant-appellant.
seize may at times be necessary to the
public welfare, still it may be exercised
and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of
the citizens, for the enforcement of no CRUZ, J.:
statute is of sufficient importance to
The accused-appellant claimed his basis of this finding, the corresponding
business was selling watches but he was charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
nonetheless arrested, tried and found
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
The trial court, disbelieving him, held it In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
was high time to put him away and marijuana, averring that all he had in his
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a bag was his clothing consisting of a
fine of P20,000.00. 1 jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, bag was confiscated without a search
1984, shortly after disembarking from the warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the manhandled to force him to admit he was
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers carrying the marijuana, the investigator
who were in fact waiting for him simply hitting him with a piece of wood in the
accosted him, inspected his bag and chest and arms even as he parried the
finding what looked liked marijuana blows while he was still handcuffed. 12
leaves took him to their headquarters for He insisted he did not even know what
investigation. The two bundles of suspect marijuana looked like and that his
articles were confiscated from him and business was selling watches and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued
examination. When they were verified as that the marijuana he was alleged to have
marijuana leaves, an information for been carrying was not properly Identified
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was and could have been any of several
filed against him. 2 Later, the information bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
was amended to include Farida Ali y headquarters. 14
Hassen, who had also been arrested with
him that same evening and likewise
investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and The trial court was unconvinced, noting
pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the from its own examination of the accused
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge that he claimed to have come to Iloilo
against Ali on the basis of a sworn City to sell watches but carried only two
statement of the arresting officers watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
absolving her after a 'thorough for that purpose and spending P107.00 for
investigation." 5 The motion was granted, fare, not to mention his other expenses.
and trial proceeded only against the 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the
accused-appellant, who was eventually two watches in a secret pocket below his
convicted .6 belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched
by the arresting officers nor were they
According to the prosecution, the PC damaged as a result of his manhandling.
officers had earlier received a tip from 16 He also said he sold one of the watches
one of their informers that the accused- for P400.00 and gave away the other,
appellant was on board a vessel bound for although the watches belonged not to him
Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full
He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on name he said did not even know. 18 The
this tip, they waited for him in the evening trial court also rejected his allegations of
of June 25, 1984, and approached him as maltreatment, observing that he had not
he descended from the gangplank after sufficiently proved the injuries sustained
the informer had pointed to him. 9 They by him. 19
detained him and inspected the bag he
was carrying. It was found to contain
three kilos of what were later analyzed as There is no justification to reverse these
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic factual findings, considering that it was
examiner, 10 who testified that she the trial judge who had immediate access
conducted microscopic, chemical and to the testimony of the witnesses and had
chromatographic tests on them. On the the opportunity to weigh their credibility
on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as
of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal follows:
the truth or expose the lie, are not
described in the impersonal record. But
the trial judge sees all of this, discovering Q You mentioned an intelligence report,
for himself the truant fact amidst the you mean with respect to the coming of
falsities. Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

The only exception we may make in this A Yes, sir.


case is the trial court's conclusion that the
accused-appellant was not really beaten
up because he did not complain about it Q When did you receive this intelligence
later nor did he submit to a medical report?
examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never
had that opportunity as he was at that time A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it
under detention by the PC authorities and was supported by reliable sources.
in fact has never been set free since he
was arrested in 1984 and up to the
present. No bail has been allowed for his Q Were you informed of the coming of
release. the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking
of marijuana leaves on that date?

There is one point that deserves closer


examination, however, and it is A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984
Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested when we received this information from
and searched without warrant, making the that particular informer, prior to June 25,
marijuana allegedly found in his 1984 we have already reports of the
possession inadmissible in evidence particular operation which was being
against him under the Bill of Rights. The participated by Idel Aminnudin.
decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General
dismissed this after an all-too-short Q You said you received an intelligence
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin report two days before June 25, 1984 with
was valid because it came under Rule respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search
also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
A Yes, sir.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted


Q Did you receive any other report aside
by the PC officers who testified for the
from this intelligence report?
prosecution, that they had no warrant
when they arrested Aminnudin and seized
the bag he was carrying. Their only
A Well, I have received also other reports
justification was the tip they had earlier
but not pertaining to the coming of
received from a reliable and regular
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal
informer who reported to them that
gambling operation.
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat
with marijuana. Their testimony varies as
to the time they received the tip, one
COURT:
saying it was two days before the arrest,
20 another two weeks 21 and a third
"weeks before June 25." 22 On this
matter, we may prefer the declaration of Q Previous to that particular information
which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report
regarding the activities of Idel
A Yes, sir.
Aminnudin

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984


A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received
you did not know that minnudin was
reports on the activities of Idel
coming?
Aminnudin.

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity,


Q What were those activities?
did not know that he was coming but on
June 23, 1984 that was the time when I
received the information that he was
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling
Q From whom did you get that and shipping marijuana stuff.
information?

COURT:
A It came to my hand which was written
in a required sheet of information, maybe
for security reason and we cannot Identify
Q And as a result of that report, you put
the person.
him under surveillance?

Q But you received it from your regular


A Yes, sir.
informer?

Q In the intelligence report, only the


A Yes, sir.
name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

ATTY. LLARIZA:
A Yes, sir.

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were


Q Are you sure of that?
more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the
woman.
A Marijuana, sir.

Q So that even before you received the


Q And this information respecting Idel
official report on June 23, 1984, you had
Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
already gathered information to the effect
marijuana was received by you many
that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo
days before you received the intelligence
on June 25, 1984?
report in writing?

A Only on the 23rd of June.


A Not a report of the particular coming of
Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You did not try to secure a search
warrant for the seizure or search of the
Q You only knew that he was coming on
June 25,1984 two days before?
subject mentioned in your intelligence under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
report? Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
A No, more. example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless
searches and seizures for violation of the
Q Why not? customs law because these vehicles may
be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be
A Because we were very very sure that secured.
our operation will yield positive result.

The present case presented no such


Q Is that your procedure that whenever it urgency. From the conflicting
will yield positive result you do not need declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
a search warrant anymore? clear that they had at least two days
within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23 who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its
That last answer is a cavalier arrival was certain. And from the
pronouncement, especially as it comes information they had received, they could
from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The have persuaded a judge that there was
Supreme Court cannot countenance such probable cause, indeed, to justify the
a statement. This is still a government of issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
laws and not of men. nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was
ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a "search warrant was
not necessary."
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches
In the many cases where this Court has
and seizures of whatever nature and for
sustained the warrantless arrest of
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
has always been shown that they were
issue except upon probable cause to be
caught red-handed, as a result of what are
determined personally by the judge after
popularly called "buy-bust" operations of
examination under oath or affirmation of
the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was
the complainant and the witnesses he may
clearly applicable because at the precise
produce, and particularly describing the
time of arrest the accused was in the act
place to be searched and the persons or
of selling the prohibited drug.
things to be seized.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant


In the case at bar, there was no warrant of
was not, at the moment of his arrest,
arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
committing a crime nor was it shown that
after personal determination by him of the
he was about to do so or that he had just
existence of probable cause. Contrary to
done so. What he was doing was
the averments of the government, the
descending the gangplank of the M/V
accused-appellant was not caught in
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
flagrante nor was a crime about to be
indication that called for his arrest. To all
committed or had just been committed to
appearances, he was like any of the other
justify the warrantless arrest allowed
passengers innocently disembarking from addiction and commends the efforts of
the vessel. It was only when the informer our law-enforcement officers against
pointed to him as the carrier of the those who would inflict this malediction
marijuana that he suddenly became upon our people, especially the
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It susceptible youth. But as demanding as
was the furtive finger that triggered his this campaign may be, it cannot be more
arrest. The Identification by the informer so than the compulsions of the Bill of
was the probable cause as determined by Rights for the protection of the liberty of
the officers (and not a judge) that every individual in the realm, including
authorized them to pounce upon the basest of criminals. The Constitution
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. covers with the mantle of its protection
the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high- handedness from the
Now that we have succeeded in restoring authorities, however praiseworthy their
democracy in our country after fourteen intentions.
years of the despised dictatorship, when
any one could be picked up at will,
detained without charges and punished Those who are supposed to enforce the
without trial, we will have only ourselves law are not justified in disregarding the
to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is rights of the individual in the name of
allowed to return, to once more flaunt its order. Order is too high a price for the loss
disdain of the Constitution and the of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said,
individual liberties its Bill of Rights "I think it a less evil that some criminals
guarantees. should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply
not allowed in the free society to violate a
While this is not to say that the accused- law to enforce another, especially if the
appellant is innocent, for indeed his very law violated is the Constitution itself.
own words suggest that he is lying, that
fact alone does not justify a finding that
he is guilty. The constitutional We find that with the exclusion of the
presumption is that he is innocent, and he illegally seized marijuana as evidence
will be so declared even if his defense is against the accused-appellant, his guilt
weak as long as the prosecution is not has not been proved beyond reasonable
strong enough to convict him. doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.
Without the evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the
case of the prosecution must fall. That ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the
evidence cannot be admitted, and should trial court is REVERSED and the
never have been considered by the trial accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is
court for the simple fact is that the so ordered.
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ.,
not an incident of a lawful arrest because concur.
there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the 5. Posadas v CA
exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. G.R. No. 89139 August 2, 1990
Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby
was inadmissible. ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA,
petitioner,

The Court strongly supports the vs.


campaign of the government against drug
THE HONORABLE COURT OF ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court
APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
PHILIPPINES, respondents. guilty and trial on the merits a decision
was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged as
Rudy G. Agravate for petitioner. follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the


foregoing, this Court , finds the accused
GANCAYCO, J.: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.

The validity of a warrantless search on


the person of petitioner is put into issue in It appearing that the accuse d was below
this case. eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense (Art. 68, par.
2), he is hereby sentenced to an
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN
o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years,
the Integrated National Police (INP) of FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of
the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs.
the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While The firearm, ammunitions and smoke
they were within the premises of the Rizal grenade are forfeited in favor of the
Memorial Colleges they spotted government and the Branch Clerk of
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they Court is hereby directed to turn over said
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom,
Davao City. 5

They approached the petitioner and


identified themselves as members of the Not satisfied therewith the petitioner
INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his interposed an appeal to the Court of
attempt to get away was thwarted by the Appeals wherein in due course a decision
two notwithstanding his resistance. was rendered on February 23, 1989
affirming in toto the appealed decision
with costs against the petitioner. 6
They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found one (1)
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver Hence, the herein petition for review, the
with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds main thrust of which is that there being no
of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 lawful arrest or search and seizure, the
a smoke (tear gas) grenade,3 and two (2) items which were confiscated from the
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 possession of the petitioner are
They brought the petitioner to the police inadmissible in evidence against him.
station for further investigation. In the
course of the same, the petitioner was
asked to show the necessary license or
The Solicitor General, in justifying the
authority to possess firearms and
warrantless search of the buri bag then
ammunitions found in his possession but
carried by the petitioner, argues that
he failed to do so. He was then taken to
under Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules
the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
of Court a person lawfully arrested may
prohibited articles recovered from him
be searched for dangerous weapons or
were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer
anything used as proof of a commission
then on duty. He was prosecuted for
of an offense without a search warrant. It
illegal possession of firearms and
is further alleged that the arrest without a The Solicitor General argues that when
warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the two policemen approached the
the circumstances. petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on in the presence of the police officers and
Criminal Procedure provides as follows: consequently the search and seizure of the
contraband was incidental to the lawful
arrest in accordance with Section 12,
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
lawful — A peace officer or a private Procedure. We disagree.
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
At the time the peace officers in this case
identified themselves and apprehended
(a) When in his presence, the person to be the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
arrested has committed is actually did not know that he had committed, or
committing, or is attempting to commit was actually committing the offense of
an offense; illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he
was hiding something in the buri bag.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been They did now know what its contents
committed, and he has personal were. The said circumstances did not
knowledge of facts indicating that the justify an arrest without a warrant.
person to be arrested has committed it;
and
However, there are many instances where
a warrant and seizure can be effected
(c) When the person to be arrested is a without necessarily being preceded by an
prisoner who has escaped from a penal arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
establishment or place where he is search" without a search warrant at
serving final judgment or temporarily military or police checkpoints, the
confined while his case is pending, or has constitutionality or validity of which has
escaped while being transferred from one been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs.
confinement to another. de Villa, 7 as follows:

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a to the effect that he had been stopped and
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the searched without a search warrant by the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall military manning the checkpoints,
be proceeded against in accordance with without more, i.e., without stating the
Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a) details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his light against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to
From the foregoing provision of law it is enable the Court to determine whether
clear that an arrest without a warrant may there was a violation of Valmonte's right
be effected by a peace officer or private against unlawful search and seizure. Not
person, among others, when in his all searches and seizures are prohibited.
presence the person to be arrested has Those which are reasonable are not
committed, is actually committing, or is forbidden. A reasonable search is not to
attempting to commit an offense; or when be determined by any fixed formula but is
an offense has in fact just been to be resolved according to the facts of
committed, and he has personal each case.
knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
Where, for example, the officer merely police checkpoints and the search thereat
draws aside the curtain of a vacant in the case at bar, there is no question that,
vehicle which is parked on the public fair indeed, the latter is more reasonable
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or considering that unlike in the former, it
flashes a light therein, these do not was effected on the basis of a probable
constitute unreasonable search. cause. The probable cause is that when
the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there
The setting up of the questioned was a probable cause that he was
checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably concealing something illegal in the bag
in other areas) may be considered as a and it was the right and duty of the police
security measure to enable the NCRDC to officers to inspect the same.
pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the It is too much indeed to require the police
benefit of the public. Checkpoints may officers to search the bag in the
also be regarded as measures to thwart possession of the petitioner only after
plots to destabilize the government in the they shall have obtained a search warrant
interest of public security. In this for the purpose. Such an exercise may
connection, the Court may take judicial prove to be useless, futile and much too
notice of the shift to urban centers and late.
their suburbs of the insurgency
movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court
military men by NPA "sparrow units," not held as follows:
to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban . . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is
centers, not all of which are reported in indispensably necessary, the mechanics
media, most likely brought about by prescribed by the Constitution and
deteriorating economic conditions — reiterated in the Rules of Court must be
which all sum up to what one can rightly followed and satisfied. But We need not
consider, at the very least, as abnormal argue that there are exceptions. Thus in
times. Between the inherent right of the the extraordinary events where warrant is
state to protect its existence and promote not necessary to effect a valid search or
public welfare and an individual's right seizure, or when the latter cannot be
against a warrantless search which is performed except without warrant, what
however reasonably conducted, the constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
former should prevail. search or seizure becomes purely a
judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances
True, the manning of checkpoints by the involved, including the purpose of the
military is susceptible of abuse by the search or seizure, the presence or absence
men in uniform in the same manner that of probable cause, the manner in which
all governmental power is susceptible of the search and seizure was made, the
abuse. But, at the cost of occasional place or thing searched and the character
inconvenience, discomfort and even of the articles procured.
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are The Court reproduces with approval the
part of the price we pay for an orderly following disquisition of the Solicitor
society and a peaceful community. General:
(Emphasis supplied).

The assailed search and seizure may still


Thus, as between a warrantless search be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk"
and seizure conducted at military or situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
individual or to maintain the status quo plaintiff-appellee,
momentarily while the police officer
vs.
seeks to obtain more information. This is
illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men accused-appellant.
repeatedly walked past a store window
and returned to a spot where they
apparently conferred with a third man.
This aroused the suspicion of a police
officer. To the experienced officer, the CRUZ, J.:
behaviour of the men indicated that they
were sizing up the store for an armed
robbery. When the police officer Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was
approached the men and asked them for convicted of illegal possession of
their names, they mumbled a reply. firearms on the strength mainly of the
Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of stolen pistol found on his person at the
them, spun him around and frisked him. moment of his warrantless arrest. In this
Finding a concealed weapon in one, he appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not
did the same to the other two and found admissible as evidence against him
another weapon. In the prosecution for because it had been illegally seized and
the offense of carrying a concealed was therefore the fruit of the poisonous
weapon, the defense of illegal search and tree. The Government disagrees. It insists
seizure was put up. The United States that the revolver was validly received in
Supreme Court held that "a police officer evidence by the trial judge because its
may in appropriate circumstances and in seizure was incidental to an arrest that
an appropriate manner approach a person was doubtless lawful even if admittedly
for the purpose of investigating possible without warrant.
criminal behaviour even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest." In
such a situation, it is reasonable for an The incident occurred shortly before
officer rather than simply to shrug his noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to Police District received a telephone call
stop a suspicious individual briefly in from an informer that there were three
order to determine his identity or suspicious-looking persons at the corner
maintain the status quo while obtaining of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
more information. . . . Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith
dispatched to the place. As later narrated
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando
be sustained under the exceptions Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there
heretofore discussed, and hence, the saw two men "looking from side to side,"
constitutional guarantee against one of whom was holding his abdomen.
unreasonable searches and seizures has They approached these persons and
not been violated. 9 identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but
were unable to escape because the other
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED lawmen had surrounded them. The
with costs against petitioner. suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused-
appellant, was found with a .38 caliber
SO ORDERED. Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber. His companion,
6. People v Mengote later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had
a fan knife secreted in his front right pants
G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992
pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then
turned over to police headquarters for
investigation by the Intelligence of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to
Division. reclusion
perpetua. 4
On August 11, 1987, the following
information was filed against the
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief
accused-appellant before the Regional
that the revolver should not have been
Trial Court of Manila:
admitted in evidence because of its illegal
seizure. no warrant therefor having been
previously obtained. Neither could it have
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO
been seized as an incident of a lawful
MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of
arrest because the arrest of Mengote was
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed
itself unlawful, having been also effected
as follows:
without a warrant. The defense also
contends that the testimony regarding the
alleged robbery in Danganan's house was
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the irrelevant and should also have been
City of Manila, Philippines, the said disregarded by the trial court.
accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and
The following are the pertinent provision
control a firearm, to wit:
of the Bill of Rights:

one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing


Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
Serial No. 8720-T secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
without first having secured the necessary any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
license or permit therefor from the proper search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
authorities. issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
Besides the police officers, one other the complainant and the witnesses he may
witness presented by the prosecution was produce, and particularly describing the
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the place to be searched and the persons or
subject weapon as among the articles things to be seized.
stolen from him during the robbery in his
house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He
pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication
He had duly reported the robbery to the and correspondence shall be inviolable
police, indicating the articles stolen from except upon lawful order of the court, or
him, including the revolver. 2 For his when public safety or order requires
part, Mengote made no effort to prove otherwise as prescribed by law.
that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it and claimed instead
that the weapon had been "Planted" on (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
him at the time of his arrest. 3 this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The gun, together with the live bullets and
its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B,
and C and admitted over the objection of There is no question that evidence
the defense. As previously stated, the obtained as a result of an illegal search or
weapon was the principal evidence that seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding
led to Mengote's conviction for violation for any purpose. That is the absolute
prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of
the Constitution. This is the celebrated Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously
exclusionary rule based on the inapplicable as Mengote was not an
justification given by Judge Learned escapee from a penal institution when he
Hand that "only in case the prosecution, was arrested. We therefore confine
which itself controls the seizing officials, ourselves to determining the lawfulness
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par.
will the wrong be repressed." The (b) of this section.
Solicitor General, while conceding the
rule, maintains that it is not applicable in
the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest Par. (a) requires that the person be
and search of Mengote and the seizure of arrested (1) after he has committed or
the revolver from him were lawful under while he is actually committing or is at
Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court least attempting to commit an offense, (2)
reading as follows: in the presence of the arresting officer.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when These requirements have not been
lawful. — A peace officer or private established in the case at bar. At the time
person may, without a warrant, arrest a of the arrest in question, the accused-
person; appellant was merely "looking from side
to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers
(a) When, in his presence, the person to themselves. There was apparently no
be arrested has committed, is actually offense that had just been committed or
committing, or is attempting to commit was being actually committed or at least
an offense; being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been


committed, and he has personal The Solicitor General submits that the
knowledge of facts indicating that the actual existence of an offense was not
person to be arrested has committed it; necessary as long as Mengote's acts
and "created a reasonable suspicion on the
part of the arresting officers and induced
in them the belief that an offense had been
(c) When the person to be arrested is a committed and that the accused-appellant
prisoner who has escaped from a penal had committed it." The question is, What
establishment or place where he is offense? What offense could possibly
serving final judgment or temporarily have been suggested by a person "looking
confined while his case is pending, or has from side to side" and "holding his
escaped while being transferred from one abdomen" and in a place not exactly
confinement to another. forsaken?

In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and These are certainly not sinister acts. And
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a the setting of the arrest made them less so,
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the if at all. It might have been different if
nearest police station or jail, and he shall Mengote bad been apprehended at an
be proceeded against in accordance with ungodly hour and in a place where he had
Rule 112, Section 7. no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3
o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
We have carefully examined the wording crowded street shortly after alighting
of this Rule and cannot see how we can from a passenger jeep with I his
agree with the prosecution. companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of
day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour This case is similar to People v.
in the blaze of the noonday sun. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that
the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while
On the other hand, there could have been be was coming down a vessel, to all
a number of reasons, all of them innocent, appearances no less innocent than the
why his eyes were darting from side to other disembarking passengers. He had
side and be was holding his abdomen. If not committed nor was be actually
they excited suspicion in the minds of the committing or attempting to commit an
arresting officers, as the prosecution offense in the presence of the arresting
suggests, it has nevertheless not been officers. He was not even acting
shown what their suspicion was all about. suspiciously. In short, there was no
In fact, the policemen themselves probable cause that, as the prosecution
testified that they were dispatched to that incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the
place only because of the telephone call constitutional requirement of a warrant.
from the informer that there were
"suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a Par. (b) is no less applicable because its
robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The no less stringent requirements have also
caller did not explain why he thought the not been satisfied. The prosecution has
men looked suspicious nor did he not shown that at the time of Mengote's
elaborate on the impending crime. arrest an offense had in fact just been
committed and that the arresting officers
had personal knowledge of facts
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, indicating that Mengote had committed it.
5 the Court sustained the warrantless All they had was hearsay information
arrest of the accused because there was a from the telephone caller, and about a
bulge in his waist that excited the crime that had yet to be committed.
suspicion of the arresting officer and,
upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, The truth is that they did not know then
6 the accused boarded a bus and placed what offense, if at all, had been
the buri bag she was carrying behind the committed and neither were they aware of
seat of the arresting officer while she the participation therein of the accused-
herself sat in the seat before him. His appellant. It was only later, after
suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously Danganan had appeared at the Police
examined the bag, which he found to headquarters, that they learned of the
contain marijuana. He then and there robbery in his house and of Mengote's
made the warrantless arrest and seizure supposed involvement therein. 8 As for
that we subsequently upheld on the the illegal possession of the firearm found
ground that probable cause had been on Mengote's person, the policemen
sufficiently established. discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted
later revealed that he was not its owners
The case before us is different because nor was he licensed to possess it.
there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
darting eyes and his hand on his Before these events, the Peace officers
abdomen. By no stretch of the had no knowledge even of Mengote'
imagination could it have been inferred identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion)
from these acts that an offense had just that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm
been committed, or was actually being or that he was involved in the robbery of
committed, or was at least being Danganan's house.
attempted in their presence.

In the landmark case of People v. Burgos,


9 this Court declared:
actually committing or attempting it. This
simply cannot be done in a free society.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the
This is not a police state where order is
officer arresting a person who has just
exalted over liberty or, worse, personal
committed, is committing, or is about to
malice on the part of the arresting officer
commit an offense must have personal
may be justified in the name of security.
knowledge of the fact. The offense must
also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police,
There is no need to discuss the other
80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
issues raised by the accused-appellant as
the ruling we here make is sufficient to
sustain his exoneration. Without the
xxx xxx xxx
evidence of the firearm taken from him at
the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important
In arrests without a warrant under Section exhibit and must therefore fail. The
6(b), however, it is not enough that there testimonial evidence against Mengote
is reasonable ground to believe that the (which is based on the said firearm) is not
person to be arrested has committed a sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
crime. A crime must in fact or actually reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to
have been committed first. That a crime him.
has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon
committed. The fact of the commission of
for her able and spirited defense of the
the offense must be undisputed. The test
accused-appellant not only in the brief but
of reasonable ground applies only to the
also in the reply brief, which she did not
identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis
have to file but did so just the same to
supplied)
stress the constitutional rights of her
client. The fact that she was acting only
as a counsel de oficio with no expectation
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. of material reward makes her
Castro, 10 thus: representation even more commendable.

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, The Court feels that if the peace officers
Section 5, of the Rules of Court in had been more mindful of the provisions
connection with a crime about to be of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of
committed, being committed, or just the accused-appellant might have
committed, what was that crime? There is succeeded. As it happened, they allowed
no allegation in the record of such a their over-zealousness to get the better of
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be them, resulting in their disregard of the
observed that under the Revised Rule requirements of a valid search and seizure
113, Section 5(b), the officer making the that rendered inadmissible the vital
arrest must have personal knowledge of evidence they had invalidly seized.
the ground therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People v. Burgos.
(Emphasis supplied)
This should be a lesson to other peace
officers. Their impulsiveness may be the
very cause of the acquittal of persons who
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any deserve to be convicted, escaping the
person could be summarily arrested and clutches of the law because, ironically
searched just because he is holding his enough, it has not been observed by those
abdomen, even if it be possibly because who are supposed to enforce it.
of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer
could clamp handcuffs on any person
with a shifty look on suspicion that he
may have committed a criminal act or is
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant
accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on
ordered released immediately unless he is
May 15, 1992. 5 After trial on the merits,
validly detained for other offenses. No
judgment was rendered by the court
costs.
below on October 8, 1992 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, attended by the
SO ORDERED.
aggravating circumstance of nighttime,
7. People v Marra and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He was further
G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994 ordered to pay the heirs of Nelson Tandoc
the sums of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
plaintiff-appellee, and the costs. 6
vs.
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy
ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan Yao," Din, positively identified appellant as the
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM triggerman in the killing of Nelson
DOE, accused. Tandoc. Din recounted that at around
2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, with each other in front of Lucky Hotel
accused-appellant. located at M.H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan
City, which was owned by the witness'
father and of which he was the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- administrator. He noticed a man pass by
appellee. on the opposite side of the street. The man
made a dirty sign with his finger and Din
informed Tandoc thereof. The man
repeated his offensive act and called them
Public Attorney's Office for accused-
by waving his hands. Infuriated, they
appellant.
followed the man until the latter stopped
in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the
corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets.
They demanded an explanation from the
REGALADO, J.: man but they were not given any. 7

In an information filed before the At that instant, two men arrived and one
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of them inquired what was going on.
Dagupan City, Samuel Marra y Zarate, Tandoc informed him that they were just
John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom demanding an explanation from the man.
Doe were charged with the crime of Din was surprised when Tandoc
murder for the fatal shooting of one unexpectedly slapped one of the two men.
Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 1 On A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing
June 4, 1992, an amended information with the two men while Din exchanged
was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan blows with the man who made the dirty
Yao," was indicated as an accused instead finger sign. After the fisticuffs, their three
of John Doe. 2 A warrant of arrest was opponents ran away in a westward
thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but direction. 8
the same was returned unserved, 4 hence
trial proceeded with regard to herein
accused-appellant Samuel Marra alone. Tandoc and Din then decided to walk
back to the hotel. When they were about
to enter the place, they noticed that the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the
men with whom they just had a fight were guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together
running towards them. Sensing danger, with some companions, chasing two
they ran inside the annex building of the persons running towards M. H. del Pilar
hotel and immediately secured the lock of Street. He further added that the man was
the sliding outer door. They entered a wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's
room and waited until they felt that the uniform. Asked where that particular
situation had normalized. After ten to guard might be, he pointed to a man
fifteen minutes, thinking that the men eating inside the eatery nearby. The man
were no longer in the vicinity, they left eating was not in a security guard's
the room. Having decided to go home, uniform. 12
Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a
sudden, Din saw Appellant, who at that
time was wearing a security guard's They approached the man and inquired
uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. whether he was the security guard of
There was a fluorescent bulb installed at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," which the latter
the front of the hotel which enabled Din answered in the affirmative. After a series
to identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot of questions, they learned that he was
in the middle of the chest and he fell Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was
down. Then, Din saw four to five men from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00
scamper away from the scene. 9 A.M. the following day, that he was still
on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of
March 7, 1992, and that the firearm
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, issued to him was in his house. Upon their
"Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase request to see the firearm, they proceeded
appellant and his companions but he to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva
failed to catch up with them. Din and his Street. 13
wife then brought Tandoc to the Villaflor
Hospital. The victim was taken to the
emergency room but he expired an hour When they arrived, Marra took a .38
later. 10 caliber revolver from inside an aparador
and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also
found five live bullets and one spent shell.
At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of
SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he
City Police Station received a report last fired the gun but the latter denied ever
about a shooting incident at the annex having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked
building of the Lucky Hotel. He him point-blank why he shot Tandoc.
proceeded to the crime scene along with Marra at first denied the accusation but
SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio when informed that someone saw him do
Flores and SPO3 Noli de Castro. Upon it, he said that he did so in self-defense,
their arrival about five minutes later, they firing at the victim only once. Tandoc
were informed by the wife of Jimmy Din allegedly had a samurai sword with him
that the victim had been brought to the at the time of the incident. However,
Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the persistent efforts on the part of the
hospital where Din informed them that he policemen to thereafter locate said bladed
could recognize the man who killed weapon proved futile. Marra also
Tandoc and that the killer was, at that admitted that prior to the incident, he
time, wearing the polo shirt of a security chased the victim and Din. The officers
guard's uniform. 11 then took Marra to the police station
where he was detained. 14

They decided to proceed to an eatery


called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor
security guard of a nearby bus company, Hospital from where he fetched Din and
they inquired from him if he knew of any brought him to the police station. There,
unusual incident that happened in the Din definitely identified Marra as the
assailant. During the investigation, De Under cross-examination, he insisted that
Vera also found out that Marra had not when he handed the gun to the policeman,
firearm license. 15 there were five live bullets, and not four
live bullets and one empty shell as
claimed by the prosecution. Prior to the
Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor
Health Officer of Dagupan City, testified does he know of any cause why Din
that he conducted an autopsy on a certain would harbor any ill feelings against him.
Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot 19
wound on the victim with the point of
entry of the left side of the anterior chest
wall and the point of exit at the lower left After a careful scrutiny of the records and
portion of the right shoulder. 16 an objective evaluation of the evidence,
the Court is not disposed to reverse the
judgment of the lower court, the decision
Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the latter being amply supported by the
of the victim, testified on the funeral, established facts and fully sustained by
burial and other expenses incurred by the the applicable law.
family. He declared that they paid
Funeraria Quiogue P25,000.00 for its
services; Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 In assailing the decision of the court
for the confinement of Tandoc; St. John below, the defense argues that "Jimmy
Memorial Cathedral, P350.00; Eternal Din . . . was not able to identify the
Garden, P3,000.00 for the interment fee assailant in a definite and believable
and P150.00 for the rent of the tent during manner." It goes on to state further that "
the burial; and that they spent P2,300.00 Jimmy Din was inside the hotel when
for the video tape expenses and Nelson Tandoc was shot and his vision
P11,800.00 for food and drinks during the was o(b)structed by the door. Jimmy Din
wake. 17 was also not familiar with the accused.
Under the circumstances by which he
allegedly witnessed the shooting, how
Understandably, appellant gave a could be identify clearly an assailant at
different version of the incident. Marra the distance of 45 meters?" 20
declared in court that he used to work as
a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw"
from seven o'clock in the evening to six Appellant's counsel is only partly correct,
o'clock in the morning of the following having conveniently failed to mention
day. On March 6, 1992, he reported for other vital parts of Din's testimony. An
duty at seven o'clock that evening as was impartial review of said testimony readily
his usual practice. At around four o'clock reveals that Din was indeed in a position
down of the following day, he went home to know the identity of the assailant.
to change his clothes. He proceeded to the Firstly, Din knew for a fact that the
Five Star Bus Terminal which was persons he and Tandoc fought with near
adjacent to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He saw the Dunkin' Donuts store were the same
Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and men who chased them while they were on
together they ordered arroz caldo. Later, their way back to the hotel because he
at about 5:00 A.M., he was approached by was able to take a good look at them.
four policemen who inquired if he was a During the chase, he naturally turned
security guard. He answered in the around to look at the men who were
affirmative. He was also asked about his running after them and who were at that
sidearm. When he answered that it was at time in front of the Balingit Trading store
his residence, they all went to his house which was well-lighted. 21 It logically
to look for it. After he handed over the follows that they were the same persons
firearm to the policemen, he was brought who were waiting for them when they
to the city hall where he was detained. 18 later came out of the hotel, and he was
familiar with their identities because of
their previous encounter.
when confronted with the fact that
somebody saw him do it, Marra admitted
Secondly, we do not agree with appellant
the act although he alleged it was done in
that the door blocked the view of Din.
self-defense. This testimony of De Vera
Said door, partly made of plywood, had a
as to the confession of Marra is of
spring hinge which makes it possible for
significant weight, but the admissibility
the door to close by itself. However, at
thereof shall also be passed upon.
that time the spring hinge had been
weakened by long and constant use such
that it would take some time for it to close
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987
the door, thereby allowing Din sufficient
Constitution provides that "(a)ny person
opportunity to have an unobstructed view
under investigation for the commission of
of the scene outside. 22
an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent
Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim
counsel preferably of his own choice. . . .
and appellant, which proximity, enabled
." The critical inquiry then is whether or
him to clearly see what really happened.
not Marra was under custodial
He thus readily perceived the actual
investigation when he admitted the
shooting at the time when Tandoc pushed
killing but invoked self-defense. We
the door open. At that precise moment,
believe that he was not so situated.
Din was at the left side of Tandoc and
about four to five meters away from the
assailant. 23
Custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated
custody or otherwise deprived of his
by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb installed on
freedom of action in any significant way.
the outside wall in front of the hotel.
It is only after the investigation ceases to
Marra was only about three meters away
be a general inquiry into an unsolved
therefrom. Such physical conditions
crime and begins to focus on a particular
would undeniably afford a clear view
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody,
from inside the hotel of the immediate
and the police carries out a process of
area outside and in front of the same
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
where the incident took place.
incriminating statements that the rule
begins to operate. 24

The prosecution presented another vital


witness in the person of Sgt. Reynaldo de
In the case at bar, appellant was not under
Vera, whose testimony we shall repeat
custodial investigation when he made the
here for easy reference. In capsulized
admission. There was no coercion
form, De Vera narrated the sequence of
whatsoever to compel him to make such
events that happened after he and his
a statement. Indeed, he could have
companions went to the crime scene to
refused to answer questions from the very
conduct an investigation. Having
start when the policemen requested that
received information that a man in a
they all go to his residence. The police
security guard's uniform was involved in
inquiry had not yet reached a level
the incident, they sought information
wherein they considered him as a
from a security guard of a nearby bus
particular suspect. They were just probing
terminal. Said security guard pointed
into a number of possibilities, having
them to Marra, who at that time was
been merely informed that the suspect
eating in a carinderia nearby. Informed by
was wearing what could be a security
Marra that his gun was at his residence,
guard's uniform. As we held in People vs.
they all went to Marra's residence to get
Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to
the same. After receiving said firearm, De
Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement
Vera asked appellant why he killed
not elicited through questioning, but
Tandoc but Marra initially denied any
given in an ordinary manner. No written
participation in the killing. Nevertheless,
confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial
In any event, even without his admission,
investigation. 26 The trial Court,
the case against appellant has been duly
therefore, cannot be held to have erred in
established by the other evidence of the
holding that compliance with the
prosecution, as earlier discussed.
constitutional procedure on custodial
However, persistently arguing for an
investigation is not applicable in the
acquittal, the defense points out that when
instant case, . . . ."
the police officers saw Marra, he was not
in a blue uniform whereas Din testified
that the person who shot Tandoc was
Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de
wearing the polo shirt of a security
Vera assumes a dominant dimension
guard's uniform. This is a puerile
because it totally destroys the defense of
argument since appellant himself
denial cum alibi subsequently raised by
removed any lingering doubts on this
appellant. In his answers to Sgt. De Vera,
point. He said that on ending his tour of
appellant expressly admitted that he shot
duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7, 1992, he
Tandoc, albeit with an exculpatory
decided to go home to change clothes,
explanation. This admission of Marra is
after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-
in complete contrast to the statements he
Ihaw" to eat. This explains why, at the
later made in open court.
time the police officers saw him, he was
already in civilian clothes. The shooting
had taken place earlier at around 2:00
In addition, the law provides that the A.M. At that time, Marra was still in his
declaration of an accused acknowledging security guard's uniform, being then on
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any duty.
offense necessarily included therein may
be given in evidence against him and, in
certain circumstances, this admission
However, while we agree that the crime
may be considered as part of the res
committed by appellant was murder
gestae. In a similar situation involved in
qualified by treachery, we reject the
the aforecited case of People vs. Dy, this
finding that the same was aggravated by
Court held:
nighttime. No evidence was presented by
the prosecution to show that nocturnity
was specially sought by appellant or
. . . the oral confession made by the taken advantage of by him to facilitate the
accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a commission of the crime or to ensure his
tourist" and that the gun he had used in immunity from capture. 27 At any rate,
shooting the victim was in his bar which whether or not such aggravating
he wanted surrendered to the Chief of circumstance should be appreciated, the
Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) penalty to be imposed on appellant would
is competent evidence against him. The not be affected considering the
declaration of an accused acknowledging proscription against the imposition of the
his guilt of the offense charged may be death penalty at the time when the offense
given in evidence against him (Sec. 29 in the instant case was committed.
[now Sec. 33], Rule 130). It may in a
sense be also regarded as part of the res
gestae. The rule is that, any person,
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court
otherwise competent as a witness, who
a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel
heard the confession, is competent to
Marra y Zarate guilty of the crime of
testify as to the substance of what he
murder and imposing upon him the
heard if he heard and understood all of it.
penalty and civil liabilities therein stated
An oral confession need not be repeated
is hereby AFFIRMED.
verbatim, but in such a case it must be
given in substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited
in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871,
SO ORDERED.
May 25, 1985, 129 SCRA 431). (Italics
supplied.) 8. People v Sapla
[ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 ] unreasonable searches and seizures. In
simple terms, the Constitution does not
allow the end to justify the means.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Otherwise, in eradicating one societal
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY disease, a deadlier and more sinister one
SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC is cultivated - the trampling of the
SALIBAD Y MALLARI, ACCUSED- people's fundamental, inalienable rights.
APPELLANT. The State's steadfastness in eliminating
the drug menace must be equally matched
by its determination to uphold and defend
DECISION the Constitution. This Court will not sit
idly by and allow the Constitution to be
added to the mounting body count in the
CAGUIOA, J: State's war on illegal drugs.

Can the police conduct a warrantless The Case


int1usive search of a vehicle on the sole
basis of an unverified tip relayed by an
anonymous informant? On this question, Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the
jurisprudence has vacillated over the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero
years. The Court definitively settles the a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari (accused-
issue once and for all. appellant Sapla), assailing the Decision3
dated April 24, 2018 (assailed Decision)
of the Court of Appeals (CA)4 in CA-
In threshing out this issue, it must be G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed
remembered that in criminal the Judgment5 dated January 9, 2017 of
prosecutions, including prosecutions for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabuk
violations of the law on dangerous drugs, City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-
our constitutional order does not adopt a 2014-C entitled People of the Philippines
stance of neutrality - the law is heavily in v. Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric
favor of the accused. By constitutional Salibad y Mallari, finding accused-
design, the accused is afforded the appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable
presumption of innocence1 - it is for the doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of
State to prove the guilt of the accused. Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6
Without the State discharging this otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
burden, the Court is given no alternative Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," as
but to acquit the accused. amended.

Moreover, if the process of gathering The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings


evidence against the accused is tainted by
a violation of the accused's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, The facts and antecedent proceedings, as
which is a most cherished and protected narrated by the CA in the assailed
right under the Bill of Rights, the Decision, and as culled from the records
evidence procured must be excluded, of the case, are as follows:
inevitably leading to the accused's
acquittal.
In an Information dated 14 January 2014,
the appellant was charged with violation
Therefore, while the Court recognizes the of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
necessity of adopting a decisive stance The accusatory portion of the said
against the scourge of illegal drugs, the Information reads:
eradication of illegal drugs in our society
cannot be achieved by subverting the
people's constitutional right against
"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior
January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Inspector (PSI) Delon Ngoslab
Tabuk City, Kalinga and within the (hereinafter referred to as PSI Ngoslab),
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the deputy company commander of the
said accused, did then and there, RPSB and team leader of the joint
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have checkpoint operation.
in his possession, control and custody
four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves, a
dangerous [drug], with a total net weight The evidence for the Prosecution
of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in established that on 10 January 2014, at
transit through a passenger [jeepney] with around 11:30 in the morning, an officer
Plate No. AYA 270 the said marijuana on duty at the RPSB office received a
without license, permit or authority from phone call from a concerned citizen, who
any appropriate government entity or informed the said office that a certain
agency. male individual [would] be transpiring
marijuana from Kalinga and into the
Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then
CONTRARY TO LAW." relayed the information to their deputy
commander, PSI Ngoslab, who
subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG
The next day, or on 15 January 2014, for a possible joint operation. Thereafter,
[accused-appellant Sapla] was committed as a standard operating procedure in drug
to the Bureau of Jail Management and operations, PO3 Labbutan, an operative
Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with
Kalinga. the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA). Afterwards, the chief of KPPO-
PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar Lingbawan
Upon his arraignment on 29 January (hereinafter referred to as PSI
2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded Lingbawan), briefed his operatives on the
"not guilty" to the crime charged against said information. Later on, the said
him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG arrived
dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution at the RPSB. PSI Ngoslab immediately
and the Defense stipulated their organized a team and as its team leader,
respective legal issues to be resolved by assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing
the court a quo. Also, the Prosecution officer, PO3 Labbutan as the arresting
identified and marked its pieces of officer, while the rest of the police
evidence, while the Defense made no officers would provide security and
proposals nor pre-mark[ed] any exhibits. backup. The said officers then proceeded
to the Talaca detachment.

Trial ensued thereafter.


At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the
RPSB hotline received a text message
The Prosecution presented three (3) which stated that the subject male person
police officers as its witnesses, namely: who [would] transport marijuana [was]
1) Police Officer (PO)2 Jim Mabiasan wearing a collared white shirt with green
(hereinafter referred to as PO2 stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a
Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd blue sack on board a passenger jeepney,
Maneuver Company, Regional Public with plate number AYA 270 bound for
Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a joint
and was the seizing officer; 2) PO3 Lito checkpoint was strategically organized at
Labbutan (hereinafter referred to as PO3 the Talaca command post.
Labbutan), an intelligence operative of
Kalinga Police Provincial Office -
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special The passenger jeepney then arrived at
Operations Task Group (KPPO- around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the
PAIDSOTG) who was tasked as the police officers at the Talaca checkpoint
flagged down the said vehicle and told its Provincial Chief, which requested that a
driver to park on the side of the road. chemistry examination be conducted on
Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan the seized items. The following
approached the jeepney and saw specimens were submitted for initial
[accused-appellant Sapla] seated at the laboratory examination: 1) one (1) blue
rear side of the vehicle. The police sack with label J&N rice, marked
officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A" PNP-
if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1) brick
front of him, which the latter answered in of suspected dried marijuana leaves,
the affirmative. The said officers then which weighed 998.376 grams, marked
requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-1"
open the blue sack. After [accused- PNP-TALACA and signature;" 3) one (1)
appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves,
Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) which weighed 929.735 grams, marked
bricks of suspected dried marijuana "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-2"
leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one (1)
calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves,
arrested [accused-appellant Sapla], which weighed 1,045.629 grams, marked
informed him of the cause of his arrest "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-3"
and his constitutional rights in [the] PNP-TALACA and signature;" 5) one (1)
Ilocano dialect. PO2 Mabiasan further brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves,
searched [accused-appellant Sapla] and which weighed 979.371 grams, marked
found one (I) LG cellular phone unit. "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-4"
Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four PNP-TALACA and signature,"· The said
(4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana initial examination revealed that the
leaves and brought [them] to their office specimens "A-1" to "A-4" with a total net
at the Talaca detachment for proper weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded
markings. positive results for the presence of
marijuana, a dangerous drug. In addition,
Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014
At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took revealed that indeed the said specimens
photographs and conducted an inventory [did] contain marijuana and that the said
of the seized items, one (1) blue sack and report indicated that the "specimen[s]
four (4) bricks of suspected dried submitted are retained in this laboratory
marijuana leaves, wherein the same for future reference."
officer placed his signature on the said
items. Also, the actual conduct of
inventory was witnessed by [accused- Also, further investigation revealed that
appellant Sapla], and by the following: 1) [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal
Joan K. Balneg from the Department of his true identity by using a fictitious name
Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected - Eric Mallari Salibad. However,
barangay official; and 3) Geraldine G. investigators were able to contact
Dumalig, as media representative. [accused-appellant Sapla's] sister, who
Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the duly informed the said investigators that
said [accused-appellant Sapla] at the [accused- appellant Sapla's] real name is
KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Jerry Guerrero Sapla.
Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M.
Duyan for further investigation.
On the other hand, the Defense presented
[accused-appellant Sapla] as its sole
At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan witness.
personally turned over the seized items to
the investigator of the case, PO2
Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the
as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping charges against him and instead, offered
and proper disposition. Also, PSI a different version of the incident. He
Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went
to Tabuk City to visit a certain relative SO ORDERED.8
named Tony Sibal. Two (2) days later,
[accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a
jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant
visit his nephew. Upon reaching Talaca Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.
checkpoint, police officers f1agged down
the said jeepney in order to check its
passenger[s'] baggages and cargoes. The The Ruling of the CA
police of1icers then found marijuana
inside a sack and were looking for a
person who wore fatigue pants at that In the assailed Decision, the CA denied
time. From the three (3) passengers who accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and
wore fatigue pants, the said police affirmed the RTC 's Decision with
officers identified him as the owner of the modifications. The dispositive portion of
marijuana found inside the sack. the assailed Decision reads:
[Accused-appellant Sapla] denied
ownership of the marijuana, and asserted
that he had no baggage at that time. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is
Thereafter, the police officers arrested DENIED. The Decision dated 9 January
[accused-appellant Sapla] and brought 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of
him to the Talaca barracks, wherein the Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case
sack and marijuana bricks were shown to No. 11-2014-C is hereby AFFIRMED
him.7 with MODIFICATIONS in that accused-
appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
The Ruling of the RTC imprisonment and to pay the fine of
P1,000,000.00.

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its


Decision convicting accused-appellant SO ORDERED.9
Sapla for violating Section 5 of R.A.
9165. The RTC found that the
prosecution was able to sufficiently The CA found that although the search
establish the corpus delicti of the crime. and seizure conducted on accused-
The dispositive portion of the Decision appellant Sapla was without a search
reads: warrant, the same was lawful as it was a
valid warrantless search of a moving
vehicle. The CA held that the essential
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the requisite of probable cause was present,
foregoing, this Court finds accused justifying the warrantless search and
JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO, a.k.a. seizure.
ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and suffer the penalty of Hence, the instant appeal.
reclusion perpetua.

The Issue
The accused to pay the fine of Five
Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.
Stripped to its core, the essential issue in
the instant case is whether there was a
The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be valid search and seizure conducted by the
submitted to any authorized police officers. The answer to this critical
representative of the PDEA for proper question determines whether there is
disposition. enough evidence to sustain accused-
appellant Sapla's conviction under
Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The Court's Ruling

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure


The instant appeal is impressed with
operation conducted by the authorities is
merit. The Court finds for accused-
reasonable only when a court issues a
appellant Sapla and immediately orders
search warrant after it has determined the
his release from incarceration.
existence of probable cause through the
personal examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
The Constitutional Right against witnesses presented before the court, with
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized particularly
described.
As eloquently explained by the Court in
People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the Bill of
Rights is the bedrock of constitutional Because of the sacrosanct position
government. If people are stripped naked occupied by the right against
of their rights as human beings, unreasonable searches and seizures in the
democracy cannot survive and hierarchy of rights, any deviation or
government becomes meaningless. This exemption from the aforementioned rule
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained is not favored and is strictly construed
as it is in Article III of the Constitution, against the government.
occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles
on governmental power."11
Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against


There are, however, instances wherein
unreasonable searches and seizures is "at
searches are reasonable even in the
the top of the hierarchy of rights, next
absence of a search warrant, taking into
only to, if not on the same plane as, the
account the "uniqueness of circumstances
right to life, liberty and property, x x x for
involved including the purpose of the
the right to personal security which, along
search or seizure, the presence or absence
with the right to privacy, is the foundation
of probable cause, the manner in which
of the right against unreasonable search
the search and seizure was made, the
and seizure."12
place or thing searched, and the character
of the articles procured."13

The right of the people against


unreasonable searches and seizures is
The known jurisprudential instances of
found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
reasonable warrantless searches and
Constitution, which reads:
seizures are:

Section 2. The right of the people to be


(1) warrantless search incidental to a
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
lawful arrest;
and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of (3) search of a moving vehicle;
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
(4) consented warrantless search;
inasmuch as the facts of the said case are
virtually identical to the instant case.
(5) customs search;

In Comprado, a confidential informant


(6) stop and frisk; and
(CI) sent a text message to the authorities
as regards an alleged courier of marijuana
who had in his possession a backpack
(7) exigent and emergency containing marijuana and would be
circumstances.14 traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de
Oro City. The CI eventually called the
authorities and informed them that the
Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-- alleged drug courier had boarded a bus
Applicability in the Instant Case with body number 2646 and plate number
KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City.
The CI added that the man would be
In upholding the warrantless search and carrying a backpack in black and violet
seizure conducted by the authorities, the colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine."
RTC and CA considered the police With this information, the police officers
operation as a valid warrantless search of put up a checkpoint, just as what the
a moving vehicle. authorities did in the instant case.
Afterwards, upon seeing the bus bearing
the said body and plate numbers
According to jurisprudence, "warrantless approaching the checkpoint, again similar
search and seizure of moving vehicles are to the instant case, the said vehicle was
allowed in recognition of the flagged down. The police officers
impracticability of securing a warrant boarded the bus and saw a man matching
under said circumstances as the vehicle the description given to them by the CI.
can be quickly moved out of the locality The man was seated at the back of the bus
or jurisdiction in which the warrant may with a backpack placed on his lap. The
be sought. Peace officers in such cases, man was asked to open the bag. When the
however, are limited to routine checks accused agreed to do so, the police
where the examination of the vehicle is officers saw a transparent cellophane
limited to visual inspection."15 containing dried marijuana leaves.

On the other hand, an extensive search of In Comprado, the Court held that the
a vehicle is permissible, but only when search conducted "could not be classified
"the officers made it upon probable cause, as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out particular type of search, the vehicle is the
of circumstances known to the seizing target and not a specific person."18 The
officer, that an automobile or other Court added that "in search of a moving
vehicle contains [an] item, article or vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally
object which by law is subject to seizure used as a means to transport illegal items.
and destruction."16 It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a
passenger of that particular bus was
The Court finds error in the CA's holding carrying marijuana such that when the
that the search conducted in the instant police officers boarded the bus, they
case is a search of a moving vehicle. The searched the bag of the person matching
situation presented in the instant case the description given by their informant
cannot be considered as a search of a and not the cargo or contents of the said
moving vehicle. bus."19

The fairly recent case of People v. Applying the foregoing to the instant
Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling case, it cannot be seriously disputed that
the target of the search conducted was not However, in order for the search of
the passenger jeepney boarded by vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-
accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or -violative of an individual's right against
contents of the said vehicle. The target of unreasonable searches, the search must be
the search was the person who matched limited to the following: (a) where the
the description given by the person who officer merely draws aside the curtain of
called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
wearing a collared white shirt with green public fair grounds; (b) where the officer
stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the
sack. officer flashes a light therein without
opening the car's doors; (d) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical
As explained in Comprado, "to extend to or body search; (e) where the inspection
such breadth the scope of searches on of the vehicles is limited to a visual search
moving vehicles would open the or visual inspection; and (f) where the
floodgates to unbridled warrantless routine check is conducted in a fixed
searches which can be conducted by the area.22
mere expedient of waiting for the target
person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up
a checkpoint along the route of that Routine inspections do not give the
vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle authorities carte blanche discretion to
when it arrives at the checkpoint in order conduct intrusive warrantless searches in
to search the target person."20 the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, as opposed to a mere
Therefore, the search conducted in the routine inspection, "such a warrantless
instant case cannot be characterized as a search has been held to be valid only as
search of a moving vehicle. long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will
Probable Cause as an Indispensable find the instrumentality or evidence
Requirement for an Extensive and pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving searched."23
Vehicle

Simply stated, a more extensive and


In any case, even if the search conducted intrusive search that goes beyond a mere
can be characterized as a search of a visual search of the vehicle necessitates
moving vehicle, the operation undertaken probable cause on the part of the
by the authorities in the instant case apprehending officers.
cannot be deemed a valid warrantless
search of a moving vehicle.
It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 (
Valmonte) where the Court first held that
In People v. Manago,21 the Court, vehicles can be stopped at a checkpoint
through Senior Associate Justice Estela and extensively searched only when there
M. Perlas-Bernabe, explained that a is "probable cause which justifies a
variant of searching moving vehicles reasonable belief of the men at the
without a warrant may entail the setting checkpoints that either the motorist is a
up of military or police checkpoints. The law-offender or the contents of the
setting up of such checkpoints is not vehicle are or have been instruments of
illegal per se for as long as its necessity is some offense."25 This doctrine was
justified by the exigencies of public order directly adopted from United States
and conducted in a way least intrusive to jurisprudence, specifically from the
motorists. pronouncement of the Supreme Court of
the United States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v.
Taylor.26
intrusive search without a search
warrant? The answer is a resounding no.
As subsequently explained by the Court
in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,27
probable cause means that there is the
The Court has already held with
existence of such facts and circumstances
unequivocal clarity that in situations
which could lead a reasonably discreet
involving warrantless searches and
and prudent man to believe that an
seizures, "law enforcers cannot act solely
offense has been committed and that the
on the basis of confidential or tipped
items, articles or objects sought in
information. A tip is still hearsay no
connection with said offense or subject to
matter how reliable it may be. It is not
seizure and destruction by law is in the
sufficient to constitute probable cause in
place to be searched:
the absence of any other circumstance
that will arouse suspicion."30
x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion
supp01ied by circumstances sufficiently
A. United States Jurisprudence on
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped
man's belief that the person accused is
Information
guilty of the offense with which he is
charged; or the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to Considering that the doctrine that an
believe that an offense has been extensive warrantless search of a moving
committed and that the items, articles or vehicle necessitates probable cause was
objects sought in connection with said adopted by the Court from United States
offense or subject to seizure and jurisprudence, examining United States
destruction by law is in the place to be jurisprudence can aid in a fuller
searched. The required probable cause understanding on the existence of
that will justify a warrantless search and probable cause vis-a-vis tipped
seizure is not determined by a fixed information received from confidential
formula but is resolved according to the informants.
facts of each case.28

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31


Sheer Unverified Information from an the SCOTUS delved into the
Anonymous Informant does not engender constitutional requirements for obtaining
Probable Cause on the part of the a state search warrant. In the said case,
Authorities that warrants an Extensive two Houston police officers applied to a
and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle local Justice of the Peace for a warrant to
search for narcotics in the petitioner's
home based on "reliable information"
received from a supposed credible person
As readily admitted by the CA, the
that the "heroin, marijuana, barbiturates
singular circumstance that engendered
and other narcotics and narcotic
probable cause on the part of the police
paraphernalia are being kept at the above
officers was the information they
described premises for the purpose of sale
received through the RPSB Hotline (via
and use contrary to the provisions of the
text message) from an anonymous
law."32
person. Because of this information, the
CA held that there was probable cause on
the part of the police to conduct an
intrusive search.29 In invalidating the search warrant, the
SCOTUS held that a two- pronged test
must be satisfied in order to determine
whether an informant's tip is sufficient in
Does the mere reception of a text message
engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the
from an anonymous person suffice to
informant's "basis of knowledge" must be
create probable cause that enables the
revealed and (2) sufficient facts to
authorities to conduct an extensive and
establish either the informant's "veracity" believe that contraband would be found in
or the "reliability" of the informant's the Gateses' home and car."36
report must be provided:

B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence


Although an affidavit may be based on on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to
hearsay information, and need not reflect Engender Probable Cause
the direct personal observations of the
affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S.
257, the magistrate must be informed of As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled
some of the underlying circumstances that an extensive warrantless search and
from which the informant concluded that seizure conducted on the sole basis of a
the narcotics were where he claimed they confidential tip is tainted with illegality.
were, and some of the underlying In People v. Aminnudin,37 analogous to
circumstances from which the officer the instant case, the authorities acted
concluded that the informant, whose upon an information that the accused
identity need not be disclosed, see would be arriving from Iloilo on board a
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. vessel, the M/V Wilcon 9. The authorities
528, was "credible" or his information waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted
"reliable."33 the accused, and inspected the latter's bag
wherein bundles of marijuana leaves
were found. The Court declared that the
Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois search and seizure was illegal, holding
v. Gates,34 the police received an that, at the time of his apprehension,
anonymous letter alleging that the Aminnudin was not "committing a crime
respondents were engaged in selling nor was it shown that he was about to do
drugs and that the car of the respondents so or that he had just done so. x x x To all
would be loaded with drugs. Agents of appearances, he was like any of the other
the Drug Enforcement Agency searched passengers innocently disembarking from
the respondents' car, which contained the vessel. It was only when the informer
marijuana and other contraband items. pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became
suspect and so subject to
In finding that there was probable cause, apprehension."38
the SCOTUS adopted the totality of
circumstances test and held that tipped
information may engender probable Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the
cause under "a balanced assessment of Court, through former Chief Justice
the relative weights of all the various Artemio V. Panganiban, held that the
indicia of reliability (and unreliability) warrantless search and subsequent arrest
attending an informant's tip"35 In the said of the accused were deemed illegal
case, the SCOTUS found that the details because "the prosecution failed to
of the informant's tip were corroborated establish that there was sufficient and
by independent police work. reasonable ground for the NBI agents to
believe that appellants had committed a
crime at the point when the search and
The SCOTUS emphasized however that arrest of Pua and Lee were made."40 In
"standing alone, the anonymous letter reaching this conclusion, the Court found
sent to the Bloomingdale Police that the authorities merely relied on "the
Department would not provide the basis alleged tip that the NBI agents
for a magistrate's determination that there purportedly received that morning."41
was probable cause to believe contraband The Court characterized the tip received
would be found in the Gateses' car and by the authorities from an anonymous
home. x x x Something more was informant as "hearsay information"42
required, then, before a magistrate could that cannot engender probable cause.
conclude that there was probable cause to
In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities constitutional guarantee against
acted solely on an informant's tip and unreasonable search and seizure."48
stopped the tricycle occupied by the
accused and asked the latter to alight. The
authorities then rummaged through the Of more recent vintage is People v.
two strapped plastic baby chairs that were Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise
loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities involved a search conducted through a
then found a package of marijuana checkpoint put up after an "unidentified
inserted between the two chairs. The civilian informer" shared information to
Court, again through former Chief Justice the authorities that a person would be
Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "raw transporting marijuana.
intelligence"44 was not enough to justify
the warrantless search and seizure. "The
prosecution's evidence did not show any In finding that there was no probable
suspicious behavior when the appellant cause on the part of the police that
disembarked from the ship or while he justified a warrantless search, the Court,
rode the motorela. No act or fact through Associate Justice Marvic Mario
demonstrating a felonious enterprise Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that
could be ascribed to appellant under such in cases finding sufficient probable cause
bare circumstances."45 for the conduct of warrantless searches,
"the police officers using their senses
observed facts that led to the suspicion.
Likewise analogous to the instant case is Seeing a man with reddish eyes and
People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where an walking in a swaying manner, based on
informant had told the police that a their experience, is indicative of a person
certain "Aling Rosa" would be who uses dangerous and illicit drugs."50
transporting illegal drugs from Baguio However, the Court reasoned that the
City by bus. Hence, the police officers case of the accused was different because
situated themselves at the bus terminal. "he was simply a passenger carrying a
Eventually, the informant pointed at a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There
woman crossing the street and identified was nothing suspicious, moreover,
her as "Aling Rosa." Subsequently, the criminal, about riding a jeepney or
authorities apprehended the woman and carrying a bag. The assessment of
inspected her bag which contained suspicion was not made by the police
marijuana leaves. officer but by the jeepney driver. It was
the driver who signaled to the police that
Cogaed was 'suspicious.'"51
In finding that there was an unlawful
warrantless search, the Court in Aruta
held that "it was only when the informant In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in
pointed to accused-appellant and engendering probable cause that justifies
identified her to the agents as the carrier a valid warrantless search, "[i]t is the
of the marijuana that she was singled out police officer who should observe facts
as the suspect. The NARCOM agents that would lead to a reasonable degree of
would not have apprehended accused- suspicion of a person. The police officer
appellant were it not for the furtive finger should not adopt the suspicion initiated
of the informant because, as clearly by another person. This is necessary to
illustrated by the evidence on record, justify that the person suspected be
there was no reason whatsoever for them stopped and reasonably searched.
to suspect that accused-appellant was Anything less than this would be an
committing a crime, except for the infringement upon one's basic right to
pointing finger of the informant."47 security of one's person and effects."52
Hence, the Court held that the search The Court explained that "the police
conducted on the accused therein based officer, with his or her personal
solely on the pointing finger of the knowledge, must observe the (acts
informant was "a clear violation of the leading to the suspicion of an illicit act,"
and not merely rely on the information confidential or tipped information. A tip
passed on to him or her.53 is still hearsay no matter how reliable it
may be. It is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause in the absence of any
Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. other circumstance that will arouse
Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion in suspicion."59
Esquillo v. People,54 the Court in Cogaed
stressed that reliance on only one
suspicious circumstance or none at all A year after Veridiano, the Court decided
will not result in a reasonable search.55 the case of Comprado. As in the instant
The Court emphasized that the matching case, the authorities alleged that they
of information transmitted by an possessed reasonable cause to conduct a
informant "still remained only as one warrantless search solely on the basis of
circumstance. This should not have been information relayed by an informant.
enough reason to search Cogaed and his
belongings without a valid search
warrant."56 The Court held in Comprado that the sole
information relayed by an informant was
not sufficient to incite a genuine reason to
Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 conduct an intrusive search on the
(Veridiano), a concerned citizen accused. The Court explained that "no
informed the police that the accused was overt physical act could be properly
on the way to San Pablo City to obtain attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse
illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the suspicion in the minds of the arresting
authorities set up a checkpoint. The officers that he had just committed, was
police officers at the checkpoint committing, or was about to commit a
personally knew the appearance of the crime."60
accused. Eventually, the police chanced
upon the accused inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. The Court emphasized that there should
The jeepney was flagged down and the be the "presence of more than one
police asked the passengers to disembark. seemingly innocent activity from which,
The police officers instructed the taken together, warranted a reasonable
passengers to raise their t-shirts to check inference of criminal activity."61 In the
for possible concealed weapons and to said case, as in the instant case, the
remove the contents of their pockets. The accused was just a passenger carrying his
police officers recovered from the bag. "There is nothing suspicious much
accused a tea bag containing what less criminal in said act. Moreover, such
appeared to be marijuana. circumstance, by itself, could not have led
the arresting officers to believe that
accused-appellant was in possession of
In finding the warrantless search invalid, marijuana."62
the Court, again through Associate
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,
held that the accused was a "mere Recently, the Court unequivocally
passenger in a jeepney who did not declared in People v. Yanson63 (Yanson)
exhibit any act that would give police that a solitary tip hardly suffices as
officers reasonable suspicion to believe probable cause that warrants the conduct
that he had drugs in his possession. x x x of a ·warrantless intrusive search and
There was no evidence to show that the seizure.
police had basis or personal knowledge
that would reasonably allow them to infer
anything suspicious."58 In Yanson, which involves an analogous
factual milieu as in the instant case, "the
Municipal Police Station of M'lang,
The Court correctly explained that "law North Cotabato received a radio message
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with
plate number 619 and carrying three (3) sustained probable cause."68 However,
people - that was transporting marijuana the case of Yanson was markedly
from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed different from these other cases. Just as in
the alert team to set up a checkpoint on the instant case, the police officers
the riverside police outpost along the road proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and
from Matalam to M'lang."64 arrest on the basis of a solitary tip:

Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the This case is markedly different. The
tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and police officers here proceeded to effect a
was stopped by the team of police officers search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of
on standby. The team leader asked the a solitary tip: the radio message that a
driver about inspecting the vehicle. The certain pickup carrying three (3) people
driver alighted and, at an officer's was transporting marijuana from Pikit.
prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly
(2) sacks of marijuana were discovered matching this description) reached the
beside the engine."65 checkpoint, the arresting officers went
ahead to initiate a search asking the driver
about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon
In the erudite ponencia of Associate this insistence did the driver alight. It was
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, also only upon a police officer's further
the Court held that, in determining prodding did he open the hood.
whether there is probable cause that
warrants an extensive or intrusive
warrantless searches of a moving vehicle, The records do not show, whether on the
"bare suspicion is never enough. While basis of indubitably established facts or
probable cause does not demand moral the prosecution's mere allegations, that
certainty, or evidence sufficient to justify the three (3) people on board the pickup
conviction, it requires the existence of 'a were acting suspiciously, or that there
reasonable ground of suspicion supported were other odd circumstances that could
by circumstances sufficiently strong in have prompted the police officers to
themselves to warrant a cautious man to conduct an extensive search. Evidently,
believe that the person accused is guilty the police officers relied solely on the
of the offense with which he is radio message they received when they
charged.'"66 proceeded to inspect the

The Court explained that in prior cases vehicle.69


wherein the Court validated warrantless
searches and seizures on the basis of
tipped information, "the seizures and In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped
arrests were not merely and exclusively information, on its own, furnished by
based on the initial tips. Rather, they were informants cannot produce probable
prompted by other attendant cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive
circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion reliance on information tipped by
they had from being tipped was informants goes against the very nature of
progressively heightened by other probable cause. A single hint hardly
factors, such as the accused's failure to amounts to "the existence of such facts
produce identifying documents, papers and circumstances which would lead a
pertinent to the items they were carrying, reasonably discreet and prudent man to
or their display of suspicious behavior believe that an offense has been
upon being approached."67 In such cases, committed and that the objects sought in
the finding of probable cause was connection with the offense are in the
premised "on more than just the initial place to be searched."70
information relayed by assets. It was the
confluence of initial tips and a myriad of
other occurrences that ultimately
As correctly explained by the Court in from the van, impelling him and PO1
Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct
be to sanction frivolity, opening the on her part, assuming it did occur, give
floodgates to unfounded searches, sufficient cause to search and to arrest?
seizures, and arrests that may be initiated
by sly informants."71
For sure, the transfer made by the
accused-appellant of the block- shaped
And very recently, on September 4, 2019, bundle from one bag to another should
the Court, through former Chief Justice not be cited to justify the search if the
Lucas P. Bersamin, promulgated its search had earlier commenced at the
Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 moment PO1 Rosales required her to
(Gardon-Mentoy). In the said case, police produce her baggage. Neither should the
officers had set up a checkpoint on the officers rely on the still-unverified tip
National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, from the unidentified informant, without
Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an more, as basis to initiate the search of the
unidentified informant that the accused- personal effects. The officers were
appellant would be transporting themselves well aware that the tip, being
dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. actually double hearsay as to them, called
Eventually, the authorities flagged down for independent verification as its
the approaching shuttle van matching the substance and reliability, and removed
description obtained from the informant the foundation for them to rely on it even
and conducted a warrantless search of the under the circumstances then obtaining.
vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block- In short, the tip, in the absence of other
shaped bundle containing marijuana. circumstances that would confirm their
suspicion coming to the knowledge of the
searching or arresting officer, was not yet
In holding that the warrantless search and actionable for purposes of effecting an
seizure were without probable cause, the arrest or conducting a search.73
Court held that a tip, in the absence of
other circumstances that would confirm
their suspicion coming from the personal The Court is not unaware that in the
knowledge of the searching officers, was recent case of Saluday v. People74
not yet actionable for purposes of (Saluday), a bus inspection conducted by
conducting a search: Task Force Davao at a military
checkpoint was considered valid.
However, in the said case, the authorities
Without objective facts being presented merely conducted a "visual and
here by which we can test the basis for the minimally intrusive inspection"75 of the
officers' suspicion about the block- accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag
shaped bundle contained marijuana, we that noticeably appeared to have
should not give unquestioned acceptance contained firearms. This is markedly
and belief to such testimony. The mere dissimilar to the instant case wherein the
subjective conclusions of the officers search conducted entailed the probing of
concerning the existence of probable the contents of the blue sack allegedly
cause is never binding on the court whose possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.
duty remains to "independently scrutinize
the objective facts to determine the
existence of probable cause," for, indeed, Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities
"the courts have never hesitated to never received nor relied on sheer
overrule an officer's determination of information relayed by an informant,
probable cause when none exists." unlike in the instant case. In Saluday, the
authorities had relied on their own senses
in determining probable cause, i.e.,
But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it having personally lifted the bag revealing
was about then when the accused- that a firearm was inside, as well as
appellant panicked and tried to get down
having seen the very suspicious looks accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of
being given by the accused therein. the incident.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence
the following conditions in allowing a
reasonable search of a bus while in
transit: (1) the manner of the search must At this juncture, the Court clarifies that
be least intrusive; (2) the search must not there is indeed a line of jurisprudence
be discriminatory; (3) as to the purpose of holding that information received by the
the search, it must be confined to ensuring police provides a valid basis for
public safety; and (4) the courts must be conducting a warrantless search,77
convinced that precautionary measures tracing its origins to the 1990 cases of
were in place to ensure that no evidence People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and
was planted against the accused.76 People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.).
Several of the cases following this line of
jurisprudence also heavily rely on the
It must be stressed that none of these 1992 case of People v. Bagista80
conditions exists in the instant case. (Bagista).

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the It is high time for a re-examination of this
search conducted was merely visual and divergent line of jurisprudence.
minimally intrusive, the search
undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla
was extensive, reaching inside the In Tangliben, acting on information
contents of the blue sack that he allegedly supplied by informers that dangerous
possessed. drugs would be transported through a bus,
the authorities conducted a surveillance
operation at the Victory Liner Terminal
Second, the search was directed compound in San Fernando, Pampanga.
exclusively towards accused- appellant At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed
Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike in a person carrying a red travelling bag who
Saluday where the bags of the other bus was acting suspiciously. They confronted
passengers were also inspected, the him and requested him to open his bag.
search conducted in the instant case The police found marijuana leaves
focused exclusively on accused-appellant wrapped in a plastic wrapper inside the
Sapla. bag.

Third, there is no allegation that the It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the
search was conducted with the intent of authorities' decision to conduct the
ensuring public safety. At the most, the warrantless search did not rest solely on
search was conducted to apprehend a the tipped information supplied by the
person who, as relayed by an anonymous informants. The authorities, using their
informant, was transporting illegal drugs. own personal observation, saw that the
accused was acting suspiciously.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that


sufficient precautionary measures were Similar to Tangliben, in the great
undertaken by the police to ensure that no majority of cases upholding the validity
evidence was planted against accused- of a warrantless search and seizure on the
appellant Sapla, considering that the basis of a confidential tip, the police did
inventory, photographing, and marking of not rely exclusively on information
the evidence were not immediately sourced from the informant. There were
conducted after the apprehension of overt acts and other circumstances
personally observed by the police that
engendered great suspicion. Hence, the In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities
holding that an inclusive warrantless did not solely rely on the police
search can be conducted on the solitary informer's report that two men and a
basis of tipped information is far from woman on board an owner type jeep with
being an established and inflexible a specific plate number would deliver
doctrine. shabu, a prohibited drug, at a Petron
Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan.
The authorities conducted a surveillance
To cite but a few examples, in the early operation and personally saw the accused
case of People v. Malmstdedt,81 the handing out a white envelope to her co-
authorities set up a checkpoint in accused, a person included in the police's
response to some reports that a Caucasian drug watch list.
man was coming from Sagada with
dangerous drugs in his possession. At the
checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the
and inspected it. Upon reaching the authorities had probable cause in
accused, the police personally observed conducting an intrusive warrantless
that there was a bulge on the accused's search, the Court explained that probable
waist. This prompted the officer to ask for cause was not engendered solely by the
the accused's identification papers, which receipt of confidential information.
the accused failed to provide. The Probable cause was produced because a
accused was then asked to reveal what prior test-buy was conducted by the
was bulging on his waist, which turned authorities, which confirmed that the
out to be hashish, a derivative of accused was engaged in the
marijuana. In this case, the Court ruled transportation and selling of shabu.
that the probable cause justifying the
warrantless search was based on the
personal observations of the authorities In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and
and not solely on the tipped information: People,86 the person subjected to a
warrantless search and seizure was
personally observed by the police to have
It was only when one of the officers reddish eyes and to be walking in a
noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared
during the course of the inspection, that to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
accused was required to present his approached and asked what he was
passport. The failure of accused to holding in his hands, he tried to resist.
present his identification papers, when The Court held that the policemen had
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse sufficient reason to accost the accused-
the suspicion of the officer that accused appellant to determine if he was actually
was trying to hide his identity.82 "high" on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that
based on information, this area was a
In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did haven for drug addicts.87
not solely rely on confidential
information that the accused would
deliver an unspecified amount of shabu In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers
using a Gemini car bearing plate number noticed a man who appeared drunk. This
PFC 411. Upon conducting a visual man was also 'wearing a camouflage
search of the motor vehicle that was uniform or a jungle suit.' Upon seeing the
flagged down by the authorities, the police, the man fled. His flight added to
police personally saw a gun tucked on the the suspicion. After stopping him the
accused's waist. Moreover, the accused police officers found an unlicensed
was not able to produce any pertinent 'homemade firearm' in his possession."89
document related to the firearm. This was
what prompted the police to order the
accused to alight from the vehicle. In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the
authorities did not rely on an anonymous,
unverified tip. Deep penetration agents The earliest case decided by the Court
were recruited to infiltrate the crime which upheld the validity of an extensive
syndicate. An undercover agent actually warrantless search based exclusively on a
met and conferred with the accused, solitary tip is the case of Maspil, Jr.,
personally confirming the criminal wherein the authorities set up a
activities being planned by the accused. checkpoint, flagged down the jeep driven
In fact, the agent regularly submitted by the accused, and examined the
reports of his undercover activities on the contents thereof on the sole basis of
criminal syndicate. information provided by confidential
informers.

The jurisprudence cited by the CA in


holding that the anonymous text message In justifying the validity of the
sent to the RPSB Hotline sufficed to warrantless search, the Court in Maspil,
engender probable cause on the part of Jr. depended heavily on the early case of
the authorities, i.e., People v. Tampis91 Valmonte, which delved into the
(Tampis), stated that "tipped information constitutionality of checkpoints set up in
is - sufficient to provide probable cause to Valenzuela City.
effect a warrantless search and
seizure."92
It bears stressing that the Court in
Valmonte never delved into the validity
However, in Tampis, as in the of warrantless searches and seizures on
aforementioned jurisprudence, the police the pure basis of confidential information.
did not merely rely on information Valmonte did not hold that in
relayed by an informant. Prior to the checkpoints, intrusive searches can be
warrantless search conducted, the police conducted on the sole basis of tipped
actually "conducted a surveillance on the information. Valmonte merely stated that
intended place and saw both appellants checkpoints are not illegal per se.95 In
packing the suspected marijuana leaves fact, in Valmonte, the Court stressed that
into a brown bag with the markings 'Tak "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither
Tak Tak Ajinomoto' inscribed on its searched nor its occupants subjected to a
side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were body search, and the inspection of the
able to personally witness the accused vehicle is limited to a visual search, said
packing illegal drugs into the brown bag routine checks cannot be regarded as
prior to the warrantless search and violative of an individual's right against
seizure. unreasonable search."96

Moreover, it is observed that when the Hence, the jurisprudential support of the
Court in Tampis held that "tipped Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best,
information is sufficient to provide frail.
probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the
case of Aruta as its basis. However, the With respect to Bagista, the Court held
Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped therein that the authorities had probable
information in and of itself is sufficient to cause to search the accused's belongings
create probable cause. In fact, in Aruta, as without a search warrant based solely on
already previously explained, despite the information received from a confidential
fact that the apprehending officers informant.
already had prior knowledge from their
informant regarding Aruta's alleged
activities, the warrantless search In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the
conducted on Aruta was deemed SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97
unlawful for lack of probable cause. (Carroll) in holding that "[w]ith regard to
the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it violations of the Prohibition Act. This
possible for the vehicle to be searched to seems to have been their regular tour of
move out of the locality or jurisdiction in duty. On the 6th of October, Carroll and
which the warrant must be sought."98 Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids
in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed
Cronenwett and Scully some distance out
Does Carroll support the notion that an from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to
unverified tipped information engenders Scully, who was taking lunch, that the
probable cause? In Carroll, which upheld Carroll boys had passed them going
the validity of a warrantless search of a toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to
vehicle used to transport contraband catch up with them to see where they
liquor in Michigan, the SCOTUS found were going. The officers followed as far
that the warrantless search was justified as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but
in light of the following circumstances: there lost trace of them. On the 15th of
December, some two months later, Scully
and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of
The search and seizure were made by duty, with Peterson, the State officer,
Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia,
prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and
state officer, in December, 1921, as the Carroll met and passed them in the same
car was going westward on the highway automobile, coming from the direction of
between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government
point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. agents turned their car and followed the
The facts leading to the search and defendants to a point some sixteen miles
seizure were as follows: on September east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped
29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an them and searched the car.
apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men
came to that apartment, a man named
Kruska and the two defendants, Carroll xxxx
and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to
them as one Stafford, working in the
Michigan Chair Company in Grand We know in this way that Grand Rapids
Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that
whiskey. The price was fixed at $13 a Detroit and its neighborhood along the
case. The three men said they had to go to Detroit River, which is the International
the east end of Grand Rapids to get the Boundary, is one of the most active
liquor and that they would be back in half centers for introducing illegally into this
or three-quarters of an hour. They went country spirituous liquors for distribution
away, and in a short time Kruska came into the interior. It is obvious from the
back and said they could not get it that evidence that the prohibition agents were
night, that the man who had it was not in, engaged in a regular patrol along the
but that they would deliver it the next day. important highways from Detroit to
They had come to the apartment in an Grand Rapids to stop and seize liquor
automobile known as an Oldsmobile carried in automobiles. They knew or had
Roadster, the number of which convincing evidence to make them
Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did believe that the Carroll boys, as they
Scully. The proposed vendors did not called them, were so-called "bootleggers"
return the next day, and the evidence in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were
disclosed no explanation of their failure engaged in plying the unlawful trade of
to do so. One may surmise that it was selling such liquor in that city. The
suspicion of the real character of the officers had soon after noted their going
proposed purchaser, whom Carroll from Grand Rapids half way to Detroit,
subsequently called by his first name and attempted to follow them to that city
when arrested in December following. to see where they went, but they escaped
Cronenwett and his subordinates were observation. Two months later, these
engaged in patrolling the road leading officers suddenly met the same men on
from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for their way westward, presumably from
Detroit. The partners in the original accused." In explaining his dissent,
combination to sell liquor in Grand Justice Padilla correctly explained that:
Rapids were together in the same
automobile they had been in the night
when they tried to furnish the whisky to In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents
the officers which was thus identified as searched the bag of the accused on the
part of the firm equipment. They were basis alone of an information they
coming from the direction of the great received that a woman, 23 years of age
source of supply for their stock to Grand with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3"
Rapids, where they plied their trade. That in height would be transporting
the officers, when they saw the marijuana. The extensive search was
defendants, believed that they were indiscriminately made on all the
carrying liquor we can have no doubt, and baggages of all passengers of the bus
we think it is equally clear that they had where the accused was riding, whether
reasonable cause for thinking so. male or female, and whether or not their
Emphasis is put by defendant's counsel on physical appearance answered the
the statement made by one of the officers description of the suspect as described in
that they were not looking for defendants the alleged information. If there really
at the particular time when they appeared. was such an information, as claimed by
We do not perceive that it has any weight. the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing
As soon as they did appear, the officers thought why they had to search the
were entitled to use their reasoning baggages of ALL passengers, not only the
faculties upon all the facts of which they bags of those who appeared to answer the
had previous knowledge in respect to the description of the woman suspected of
defendants.99 carrying marijuana.

Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause Moreover, the accused was not at all
justifying the warrantless search was not acting suspiciously when the NARCOM
founded on information relayed by agents searched her bag, where they
confidential informants; there were no allegedly found the marijuana.
informants involved in the case
whatsoever. Probable cause existed
because the state authorities themselves From the circumstances of the case at bar,
had personally interacted with the it would seem that the NARCOM agents
accused, having engaged with them in an were only fishing for evidence when they
undercover transaction. searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused.
They had no probable cause to reasonably
Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the believe that the accused was the woman
jurisprudential support upon which carrying marijuana alluded to in the
Bagista heavily relies is not strong. information they allegedly received.
Thus, the warrantless search made on the
personal effects of herein accused on the
It is also not lost on the Court that in basis of mere information, without more,
Bagista, the Court did not decide with is to my mind bereft of probable cause
unanimity. and therefore, null and void. It follows
that the marijuana seized in the course of
such warrantless search was inadmissible
In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, in evidence.100
Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
expressed the view that "the information
alone received by the NARCOM agents, It is said that dissenting opinions often
without other suspicious circumstances appeal to the intelligence of a future
surrounding the accused, did not give rise age.101 For Justice Padilla's Dissenting
to a probable cause justifying the Opinion, such age has come. This
warrantless search made on the bag of the holding, which is reflected in the recent
tide of jurisprudence, must now fully find x x x Everyone would be practically at the
the light of day as it is more in line with mercy of so-called informants,
the basic constitutional precept that the reminiscent of the Makapilis during the
Bill of Rights occupies a position of Japanese occupation. Any one whom they
primacy in the fundamental law, hovering point out to a police officer as a possible
above the articles on governmental violator of the law could then be subject
power. The Court's holding that tipped to search and possible arrest. This is
information, on its own, cannot engender placing limitless power upon informants
probable cause is guided by the principle who will no longer be required to affirm
that the right against unreasonable under oath their accusations, for they can
searches and seizures sits at the very top always delay their giving of tips in order
of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any to justify warrantless arrests and searches.
allowable transgression of such right is Even law enforcers can use this as an
subject to the most stringent of scrutiny. oppressive tool to conduct searches
without warrants, for they can always
claim that they received raw intelligence
Hence, considering the foregoing information only on the day or afternoon
discussion, the Court now holds that the before. This would clearly be a
cases adhering to the doctrine that circumvention of the legal requisites for
exclusive reliance on an unverified, validly effecting an arrest or conducting a
anonymous tip cannot engender probable search and seizure. Indeed, the majority's
cause that permits a warrantless search of ruling would open loopholes that would
a moving vehicle that goes beyond a allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
visual search - which include both long- seizures.103
standing and the most recent
jurisprudence - should be the prevailing
and controlling line of jurisprudence. It is not hard to imagine the horrid
scenarios if the Court were to allow
intrusive warrantless searches and
Adopting a contrary rule would set an seizures on the solitary basis of
extremely dangerous and perilous unverified, anonymous tips.
precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of
an unverified information passed along
by an alleged informant, the authorities Any person can easily hide in a shroud of
are given the unbridled license to anonymity and simply send false and
undertake extensive and highly intrusive fabricated information to the police.
searches, even in the absence of any overt Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly
circumstance that engenders a reasonable take advantage of this and easily harass
belief that an illegal activity is afoot. and intimidate another by simply giving
false information to the police, allowing
the latter to invasively search the vehicle
This fear was eloquently expressed by or premises of such person on the sole
former Chief Justice Artemio V. basis of a bogus tip.
Panganiban in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion in People v.
Montilla.102 In holding that law and On the side of the authorities,
jurisprudence require stricter grounds for unscrupulous law enforcement agents can
valid arrests and searches, former Chief easily justify the infiltration of a citizen's
Justice Panganiban explained that vehicle or residence, violating his or her
allowing warrantless searches and right to privacy, by merely claiming that
seizures based on tipped information raw intelligence was received, even if
alone places the sacred constitutional there really was no such information
right against unreasonable searches and received or if the information received
seizures in great jeopardy: was fabricated.
Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and
heavilv-protected right against
In fact, as borne from the cross-
unreasonable search and seizure will be at
examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the
the mercy a phony tips. The right against
authorities did not even personally
unreasonable searches and seizures will
receive and examine the anonymous text
be rendered hollow and meaningless. The
message. The contents of the text
Court cannot sanction such erosion of the
message were only relayed to them by a
Bill of Rights.
duty guard, whose identity the police
could not even recall:
D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the
Instant Case
Q x x x [W]ho received the information,
was it you or another person, Mr.
Witness?
Applying the foregoing discussion in the
instant case, to reiterate, the police merely
adopted the unverified and
A The duty guard, sir.
unsubstantiated suspicion of another
person, i.e., the person who sent the text
through the RPSB Hotline. Apart from
the information passed on to them, the Q And usually now, informations (sic) is
police simply had no reason to reasonably usually transmitted and text (sic) to the
believe that the passenger vehicle duty guard, Mr. Witness?
contained an item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and
destruction. A Yes, sir.

What further militates against the finding Q Can you produce the transcript of the
that there was sufficient probable cause text message (sic) can you write in a piece
on the part of the police to conduct an of paper, Mr. Witness?
intrusive search is the fact that the
information regarding the description of
the person alleged to be transporting A Our duty guard just informed us the
illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared information, sir.
white shirt with green stripes, red ball
cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed
merely through a text message from a Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr.
completely anonymous person. The Witness?
police did not even endeavor to inquire
how this stranger gathered the
information. The authorities did not even A Yes, sir.
ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete
stranger was credible. After receiving this Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?
anonymous text message, without giving
any second thought, the police accepted
the unverified information as gospel truth A I cannot remember, sir.104
and immediately proceeded in
establishing the checkpoint. To be sure,
information coming from a complete and Simply stated, the information received
anonymous stranger, without the police through text message was not only
officers undertaking even a semblance of hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.
verification, on their own, cannot
reasonably produce probable cause that
warrants the conduct of an intrusive Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan
search. himself, tipped information received by
the authorities through the duty guard was
unwritten and unrecorded, violating the
Therefore, with the glaring absence of
Standard Operating Procedure that any
probable cause that justifies an intrusive
information received by a police station
warrantless search, considering that the
that shall be duly considered by the
police officers failed to rely on their
authorities should be properly written in a
personal knowledge and depended solely
log book or police blotter:
on an unverified and anonymous tip, the
warrantless search conducted on accused-
appellant Sapla was an invalid and
Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating
unlawful search of a moving vehicle.
Procedure that any information received
by the Police Stations or a detachment
properly written in a log book or written
The Inapplicability of The Other
in a Police blotter, that is the Standard
Instances of Reasonable Warrantless
Operating Procedure, correct, Mr.
Searches and Seizures
Witness?

Neither are the other instances of


A Yes, sir.
reasonable warrantless searches and
seizures applicable in the instant case.
Q It was not written the information that
you received, correct, Mr. Witness?
Without need of elaborate explanation,
the search conducted on accused-
appellant Sapla was not incidental to a
A Not at that time, sir.105
lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful
arrest that precedes the search, which is
not the case here. Further, the prosecution
Further, it does not escape the attention of has not alleged and proven that there was
the Court that, as testified to by PSI a seizure of evidence in plain view, that it
Ngoslab on cross-examination, the was a customs search, and that there were
mobile phone which received the exigent and emergency circumstances
anonymous person's text message was not that warranted a warrantless search.
even an official government -issued
phone.106 From the records of the case,
it is unclear as to who owned or possessed
Neither can the search conducted on
the said phone used as the supposed
accused-appellant Sapla be considered a
official hotline of the RPSB Office.
valid stop and frisk search. The Court has
Furthermore, PSI Ngoslab testified that
explained that stop and frisk searches
he was not even sure whether the said
refer to 'the act of a police officer to stop
official hotline still existed.107
a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.'
Thus, the allowable scope of a 'stop and
Surely, probable cause justifying an frisk' search is limited to a "protective
intrusive warrantless search and seizure search of outer clothing for weapons."108
cannot possibly arise from double The search conducted by the authorities
hearsay evidence and from an irregularly- on accused-appellant Sapla went beyond
received tipped information. A a protective search of outer clothing for
reasonably discreet and prudent man will weapons or contraband.
surely not believe that an offense has
been committed and that the item sought
in connection with said offense are in the
Moreover, while it was clarified by the
place to be searched based solely on the
Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals109
say-so of an unknown duty guard that a
that probable cause is not required to
random, unverified text message was sent
conduct stop and frisk searches, "mere
to an unofficial mobile phone by a
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
complete stranger.
'stop and frisk.' A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's law and jurisprudence require more than
experience and surrounding conditions, the presence of these circumstances to
to warrant the belief that the person constitute a valid waiver of the
detained has weapons concealed about constitutional right against unreasonable
him."110 In Comprado, Cogaed, and searches and seizures. Courts indulge
Veridiano, the Court has held that mere every reasonable presumption against
reliance on information relayed by an waiver of fundamental constitutional
informant does not suffice to provide a rights; acquiescence in the loss of
genuine reason for the police to conduct a fundamental rights is not to be presumed.
warrantless search and seizure. In other The fact that a person failed to object to a
words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court search does not amount to permission
has held that information from an thereto."113
informant is mere suspicion that does not
validate a stop and frisk search.
Hence, even in cases where the accused
voluntarily handed her bag114 or the
Invalid Consented Warrantless Search chairs containing marijuana to the
arresting officer,115 the Court has held
there was no valid consent to the
Neither can the Court consider the search search.116
conducted on accused--appellant Sapla as
a valid consented search.
Again, in Veridiano, the Court
emphasized that the consent to a
The CA found that accused-appellant warrantless search and seizure must be
Sapla "consented to the search in this case unequivocal, specific, intelligently given
and that the illegal drugs - four (4) bricks and unattended by duress or coercion.117
of marijuana, discovered as a result of Mere passive conformity to the
consented search [are] admissible in warrantless search is only an implied
evidence."111 acquiescence which does not amount to
consent and that the presence of a
coercive environment negates the cl2im
The Court disagrees. that the petitioner therein consented to the
warrantless search.118

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can


only be an effective waiver of rights The very recent case of Yanson is
against unreasonable searches and likewise instructive. As in the instant
seizures if the following requisites are case, "Sison, [the therein accused] who
present: was then unarmed, was prodded by the
arresting officers to open the pickup's
hood. His beguiling conformity is easily
1. It must appear that the rights exist; accounted by how he was then
surrounded by police officers who had
specifically flagged him and his
2. The person involved had knowledge, companions down. He was under the
actual or constructive, of the existence of coercive force of armed law enforcers.
such right; and His consent, if at all, was clearly
vitiated."119

3. Said person had an actual intention to


relinquish the right.112 In the instant case, the totality of the
evidence presented convinces the Court
that accused-appellant Sapla's apparent
Considering that a warrantless search is in consent to the search conducted by the
derogation of a constitutional right, the police was not unequivocal, specific,
Court has held that "[t]he fundamental intelligently given, and unattended by
duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously
denied that accused-appellant Sapla was
Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the
subjected to a coercive environment,
confiscated marijuana bricks, there is no
considering that he was confronted by
more need for the Court to discuss the
several armed police officers in a
other issues surrounding the
checkpoint.
apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla,
particularly the gaps in the chain of
custody of the alleged seized marijuana
In fact, from the testimony of PO3
bricks, which likewise renders the same
Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily
inadmissible. The prosecution is left with
apparent that accused-appellant Sapla's
no evidence left to support the conviction
alleged voluntary opening of the sack was
of accused-appellant Sapla.
not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan
Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is
asked accused-appellant Sapla to open
acquitted of the crime charged.
the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it
was only "[a]fter a while [that] he
voluntarily opened [the sack]."120
Epilogue

At most, accused-appellant Sapla's


The Court fully recognizes the necessity
alleged act of opening the blue sack was
of adopting a resolute and aggressive
mere passive conformity to a warrantless
stance against the menace of illegal
search conducted in a coercive and
drugs. Our Constitution declares that the
intimidating environment. Hence, the
maintenance of peace and order and the
Court cannot consider the search
promotion of the general welfare are
conducted as a valid consented search.
essential for the enjoyment by all the
people of the blessings of democracy.122
The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred
and indelible right against unreasonable
searches and seizures for expediency's
The necessary and inescapable
sake, the very maintenance of peace and
consequence of the illegality of the search
order sought after is rendered wholly
and seizure conducted by the police in the
nugatory. By disregarding basic
instant case is the inadmissibility of the
constitutional rights as a means to curtail
drug specimens retrieved.
the proliferation of illegal drugs, instead
of protecting the general welfare,
oppositely, the general welfare is
According to Article III, Section 3(2) of viciously assaulted. In other words, when
the Constitution, any evidence obtained the Constitution i.s disregarded, the battle
in violation of the right against waged against illegal drugs becomes a
unreasonable searches and seizures shall self-defeating and self-destructive
be inadmissible for any purpose in any enterprise. A battle waged against illegal
proceeding. drugs that tramples on the rights of the
people is not a war on drugs; it is a war
against the people.123
Known as the exclusionary rule,
"evidence obtained and confiscated on
the occasion of such unreasonable The Bill of Rights should never be
searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted sacrificed on the altar of convenience.
and should be excluded for being the Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In rule of men dislodges the rule of law.124
other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
purpose in any proceeding."121
the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated April 24, 2018 of the Clerk of Court
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad
y Mallari is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt, and is ORDERED
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
detention unless he is being lawfully held
for another cause. Let an entry of final
judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished


the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The said Director is
ORDERED to REPORT to this Court
within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., Perlas-Bernabe, Gesmundo,


J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., I concur. See separate


opinion.

Carandang, J., I join the dissenting


opinion of J. Javier and Justice Lopez.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 16, 2020 a


Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on August 7,
2020 at 11:55 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

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