False Affidavit Of Cohabitation Renders A

Marriage Void For Lack Of Marriage

License…
by The Lawyer's Post • December 17, 2014 • 0 Comments
Jose filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Felisa before the RTC of Pasay City. According
to him, she was deceived by Felisa, who was his landlady, into signing a set of papers which he later found out to
be their marriage contract, when she invited him to Pasay City Hall to fetch a package. Furthermore, their
marriage was celebrated without a license, as the affidavit of cohabitation they executed was false, they not
having complied with the 5-year requirement of cohabitation prior to marriage since they were introduced to
each other five months before their marriage. In her answer, Felisa averred that her marriage to Jose is valid; they
maintained the relationship between man and wife without marriage since 1980 but deferred marriage on account
of they age; while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with Rufina, to which she
filed criminal and civil actions against him, resulting in his suspension by the Office of the Ombudsman for one
year.
The RTC dismissed Jose’s complaint, citing it as incredible and ruled his marriage to Felisa valid in the absence
of fraud or trickery, which even if present was already barred by prescription. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the CA initially dismissed Jose’s case but reversed itself on motion for reconsideration. According to the CA,
applying Ninal vs. Bayadog, it ruled that inasmuch as Jose and Felisa’s period of cohabitation did not extend for
at least five years, their marriage was solemnised without a marriage license, hence void from the very
beginning. It was at this juncture that the OSG filed a petition for review of the CA ruling, alleging that Jose did
not come to court with clean hands, hence he must not benefit, on account of equity, on his fraudulent conduct.
Further, the presumption of marriage must be upheld.
The Supreme Court:
“Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception
in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of
majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation
is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting
parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and
that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps
to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to
the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also
noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February
or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only
in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is
factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled
that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from
the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement
in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted
from the requirement of a marriage license.”
xxx
“Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one.
Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating
to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no
affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be
denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without
prejudice to their criminal liability.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the
legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took
Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right
to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation
period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years – and continuity that is unbroken.”
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. JOSE
A. DAYOT, Respondent. [G.R. No. 179474]FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT