VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA

A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to
a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as
IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and
EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds: 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondents alleged
violation of the so-called rotation rule with the purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the State Bar
of California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his
license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to
lead the country’s most noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined
from assuming office as IBP National President. Respondent, in his comment, stated that the
issues raised in Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by
the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata. On the
other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at
bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his
disqualification. During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote,
resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive
Vice President for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. On
the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and categorically denied
having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an
unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him
posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due
process. On their response, the IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove
Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant
member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain
the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the
basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board,
then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which

HELD:

1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is
not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered
his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of
suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there
is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de
Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove
that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. 2. Petitioners contend that
respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao.
His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP
Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The contention
has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or
choice. 3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held
therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is
nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. The
Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was
not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election
disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from
the practice of law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that
one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of
the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under
the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness
should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. 4. In the instant
administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been
resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainant’s contention that the
principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was
one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or
disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed
neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to
enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. Although the parties in
the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in
these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of
res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential
conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de
Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the
same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming
his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant
in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or
disbarment.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera
in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de
Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard
de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse
of discretion; 3. AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar
as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the
term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any
showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to
immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article
VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.