Aristotle's Doctrine That Man Is a Political Animal

Author(s): R. G. Mulgan
Source: Hermes, 102. Bd., H. 3 (1974), pp. 438-445
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE THAT MAN IS A POLITICAL ANIMAL

That man is by nature a political animal (7roX&T6Lx6v 4iX,ov) is one of the

best known of Aristotle's sayings. The frequency with which it is quoted
suggests that its meaning is thought to be transparently clear. In fact, though
justly famous, the doctrine is far from uncomplicated and contains certain
unresolved ambiguities.

II

In the first place it is often forgotten that Aristotle uses the phrase 7tOXtLx6V
Ccoov of animals other than man. In the first chapter of Book A of the Hi-
storia Animalium, probably the earliest of the zoological works, Aristotle
introduces a large number of distinctions between different types of animals
(4xc), in the course of which he says:

(1) Ecal 8? xal TOto& 8tLcopxl xocT& t0o PLou4 xacl T&oq 7rp&L. TM JeV
yap OUTC)V egtLV oyeXtOC Ta V a C ovaLXoX, Xocl 7reoc XxoLl 7TtVA XOCL 7TXO,
Ta 6' L=(pgOTOpL. XOa TG)V &yeXOWcOv XXL tCV [4OvX3C&Z-V Ta VL'V 7rO?L'TLX0X
TX e a7OpMatoxl eatLV -y Xo X p?v o6V otov eV 1-otq MtnVo& T0 T(OV
7repLTrpet)V y6voq XOCL yep' o4 xo I X6XvO (ya 6 vuyov a, ou'Kv &yexa?0ov),
xOCL TCV rXIrCTOV roc YzVI TCV ZO6UoV, OtoV OU5 xoc?05cn 3a[aq,
OUVVOL, 7XMLU e5, lOLX O a &V0pO)70 O?tpLL4t. nOtLXtX a rTLV
6)V ?V Tt xaL XOLVOV yl'V tO(5 7sXavr)V To Spyov, o0rp OU MMX=T 7tLeL T-
&yeXO?Zx. &atL K TOL0'7tOV &vOp(o0r0, XLTTOC, FCP', UpVT,i, yepchvo0.
xXc to6tov T&V 4iv vp r1y?6ova Mr- Td o& v'px c olov yepocvo0 0v xoa
TO T&@v ,UtrTiv yevoq ip' 'gy6Ov%C, VUpll7X? c xc wpu &% &oc avapXoc.
(HA 487 b 33-488 a I3).
Two separate distinctions are made in this passage: firstly between those
animals which are 'gregarious' (&ye?a Z) and those which are 'solitary'
(toviatzok); secondly between those which are 'political' (7r0?,tLx0 ) and those
which are 'scattered' (caropoc8&x0). In terms of the former, man is both gre-
garious and solitary (he 'dualizes' in PECK's apt translation of the technical
term potrpLL). This is consistent with Aristotle's conclusion in Nico-
machean Ethics K2 that the good life for man consists partly in philosophical
contemplation which can be carried on quite independently of other people,
and partly in the exercise of social virtues which can only be exercised in the
company of others. With respect to the second distinction, man is 7rokLVLX6v.
7roXLcLxM& ~Cpc are a sub-group of the gregarious animals (or, strictly speaking,

I Aristotle, Historia Animalium, with an English Translation by A. L. PECK, London

and Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955 (Loeb Classical Library).
2 177 b 26- 178 a 14.

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 R. G. MULGAN: Aristotle's Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal 439

in view of man's mixture of gregarious and solitary characteristics a sub-

group of those that are fully or partly gregarious)3. But man is not the only
7rOXLTtx6v ~Coov. Other animals, i. e. bees, wasps, ants and cranes, are also so
classified .
In this passage therefore, 7toXv-tX' cannot literally mean 'belonging to the
,noX'L because the polis is an exclusively human institution. It is therefore
tempting- and most translators of the Historia Animalium5 yield to this
temptation - to translate 7roXtL'CLx as 'social' which implies a common group
activity without specifying anything further about the nature of the activity
or the group. But this obscures the fact that Aristotle is taking a word with
a clear, literal sense, 'belonging to the :otXLq', and giving it a wider, meta-
phorical extension, meaning roughly speaking, 'belonging to a 7rorqL-like
association'. The extent to which the life of these animals resembles human life
in the 7t6?LXq is left vague. Aristotle defines 7ro),t?&x6v as having one common
ipyov i. e. work or function. He tells us that having rulers and subjects is not
essential (many political animals have no rulers) 6. That permanent territorial
unity is also not a necessary characteristic can be inferred from the example
of the crane, which in Greece was known largely as a migratory bird, flying in
almost military order from north to south and back again 7. The defining
characteristic is therefore simply cooperating or working together in some
common enterprise.

III

We must now consider the relation between this zoological sense of 7ro?Lrtxo'v
4,ov and the description of man as 7roXvLtx6v in the works solely concerned
with human beings, that is the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics and the

3 This is the implication of 488 a io, 67rep OR 7r&vTO 7r0LIL 0C& &Tyekoco. Most modern
editors (e. g. DITTMEYER, THOMPSON, PECK) follow SCHNEIDER in deleting xac tr6v ,ovocaxmv
in 488 a 2 on the grounds that Vovoc8x& can never be 7roXLTtxac. But this is unnecessary.
The example of man shows at least that an animal which is partly oLvICxo&6V can be 7rOkLz6v.
Moreover, if we take the distinction between 7roMt6xOC and 7rtopAmcLx to apply only to
&y-kcaZa, it is even more difficult to understand the force of a7ropa8Lx&. Meaning literally
'scattered', antopocax6q is elsewhere contrasted with &yE? ZoZ (Pol. 1256 a 23, cf. HA 6I7 b
2I). It is therefore more likely that Aristotle meant the 7oXtOLxT / a7sropIcamx distinction
to apply to all animals, whether &ye)cxtca or lzovMa8Lxx, though in fact no fully poOvICLx6v
animal was 7o?,LTLx6v. Thus the a7topx8&x would include all fully pLoVocaLxci who are much
more plausibly described as 'scattered', as well as some of the &ysXoci.
' Cf. Plato, Phaedo 82 b 5-8: "O'L TO&Tou; ?6XO &aTLV CEg TOL0UTOV 7ICM V OII?PLXVeLaOOCL
7rO)XTLX6'V XaLi 'fLepOV yiVOc, 7 7OU [LeXVTt7)V iT aCPCV e 1.P[pX(OV, xOl rt5 TOCU76V Yl 7t&tv
T6 O pC6O 7rLVOV ykvo4, xOc yEyv1aCOOL 6i OCU'T4v &vWpCq Fxc PL.OUlo.
5 E. g. PECK, THOMPSON, (J. A. SMITH and W. D. Ross [edd.], The Works of Aristotle
Translated into English, Vol. IV, Oxford, igio); cf. P. LouIs (ed.), Aristote Histoire des
Animaux, Paris, I964 (Bude).
6 488 a I I-3.

7 Cf. D' A. W. THOMPSON, A Glossary of Greek Birds, Oxford, I895, P. 42.

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 440 R. G. MULGAN

Politics 8. We will examine all the passages in the ethical and political writtings
in which man is described as 7toXtrLx6v, leaving the best known but also most
difficult passage (Politics I253 a I-29) till last.
In Book H of the Eudemian Ethics, in a discussion of the different sorts
of justice found in different types of friendship, Aristotle says:

(2) -rT6 re yocp 8'MoXL6V IaTL XOL XOLV6)VOLq, XoCd 0 pXOGq XOLVCO)Vo6, O tV Y9vovq,
6o ae ,Bou. o y&'p cvOpCorno oiu ,6voV 7nOXVLTXOV oc?Xoc OIXOVO,uLXoV Crov,

xOcl O COVUM (X6rp iX OCOTE GuvaUokeouxcL W ?TowL XC ZTXVtxaL O7,)XL xoc

OCpp?VL, WXX 'Lc OU tLOVOUXLxV OCXk& XOLV(,)VLXOV xOC zvOp qog C9ov 7rp6
OU) C(puaL auyyeVeLoC eTLv.

(EE I242 a 2I-26) 9.

Here he distinguishes between the r'6XL4 and the o5xLoc and describes
man's need for these two associations by the adjectives noXtl-x6v and
otxovo,uLx6v. Thus the description of man as a 7roXLrLxov ~Cpov in this passage
means that he is literally a '-)'Xtq-animal' in contrast to his membership of
other associations such as the household. A similar contrast is found in a
passage from the Nicomachean Ethics, again in the discussion of friendship.

(3) &vLpi ? xal yuvoc!XLx ?L ROX&L xcr& (uv ip &p)7or yap

G ep6?L UVaUOCGTLXOV Pa&)ov n 'TL COLTLXoV, 6ap rPOrptpov x
XCOTC&ePoV OLXLOX 7rox6oq, XOCOL xTeVOrO6LOC XOLIVOrpov roz4 qC04.

(EN II62 a I6-I9).

Here, again, we have the same implication that the political nature of man
refers to his need for the city state rather than for other types of association.
There are two further instances of the term no?LtLxoV (%iOov) in the Nico-
macheant Ethics, in both of which the meaning seems to be significantly dif-
ferent from the ones we have just discussed. In Book I, in reply to the question
whether the happy man will need friends, Aristotle says:

(4) ou'Mq y'p o0L-' aXv XOC' auYrov k 7okvr' 'Xev ocyoOoc 7COXL0LXov yap 6
OCVOpG)7COq XOCGUg( 11V 69b1UX7-9.

(EN II69 b I7-I9).

8 Though W. L. NEWMAN (The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford, I887-1902, note on

1253 a 8) gives a cross reference to the passage in HA, he does so without comment. Cf.
F. SUSEMIHL and R. D. HIcKs, The Politics of Aristotle, Books I-5, London, I894, note
on 1253 a 7.

9 18EZ OU ,OVOCU.XO6V iS SPENGLER'S plausible emendation of ct &uci&v, ocv x6v

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 Aristotle's Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal 44I

The same point has already been made in Book A:

(5) -ro ' -UrapxCs, x6yo0?v o'Ux ocu-,c t6vc,, rij ~Cvrt f3LOV OV6T-qv, &X?
xol yoveu5L XOCA r?XVoL xal ylUvcVxL XOCL 6X)4 ro-q (pLAo4q Xa(l 7LtrOC4ta,
e7reL84 CpE$aCL 7C0XVtLX6V O &vOpC07or.
(EN I097 b 8-I2).

In these passages, the contrast is not between membership of the =6X!?4

and membership of other associations, such as the oxLoc but rather between
social life in general and the life of a solitary individual. In its emphasis on the
general need for social life (au4nv), this is closer to the sense of 7roXL-rxOv 46ov
in HA. But the idea of the ro6XL4 is not as attenuated as it is in the zoological
definition. The actual community of the 7roXL4 is clearly implied in the second
of these two passages (5) with its reference to the need for fellow citizens
(7ro?X-ocL) and mention of self-sufficiency which Aristotle tells us elsewhere is
provided only by the 7r6XoL'1. Though there is no explicit reference to the
InL in the former passage (4), the close connection of 7ro?tvtx6v wih 7rcA in
the other passages from both EN and EE suggests that a similar connection
is also implied here.
We can say then that in the ethical treatises man is described as 7to?tVtxo'v
in two senses, one 'exclusive', the other 'inclusive', the difference depending
on whether the polis is contrasted with other social institutions or is regarded
as including all of them within its organisation. Both of these senses, however,
imply the actual human institution of the 7ro4?Lq in its literal sense and are
therefore quite distinct from the zoological use in HA which involves a meta-
phorical extension of the meaning of 7to6?tL to other 7r6Xc-like groups, found
among other animals. However, the use of the inclusive sense to describe
men's need to live and work together does provide a parallel with the zoo-
logical sense.
The phrase is also used in two passages in the Politics. In Book r, ch. 6,
while introducing his classification of constitutions and leading up to the
distinction between those which are 'normal' and follow the common interest
and those which are 'perverted' and follow the interests of the rulers, Aristotle
suggests two reasons why men join together in a 7ro6?. One is the pursuit of the
common advantage, the other is man's 'political' nature.

(6 ) etp410Cl Zaa'xxk 10Vgq 7rpG',ou Xo'youq, ?'V o'Lq 7ep'L olxovoLdf. aut)pL04
xocl G7r'O-L0C, xO' btL Cpu6aet bv 'ea'rrtV vOpCtoC ~46ov 7O?LXT&X'V. aLO
XCXO p) ae 6 ?VOL q 7Xp& M&XX~Xwv P07)0eL0C oVx SXoc'Tov 6peyovIat

(Pol. I278 b I7-2I).

10 Pol. I253 a I; 1280 b 3I-35; I326 b 2-24.

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 442 R. G. MULGAN

This is a clear reference back to Book A, which we will be discussing

shortly. We should simply note that here Aristotle puts the doctrine that man
is a political animal to the same use as in the last two passages from EN
(4 and 5). Man has a natural need and desire to live together with other men

(*V,v ) and he requires the rr6XL; for the full satisfaction of his need.
The final and most important passage occurs in Book A, chapter 2 of the

Politics. Aristotle's purpose, in this complex chapter, is to prove that the 7Zt?lq
is natural. He begins by tracing the origin of the nr6)XM back to certain innate
impulses in men, namely the need for sexual relations and for the relationship
of ruler and ruled, which between them give rise to the household (oLxLx).
In order to satisfy further needs a collection of households forms a village

(*4t) and then a collection of villages forms a n6XGL. Furthermore, the 16?
is natural, because it is the end of human development, a self-sufficient asso-
ciation providing the good life for men.

otov y&p exact6v earL -rCi YeV6a@o aOeqaN, taQV (pa ocv t v
pV6LV siVot &X&a'Tou, (R)6trp &vOpcsou trtcou oLxtoc,. ?&; Tz O?iz VrX0 xal

TO 'tSXO4 |3?X-T6TOV -T 8' a-l)rpxe!;o xal -Oor 7 oc xaOl -3vL6e_V.

(Pol. 1252 b 32-I253 a i).

He then summarises his conclusions so far by saying,

(7) ?X TOVJ)cV 0oV (pXvZp6v 6"tL Tiv (piaL T r6?xtq eTL , XOCL OTL 0 &VOPCorno

(I253 a I-2).

The term noX.L'Xo'v Ccov is here clearly used in the inclusive sense. The
Jr6XLq embraces all the lesser associations in a self-sufficient unit, and man is
naturally 7ZO?LtL%O6v because this unit is the one in which his nature finds its
perfect development.
A few lines later on, however, Aristotle shows that he has not altogether
forgotten the zoological sense of the phrase as defined in the HistoriaAnimalium.
After quoting Homer (and slightly misinterpreting him"1) on the evils of the
man who is OtCcpp7'jp, &0kL4G-ao, dcvearLo4 and saying that he is &vui cv
oaD=Pp Cv 7?ToZq, he concludes,

(8) &6'L ae TCO?,XLLXOV o &vOp(orno 4ov 7r&aOY [LOAT11% xaL 7CoVrO OCyexcou
C4ou LOauOV, a4kov.
(I235 a 7-9).

The use of the term &yeXocZoq and mention of the bee which is one of the
7rO?\LCxO&C C@O given in HA suggest that this sentence is a clear reference to the

11 Cf. NEWMAN, op. cit., ad. loc.

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 Aristotle's Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal 443

zoological classification. It seems then that Aristotle is trying to accommodate

the use of the term 7roXL-xOx6v ~Ccov elsewhere in the ethical and political works,
where as we have seen, it means literally a rr6XL4-animal, to the wider, zoolo-
gical sense, as defined in the Historia Animalium.
In order to understand the way in which Aristotle intends these two
meanings to be related to one another, we must first ask what he means when

he says that man is 7roXLrLxOV ... 4pOV . . . [EXXov. The word [aEXXoV can
mean either 'more than' or 'rather than'. That is, Aristotle could either be
saying that man, rather than other animals, is 7roXLrLx6v, thus implying that,
for his present purposes at any rate, man is the only 7roXLLxOv 4x,ov; or he
could mean that man is more 7ro?LTLx6v than other animals, with the impli-
cation that other animals are noMroxk but that man is nroLx6v to a greater
degree. If we take the former interpretation, it allows us to say that Aristotle
by claiming that only man is 7ro?XLLx6v, is using 7roXLrLx6v in the sense of
'belonging to the 7r6XL4'. If, however, we take the latter, it follows that a
wider sense must be understood because animals other than man are being
referred to as wTo4Xvx&. It is tempting to adopt the former interpretation,
taking ,uaXXov as 'rather than', with the implication that man is the only
political animal12. This would be consistent with the use of the phrase a few
lines above meaning '7r6XLq-animal', a meaning which can apply only to man
and not to other animals, and also with all the other instances that we have
discussed in the ethical and political writings. This interpretation, however, is
an unlikely one for several reasons.
Firstly, if Aristotle were saying that man is a political animal rather than
any bee or other gregarious animal, he would be expressly disagreeing with the
zoological definition. It would be untypical of his usual method to go out of
his way flatly to contradict a statement from another work on another sub-
ject. Such cross references are usually made for the sake of consistency and
corroboration.
Secondly, we have seen that elsewhere Aristotle uses the doctrine that
man is a 7roL'LxOv 4X,ov in an inclusive sense to prove not only that man
must live specifically in the 7r6XLq but also that he must live with other people
and not on his own. Though this inclusive sense of 7O?LtLXOV still involves,
as we saw, the literal sense of wotXLq Aristotle's use of it in connection with
man's need for social life in general provides a parallel with the zoological
definition and suggests that this sense of the phrase may have been present
in Aristotle's mind when he applied it to human beings.

12 *Moreover, life in a 7r6XLq is also part of the 'normal nature' of man, distinguishing
him from beasts, none of which, however gregarious or industrious, they may be, can
reasonably be called 6ov noXLtLx6v 4, T. A. SINCLAIR, A History of Greek Political Thought,
London, I951, P. 2I4.

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 444 R. G. MULGAN

Thirdly, we should consider the argument which Aristotle proceeds to

give in support of the statement that man is 7ro?X&tx6v . .. 6ov . .. ,uEXov.

oiVOv y P, Cpall ( t&tU v C cp6G GV MteZ- ?YOV ' F6VOV &v0p&rno4

eZZl TCV 76V ' fLe'V OVV pV& TOU XU-o 05XXppoV xoc 3&o Zgar1 aT%SZOV,
&O, xcal T'oL &?XOLc 67c&pxt ~46c (ueZxpL yocp TOUTOU YU Cpl% OCUTCOV
?X7VU0e, TOU5 ?`?v (c'KaONLV XU7POU XOCL oeq xocL T-CToc afLOCULVELV
OC?)<OLc,), o e X6yOq E7r\ 'TY 3 5OUV ?-TL TO\ GU[(pePOV XOC\ To6 PocP3Zpov,
&COt? xoca TO CxaLOV XOaL TO &COLXoV TOUTO YOCP 7rpOq OC aa4X, acpoc roc
aVOp(L7Co&c 'tatoV, To po6vov &yOoi xo xoc0 XoXi X\x,, ou xac &xou xocL
tcov &aXXCv 0 r'aO' ctn0 v eCtv. f 8? rouTCO& V XOLVCIVLOC noCeZ otxLocv xoct 7rOX&v.

(I253 a 9-I8).

In addition to voice (qcov7 ) which allows the expression of pleasure and

pain and which is found in other animals 13 man has ?o6yoq which allows him to
indicate the advantageous and disadvantageous and the right and the wrong.
The fact that Aristotle gives these two faculties which enable communication
between animals of the same species and attributes one to man in common
with other animals and one to man only suggests that he meant that the
difference is one of degree. Other animals may be -xOMroXk but man is more so.
But this is perhaps not conclusive. One could argue that Aristotle is emphasizing
the unique faculty of Xoyoq and so means to deny that other animals are at all

It appears on balance, however, that Aristotle means that other animals

besides man are 7tohLtxoc but that man is more xo?L-tCXOV than they are. As
we have seen, this cannot make sense if 7roXrox6Ov is taken to mean 'belonging
to the no'?L4', because, according to this definition, only man, the 7to6XL-animal,
can be 7ro?umX6v. Are we then to suppose that Aristotle deliberately used the
phrase 7roXrLx0Qv 4 ov in two quite different senses in the space of five lines
without giving any indication of such a change? It hardly seems credible.
On the other hand, it is quite plausible that he may not have noticed, any
more than most of his subsequent commentators and translators, that he was
being inconsistent. Perhaps he realised that he had been using the term
noXLrtcxOv Coov of man in a different sense from that used of other animals
in the Historia Animalium and hoped to reconcile the two by saying that man
was more xo?Ct%6vOv, thus preserving the zoological similarity between man
and other 'political' animals and at the same time maintaining that man is
7ro?&TL'XOV in a special, unique sense. It is as if we were to describe as
'housebuilders' all animals who construct their own dwelling-places, as
birds build nests, and rabbits excavate burrows; and then we were to say
that man is more of a housebuilder because the dwelling-place he constructs is

13 Cf. De Gen. An. 786 b 21.

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 Aristotle's Doctrine that Man is a Political Animal 445

actually a house. Strictly speaking, this would be fallacious. It would be

quite legitimate to say that, in addition to being a 'housebuilder' in the wider
sense which we have just defined, man is also a 'housebuilder' in the literal
sense. In other words, man is a 'housebuilder' in more senses than one. But to
say simply that man is more of a 'housebuilder' than other animals implies,
falsely, that there is one sense of 'housebuilder' which applies to other animals
but in terms of which man is superior to them. Nonetheless, it is a fallacy
which is easily committed and one which Aristotle, in his desire to accom-
modate his political theory to his general biological principles, might well
have been tempted into.

IV

To conclude: Aristotle uses the phrase 7oXvrtXzv 4x,ov in three different

though related senses:
(i) to refer to man's need for the ror6XL exclusively of other social insti-
tutions.
(ii) to refer to man's need for the 7oStX4 inclusively of other social institutions.
(iii) to refer to the need, shared by man and some other animals, to share
a collective activity with other members of the same species.
The first two senses are related through the common notion of the -no6?q;
the latter two through the common idea of collective activity in contrast with
isolated activity. Aristotle's failure to distinguish these different senses is in
most cases not culpable as the meaning is quite clear from the context. In one
passage (Politics, I253 a I-29), however, an awareness of the different uses
of the phrase is essential for understanding Aristotle's purpose 14.

University of Otago R. G. MULGAN

Dunedin, New Zealand

14 An earlier version of this article was read at the New Zealand Universities Classics
Conference held in Wellington in May I97I. The author is grateful to those present for
several helpful comments and suggestions.

Hermes 102,3 29

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